Le sang en droit de la famille

Blood in family law

• Auteur / Autrice : Chloé Bill idoma
• Direction : Delphine Tharaud, Carine Laurent-boutot
• Type : Projet de thèse
• Discipline(s) : Droit mention Droit privé et sciences criminelles
• Date : Inscription en doctorat le 31/08/2024
• Etablissement(s) : Limoges
• Ecole(s) doctorale(s) : Gouvernance des Institutions et des Organisations
• Partenaire(s) de recherche : Laboratoire : Observatoire des Mutations Institutionnelles et Juridiques

Mots clés

Mots clés libres

Sang

Droit

Famille

Blood

Law

Family

Résumé

« Bon sang ne saurait mentir » , ce proverbe du XIVème siècle évoque la vérité physiologique offerte par le sang. Le sang est le liquide de vie faisant naître un lien de parenté. Le caractère irréfutable du lien qu'il produit, s'impose parfois comme un élément indispensable au rendu de la justice. Dans le même temps, le droit admet de faire du lien de sang une parfaite fiction. La place accordée au sang au cœur des préoccupations juridiques se caractérise par une radicale ambivalence. Il constitue un élément nécessaire d'identification et de transmission de la parenté. Cependant, il ne lui est pas accordé pour autant une préséance à toute épreuve. Finalement, en droit de la famille, l'existence d'un lien de sang est aussi importante que son absence. Bousculé et remis en question par les mutations familiales, sociétales et bioéthiques, repenser ce sujet devient aujourd'hui essentiel. Cette étude s'inscrit dans une optique prospective et vise à proposer à des problématiques nouvelles que le droit ne régit pas encore, des solutions adaptées. Mais elle tend aussi à apporter un angle de vue nouveau à des questions anciennes en pleine métamorphose. Pour comprendre l'importance de ce sujet, il conviendra d'analyser l'ambivalence des considérations liées au sang en droit de la famille et de mettre en lumière les difficultés que cette ambivalence fait naître. Tantôt centrale, tantôt occultée, la place du sang en droit de la famille revêt un aspect nébuleux. Le sang est au cœur des préoccupations régies par le Code civil. Son illustration la plus frappante réside dans les règles relatives à la filiation. Ces dispositions sont scindées en deux titres selon qu'il y ait ou non, un don de sang du parent . Cette structure n'est pas le fruit du hasard et démontre l'intérêt porté au lien biologique. Le sang en droit de la famille ne se limite pas à la filiation, il concerne plus largement la question de la parenté. La parenté instituée par le sang relève parfois de considérations pénales. Le lien de sang peut être la cause d'aggravation d'un crime lorsqu'il est commis sur un descendant ou un ascendant. Par exemple, depuis la loi du 21 avril 2021 , le viol incestueux est puni de vingt ans de réclusion criminelle. Le sang est également à l'origine de considérations territoriales liées au droit international privé. Le principe absolu en matière de nationalité, est celui du droit du sang . Le sang ne transmet donc pas seulement un patrimoine génétique, il transmet également un patrimoine culturel et national. C'est souvent par le sang qu'arrive la preuve. Un test sanguin peut apporter la preuve de la parenté. Ce test revêt une telle fiabilité, qu'un refus de s'y soumettre, peut être considéré comme un aveu de parenté. Cependant, le lien de sang ne garantit pas toujours les mêmes effets. Il a longtemps existé une discrimination institutionnalisée de l'enfant adultérin , comme si le lien de sang était altéré lorsqu'il était le résultat d'une relation hors mariage. L'origine de la parenté n'est pas toujours biologique, elle peut résulter de l'alliance, de la reconnaissance ou de l'adoption. Dans ces cas, le lien de sang est simulé. À titre d'illustration, c'est par le droit du sang que l'enfant adopté plénièrement acquiert la nationalité de ses parents adoptifs. Les nouveaux modes de famille offrent également une démonstration parfaite des nouveaux défis auxquels le droit est confronté. À titre d'illustration, les parents ayant recours à une convention de gestation pour autrui peuvent désormais voir établir une double filiation, tant pour le père biologique que pour la mère d'intention . En admettant cela, la Cour de cassation va au-delà des exigences de la Cour européenne des droits de l'Homme , en dépit de la fraude à la loi que produisent ces conventions. S'il n'est pas nouveau que les liens de sang puissent être feints, aujourd'hui plus qu'hier, la parenté s'éloigne de la vérité physiologique. Déjà en 2005, le professeur Jean Hauser évoquait un état civil français « à bout de souffle » . La loi bioéthique de 2021 venue remodeler en partie le droit traditionnellement applicable à la famille, entérine ce constat. Cette loi prévoit notamment la possibilité pour les couples de femmes ayant eu un enfant par assistance médicale à la procréation avec donneur de faire établir la filiation à l'égard de la mère n'ayant pas accouchée par une simple reconnaissance anticipée devant notaire. Malgré les évolutions, Le souhait de fonder une famille persiste, ce sont simplement les modalités de création de la famille qui évoluent. Contrairement à ce qui existent dans d'autres cultures juridiques, le rapport au sang en droit de la famille ne relève plus de l'évidence. Cette ambivalence amène d'ailleurs parfois à des conflits de lois, comme en matière de kafala, une institution de droit de la famille de certains pays de tradition musulmane interdisant l'établissement d'une filiation adoptive lorsqu'il n'existe aucun lien de sang . Si son rôle peut être altéré, il n'est pas supprimé pour autant. Une certaine confusion se dégagent de la relation qu'entretiennent sang et droit, soulevant des questionnements jusqu'ici irrésolus. L'ambiguïté du droit de la famille face au sang fait naître deux questions : Quelle place doit être accordée au sang en droit de la famille ? Est-il toujours pertinent de se référer aux liens du sang ? Quelles que soient les réponses à ces interrogations, il semble indispensable de reconsidérer la place du sang en droit de la famille. De multiples observations font apparaître cette nécessité. Le sang peut ouvrir l'accès à un droit comme il peut l'entraver. Le mariage incestueux est prohibé entre ascendants et descendants en ligne directe, entre frères et sœurs, oncle/ tante et neveu / nièce. L'interdiction du mariage incestueux ne résulterait pas du seul risque génétique attribuées aux unions consanguines . D'après Claude Lévi-Strauss, « la prohibition de l'inceste est moins une règle qui interdit d'épouser mère, sœur ou fille, qu'une règle qui oblige à donner mère, sœur ou fille à autrui, la règle du don par excellence » . Pourtant, rien ne prohibe le mariage entre cousins germains. L'exception accordée à cette union, pourrait s'expliquer historiquement par des raisons patrimoniales, afin d'éviter la division du domaine familial . Si des considérations patrimoniales ont pu fonder une dérogation à l'inceste, il convient alors de se demander si d'autres considérations pourraient tempérer cette interdiction. Or, la clémence accordée aux unions entre cousins ne se retrouve pas pour toutes les relations. L'enfant né de l'inceste ne peut bénéficier de l'établissement d'un double lien de filiation . Il peut sembler surprenant que le principe d'intérêt supérieur de l'enfant ne vienne pas protéger l'enfant des conséquences de l'acte commis par ses parents. D'autres circonstances témoignent de la contradiction apportée par la référence aux liens de sang ou plutôt, ici, par leur absence. L'union maritale peut aussi être interdite en raison de la parenté par l'alliance. Le mariage entre ex-alliés en ligne directe est prohibé. Cette interdiction viendrait cette fois éviter une transgression générationnelle . Concrètement, un ancien beau-parent ne peut épouser son ancienne belle-fille ou beau-fils, la Cour de cassation a déjà rappelé cette prohibition . Elle a cependant déjà dérogé à cette règle, notamment en raison de la longévité de la relation , ce qui démontre l'inconstance de cette prohibition. Il convient de souligner le paradoxe, consistant à préférer un mariage consanguin à l'union de personnes dépourvues de tout lien biologique alors même que la prohibition de l'inceste est une règle d'ordre public . En dehors du couple, le sang fonde d'autres interdictions. La consanguinité vient aussi empêcher la reconnaissance d'une communauté de vie au sein d'une même fratrie. La cohabitation des frères et sœurs célibataires reste fréquente, particulièrement en milieu rural mais il n'existe aucun statut légal régissant ces situations. La position est partagée par la Cour européenne des droits de l'Homme qui a refusé de reconnaître que la cohabitation fraternelle puisse conduire à l'exonération de l'impôt sur les successions au même titre qu'un couple, elle estime que « l'absence d'un (…) accord juridiquement contraignant entre les requérantes fait que leur relation de cohabitation, malgré sa longue durée, est fondamentalement différente de celle qui existe entre deux conjoints ou partenaires civils » . La juridiction internationale se fonde sur l'absence d'engagement public pour justifier sa décision. En effet, le lien fraternel est un lien imposé par le sang mais il n'est pas certain que ce lien doive fonder une différence de traitement, d'autant qu'il est d'une stabilité indéniable. Au cours des débats avant l'adoption du PACS, il avait été proposé d'ouvrir cette forme d'union aux frères et sœurs, puisque le partenariat ne repose aucunement sur une analyse biologique ou procréative mais davantage sur des considérations économiques. L'ambiguïté de la place accordée au sang en droit de la famille pourrait donc même être perçue comme une atteinte potentielle au principe de non-discrimination, puisqu'elle provoque des différences de traitement sans que la différence de situation ne semble légitimement le justifier. Que le lien de sang existe ou non, qu'il ouvre ou restreigne l'accès à un droit, il est toujours à l'origine de retentissements importants, dépassant bien souvent le seul droit de la famille.

''Blood never lies'', this 14th century proverb evokes the physiological truth offered by blood. Blood is the life-giving liquid that gives rise to a bond of kinship. The irrefutable nature of the bond it produces is sometimes essential to the rendering of justice. At the same time, the law allows the blood relationship to be a complete fiction. The place given to blood at the heart of legal concerns is characterised by radical ambivalence. It is a necessary element in the identification and transmission of kinship. However, this does not mean that it is given unquestioned precedence. Finally, in family law, the existence of a blood relationship is as important as its absence. Shaken up and called into question by changes in the family, society and bioethics, it is now essential to rethink this subject. This study takes a forward-looking approach and aims to propose appropriate solutions to new issues not yet covered by the law. But it also aims to provide a fresh perspective on long-standing issues that are undergoing radical change. To understand the importance of this subject, it will be necessary to analyse the ambivalence of blood-related considerations in family law and to highlight the difficulties that this ambivalence gives rise to. Sometimes central, sometimes obscured, the place of blood in family law is nebulous. Blood is at the heart of the concerns governed by the Civil Code. Its most striking illustration lies in the rules relating to filiation. These provisions are divided into two headings depending on whether or not there is a gift of blood from the parent. This structure is not the result of chance and demonstrates the interest shown in the biological link. Blood in family law is not confined to filiation, but has a wider bearing on the question of kinship. Kinship based on blood is sometimes a matter of criminal law. The blood relationship can be the cause of aggravation of a crime when it is committed against a descendant or ascendant. For example, since the law of 21 April 2021 , incestuous rape has been punishable by twenty years' imprisonment. Blood also gives rise to territorial considerations linked to private international law. The absolute principle in matters of nationality is that of blood law. Blood not only transmits a genetic heritage, it also transmits a cultural and national heritage. Proof often comes in the form of blood. A blood test can provide proof of relationship. This test is so reliable that a refusal to undergo it can be considered an admission of kinship. However, the blood link does not always guarantee the same effects. For a long time, there was institutionalised discrimination against adulterous children, as if the blood relationship was altered when it resulted from a relationship outside marriage. The origin of the relationship is not always biological; it may result from alliance, recognition or adoption. In these cases, the blood relationship is simulated. By way of illustration, it is through blood law that a fully adopted child acquires the nationality of his or her adoptive parents. New family forms also provide a perfect illustration of the new challenges facing the law. By way of illustration, parents who have recourse to a surrogate motherhood agreement can now have dual filiation established, both for the biological father and for the mother of intention. By accepting this, the Cour de cassation goes beyond the requirements of the European Court of Human Rights, despite the fraudulent nature of these agreements. While it is nothing new that blood ties can be feigned, today more than ever before, kinship is moving further and further away from the physiological truth. As far back as 2005, Professor Jean Hauser spoke of a French civil status that was ‘out of breath'. The Bioethics Act of 2021, which partly reshaped the law traditionally applicable to the family, confirms this observation. In particular, this law provides for the possibility for couples who have had a child through medically assisted procreation with a donor to establish filiation with regard to the mother who has not given birth by simply acknowledging the child in advance before a notary. Despite these changes, the desire to create a family persists; it is simply the methods of creating a family that are evolving. Unlike in other legal cultures, the relationship between blood and family law is no longer self-evident. This ambivalence sometimes leads to conflicts of law, as in the case of kafala, a family law institution in certain countries with a Muslim tradition that prohibits the establishment of adoptive filiation where there is no blood relationship. Although its role may be altered, this does not mean that it has been abolished. The relationship between blood and law has given rise to a certain amount of confusion, raising questions that have not yet been resolved. The ambiguity of family law in relation to blood raises two questions: What place should be given to blood in family law? Is it still relevant to refer to blood ties? Whatever the answers to these questions, it seems essential to reconsider the place of blood in family law. Numerous observations point to this need. Blood can both open up access to a right and hinder it. Incestuous marriage is prohibited between direct ascendants and descendants, brothers and sisters, uncles and aunts and nephews and nieces. The prohibition of incestuous marriage is not solely due to the genetic risk attributed to consanguineous unions. According to Claude Lévi-Strauss, ‘the prohibition of incest is less a rule that forbids marrying mothers, sisters or daughters, than a rule that obliges one to give mothers, sisters or daughters to others, the rule of gift par excellence'. However, there is nothing to prohibit marriage between first cousins. The exception granted to this union could be explained historically by patrimonial reasons, in order to avoid the division of the family estate. If patrimonial considerations were the basis for a derogation from incest, the question then arises as to whether other considerations could temper this prohibition. The leniency granted to unions between cousins does not apply to all relationships. A child born of incest cannot benefit from the establishment of a double parent-child relationship. It may seem surprising that the principle of the best interests of the child does not protect children from the consequences of acts committed by their parents. Other circumstances bear witness to the contradiction brought about by the reference to blood ties or rather, in this case, by their absence. Marital union may also be prohibited on the grounds of relationship by marriage. Marriage between former allies in the direct line is prohibited. This prohibition would prevent a generational transgression. In practical terms, a former parent-in-law may not marry his or her former daughter-in-law or son-in-law, as the Cour de cassation has already pointed out. However, it has already departed from this rule, in particular because of the longevity of the relationship, which demonstrates the fickleness of this prohibition. It is worth highlighting the paradox of preferring a consanguineous marriage to the union of people with no biological link, even though the prohibition of incest is a rule of public order. Outside the couple, blood is the basis for other prohibitions. Consanguinity also prevents the recognition of a community of life within the same sibling. Unmarried brothers and sisters often live together, particularly in rural areas, but there is no legal status governing these situations. This position is shared by the European Court of Human Rights, which refused to recognise that fraternal cohabitation could lead to exemption from inheritance tax in the same way as a couple, considering that ‘the absence of a (...) legally binding agreement between the applicants means that their cohabitation relationship, despite its long duration, is fundamentally different from that between two spouses or civil partners'. The international court based its decision on the absence of a public commitment. In fact, the fraternal bond is a bond imposed by blood, but it is not certain that this bond should be the basis for a difference in treatment, especially as it is undeniably stable. During the debates prior to the adoption of the PACS, it was proposed that this form of union should be open to brothers and sisters, since the partnership is not based on any biological or procreative analysis but rather on economic considerations. The ambiguity of the place given to blood in family law could therefore even be seen as a potential infringement of the principle of non-discrimination, since it gives rise to differences in treatment that do not appear to be legitimately justified by the difference in situation. Whether blood ties exist or not, whether they give or restrict access to a right, they are always the source of major repercussions, often extending beyond family law alone. This position is shared by the European Court of Human Rights, which refused to recognise that fraternal cohabitation could lead to exemption from inheritance tax in the same way as a couple, considering that ‘the absence of a (...) legally binding agreement between the applicants means that their cohabitation relationship, despite its long duration, is fundamentally different from that between two spouses or civil partners'. The international court based its decision on the absence of a public commitment. In fact, the fraternal bond is a bond imposed by blood, but it is not certain that this bond should be the basis for a difference in treatment, especially as it is undeniably stable. During the debates prior to the adoption of the PACS, it was proposed that this form of union should be open to brothers and sisters, since the partnership is not based on any biological or procreative analysis but rather on economic considerations. The ambiguity of the place given to blood in family law could therefore even be seen as a potential infringement of the principle of non-discrimination, since it gives rise to differences in treatment that do not appear to be legitimately justified by the difference in situation. Whether blood ties exist or not, whether they give or restrict access to a right, they are always the source of major repercussions, often extending beyond family law alone. This position is shared by the European Court of Human Rights, which refused to recognise that fraternal cohabitation could lead to exemption from inheritance tax in the same way as a couple, considering that ‘the absence of a (...) legally binding agreement between the applicants means that their cohabitation relationship, despite its long duration, is fundamentally different from that between two spouses or civil partners'. The international court based its decision on the absence of a public commitment. In fact, the fraternal bond is a bond imposed by blood, but it is not certain that this bond should be the basis for a difference in treatment, especially as it is undeniably stable. During the debates prior to the adoption of the PACS, it was proposed that this form of union should be open to brothers and sisters, since the partnership is not based on any biological or procreative analysis but rather on economic considerations. The ambiguity of the place given to blood in family law could therefore even be seen as a potential infringement of the principle of non-discrimination, since it gives rise to differences in treatment that do not appear to be legitimately justified by the difference in situation. Whether blood ties exist or not, whether they give or restrict access to a right, they are always the source of major repercussions, often extending beyond family law alone. This position is shared by the European Court of Human Rights, which refused to recognise that fraternal cohabitation could lead to exemption from inheritance tax in the same way as a couple, considering that ‘the absence of a (...) legally binding agreement between the applicants means that their cohabitation relationship, despite its long duration, is fundamentally different from that between two spouses or civil partners'. The international court based its decision on the absence of a public commitment. In fact, the fraternal bond is a bond imposed by blood, but it is not certain that this bond should be the basis for a difference in treatment, especially as it is undeniably stable. During the debates prior to the adoption of the PACS, it was proposed that this form of union should be open to brothers and sisters, since the partnership is not based on any biological or procreative analysis but rather on economic considerations. The ambiguity of the place given to blood in family law could therefore even be seen as a potential infringement of the principle of non-discrimination, since it gives rise to differences in treatment that do not appear to be legitimately justified by the difference in situation. Whether blood ties exist or not, whether they give or restrict access to a right, they are always the source of major repercussions, often extending beyond family law alone. This position is shared by the European Court of Human Rights, which refused to recognise that fraternal cohabitation could lead to exemption from inheritance tax in the same way as a couple, considering that ‘the absence of a (...) legally binding agreement between the applicants means that their cohabitation relationship, despite its long duration, is fundamentally different from that between two spouses or civil partners'. The international court based its decision on the absence of a public commitment. In fact, the fraternal bond is a bond imposed by blood, but it is not certain that this bond should be the basis for a difference in treatment, especially as it is undeniably stable. During the debates prior to the adoption of the PACS, it was proposed that this form of union should be open to brothers and sisters, since the partnership is not based on any biological or procreative analysis but rather on economic considerations. The ambiguity of the place given to blood in family law could therefore even be seen as a potential infringement of the principle of non-discrimination, since it gives rise to differences in treatment that do not appear to be legitimately justified by the difference in situation. Whether blood ties exist or not, whether they give or restrict access to a right, they are always the source of major repercussions, often extending beyond family law alone. This position is shared by the European Court of Human Rights, which refused to recognise that fraternal cohabitation could lead to exemption from inheritance tax in the same way as a couple, considering that ‘the absence of a (...) legally binding agreement between the applicants means that their cohabitation relationship, despite its long duration, is fundamentally different from that between two spouses or civil partners'. The international court based its decision on the absence of a public commitment. In fact, the fraternal bond is a bond imposed by blood, but it is not certain that this bond should be the basis for a difference in treatment, especially as it is undeniably stable. During the debates prior to the adoption of the PACS, it was proposed that this form of union should be open to brothers and sisters, since the partnership is not based on any biological or procreative analysis but rather on economic considerations. The ambiguity of the place given to blood in family law could therefore even be seen as a potential infringement of the principle of non-discrimination, since it gives rise to differences in treatment that do not appear to be legitimately justified by the difference in situation. Whether blood ties exist or not, whether they give or restrict access to a right, they are always the source of major repercussions, often extending beyond family law alone.This position is shared by the European Court of Human Rights, which refused to recognise that fraternal cohabitation could lead to exemption from inheritance tax in the same way as a couple, considering that ‘the absence of a (...) legally binding agreement between the applicants means that their cohabitation relationship, despite its long duration, is fundamentally different from that between two spouses or civil partners'. The international court based its decision on the absence of a public commitment. In fact, the fraternal bond is a bond imposed by blood, but it is not certain that this bond should be the basis for a difference in treatment, especially as it is undeniably stable. During the debates prior to the adoption of the PACS, it was proposed that this form of union should be open to brothers and sisters, since the partnership is not based on any biological or procreative analysis but rather on economic considerations. The ambiguity of the place given to blood in family law could therefore even be seen as a potential infringement of the principle of non-discrimination, since it gives rise to differences in treatment that do not appear to be legitimately justified by the difference in situation. Whether blood ties exist or not, whether they give or restrict access to a right, they are always the source of major repercussions, often extending beyond family law alone. This position is shared by the European Court of Human Rights, which refused to recognise that fraternal cohabitation could lead to exemption from inheritance tax in the same way as a couple, considering that ‘the absence of a (...) legally binding agreement between the applicants means that their cohabitation relationship, despite its long duration, is fundamentally different from that between two spouses or civil partners'. The international court based its decision on the absence of a public commitment. In fact, the fraternal bond is a bond imposed by blood, but it is not certain that this bond should be the basis for a difference in treatment, especially as it is undeniably stable. During the debates prior to the adoption of the PACS, it was proposed that this form of union should be open to brothers and sisters, since the partnership is not based on any biological or procreative analysis but rather on economic considerations. The ambiguity of the place given to blood in family law could therefore even be seen as a potential infringement of the principle of non-discrimination, since it gives rise to differences in treatment that do not appear to be legitimately justified by the difference in situation. Whether blood ties exist or not, whether they give or restrict access to a right, they are always the source of major repercussions, often extending beyond family law alone. This position is shared by the European Court of Human Rights, which refused to recognise that fraternal cohabitation could lead to exemption from inheritance tax in the same way as a couple, considering that ‘the absence of a (...) legally binding agreement between the applicants means that their cohabitation relationship, despite its long duration, is fundamentally different from that between two spouses or civil partners'. The international court based its decision on the absence of a public commitment. In fact, the fraternal bond is a bond imposed by blood, but it is not certain that this bond should be the basis for a difference in treatment, especially as it is undeniably stable. During the debates prior to the adoption of the PACS, it was proposed that this form of union should be open to brothers and sisters, since the partnership is not based on any biological or procreative analysis but rather on economic considerations. The ambiguity of the place given to blood in family law could therefore even be seen as a potential infringement of the principle of non-discrimination, since it gives rise to differences in treatment that do not appear to be legitimately justified by the difference in situation. Whether blood ties exist or not, whether they give or restrict access to a right, they are always the source of major repercussions, often extending beyond family law alone. This position is shared by the European Court of Human Rights, which refused to recognise that fraternal cohabitation could lead to exemption from inheritance tax in the same way as a couple, considering that ‘the absence of a (...) legally binding agreement between the applicants means that their cohabitation relationship, despite its long duration, is fundamentally different from that between two spouses or civil partners'. The international court based its decision on the absence of a public commitment. In fact, the fraternal bond is a bond imposed by blood, but it is not certain that this bond should be the basis for a difference in treatment, especially as it is undeniably stable. During the debates prior to the adoption of the PACS, it was proposed that this form of union should be open to brothers and sisters, since the partnership is not based on any biological or procreative analysis but rather on economic considerations. The ambiguity of the place given to blood in family law could therefore even be seen as a potential infringement of the principle of non-discrimination, since it gives rise to differences in treatment that do not appear to be legitimately justified by the difference in situation. Whether blood ties exist or not, whether they give or restrict access to a right, they are always the source of major repercussions, often extending beyond family law alone.