L'action du discours Approche normativiste de l'acte illocutoire

par Chloé Muteau-Jaouen

Projet de thèse en Philosophie

Sous la direction de Denis Vernant et de Bruno Ambroise.

Thèses en préparation à l'Université Grenoble Alpes , dans le cadre de École doctorale de philosophie , en partenariat avec Institut de Philosophie de Grenoble (laboratoire) depuis le 01-10-2014 .


  • Résumé

    The thesis is about discourse as constituting an action. What exactly is this action? What are the concepts we need to elucidate it? The action of discourse has been put under examination and described as including a special “illocutionary” act by J. L. Austin. Authors in the Gricean tradition of langage analysis gave an intentionalist version of the illocutionary act. However, this stance makes it difficult to properly understand the relationship between illocutionary acts and the normative outputs of utterances. It is also difficult to account for the dynamic feature of the illocutionary act constitution, e. g. the potential for the negociation, enforcement or blocking of the act depending on the balance of power in the speech situation. Drawing from several approaches of speech action – but especially those of J. L. Austin himself, R. Brandom, R. Kukla and M. Lance – the thesis aims to accomodate intentional and conventional features in the performance of illocutionary acts, by arguing for a normativist and pragmatist account of illocutionary acts, according to which these acts depends on norms implicit in practices and should be defined by normative results of utterances.

  • Titre traduit

    The Action of Discourse A Normativist Approach of The Illocutionary Act


  • Résumé

    The thesis is about discourse as constituting an action. What exactly does this action consists of? What concepts do we need to elucidate it? The action of discourse has been put under examination and described by J. L. Austin as including a special “illocutionary” act. Authors in the Gricean tradition of language analysis gave an intentionalist version of the illocutionary act. However, this stance makes it difficult to properly understand the relationship between illocutionary acts and the normative outputs of utterances. It is also hard to account for the dynamic feature of the illocutionary act constitution – e. g. the potential to negociate, enforce or block the illocutionary act depending on the balance of power in the speech situation. Drawing from several approaches of speech action – but especially those of J. L. Austin himself, R. Brandom, R. Kukla and M. Lance – the thesis aims to accomodate intentional and conventional features of the performance of illocutionary acts, by arguing for a normativist and pragmatist account of illocutionary acts, where these acts depend on norms implicit in practices and should be defined by normative results of utterances.