La pré-distribution comme élément préalable à une égalité démocratique robuste

• Auteur / Autrice : Delphine Irac
• Direction : Patrick Savidan
• Type : Projet de thèse
• Discipline(s) : Sciences politique
• Date : Inscription en doctorat le 02/03/2022
• Etablissement(s) : Université Paris-Panthéon-Assas
• Ecole(s) doctorale(s) : École doctorale Georges Vedel Droit public interne, science administrative et science politique (Paris ; 1992-....)

Résumé

Predistribution as a prerequisite for robust democratic equality The first purpose of my dissertation will be to define conceptually predistribution. Pre-distribution is based on the intuitive idea that the work of distributive justice must also be based on non-State institutions (like the institutional framework of markets and exchanges, productive justice in firms, educational system, price and wage settings etc.) and not only on income fiscal redistribution by the State. The first part of the dissertation will try to propose and test a generic definition of predistribution as an action of the state on institutions. The second purpose of my dissertation will be to investigate the links that predistribution has with non- domination. I argue that some economic justice of incomes is necessary for non-domination; I call it non- domination-sustaining economic justice. I will study the claim that non-domination-sustaining economic justice must be based on predistribution rather than redistribution. The argument is based on the idea that predistribution, which is founded on institutions, as previously discussed, is more robust to electoral shock than redistribution that targets wealth. I will argue that the following sequence is not robust: Redistribution (without productive justice) => economic equality =>Non domination=> democratic equality. Indeed, possible electoral outcomes can break it by suppressing redistribution and damaging democratic equality. There is no restoring force. I claim that the following sequence is more robust: Predistribution => economic equality => Non- domination => democratic equality. Why? Firstly, because the state can deviate from the fulfilment of non-domination-sustaining economic justice and, secondly, predistribution is not immediately sensitive to such a deviation (it takes much longer to unravel big public services in education or egalitarian ethos in business than it does to remove a specific social allowance). Predistribution serves as an anchor of democratic equality.