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Migrant Workers in Turkish Agriculture: Patterns of Mobility and Dispossession, 1990-2018

Deniz Pelek

Sous la co-direction de Nora SENI, Sevket PAMUK et Umut TUREM

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Migrant Workers in Turkish Agriculture: Patterns of Mobility and Dispossession (1990-2018)

Deniz Pelek

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Declaration of Originality

The intellectual content of this dissertation, which has been written by me and for which I take full responsibility, is my own, original work, and it has not been previously or concurrently submitted elsewhere for any other examination or degree of higher education apart from those of the specified dual or joint degree program. The sources of all paraphrased and quoted materials, concepts, and ideas are fully cited, and the admissible contributions and assistance of others with respect to the conception of the work as well as to linguistic expression are explicitly acknowledged herein.

_____

Abstract

Migrant Workers in Turkish Agriculture:
Patterns of Mobility and Dispossession (1990-2018)

Deniz Pelek, Doctoral Candidate, 2019
at the Atatürk Institute for Modern Turkish History at Boğaziçi University and
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Professors Şevket Pamuk and Nora Şeni and Associate Professor Umut Türem, Dissertation Advisors

This dissertation examines migrant agricultural labor in Turkey as lens through which to explain the effects of economic, political, and geopolitical changes on rural mobilities. Two factors explain why Seasonal agricultural migration is on the rise. First, agrarian transformation starting in the 1990s resulted in a decreasing number of unpaid family workers, and the demand for seasonal migrant workers for agricultural work requiring manual labor surged since then. Second, domestic, regional, and foreign policies being to the Kurdish Question, the influx of Syrian refugees, and migration from the Caucasus have reshaped the new waves of agricultural migrants adding new categories such as refugees, irregular migrants, and internally displaced people to their profile. Given this situation, this study critically discusses how the transformation in agricultural production was realized through the availability of cheap, flexible seasonal migrant workers. Further, this work problematizes new patterns in mobility and the recent phenomenon of the dispossession of workers challenging the "temporal" characteristic of seasonal agricultural work. Based on research conducted in various regions among differing rural actors, this dissertation investigates how agrarian transformation, geopolitical developments, and agencies for migrants have

produced new forms of rural mobilities and rural space in Turkey since the 1990s.

102,000 words

Özet

Türkiye'de Göçmen Tarım İşçileri:
Mülksüzleşme ve Hareketlilik Biçimleri (1990-2018)

Deniz Pelek, Doktora Adayı, 2019
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Tez Danışmanları

Bu tez Türkiye tarımında göçmen emeğini ekonomik, politik ve jeopolitik değişimlere bağlı olarak değişen kırsal hareketlilikler aracılığıyla incelemektedir. Mevsimlik tarım göçü iki temel faktör nedeniyle yükselişte dir. Birinci olarak, 1990'lardan beri süren kırsal dönüşüm ücretsiz aile işçilerinin sayısını azaltırken, kol emeği gerektiren tarım işlerinde mevsimlik göçmen işçilere olan talebi arttırdı. İkinci olarak, Kürt sorunu, Suriye'den mülteci akını ve Kafkasya'dan gelen göç konularında izlenen iç, dış ve bölgesel politikalar ile şekillenen yeni göç dalgaları göçmen tarım işçisi profilini mülteci, düzensiz göçmen ve yerinden edilmiş göçmen gibi yeni kategoriler ile yeniden biçimlendirdi. Bu zemine dayanarak, bu çalışma tarımsal üretimdeki dönüşümün mevsimlik tarım işçilerinin "ucuz ve esnek" olarak bulunabilirliği yoluyla gerçekleştiğini eleştirel bir bakışla tartışmaktadır. Ayrıca, bu süreçte beliren işçilerin yeni hareketlilik ve mülksüzleşme modellerinin, mevsimlik tarım işçilerinin "geçici" karakteri ile çatışan özellikleri bu tezde sorunsallaştırılacaktır. Farklı bölgelerde ve farklı kırsal aktörlerle yapılan araştırmaya dayanarak, bu çalışma Türkiye'de 1990lardan beri gerçekleşen kırsal dönüşümün, jeopolitik gelişmelerin ve göçmenlerin "failliklerinin" kırsal hareketlilik ve kırsal mekanda ürettiği yeni formları iredeleyecektir.

102.000 kelime

Résumé

Travailleurs migrants dans l'agriculture turque: les motifs de la mobilité et de la dépossession, 1990-2018

Deniz Pelek, Doctorante, 2019
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Cette thèse porte sur la main-d'œuvre agricole migrante en Turquie en tant que révélatrice des changements économiques, politiques et géopolitiques dans le champ des mobilités rurales. La migration agricole saisonnière augmente sous l'effet de deux principaux facteurs. Premièrement, la transformation agraire entraîne, à partir des années 1990, une diminution du nombre de travailleurs familiaux non rémunérés, tandis que la demande de travailleurs migrants saisonniers ne cesse d'augmenter pour les travaux agricoles exigeant un travail manuel. Deuxièmement, dans le prolongement des politiques intérieures, régionales, et étrangères en réponse à la question kurde, l'afflux des réfugiés syriens et des migrants en provenance du Caucase remodèle les migrations saisonnières. De nouvelles catégories de migrants agricoles apparaissent, comme les réfugiés, les migrants irréguliers et les personnes déplacées à l'intérieur des frontières. Dans ce contexte, cette étude propose une étude critique de la transformation de la production agricole basée sur la disponibilité de travailleurs migrants saisonniers bon marché et flexibles. Nous entendons introduire de nouveaux modèles de mobilité et de dépossession des travailleurs - apparus avec ces processus récents - qui remettent en question l'aspect supposé « temporaire » des migrations de travail agricoles saisonnières. Basé sur une recherche menée

dans différentes régions et auprès de différents acteurs ruraux, ce travail montre comment la transformation agraire, les développements géopolitiques, et l'agencéité des migrants ont produit de nouvelles formes dans les mobilités rurales et l'espace rural en Turquie, depuis les années 1990.

102.000 mots

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- "Women in the Fields, Women in the Tents: Analysis of Seasonal Migrant Workers in Turkish Agriculture from the Gender Perspective," National Conference on the Critical Social Sciences: History, Culture and Politics in Modern Turkey, Altinbas University, Istanbul, 14-15 March 2019.
- "*'Dispeasanted Peasants'* in the East-West Journey: the Case of Cizre after Forced Migration," International Symposium Emigration-Immigration as A "Total Social Fact" A Focus on Abdelmalek Sayad's Work and Thinking", EHESS, Paris, 26-28 September 2018.
- "Ethnicity or Poverty? Re-Construction of Unequal Power Relations in the Rural: the Case of Syrian Refugees in Turkish Agriculture," the 5th International Seminar Migration and Agriculture in the Mediterranean and beyond, Mucem, Marseille, 15-16 March 2018.
- "Agrarian Transformation and Seasonal Migrant Workers in Contemporary Turkey," the 8th Annual Conference in Political Economy, the Berlin School of Economics and Law, Berlin, 13-15 September 2017.
- "Syrian Refugees in Rural Turkey," Migration with(out) Boundaries Conference, Michigan State University, East Lansing, 21-22 October 2016.
- "Syrian Refugees in Turkish Agriculture," the 21st Annual Association for the Study of Nationalities World Convention, Columbia University, New York, 14-16 April 2016.
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To my mother

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Glossary of Non-English Terms

Agence nationale de l'accueil des étrangers et des migrations	National Agency for the Reception of Foreigners and of Migration (ANAEM)
Office français de l'immigration et de l'intégration	French Office of Immigration and Integration (OFII)
l'Office des migrations internationals (OMI)	Office of International Migration
Office national d'immigration	National Office of Immigration (ONI)
Ağa	Landlord
Ayan	Local notables
Aşiret	Tribe
Köy Korucusu	Village Guard
İmam-Hatip Liseleri	Religious high schools
Milli Görüş Hareketi	National Vision movement
Olağanüstü Hal	State of Emergency
Sırpları Tel'in Mitingleri	Marches condemning Serbs

Abbreviations and Acronyms

AFAD	Afet ve Acil Durum Yönetimi Başkanlığı (The Disaster and Emergency Management Authority)
AKP	Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party)
ARIP	Agricultural Reform Implementation Project
BTC	Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline
DPT	Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı (State Planning Organization)
DSP	Demokratik Sol Parti (Democratic Left Party)
DSI	Devlet Su İşleri (General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works)
DYP	Doğru Yol Partisi (True Path Party)
EU	European Union
FP	Fazilet Partisi (Virtue Party)
Göç-Der	Association for Solidarity with Migrants
HDP	Halkların Demokratik Partisi (People's Democratic Party)
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
IHD	İnsan Hakları Derneği (Association for Human Rights)
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IDP	Internally displaced people
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
MHP	Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (National Movement Party)
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MGK	Milli Güvenlik Kurulu (National Security Council)
NATO	The North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
Mazlum-Der	Association for Solidarity with the Opressed
PKK	Kürdistan İşçi Partisi (Kurdistan Workers' Party)
PYD	Demokratik Birlik Partisi (Democratic Union Party)
RP	Refah Partisi (Welfare Party)

TARİŞ	Tarım Satış Kooperatifleri (Agricultural sales cooperatives)
TEKEL	Tütün, Tütün Mamulleri, Tuz ve Alkol İşletmeleri Genel Müdürlüğü (Turkish Tobacco and Alcoholic Beverages Company)
TİHV	Foundation for Human Rights
TÜİK	Turkish Statistical Institute
TÜRKSOY	Uluslararası Türk Kültürü Teşkilatı)International Organization of Turkic Culture)
UN	United Nations
UNCHR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
WTO	World Trade Organization

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wrote the greater part of this dissertation. My colleagues at the IRES and IFEA provided a friendly environment, I am indebted to them. I am, especially, deeply grateful to Antoine Math for his great support during my tenure at the IRES. I extend my thanks to a small group - called AYAK (Akademik Yalnızlığa Karşı) - in the IFEA, Maissam Nimer, Souad Usayran, Fiona Gedeona Achi, Solène Poyraz, Lydia Zeghmar and Aurélie Stern for receiving invaluable comments and feedback on my thesis. I would like to express my special thanks to Ayça Akarçay, Sophie de Tapia and Armand Aupiais l'homme, for their help in writing the French summary of this study. I also want to thank Jonathan Philips for his meticulous English editing and Kadriye Tamtekin, Dilek Tecirli and Leyla Kılıç for making life easier at the Atatürk Institute.

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NOTE: The in-house editor of the Atatürk Institute has made detailed recommendations with regard to the format, grammar, spelling, usage, syntax, and style of this dissertation.

Résumé substantial de la these en cotutelle ecrite en anglais et intitulée “Migrant Workers in Turkish Agriculture: Patterns of Mobility and Dispossession (1990-2018)

Résumé

Cette thèse porte sur la main-d’œuvre agricole migrante en Turquie en tant que révélatrice des changements économiques, politiques et géopolitiques dans le champ des mobilités rurales. La migration agricole saisonnière augmente sous l’effet de deux principaux facteurs. Premièrement, la transformation agraire entraîne, à partir des années 1990, une diminution du nombre de travailleurs familiaux non rémunérés, tandis que la demande de travailleurs migrants saisonniers ne cesse d’augmenter pour les travaux agricoles exigeant un travail manuel. Deuxièmement, dans le prolongement des politiques intérieures, régionales, et étrangères en réponse à la question kurde, l’afflux des réfugiés syriens et des migrants en provenance du Caucase remodèle les migrations saisonnières. De nouvelles catégories de migrants agricoles apparaissent, comme les réfugiés, les migrants irréguliers et les personnes déplacées à l’intérieur des frontières. Dans ce contexte, cette étude propose une étude critique de la transformation de la production agricole basée sur la disponibilité de travailleurs migrants saisonniers bon marché et flexibles. Nous entendons introduire de nouveaux modèles de mobilité et de dépossession des travailleurs - apparus avec ces processus récents - qui remettent en question l’aspect supposé « temporaire » des migrations de travail agricoles saisonnières. Basé sur une recherche menée dans différentes régions et auprès de différents acteurs ruraux, ce travail montre comment la transformation agraire, les développements géopolitiques, et l’agencéité des migrants ont produit de nouvelles formes dans les mobilités rurales et l’espace rural en Turquie, depuis les années 1990.

1. Introduction

Cette thèse porte sur l'émergence d'un régime de travail agricole qui se manifeste par de nouvelles formes de dépossession et de mobilité des travailleurs migrants saisonniers. Ces dernières années, l'agriculture turque connaît des transformations structurelles qui stimulent la demande de main-d'œuvre agricole migrante. La Turquie présente un cas particulièrement intéressant, dans la mesure où la transformation agraire néolibérale progresse parallèlement à l'afflux de migrants dû aux évolutions géopolitiques dans les pays environnants, et à la mise en œuvre de politiques intérieures et internationales qui provoquent une forte augmentation des mobilités des migrants à partir des années 1990. La transformation agraire et les mobilités internationales et internes sont étroitement liées et corrélées, ce qui exige d'adopter une nouvelle compréhension du phénomène des migrations agricoles saisonnières. Cette thèse offre une analyse substantielle des migrations saisonnières, des mobilités et de la production agricole en Turquie depuis les années 1990 qui serait une ressource importante pour les chercheurs en sociologie rurale, géopolitique des migrations, études sur les réfugiés et sur les migrations.

Notre analyse parcourt les trente dernières années, pour mieux examiner comment la coexistence des politiques néolibérales à l'égard de la paysannerie, et l'augmentation des flux migratoires vers la Turquie, reconfigurent la production agricole, les relations de travail et les relations sociales dans l'espace rural. Nous nous concentrerons à cet effet sur l'analyse du rôle indispensable des travailleurs migrants saisonniers. Les producteurs sont dépendants de l'utilisation de la main d'œuvre extérieure, qui fait continuellement l'objet de régulations, de remises en question, et de redéfinitions par des acteurs politiques nationaux, régionaux et mondiaux. En d'autres termes, le but de cette thèse est de comprendre comment l'interaction entre les pressions économiques et politiques externes, et la micro-politique au niveau des exploitations agricoles, influencent l'organisation du travail et les moyens de subsistance des travailleurs ruraux. Nous discutons des liens et des conflits

entre économies agricoles, politiques agricoles et moyens de subsistance des travailleurs et des habitants des fermes. Nous cherchons à comprendre comment les processus de la transformation agraire, de la dépossession et du développement géopolitique se remodèlent et sont façonnés par la migration agricole saisonnière et les mobilités rurales.

1.1. Questions et objectifs de recherche

La migration ‑ mouvement des peuples et des individus depuis un pays, une ville, ou un village, vers d'autres ‑ est un concept ancien, périodiquement « réinventé » pour être adapté à des moments socio-historiques et à des formations politiques spécifiques.[1] Dans le contexte agraire, sont questionnés la « nouvelle paysannerie », la « nouvelle migration », les « nouveaux espaces ruraux ». Mais que signifient ces termes et quels en sont les acteurs spécifiques ? S'il existe une nouvelle migration et une nouvelle paysannerie, existe-t-il également de « nouveaux migrants » et de « nouveaux paysans » ? Qui sont les nouveaux paysans et qu'est-ce qui rend cette paysannerie nouvelle ? Qui sont les nouveaux migrants et qu'y a-t-il de « nouveau » dans leur migration, pour les zones rurales ?

Réfléchir sur la « nouveauté » mène à réfléchir sur les nouvelles formes de la production et du travail agricoles. Nous considérons trois piliers principaux : l'afflux de migrants, la transformation agraire néolibérale, et les modèles de dépossession des travailleurs saisonniers. Nous examinons essentiellement la croissance de vagues de migrations à grande échelle et des mobilités rurales transnationales et internes et leur intégration dans le processus de transformation agricole en cours, donnant naissance à un nouveau régime du travail, en particulier en Turquie. Un important corpus de travaux[2] sur les travailleurs migrants saison-

1 Oum-Hani Alaoui, Trajectoires migratoires : Frontières marocaines et imaginaires translocaux (thèse de doctorat, Université de Princeton, 2009), 1.

2 Deniz Duruiz, "« Incarnation de 'l'espace et du travail : Kurdish Migrant Workers in Turkish Agriculture », dans The Kurdish Issue in Turkey, sous la direction de Zeynep

niers en Turquie souligne la dimension ethnique du travail migrant saisonnier, et les relations d'exploitation inhérentes à la production agraire. Il fournit une analyse fine de la discrimination à l'égard des travailleurs saisonniers, un aspect important du fonctionnement des différences ethniques dans la fragilisation des travailleurs.

Toutefois, ces études ne prennent pas compte de l'impact de la vulnérabilité économique des migrations récentes sur la restructuration de l'agriculture en Turquie. C'est pourquoi, au-delà de cette littérature, nous nous concentrons sur le rôle clé des travailleurs migrants saisonniers dans le processus de transformation agraire. Ce faisant, nous mettons en lumière l'ethnicisation du marché du travail, due à la variation des flux migratoires, qui permet aux producteurs de maximiser leurs profits à travers une concurrence accrue sur le marché. Tout au long de la thèse, nous gardons l'idée que le travail agricole ne peut être étudié sans examiner les flux migratoires.

À l'encontre du schéma historique dans lequel la Turquie est un pays d'émigration, il y a aujourd'hui un changement de perception qui en fait un pays de destination.[3] Au début des années 1990, la Turquie se trouve au carrefour de divers flux migratoires en provenance des Balkans, du Caucase, d'Irak, de Syrie et des pays africains. Sous l'influence de l'évolution géopolitique de ces régions voisines, les immigrés originaires du Caucase et de Syrie s'installent désormais dans les campagnes turques, où ils trouvent principalement des emplois temporaires à forte intensité

Gambetti et Joost Jongerden (Routledge, 2015). https://doi.org/10.4324/9781381315740881-22 ; Uygar Yıldırım, 1980 Sonrası Türkiye Tarımında Yapısal Yapısal Dönüşüm ve Mevsimlik Tarım İşçileri (Université 'd'Istanbul, 2014) ; İclal Ayşe Küçükkırca Küçükkırca, " Etnisite, Toplumsal Cinsiyet, Sınıf Ekseninde Mevsimlik Kürt Tarım İşçileri " Toplum ve Kuram 6 (2012) ; Ayşegül Özbek, New Actors of New Poverty : The'Other' Children of Çukurova (Thèse de maîtrise, Middle East Technical University, 2007).

3 Ibrahim Sirkeci et Barbara Pusch, " Introduction : Turkish Migration Policy at a Glance, " dans Turkish Migration Policy, sous la direction de İbrahim Sirkeci et Barbara Pusch (London Transnational Press, 2016), 9.

de main-d'œuvre dans l'agriculture.[4] Autrefois, les travailleurs locaux et les travailleurs kurdes de Turquie constituaient la principale force de travail pour les emplois agricoles temporaires, et ils continuent d'être une importante réserve de travail aujourd'hui. Cependant les flux migratoires en provenance du Caucase et de Syrie transforment le bassin de main-d'œuvre précédent, en ajoutant de nouvelles couches au marché du travail. Dans ce contexte, nous soutenons que les mobilités rurales contemporaines ouvrent la voie à de nouveaux processus de changement rural. Nous établissons plusieurs hypothèses, suivant quatre axes principaux :

- Économiquement, la coexistence de différents groupes de migrants restructure le marché du travail. Les salaires varient en fonction de l'origine ethnique des travailleurs, ce qui entraîne une baisse des coûts de production des employeurs. Ceci a un double impact : les grandes entreprises agricoles augmentent leurs profits à travers l'hyper-exploitation des travailleurs migrants, tandis que la petite paysannerie ne disparaît pas totalement ; au contraire, leur survie est soutenue par des coûts de main-d'œuvre en baisse.
- Socialement, la rencontre croissante entre « locaux » et « étrangers » dans les villages et entre les différents groupes de travailleurs a créé de nouveaux melting-pots ruraux[5], qui reflètent et accélèrent la différenciation sociale dans une campagne plus hétérogène. Les conflits et les pratiques de cohabitation entre différents groupes se manifestent dans l'espace rural, ce qui nécessite un regard nouveau sur la diversité de la population rurale et les relations sociales, à la différence de l'image historique « pure » des campagnes turques.

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4 Bien qu'il soit possible de voir des travailleurs migrants 'd'Afghanistan, 'd'Iran et des pays 'd'Asie centrale dans les campagnes turques, les flux migratoires les plus importants en ce qui concerne les emplois agricoles saisonniers ont été ceux du Caucase (Géorgie et Azerbaïdjan) et de Syrie. Voir dans Saniye Dedeoğlu, Türkiye'de Mevsimlik Tarımsal Üretimde Yabancı Göçmen İşçiler Mevcut Durum Raporu Yoksulluk Nöbetinden Yoksulların Rekabetine (Kalkınma Atölyesi, 2016).

5 Jesús Oliva, "Rural Melting-Pots, Mobilities and Fragilities : Réflexions sur le cas espagnol." Sociologia Ruralis 50, non. 3 (2010) : 277-95. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9523.2010.00516.x.

- Politiquement, le champ d'action de l'État turc s'étend des agriculteurs aux travailleurs migrants, par opposition aux périodes antérieures où il gérait essentiellement les paysans. À ce titre, la question de savoir quel(s) groupe(s) de migrants sera (seront) employé(s) dans les emplois agricoles et comment la nouvelle dynamique de changement socioculturel dans les zones rurales sera gérée, devient un enjeu important dans l'agenda politique. Outre l'État, les ONG et les organismes autonomes concernés, qui sont des acteurs ruraux importants dans l'élaboration des politiques, portent également leur attention sur les travailleurs migrants.
- Spatialement, l'augmentation des flux migratoires vers les zones rurales turques et les nouvelles tâches assignées à la main-d'œuvre migrante dans le processus de transformation agraire donnent lieu à différents types de logements. Dans certaines régions, l'installation permanente de travailleurs migrants saisonniers dans la périphérie des villages conduit à la formation de *quartiers ghettos,* phénomène qui a deux implications majeures. Premièrement, l'espace rural contient au-delà du village des extensions isolées physiquement et socialement. Deuxièmement, le caractère « temporaire » des travailleurs agricoles saisonniers est remis en cause par la présence permanente de migrants pris dans un nouvel ensemble de relations dans l'espace rural.

Ainsi, la transformation contemporaine du paysage rural de la Turquie introduit une discussion fructueuse à nos questions de recherche : Comment les flux migratoires remodèlent-ils le phénomène des migrants agricoles saisonniers en Turquie ? Comment se construisent de nouvelles relations de pouvoir entre les différents acteurs au niveau macro et micro ? Cette question est examinée dans le chapitre 3 où une analyse géopolitique des flux migratoires examine les conflits à l'échelle transnationale, régionale et nationale qui produisent des vagues migratoires vers les campagnes turques.

Cette étude questionne également comment et pourquoi les travailleurs migrants saisonniers gagnent en importance dans le processus de transformation agraire. Quelles sont les raisons de l'expansion des travailleurs migrants saisonniers dans différents contextes ? Cette question

est abordée dans le chapitre 4 qui examine le rôle crucial de la disponibilité des travailleurs migrants saisonniers, main-d'œuvre moins chère et plus flexible, dans la production agricole et la dynamique des relations de travail. Les différents statuts de migrants s'intégrant dans le processus de transformation de l'agriculture, le chapitre 5 revient sur les différences entre migrations de réfugiés et migrations de travail volontaires, et sur la fonction de la catégorie de « travailleur réfugié » sur le marché du travail.

Par ailleurs, cette thèse examine les nouvelles tendances en matière de mobilité, d'espace rural et de dépossession des travailleurs migrants saisonniers. À ce titre, deux questions importantes se posent : comment les nouvelles mobilités rurales et l'appauvrissement économique des travailleurs remodèlent-ils le phénomène des migrations agricoles saisonnières en Turquie ? Et quelles sont leurs implications sur les relations socio-spatiales ? Cette question est examinée dans le chapitre 6 qui explore les nouveaux processus de dépossession des travailleurs et divers modèles socio-spatiaux dans l'espace rural. Avec cette discussion, nous entendons contribuer à la littérature spécifique aux travailleurs migrants saisonniers en Turquie de différentes manières :

1. Nous analysons le cas des travailleurs migrants saisonniers dans une relation dialectique entre production agricole et travail. Ceci vise à discuter du rôle crucial des travailleurs migrants saisonniers dans la transformation de l'agriculture, qui paradoxalement se concrétise dans un processus de dépaysannisation à l'échelle mondiale et nationale.

2. Nous articulons les niveaux macro et micro dans l'approche des travailleurs agricoles migrants. L'un des objectifs d'une telle démarche est de révéler l'impact des évolutions géopolitiques intérieures et internationales sur les flux migratoires, qui transforment le phénomène des travailleurs migrants saisonniers en Turquie.

3. Nous discernons et discutons les nouveaux modèles de migration agricole saisonnière, et de leurs implications sur l'espace rural. Remettant en cause la définition conventionnelle des migrations agricoles saisonnières comme « temporaires », nous mettons en évidence les caractéristiques non-saisonnières et permanentes de ce phénomène.

2. État de l'art

Après avoir établi les questions de recherche et les objectifs de la thèse, nous situons notre recherche dans le cadre de la discussion contemporaine de la littérature pertinente. Dans cette section, nous définissons un cadre conceptuel à même d'aborder la migration rurale et la transformation agraire qui interagissent et ouvrent la voie à de nouvelles formes sociales dans les zones rurales, dans un contexte de néolibéralisation. Nous identifions les concepts clés, les tensions et les défis de ces approches dans les travaux de recherche contemporains. La section suivante propose un examen critique des travaux sur la paysannerie et le travail agricole en Turquie, et discute des déficiences et lacunes des approches existantes. Nous montrons que les travailleurs migrants saisonniers dans l'agriculture turque se situent à l'intersection de deux domaines de recherche - agriculture et migration - et examinons les concepts et débats théoriques utiles à la compréhension de l'évolution observée dans le cas particulier de la Turquie. Ce cadre sera appliqué tout au long de la thèse.

2.1. Mobilités rurales et la transformation agricole néolibérale

Cette thèse offre de nouvelles perspectives pour répondre aux questions décrites dans la section précédente. La compréhension de la relation entre les travailleurs migrants saisonniers et le processus plus large de transformation rurale pose un défi conceptuel en raison des configurations complexes des nouvelles mobilités rurales et du processus de transformation agraire néolibérale. Il est important de noter que le sujet couvre les domaines de recherche des études rurales et des études migratoires. Nous nous appuyons sur certaines des avancées réalisées dans ces domaines qui soulignent la nécessité de nouvelles approches pour l'étude des travailleurs agricoles migrants saisonniers.

Les études de migratoires modélisent les flux migratoires en fonction des motivations des migrants dans l'histoire mondiale récente.[6] D'une part, la théorie des facteurs d'attraction et de répulsion trace une trajectoire de migration des régions économiquement sous-développées vers des régions développées en affirmant que la principale motivation qui sous-tend le mouvement des personnes est économique. De ce point de vue, les migrants sont considérés comme les personnes rationnelles qui agissent en fonction de leurs intérêts économiques. L'approche de modernisation, d'autre part, critique la théorie d'attraction et de répulsion où l'analyse est centrée sur la prise de décision rationnelle de l' « homo œconomicus » elle repose sur. L'approche de la modernisation offre un nouveau regard sur la migration à travers le prisme de l'histoire qui relie les transformations dans les comportements de migration et de mobilité aux différentes étapes du processus de modernisation.[7]

La théorie du système-monde développée par Emmanuel Wallerstein propose une approche encore différente qui identifie les principales directions de la migration sur la base d'une analyse des inégalités mondiales. Cette perspective holiste induit une analyse structurelle des mobilités, des pays en développement périphériques vers les pays où le capitalisme, à l'échelle mondiale, a besoin d'une sous-classe (« underclass »). Outre les besoins économiques des migrants et du marché mondial, la théorie des réseaux met l'accent, sur les mécanismes de prise de décision des migrants en fonction de leur appartenance aux réseaux sociaux façonnés par les relations de parenté, d'amitié, et de camaraderie. Par exemple, la présence de parents arrivés antérieurement dans un pays étranger peut inciter de nouveaux migrants de la même famille à bénéficier du capital social. Toutes ces approches des migrations sont critiquées par le paradigme des espaces transnationaux qui entend dépasser la division entre espace d'origine et espace d'accueil. Cette perspective

6 Russell King, "Theories and Typologies of Migration : Un aperçu et une introduction." Document de travail. Suède : Université de Malmö, 2012 : 11-23.

7 Ibid. 15.

offre une nouvelle façon de penser, qui permet de considérer le mouvement mutuel des idées, des symboles, des pensées, des idéologies, des mouvements sociaux et politiques, des cultures et des arts, entre et au-delà des frontières nationales.[8] Dans ce cadre, le migrant habiterait à la fois dans son pays d'origine et dans le lieu d'accueil feraient l'expérience d'une certaine ubiquité entre pays d'origine et pays d'accueil, aidé en cela par le développement des technologies de transport et de communication, grâce à des interactions réelles et symboliques.

Les théories de la migration sont certes utiles pour comprendre les décisions, les motivations et les orientations des flux migratoires à l'échelle mondiale. Elles fournissent des outils analytiques importants pour l'analyse des migrations saisonnières en Turquie contemporaine. Cependant, la focalisation sur la « migration » a également plusieurs inconvénients, puisqu'elle réfère principalement à un mouvement d'un lieu à un autre. Si les hypothèses et les affirmations des études des migrations permettent d'évaluer les flux migratoires réguliers et irréguliers, elles n'expliquent pas le cadre très mobile des zones rurales, façonné aujourd'hui par des mouvements diversifiés tels que les déplacements quotidiens entre et dans les villages, les périodes de travail et de séjour indéfinies des demandeurs d'asile et des réfugiés, et la transit-migration sur plusieurs pays. C'est pourquoi le concept de « mobilité » est nécessaire dans l'étude des migrations agricoles saisonnières contemporaines et dans la compréhension de leur fluidité.

Au tournant du XXI^{e} siècle, la circulation des personnes, des biens, de la monnaie, des technologies, des idées et des cultures s'est accélérée et développée par-delà les frontières locales et nationales. Sheller et Urry ont introduit le « paradigme des nouvelles mobilités »[9] qui se réfère à l'accélération des mobilités des personnes et des biens, à l'importance

8 Ayhan Kaya, "Uluslararası Göç Teorileri Bağlamında Yeni Göç Türlerini Anlamaya Çalışmak : Türkiye'de'Yabancı' ve'Öteki' Olmak', " in *Türkiye ve yeni uluslararası göçler*, (eds.) Ayhan Kaya and Muammer Tuna (Bursa : Sentez Yayıncılık, 2014), 21.

9 Mimi Sheller and John Urry, "The New Mobilities Paradigm" *Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space* 38, no. 2 (1 February 2006): 207–26. https://doi.org/10.1068/a37268.

croissante de lieux fixes comme les aéroports, et à l'organisation des mobilités en réseau. Les auteurs établissent la nécessité de changer de paradigme en sciences sociales - ce qu'ils appellent le « tournant des mobilités [mobility turn] » - qui permettrait de produire de nouvelles questions, de nouvelles théories et de nouvelles méthodes pour analyser comment « le monde semble être en mouvement ». Nous vivrions un Âge de la Migration[10], auquel l'espace rural n'est paradoxalement pas étranger, contrairement à la perspective commune qui considère les espaces ruraux et les communautés rurales comme stables, résistantes au changement, idylliques et homogènes.[11] Au contraire, les zones rurales se mondialisent[12] et se diversifient de plus en plus aujourd'hui, accueillant des migrants de différentes parties du monde, aux motivations multiples,[13] qui transforment l'espace rural en un lieu hybride aux caractéristiques et populations multiculturelles, internationales et pluralistes.[14]

Les nouvelles mobilités dans et vers les espaces ruraux soulèvent plusieurs questions importantes. Comment la « mobilité » progresse-t-elle dans la campagne par rapport à l'espace urbain ? Comment les nouvelles mobilités rurales interagissent-elles avec les transformations agricoles au niveau de la production, du travail et de la commercialisation ? Comment les transitions et les transformations de niveau macro pénètrent-elles la vie quotidienne et les routines de niveau micro à la campagne ? Quelles sont les réactions et les rôles des différents acteurs ruraux face

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10 Stephen Castles, Mark J Miller et Hein de Haas. *The Age of Migration* (New York, N.Y. ; Londres : Guilford, 2014).

11 Michael M. Bell et Giorgio Osti, " Mobilities and Ruralities : An Introduction, " *Sociologia Ruralis* 50, non. 3 (2010) : 199. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9523.2010.00518.x.

12 Michael Woods, " Engaging the Global Countryside : Globalization, Hybridity and the Reconstitution of Rural Place, " *Progress in Human Geography* 31, no. 4 (1er août 2007) : 485-507. https://doi.org/10.1177/0309132507079503.

13 Charlotta Hedberg et Karen Haandrikman, " Repopulation of the Swedish Countryside : Globalisation by International Migration ", *Journal of Rural Studies* 34 (1er avril 2014) : 137. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrurstud.2014.01.005.

14 Kye Askins, " Crossing Divides : Ethnicity and Rurality ", *Journal of Rural Studies*, De-centring White Ruralities : Ethnicité et indigénéité, 25 ans, non. 4 (1er octobre 2009) : 365-75. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrurstud.2009.05.009.

aux mobilités croissantes ? Dans ce contexte, comment les relations de pouvoir sont-elles reconstruites dans des communautés rurales très mobiles ? Autant de questions centrales aux études rurales. « L'intégration des migrants » dans le marché du travail agricole et dans les communautés rurales constitue le thème principal de la littérature émergente sur les mobilités des travailleurs saisonniers.

Premièrement, l'intégration au marché du travail est évaluée en fonction des besoins croissants de main-d'œuvre à bas salaires et précaire dans une économie agricole mondialisée, ce qui a eu pour effet d'accentuer les divisions sur le marché du travail. La différenciation des conditions de travail, des salaires et des heures de travail journalier pour le même emploi, peut être conceptualisé comme un marché du travail « segmenté », « dual », ou « primaire/secondaire ».

Rye et Andrzejewska[15] établissent par exemple l'émergence d'un marché du travail agricole secondaire en Norvège, après l'entrée des travailleurs des pays d'Europe de l'Est. Celui-ci est marqué par l'emploi informel, la marginalisation des travailleurs agricoles et l'acceptation d'un faible pouvoir de négociation par les migrants, qui construiraient leur cadre de référence à partir de la comparaison entre lieux de départ et lieux d'accueil, en termes de disponibilité des opportunités d'emploi et de meilleures conditions de vie. Dans le même ordre d'idées, le travail de Hoggart et Mendoza[16] sur les immigrés dans l'agriculture espagnole explique la segmentation du marché du travail, et l'incorporation des immigrés africains dans les « emplois non désirés » par les locaux. En outre, cette étude montre que les divisions[17] sur le marché du travail sont structurées par les relations de race, de genre, et ethniques, qui offrent aux

15 Johan Fredrik Rye et Joanna Andrzejewska, " The Structural Disempowerment of Eastern European Migrant Farm Workers in Norwegian Agriculture ", *Journal of Rural Studies* 26, no 1 (1er janvier 2010) : 41-51. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrurstud.2009.06.003.

16 Keith Hoggart et Cristóbal Mendoza, " African Immigrant Workers in Spanish Agriculture ", *Sociologia Ruralis* 39, non. 4 (1999) : 538-62. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9523.00123.

17 Edna Bonacich, " A Theory of Ethnic Antagonism : The Split Labor Market ", *American Sociological Review* 37, non. 5 (1972) : 547-59. https://doi.org/10.2307/2093450.

entrepreneurs et aux propriétaires agricoles des conditions favorables pour maximiser leur profit.

La diversité des conditions de travail des différents groupes de travailleurs a un double impact. Premièrement, elle réduit considérablement les coûts de main-d'œuvre en employant des travailleurs relativement défavorisés tels que les membres des groupes ethniques « marginalisés »,[18] les enfants, les femmes, les migrants sans-papiers, etc. Deuxièmement, l'évolution des niveaux de vulnérabilité en fonction de multiples facteurs - genre, âge, ethnicité, citoyenneté - constitute un obstacle au développement de la conscience de classe et la syndicalisation des travailleurs. Comme l'affirment Canales et Pérez , les migrants agricoles sont économiquement inclus dans les emplois les plus précaires et gagnent de faibles salaires, alors même qu'ils connaissent une immense vulnérabilité sociale.

L'intégration des migrants dans l'espace rural fait l'objet de nombreuses discussions, qui concernent la relation complexe entre mobilités rurales et inégalités sociales. L'enquête d'Oliva[19] montre les fragilités spatiales façonnées par la coexistence de différents groupes ruraux tels que les propriétaires agricoles, les travailleurs migrants, les retraités - qu'il définit comme des « melting pots » ruraux. Le processus difficile d'intégration des migrants ruraux est souligné par Hedberg et Haandrikman, qui montrent l'image « perturbée » du rural différemment des « ruralités blanches et idylliques » précédentes.[20] La pauvreté et l'ethnicité sont

18 Alejandro I. Canales et Carlos Pérez, " Inclusion and Segregation : The Incorporation of Latin American Immigrants into the U.S. Labor Market ", *Latin American Perspectives* 34, no 1 (2007) : 73-82.

19 Jesús Oliva, " Rural Melting-Pots, Mobilities and Fragilities : Réflexions sur le cas espagnol ", *Sociologia Ruralis* 50, non. 3 (2010) : 277-95. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9523.2010.00516.x.

20 Charlotta Hedberg et Karen Haandrikman, "Repopulation of the Swedish Countryside : Globalisation by International Migration, " *Journal of Rural Studies* 34 (1er avril 2014) : 128-38. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrurstud.2014.01.005.

donc devenues des thématiques actuelles importantes des études rurales[21], depuis que l'appauvrissement économique converge vers des identités ethniques « marginales », et produit des vulnérabilités socio-économiques, dans le cas des travailleurs agricoles migrants saisonniers. En somme, le groupe particulier des migrants est abordé séparément des autres. Kassimis[22] et Rye[23] le qualifie de sous-classe rurale, et Avallonne,[24] de « nouveau prolétariat international ».

Dans l'ensemble, les études rurales et migratoires soulignent les caractéristiques émergentes des nouveaux mécanismes d'inclusion économique et d'exclusion sociale en ce qui concerne les travailleurs migrants saisonniers dans l'espace rural. C'est pourquoi il nous semble pertinent de comprendre le rôle que peuvent jouer les travailleurs migrants saisonniers dans le processus de transformation agraire néolibérale contemporaine, en lien avec les structures politiques plus larges et les intérêts en jeu. Dans cette perspective théorique, cette thèse étudie et analyse l'impact de la transformation agraire sur les travailleurs migrants saisonniers. Elle se concentre sur trois piliers principaux : la mobilité, la dépossession, et l'espace, dans un contexte turc marqué par de récentes mobilités rurales, façonnées par différents processus de dépossession contribuant à remodeler les modèles économiques, sociaux et spatiaux dans la campagne.

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21 Voir par exemple, Gyöngyi Schwarcz, " Ethnicizing Poverty through Social Security Provision in Rural Hungary ", *Journal of Rural Studies*, *Rural* Realities in the Post-Socialist Space, 28, no 2 (1er avril 2012) : 99-107. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrurstud.2012.01.022.

22 Charalambos Kasimis, " Survival and Expansion : Migrants in Greek Rural Regions ", *Population, Space and Place* 14, no 6 (2008) : 511-24. https://doi.org/10.1002/psp.513.

23 Johan Fredrik Rye, " The Western European Countryside From An Eastern European Perspective : Case Of Migrant Workers In Norwegian Agriculture," *European Countryside* 6, no. 4 (décembre 2014) : 327-46. https://doi.org/10.2478/euco-2014-0018.

24 Cité dans Johan Fredrik Rye et Sam Scott, "International Labour Migration and Food Production in Rural Europe : A Review of the Evidence," *Sociologia Ruralis* 58, non. 4 (2018) : 928-52. https://doi.org/10.1111/soru.12208.

2.2. Paysans et travailleurs agricoles migrants saisonniers en Turquie

Les travailleurs migrants saisonniers en tant qu'unité d'analyse ont été longtemps négligés en Turquie. La littérature turque restait axée sur la petite paysannerie et la vie rurale. Les monographies rurales et les études de terrain publiées au cours des années 1940-1970 par Behice Boran[25], Niyazi Berkes[26], Mahmut Makal[27], Ibrahim Yasa[28], Mubeccel Kıray[29] et Kemal Karpat[30], sont parmi les rares sources qui permettent de comprendre l'organisation de l'économie rurale, son niveau de mécanisation et ses impacts sur la vie du village, la structure foncière, la division du travail, et son articulation avec les relations familiales et communautaires.

« Les paysans et la vie paysanne » sont devenus un sujet de recherche populaire dans les études rurales turques, dans le cadre de débats plus larges sur le marxisme et la transition au socialisme. Les travaux de Oya

25 Behice Boran, Toplumsal Yapı Araştırmaları Araştırmaları : İki Köy Çeşidinin Mukayeseli Tetkiki (Ankara : Türk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1945).

26 Niyazi Berkes, Bazı Ankara Köyleri Üzerinde Bir Araştırma (Ankara : Uzluk Basımevi, 1942).

27 Mahmut Makal, Bizim Köy : Bir Öğretmenin Notları Notları (Istanbul : Varlık Yayınları Yayınları, 1950).

28 Ibrahim Yasa, 25 Yıl Sonra Hasanoğlan Köyü Karşılaştırmalı Bir Toplumbilimsel Araştırma (Ankara : Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, 1969).

29 Mübeccel Kıray, Ereğli, Ereğli Ağır Sanayiden Önce Bir Sahil Kasabası (Istanbul : Bağlam Yayınları, 2000).

30 Kemal Karpat, " Social Effects of Farm Mechanization in Turkish Villages ", Social Research 27, no.1 (1960).

Köymen[31], Korkut Boratav[32], Çağlar Keyder[33], Bahattin Akşit[34] traitent du sort de la petite paysannerie. Les petites propriétés familiales se dissoudront-elles par l'entrée du capital dans les zones rurales, et les paysans survivront-ils au capitalisme agricole en s'intégrant au système avec leurs propres méthodes ? Autant de déclinaisons de la célèbre « Question Agraire »[35] en études rurales, qui négligent toutefois les travailleurs migrants saisonniers en tant que groupe de main-d'œuvre, et se limitent d'évaluer l'emploi agricole à l'aune de l' « agriculture familiale », du « métayage », ou du « fermage ». Ces études ne prennent en compte, comme migrants saisonniers, que les petits propriétaires terriens qui migrent pour travailler dans emplois temporaires afin de gagner un revenu supplémentaire.

Après 1980, l'intérêt pour les études rurales diminue de manière concomitamment à l'urbanisation rapide du pays. Suivant cette dynamique, les études urbaines, la migration rurale-urbaine, les ghettos urbains de-

31 Oya Köymen, Kapitalizm ve Köylülük : Ağalar - Üretenler- Patronlar (İstanbul : Yordam Yayınları, 2008).

32 Korkut Boratav, Tarımsal Yapılar ve Kapitalizm (Ankara : İmge Kitabevi, 2004).

33 Çağlar Keyder, " The Cycle of Sharecropping and the Consolidation of Small Peasant Ownership ", Journal of Peasant Studies 10, no 2-3 (1983).

34 Bahattin Akşit, " Kırsal Dönüşüm Dönüşüm ve Köy Araştırmaları : 1960-1980 " 11. Tez (1987).

35 La « question agraire » fait référence au débat du XIXe siècle dans la littérature qui évolue autour de la manière dont le monde rural sera restructuré après ou avec la transition vers les conditions du marché capitaliste. Elle comprend deux approches concurrentes. La thèse de la disparition plaidant essentiellement pour l'existence de trois classes paysannes (riche, moyenne et pauvre), affirme qu'elles se transformeront en deux : le capital agraire (paysans riches) et le travail prolétarien (paysans pauvres). La majorité des paysans moyens rejoindraient le groupe des pauvres, tandis que le reste minoritaire rejoindrait les groupes des paysans riches (Bernstein, 2009 : 58). La thèse opposée de la permanence affirme que les petits paysans indépendants pourraient survivre sous l'expansion capitaliste de l'agriculture en développant des stratégies de survie telles que l'auto-exploitation du travail familial. Ils s'adapteraient ainsi au système capitaliste sans devenir des « entrepreneurs capitalistes ». Farshad A. Araghi, " Global Depeasantization, 1945-1990 ", The Sociological Quarterly 36, no 2 (1995).

viennent les sujets d'actualité en sciences sociales. Les discussions animées sur les aspects de la culture et de l'économie paysannes, dans les années 1960 et 1970, s'estompent dans les années 1980 et 1990, à quelques exceptions près. Parmi ces exceptions, l'ouvrage de Murat Şeker[36] analyse les travailleurs agricoles, décrit leurs conditions de vie, de travail et de santé, et problématise leur intégration sociale à la société turque. L'étude de Karacan[37] examine également le statut juridique et social des travailleurs temporaires, et ses limites.

L'intérêt pour les études rurales connaît une revitalisation dans les années 2000, alors que l'importance des différents aspects du secteur agricole redevient un enjeu majeur. Sans prétendre aborder toutes les dimensions prises en compte par les nouvelles études rurales, il est utile de résumer, pour mieux la comprendre, la littérature récente concernant la migration saisonnière. C'est d'abord la « santé » et la question de la qualité de l'alimentation[38] qui devient, dans l'opinion publique et sous l'influence de certains médias, une question primordiale des études rurales. Les consommateurs urbains souhaitent se renseigner sur leur propre alimentation, et sur l'utilisation de semences génétiquement modifiées et de pesticides dans la production horticole, etc. Ainsi, les aliments biologiques et autres produits certifiés - notamment issus de la production certifiée « Bonnes Pratiques Agricoles » - sont promus par des médecins à travers des programmes télévisés, des livres, des journaux et magazines, en Turquie, comme dans d'autres pays. L'intérêt croissant pour l'alimentation suscite des interrogations sur la corporatisation de l'agriculture, la pollution environnementale, ou encore la préservation de la nature.

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36 Murat Şeker, Türkiye'de Tarım İşçilerinin Toplumsal Bütünleşmesi (Ankara : Değişim Yayınları, 1986).

37 Ali Rıza Karacan, Tarım Kesiminde Geçici Tarım İşçilerinin İşçilerinin Çalışma Çalışma Koşulları, Ücret Sistemleri ve Çalışanların Sosyal Güvenlikleri Üzerine Bir Araştırma : Manisa Örneği (Fredrich Ebert Vakfı, 1991).

38 'L'étude de Keyder et Yenal (2013) souligne 'l'importance du sujet "Alimentation" pour 'l'intérêt croissant pour 'l'agriculture.

Le coût élevé des aliments biologiques et d'autres produits certifiés incite les consommateurs urbains à rechercher des aliments sains à des prix plus modestes. En conséquence, des coopératives alternatives, qui fonctionnent comme un moyen direct entre les producteurs et les consommateurs - excluant les intermédiaires commerciaux - se développent dans les villes, renforçant l'agriculture de petite et moyenne échelle. Les produits non certifiés appelés « naturels », produits à partir de semences traditionnelles et d'anciennes méthodes de culture sont généralement considérés comme « bons » pour la santé et préférés aux autres. De plus, le retour aux produits naturels renforce les mouvements écologiques et l'activisme paysan.

Dans le prolongement de ces préoccupations, les études sur la souveraineté alimentaire, la mondialisation de l'agriculture, l'agriculture alternative, les coopératives agricoles et l'écologie, se multiplient ces dernières années[39]. Les études contemporaines contribuent à esquisser et à diffuser une nouvelle perception de la ruralité qui la distingue des modèles socio-économiques du passé. Les stratégies de survie de la paysannerie, pour contrer les politiques économiques néolibérales à l'échelon local, deviennent également des questions d'actualité. Ces différentes stratégies, qui comportent la diversification des revenus des membres des ménages paysans, la création d'opportunités alternatives d'investissement rural, le développement de l'écotourisme, combinées à un certain

39 Par exemple, Mehmet Ecevit, Nadide Karkıner et Mehmet Ecevit, " Köy Sosyolojisininin Daraltılmış Kapsamından Kapsamından, Tarım-Gıda-Köylülük İlişkilerine ", Mülkiye 33 (2009) ; Zafer Yenal, " Türkiye'de Gıda Üretimininin Yeniden Yapılandırılması ", Toplum ve Bilim 88 (2001) ; Kenan Demirkol, " Beslenmenin Demokratikleştirilmesi ", *Mülkiye* 33 (2009) ; Cemil Aksu, Sinan Erensü et Erdem Evren, *Sudan Sebepler : Türkiye'de de neo-liberal su-enerji politikaları ve direnişler* (İstanbul : İletişim Yayınları, 2016) ; Leah Temper, Mariana Walter, Iokiñe Rodriguez, Ashish Kothari et Ethemcan Turhan. " A Perspective on Radical Transformations to Sustainability : Résistances, mouvements et alternatives ", *Sustainability Science* 13, non. 3 (1er mai 2018) : 747-64. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11625-018-0543-8.

effacement des frontières entre zones rurales et urbaines, sont conceptualisés comme les enjeux cruciaux dans l'approche de la « nouvelle paysannerie ».[40]

L'abondante littérature sur la nouvelle paysannerie fournit d'importants outils pour analyser la situation agraire actuelle sous l'angle des changements sociaux et spatiaux, au fur et à mesure du changement des relations de pouvoir et du remodelage de la vie rurale, simultanément avec les politiques macro-économiques. Mais la question de l'émergence d'un « nouveau régime du travail » n'est pas encore introduite dans ces travaux. L'étude de Öztürk et al. affirme que la pénétration capitaliste dans la production agricole ne dissout pas la petite agriculture paysanne, qui aurait réussi à se maintenir en diversifiant ses revenus - par l'emploi urbain de certains membres du ménage - et en réduisant les problèmes financiers grâce aux relations communautaires et de voisinage - par exemple, en contractant des prêts aux habitants des villages, et non aux banques.[41]

Le rôle de la main-d'œuvre migrante à moindre coût, relative à la diversité ethnique de la main-d'œuvre, et le rôle des petits exploitants agricoles en tant qu' « employeurs » fait défaut dans ces études. La résistance de la petite paysannerie est plutôt évaluée en fonction de son adaptabilité au nouveau système, par la diversification des revenus, l'agriculture contractuelle, les pratiques alternatives d'endettement, etc. Par ailleurs, les études sur les travailleurs migrants saisonniers[42] ne parviennent pas à

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40 Voir Murat Öztürk, Joost Jongerden et Andy Hilton. " La (re)production de la nouvelle paysannerie en Turquie ", *Journal of Rural Studies* 61 (juillet 2018) : 244-54, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrurstud.2017.10.009 ; Çağlar ; Çağlar Keyder et Zafer Yenal, *Bildiğimiz Tarımın Sonu Küresel İktidar ve Köylülük* (İstanbul : İletişim Yayınları, 2011).

41 La critique de la nouvelle littérature paysanne sur l'agriculture turque est approfondie dans la sous-section « Vers une nouvelle paysannerie ? ou une nouvelle force de travail agricole » du chapitre 4.

42 Par exemple, Uygar D. Yıldırım, *1980 Sonrası Türkiye Tarımında Yapısal Yapısal Yapısal Dönüşüm ve Mevsimlik Tarım İşçileri* (Ph.D. Diss., Istanbul University, 2014) ; Ayşegül Özbek, *New Actors of New Poverty : The 'Other' Children of Çukurova* (M.A. Thesis. Middle East Technical University, 2007) ; Sidar Çınar, *Bağımlı Çalışma Çalışma İlişkileri Örneği*

les resituer dans un contexte globalisé qui affecte les relations employeurs-travailleurs. Bien qu'un certain nombre d'auteurs soulignent la pertinence du contexte mondial, cette question demeure à peine explorée dans leurs analyses, qui se concentrent sur les travailleurs migrants saisonniers en tant que groupe ethnique victime de discrimination dans les relations de travail. Peu d'attention est accordée au statut vulnérable des travailleurs migrants - qui évolue en fonction du statut juridique, du niveau de dépossession et de l'appartenance ethnique - dans la restructuration néolibérale de l'agriculture turque. Pour combler cette lacune dans la littérature, nous examinons le statut des travailleurs migrants saisonniers dans le processus de transformation agraire en tant que relation réciproque entre employeurs et travailleurs, et son impact sur l'évolution de la nature socio-spatiale de la campagne. Notre cadre conceptuel est constitué par les mobilités rurales, la dépossession, et l'ethnicisation du travail, qui s'entremêlent pour produire des conceptions alternatives de l'espace rural, modifiant les relations productives et reproductives. Cette perspective présente des avancées importantes pour comprendre l'ampleur et la dynamique des mobilités rurales et de la transformation agraire en Turquie. Depuis les années 1990, l'urbanisation coexiste avec des transformations économiques néolibérales, la violence interne dans les régions de l'Est et du Sud-Est, et enfin la guerre civile syrienne. L'étude de l'espace agraire turc permet de s'interroger à nouveaux frais sur la transformation agraire et le travail des migrants temporaires, grâce au caractère unique du cas en termes d'agenda économique, social et politique.

Cette thèse étudie le processus de transformation agraire, la question kurde et les flux migratoires internationaux récents vers la Turquie, démontrant leurs liens dans un monde du travail et un espace productif en

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Kapsamında Mevsimlik Tarım İşçilerinin Malatya Örneği Üzerinden Analizi (Ph.D. diss., Istanbul University, 2012). Deniz Duruiz, Travailleurs agricoles saisonniers à Manisa : Materialization of Labor, Bodies and Places through Everyday Encounters (Thèse de maîtrise, Université de Bogazici, 2011) ; Ayse Küçükkırca, " Etnisite, Toplumsal Cinsiyet ve Sınıf Ekseninde Mevsimlik Kürt Tarım İşçileri ", *Toplum ve Kuram Dergisi* 6 (2012).

mutation. Comment l'afflux migratoire contemporain s'est-il ancré dans la transformation agricole, dans le cas particulier de la Turquie ? Quelles sont les conséquences sociales, politiques, économiques et spatiales de la transformation d'anciens espaces relativement isolés en des espaces axés sur le marché et connectés au monde ? La section suivante se concentre sur l'afflux de migrants et examine la géopolitique des flux migratoires en ce qui concerne l'emploi saisonnier des migrants dans l'agriculture turque.

3. Géopolitiques des migrations saisonnières dans l'agriculture turque : nouvelles cartographies et acteurs émergents.

Les flux migratoires récents diffèrent historiquement des précédents par leurs causes géopolitiques ainsi que leurs conséquences sur la société turque. Par conséquent, cette partie présente un aperçu de la manière dont la politique changeante du gouvernement provoque et réglemente des flux de migration et d'immigration sans précédents, qui recomposent les relations de pouvoir à l'échelle locale, régionale et internationale et a des conséquences considérables sur le travail agricole des migrants. À travers un point de vue géopolitique critique, nous nous intéressons non seulement aux voies de migration et d'immigration des travailleurs mais également aux mécanismes sous-jacents des pôles de pouvoir antagonistes et leurs différentes alliances qui ayant un impact quantitatif et qualitatif sur les flux de migrants agricoles.

Dans un premier temps nous déconstruisons les luttes de pouvoir sur un territoire donné. Comme l'affirme Yves Lacoste, le territoire géographique est essentiel à la géopolitique mais il est important de dépasser les limites physiques de l'espace afin d'analyser les hommes et les femmes qui y vivent et les autorités qu'ils reconnaissent ou contre lesquelles ils se battent à cause de faits historiques qu'ils se racontent à tort ou à raison et les craintes et représentations qu'ils ont de leur passé et de

leur futur, proche et lointain[43]. À cet égard, nous explorons comment les mouvements deviennent significatifs et se transforment en mobilité par le biais de la politique et de l'idéologie. La création de nouvelles images géopolitiques de « menace », « domination », « violence », « exclusion », « inclusion », et d'« identité » joue un rôle crucial dans la détermination des préférences en matière de politiques migratoires.

L'imagination géopolitique peut également redéfinir des ennemis comme des alliés potentiels et des zones de conflits précédentes comme de potentielles zones d'influence[44]. À partir de ce constat, nous nous intéressons à la manière dont les relations et les images géopolitiques s'inscrivent dans le processus de migration et d'immigration en Turquie, influençant la mobilité et les représentations. À cet effet, nous combinons les données conceptuelles et cartographiques à travers les facteurs matériels - à savoir les limites spatiales et la proximité des paysages territoriaux -, aux données conceptuelles et imaginaires contenues dans les discours sur l'identité, la perception, les préjudices et la discrimination positive et négative pour définir une forme distincte de relation entre pouvoir et géographie.

Dans cette partie, nous soutenons que l'approche géographique fournit de nouvelles idées et visions pour comprendre les transformations politiques au sein des relations intérieures et extérieures, qui déterminent les politiques régionales, nationales et internationales. Cela nous permet d'identifier les principaux acteurs dans les relations de pouvoir et d'analyser les représentations dans divers domaines comme les questions de culture, de langue et de genre. L'analyse géopolitique est néces-

43 Yves Lacoste, "La géographie, la géopolitique et le raisonnement géographique," Herodote, no. 130.

44 Bülent Aras and Hakan Fidan. "Turkey and Eurasia: Frontiers of a New Geographic Imagination," *New Perspectives on Turkey* 40 (2009): 194, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0896634600005276.

saire à la conception d'un territoire dynamique de migrations et de mobilités saisonnières formées par les différents intérêts de divers acteurs et leurs motivations face à des enjeux complexes.[45]

À cet effet, nous esquissons les politiques néo-ottomanistes intérieures et extérieures des années 1990, ayant influencé la politique sélective turque à l'égard des immigrants en déterminant leur statut d'éligibilité en tant que « citoyen », « travailleur », « résident », « bénéficiaire des services d'éducation ou de santé » ou d'autres besoins essentiels à la survie. Nous soutenons que le rôle du néo-ottomanisme dans la politique intérieure et extérieure fournit un outil indispensable dans la compréhension des relations complexes entre géopolitique et migration. Nous abordons ensuite les vagues migratoires en provenance du Caucase, de la Syrie et du Kurdistan avec les dynamiques géopolitiques qui remodèlent les migrations et les mobilités saisonnières agricoles.

3.1. Le Néo-Ottomanisme dans les politiques intérieures et extérieures : nouveaux défis pour la Turquie et le Moyen-Orient.

Au cours des trois dernières décennies, les politiques néo-ottomanistes ont été l'un des principaux facteurs de mobilités au sein et à l'extérieur de la Turquie. Le néo-ottomanisme est traditionnellement défini comme une politique étrangère ferme, principalement dans les ex-régions ottomanes qui établit de nouveaux liens et relations dans les domaines de l'économie, la politique et de la culture, particulièrement avec les pays turciques et islamiques. L'outil politique le plus important de cette approche est la référence ottomane au passé commun, souligné par le partage d'une langue, d'une religion et d'une culture commune. La Turquie a émergé en tant qu'acteur régional dans les pays voisins du Moyen-Orient, des Balkans et du Caucase avec le discours du Néo-ottomanisme depuis les années 1990. Les missions de médiation de la Turquie au Moyen-

45 Pour une information détaillée sur 'l'analyse critique et géopolitiqye, voir Stéphane Rosière, "Géographie politique, géopolitique et géostratégie: distinctions opératoires," *'L'Information Géographique* 65, no. 1 (2001): 37, https://doi.org/10.3406/ingeo.2001.2732.

Orient sur des questions comme le conflit israélo-arabe, l'invasion de l'Irak par les Etats-Unis, la guerre du Kossovo ou encore la guerre civile syrienne ont toutes souligné le rôle de la Turquie dans la région, comme une puissance douce et stricte mais toujours avec un certain pouvoir régional. Dans le milieu universitaire et politique, cette nouvelle présence dans le voisinage de la Turquie a été qualifiée de Néo-ottomanisme[46] ou de Moyen-Orientalisation[47] et est interprétée comme l'abandon de l'Occident en faveur de l'Orient.

3.2. Les premières vagues de migration issues du Caucase après le démantèlement de l'Union Soviétique.

Ces dernières années, les flux migratoires en provenance du Caucase ont considérablement augmenté, ce qui a entraîné une augmentation du nombre de travailleurs migrants saisonniers originaires de Géorgie et d'Azerbaïdjan[48]. L'émergence et la croissance de cette migration s'expliquent par la dissolution de l'Union Soviétique qui a entraîné en 1991 l'indépendance des Républiques d'Azerbaïdjan, d'Arménie et de Géorgie. La Turquie reconnaît ces trois républiques immédiatement et établit des relations diplomatiques avec la Géorgie et l'Azerbaïdjan. Plusieurs conflits, nettoyages ethniques, coups d'état et guerres ont lieu pendant le vide politique ayant suivi la dissolution de l'Union Soviétique. Les affrontements ethniques entre les Azerbaidjanais et les Arméniens en 1994, les guerres en Abkhazie et en Ossétie du Sud entre 1992 et 2008 et les guerres russo-

46 Henri J Barkey. "Turkish Foreign Policy and the Middle East," Science Po CERI Strategy Papers, CNRS Editions 10 (Juin, 2011): 1-14.

47 Tarik Oğuzlu, "Middle Easternization of Turkey's Foreign Policy: Does Turkey Dissociate from the West?," Turkish Studies 9, no. 1 (Mars 2008): 3-20. https://doi.org/10.1080/14683840701813960.

48 Si ce flux de migrants inclue les Arméniens, nous nous intéressons uniquement aux Géorgiens et aux Azerbaidjanais car ces deux groupes de migrants travaillent en tant que travailleurs saisonniers dans l'agriculture turque tandis que les Arméniens travaillent principalement dans les travaux domestiques urbains.

tchétchénes entre 1994 et 2000 ont plus particulièrement provoqué d'importants flux migratoires de réfugiés et de déplacés internes[49], ayant migré vers différentes régions des pays environnants, notamment la Turquie. La réponse de Turgut Özal, premier ministre de 1983 à 1989 puis président de 1989 à 1993 et partisan des politiques néo-ottomanes, est positive vis-à-vis des flux migratoires, conformément à ses opinions néo-ottomanistes favorables à l'augmentation des éléments turco-musulmans dans la société. Il donne son point de vue ci-dessous :

> « Lorsque l'on observe cet espace géopolitique de la Mer Adriatique à l'Asie Centrale sous l'autorité de la Turquie, on réalise que cet espace est modelé et dominé par les populations ottomanes-musulmanes et turciques. Les populations ottomanes-musulmanes partagent le même héritage et destin historique que les Turcs d'Anatolie et se considèrent toujours comme « turcs » dans le sens religieux et culturel. Ces groupes vivent en Bosnie, en Albanie, au Kosovo, en Macédoine, au Caucase ou encore en Thrace occidentale ». [50]

Il utilise de manière pragmatique les avantages des identités ethniques et religieuses pour étendre l'influence turque en faisant référence à une « nouvelle géographie imaginée ». Les développements internationaux offrent à Özal des opportunités favorables pour réaliser son objectif de créer une politique étrangère turque proactive et d'étendre les marchés régionaux de biens turcs tout en cherchant à éliminer les frontières économiques dans les Balkans, le Caucase et les pays du Moyen-Orient et

49 Fabio Salomoni, "The Caucasian Borders, Labor Migrants and Refugees" in Nurcan Özgür Baklacioğlu and Yeşim Özer (eds) Migration, Asylum, and Refugees in Turkey: Studies in the Control of Population at the Southeastern Borders of the EU (Lewiston: Mellen, 2014): 339.

50 Turgut Özal, "Türkiye'nin Önünde Hacet Kapıları Açılmıştır," Türkiye Günlüğü 19 (1992): 14.

ainsi de permettre la libre circulation des biens, des idées et des individus[51]. À ce sujet, l'identité ottomane est l'élément clé de la construction des discours et des politiques :

> « Comme sous l'Empire ottoman, il est aujourd'hui possible de transcender les différences ethniques à travers l'identité islamique. Nous estimons que l'élément constitutif le plus puissant de l'identité dans cette société est l'Islam. C'est la religion qui réunit les musulmans d'Anatolie et des Balkans. Par conséquent, l'Islam est le ciment puissant de la coexistence et de la coopération entre différents groupes musulmans. Être turc dans l'espace ex-ottoman signifie être musulman ou inversement ». [52]

L'identification des éléments turcs et musulmans relatifs à l'identité ottomane est la formulation de la carte cognitive politique d'Özal dans les relations étrangères. Dans cette perspective, en tant que dirigeant, il développe les relations politico-économiques avec les pays et communautés turcs et/ou musulmans. Sur le plan économique, Özal joue un rôle clé dans l'établissement de l'Organisation de Coopération Économique de la Mer Noire en 1992 dans l'objectif de renforcer l'environnement des affaires. Özal vise également à développer les liens culturels au-delà des relations économiques en rejoignant l'Organisation Internationale pour la Culture Turque (TÜRKSOY), qui regroupe les pays turcophones d'Asie centrale et l'Azerbaïdjan en plus des républiques turcophones de la fédération russe. La vision néo-ottomaniste d'Özal est prolongée par la politique de Recep Tayyip Erdoğan depuis 2002.

Sur le plan militaire, la Turquie et la Géorgie signent de multiples accords de défense mutuelle: les forces militaires turques aident à moderniser les institutions militaires géorgiennes ; les experts de la Force Aérienne Turque se rendent en Géorgie afin d'aider à la reconstruction de

51 Yavuz, "Social and Intellectual," 454.

52 Özal, "Türkiye'nin Önünde,"17.

l'aérodrome militaire et à participer à la formation des officiers de l'Armée de l'Air géorgiens. Les officiers turcs et géorgiens développent un programme militaire commun afin de protéger les pipelines ; des soldats géorgiens opèrent sous le commandement turc au Kosovo dans le cadre d'opérations de paix menées par les Nations Unies ; des entreprises turques modernisent l'aéroport de Batum qui est ouvert pour un usage commun par les deux pays.[53] Lors des premières années de la période AKP, l'une des conséquences majeures des visites du premier ministre Erdoğan en Géorgie est le lancement d'un projet de voie ferrée entre la Turquie, la Géorgie et l'Azerbaïdjan. Le projet de voie ferrée Kars-Tbilissi-Bakou est approuvé par les trois chefs d'État en Géorgie en 2007.

Les acteurs émergents de l'économie (l'Organisation de Coopération Économique de la Mer Noire), de la culture (TURKSOY) et la coopération étroite en matière militaire et énergétique contribuent au développement des relations diplomatiques bilatérales entre la Turquie et les pays du Caucase. L'une des conséquences majeures du rapprochement entre ces pays est l'accord d'exemption de visa signé en 1996 par la Turquie et la Géorgie permettant aux citoyens de séjourner dans chaque pays pendant 30 jours sans visa, cette durée s'étend à 90 jours en 2006. Depuis 2011 grâce à un nouveau protocole entre ces deux pays, une simple carte d'identité suffit à passer la frontière. Ces facilités de visa entraînent directement une augmentation du nombre de visiteurs. Par exemple, le nombre de Géorgiens ayant franchi la frontière turque s'élève à environ 161 000 en 2002 et atteint les 2 millions en 2017.[54]

Les Géorgiens viennent habituellement avec des visas de touristes et travaillent en tant qu'agriculteurs saisonniers pour trois mois avant de rentrer en Géorgie. En d'autres termes, ils effectuent une sorte de migration circulaire augmentant chaque année. En fait, les autorités politiques ne le déclarent pas réellement mais l'exemption de visa de trois mois

53 Aras and Fidan, "Turkey and Eurasia," 207.

54 The Ministry of Culture and Tourism, Border Statistics (2002-2017). https://yigm.ktb.gov.tr/TR-201111/sinir-istatistikleri.html

fournit d'importants avantages aux producteurs et travailleurs pour couvrir la période de récolte car les ambitions politiques des autorités se rejoignent sur le besoin d'une main-d'œuvre « bon marché » de petits et moyens producteurs agricoles grâce à la migration circulaire. Des études réalisées sur le terrain[55] montrent que les Géorgiens préfèrent travailler dans la récolte de thé et de noisettes dans la région de la Mer Noire. Comme Saskia Sassen l'affirme, les liens culturels et historiques jouent traditionnellement un rôle important pour déterminer les flux migratoires au cours des siècles[56]. Les liens historiques entre les deux pays sont devenus un facteur important pour le choix du travail et l'accueil des immigrants géorgiens.

À travers les siècles, les deux régions voisines - la Turquie et le Caucase - sont témoins d'intenses échanges économiques et culturels mais également de migrations de populations, lors de guerres ou de conflits.[57] Grâce à leur affinité historique, aujourd'hui la région de la Mer Noire en Turquie est marquée par la présence de quelques villages géorgiens. La capacité à parler le géorgien de certains turcs et les habitudes culturelles communes aux deux peuples constituent d'importants facteurs encourageant la migration d'immigrants géorgiens. Cette affinité socio-culturelle a un impact sur les relations entre les immigrants et les habitants locaux. Les attitudes des populations locales de la région de la Mer Noire sont bien plus accueillantes envers les Géorgiens qu'envers d'autres groupes de migrants. Par exemple, les salaires journaliers des Géorgiens sont plus élevés que ceux des travailleurs[58] syriens ou kurdes de Turquie en raison de la familiarité des Géorgiens avec les cultures locales et de l'assiduité

55 Saniye Dedeoğlu, Türkiye'de Mevsimlik Tarımsal Üretimde Yabancı Göçmen İşçiler Mevcut Durum Raporu Yoksulluk Nöbetinden Yoksulların Rekabetine (Kalkınma Atölyesi, 2016) ; Pınar Uyan Semerci et al., Mevsimlik Gezici Tarım İşçiliği 2014 Araştırma Raporu (Hayata Destek İnsani Yardım Derneği, 2014); Deniz Pelek, Seasonal migrant workers in agriculture: The cases of Ordu and Polatlı (MA Thesis, Bogazici University, 2010).

56 Saskia Sassen, A Sociology of Globalization (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2007).

57 Salomoni, "The Caucasian Borders," 339.

58 Dedeoğlu, Yoksulluk Rekabetinden, 16

des employeurs-propriétaires fonciers[59]. Selon le rapport « Enhancing the Role of Georgian Emigrants at Home » (2014), les femmes ont plus tendance à migrer vers la Turquie en raison d'un marché du travail insensible au genre en Géorgie.[60] En tant que tel, le modèle de migration des Géorgiens diffère de celui des autres migrants. Tandis que les migrants kurdes de l'Est de la Turquie et les réfugiés syriens occupent des emplois agricoles saisonniers avec leur famille, les Géorgiens préfèrent venir travailler seuls dans les exploitations agricoles turques. Les femmes sont traditionnellement logées au domicile des exploitants afin d'économiser pour leur famille restée en Géorgie. Quant aux hommes, ils trouvent à se loger dans des chambres pour célibataires à Ordu et Giresun[61].

De la même façon, les flux de migrants azerbaidjanais sont les bienvenus dans ce contexte politique. Depuis 1991, les relations turco-azerbaidjanaises s'inscrivent dans le discours principal de parenté ethnique, la *turcité*, bien illustré par le slogan « Une nation, deux états », une phrase utilisée par Haydar Aliev lors d'un discours au parlement turc en 1995.[62] Par la suite, cette phrase devient une expression symbolique dans différentes activités organisées par chaque pays, comme par exemple, la commémoration de l'indépendance de l'Azerbaïdjan qui est célébrée dans différentes villes turques ; ou encore les conférences, concerts et séminaires « un millet deux nations » qui sont organisés dans les deux pays.[63] La notion de fraternité turque est fortement soulignée par les dirigeants. Ainsi, Tayyip Erdoğan déclare : « Nos pays possèdent 78 cimetières de martyrs dans 24 pays différents. L'Azerbaïdjan est le pays qui compte le plus de

59 Pelek, Seasonal Migrant in Agriculture, 101.

60 Dedeoglu, Yoksulluk Nobetinden, 86.

61 Pelek, Seasonal Migrant in Agriculture.

62 Salomoni, "The Caucasian Borders" 350

63 Par exemple, « Azerbaycan'da 'Bir Millet İki Devlet' Sanat Gecesi Düzenlendi » TRT Haber, October 27, 2018, URL : https://www.trthaber.com/haber/kultur-sanat/azerbaycanda-bir-millet-iki-devlet-sanat-gecesi-programi-duzenlendi-391256.html and « Bir Millet İki Devlet Konseri CRR'de Gerçekleşti » Habertürk, December 13, 2018, URL : https://www.haberturk.com/bir-millet-iki-devlet-konseri-crrde-gerceklesti-2258806#

martyrs avec 1132 cimetières suivi par la Turquie. Ces martyrs représentent aussi le destin commun des deux nations[64] ». « Le sang », « les martyrs », « la mort » servent de concepts clés à la construction d'un « millet » imaginaire au-delà des frontières.

De bonnes relations diplomatiques se reflètent dans d'autres domaines tels que l'énergie et l'économie. Après l'indépendance de l'Azerbaïdjan, l'oléoduc Bakou-Tbilissi-Ceyhan (BTC) devient une projection importante pour les états comme la Turquie qui souhaitent trouver un accès garanti aux ressources énergétiques vitales. Le BTC est achevé en 2006 et devient un oléoduc de transit vital pour la Turquie[65]. Les bonnes relations qu'entretiennent la Turquie et l'Azerbaïdjan dans les domaines de l'énergie, de l'économie et de la diplomatie dirigent les migrants azerbaidjanais vers le territoire turc dans un mouvement circulaire comme c'est le cas avec les Géorgiens. Bien entendu, des raisons de migration économique, comme un taux élevé de chômage et de mauvaises conditions de travail dans leur pays d'origine sont des facteurs importants, mais la préférence des migrants azerbaidjanais pour la Turquie est étroitement liée à la promotion de la migration au travers des discours accueillants et des facilités bureaucratiques pour franchir la frontière[66]. Selon l'accord sur les visas conclu entre la Turquie et l'Azerbaïdjan, les Azerbaidjanais peuvent obtenir leur visa à la frontière turque et y séjourner 30 jours, ce qui facilite les aller et retours et affecte leur préférence de travailler en Turquie.[67] Le régime de visa plus flexible et des relations diplomatiques améliorées ont entraîné une augmentation considérable

64 "Erdoğan: İki Devlet Bir Millet Diyerek Sembolleştirdiğimiz Kemik Kardeşliğimizi İdrak Ediyoruz" Haberler.com, September 15, 2018, URL: https://www.haberler.com/erdogan-iki-devlet-bir-millet-diyerek-11236244-haberi/

65 Emre İşeri, "Geopolitics of Oil and Pipelines in the Eurasian Heartland," in The Politics of Caspian Oil edited by Bülent Gökay, (London: Routledge, 2001).

66 Dedeoğlu attire 'l'attention sur 'l'augmentation du nombre de migrants irréguliers originaires 'd'Azerbaijan et les procedures de visa facilities, Dedeoğlu, Yoksulluk Nobetinden, 58 and 93.

67 Ibid., 57.

du nombre de visiteurs azerbaidjanais qui est passé de 177 000 à 765 000 entre 2001 et 2017.[68]

Dans la même optique des habitudes de travail des Géorgiens, les migrants azerbaidjanais travaillent principalement dans l'élevage dans la région de Kars-Ardahan-Iğdır située dans le Nord-Est de la Turquie, une région dans laquelle une population importante turco-azéri vit déjà. La parenté est un facteur considérable sur plusieurs niveaux pour les flux migratoires car les proches de ces Azerbaidjanais se sont installés dans les régions de Nakhcivan et de Kars-Iğdır.[69] Les déplacements entre les deux régions pour rendre visites aux proches et disposer d'un réseau social basé sur les relations familiales, semblent être des catalyseurs facilitant la migration. Ainsi, les avantages de la langue, l'affinité ethnique, la proximité géographique et les facilités de visa augmentent le nombre de passages de la frontière à la douane de Dilucu, en août, la saison de la tonte du gazon pour l'élevage.[70] De plus, les études de Saniye Dedeoglu révèlent que la majorité des azerbaidjanais restent en Turquie en situation irrégulière après l'expiration de leur visa. Pour eux, un emploi agraire temporaire à Kars est une première étape afin d'économiser avant de pouvoir ensuite migrer vers de grandes villes comme Istanbul et Izmir et y trouver un emploi sur le marché urbain dans l'espoir de devenir résident permanent.

Les deux flux migratoires caucasiens vers l'agriculture turque montrent l'impact du passage à une politique néo-ottomaniste sur les afflux de migrants. L'orientation turco-musulmane de l'approche géopolitique reflète la dualité entre migrants « désirés » et « non désirés[71] ». Ici, l'affirmation d'Yves Lacoste sur les représentations positives et négatives de la migration est un outil explicatif car il démontre parfaitement l'évaluation

68 Ministère de la Culture et du Tourisme, Statistiques de la frontière (2002-2017). https://yigm.ktb.gov.tr/TR-201111/sinir-istatistikleri.html

69 Dedeoğlu, Yoksulluk Nobetinden, 135.

70 Ibid., 93.

71 Michel Agier, Managing *the Undesirables* (Polity Press, 2011).

relative du contexte de migration en plein changement, afin de représenter de manière positive les migrants grâce à leur identité ethnique et leur langue commune à celle des communautés d'accueil, face à la montée des tensions reposant sur différentes identités religieuses et nationales entre autochtones et étrangers.[72]

Lacoste illustre d'un côté le cas des migrants francophones au Québec dont le portrait est dressé de manière positive, comme des personnes possédant la même langue et une même identité ethnique, ce qui mène à un encouragement de la migration. De l'autre côté la migration économique des pays postcoloniaux ou des pays économiquement sous-développés vers la France souffre d'une représentation négative reposant sur les différences ethniques et religieuses entre les groupes de migrants et leur pays d'accueil. À cet égard, plutôt que de maintenir l'intégration, mettre un terme aux groupes de migrants marqués par une représentation négative est devenu un objectif pour les autorités politiques. Les arguments de Lacoste sont instructifs pour évaluer et comprendre la situation complexe de la migration. En Turquie, alors que les migrants originaires d'Afrique et du Moyen-Orient ont une image négative et un statut de « migrant en transit » ou de « sans-papier », les migrants turcs d'Azerbaïdjan et les réfugiés musulmans de Géorgie sont incorporés à la société avec une représentation positive sur un plan politique. L'identité commune des Turcs avec les Azerbaidjanais et l'identité musulmane commune avec les Géorgiens sont les piliers de la construction du discours de *fraternité.*[73]

72 Yves Lacoste, Dictionnaire de géopolitique (Paris: Flammarion, 1993): 1024.

73 Un autre exemple peut être les turcs bulgares qui ont émigré en Turquie pendant les années 1990 suite à la déportation des musulmans par 'l'état bulgare. Nous pouvons retrouver des signes de représentation positive pour ces groupes de migrants dans 'l'augmentation du nombre de migrants, les discours accueillants et les bonnes relations diplomatiques entre les états concernant la migration.

3.3. La seconde vague de migration : « Réfugisation » de l'emploi migrant saisonnier après la guerre de Syrie

À la différence des migrants géorgiens et azerbaidjanais, les Syriens se réfugient en Turquie depuis 2011 suite à la guerre civile en cours dans la région. Jusqu'à présent, 3,6 millions de réfugiés sont arrivés en Turquie et le chiffre ne cesse d'augmenter.[74] Du fait de sa proximité avec la Syrie, l'identité religieuse et ethnique commune et la mise en place d'une politique d'ouverture des frontières, la Turquie devient la destination préférée des réfugiés syriens devant le Liban, la Jordanie et l'Irak. Les flux de réfugiés vers la Turquie ont changé au cours du temps en fonction de l'insécurité et de la violence croissante en Syrie.

Alors que le nombre de réfugiés syriens s'élève à 224 655 en 2013, 1 519 289 réfugiés en 2014, et 2 503 549 en 2015, il atteint aujourd'hui 3,6 millions de Syriens enregistrés[75]. Les chiffres exceptionnels en matière d'afflux de réfugiés au cours des années 2014 et 2015 montrent un « long été de migration »[76] avec l'arrivée d'un nombre considérable de réfugiés dû à l'intensification des combats rapprochés dans la région qui entraîne de nombreux défis pour la Turquie. Comme François Dumont l'affirme, le conflit syrien représente un cas extrêmement intéressant au-delà des frontières du Moyen-Orient, avec ses challenges, ses conflits et ses acteurs.[77]

Il ne s'agit pas simplement d'une guerre entre un régime et des forces anti-régime, mais plutôt d'un conflit pluriel[78] à l'échelle locale, régionale

74 UNCHR, Situation Syria Regional Refugee Response, lu le 10 Mars 2019, URL: [https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria].

75 Ibid.

76 Gökçe Yurdakul, Regina Römhild, Anja Schwanhäußer, Birgit Zur Nieden, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, and Institut für Europäische Ethnologie. Witnessing the Transition Moments in the Long Summer of Migration. (Berlin: Berlin Institute for Empirical Integration and Migration Research (BIM), 2017).

77 Gérard-Francois Dumont,"Syrie et Irak: Une Migration sans Précédent Historique?" Diploweb.com, 2015, 1-17.

78 Ibid., 5-7.

et mondiale qui créé un cadre complexe en Turquie au carrefour de diverses relations de pouvoir. À l'échelle locale, outre l'armée syrienne, le YPG et l'État Islamique, beaucoup de groupes de djihadistes comme le Hezbollah, l'armée syrienne libre, l'armée libre d'Idlib et les soldats d'Al-Aqsa[79] sont impliqués dans cette guerre.

Une grande partie de divers groupes différents participant au conflit amplifient l'instabilité régionale et les réticences donnent lieu à une guerre civile prolongée en Syrie. À l'échelle régionale du Moyen-Orient, les pays comme l'Arabie Saoudite, le Qatar, le Liban, l'Iran et l'Irak ont tous des intérêts et des alliances différentes. Tandis que l'Iran, la Russie et l'Irak soutiennent l'armée nationale syrienne, l'Arabie Saoudite, le Qatar et la Turquie se rangent du côté de l'armée libre de la Syrie face au régime d'Assad. Toutes ces alliances et ces oppositions entre États sont reconfigurées par de nouveaux accords tout au long de la guerre et par l'équilibre de guerre au-delà des frontières nationales de la Syrie, devenu un conflit géopolitique mondiale turbulent englobant différents états, régions, organisations locales, sociétés et populations.

À l'échelle mondiale, l'acteur majeur de l'internationalisation du conflit syrien est Raqqa par l'État Islamique d'Irak et du Levant (EIIL) ayant déclaré la guerre au monde entier. Ainsi, à la suite de l'occupation de Raqqa et sa désignation en tant que capitale, l'EI déclare la guerre à plusieurs pays, en organisant des attaques de grande envergure telles que des attentats à la bombe, des véhicules fonçant sur des foules ou encore des attaques à l'arme blanche dans différents endroits, de Paris au Sri Lanka en passant par Ankara et Los Angeles, créant ainsi une opinion publique mondiale décidée à mettre fin aux attaques de l'EI. Ainsi, la lutte contre le djihadisme dépasse les frontières nationales de la Syrie, ce qui aboutit à une coalition de 66 pays afin d'éradiquer l'EI. De plus, les membres de l'EI sont originaires de pays du Moyen-Orient, mais des ci-

79 Il y a plusieurs groupes de djihadistes en Syrie, certains 'd'entre eux sont en conflits et 'd'autres font partie 'd'alliances combatant contre les groupes "hostiles » ciblés.

toyens d'Afrique, d'Europe ou d'Asie y participent également. Par conséquent, le débat sur l'Islam, les minorités et l'intégration dans d'autres contextes nationaux posent un problème sociologique.

Dans ce contexte, les années 2014-2015 sont le théâtre d'attaques violentes de l'EI, d'une coalition mondiale contre l'EI, de nouveaux accords entre les états et d'un nombre record de flux de réfugiés. La Turquie est le pays ayant accueilli le plus de réfugiés syriens mais les flux vers l'Europe, en particulier l'Allemagne, sont également importants de 2014 à 2015. Depuis le « long été de migration »,[80] des milliers de réfugiés syriens parviennent jusqu'aux frontières de l'Europe et certains perdent tragiquement leur vie en Méditerranée. D'un autre côté, le nombre de réfugiés ayant franchi la frontière européenne passe de 542 680 en 2014 à 1 255 660 en 2015. L'été suivant ,en 2015, l'UE et la Turquie conviennent d'un plan d'action commun le 29 novembre 2015 dans lequel l'UE s'engage à relancer le processus d'adhésion de la Turquie en établissant un dialogue de haut niveau structuré et plus fréquent, en ouvrant de nouveaux chapitres de négociations à accélérer la levée des obligations de visas pour les citoyens turcs dans l'espace Schengen et à fournir trois millions d'euros dans un premier temps, afin d'améliorer la situation des Syriens en Turquie et éviter la migration des réfugiés au-delà de la Turquie.[81]

À la suite des efforts de l'UE pour bloquer le flux de migrants en Turquie, nous observons un déclin considérable du nombre de passages frontaliers irréguliers entre la Turquie et la Grèce, mais peu de progrès dans les autres objectifs de l'accord[82]. Ainsi, l'UE ne verse qu'une partie des trois millions d'euros qu'en contrepartie de la soumission de projets

80 Yurdakul, Witnessing the Transition.

81 Ahmet İçduygu and Doğuş Şimşek, "Syrian Refugees in Turkey: Towards Integration Policies." Turkish Policy Quarterly 15, no. 3 (2016): 61.

82 Ahmet İçduygu and Doğuş Şimşek, "'Bargaining over refugees: Turkey's view' in Beyond the Migration and Asylum Crises" in Ferrucio Pastore (ed) Beyond the Migration and Asylum Crises Options and Lessons for Europe. (Aspen Institute Italia, 2017): 86

pertinents.[83] De plus, l'UE toujours reporte l'exemption de visa pour les citoyens turcs en demandant l'adoption de dispositions relatives aux six sujets suivants - modification de la législation anti-terroriste, collaboration sur les affaires pénales, accord avec Europol, lutte contre la corruption et accord de réadmission[84]. En novembre 2016, le Parlement européen décide de geler les discussions sur l'admission de la Turquie face aux critiques sur la violation des droits de l'homme en Turquie. En réaction, Erdoğan menace l'UE d'ouvrir les frontières de l'Europe à des millions de réfugiés syriens.[85] Par conséquent, l'avenir de l'accord de migration UE-Turquie semble incertain.[86]

La Turquie adopte « une politique d'ouverture des frontières » depuis le début de la guerre civile en Syrie. Les réfugiés syriens s'installent en Turquie sous une « protection temporaire » leur fournissant des soins de santé de base, une éducation aux langues et une aide humanitaire. Le caractère « temporaire » dans un cadre politico-légal est important car il incite l'opinion publique à voir ces migrants comme des « invités » qui retourneront un jour dans leur pays d'origine. Le discours d'accueil d'Erdoğan envers les réfugiés syriens se base sur la notion de « fraternité musulmane ». Ainsi, Erdoğan s'adressent aux réfugiés syriens en 2014 ‑ en des temps de conflits armés intenses ‑ avec les mots suivants:

> « Nous sommes – la Turquie – heureux et fières de vous accueillir depuis quatre ans. Vous êtes devenus « muhajir ». Vous avez provisoirement dû quitter votre pays. Nous sommes devenus « ansar » pour

83 Mülteciler.org, « Avrupa Birliği'nden 3 Milyon Euro Geldi mi ? » 15 avril 2019, lu en avril 2019, disponible en ligne :https://multeciler.org.tr/avrupa-birliginden-3-milyar-euro-geldi-mi/

84 Journal Hürriyet, « AB'ye vize mesajı : 'Kolaylaştırın' » 25 Mars 2019, lu en avril 2019, disponible en ligne : http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/dunya/abye-vize-mesaji-kolaylastirin-41160489

85 Deutsche Welle, « Erdoğan AB'yi tehdit etti : Sınırları Açarız » 25 novembre 2016, lu en septembre 2018, disponible en ligne : https://www.dw.com/tr/erdo%C4%9Fan-abyi-tehdit-etti-s%C4%B1n%C4%B1rlar%C4%B1-a%C3%A7ar%C4%B1z/a-36519386

86 Içduygu and Şimşek, « Bargaining over refugees", 86.

vous et avons utilisé toutes nos ressources disponibles pour vous aider. On peut dire ce qu'on veut, vous ne serez jamais un fardeau pour nous. »[87]

Selon la croyance islamique conventionnelle, « muhajir » désigne les musulmans ayant voyagé de Médine à la Mecque (Hegira) pour échapper aux violences infligées aux musulmans lors de l'expansion de l'Islam et « ansar » désigne les peuples ayant aidé les muhajirs à Médine. Le vocabulaire utilisé par Erdoğan et ses références théologiques révèlent la caractéristique idiosyncratique de la migration des réfugiés syriens différente des autres flux migratoires en Turquie. Son discours islamique intentionnel, plutôt que d'utiliser les concepts modernes de réfugiés/immigrants et d'état d'accueil, s'accorde parfaitement avec la figure de leader paternaliste inspiré par le sultan Abdulhamid II, ayant accueilli les migrants musulmans à la fin de la période ottomane. C'est pourquoi, la migration des réfugiés syriens joue un rôle important dans la construction de l'idéal néo-ottomaniste d'Erdoğan et de l'AKP.

Le projet néo-ottomaniste dans les affaires intérieures influence également la position des migrants sur le plan socio-économique. Particulièrement sur la gestion des migrations, les ONG à vocation musulmane jouent un rôle actif dans la satisfaction des besoins de base des migrants comme l'éducation, la santé et l'hébergement, ce qui a un impact sur le processus d'intégration. Selon une étude réalisée par Danış et Nazlı, l'AKP met en place un système de gestion des flux de réfugiés syriens basé sur une « alliance fidèle » entre les ONG et l'État.[88] Ces deux piliers constituent la base de ce système. Dans un premier temps, l'État répète l'ère

87 « Erdoğan Suriyeli Sığınmacılara Seslendi » Hürriyet Newspaper, 8 novembre 2014, URL : http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/erdogan-suriyeli-siginmacilara-seslendi-27342780

88 Didem Danış and Dilara Nazlı, "A Faithful Alliance Between the Civil Society and the State: Actors and Mechanisms of Accommodating Syrian Refugees in Istanbul" International Migration 57, no. 2 (2019): 143-57. https://doi.org/10.1111/imig.12495.

néolibérale et la gouvernance en collaboration avec les acteurs de la société civile qui prennent en charge l'aide humanitaire et des besoins de base des réfugiés. Dans un second temps, les associations à vocation religieuse deviennent les agents principaux de ce régime de migration. Cependant, ces sociétés servent « d'organisations pro-gouvernementales » plutôt que d'acteurs de la société civile puisqu'elles organisent des activités en collaboration active avec l'État, avec les fonds, les infrastructures et le pouvoir de celui-ci.[89]

L'intégration au marché du travail des personnes sous protection temporaire devient un sujet important depuis que la présence des réfugiés syriens est une réalité à long terme. La régulation des permis de travail pour étrangers sous protection temporaire, publiée dans le journal officiel du 15 janvier 2016, leur permet de demander au ministère un permis de travail six mois après leur enregistrement sous le statut de protection temporaire. Seulement, ceux qui travaillent dans l'agriculture et l'élevage en tant que travailleurs saisonniers sont dispensés d'obligation de permis de travail (Guide d'implémentation concernant les permis de travail des étrangers sous protection temporaire). Les encouragements implicites de l'État pour pousser les réfugiés syriens à travailler dans l'agriculture peuvent considérablement augmenter le nombre de travailleurs agricoles syriens (déjà assez élevé) dans un avenir proche.

Comme plusieurs études le montrent[90], les réfugiés syriens travaillent pour des salaires plus bas, vivent dans de mauvaises conditions et sont plus susceptibles d'être attaqués dans les zones rurales, mais le nombre de réfugiés syriens en tant que migrants saisonniers continue d'augmenter dans les campagnes turques. On peut voir des réfugiés syriens dans les régions de la Mer Noire, la Méditerranée, la Mer Egée, l'Anatolie centrale ou la mer de Marmara, où le besoin de travailleurs agricoles saisonniers temporaires est urgent. Le manque d'opportunités d'emplois en ville, l'encouragement implicite de l'État en levant légalement les permis

89 Ibid., 8-10.

90 Voir Dedeoğlu, Yoksulluk Nöbetinden (2016); Semerci, Mevsimlik Gezici Tarım (2014) and Pelek, *Seasonal Migrant Workers as Syrian*, (2018).

de travail et les chances plus importantes de trouver un emploi et un logement dans les zones rurales conduisent les Syriens à se diriger vers des emplois saisonniers.

3.4. La troisième vague migratoire : les travailleurs migrants saisonniers kurdes après la migration forcée des années 1990

Les flux migratoires de travailleurs kurdes évolue dans un double contexte. Premièrement, la capitalisation néo-libéraliste du secteur agricole turc entraîne une diminution de la production agricole et un processus de « dépaysannisation » des régions de l'Est et du Sud-Est de la Turquie. Face au manque de soutien et de subventions de la part de l'État, les fermiers et les métayers kurdes ne parviennent pas à adapter leur production en cultivant des denrées alternatives car les terres de l'Est et du Sud-Est ne permettent pas de modifier les cultures pour des raisons de fertilité des sols, de relief et de conditions climatiques. Dans bien des cas, ils sont passés de fermiers à travailleurs migrants saisonniers.[91] Dans un second temps, la migration interne – suivant l'état d'urgence en 1987 –accélère le processus de dépaysannisation en créant un prolétariat rural mobil et dépossédé.

La migration forcée de la population kurde n'est pas un phénomène récent, elle remonte à 1924, lorsque l'assemblée nationale vota une loi permettant aux citoyens turcs qui souhaitent résider dans l'Est de la Turquie d'utiliser les terres des citoyens kurdes.[92] La migration des kurdes imposée par le nouvel État-nation turc continue dans les années 1920 et 1930, décennies au cours desquelles la migration kurde en Anatolie centrale et occidentale est la plus forte.[93] L'objectif principal de la migration forcée est d'homogénéiser la population selon les politiques nationalistes

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91 Deniz Pelek, Seasonal Migrant Workers in Agriculture: The Cases of Ordu and Polatlı (M.A. Thesis, Bogazici University, 2010), 54-65.

92 Robert W. Olson and William F Tucker, The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh Said Rebellion, 1880-1925 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2010): 91.

93 Mehrdad R. Izady, The Kurds: A Concise Handbook (Washington, DC: Crane Russak, 1992):106.

du début de la période républicaine. Cependant, une migration intensifiée, impliquant beaucoup de citoyens kurdes a lieu après les années 1980 avec la résurrection du Parti des Travailleurs du Kurdistan (PKK) fortement opprimé par le gouvernement militaire provisoire au pouvoir suite au coup d'état de 1980.

Le gouvernement militaire crée la loi 8/2543 avec l'objectif d'empêcher le soutien des factions kurdes syriennes et irakiennes du PKK en forçant les kurdes vivant dans les villages frontaliers à migrer.[94] De plus, la mise en œuvre de l'état d'urgence de 1987, autorisant le gouverneur régional d'état d'urgence (Olağanüstü Hal Bölge Valisi) à évacuer les villages et les hameaux et de réinstaller la population selon les besoins de sécurité, dû aux conflits proches dans les provinces du Sud-Est, accélère le processus de migration forcée. En conséquence, la migration forcée s'accélère considérablement dans les années 1990. Le nombre total d'individus touchés par l'ensemble du processus incluant les décès, les personnes ayant migré vers d'autres pays, et ceux qui n'ont pas été forcé de migrer mais ont fui les conflits pour leur sécurité, est estimé à environ 1,5 million[95]. Cependant, le nombre exact de personnes soumises à la migration forcée reste inconnu. Les revendications sont controversées ; alors que les institutions gouvernementales ont d'abord déclaré 300 000 déplacés, les ONG kurdes en citent près de trois millions.[96]

Le processus d'évacuation démarre plus particulièrement avec l'ultimatum des gendarmes de quitter les villages dans un court laps de temps, de quelques heures à quelques jours. Les maisons, les bergeries, les stocks de céréales, les champs et les arbres sont tous brûlés pendant ou

94 Seda Kartal, "Ethnic Identity and Turkey's Migrant Kurds in Urban Provinces", (Ph. D. diss., Northern Illinois University, 2008): 38.

95 Abdülkerim Sönmez, "The Effects of Violence and Internal Displacement on Rural-Agrarian Change in Turkey," Rural Sociology 73, no. 3 (2008): 384. https://doi.org/10.1526/003601108785766534.

96 Djordje Stefanovic, Neophytos Loizides, and Samantha Parsons. "Home Is Where the Heart Is? Forced Migration and Voluntary Return in Turkey's Kurdish Regions," Journal of Refugee Studies 28, no. 2 (June 2015): 281. https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/feu029.

après l'éviction des résidents, soit par les gendarmes ou les gardes du village afin de rendre tout retour impossible.[97] Les incendies des villages et des hameaux ont une double conséquence. D'un côté, les déplacés internes sont forcés de migrer de manière permanente, ce qui crée une sorte de séparation avec leur terre natale, leurs habitudes spatiales et les relations sociales qu'ils entretenaient dans leurs villages. D'un autre côté, la production agricole et l'élevage sont arrêtés et la carte agricole turque a été modifiée par l'absence importante des provinces de l'Est et du Sud-Est.

Après la mise en place de la migration forcée, une grande partie de la population déplacée migrent vers des périphéries métropolitaines, notamment à Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir et Adana. D'un autre côté, ceux n'ayant pas de réseau familial dans ces centres urbains s'installent dans des villes du Sud-Est dans les régions de Batman, Diyarbakır, Şırnak, et Mardin[98]. À cause du taux de chômage élevé dans ces dernières, ils sont vite devenus travailleurs migrants saisonniers. Ils travaillent selon la saison dans les régions du nord et de l'ouest de la Turquie de 6 à 8 mois tous les ans et passent l'hiver au chômage dans leur ville d'origine. En conséquence, la migration forcée fait des fermiers kurdes la source principale de main-d'œuvre agraire dans les années 1990. Beaucoup d'études montrent que les travailleurs kurdes touchent les salaires les plus bas et ont les pires conditions de travail et d'hébergement.[99] Cependant, cette image a changé après l'introduction des réfugiés syriens qui ont pris la place des Turcs kurdes au bas de l'échelle.

Avant la migration forcée, la plupart des gens pratiquaient l'agriculture et l'élevage de subsistance dans leurs villages. L'élevage de moutons

97 Bilgin Ayata and Deniz Yükseker, "A Belated Awakening: National and International Responses to the Internal Displacement of Kurds in Turkey," New Perspectives on Turkey 32 (2005): 16. https://doi.org/10.1017/S089663460000409X.

98 Uygar Yıldırım, 1980 Sonrası Türkiye Tarımında Yapısal Dönüşüm ve Mevsimlik Tarım İşçileri, Ph.D. Diss. (Istanbul: Istanbul University, 2014): 202

99 Voir Yıldırım, 1980 Sonrası Türkiye; Ayşegül Özbek, New Actors of New Poverty: The 'Other' Children of Çukurova, MA Thesis, (Ankara: Middle East Technical University, 2007); Sidar Çınar, Bağımlı Çalışma İlişkileri Kapsamında Mevsimlik Tarım İşçilerinin Malatya Örneği Üzerinden Analizi (PhD dissertation, Marmara University, 2012).

fournissant du beurre, du fromage, de la laine et de l'angora était courant dans la région contrairement aux produits agricoles moins répandus à cause du manque d'infrastructures d'irrigation. Par conséquent, les produits agricoles secs comme le blé, les lentilles et l'orge étaient les seules à être cultivés. Cette production n'était pas destinée à un usage commercial, il s'agissait principalement d'agriculture de subsistance. Après l'évacuation des villages, l'économie rurale est complètement perturbée. Pour ceux installés dans les centres des provinces de l'Est et du Sud-Est, il n'y avait pas d'autre option que le commerce frontalier et/ou un emploi saisonnier agricole à cause du fort taux de chômage dans la région[100]. Par conséquent, sous la pression militaire, la dépaysantisation des terres et l'abandon des activités économiques de subsistance, les paysans kurdes se sont retrouvés dans un mouvement désastreux se battant pour la survie.

Gouvernance de migration de l'Etat et discours de développement

Plusieurs gouvernements se sont succédés depuis mais le discours principal reste le même : les membres des gouvernements successifs accusent le PKK de brûler les villages et d'être la cause des déplacements. Les autorités politiques turques évaluent la question avec une approche basée sur le « sous-développement » formulant un problème avec des opportunités et des infrastructures économiquement insuffisantes dans l'Est et le Sud-Est de la Turquie. L'État évite toujours de problématiser la « question kurde » en relation avec les migrations forcées. Même dans les rapports des ministères, les déplacés internes ne sont pas définis comme kurdes.

Dans le cadre de ce discours dominant sur le déni et la négligence de la part de l'État, les acteurs de la société civile prennent de plus en plus d'importance de sorte que le problème de la migration forcée reste à

100 Cette région a le plus fort taux de chômage de Turquie. Il est 'd'environ 27% pour 'l'année 2017 selon 'l'Institut statistique de Turquie (TUIK).

l'ordre du jour. Les ONG domestiques importantes travaillant sur la question depuis les années 1990 sont l'Association des Droits Humains (IHD), La Fondation des Droits Humains (TIHV), l'Association pour la Solidarité avec les Opprimés (Mazlum-Der) et l'Association pour la Solidarité avec les Migrants (Göç-Der) qui entreprennent un nombre d'activités pour attirer l'attention sur la situation des déplacés internes. Des enquêtes et des données sont compilées, des rapports publiés, des conférences tenues et des pétitions adressées au parlement et aux agences gouvernementales.[101]

D'un autre côté, les acteurs internationaux contribuent également au débat autour du problème de la migration forcée. Depuis les années 1990, Human Rights Watch alerte régulièrement l'opinion publique internationale sur la migration forcée en Turquie[102]. En 1999, le Comité Américain pour les Réfugiés publie un rapport examinant le processus d'évacuation des villages et la situation des déplacés internes kurdes dans les villes. De plus, le Projet Kurde pour les Droits de l'Homme basé à Londres publient des rapports et reprennent les revendications d'un nombre de déplacés internes kurdes.[103]

Cependant, comme Ayata et Yükseker l'affirment, les déplacements internes n'affectent pas de manière significative les relations extérieures de la Turquie, les activités de ces acteurs domestiques et les acteurs internationaux ne réussissent pas à briser le « mur de déni » concernant le problème des déplacements en Turquie. Les agences des Nations Unies présentes en Turquie comme le HCR et le PNUD ne soulèvent pas la question des déplacés internes et gardent le silence pour ne pas contrarier le gouvernement.[104] En tant qu'allié proche, les Etats-Unis protègent les « sensibilités » de la Turquie et se se retiennent d'exercer une pression importante en mentionnant simplement la question des déplacés internes dans ses rapports d'état annuels. Les institutions européennes

101 Ayata and Yükseker "A belated awakening," 18.

102 Voir les rapports annuels HRW Country sur la Turquie, disponible en ligne : https://www.hrw.org/tr/world-report/2019/country-chapters/325436

103 Ayata and Yükseker, "A belated awakening," 25.

104 Ibid., 26.

suivent des stratégies inconsistantes : l'Assemblée Parlementaire du Conseil de l'Europe (APCE) et le Parlement européen critiquent la politique de déni face au déplacement mais de plus puissantes institutions comme la Commission de l'EU et le Conseil de l'Union Européenne se sont abstenus de parler du problème de déplacement au niveau intergouvernemental.[105]

L'Union Européenne comme acteur majeur des années 2000 pour les déplacés internes

En 1999, la Turquie obtient le statut de candidat à l'adhésion de l'UE mais elle doit respecter les Critères de Copenhague concernant une série de standards politiques et économiques pendant les négociations d'adhésion. Pendant la procédure, l'UE évoque le cas des déplacés internes kurdes après les efforts des acteurs de la société civile nationale et internationale et des diasporas à l'étranger. Alors que le premier Document de Partenariat d'Adhésion entre l'UE et la Turquie ne fait aucune mention des déplacés internes, la révision du document en 2003 remet le retour des déplacés internes sur leurs terres d'origine (dans le cadre des efforts visant à réduire les disparités régionales) sur la liste des priorités. Cependant, la visite du Représentant Spécial Francis Deng en Turquie afin d'examiner la situation des déplacés internes constitue la première étape décisive de la procédure.

Comme ni l'UE, ni les agences des Nations Unies en Turquie n'avaient auparavant de politique spécifique sur les déplacements internes, le rapport de Deng suite à sa visite fournit un cadre pour que ces institutions permettent d'engager davantage le gouvernement sur la question. Bien entendu, la visite de Deng provoque un changement apparent dans la politique du gouvernement lorsque la Turquie entre en dialogue avec les organisations internationales afin d'entreprendre des démarches pour remédier aux conditions des déplacés internes. En 2003, des respon-

105 Ibid., 26.

sables de l'organisation de la planification de l'État, le Ministre des Affaires Intérieures et le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères tiennent une série de réunions avec les agences des Nations Unies en Turquie afin de déterminer les mesures possibles, et un nombre d'initiatives sont mises en place.

En 2004, le Rapport de Progrès du Conseil de l'Europe concernant la Turquie, observe le problème des déplacements internes de plus près en proposant d'éventuelles solutions comme la levée des obstacles pour retourner dans les villages et des politiques spécifiques avec pour objectif le développement économique de l'Anatolie du Sud-Est.[106] La Turquie réagit aux rapports de Deng et du Conseil de l'Europe de manière plutôt positive. En juillet 2004, l'Institut d'Étude des Populations de l'Université d'Hacettepe mène une étude démographique recommandée par le rapport Deng, pour spécifier les vrais chiffres des populations de déplacés internes et décrire leurs problèmes actuels. Le même mois, la « loi sur la compensation des dommages causés par la terreur et la lutte anti-terroriste » (loi n° 5233) ; un document cadre publié par le Conseil des Ministères intitulé « Mesures sur le problème des déplacés internes et retour dans les villages et projet de réhabilitation en Turquie » (2005) ; et le Plan d'Action Van (2006) sont votés par le parlement.[107] Cependant, d'autres actions recommandées par le rapport Deng comme le déminage, l'abolition du système de gardes des villages, un rôle plus prononcé des ONG et une révision du rôle des forces de sécurité dans la région ne sont pas encore implémentés.[108]

En ce qui concerne les déplacés internes travaillant comme migrants saisonniers, le projet de Retour dans les villages et de réhabilitation reste une priorité. Alors que le gouvernement soutient qu'un tiers des 360

106 Dilek Kurban et.al., Coming to terms with forced migration: post-displacement restitution of citizenship rights in Turkey (TESEV, 2007), 114.

107 Özgür Sevgi Göral Birinci, Enforced Disappearence and Forced Migration in the Context of Kurdish Conflict: Loss, Mourning and Politics at the Margin, (PhD Dissertationi Ecole des Hatutes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, 2017).

108 Ayata and Yükseker "A belated awakening," 31

milles déplacés internes sont rentrés, le nombre réel de rapatriés serait bien plus bas.[109] Selon les chiffres de l'enquête d'Hacettepe, le pourcentage de déplacés internes rentrés chez eux par rapport au nombre total de déplacés internes ne serait que de 11,5%. Plusieurs facteurs permettent d'expliquer ce faible pourcentage. Premièrement, un nombre limité de villages est ouvert au retour. Pour certains villages évacués le rapatriement n'a pas été autorisé pour des raisons de sécurité[110]. Ensuite, retourner chez soi signifie rentrer dans ses terres d'origine. Or, le manque d'opportunités d'emploi dans ces régions d'origine et la destruction des villages et des hameaux pendant la guerre sont des difficultés importantes pour maintenir la subsistance des ménages.[111] Avec la détérioration des relations Turquie-UE, particulièrement pendant la seconde période de l'AKP depuis 2007, les déplacés internes ne sont plus un sujet à l'ordre du jour. L'intensification des politiques néo-ottomanistes par l'orientation du Moyen-Orient relègue la question des déplacés internes et des acteurs concernés – les ONG nationales et internationales. Dès lors, la migration saisonnière agricole reste une option vitale pour que les déplacés internes.

En résumé, dans cette partie, sont exposés les flux migratoires récents vers la Turquie à partir du lien entre le travail agricole saisonnier et les nouvelles relations de pouvoir dans le domaine géopolitique. Trois flux migratoires principaux peuvent être d'finis vers les exploitations agricoles turques depuis les années 1990 : les travailleurs sans-papiers des ex-pays soviétiques, les réfugiés syriens et les déplacés internes kurdes. Nous soutenons que l'évolution des orientations politiques en Turquie et la reformulation du néo-ottomanisme, particulièrement pendant les périodes d'Özal et d'Erdoğan, redéfinissent les flux migratoires en encourageant certains groupes à migrer vers la Turquie. Le résultat final est l'émergence d'une nouvelle classe de travailleurs agricoles. Les violences internes dans l'Est et le Sud-Est de la Turquie, les instabilités économiques et politiques dans le Caucase et la guerre civile en Syrie font de la

109 Kurban et.al., Coming to terms , 317.

110 Ayata and Yükseker "A belated awakening," 35.

111 Kurban et.al., Coming to terms , 35

Turquie un cas particulier pour débattre du rôle des dynamiques géopolitiques dans la migration saisonnière agricole, les mobilités et les relations sociales dans les zones rurales après l'arrivée de migrants, de réfugiés et de déplacés internes. Façonné par les évolutions politiques au niveau macro, ces migrations façonnent à leur tour les choix géopolitiques. Ainsi, l'espace agraire turc contemporain fournit de nouveaux aperçus et perspectives d'études sur la migration et la géopolitique.

4. Restructuration et réorganisation du travail agricole : Cinq études de cas

Cette recherche adopte une stratégie pour analyser les dynamiques des relations complexes entre la transformation agricole, les mobilités rurales internes et transnationales et le changement socio-spatial de l'espace rural. Par conséquent, les points essentiels de cette étude sont les transformations, les nouveautés et les changements dans différents contextes. Cependant, il n'existe pas de modèle unique applicable à toutes les régions de la Turquie. Des caractéristiques particulières telles que la fertilité des terres, les plantes cultivées, la structure de la propriété foncière et les installations de commercialisation sont des facteurs clés pour le niveau de transformation et leur impact sur la population rurale. L'entrée des migrants dans ce contexte interagit à différents niveaux de transformation de l'agriculture. Nous avons sélectionné nos terrains de recherche en fonction des différentes caractéristiques agricoles des régions. Nous avons effectué des travaux de terrain à Manisa, dans l'ouest de la Turquie, en août 2013 et en août 2014, lors de la saison de la récolte et du séchage au soleil des tomates et des raisins. Adana et Mersin, dans le sud de la Turquie, sont deux autres villes que nous avons visité en septembre 2013 et en février 2015. La diversité des cultures dans ces deux dernières zones permettent d'observer la récolte de différents produits. Ces villes sont choisies en raison de plusieurs critères liés aux questions de recherche.

Premièrement, les régions d'Adana, de Mersin et de Manisa ont depuis longtemps recours à la main-d'œuvre supplémentaire, extérieure à

la région, pour soutenir leur production importante. Ces lieux sont donc appropriés pour observer l'impact de la transformation agricole sur les processus bien-établis de la production agricole. En plus, les travailleurs migrants saisonniers y sont abondants, ce qui nous permet de sécuriser nos informateurs sans effort supplémentaire. Deuxièmement, l'offre du travail est ethniquement hétérogène et comprend des travailleurs kurdes des villes de l'est et du sud-est de la Turquie, des Romanis d'Afyon, d'Aydın et de Balıkesir du centre et de l'ouest de la Turquie, des habitants d'origine turque et des réfugiés syriens. Ces lieux sont propices pour observer la solidarité, les frictions et les conflits entre différents groupes ethniques ainsi qu'à l'analyse des dynamiques suite à l'arrivée des Syriens sur le marché du travail déjà hiérarchisé.

Troisièmement, les conditions climatiques à Adana et à Mersin sont favorables pour rester à l'extérieur même en hiver, de sorte que la période d'habitation temporaire est relativement longue dans ces régions. Il existe des quartiers de tentes permanentes, que nous appelons des *ghettos ruraux*, où les travailleurs restent presque toute l'année (Chapitre 6). Donc, les villes d'Adana et de Mersin sont idéales pour examiner les questions sur la transformation d'un espace physique, social, économique et culturel par les migrants. Nous vérifions également si une solidarité transnationale émerge entre ces communautés et des Syriens de même origine ethnique. Nous portons une attention particulière aux relations de solidarité entre différents groupes car le manque d'une telle aide est un catalyseur de la vulnérabilité de ces immigrés.

La province de Bursa-Orhangazi est un autre terrain de notre étude. L'industrie oléicole recruter des travailleurs depuis peu, principalement de villes proches. Les relations de production traditionnelles telles que l'agriculture familiale et l'*imece* ne sont que récemment remplacées par des relations salariales capitalistes via l'offre du travail de nouveaux migrants. Ainsi, les résultats de l'enquête de terrain permettent de mettre en évidence les dynamiques de la transformation rurale en cours. En outre, les producteurs d'olives subissent un processus de transformation caractérisé par de nombreux changements importants, tels que le développement de l'agriculture biologique, la présence des grandes sociétés

et la défonctionnalisation des entreprises agricoles. Il est donc important d'analyser les stratégies de survie des petits producteurs pour faire face à l'expansion des relations de marché dans les zones rurales et l'impact de ces stratégies sur les travailleurs agricoles saisonniers.

Nous avons également effectué des observations pendant les mois d'hiver lorsque les travailleurs sont au chômage afin de comprendre leur situation de dépossession, qui constitue un thème essentiel pour examiner les questions de recherche liées à la prolétarisation et à la précarisation dans ce travail. À cette fin, nous avons choisi le district de Cizre de la ville de Şırnak. Cizre est un centre d'habitation pour les victimes de migration forcée après être évacués de leurs villages dispersés autour de Şırnak en 1994. L'enquête de terrain dans cette région fournit une meilleure explication des raisons politiques - au-delà des considérations économiques - de ces nouveaux prolétariats ruraux. En outre, la population de Cizre comprend les travailleurs migrants saisonniers qui travaillent dans le secteur agricole mais habitent dans un quartier urbain, compliquant la compréhension de la liminalité entre les zones urbaines et rurales ainsi que la dichotomie des citadins et des villageois.

5. Les méthodes et les données

Cette étude applique des méthodes de recherche mixtes comprenant des méthodes qualitatives et cartographiques. Une conception de recherche qualitative et ethnographique a permis de disposer de suffisamment de temps pour collecter diverses formes de données afin d'appréhender le problème dans un cadre plus large. Par exemple, les données des entretiens ont été combinées avec des observations réalisées dans les tentes des participants, des repas partagés, des temps du travail collectif dans les champs et des discussions dans les zones d'habitation.

Nous avons rencontré certaines difficultés au cours du travail de terrain en rapport avec la méthodologie. Tout d'abord, le nombre exact de travailleurs migrants saisonniers en provenance de différentes villes de Turquie est mal connu. La seule source d'information statistique dont

nous disposons est celle fournie par l'Institut des Statistiques de la Turquie (Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu, TUIK) qui donne le nombre de travailleurs salariés occupant des emplois agricoles, mais n'inclut pas le nombre de travailleurs venant de l'extérieur et le nombre de travailleurs locaux employés dans des emplois temporaires. De plus, pour les réfugiés syriens, l'Autorité de Gestion des Catastrophes et des Situations d'Urgence (Afet ve Acil Durum Yönetimi Başkanlığı, AFAD), et les statistiques de l'Agence des Nations Unies pour les Réfugiés (UNCHR) constituent les sources principales. Cependant, les données sont plutôt rudimentaires, fournissant simplement quelques connaissances générales sur les Syriens en Turquie, sans aucune précision sur la distribution urbaine-rurale.

L'absence de données détaillées nous a amené à utiliser l'échantillonnage en boule de neige pour choisir mes informateurs. Cette méthode convient particulièrement aux études exploratoires et aux situations dans lesquelles les connaissances sur le terrain sont rares; il est utile dans les cas où il n'est pas possible de déterminer un representative sample pour choisir l'échantillon. L'échantillonnage en boule de neige permet également d'établir une relation de confiance mutuelle avec un groupe vulnérable, de surmonter les soupçons des informateurs et de faciliter l'entrée dans les groupes. Au début, nous réalisons des efforts pour trouver un contact approprié permettant d'entrer aux camps de travail. Ces contacts clés varient selon les terrains de recherche ; parfois un intermédiaire du travail, parfois un ouvrier et parfois un villageois ont fait le premier pas dans les groupes de migrants pour nous faciliter l'entrée.

Après avoir établi le premier contact avec les migrants, nous avons mené des entretiens individuels semi-structurés et approfondis avec un total de 111 travailleurs, comprenant des Kurdes syriens et des Arabes syriens, des Kurdes turcs, des Romanis turcs, des Arabes turcs et des travailleurs turcs locaux, nous avons posé des questions fermées pour connaître leurs antécédents socio-démographiques. Nous avons également posé des questions ouvertes pour enquêter sur leurs expériences personnelles en tant que travailleur migrant saisonnier et leurs opinions sur l'emploi, les employeurs, les intermédiaires de travail et les espaces de

travail. Ces entretiens avec des Kurdes et des Arabes syriens ont été réalisés dans la langue maternelle des travailleurs, le kurde et l'arabe, et ont été assistés par un travailleur ou un intermédiaire du travail qui parle la langue en question en tant qu'interprète simultané. En ce qui concerne les Kurdes turcs et les Arabes turcs, nous avons mené des entretiens principalement en turc, à quelques exceptions près.

Nous souhaitions que l'échantillon soit aussi large que possible pour inclure séparément les femmes, les hommes, les enfants et les travailleurs âgés. Nous avons également mené des entretiens semi-structurés et approfondis avec d'autres acteurs ruraux ; 28 employeurs, 16 intermédiaires du travail et 13 représentants d'agences d'État et d'organisations non gouvernementales, afin de mieux comprendre les dynamiques du processus d'emploi en tenant compte de tous les aspects. En plus des entretiens, nous avons eu l'occasion de passer du temps avec des ouvriers des champs agricoles et des zones de tentes pendant notre travail de terrain ; nous avons cueilli des tomates avec les travailleurs, préparé des repas avec des femmes sous des tentes, joué avec des enfants travailleurs.

Nous avons utilisé des méthodes cartographiques pour visualiser les données de migration. Le logiciel QGIS permet d'analyser les flux de migrants en provenance de Géorgie, d'Azerbaïdjan et de Syrie et les migrations internes forcées en Turquie. L'analyse géopolitique des flux de migrants permet de mieux comprendre les mobilités rurales dans le contexte politique changeant de la Turquie. Cette analyse identifie des pôles de pouvoir antagonistes et des conflits générateurs d'afflux de migrants ayant un impact sur l'espace rural et les acteurs concernés. À cette fin, nous complétons les données conceptuelles et cartographiques avec les données conceptuelles et imaginaires contenues dans les discours sur l'identité, la perception, les préjugés et la discrimination positive / négative à l'encontre des migrants afin de développer une forme de relation distincte entre pouvoir et géographie.

D'autre part, nous avons examiné les lois et réglementations récentes concernant les travailleurs agricoles saisonniers et les réfugiés syriens.

Outre les interactions quotidiennes des acteurs impliqués dans le marché du travail agricole, les transitions au niveau macro-économique sont également importantes dans le cadre de cette recherche puisque les actions et les perceptions des agents sont toujours liées à des processus structurels plus larges. Ainsi, nous avons cherché à rassembler les analyses aux niveaux micro et macro en considérant les éléments controversés du marché du travail comme un cas à la réalisation de notre travail de terrain où structure et agence jouent un rôle crucial dans la reproduction, la remise en question et la reconstruction des relations de pouvoir dans le marché du travail.

Terminologie

Certains éléments terminologiques clés sont utilisés tout au long de cette étude. Premièrement, les concepts concernant la durée du travail - saisonniers, temporaires et permanents - sont cruciaux pour comprendre la structure du travail agraire. La catégorie « travailleurs permanents » représente ceux qui travaillent pendant un an dans le secteur agricole sans interruption. Le terme « saisonnier » fait référence à la saison de récolte, une période à forte intensité de main-d'œuvre par rapport aux autres périodes de l'année, ce qui augmente la demande de main-d'œuvre des entreprises agricoles. Les termes « travailleur saisonnier » et « travailleur temporaire » sont utilisés de manière interchangeable afin de préciser la durée du travail.

Deuxièmement, deux catégories clés « demandeur d'asile » et « réfugié » doivent être clarifiées. Selon les définitions de l'UNCHR, les réfugiés sont définis comme des personnes fuyant un conflit ou une persécution. Ils sont protégés par le droit international, qui interdit leur expulsion pour empêcher leur retour dans des conditions où leur vie et leur liberté sont en danger. En revanche, un demandeur d'asile fait référence à une personne dont la demande de refuge n'a pas encore été traitée. Bien que les deux termes soient adaptables au cas des Syriens en Turquie, et conformément au cadre législatif selon lequel ils ont déjà le statut de « protection temporaire » en Turquie, nous préférons utiliser le mot « réfugié

», car leur statut juridique est plus proche de celui-ci que celui de demandeur d'asile. Le cas des réfugiés syriens est considéré comme différent de celui de nombreux autres pays, par exemple : Kurdes en France, Karens aux États-Unis et Érythréens en Italie. Enfin, nous utilisons « Kurdes syriens », « Arabes syriens », « Kurdes turcs » et « Arabes turcs » pour analyser le facteur de citoyenneté.

6. Structure de la thèse

Cette thèse est structurée autour de six chapitres. Le chapitre 2 suggère que les thèmes de la migration et de l'agriculture doivent être considérés ensemble dans le cas des travailleurs agricoles migrants saisonniers. À cette fin, nous présentons d'abord un aperçu théorique des mobilités rurales et de la migration. En particulier, est expliquée la différence entre les concepts de migration et de mobilité. La nécessité d'adapter le terme « mobilité rurale » sera soulignée et les outils analytiques de la littérature sur les migrations seront sollicités dans la compréhension des motivations des migrants. Ensuite, la néolibéralisation de l'agriculture et les thèmes émergents abordés dans les études rurales - tels que le « nouveau régime agricole », les « stratégies de survie de la paysannerie » et « le besoin croissant de main-d'œuvre migrante bon marché » - sont développés.

Le chapitre 2 examine les différents types de migration et de mobilité dans différents contextes. Diverses expériences dans les pays développés et en développement ont influencé différents aspects de la littérature sur la transformation de l'agriculture et le travail salarié, entraînant des travaux sur la légalité, la santé publique, la réorganisation socio-économique et l'administration publique. En ce qui concerne l'expérience unique de la migration agricole saisonnière, des disciplines telles que le droit, la médecine, l'économie, la sociologie et les sciences politiques ont été sollicitées dans différents pays. Une compréhension critique de la littérature émergente relative à l'expérience de la migration saisonnière dans des régions spécifiques est importante pour reconnaître comment

la diversité et l'apparence de ses caractéristiques dans différentes localités contribuent à déterminer si le rôle de la main-d'œuvre migrante salariée dans la transition agraire contemporaine est décrit comme un obstacle ou une opportunité. Basé sur des outils analytiques tirés de la littérature, le chapitre décrit les relations foncières, la production et les relations de travail dans le cas spécifique de la Turquie. La transition de la main-d'œuvre familiale à l'emploi de migrants sera présentée pour montrer comment les relations salariales capitalistes modifient l'ordre socioéconomique à la campagne et comment les asymétries de pouvoir sont reconfigurées entre les anciens et les nouveaux acteurs : agriculteurs de petite, moyenne et grande échelle, intermédiaires du travail, les travailleurs locaux, les migrants internes, les immigrants irréguliers et les réfugiés. Ce cadre est appliqué tout au long de la thèse.

Le chapitre 3 analyse les flux migratoires et d'immigration récents en Turquie en ce qui concerne l'emploi agraire saisonnier. Une analyse géopolitique de l'afflux de migrants est introduit afin de problématiser l'impact transformateur de la modification des politiques étrangères et nationales sur les flux de migrants qui remodèlent la campagne turque aujourd'hui. Nous exposons d'abord l'approche politique néo-ottomaniste qui a façonné l'attitude sélective de la Turquie à l'égard des immigrants en ce qui concerne leur admissibilité à devenir citoyens, travailleurs et résidents et à pouvoir bénéficier des services d'éducation, de santé et des autres besoins de base. Nous examinons une première vague d'immigration en provenance du Caucase à la suite de la dissolution de l'Union soviétique avec la politique néo-ottomaniste. Plus précisément, les Géorgiens et les Azerbaïdjanais sont examinés car ces deux groupes d'immigrants sont les seuls à avoir été régulièrement employés dans des emplois agricoles temporaires.

Nous analysons ensuite une deuxième vague de migration de réfugiés syriens ayant travaillé en tant que travailleurs migrants saisonniers depuis 2012. Pour ces deux vagues, les identités turques et musulmanes des migrants en relation avec la politique néo-ottomaniste et la gouvernance de la migration sont évaluées. Enfin, une troisième vague de migration, celle des migrants kurdes en Turquie, est analysée. L'appauvrissement

économique des migrants kurdes, la violence dans le sud-est de la Turquie et la migration forcée des Kurdes turcs dans les années 90 sont évalués en tenant compte à la fois de la dynamique de la question kurde et de l'évolution de la politique néo-ottomaniste de la Turquie à l'égard du Moyen-Orient. L'analyse de ces trois vagues migratoires éclaire l'impact transformateur de la coexistence de violences internes à l'est et au sud-est de la Turquie, de l'instabilité économique et politique dans le Caucase et de la guerre en Syrie sur le phénomène de la migration saisonnière dans l'agriculture turque. De nouveaux modèles sont observés : la reconfiguration spatiale à travers la formation de ghettos ruraux ; les relations de travail à travers l' « ethnicisation » et la « réfugiéisation » de la main-d'œuvre ; et les différents modèles de mobilité à travers l'émergence d'un nouveau type de nomadisme, qui est discuté dans les chapitres suivants.

Le chapitre 4 explore l'impact de la transformation agraire en cours sur les travailleurs migrants saisonniers en problématisant les nouveaux moyens et relations de production influencés par les politiques néolibérales. Une attention particulière est accordée aux questions relatives aux moyens de survie des paysans de petite et moyenne taille et à leurs conséquences pour le travail. La transformation historique des petits et moyens producteurs indépendants en employeurs agraires et travail salarié a commencé depuis le début des années 1980 accompagné d'un processus conséquent de dépaysannisation. Dans ce chapitre, nous mettons l'accent sur le besoin croissant de main-d'œuvre saisonnière à moindre coût dans le processus de production. Afin d'analyser la demande de travail saisonnier, nous examinons l'impact de la transformation agraire sur les producteurs, qui sont obligés de modifier le processus et les moyens de production. Nous posons la question de comment et de quelle manière les agriculteurs maintiennent leur production agricole face à l'exode rural. Dans ce chapitre, nous discutons du rôle des travailleurs migrants saisonniers dans la transformation agraire en analysant les choix des employeurs en matière d'embauche de main-d'œuvre.

Après avoir démontré que les employeurs ont de plus en plus besoin de main-d'œuvre moins chère, nous examinons le cas des réfugiés syriens en tant que travailleurs migrants saisonniers en Turquie dans le

chapitre 5. Nous discutons de la vulnérabilité des réfugiés syriens par rapport à d'autres groupes de migrants en ce qui concerne leurs conditions de vie et de travail, dévoilant ainsi le processus et la pratique d'un marché du travail agricole hiérarchisé sur le plan ethnique après l'arrivée de réfugiés. Cette partie de la thèse développe les différentes perspectives des acteurs ruraux (travailleurs, intermédiaires du travail, propriétaires fonciers, exploitants agricoles et parties prenantes des entreprises publiques et ONG) sur la situation actuelle en ce qui concerne trois sujets controversés : l'emploi des migrants, le cadre juridique, et les réfugiés syriens. Ce chapitre met l'accent sur le statut juridique précaire des réfugiés et l'informalité de leurs relations de travail pour examiner en quoi la migration des réfugiés diffère de la migration de travail ordinaire.

En dernière lieu, le chapitre 6 montre que les nouvelles relations socio-économiques et spatiales révèlent un paradigme sous-jacent sur lequel se construisent les approches des processus et des schémas migratoires, ainsi que les phénomènes d'un prolétariat rural dépossédé. L'intention est de transcender les approches existantes sur l'emploi saisonnier de migrants en défiant le concept de saisonnalité lui-même. Ce chapitre illustre d'abord les différentes formes de dépossession chez les travailleurs migrants saisonniers. Nous faisons la distinction entre les raisons économiques et politiques en termes de la croissance de dépossession qui est essentielle à l'apparition d'un prolétariat rural. Suite aux résultats des travaux de terrain, cette première partie discute des effets néfastes de la politique économique néolibérale sur les anciens producteurs et les métayers, ainsi que les problèmes structurels tels que la manque d'eau et de la stérilité des terres dans les villes d'origine des travailleurs, ainsi que les conséquences de la migration forcée des Kurdes déplacés. Les résultats du travail de terrain mené à Cizre corroborent les analyses de cette section.

Nous nous concentrons ensuite sur les nouvelles relations socio-spatiales et les modèles de mouvements migratoires parmi les travailleurs ruraux dépossédés. Nous définissons la transition des tentes temporaires aux nouveaux ghettos ruraux dans cette partie. Plus précisément,

nous démontrons que la transition vers des cultures de grande valeur et l'augmentation des flux de migrants, ainsi que les nouvelles catégories de personnes déplacées et de réfugiés, ont ouvert la voie à la création de quartiers de tentes permanentes, que nous appelons ghettos ruraux. En outre, cette section discute un nouveau modèle de migration que nous appelons le nouveau nomadisme, qui fait référence à un mouvement cyclique continu dans l'ensemble de la Turquie. Ce schéma de migration se produit parmi certains réfugiés syriens et certains groupes de migrants kurdes. Malgré les caractéristiques distinctives de ces groupes de travailleurs migrants saisonniers par rapport aux nomades traditionnels, nous affirmons que le terme de nouveau nomadisme est nécessaire pour souligner leur mouvement continu, différent de la migration saisonnière des autres travailleurs migrants. Dans ce chapitre, nous soulignons le caractère permanent ou « désaisonnier » du phénomène contemporain du travail migrant saisonnier en ce qui concerne l'espace, la mobilité et la dépossession.

7. Principaux résultats

Cette thèse a pour effet d'expliquer le sens et l'importance du travail agricole migrant saisonnier, de sa transformation et de sa revitalisation depuis les années 1990, alors que l'agriculture était paradoxalement en plein processus de dissolution. Nous analysons d'abord les lacunes de la littérature, qui sous-estime le rôle des travailleurs migrants saisonniers dans le processus de restructuration de la production agricole. En conséquence, nous faisons l'hypothèse que l'obtention d'une main-d'œuvre moins chère va de pair avec l'émergence de nouvelles catégories de migrants telles que les personnes déplacées, les migrants en situation irrégulière et les réfugiés, qui aboutissent à la transformation de la production agricole, des relations de travail et des contextes socioculturels connexes.

Mais cette thèse propose surtout une analyse plus approfondie du phénomène des migrations saisonnières dans trois domaines majeurs : i) la relation entre flux migratoires et évolution des visées géopolitiques

nationales et internationales ; ii) l'impact de la transformation agraire sur la production et les producteurs, contribuant à remodeler la structure du travail ; iii) les modèles émergents de mouvements migratoires dans l'espace rural qui accompagnent ces processus de transformation. Plusieurs chapitres de cette thèse sont consacrés à cette fin aux connexions et aux contradictions entre production agricole, politiques migratoires, contexte géopolitique de la migration et subsistance des ménages ruraux - tant agriculteurs, que travailleurs. Dans cette section, après avoir abordé les thèmes centraux de chaque chapitre, nous conclurons donc par des perspectives pour de futures recherches.

Plusieurs thèmes liés aux travailleurs migrants saisonniers et à l'agriculture turque émergent de cette thèse. Tout d'abord, l'analyse géopolitique (chapitre 3) montre la dynamique qui façonne une politique de migration sélective. L'évolution politique dans le sens d'un certain " néo-ottomanisme " gouvernemental, attire les migrants internationaux d'identité turque et/ou musulmane, ce qui a influé sur l'ethnicisation du marché du travail agricole. Nous avons identifié trois grandes vagues de migration : les travailleurs migrants de Géorgie et d'Azerbaïdjan sans papiers, à partir des années 1990, les réfugiés syriens depuis 2011, et les déplacés kurdes après la migration forcée des années 1990.

La coexistence de ces différents groupes de migrants - réfugiés, immigrés sans papiers, et déplacés internes - a restructuré l'espace rural sur un nouvel ensemble de relations, et à partir de niveaux de vulnérabilité des travailleurs changeant en fonction de leur appartenance ethnique, de leur citoyenneté, de leur identité partagée ou non, de leur pouvoir de négociation et des réseaux sociaux sur lesquels ils peuvent s'appuyer ou non. Par ailleurs, l'analyse géopolitique des migrations agricoles saisonnières a également mis en évidence l'élargissement du cercle des acteurs micro, macro et méso-niveaux et leurs différentes alliances et conflits dans un espace rural nouvellement transnationalisé.

L'orientation de la politique turque est un facteur clé dans la définition de l'importance des acteurs particuliers qui affectent les flux migratoires agricoles. L'Union Européenne, par exemple, a été un acteur décisif pour les personnes déplacées pendant le processus de candidature de la

Turquie. En effet, à certaines étapes importantes des négociations pour l'entrée de la Turquie dans l'UE, le retour dans les villages et/ou l'indemnisation des dommages subis par les personnes déplacées ont constitué une des mesures d'harmonisation. Cette mesure d'indemnisation, qui offrait aux populations une alternative au travail agricole saisonnier, a été prise après l'intensification des relations entre la Turquie et le Moyen-Orient et la détérioration des relations avec l'UE, alors que les personnes déplacées n'étaient plus inscrites à l'agenda politique. Autre exemple, la politique étrangère turque vis-à-vis de la guerre civile syrienne a directement affecté l'emploi saisonnier des migrants. En tant que tels, les attentes concernant la fin de la guerre à court terme ont échoué et l'absence de politique d'intégration des réfugiés en matière de logement et d'emploi a poussé les Syriens à travailler et à se loger dans les zones rurales turques.

Thème 1 : Nouvelles classes de main-d'œuvre agricole. L'analyse géopolitique des flux migratoires récents montre est l'émergence de nouvelles classes de main-d'œuvre agricole de différentes catégories, qui remodèlent aujourd'hui les campagnes turques. La pénétration de différents groupes de migrants sur le marché du travail agricole, ainsi que dans les communautés rurales, illustre les différences fondées sur l'ethnicité, la pauvreté, la nationalité, et les relations d'exploitation reconstruites dans ce contexte. Aussi, la fragilité des travailleurs migrants invite à repenser la structure de classes rurale en Turquie et ses importantes déviations par rapport aux modèles passés. Kassimis[112] et Rye[113] qualifient ces travailleurs de « sous-classe » rurale. Avallonne[114] la qualifie de « nou-

112 Charalambos Kasimis, « Survival and Expansion : Migrants in Greek Rural Regions », Population, Space and Place 14, no 6 (2008) : 511-24. https://doi.org/10.1002/psp.513.

113 Johan Fredrik Rye, « The Western European Countryside From An Eastern European Perspective : Case Of Migrant Workers In Norwegian Agriculture », European Countryside 6, no. 4 (décembre 2014) : 327-46. https://doi.org/10.2478/euco-2014-0018.

114 Cité dans Johan Fredrik Rye et Sam Scott, « International Labour Migration and Food Production in Rural Europe : A Review of the Evidence », Sociologia Ruralis 58, non. 4 (2018) : 928-52. https://doi.org/10.1111/soru.12208.

veau prolétariat international ", vue l'hyper exploitabilité de ces travailleurs et son impact utilitaire sur le marché mondial. Le cas turc peut donc être évalué comme faisant partie d'un cadre global marqué par l'émergence de nouvelles classes agricoles aux vulnérabilités diverses. La Turquie ne fait pas exception au régime alimentaire international[115], qui s'est établi en générant également de nouvelles conditions de travail. Il faut aussi noter que cette thèse attire l'attention sur la structure agricole particulière (chapitre 4) et le contexte politique (chapitres 3 et 5) de la Turquie dans le processus de transformation rurale en cours, ce qui rend ce cas idiosyncrasique.

Le chapitre 4 problématise la survie de la petite paysannerie à l'ère néolibérale. Contrairement aux théories de la "nouvelle paysannerie", qui supposent la revitalisation des relations traditionnelles dans les zones rurales, le chapitre montre que les agriculteurs soumettent leur production agricole à un nouvel ensemble de règles. Tout d'abord, ceux-ci sont soucieux d'adopter de nouvelles technologies agricoles, malgré le faible niveau de l'agriculture mécanisée en Turquie. Les résultats du travail sur le terrain effectué à Manisa, Adana, Mersin et Bursa montrent que le principal facteur conduisant les agriculteurs à préférer les cultures nécessitant un travail manuel sont les intrants et les prix du marché. L'argument avancé dans la littérature de la Nouvelle Paysannerie, selon lequel les agriculteurs auraient tendance à s'impliquer dans les relations de travail traditionnelles en période d'insécurité, n'explique pas vraiment cette motivation. Au contraire, il semble que le coût et le "prix" de commercialisation des cultures soient le facteur principal. De plus, les agriculteurs adoptent de nouvelles technologies dans la mesure où la culture permet le binage, l'irrigation et la pulvérisation des engrais. Ainsi, les agriculteurs prennent des décisions de production dans une logique capitaliste, suivant les fluctuations du marché. La dépendance des agriculteurs à l'égard de la main-d'œuvre salariée migrante s'accroît avec l'absence de surexploitation de la main-d'œuvre domestique et du nombre de travailleurs familiaux non rémunérés.

115 Henry Bernstein, Class Dynamics of Agrarian Change (Kumarian Press, 2013), 82-83.

Thème 2 : Demande croissante de main-d'œuvre à meilleur marché. L'évolution des politiques de l'État ont laissé les petits et les moyens agriculteurs sans protection sur le marché, et poussé à l'élaboration de stratégies de survie pour les agriculteurs. Contrairement à ce qu'affirment les tenants de la théorie de la Nouvelle Paysannerie, pour qui les paysans tirent profit des relations sociales et culturelles traditionnelles pour survivre[116], nous soutenons que les réponses des paysans se sont développées dans une logique « plus capitaliste » . Leur stratégie de changement de production est rendue possible par la disponibilité de travailleurs migrants, et non des relations traditionnelles de solidarité ou de surexploitation du travail familial. Les petits paysans sont privés des conditions nécessaires au réinvestissement qui les ont conduits à rechercher une main d'œuvre toujours « moins chère ». Les conditions de travail ont également changé en fonction des nouvelles exigences de la culture. Le passage de la production de coton à la production d'agrumes, en particulier, nécessite une présence plus longue des travailleurs salariés et des employés temporaires, de façon intermittente, ce qui est compatible avec le profil des travailleurs dépossédés, suffisamment vulnérables pour accepter un travail plus précaire. Les nouvelles demandes en travailleurs agricoles temporaires correspondent alors au profil des travailleurs réfugiés syriens.

Thème 3 : Réfugiéisation de la main-d'œuvre. Le chapitre 5 établit l'existence d'une place ouverte pour l'emploi des réfugiés syriens dans l'agriculture turque. Les Syriens connaissent des conditions de travail et de vie indécentes à Manisa, Adana et Mersin, où ils sont exposés à la discrimination des employeurs, des résidents locaux et d'autres groupes de migrants. La différenciation des réfugiés syriens, qui en fait un cas particulier par rapport aux autres migrants, invite à repenser les raisons économiques et politiques qui créent les conditions nécessaires d'hyper-exploitabilité des travailleurs.

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116 Öztürk, Murat, Joost Jongerden et Andy Hilton. " La (re)production de la nouvelle paysannerie en Turquie ", Journal of Rural Studies 61 (1er juillet 2018) : 244-54. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrurstud.2017.10.009.

Les violations des droits humains constituent en effet une menace plus décisive que les violations des droits des travailleurs, du point de vue des réfugiés syriens, ce qui conduit certains auteurs à forger le concept de « réfugiéisation de la main-d'œuvre ».[117] Dans ce chapitre, nous introduisons la « peur de la mort et de la violence » - qui se réfère à un impact de l'émotion et à la mémoire de la guerre et de la violence - comme une notion explicative dans la construction de l'acceptabilité de conditions d'emploi *a priori* injustes, imposées aux réfugiés. Cette peur a créé des conditions favorables aux différents acteurs ruraux, c'est-à-dire aux employeurs et aux courtiers en main-d'œuvre, tandis que la transformation néolibérale de l'agriculture, avec la présence de l'Armée de réserve du travail, a balisé la voie pour la survie de la petite paysannerie et l'augmentation du profit pour les grandes exploitations agricoles.

Thème 4 : Modalités de la dépossession. Le chapitre 6 introduit divers modèles de dépossession parmi les travailleurs migrants saisonniers. Premièrement le manque d'eau, l'infertilité des terres et l'inadaptation des territoires au changement de types de culture, dans la ville natale des ménages des travailleurs, sont des causes structurelles qui transforment d'anciens paysans et métayers en travailleurs migrants saisonniers. Deuxièmement, la migration forcée au cours des années 1990 a été la cause politique principale, à l'origine de la dépaysannisation dans l'Est et le Sud-Est de la Turquie, et de la prolétarisation rurale dans les autres régions du pays, où les travailleurs kurdes ont été déplacés.

Les résultats du travail de terrain réalisé à Cizre illustrent ici un nouveau profil d'ouvriers. Ceux-ci résident dans le centre-ville pendant six à huit mois et travaillent comme ouvriers agricoles temporaires dans différentes villes. Notons d'abord que ce profil social se situe à mi-chemin entre travail paysan et travail ouvrier, puisque d'anciens paysans possédant leurs propres terres où ils pratiquaient l'agriculture de subsistance

117 Nick Dines et Enrica Rigo, « Refugeeization of the Workforce : Migrant Agricultural Labor in the Italian Mezzogiorno », dans Postcolonial Transitions in Europe : Contexts, Practices and Politics, sous la direction de Sandra Ponzanesi, Gianmaria Colpani, Paul Gilroy et Anca Parvulescu, Londres, New York, Rowman & Littlefield International, 2016, 151-172.

trouvent actuellement comme activité économique principale le travail agricole. De plus, ce groupe de travailleurs engendre à travers leurs routines quotidiennes une sorte de vie villageoise au centre-ville de Cizre, tandis qu'ils vivent dans des tentes pendant les quelques 6 mois de l'année où ils sont embauchés comme ouvriers. Les termes de cette alternance nuance fortement les oppositions binaires paysans/travailleurs et habitants ruraux/urbains. De la même manière, le profil de travailleurs des réfugiés syriens est compatible avec les besoins du marché agricole, vue leur faible pouvoir de négociation et leur forte dépossession.

Thème 5 : Ghettoïsation rurale. Le chapitre 6 examine le phénomène de ghettoïsation rurale dans le sud de la Turquie, qui fait référence aux tentes permanentes des travailleurs au fil des ans par opposition à leur séjour et à leur travail temporaire dans le passé. Nous avançons trois causes sous-jacentes à ce changement socio-spatial sans précédent. Premièrement, le passage de la production de coton à la production d'agrumes (chapitre 4) a nécessité des travailleurs temporaires qui travailleraient de façon intermittente, mais pour une plus longue période dans l'année. Deuxièmement, les niveaux de pauvreté extrêmes récemment atteints par les travailleurs migrants kurdes, dus à la fois aux politiques agraires néolibérales sur leurs terres d'origine qui les poussent à devenir des travailleurs migrants, et aux migrations forcées pour fuir la violence dans les régions Est et Sud-Est, ont entraîné des niveaux élevés de dépossession, qui les obligent à vivre en permanence dans des tentes, dans les camps de travail. Troisièmement, le travail agricole temporaire est devenu une solution aux problèmes de logement et d'emploi des réfugiés syriens. Bien que les camps de travail du sud de la Turquie offrent un travail et un logement indécents, il répond aux besoins de logement de base des ménages de réfugiés syriens.

En résumé, tous les thèmes montrent l'évolution de la nature sociale, économique et spatiale de la campagne turque. Les principales conclusions confirment l'opinion selon laquelle la transformation rurale est devenue tributaire des travailleurs migrants. Les implications de ce changement structurel sont doubles. D'une part, l'ethnicisation du marché du

travail et de l'espace rural fait survivre les petites et moyennes paysanneries, ce qui signifie que la structure traditionnelle des villages se perpétue dans une certaine mesure en s'appuyant sur les bas salaires des travailleurs migrants. D'autre part, de nouveaux profils de travailleurs et de nouvelles pratiques de travail et d'hébergement obligent à repenser la définition conventionnelle des travailleurs migrants saisonniers, et en particulier de l'aspect provisoire attaché au terme " saisonnier ", puisque les éléments " désaisonnalisés " sont de plus en plus apparents, et changent les relations socio-économiques établies dans la campagne turque.

8. Limites de la thèse et perspectives pour des recherches ultérieures

Cette thèse suggère finalement plusieurs pistes et perspectives pour l'orientation des futures études sur les travailleurs agricoles migrants saisonniers. Sa principale limite est le caractère exclusivement qualitatif des données récoltées, en raison du caractère informel du terrain. Si des données quantitatives étaient obtenues, les différences régionales dans l'impact facteur " migrant " pourraient être analysées numériquement. De plus, l'impact des différents groupes ethniques en tant que travailleurs saisonniers pourraient être examiné de manière plus systématique, et permettraient de discuter les théories de la segmentation du marché du travail, du double emploi, ou des conflits de groupe. Ceci apporterait une autre contribution significative à la littérature.

Cette thèse se concentre surtout sur les relations complexes entre transformation agricole et migration de la main-d'œuvre. Or, les thèmes clés décrits dans la section précédente pourraient aussi faire l'objet d'études distinctes et plus approfondies. La ghettoïsation rurale, en particulier, mériteraient de faire l'objet de plus amples études ethnographiques. À partir de telles études de cas, nous pourrions discuter des processus à l'œuvre dans les interactions locales entre agriculteurs et travailleurs migrants, en termes de mise en contact des populations des

villages et des camps de travail dans la vie quotidienne, et en définitive de redéfinition de l'espace rural,.

Sur la réfugiéisation de la Force de Travail, des études qualitatives approfondies sur différents aspects, comme la vie quotidienne des Syriens dans les camps de travail et l'intégration des réfugiés dans l'espace rural, me semblent utiles. Les études des migrations gagneraient à se concentrer sur les réfugiés syriens dans les zones rurales, ce qui met en lumière la diversification, l'intensification, et la sédimentation de la présence syrienne dans la Turquie contemporaine, autant d'aspects que les enquêtes sur les réfugiés urbains ne suffisent plus à mettre en lumière. Il me semble urgent de mener davantage de recherches sur les réfugiés syriens en contextes ruraux, ce qui nécessite de développer des perspectives théoriques et des conceptions ethnographiques distinctes de celles mobilisées en études urbaines.

En outre, différents groupes de travailleurs et acteurs ruraux pourraient être examinés individuellement. Les femmes, les enfants, les courtiers de main-d'œuvre, pourraient faire l'objet de thèses ou de mémoires de recherche spécifiques. La relation entre courtiers en main-d'œuvre et travailleurs pourrait faire l'objet d'une recherche qualitative, qui mette en lumière les spécificités de ce type de relation en termes de paternalisme et de fonction capitaliste, comme nous le soulignons.

Pour finir, nous espérons que cette étude pourra être une ressource pour les travaux sur les travailleurs agricoles migrants dans un cadre plus large. Nous soulignons en particulier que le cas des travailleurs migrants saisonniers représente un enjeu social majeur, au-delà des travaux scientifiques en sciences sociales, et pour l'art et la littérature en particulier. Le parcours des travailleurs saisonniers en voyage, en travail et en séjour a inspiré de nombreux écrivains, réalisateurs, peintres et photographes au fil des ans. Or, la production d'œuvres d'art et de littérature reste aujourd'hui une nécessité, puisque les inégalités mondiales sont continuellement reconstruites avec des relations différentes pour ces travailleurs. John Steinbeck a publié *Les raisins de la colère* en 1939. Aujourd'hui les travailleurs saisonniers latino-américains, caribéens, africains, arabes,

kurdes et syriens, et bien de bien d'autres groupes, qui vivent une expérience similaire à celle de Okies, méritent qu'on leur porte la même attention que celle consacrée aux migrants saisonniers nord-américains pendant la grande crise des années 1930.

There is a sorrow here that weeping cannot symbolize. There is a failure here that topples all our success. The fertile earth, the straight tree rows, the sturdy trunks, and the ripe fruit. And children dying of pellagra must die because a profit cannot be taken from an orange. And coroners must fill in the certificate- died of malnutrition – because the food must rot, must be forced to rot.

John Steinbeck, *The Grapes of Wrath*

Gurbete düşersin sıla çağırır. Sılana kavuşursun gurbet el eder.

Orhan Kemal, *Bereketli Topraklar Üzerinde*

1

Introduction

This thesis is about an emerging agricultural labor regime that manifests itself through new forms of dispossession and new mobility patterns of seasonal migrant workers. In recent years, Turkish agriculture has experienced structural transformations that boosted demand for migrant agricultural labor. Turkey represents an interesting case as a neoliberal agrarian transformation has progressed concurrently with immigrant influxes resulting from geopolitical developments in the surrounding region. It has pursued domestic and foreign policies that resulted a surge in mobilities of migrants starting in the 1990s. I problematize the agrarian transformation and the transnational and internal mobilities that are closely linked and interrelated. Ultimately today a new understanding of the seasonal agricultural migration phenomenon is required. This dissertation offers a substantial analysis of seasonal migration, mobilities and agricultural production in Turkey since the 1990s that is an important resource for scholars of rural sociology, geopolitics of migration, and refugee and migration studies.

I take the reader back and forth through the last thirty years and consider how the coexistence of neoliberal policies toward the peasantry and increasing migrant flows to Turkey have reconfigured agricultural production, labor relations and even social relations in rural space. To that effect, I analyze the indispensable role of seasonal migrant workers -that

is observable in the rising dependency of producers on the use of outside labor-, which is continuously regulated, challenged, and redefined in the broader frame of national, regional, and global policies and among relevant meso, macro, and micro level actors. The goal of this dissertation is to understand the interplay between external economic and policy pressures and micro-politics at the farm level and how this influences the organization of labor and rural livelihoods. Links and conflicts among the economic context of farming, agricultural policies, and livelihoods of workers and farm dwellers will be unclosed. Thus, I problematize how wider processes of agrarian transformation, dispossession, and geopolitical developments reshape and also are shaped by seasonal agricultural migration and rural mobilities.

§ 1.1 Research Questions and Purpose of the Study

Migration, the movement of a people or individuals from one country or city another, even from one village to the neighboring village, is an old concept that is periodically "reinvented" to fit specific socio-historical moments and political formations.[1] In the agrarian context, the "new peasantry," "new migration," and "new rural spaces" are contemporary issues. But what is the "new peasantry?" And what is "new migration?" If there is a new migration and new peasantry, then must there also be a "new migrant" and a "new peasant". Who is this "new peasant?" What makes this peasantry "new?" "Who is new migrant?" What is "new" in rural areas?

Considering the "new" led me to study novelties of agricultural production and labor. This study focused on three main research areas of neoliberal agrarian transformation, migrant and immigrant influx to Turkey's agriculture, and dispossession and mobility patterns of the seasonal workers. This dissertation asks how large-scale waves of migra-

1 Oum-Hani Alaoui, *Migratory Trajectories: Moroccan Borderlands and Translocal Imaginaries* (PhD dissertation, Princeton University, 2009), 1.

tion and increasing transnational and internal rural mobilities are embedded in an ongoing process of agricultural transformation that is producing a new labor regime in the particular case of Turkey. A large body of work on seasonal migrant workers in Turkey points to the ethnic dimension of seasonal migrant labor and to exploitative relations in agrarian production.[2] It provides a fine analysis of discrimination against seasonal workers, which is an important aspect of how ethnic differences function to make workers vulnerable.

However, these studies have not paid attention to how increasing vulnerability of migrants is significant for the restructuring of Turkish agriculture. Going beyond the literature, the present study focuses on the key role of seasonal migrant workers in the agrarian transformation process. In so doing, this dissertation unpacks the impact of the ethnicization of the labor market due to variation in the migration flows that have allowed producers to maximize profit and better compete in the market. Throughout the dissertation, I maintain the idea that agricultural workers cannot be studied without examining migrant flows.

Contrary to historical patterns, in which Turkey was a migrant-sending country, there is a shift in the perception of the country to being to a destination.[3] Starting in the early 1990s, Turkey became the crossroads of diverse migrant flows from the Balkans, the Caucasus, Iraq, Syria, and African countries. Under the influence of geopolitical developments in regions surrounding Turkey and influx of migrants from the Caucasus and

2 Deniz Duruiz, "Embodiment of Space and Labor: Kurdish Migrant Workers in Turkish Agriculture," in *The Kurdish Issue in Turkey*, edited by Zeynep Gambetti and Joost Jongerden (Routledge, 2015). https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315740881-22; Uygar Yıldırım, *1980 Sonrası Türkiye Tarımında Yapısal Dönüşüm ve Mevsimlik Tarım İşçileri* (Istanbul University, 2014); İclal Ayşe Küçükkırca, "Etnisite, Toplumsal Cinsiyet, Sınıf Ekseninde Mevsimlik Kürt Tarım İşçileri," *Toplum ve Kuram* 6 (2012); Ayşegül Özbek, *New Actors of New Poverty: The 'Other' Children of Çukurova* (MA Thesis, Middle East Technical University, 2007).

3 Ibrahim Sirkeci and Barbara Pusch, "Introduction: Turkish Migration Policy at a Glance," in *Turkish Migration Policy*, edited by İbrahim Sirkeci and Barbara Pusch (London Transnational Press, 2016), 9.

Syria now settle in the Turkish countryside where they predominantly find temporary, labor-intensive jobs in agriculture.[4] Before, local workers and Kurdish workers from Turkey comprised the main labor force for these temporary agricultural jobs. Migrant flows from the Caucasus and Syria disturbed the antecedent labor pool by adding new layers to the labor market. Against this background, this study argues that contemporary rural mobilities pave the way for novel processes of rural change. The present work traces four main braches of these new patterns:

- Along the economic axis, the coexistence of different migrant groups has re-structured the labor market with different wages changing according to the ethnic origin of the workers,[5] which has resulted in a decrease in production costs for the employers. This has two-fold impact: large agricultural enterprises maximize profits through the hyper-exploitation of migrant workers. Small peasantries do not totally disappear; instead, their survival is sustained notwithstanding decreasing wages.
- Along the social axis, increasing encounters between "insiders" and "outsiders" in the villages and among various groups of workers have created new rural melting pots[6] that reflect and accelerate social differentiation in a now more heterogeneous Turkish countryside. Conflicts and cohabitation practices among groups living together in rural space are apparent, necessitating a new look at the diversity of the rural population and social relations that leaves the historical, "pure" image of the Turkish countryside aside.

4 Although there are migrant workers originating from Afganistan, Iran, and Central Asian countries in Turkey's countryside, the largest flows of migrants filling seasonal agricultural jobs have been from Caucasia (from Georgia and Azerbaijan) and Syria. See Saniye Dedeoğlu, *Türkiye'de Mevsimlik Tarımsal Üretimde Yabancı Göçmen İşçiler Mevcut Durum Raporu Yoksulluk Nöbetinden Yoksulların Rekabetine* (Kalkınma Atölyesi, 2016).

5 Dedeoğlu, *Türkiye'de Mevsimlik Tarımsal*, 168.

6 Jesús Oliva, "Rural Melting-Pots, Mobilities and Fragilities: Reflections on the Spanish Case." *Sociologia Ruralis* 50, no. 3 (2010): 277–95. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9523.2010.00516.x.

- Along the political axis, the scope of management by the Turkish state has extended from farmers to migrant workers as opposed to earlier periods when the essential focus was peasants. As such, which migrant group(s) are employed in agricultural jobs and how the new dynamics of sociocultural change in rural areas is managed emerged as important topics on the political agenda. Besides the state, relevant NGOs and autonomous bodies that are important actors in rural policymaking are also directing their attention toward migrant workers.
- Along the spatial axis, increasing migrant flows to rural areas of Turkey and the newly assigned tasks for migrant laborers in the agrarian transformation process have resulted in a different pattern of accommodation. In some regions, permanent settlement of seasonal migrant workers on the outskirts of villages resulted in ghetto neighborhoods. This phenomenon has two significant implications. First, in physical and social terms, rural space now means more than villages with the advent of these ghettos. Second, the temporary character of seasonal agricultural workers is changing with the permanent appearance of migrants and immigrants, creating a new set of relations in rural space.

Thus, contemporary rural transformation in the Turkish landscape invites discussion of the following research questions: How do migrant flows reshape the seasonal agricultural migrant phenomenon in Turkey? How and in which ways are new power relations being constructed among various macro and micro level actors? This is examined in chapter 3, where a geopolitical analysis of migrant flows investigates new power zones and conflicts at the transnational, regional, and national levels that have produced migration waves to the Turkish countryside.

Additionally, this study asks how and why seasonal migrant workers are becoming increasingly important in the agrarian transformation process. What are the reasons for the expansion of seasonal migrant work in different settings? This is addressed in chapter 4, which investigates the crucial role of the availability of seasonal migrant workers as a cheap, flexible labor force in the transformation of agricultural production and labor relations. Furthermore, this dissertation scrutinizes how different

migrant statuses become embeded in agricultural transformation process. As such, chapter 5 analyzes how refugee migration differs from routine labor migration and illuminates how the category of "refugee worker" functions in the labor market.

This dissertation also examines new patterns in mobility, rural space, and dispossession with regard to seasonal migrant workers. Two important questions are asked: how have new rural mobilities and the economic impoverishment of workers reshaped the seasonal agricultural migration phenomenon in Turkey? And what are the implications of new socio-spatial relations. Chapter 6 explores the new process of the dispossession of workers and the diverse socio-spatial patterns in rural space. In light of this discussion, the study contributes to the literature, particularly to that of seasonal migrant workers in Turkey, in multiple ways:

- This dissertation analyzes the case of seasonal migrant workers through the dialectical relationship of agricultural production and labor. It discusses the crucial role of seasonal migrant workers in the agricultural transformation that has paradoxically been realized through a process of depeasantization at the global and national scales.
- The study brings together macro and micro level analysis to examine the case of migrant agricultural workers. Thus, one objective is to reveal the impact of changing geopolitical objectives and foreign and domestic policies on migrant flows that have reshaped the seasonal migrant workers phenomena in Turkey.
- This dissertation discerns and discusses new patterns of seasonal agricultural migration and its implications for the rural space. Challenging the conventional definition of seasonal agricultural migration that is characterized as with the term temporary, the present study uncovers the deseasonal and perpetual character of this phenomenon today.

§ 1.2 Changing Contexts and Trajectories of Seasonal Migration

Over the past four decades, transnational corporations and agencies have emerged as decisive actors shaping the global market and agricultural

production, which have been restructured by a shift from producer-driven to consumer-driven food chains. McMichael and Friedmann articulates the concept of "food regime," which refers to new global agri-food systems realized through the financialization of agricultural processes and the consolidation of retailer power through a supermarket revolution.[7]

Consumer demand for "eating fresh," "on time deliver," and "eating in season" as well as particular region preferences for specific crops have contributed to this restructuring process. Needless to say, advanced communication facilities have influenced the spread in awareness and formation of public opinion on food, which resulted in empowerment of consumer preference vis-à-vis agricultural production. Both consumer and market demands have shaped the preferences of supermarkets, which are the essential component of the new food regime the enormous buyer power of which gives control over distribution, production processing, and the consumption of food.[8] To this end, expectations from the production process that vary with changing crops and cultivation methods have been met by the global availability of migrants.

We are living an age of migration[9] and rural space is no longer beyond its scope. Contrary to the predominant image of the rural as idyllic, stag-

7 Philip McMichael and Harriet Friedmann, "Situating the Retailing Revolution in Supermarkets and Agri-Food Supply Chains: Transformations in the Production and Consumption of Foods," in *Supermarkets and Agri-Food Supply Chains: Transformations in the Production and Consumption of Foods*, edited by Geoffrey Lawrence and David Burch. (Cheltenham, U.K.; Northampton, Mass.: E. Elgar, 2007).

8 Alessandra Corrado, Carlos de Castro, and Domenico Perrotta, "Introduction. Cheap food, cheap labour, high profits: Agriculture and the mobility in Mediterranean," in *Migration and Agriculture Mobility and Change in the Mediterranean Area*, edited by Alessandra Corrado, Carlos de Castro, and Domenico Perrotta (London: Routledge, 2016), 8.

9 Stephen Castles, Mark J Miller, and Hein de Haas, *The Age of Migration.* (New York, N.Y.; London: Guilford, 2014).

nant, and sedentarist, the persistent presence of rural migrants is forming more dynamic countryside today.[10] Migrant employment in agricultural jobs is on the rise, but it's increase is either concurrent nor identical in every part of the world. While the United States, Australia and northern Europe have already experienced the delocalization of their agricultural labor forces, Mediterranean countries and parts of Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region -namely, Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt- as well as Turkey are still progressively restructuring agriculture based on the abundance of migrant workers available to be employed in especially the farming of fresh fruit, and vegetables and horticulture.[11]

In Mediterranean agriculture, the replacement of family labor with delocalized workers has provided a vulnerable, cheap, and flexible labor force with which to meet downward pressure on costs and the demand for just-in-time production by agri-food chains.[12] France has a long history of importing agricultural workers , and international migration after the Second World War was especially important for the development of its intensive agriculture.[13] The Office national d'immigration (ONI) served as a principal agent to manage the recruitment of seasonal agricultural workers from non-European countries. It took the name l'Office

10 Johan Fredrik Rye, "Labour Migrants and Rural Change: The 'Mobility Transformation' of Hitra/Frøya, Norway, 2005–2015." *Journal of Rural Studies* 64 (November 2018): 190. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrurstud.2017.12.003.

11 Alessandra Corrado, Carlos de Castro, and Domenico Perrotta, "Introduction. Cheap food, cheap labour, high profits: Agriculture and the mobility in Mediterranean," in *Migration and Agriculture Mobility and Change in the Mediterranean Area*, edited by Alessandra Corrado, Carlos de Castro, and Domenico Perrotta (London: Routledge, 2016), 4.

12 Ibid., 10.

13 Frédéric Décosse, "Persistent Unfree Labour in French Intensive Agriculture: An Historical Overview of the 'OFII' Temporary Farmworkers Programme," in *Migration and Agriculture Mobility and Change in the Mediterranean Area*, edited by Alessandra Corrado, Carlos de Castro, and Domenico Perrotta (London: Routledge, 2016), 183–98.

des migrations internationals (OMI) in 1988 and the name Agence nationale de l'accueil des étrangers et des migrations (ANAEM) in 2005.[14] The office français de l'immigration and de l'integration (OFII) has been in charge of the bureaucratic process of migration -maintaining residence and work permit- since 2009. Morice and Michalon argue that the temporariness of the work and stay of workers which was realized together with non-European countries through several schemes and programs in the frame of bi-lateral agreements, offered favorable conditions to agricultural employers with respect to the availability of workers.[15]

Relying on their colonialist histories, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, and African countries supply migrants that constitute an important labor reserve for seasonal work in France. Documented migration through bilateral arrangements and work permits have been accompanied by several forms of undocumented migration such as overstaying the residence permit or arriving and living in France without legal permission.[16] Similarly, Moroccan workers are the majority employed in Spanish agriculture along with other migrant groups from Eastern European, sub-Saharan African, and South Asian countries to a lesser extent.[17] Italy has also become an important destination or transit-country for migration.

Migration to Europe has been regulated on a national level since the establishment of the European Community. However, the European Union sought to execute a common migration management policy to regulate migrant flows in 2007. The Europeanization of migration policy led to the establishment of mobility partnerships. For instance, the Mobility Partnership with Morocco, reinforced the implementation of circular mobility between countries of origin and member states of the European

14 Alain Morice and Bénédicte Michalon. "Introduction: Travailleurs Saisonniers dans L'agriculture Européenne." *études rurales*, no. 182 (2008): 12. https://doi.org/10.4000/etudesrurales.8748.

15 Ibid., 12.

16 Piotr Plewa, "The Politics of Seasonal Labour Migration in Switzerland, France and Spain." *International Migration* 51, no. 6 (2013): 110. https://doi.org/10.1111/imig.12134.

17 Ibid., 113.

Union.[18] Despite these legislative programs and legal frameworks, informal employment has not disappeared. Informal intermediaries -who serve as a bridge between employers and workers- have always been a constitutive element of the import of labor. Besides, formal recruitment by public and private actors guarantees neither better working and housing conditions nor longer contracts than informal intermediation.[19]

§ 1.3 Idiosyncrasies of Seasonal Agricultural Migration in Turkey[20]

Unlike European cases where documented and undocumented migration coexist, the job market in Turkey is informal and without rules though it has its own implicit rules complicated by different power relations. State control mechanisms for seasonal migration are so ineffective that these jobs are performed on almost entirely informal basis. In France, migrants come from different countries such as Tunisia and Morocco and are employed in French agriculture for a relatively short period; moreover, the OFII organizes their work and residence permits. Conversely, migration patterns to Turkey are complicated by internal migrants from eastern and southeastern regions as well as immigrants coming primarily from Syria and less so from Georgia and Azerbaijan. There is no regulatory board in Turkey like the OFII to organize work permits for temporary agrarian jobs.

The current economic and political agenda concerned with the agrarian labor market in the idiosyncratic context of Turkey is key to understanding the current seasonal migrant phenomenon. Foremost, in economic terms, Turkey has undergone a dramatic agrarian dissolution

18 Jorg Gertel and Sarah Ruth Sippel, eds. *Seasonal Workers in Mediterranean Agriculture the Social Costs of Eating Fresh*. (Routledge, 2017), 14.

19 Corrado, de Castro, and Perrotta, "Introduction. Cheap food", 13.

20 A large part of this section was published in Deniz Pelek, "Syrian Refugees as Seasonal Migrant Workers: Re-Construction of Unequal Power Relations in Turkish Agriculture," *Journal of Refugee Studies*. (2018). https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/fey050.

since 1980s as part of the broader neoliberalization of its economy, which led to the gradual withdrawal of state policies that were protective of small producers. This triggered demographic mobility. The urban population has increased from 18.219.778 to 53.473.706 between 1980 and 2009.[21] Most small-scale producers were unable to compete under the new conditions and migrated to cities for this reason alongside others like better access to education and health services.

Such transformation certainly marks extensive change in the economic, social, and cultural realms that far exceed the scope of this study. For concerns, it is sufficient to point out the significant consequences for the agrarian labor market. As populations disengaged from agrarian activities, traditional collective labor practices such as *imece* and *icar* dissolved.[22] Other survival strategies of farmers struggling with harsh market conditions, which were based on unpaid family labor practices were also weakened. This inevitably boosted the demand for seasonal labor.

Second, a political factor underpins the uniqueness of the Turkish example- namely forced internal migration in the 1990s. Due to skirmishes between Turkish security forces and the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in southeastern provinces, the state announced State of Emergency Rule in 1987, following which forced migration was put into effect. The goal was to eradicate any complicity that is providing money, shelter, or food to the PKK.[23] Thus, many Kurdish villages were evacuated, resulting an immense wave of migration from eastern and southeastern provinces to western Turkey.

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21 Nuriye Garipağaoğlu, "Türkiye'de Kentleşmenin, Kent Sayısı, Kentli Nüfus Kriterlerine Göre İncelenmesi ve Coğrafi Dağılışı," *Marmara Coğrafya Dergisi*, no. 22 (July 2010): 22.

22 *İmece* refers to the situation in which all the members of a family work or their neighbors in exchange for the work of the latter's family members for them. This system dissolved when these unpaid workers migrated to cities. *İcar* corresponds to share-crooping, which that is a form of agriculture in which a landowner allows a tenant to use the land in return for a share of the crops produced. The proportion is usually 50 per cent in Turkey.

23 Seda Kartal, *Ethnic Identity and Turkey's Migrant Kurds in Urban Provinces* (Ph. D. diss., Northern Illinois University, 2008), 39.

Internally displaced people migrated to Istanbul, Izmir, Adana, and Mersin as well as to the centers of eastern and southeastern cities. However, they could not find job opportunities in eastern regions because of high unemployment, forcing them to work as seasonal migrant workers in other parts of Turkey (chapter 6). In other words, the "kurdification" of labor force became prevalent in agriculture after forced migration simultaneous with a rising demand to fill the vacancy left by unpaid family workers who had migrated to cities. In addition, neoliberal agrarian policies had an adverse impact on Kurdish peasants and sharecroppers who have no opportunity to convert their land or to cultivate more profitable cash crops due to the scarcity of water, infertility of the land, and the rugged terrain in that geography (chapter 4). Thus, former peasants became the new seasonal migrant workers because of both shifting agricultural policies and internal forced migration.

The tangled labor market in agriculture is constituted of Kurdish migrants from Eastern and Southeastern Turkey, locals who hire themselves out for extra work after completing their own harvests, Romanis who travel across the Aegean region to look for temporary jobs, Georgian and Azerbaijani workers who emigrated following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and Syrians who have been arriving since 2011. The differences among migrant, non-migrant and immigrant statuses already entail remarkable inequality in terms of working conditions, shelter, and travel.

This situation involves a further distinction based on ethnicity: internal migrant workers are almost al Turkish Kurds, Turkish Gypsies and Turkish Arabs; immigrants consist of Georgians, Azeris, and Syrians of Kurdish or Arabic origin; and non-migrant seasonal workers are local Turks who usually work in fields in the vicinity of their homes.[24] The

24 Throughout the thesis, in order to distinguish among migrants who have the same ethnic origin but different citizenship, I write first the national identity and then the ethnic origin of the migrants (i.e., Turkish Kurds, Syrian Kurds; Turkish Arabs, Syrian Arabs). This usage will be explained in depth in section on Terminology (§ 1.7).

presence of such ethnic diversity has provided employers with the opportunity to lower labor costs by organizing work along these lines. A number of field studies illustrate that wage differentials hinge on ethnicity. A research report on foreign seasonal workers in Turkish agriculture suggests that Syrian refugee workers receive two-thirds the wage of other workers for the same job.[25] Georgians are one place one place ahead of Turkish Kurds in the ethnic hierarchy among seasonal migrant workers, while local Turkish workers are at the top.[26]

Accommodations for different groups of workers are similar. Local non-migrant workers usually stay in their own homes or if too far away for a daily commute, in an empty house or a room at the back of the local coffee house arranged by the employer. Other migrant workers mostly stay in tents near the fields.[27] In other words, if an empty house is available, it is reserved for local workers instead of migrants. One of the essential conclusions of this study is to understand the implications of the concept of inequality by investigating it as embedded within diverse hierarchies and asymmetries among different actors: employers and workers; labor intermediaries and workers, and workers from different groups. Consisting of multiple layers of class, ethnicity, and nationality, Turkish agricultural space enables the observation and analysis of such complexities in power relations. As the wages indicate, employing migrant labor is favorable. Maintaining the supply of cheap labor, on the other hand, depends on the mechanisms of a flexible, informal labor market.

There is no law protecting seasonal migrant workers in agriculture, per se; thus, legal status of these workers is determined only by general

25 Saniye Dedeoğlu, *Türkiye'de Mevsimlik Tarımsal Üretimde Yabancı Göçmen İşçiler Mevcut Durum Raporu Yoksulluk Nöbetinden Yoksulların Rekabetine* (Kalkınma Atölyesi, 2016), 168.

26 Deniz Duruiz, "Embodiment of Space and Labor: Kurdish Migrant Workers in Turkish Agriculture," in *The Kurdish Issue in Turkey*, edited by Zeynep Gambetti and Joost Jongerden. (Routledge, 2015) 294.

27 Ibid., 291.

laws.[28] Most excluded by the İş Kanunu (Labor Law), Law No. 4857, which regulates the general conditions of work in Turkey. Below does not encompass agricultural workers employed by agricultural or forestry enterprises with fewer than fifty employees or jobs with a duration of less than 30 days. Moreover, clearing the number of workers is the responsibility of the employer, which at times results in pretenses. Accordingly, temporary workers in agriculture do not benefit from the same guarantees with respect to wages, vacation time, social security, pensions, and work safety inspections as other workers included in the scope of the Labor Law.

Due to the lack of legal regulations, these jobs are organized on a holy informal basis in Turkey. In this labor network, the key figure is a labor intermediary who serves as a middleman between employers and workers who is locally known as a *dayıbaşı*[29] or *elçi.*[30] A *dayıbaşı* is usually a relative of some of the workers or a fellow townsman with the same place of origin. He makes a verbal contract with the employer, gathers a group of workers, and arrives at the field at the right time with the correct number of workers. Generally, his responsibilities consist of ensuring that workers arrive on time and work suitably each work-day; of accommodating workers by helping them set up tents or arranging a temporary place, and of solving any disagreement between the workers and the employer.

After the job is accomplished, the employer pays the total sum of the wages to the dayıbaşı. The latter then distributes the money to workers after taking his cut, including his extra expenses such as loans or travel expenses lent to the workers. He receives a commission of around 10 percent from each worker's daily wage; in other words, labor intermediaries earn no salary directly from the employer. The other practices in the work, including the labor process, types of remuneration (daily wage or

28 Nurettin Yıldırak, Bülent Gülçubuk and Sema Gün, *Türkiye'de Gezici ve Geçici Kadın Tarım İşçilerinin Çalışma ve Yaşam Koşulları ve Sorunları* Ankara: TARIM-İŞ (2003), 26.

29 Dayıbaşı means uncle in Turkish

30 Elçi means delegate in Turkish

piecework), and duration of the work in each field or region as well as conditions of travel and accommodation differ immensely according to product, region, and field. Many studies of this informal, ethnically hierarchized labor market indicate that Kurdish workers earn the lowest wages and have the worst shelter and work conditions.[31] However, this picture changed after the introduction of Syrian immigrants who have replaced Turkish Kurds at the bottom.

§ 1.4 New Precarious Labor Force: Syrian Refugees

Turkey has been the preferred migration destination for Syrian refugees since 2011. Today, in Turkish territory, there are about 3,5 million Syrians escapes from the war in Syria. Geographic, demographic, and religious factors play a role in the leading position of Turkey as a destination. There are four main reasons. First, Syria is located along the south border of Turkey, making the migration easier for war victims. The second is that Turkey opened up its borders to Syrians. Moreover, the considerable presence of Arab and Kurdish populations in Turkey partly solved the language problem given that the ethnic identity of Syrians is mostly Kurdish or Arabs. Finally, a shared religious identity, Islam, is another catalyst for integration with the host society.

Turkey, which occupies geostrategic space between Syria and Europe means that is both being an immigration destination and a place of transit along the way to the west. Thus, Turkish agricultural territory has ascended to a privileged location that is watched by immigrants, the media, NGOs, political authorities from various countries, local police forces, and government officials owing to the high employment of Syrians as temporary agrarian workers.

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31 See Uygar Yıldırım, *1980 Sonrası Türkiye Tarımında Yapısal Dönüşüm ve Mevsimlik Tarım İşçileri* (Ph.D. Diss., Istanbul University, 2014); Sidar Çınar, *Bağımlı Çalışma İlişkileri Kapsamında Mevsimlik Tarım İşçilerinin Malatya Örneği Üzerinden Analizi* (Ph.D. Diss., Marmara University, 2012) and Aysegül Özbek, *New Actors of New Poverty: The "Other" Children of Çukurova* (MA Thesis, Middle East Technical University, 2007).

The coexistence of urbanization, agrarian transformation, internal violence in the east and southeast of Turkey, and the extraterritorial war in Syria provide a setting from which to analyze dynamics within the labor market -as well as the dynamics of social relations in rural space after the entrance of an ethnic group who are civilian victims of war- that are shaped by sociopolitical developments at a macro level and in turn shape them. Thus, studying Turkish agrarian space allows to pose new questions not addressed in the literature on agrarian transformation and temporary migrant work on account of the economic, social, and political uniqueness of the case.

Against this background, this dissertation analyzes how a wider process of agricultural transformation, the Kurdish question, and recent migrant flows to Turkey are connected in the shifting world of work and production. More specifically, this study examines how the contemporary migration influx has been embedded in agricultural transformation in the particular case of Turkey and what are the social, political, economic and spatial consequences of the transformation of former backwaters into market-driven as well as globally connected space.

§ 1.5 Restructuring and Reorganization of Agricultural Labor: Five Case Studies

This research adopts an ambitious strategy to analyze the dynamics of complicated, puzzling relations among agrarian transformation, internal and transnational rural mobilities, and socio-spatial change in rural space. Therefore, the essential focuses of this study are transformations, novelties, and change in different settings. However, there is no single pattern that applies to all regions in Turkey. Instead, particular features such as the fertility of land, the crops being cultivated, the land ownership structure, and marketing facilities are key factors in the level of transformation and its impact on the rural population. The entrance of migrants into this context functions on different levels of agricultural transfor-

mation. Therefore, I selected research sites according to the differing agricultural characteristics of the regions. Figure 1.1. shows the research sites of this study.



Figure 1.1 Map of the Research Sites. Created by the author.

I conducted fieldwork in Manisa, a western province of Turkey, in August 2013 and August 2014 when tomatoes and grapes were being picking and sun dried. Two other sites of my fieldwork were Adana and Mersin in southern Turkey, both of which I visited in September 2013 and February 2015. The diverse range of crops in the latter two areas gave me the chance to observe the harvesting of various crops. I chose these cities due to several criteria related to the research questions.

First, the areas of Adana, Mersin, and Manisa have long needed outside labor to support its extensive production. Thus, these research sites are convenient to observe the impact of agrarian transformation on well-established processes of agricultural production. In addition, seasonal migrant workers are abundant, enabling me to secure my informants without extra effort. Second, the labor supply is ethnically heterogeneous

comprised of Kurdish workers from eastern and southeastern cities of Turkey, Romanis from Afyon, Aydın, and Balıkesir in central and western Turkey, the locals of Turkish origin, and Syrian refugees. These locations are good for observing solidarities, frictions, and conflicts among different ethnic groups as well as for analyzing changing dynamics that followed the arrival of Syrians in an already hierarchically structured labor market.

Third, weather conditions in Adana and Mersin are favorable for staying outside even in winter, so the period of temporary settlement is relatively long in these regions. There are even permanent tent neighborhoods, which I call rural ghettos, where the workers stay almost yearround (chapter 6). Thus, Adana and Mersin are ideal for pursuing the questions of how migrants transform a space physically, socially, economically, and culturally. Lastly, Adana is home to Turkish Kurds and Turkish Arabs. I also ascertain whether any transnational solidarity emerged between these communities and Syrians of the same ethnic descent. I pay particular attention to relations of solidarity across different groups as the lack of aid is a catalyst for the vulnerability for these immigrants.

The Bursa-Orhangazi region is another field for my study. The olive production industry there has only just begun to recruit workers, from mostly nearby cities. Traditional production relations such as family farming and *imece* are only recently being replaced by capitalist wage relations via supply of new migrants. Thus, the field survey results enables an account of the dynamics of rural transformation in progress. Furthermore, olive producers have undergone a transformation process characterized by many important changes such as the promotion of organic farming, the presence of large corporations, and the defunctionalization of agricultural corporations. Thus, it is significant to analyze the survival strategies of small producers to cope with the spread of market relations in rural areas and the impact of these strategies on seasonal agricultural workers.

I also conducted observations in winter months when workers are unemployed in order to comprehend their situation of dispossession that is a key research theme for invesitigating the research questions related

to proletarianization and precarization in this study. To this end, I selected the Cizre district of Şırnak as a research site. Cizre has been a settlement center for victims of forced migration after their villages dispersed around Şırnak were evacuated in 1994. The field survey in this region provides a better explanation of the political reasons -beyond the economic ones- for the emerging rural proletariats. Furthermore, the population of Cizre consists of the seasonal migrant workers; they are occupied with farming but they inhabit a city district, complicating the understanding of the liminality between urban and rural areas as well as the dichotomy city dwellers and villagers.

§ 1.6 Methods and Data

This study employed various research methods including qualitative and cartographic methods. Qualitative, ethnographic research provided significant time to collect various forms of data in order to comprehend the issue more broadly. For instance, interviews were combined with participant observation during time spent in participants' tents, during shared meals, while working together in the fields, and in chats in the lodging areas.

I encountered certain difficulties during my fieldwork related to my methodology. First, little is known about the exact number of seasonal migrant workers that come from different cities in Turkey. The only statistical information available is provided by the Turkish Statistical Institute (Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu, TÜİK) that gives a number for wage workers in agrarian jobs but neither specifies how many workers come from outside nor how many local workers are employed in temporary jobs. With respect to Syrian refugees, the Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (Afet ve Acil Durum Yönetimi Başkanlığı, AFAD) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNCHR) are the main sources of statistical data. Yet the LIRR data is rather rudimentary, providing merely general information about Syrians throughout Turkey without any specifics regarding their urban-rural distribution.

The lack of detailed data led me to use snowball sampling to choose my informants. This method is suitable for explorative studies and in situations where knowledge of the field is scarce; it is useful in cases where it is not possible to determine the sample.[32] Snowball sampling helped me sustain mutual trust with a vulnerable group to overcome the suspicion of the informants, and to facilitate entry into the groups. From the outset, I sought to a suitable contact to enable me to reach labor camps. The roles of key contacts varied across research sites; sometimes a labor intermediary, sometimes a worker, and sometimes a villager took the first step of introducing me to the migrant groups.

After establishing the first contact with migrants, I conducted semi-structured and in-depth face-to-face interviews with a total of 111 workers consisting of Syrian Kurds and Syrian Arabs, Turkish Kurds, Turkish Romanis, Turkish Arabs, and local Turkish workers. Closed-ended questions were posed to learn their sociodemographic backgrounds. I asked open-ended questions to investigate their personal experiences of being a seasonal migrant worker as well as their opinions about the job, their employers, the labor intermediaries, and the spaces of their work. The interviews with Syrian Kurds and Arabs were conducted in their native language- Kurdish, and Arabic- with the help of another worker or labor intermediary who spoke that language and served as a simultaneous interpreter. As for Turkish-Kurds and Turkish-Arabs, I conducted most interviews in Turkish with few exceptions.

I kept the sample as broad as possible and included women, men, children, and elderly workers. I also conducted semi-structured and in-depth interviews with other rural actors. Twenty-eight employers, sixteen labor intermediaries, and thirteen representatives of state agencies and non-governmental organizations were interviewed to take all aspects of the dynamics of the employment process into account. Apart from interviews, I also spent time with workers in fields, and camps during my

32 Jean Francoise Pérouse, Didem Danis and Cherie Tharaghi, " 'Integration in Limbo': Iragi, Afghan, Maghrebi and Iranian Migrants in Istanbul," in: Kemal Kirisci and Ahmet Icduygu, (eds.), *Land of Diverse Migrations Challenges of Emigration and Immigration in Turkey* (Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi University Press (2009), 448.

fieldwork; I picked tomatoes with the workers, cooked meals with the women in the tents, and played with child workers.

I used cartographic methods to visualize migration data. Migrant flows from Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Syria and internal forced migration within Turkey were analyzed with the QGIS software. Geopolitical analysis of migrant flows offered new insight into rural mobilities in Turkey's changing political context. This analysis identified antagonistic poles pf power and conflicts that produce migrant influxes and have an impact on rural space and relevant actors. To this end, I complement conceptual, cartographic data with conceptual data in the discourses on identity, perception, prejudice, and positive and negative discrimination against migrants, thereby unfolding a distinct relational form between power and geography.

As secondary data, I examined recent laws and regulations on seasonal agricultural workers and Syrian refugees. Apart from the everyday interactions of actors involved in the agricultural labor market, macro level transitions matter for this research since individual agents' actions and perceptions are interrelated with broader structural processes. Thus, I bring micro and macro level analysis together by considering controversial aspects of the labor market where both structure and agency play a crucial role in reproducing, challenging, and reconstructing power relations.

§ 1.7 Terminology

I need to clarify key terminology that is used throughout this study. First, concepts regarding the time span of the agricultural work – that is, seasonal, temporary, and permanent - are crucial for understanding agrarian labor structure. The category of permanent workers notes those who work uninterrupted for a year in agricultural sector. The term seasonal refers to the harvest season, a more labor-intensive period relative to other times of the year, in which the demand of agricultural enterprises or labor increases. I use the terms seasonal worker and temporary

worker interchangeably in order to precise the duration of work in order to avoid the repetition.

Second, two key categories -asylum seeker and refuge- need to be clarified. According to the definitions of UNCHR, refugees are people fleeing conflict or persecution. They are protected by international law, which forbids their expulsion in order to prevent their return to a situation where their life and freedom are at risk. An asylum-seeker, on the other hand, refers to someone whose request for sanctuary has yet to be processed. Although both terms are applicable to Syrians in Turkey, in line with the legislative frame that they have already hold temporary protection status in Turkey, I prefer refugee given that their legal status in Turkey where the legislative frame has granted them temporary protection status, is closer to this category than to that of the asylum seeker. I should note that I consider the case of Syrian refugees to be different from that of the refugees in many other countries like the Kurds in France, Karens in the United States, and Eritreans in Italy. Lastly, I use the terms Syrian Kurds, Syrian Arabs and Turkish Kurds and Turkish Arabs in order to isolate the factor of citizenship.

§ 1.8 Structure of the Dissertation

This dissertation is structured around six chapters. Chapter 2 suggests that the themes of migration and agriculture must be thought of together in the case of seasonal migrant agricultural workers. To that end, I first present a theoretical overview on rural mobilities and migration. In particular, the difference between the concepts of migration and mobility will be explained. The need to adapt the term rural mobility will be emphasized and analytical tools from the migration literature also be advocated for with regard to their contribution to understanding migrant's motivations. Then, the neoliberalization of agriculture and emerging themes discussed in rural studies -such as "new agricultural regime," "survival strategies of the peasantry," and "the increasing need for cheap migrant labor" - will be elaborated upon.

Chapter 2, will then examine different migration, and mobility patterns in different settings. Diverse experiences in developed and developing countries have influenced different aspects of the literature on agricultural transformation and wage labor, prompting works on legality, public health, socioeconomic reorganization, and public administration. Regarding the unique experience of seasonal agricultural migration, disciplines such as law, medicine, economics, sociology, and political science have variously come to the fore in different countries. A critical understanding of the emerging literature in relation to the experience of seasonal migration in specific regions is important in order to recognize how the diversity and semblance of its characteristics in different localities contribute to whether the role of waged migrant labor in contemporary agrarian transition is described an obstacle or an opportunity. Based on analytical tools gleaned from the literature, the chapter will continue by describing land, production, and labor relations in the specific case of Turkey. The transition from family labor to the employment of migrants will be introduced to show how capitalist wage relations reshape socioeconomic order in the countryside and how power asymmetries are reconfigured among old and new actors: small, medium, and large scale farmers, labor intermediaries, local workers, internal migrants, irregular immigrants, and refugees. This framework will be applied throughout the thesis.

Chapter 3 analyzes the recent migration and immigration flows to Turkey with regard to seasonal agrarian employment. A geopolitical analysis of migrant influx will problematize the transformative impact of changing foreign and domestic policies on the migrant flows that are reshaping the Turkish countryside today. I will first elaborate the Neo-Ottomanist policy approach that has shaped the selective Turkish stance towards immigrants with respect to whether if they are eligible to be citizens, workers, and residents and whether they can receive recipient of education and health services and other basic survival needs. Then, I will examine a first wave of immigration from Caucasus following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in mind with Neo-Ottomanist policy. Specifically, Georgians and Azerbaijanis will be examined because of these two

immigrant groups are the only ones that have been regularly employed in temporary agricultural jobs.

Subsequently, a second migration wave of Syrian refugees who have worked as seasonal migrant workers since 2012 will be analyzed. For these two waves, the Turkish and Muslim identities of the migrants in relation to the Neo-Ottomanist policy and the governance of migration will be evaluated. Finally, a third migration wave that of Kurdish migrants within Turkey will be analyzed. The economic impoverishment of Kurdish migrants, the violence in Southeastern Turkey and forced migration of Turkish Kurds in the 1990s will be evaluated by considering both the dynamic of Kurdish Question and the changing Neo-Ottomanist policies of Turkey with respect to the Middle-East. The analysis of these three migration waves will illuminate the transformative impact of the coexistence of internal violence in the east and southeast of Turkey, economic and political instability in the Caucasus and the war in Syria on the phenomenon of seasonal migration in Turkish agriculture. New patterns will be observed with respect to spatial reconfiguration via the formation of rural ghettos, with respect to work relations via the ethnicization and refugeeization of labor force, and with respect to different mobility models via the emergence of a new kind of nomadism, which will be discussed in ensuing chapters.

Chapter 4 explores the impact of the ongoing agrarian transformation on seasonal migrant workers by problematizing the new means and relations of production influenced by neoliberal policies. Special reference will be made to the issues around the means of survival of small farming and their consequences for labor. A historic shift from independent small and medium scale producers to agrarian employers and to waged labor has been taking place since 1980 alongside a striking depeasantization process. In this chapter, I will focus only on the emergent need for cheaper seasonal labor in the production process. In order to analyze the demand for seasonal labor, I will examine the impact of agrarian transformation on producers by which they are forced to change the production process and means. I ask how and in what ways farmers maintain agricultural production given rural-urban migration. In this chapter, I will

discuss the role of seasonal migrant workers in agrarian transformation by analyzing employers' choices with respect to hiring of manual labor.

After demonstrating an increasing need of employers for cheaper labor, I will examine the case of Syrian refugees as seasonal migrant workers in Turkey in chapter 5. I will discuss the vulnerability of Syrian refugees compared to other migrant groups with regard to living and working conditions, thereby unfolding the process and practice of an ethnically hierarchized agricultural labor market following the arrival of refugees. This part of the dissertation will elaborate the different perspectives of rural actors (workers, labor intermediaries, land owners, farm dwellers and stake holders from the state enterprises, and NGOs) on the current situation with regard to three controversial topics: migrant employment, the legal framework, and Syrian refugees. This chapter emphasizes the tenuous legal status of refugees, and the informality of their job relations to scrutinize how refugee migration differs from routine labor migration.

Lastly, chapter 6 shows that new socioeconomic and spatial relations reveal an underlying paradigm on which approaches to migratory processes and patterns, and the phenomena of a dispossessed rural proletariat are constructed. The intent is to transcend previous donations of seasonal migrant employment by challenging the concept of seasonality itself. This chapter will first illustrate different dispossession patterns among seasonal migrant workers. I will distinguish between economic and political reasons for increasing the level of dispossession, which is essential to the formation of a rural proletariat. Following from the results of the fieldwork, this first part will discuss the adverse effects of neoliberal economic policy on former producers, and sharecroppers as well as structural issues such as water shprtages and infertility of the land in workers' hometowns alongwith the consequences of forced migration on internally displaced Kurds. The results of the fieldwork conducted in Cizre will substantiate this section.

I will then focus on the new socio-spatial relations and patterns of migratory movement among dispossessed rural workers. I will define the transition from temporary tent settlement to new rural ghettos in this part. Specifically, I will demonstrate that the transition to high value

crops and increasing migrant flows, along with the new categories internally displaced people and refugees, have paved the way for the formation of permanent tent neighborhoods that I call rural ghettos. Moreover, this section will argue for a new migratory pattern that I call new-nomadism, which refers to nonstop cyclical movement throughout Turkey. This migration pattern occurs among some Syrian refugees and some Kurdish migrant groups. Despite the distinctive features of these groups of seasonal migrant workers vis-à-vis traditional nomads, I assert that the term new-nomadism is necessary to emphasize their continuous movement that is distinct from the seasonal migration of other such migrant workers. In this chapter, I will put forward the permanent or deseasonal character of the contemporary phenomenon of seasonal migrant work with respect to space, mobility, and dispossession.

2

Rural Mobilities in the Globalizing World: Theoretical Perspectives

This chapter puts theoretical perspectives in rural and migration studies into the context of neoliberal transformations. In line with the research questions forward in the previous chapter, I bring the themes of neoliberalization of agriculture and rural migration and mobilities together to study seasonal agricultural migrant workers in Turkey. In so doing, I scrutinize how rural migration and agrarian transformation under neoliberalization interact in rural areas. This chapter responds to this question by reviewing key concepts in the relevant literature of rural migration/mobilities and the neoliberal transformation of agriculture, identifying the tensions and challenges of such approaches. I provide a foundation for understanding and reinterpreting Turkey's new agricultural labor regime and its independence depended on seasonal migrant workers that will be discussed throughout the thesis. Accordingly, this chapter is structured around four main topics: rural mobilities, the neoliberalization of agriculture, the experience of seasonal migration throughout the world, and a historical overview of land and agricultural labor in Turkey through the lenses of the analytical tools debated in this chapter of the dissertation.

I will first identify the main approaches by which migration studies conceive how different types of migration -irregular, transit, and forced-

and agricultural transformation are linked to rural mobilities in the neoliberal context. Although the migration literature provides useful analytical tools for understanding migrants' motivations to move, their integration, and the main directions of migration flows with regard to inequality, it is not sufficient to comprehend contemporary fluidity across the local, national, and regional boundaries in a globalizing world. Moreover, the studies in the literature on seasonal migrant workers mainly focus on the migration itself, while I argue that the key concept of mobility represents an equally important constituent of rural places.[1] This perspective offers a way to understand how agrarian transformation and labor migration/mobilities are linked and produce new set of relations among different rural actors with regard to agricultural workers.

This study considers themes of migration, mobility, and agricultural transformation hand in hand since the case of seasonal migrant workers needs a discussion of migrants in a particular rural context. As such, the following section will argue key themes in the agrarian transformation process in the neoliberal era. In particular, I will problematize the dependence of the new agricultural regime[2] on a perpetual need for manual labor in a globalizing world. This section will show emergent socioeconomic differentiation in rural areas in which there is a mutual dependence between small, medium, and large scale farmers and temporary workers resulting from increasing migrant flows to the countryside in a global scale.

After considering analytical tools from both rural studies and migration studies, I will continue with the particular experiences of seasonal migrant workers in the global north and the global south. In this section, I will focus on how certain legal frameworks and migration experiences themselves influence the relevant literature on seasonal migrant workers and whether the conclusions with regard to these workers can be applied to the other national contexts and practices. The chapter will continue

1 Paul Milbourne and Lawrence Kitchen, "Rural Mobilities: Connecting Movement and Fixity in Rural Places," *Journal of Rural Studies* 34 (April 2014): 326–36. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrurstud.2014.01.004.

2 Henry Bernstein, *Class Dynamics of Agrarian Change* (Kumarian Press, 2013).

with a critical review of the literature on land and agricultural labor in Turkey. It will argue that there are shortcomings and gaps in this academic field of research. This part of thesis will underscore how seasonal migrant workers in Turkish agriculture are situated between two fields of research - agriculture and migration - and which concepts and theoretical debates can be useful for evaluating particular case of Turkey.

§ 2.1 Conceptualizing Rural Migration and Mobilities

Over the centuries, groups of people have moved in times of acute crisis - the British-Chinese Opium war of the 1840s, and the Great Depression of 1929 are but a few examples of critical historical moments in which people left their homelands *en masse* seeking to build a better life elsewhere.[3] Thomas Faist asserts that there are three large-scale migration periods in modern times: First, colonizers imported involuntary labor during European colonization from the seventeenth to nineteenth century.[4] In this way, massive cross continental movements occurred, for example, of African workers to the Americas with from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century and of Indians to Australia in the nineteenth century.

A second, dissimilar migration flow occurred among economically motivated migrants. In the second half the nineteenth and the early twentieth century, white men settled in the Americas, Australia, and South Africa, while peasants from the rural countryside, on the other hand, moved to the urban centers in Europe. Further, groups who were discriminated against due to their religious and political identities migrated to the New World, - the Hutteries in nineteenth century - Russia and political activists of the 1848/9 revolutions from Europe, for instance.

Third, labor migration and refugee flows increased from developing to developed countries after the Second World War. Especially the United

3 Oum-Hani Alaoui, *Migratory Trajectories: Moroccan Borderlands and Translocal Imaginaries* (PhD dissertation, Princeton University, 2009),2.

4 Thomas Faist, *The Volume and Dynamics of International Migration and Transnational Social Spaces*. Oxford: Clarendon, 2004.

States and economically developed countries in Europe became centers of attraction for migrants from Asia, Latin America, Africa, and Eastern Europe from the mid-1960s to the end of the 1970s. Later, new immigration destinations emerged in the Near East. For instance, there is increasing migration from poorer South Asian countries to economically attractive locations such as Japan.

Given the long history of migration with a multiplicity of causes as well as implications in different periods, a rich literature emerged in this field. I will sketch out just the main approaches of the canonical literature - as summarized by Kaya[5] and King[6] -, which attempt to model the most important migrations in recent world history.

5 Ayhan Kaya, "Uluslararası Göç Teorileri Bağlamında Yeni Göç Türlerini Anlamaya Çalışmak: Türkiye'de 'Yabancı' ve 'Öteki' Olmak." In *Türkiye ve yeni uluslararası göçler*, Ayhan Kaya and Muammer Tuna (eds), Bursa: Sentez Yayıncılık, 2014: 17-23.

6 Russell King, "Theories and Typologies of Migration: An Overview and a Primer." Working Paper. Sweden: Malmö University, 2012: 11-23.

Table 2.1 Schematic Overview of Theoretical Approaches to Migration

	Motive for Migration	Direction
Push and Pull Factors	Economic reasons, such as unemployment, and poor working conditions	From economically underdeveloped to developed countries
Modernization Approach	Structural factors	In underdeveloped countries: rural-urban migration and immigration In developed countries: urban-urban migration
World System Theory: Center-Periphery Approach	Global inequality	From regions where the labor force is abundant to the capital-intense locations
Network Theories	Several reasons, such as unemployment, discrimination, and the desire to live another country	Migration destinations determined with the help of the social networks of migrants
Transnational Spaces Approach	Various reasons, such as economic hardship and discrimination against minorities	Trans-migrants in between host and home countries. There are close connections via transportation and technology between the two places

As summarized in the table, push and pull factors theory posits a migration trajectory from economically underdeveloped to developed regions, asserting that the main motivation behind the movement of the people is economic. From this perspective, migrants are evaluated as rational and acting in their own economic interest. The modernization approach, on the other hand, criticizes push and pull theory because "homo-economicus" rational decision-making is at the center of the analysis. Instead, modernization approach offers a new look on migration through historical lenses that link changes in migration and mobility behavior to different stages in a process of modernization.[7] For instance, in early transitional societies, the dominant migration type was mass rural-urban

7 Ibid., 15.

migration and emigration to attractive foreign destinations. Meanwhile rural-urban migration and emigration decreased and various other kinds of circulation, such as commuting within urban areas, increased in late transitional societies.

World System Theory, developed by Immanuel Wallerstein, presents a different approach that identifies the main migration directions based on an analysis of global inequality. This holistic perspective provides a structural analysis of the mobilities from peripheral, developing countries to places where there is need for cheap labor in a global scale. Besides the economic needs of migrants and the market, network theories stress that the decision-making mechanisms of migrants are shaped by social networks – that, by kinship, and friendship relations. For instance, the presence of relatives in a foreign country may trigger new migrants from the same family through the advantage of social capital.

The aforementioned migration approaches are criticized by the Transnational Spaces paradigm for the division between hosting and originating places. This perspective offers a new way of thinking that considers the mutual movement of ideas, symbols, thoughts, ideologies, social and political movements, cultures, and arts between and beyond national borders.[8] In this understanding, migrants live ubiquitously in both their homeland and the host place with the help of enhanced transportation and communication technologies that provided both actual and symbolic interactions.

Distilling the main approaches on migration produces theoretical insight into the causal stimuli for migration. In effect, migration theories are useful to understand migrants possibly decisions and motivations and the global directions of migration. These are substantial analytical tools for the analysis of migration even today. However, focusing on migration has also several drawbacks, since it primarily refers to the movement from one place to another. Although the arguments and assertions of migration theories are significant for evaluating regular and irregular

8 Ayhan Kaya, "Uluslararası Göç Teorileri Bağlamında Yeni Göç Türlerini Anlamaya Çalışmak: Türkiye'de 'Yabancı' ve 'Öteki' Olmak," in *Türkiye ve yeni uluslararası göçler*, (eds.) Ayhan Kaya and Muammer Tuna (Bursa: Sentez Yayıncılık, 2014), 21.

migrant flows, they do not explain highly mobile frame of contemporary rural areas shaped by diversified movements such as daily commutes in and between the villages, indefinite work-stay periods asylum-seekers and refugees, and transit-migration involving multiple countries. Therefore, a concept of mobility is also necessary to study contemporary seasonal agricultural migrant workers and comprehend this fluidity.

By the turn of the twenty-first century, the movement of people, goods, money, technologies, ideas, and cultures became increasingly fast and common across local and national boundaries. Sheller and Urry discuss new mobilities paradigm - referring to the contemporary high mobilities of people and things and the increasing importance of fixed places such as airports as well as network mechanisms to organize these - that necessitates a paradigmatic change in the social sciences, which they call a mobility turn, that will produce new sets of questions, theories, and methodologies to analyze the situation that "all the world seems to be on the move."[9] We are living in the age of migration[10] and rural space is no longer left out of this loop, contrary to the common perspective that approaches rural spaces and rural communities as stable, resistant to change, idyllic, and homogenous.[11]

Rural areas are becoming increasingly global[12] and diversified, involving migrants from different parts of the world with multiple motives for

9 Mimi Sheller and John Urry, "The New Mobilities Paradigm" *Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space* 38, no. 2 (1 February 2006): 207–26. https://doi.org/10.1068/a37268.

10 Stephen Castles, Mark J Miller, and Hein de Haas. *The Age of Migration* (New York, N.Y.; London: Guilford, 2014).

11 Michael M. Bell, and Giorgio Osti, "Mobilities and Ruralities: An Introduction," *Sociologia Ruralis* 50, no. 3 (2010): 199. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9523.2010.00518.x.

12 Michael Woods, "Engaging the Global Countryside: Globalization, Hybridity and the Reconstitution of Rural Place," *Progress in Human Geography* 31, no. 4 (1 August 2007): 485–507. https://doi.org/10.1177/0309132507079503.

migrating,[13] which has turned rural space into a hybrid place involving multicultural, international, pluralistic features and populations.[14] Today's new mobilities to rural space raises several substantial questions. How is mobility itself in the countryside distinct from mobility in urban space? How do new rural mobilities interplay with agricultural transformations in the fields of production, labor, and marketing? How do macro-level transitions and transformations penetrate micro-level, everyday lives and routines in the countryside? What are the reactions and roles of diverse rural actors in the face of increasing mobilities? And in this context, how are power relations being reconstructed in vastly mobile rural communities?

The essential component with which to interrogate the new rural mobilities is the participation of migrants as a labor force in the rural communities. Marriage, family life, and the neighborhood relations of migrants are also subjects investigated. However, the turning point for integration in rural life is usually to participate in the agricultural labor market. The essential motivations of migrant workers may differ from the basic reasons of economic migration - that is, high unemployment and poor working-living. Indeed migrant profiles reflect and unprecedented diversity, from asylum-seekers to transit-migrants to irregular migrants to internally displaced people, but the first essential step for all to participate in a rural host community is usually to take temporary employment. Thus, the identities of "migrant" and "worker" are conjoined in the process by which rural integration is shaped.

The integration of migrants into the agricultural labor market and into rural communities are principal themes in the emerging literature of rural mobilities. First, increasing need for insecure, low-wage labor in a

13 Charlotta Hedberg and Karen Haandrikman, "Repopulation of the Swedish Countryside: Globalisation by International Migration," *Journal of Rural Studies* 34 (1 April 2014): 137. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrurstud.2014.01.005.

14 Kye Askins, "Crossing Divides: Ethnicity and Rurality," *Journal of Rural Studies*, De-centring White Ruralities: Ethnicity and Indigeneity, 25, no. 4 (1 October 2009): 365–75. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrurstud.2009.05.009.

globalized agricultural economy has resulted in deepening splits in the labor market that can be observed and analyzed in different settings. Different work conditions in terms of wages, duration of work per day, and conditions of employment for the same job is conceptualized as a segmented labor market, dual labor market, or secondary labor market.

For example, Rye and Andrzejewska[15] show that the emergence of a secondary agricultural labor market in Norway following the arrival of workers from Eastern European countries is shaped by informal employment, the marginalization of farm workers, and the acceptance of a weak bargaining position by migrants whose frame of reference is a comparison between the countries they left and the host places in terms of the availability of job opportunities and living conditions. In similar vein, Hoggart and Mendoza's work[16] on immigrants in Spanish agriculture explains the segmentation in the labor market that occurred with the incorporation of African immigrants who took jobs "unwanted" by locals. Moreover, this study shows that splits in the labor market are structured around the race, gender and ethnicity, creating favorable conditions for the agricultural entrepreneurs and farm owners to maximize their profit.[17]

In effect, diverse work conditions for different worker groups has a two-fold impact. First, it significantly reduces the labor costs given that relatively disadvantaged workers are employed, such as members of "marginal" ethnic groups, children and women, and undocumented migrants. Second, variable levels of vulnerability based on multiple factors - gender, age, ethnicity, citizenship - impedes the development of class consciousness and the unionization of the workers. As Canales and Pérez

15 Johan Fredrik Rye and Joanna Andrzejewska, "The Structural Disempowerment of Eastern European Migrant Farm Workers in Norwegian Agriculture," *Journal of Rural Studies* 26, no. 1 (1 January 2010): 41–51. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrurstud.2009.06.003.

16 Keith Hoggart and Cristóbal Mendoza, "African Immigrant Workers in Spanish Agriculture," *Sociologia Ruralis* 39, no. 4 (1999): 538–62. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9523.00123.

17 Edna Bonacich, "A Theory of Ethnic Antagonism: The Split Labor Market," *American Sociological Review* 37, no. 5 (1972): 547–59. https://doi.org/10.2307/2093450.

state, agricultural migrants are economically included with the most precarious jobs, earning low salaries and experiencing immense social vulnerability.[18]

The intricate relation between rural mobilities and social inequality is reviewed and analyzed in Oliva's study that shows the spatial fragilities shaped by the coexistence of different rural groups such as farm owners, migrant workers, and retirees people - what she calls rural melting-pots.[19] The challenging process of integrating rural migrants is analyzed by Hedberg and Haandrikman who show the disrupted image of the rural that differs from the earlier white and idyll ruralities.[20] Poverty and ethnicity, have thus become hot topics in rural studies[21] since economic impoverishment effectively converges on marginal ethnic identities to produce socioeconomic vulnerability in the case of seasonal migrant agricultural workers. Therefore, this particular group is addressed separately. Kassimis and Rye call them a rural underclass, and Avallonne termes them the new international proletariat.[22] To understand the new

18 Alejandro I. Canales and Carlos Pérez, "Inclusion and Segregation: The Incorporation of Latin American Immigrants into the U.S. Labor Market," *Latin American Perspectives* 34, no. 1 (2007): 73–82.

19 Jesús Oliva, "Rural Melting-Pots, Mobilities and Fragilities: Reflections on the Spanish Case," *Sociologia Ruralis* 50, no. 3 (2010): 277–95. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9523.2010.00516.x.

20 Charlotta Hedberg and Karen Haandrikman, "Repopulation of the Swedish Countryside: Globalisation by International Migration," *Journal of Rural Studies* 34 (1 April 2014): 128–38. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrurstud.2014.01.005.

21 See Gyöngyi Schwarcz, "Ethnicizing Poverty through Social Security Provision in Rural Hungary," *Journal of Rural Studies*, Rural Realities in the Post-Socialist Space, 28, no. 2 (1 April 2012): 99–107. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrurstud.2012.01.022.

22 Charalambos Kasimis, "Survival and Expansion: Migrants in Greek Rural Regions," *Population, Space and Place* 14, no. 6 (2008): 511–24. https://doi.org/10.1002/psp.513; Johan Fredrik Rye, "The Western European Countryside From An Eastern European Perspective: Case Of Migrant Workers In Norwegian Agriculture," *European Countryside* 6, no. 4 (December 2014): 327–46. https://doi.org/10.2478/euco-2014-0018; Cited in Johan Fredrik Rye and Sam Scott, "International Labour Migration and Food Production in Rural Europe: A Review of the Evidence," *Sociologia Ruralis* 58, no. 4 (2018): 928–52. https://doi.org/10.1111/soru.12208.

aspect and capture emerging themes and definitions in the relevant literature, agrarian transformation in the neoliberal era should be analyzed.

§ 2.2 Neoliberalization of Agriculture

This section will present key analytical concepts with regard to new rural mobilities and agricultural labor in the neoliberal era. In this context, three themes from the relevant literature - new agricultural regime, survival strategies of small farmers and cheaper labor and new socioeconomic differentiation in rural areas – will be discussed to analyze the impact of contemporary agrarian transformation on seasonal migrant workers and how rural studies respond to substantial changes in agricultural production and labor.

2.2.1 *Theme 1: The New Agricultural Regime*

The long process of the development of capitalism in agriculture has taken place in multiple forms and at different paces in different geographies. Henry Bernstein points to a Global North-South divide to conceptualize an international food regime in the process of neoliberal globalization and specify its impact on agriculture over recent decades:[23]

- Trade liberalization in the agricultural sector at the global level - associated mostly with the major actor, World Trade Organization (WTO)
- Financialization of the world agricultural market and increasing fluctuations in global agricultural prices
- Removal of subsidies and other forms of state support for independent, small and medium scale farmers in Global South countries
- Monopolization by global corporations in both the agri-input and agro-food industries and larger market shares of North-Global oriented companies

23 Henry Bernstein, *Class Dynamics of Agrarian Change* (Kumarian Press, 2013), 82-83.

- New organizational technologies deployed by these corporations along commodity chains spanning farming through processing and manufacturing to retail distribution; for example, the supermarket revolution in the global sourcing of food, and the market shares of food sales, and the recent entry of major supermarket chains into China, India, and other parts of the Global South
- Increasing connection between farmers and consumers based on a combination of these organizational technologies and corporate economic power
- Push by corporations to claim Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) and patent in genetic plant material under the trade provisions of the WTO related to IPR
- Technical frontier of engineering plant and animal genetic material (genetically modified organisms) that, together with specialized monoculture, contributes to a loss of biodiversity
- Profit frontier of biofuel production dominated by agribusiness corporations supported by public subsidies in the United States and Europe
- Health consequences, including rising levels of toxic chemicals in industrially grown and processed foods, the nutritional deficiencies of junk food diets, fast foods and processed foods, and the growth of obesity and obesity-related illness together with continuing, possibly increasing, hunger and malnutrition
- Environmental costs of all of the above, including levels of energy use and carbon emissions in the ongoing industrialization of food farming, processing, and sales
- Issues of the sustainability resulting from the above and the current global food system, its continued growth, and expanded reproduction along the same trajectories

Bernstein summarized these focal points by showing substantial changes in agricultural production, marketing, trade, and consumption as well as to the environment and to the roles of macro and meso-level actors in the global restructuring process. In effect, the origins of the transition process are economic and political reforms promulgated in the late 1970s. With the collapse of developmental policies that support social welfare

programs, equal distribution of wealth, advanced social security, and equal opportunity for everyone in the second half of the 1970s, agriculture was evaluated as an area to be restructured according to the needs of a free market. To that end, protective legislation favoring local producers were abandoned, the free flow of capital became the major determinant of the marketing relations, and the local and global became closely linked.

Trade protectionism, a state-led economy, corporatism, production, subsidies, and deficit financing were replaced by the deregulation of the economy and dismantling of state-run agencies and programs.[24] The retreat of the state as a supportive and regulatory force and its replacement with free market conditions influenced the fate of the peasantry. This substantial change meant that nothing – including production and marketing relations and working life - would be the same as in the past. Against this background, Neiman and Quaranta assert the term "the new agricultural regime."

> The new agricultural regime that was consolidated in the last decades of the twentieth century is following convergent global patterns, either as a consequence of the initiative of a nation or of a private actor established in a particular region and/or country or as a result of the influence of the new patterns of operation of the global economy. An important feature of this trend is the aim of transcending the productionist model as large agricultural production advances toward more flexible models oriented toward quality products and characterized by increasing demand and lower production costs.[25]

They claim that a more flexible model and lower production costs are necessary to build up the "new agricultural regime." With reference to this remark by Neiman and Quaranta, this dissertation adopts the view

24 Paola Sesia, *Confronting Neoliberalism: Food Security and Nutrition Among Indigenous Coffee-Growers in Oaxaca*, Mexico (PhD dissertation, University of Arizona, 2002), 64.

25 Guillermo Neiman and Germán Quaranta, "Restructuring and Functional Flexibilization of Agricultural Labor in Argentina," *Latin American Perspectives* 31, no. 4 (July 2004): 48. https://doi.org/10.1177/0094582X04266255.

that the key role of seasonal migrant workers in the broader picture is to reduce the production costs of the employers, which contributes to the global regime change. Although, the cooperation of principal meso-level actors behind the transformation - such as the World Bank (WB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Trade Organization (WTO) – and national governments especially in Global South countries, effectively dissolved the buyer, developmentalist policies,[26] the transition process of a new agricultural regime has not been completed. The dismantling of all established mechanisms is no easy task in national contexts where different means of resistantance ways to cope with the market conditions and antecedent rights of rural actors who are disadvantaged by the transition. Araghi argues, that global depeasantization refers to the dissolution of the peasantries on a world scale that has not transpired completely in spite of the huge economic and political pressure of principal meso-level actors.[27] Social classes do not simply disappear in these movements but develop social struggles and continue to live. Against this background, another theme: survival strategies of small peasantries will be the subject of the next sub-section.

2.2.2 *Theme 2: Survival Strategies of Small Farmers*

Small farmers who managed to survive under neoliberal conditions developed their own strategies to reduce the devastating effects of the free market. First, adopting themselves to new technologies has been fundamental in the face of the increasing modernization of agricultural production techniques. Diversified and enhanced agricultural machines; the expansion of electricity in the countryside; improvements in irrigation, drainage, and fertilizer technology, the increasingly scientific character of modern agriculture with the expansion of various institutes specializing in agronomy and the growing complexity of the courses taught in them;

26 Bernstein, *Class Dynamics,* 82-84.

27 Farshad A. Araghi, "Global Depeasantization, 1945-1990," *The Sociological Quarterly* 36, no. 2 (1995).

and the penetration of agronomy as a branch of science into established universities in Germany, Austria, France, and Italy played a crucial role in the process of agricultural transformation.[28]

Under these conditions, the ability to adjust to new developments in the field of technology and science became important for agricultural producers. Owing to the comparatively disadvantageous position of small farmers, their options to withstand the new conditions vary. Sànchez, for instance, refers to the case of Mexican strawberry producers whose survival strategies include negotiating with banks, using new technologies such as irrigation systems and plant varieties; and adapting themselves to changing government policies regulating farm production.[29]

Another strategy of farmers is to change the crops they cultivate. In accordance crops promoted in the market, many farmers shifted production to these so-called cash crops, whether voluntarily or involuntarily. The new agricultural regime on the global level led to intensified production of specific crops in the certain regions, such as the transition from coffee to corn in Mexico,[30] and the intensification of horticultural production in Spain[31] and Italy[32] where production of traditional crops such as

28 Jairus Banaji, "Summary of Selected Parts of Kautsky's The Agrarian Question," in *The Articulation of Modes of Production: Essays from Economy and Society*. (ed.) Harold Wolpe (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980), 53.

29 Teresa Figueroa Sànchez, *Mexican Immigrant Family Farms in the California Strawberry Industry* (PhD dissertation, University of California Santa Barbara, 200), 3.

30 Paola Sesia, *Confronting Neoliberalism: Food Security and Nutrition Among Indigenous Coffee-Growers in Oaxaca, Mexico* (PhD dissertation, University of Arizona, 2002).

31 Alicia Reigada, "Family Farms, Migrant Labourers and Regional Imbalance in global agri-food systems: On the social (un)sustainability of intensive strawberry production in Huelva (Spain)" in *Migration and Agriculture Mobility and Change in the Mediterranean Area* (eds.) Alessandra Corrado, Carlos de Castro, and Domenico Perrotta (London: Routledge, 2016), 95-111.

32 Domenico Perrotta, "Processing tomatoes in the era of retailing revolution: Mechanization and migrant labour in northern and southern Italy" in *Migration and Agriculture Mobility and Change in the Mediterranean Area* (eds.) Alessandra Corrado, Carlos de Castro, and Domenico Perrotta (London: Routledge, 2016), 58-77.

cereals and cotton as well as pasturing and livestock farming are decreasing. As in effect, the dominance of cash crops brought about a need for manual labor because they are not conducive to mechanized farming. Labor-intensive farming expanded especially in developing countries, the global role of which became exporter of fresh fruit and vegetables to the rest of the world.[33]

Crop diversification is another way of coping with market conditions for small farmers.[34] In order to reduce the risks introduced by the market, such as rapid decreases and fluctuations in prices, farmers usually divide their fields and sow many crops. In this way their profit on one crop can compensate for loss in another. Small farmers not only prefer to diversify their crops, they also diversify their income activities, undertaking non-agricultural jobs along with their agricultural ones. Especially farmers who reside near urban or touristic places work seasonally or daily in other jobs. Keyder and Yenal define this phenomenon as part-life time proletarianization.[35] Additionally, in the age of the commodification of everything, suitable agricultural land is converted by investments in tourism.[36] The commodification of land has further impeded the peasantry's agricultural activities; however, peasants have not disappeared because of it. Instead, new survival strategies have emerged. For instance, they sell souvenirs and local goods, open restaurants offering local food to tourists, or work in non-agrarian jobs in nearby villages. But they ultimately stay put in their homes in rural areas.

33 See the example of Chile in Cristóbal Kay, "Chile's Neoliberal Agrarian Transformation and the Peasantry," *Journal of Agrarian Change* 2, no. 4 (2002): 464–501. https://doi.org/10.1111/1471-0366.00043.

34 Çağlar Keyder and Zafer Yenal, *Bildigimiz Tarimin Sonu* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık, 2013), 70-72.

35 Çağlar Keyder and Zafer Yenal, "Agrarian Transformation, Labor Supplies, and Proletarianization Process in Turkey: A Historical Overview," *Austrian Journal of Development* 27, no. 1 (2011).

36 Keyder and Yenal, *Bildigimiz Tarimin.*

2.2.3 *Theme 3: Cheaper Labor and New Socioeconomic Differentiation in Rural Areas*

All the transformations in the production process presented up to now have reshaped working habits and the need for labor in the countryside. In fact, there is a paradox with respect to the relationship between developments in agricultural technologies and the working and living conditions of workers. On one hand, new technologies in the fields of irrigation, agricultural spraying, disinfecting, harvesting, and producing enabled increased production of "sterile" and "organic" food. On the other hand, the working conditions of workers gradually worsened. The development of new technologies and healthier food strategies does not have a positive effect on labor conditions. Agricultural modernization through technologies that are less harmful to the environment and healthier for the consumer go hand in hand with the devaluation of labor and deterioration of the working and living conditions of the laborers, of whom more is now required to perform their jobs.[37]

The literature on seasonal migrant workers has mostly focused on the new variables of ethnicity,[38] gender,[39] citizenship[40] in the production of cheaper labor. New forms of social differentiation and labor segmentation at the global level are constructed via different migrant categories.[41]

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37 Hubert Carton De Grammont and Sara María Lara Flores, "Productive Restructuring and 'Standardization' in Mexican Horticulture: Consequences for Labour," *Journal of Agrarian Change* 10, no. 2 (2010): 230. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1471-0366.2009.00246.x.

38 Edna Bonacich, "A Theory of Ethnic Antagonism: The Split Labor Market," *American Sociological Review* 37, no. 5 (1972): 547–59. https://doi.org/10.2307/2093450.

39 Emmanuel Hellio, "We Don't Have Women In Boxes" in *Seasonal Workers in Mediterranean Agriculture the Social Costs of Eating Fresh* (eds.) Jorg Gertel and Sarah Ruth Sippel (Routledge, 2017).

40 Deniz Pelek, "Syrian Refugees as Seasonal Migrant Workers: Re-Construction of Unequal Power Relations in Turkish Agriculture," *Journal of Refugee Studies*.. https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/fey050.

41 Alejandro I. Canales and Carlos Pérez, "Inclusion and Segregation: The Incorporation of Latin American Immigrants into the U.S. Labor Market," *Latin American Perspectives* 34, no. 1 (2007): 76.

The mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion work together. Immigrant workers are included in the labor market temporarily, extensively and mostly informally. On the other hand, they are excluded from society, discriminated against, and deprived of the rights of citizenship in their host countries, as reported in several studies.[42] Canales and Pérez state that

> By making employment precarious, globalization sets in motion various mechanisms of social inclusion and exclusion that result in new patterns of social polarization and differentiation based on two different and complementary processes. One of these is the configuration of a labor system based on flexibility and deregulation – a system that Beck (2000) characterizes as a system of labor risk – that has replaced the labor system and social institutions associated with the welfare state. The other is the transformation of the occupational system through increasing segmentation and accompanying social differentiation.[43]

Precarization represents a significant notion for the adaptation to the migrants in the labor market. The term refers to uncertainty ragrding the work, and the fact that employment is temporary employment and often performed without a contract. It entails the possibility of being fired at any time. Canales correlates the inclusion and exclusion mechanisms of society in the economic and social realms:

> The socially constructed vulnerability of immigrants is transferred to the labor market in the form of a devaluation of the labor force, its life circumstances, and its social reproduction. In this context, the poverty and precarious existence of these workers are

42 See, for instance, Marta Maria Maldonado, "'It Is Their Nature to Do Menial Labour': The Racialization of 'Latino/a Workers' by Agricultural Employers," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 32, no. 6 (July 1, 2009): 1017–36. https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870902802254; and Nicos Trimikliniotis, Steven Gordon, and Brian Zondo. "Globalisation and Migrant Labour in a 'Rainbow Nation'': A Fortress South Africa?'" *Third World Quarterly* 29, no. 7 (October 1, 2008): 1323–39. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436590802386476.

43 Canales and Pérez. "Inclusion and Segregation," 76.

> not the result of exclusion from the labor market but the way in which they are incorporated into it. In the context of economic deregulation and labor flexibility, modernization generates and reproduces its own forms of poverty and precariousness. Individuals' social vulnerability as members of social, demographic, and cultural minorities based on gender, ethnicity, and migration ceases to be a factor that exposes them to possible economic exclusion and becomes a prerequisite for their inclusion.[44]

Immigrants are not excluded from economic activities; instead, their vulnerable position as migrant, their ethnic identity, or their gender are not an obstacle but a catalyst for getting involved in the fragmented labor market; these groups are more easily exploited and thus provide capitalists with a more flexible and disposable labor force. The new agricultural regime is built upon these segregation and inclusion mechanisms for migrant workers. Today, obviously, seasonal migrant workers have become ubiquitous around the world. As Kye Askins asserts, the rural is no more a homogenous, national, closed place.[45] On the contrary, today the rural areas has multicultural, international, and pluralistic features and populations. It has gradually become mobile, circulating, and ubiquitous. In scholarly disputes and studies, concepts such as the "flexibility" and "precarization of labor" should therefore not only be considered for the urban areas, but for the countryside, as well. Given these analytical tools, the rest of the chapter will focus on different experiences of seasonal migration in the world and in Turkey as well as a review of the relevant literature.

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44 Canales and Pérez. "Inclusion and Segregation", 75.

45 Kye Askins, "Crossing Divides: Ethnicity and Rurality," *Journal of Rural Studies*, De cen tring White Ruralities: Ethnicity and Indigeneity, 25, no. 4 (October 1, 2009): 365–75. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrurstud.2009.05.009

§ 2.3 Seasonal Migration Experiences in the World

On a global scale, temporary agricultural jobs are performed by migrants and immigrants in the different parts of the world, from China to Spain, from Bengal to Italy, from the United States to England, and from India to Turkey, and have been studied by a variety of disciplines such as public health, medicine, sociology, anthropology, and law. A rich literature has developed that discusses the working conditions, health problems, legal status, and socioeconomic situation of these workers. Inevitably, academic work is concentrated on specific aspects that are derived from the individual, unique patterns of transformation taking place in different settings.

In the scope of developed countries, the United States, Canada, and European countries exhibit similar employment patterns vis-à-vis seasonal agricultural jobs. In 1942, the *bracero* agreement was signed between Mexico and the US to compensate for labor need deriving from losses during the Second World War. Migrants were assigned temporary jobs in the construction, agriculture, and highway construction sectors. In the following years, bilateral agreements between the two countries were occasionally repeated with new conditions. Thus, the majority of migrant agricultural workers come from Mexico - about 95 percent - but there are also Guatemalhan, Haitian, Jamaican, and El Salvadorian workers.[46]

The Seasonal Agricultural Workers Program (SAWP) is the guest worker program of Canada, which is similar to *bracero* and subsequent legal arrangements in the United States and was organized to recruit agricultural workers from the Commonwealth Caribbean and Mexico. More than 20 thousand Mexican and Caribbean migrants work in Canadian horticulture for periods of six weeks to eight months a year under this

46 Peter Benson, "EL CAMPO: Faciality and Structural Violence in Farm Labor Camps," *Cultural Anthropology* 23:4, 2008: 592.

program.[47] Bracero and SAWP are similar, but the conditions to participate or more difficult in Canada. A candidate must be older than twenty-five, have an experience in agricultural jobs, have good health, and have a clean criminal record, but Canada offers better working conditions, shelter and life conditions to migrant workers comparing to the US.[48] They are supplied with free housing, provided with medical coverage, and earn wages comparable to those of Canadian farm workers. In both the US and Canada, concurrent with documented migration, undocumented migration is continuous including the arrival of immigrants via illegal means and the extension of their stays in these countries without legal permission.

It is common that seasonal migrants are called "permanent temporary workers." Their stay and work period is intended to be temporary; they are intended to go back and forth between their hometown and the host country. The target is a circular migration. "Time" is taking place in the studies with a problematization of the return of the workers to their countries, their period of work, their legal status of while staying in the US and Canada, and the guarantee that their stay is temporary and that they move in a circle. In this sense, the literature has been shaped mainly by the influence of the migration experience itself.

In the US and Canada, scholarly works have focused mostly on social policy, law,[49] and regulating the legal framework on the work and accommodation of the work for the duration of their stay in the host country. Moreover, "space," especially in the field of medicine, is evaluated through the frames of the hygiene of shelters in relation to health of the workers,

47 Leigh Binford, "From Fields of Power to Fields of Wheat: the dual process of constructingtemporary migrant labour in Canada," *Third World Quarterly* 30, no. 3 (2009).

48 Deniz Duruiz, Seasonal Agricultural Workers in Manisa: Materialization of Labor, Bodies and Places through Everyday Encounters (MA Thesis, Bogazici University, 2011): 38.

49 For example, Philip Martin, "Mexican Workers and U.S. Agriculture: The Revolving Door," *International Migration Review* 36, no.4 (2002); Vernon M. Briggs, "The "Albatross" of Immigration Reform: Temporary Worker Policy in the United States," *International Migration Review* 20 (1986); and T. W. Kelsey, "The agrarian myth and policy responses to farm safety," *American Journal of Public Health* (1994).

health hazards caused by a lack of sanitation, pesticide exposure, occupational injury, overwork, and labor and camp safety during the workers' stay in the two countries.[50]

Similarly, European countries such as France, Germany, England, and Norway also made bilateral agreements with Eastern European countries - Poland, Romania, Hungary and Slovenia - to fulfill their need for temporary labor need in agricultural under the auspices of the Seasonal Agricultural Workers Scheme.[51] Unlike the US and Canada, European literature is concentrated on the economy and social integration issues.[52] The effects of remittances on the economy and the themporary integration of workers into society are problematized. Time and space appear again as an analytical categories in the European literature as in that of US and Canada. Actually, the image of "permanent temporariness" is a corner stone in analysis and arguments about "time" and "space." Specifying migrants' period of work, ensuring their return from the host country, legalizing entrance via visas, and dealing with health problems in shelters and problematizing the integration of migrants into the local community are also questioned in European scholarly works.

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50 For example, Carol Sakala, "Migrant and Seasonal Farmworkers in the United States: A Review of Health Hazards, Status,and Policy," *International Migration Review* 21, no. 3 (1987); Peter M. Rabinowitz, et al., "Hearing Loss in Migrant Agricultural Workers," *Journal of Agromedicine* 10, no.4 (2005): 9-17; and M.Anthony, et.al., ""Health Needs of Migrant and Seasonal Farmworkers," *Journal of Community Health Nursing* 25, no.3 (2008).

51 See Johan Fredrik Rye and Joanna Andrzejewska, "The Structural Disempowerment of Eastern European Migrant Farm Workers in Norwegian Agriculture," *Journal of Rural Studies* 26, no. 1 (April 2010) and Sidar Çınar, Bağımlı Çalışma İlişkileri Bağlamında Mevsimlik Tarım İşçilerinin Malatya Örneği Üzerinden Analizi (PhD Diss, Marmara University, 2012).

52 For instance, Isabella Gidarakou, Leonidas Kazakopoulos and Alex Koutsouris, "Economic Immigrants in Greek Rural Areas: Socio-Economic Integration and Questions of Ethnic Exclusion," *South European Society and Politics* 16, no. 4 (2011); and Charalambos Kassimis, Apostolos G. Papadopoulos and Costas Papas, "Gaining from Rural Migrants: Migrant Employment Strategies and Socioeconomic Implications for Rural Labour Markets," *Sociologia Ruralis* 50, no. 3 (2010)

The distinct dynamic for temporary agricultural migration in developing countries is regional inequality, which shapes migration patterns in a unique form. People from underdeveloped regions migrate towards richer areas where commercial farming is developed. For instance, migration within India has occurred from Bihar, an economically poor province, to Punjab, where commercial farming is developed. Likewise, native tribes from the highlands migrate to agriculturally developed places in Latin America.[53] Developing countries are sometimes destinations for migration from abroad. For example, Mexico accepts Guatemalan workers under and agreement between the two countries. Furthermore, Indonesian, Thai, and Philippine workers are employed on plantations in Malaysia.[54] Diverse experiences including both internal and external migration around the world has brought about a rich literature that analyzes the phenomenon of seasonal agricultural workers under themes of "poverty,"[55] "exclusion,"[56] and "unfree labor."[57] This literature provides

53 Sidar Çınar, *Bağımlı Çalışma İlişkileri Kapsamında Mevsimlik Tarım İşçilerinin Malatya Örneği Üzerinden Analizi* (Ph.D. Diss., Marmara University, 2012): 13-20; International Labour Organization, *A Global Alliance against Forced Labour: Global Report under the Follow-up to the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, 2005*. Report / International Labour Conference, 93rd Session 2005, 1 (B). Geneva: International Labour Office, 2005.

54 International Labour Organization, "Decent Work in Agriculture." Symposium, September 15, 2003. http://www.ilo.org/actrav/events/WCMS_112413/lang--en/index.htm.

55 For instance, Daniel T. Lichter and Kenneth M. Johnson, "The Changing Spatial Concentration of America's Rural Poor Population," *Rural Sociology* 72, no.3 (2007); and Binford, "From fields of power."

56 For instance, Bonacich, "A Theory of Ethnic Antagonism"; Maldonado, "'It is their nature"; Harald Bauder, "Foreign Farm Workers in Ontario (Canada): Exclusionary Discourse in the Newsprint Media," *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 35, no.1 (2008); and Liliana Suarez-Navaz, "Immigration and the Politics of Space Allocation in Rural Spain: The Case of Andalusia," *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 34, no. 2 (2007).

57 For instance, Tom Brass, "Some Observations on Unfree Labour, Capitalist Restructuring and Deproleterianization," in *Free and Unfree Labour: The Debate Continues* (eds.) Tom Brass and Marcel van der Linden (Bern, Switzerland; New York: Peter Lang,1997); Jairus Banaji, "The Fictions of Free Labour: Contract, Coercion and so-called Unfree Labour," *Historical Materialism* 11, no. 3 (2003): 69-95; Philip Corrigan, "Feudal Relics or Capitalist

useful conceptual tools to examine seasonal migrant workers in different contexts including Turkey. The next section will argue that the particular case of seasonal migrant workers in Turkey benefits from such theoretical approaches and perspectives.

§ 2.4 A Critical Review on Turkey, Land, and Agricultural Labor

The issue of migrant workers became a subject when the commercialization of agriculture began in the Ottoman Empire. Corresponding to the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century. By the dissolution of the *tımar* system,[58] the decentralization process in the empire began.[59] On one hand, the military and political power of the state shrunk. On the other, *ayans* (local notables) and *ağas* (landlords) emerged as powerful new actors in the provinces. Their power was strengthened after taking the positions of provincial administrators, tax collectors, usurers, merchants and de facto owners of tracts of *miri* (state) lands.[60] In addition, European demand for agricultural products of the Levant as a consequence of a "Commercial Revolution" in the west

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Monuments? Notes on the Sociology of Unfree Labor," *Sociology* 11, no.3 (1977): 435-463; Tom Brass, "Why Unfree Labor is Not 'So-Called': The Fictions of Jairus Banaji," *Peasant Studies* 31, no.1 (2003): 101-136; Fred Krissman, and "California's Agricultural Labor Market: Historical Variations in the Use of Unfree Labor, 1769-1994," in: *Free and Unfree Labour: The Debate Continues* (eds.) Tom Brass and Marcel van der Linden eds. (Bern, Switzerland; New York: Peter Lang, 1997).

58 The tımar system was based on land being distributed for a limited time to *sipahis* (militrary men) and other members of the military class in exchange for annual military service. The Ottoman State gave authority over a particular territory temporarily to tımar holders who were responsible for cultivation and the organization of production by peasants. One essential aim of this system was to eliminate the feudal system and aristocratic elements within the Empire.

59 Şevket Pamuk, *The Ottoman Empire and European Capitalism, 1820-1913: Trade, Investment and Production* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 86.

60 Ibid., 86.

spending the period from 1760 to 1808 coincided with the rise of the ayans (landed proprietors in the Ottoman Empire).[61] Reşat Kasaba investigates the relationship between the commercialization of agriculture and the employment of migrant workers, stating that the rise of the *ayans* was accompanied by increases in taxes and other revenues. It naturally brought about the agricultural commercialization.[62]

The majority of waged laborers consisted of Kurds and Lazi[63] alongside nomads. However, Kasaba states that the ayans had difficulty maintaining their agricultural life in this way because labor sources were uncertain; the origin and number of migrants changed from time to time, and finding outside labor was a major problem during that time. They found a remedy by opting for the sharecropping system and other forms of tenancy, so the dominant type of peasant gradually became sharecroppers, small landowners, and tenants.[64]

The places of cotton production were important migration areas due to the need for intense manual labor. Zafer Toprak, in his brief history of labor and capital in Çukurova (Southern Turkey), emphasizes that labor shortage were a prominent problem for agricultural entrepreneurs during the late Ottoman period.[65] Toprak states that there were about 60-80 thousand temporary workers in the cotton fields of Çukurova, and this labor force came mostly from eastern provinces such as Van, Erzurum, Diyarbakır, Musul, Antep, Maraş, Sivas, Niğde, Kayseri, Konya, Antakya, and Lazkiye. Massive migration during harvest times, especially for spading out the cotton. The reasons for the rise of Çukurova as a migration destination were twofold. At the time, the cotton trade was bringing in a considerable profit, so landowners rationally shifted to massive cotton

61 Halil İnalcık, "The Emergence of Big Farms, Çiftliks: State, Landlords and Tenants" in *Landholding and Commercial Agriculture in the Middle East* (eds.) Faruk Tabak and Çağlar Keyder (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), 24.

62 Reşat Kasaba, "Migrant Labor in Western Anatolia 1750-1850" in *Landholding and Commercial Agriculture in the Middle East* (eds) Faruk Tabak and Çağlar Keyder, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), 115.

63 Ibid., 116

64 Ibid., 117.

65 Zafer Toprak, "Çukurova'da Emek ve Sermaye," *Toplumsal Tarih* 191, (November 2009).

production. But this crop required intense manual labor during times of harvest and hoeing.

Labor shortage continued to be an important problem after the establishment of the Turkish Republic. World War I had adversely affected the labor structure by yielding negative socioeconomic conditions, especially for ordinary citizens. The purchasing power of seasonal migrant workers - who consisted of landless peasants and small landowners - significantly declined along with their level of welfare. Toprak[66] and Başar[67] point out the emergent labor scarcity in Adana during the early republican years.

The period 1939-1945 was catastrophic for rural population, like in World War I. Turkey did not participate in World War II and maintain neutrality, yet the obligation to mobilize to get ready for a possible war caused severe difficulties for people, especially for peasants who constituted three quarters of the population. The government built up an army of more than one million soldiers out of a total population of around 18 million. This deeply affected agriculture because the tenure of military service was four years during the war. Many young peasants and potential producers could not engage in their usual agricultural activities, resulting in labor scarcity in the fields.[68]

After the war, relative relief was achieved via increasing subsidies into agriculture, the empowerment of parastatal support institutions – TEKEL, Fiskobirlik, Tariş, and Marmarabirlik –, and rising opportunities to borrow from state banks at reasonable interest rates in accordance with the Import Substitution Industrialization model. Thus, the need for labor was met with seasonal migrant workers in commercialized agricultural areas - mostly in the South and in Aegean Turkey - while at the same

66 Zafer Toprak, "Cumhuriyetin İlk Yıllarında Amele Buhranı" *Toplumsal Tarih* 41 (1997).

67 Ahmet Hamdi Başar, *Atatürk'le 3 Ay ve 1930'dan Sonra Türkiye* (İstanbul: Tan Yayınları, 1945), 117.

68 Şevket Pamuk, "War, State Economic Policies, and Resistance in Turkey," in *Peasants & Politics in The Modern Middle East* (eds.) Farhad Kazemi and John Waterbury (Miami: Florida International University Press, 1991), 130.

time those peasants who relied on family labor were empowered by state support policies.

The focus of the Turkish academic literature during those years was on the dominant, the small peasantry and rural life. From the 1940s to the 1970s, monographs on rural life and fieldwork studies written by Behice Boran,[69] Niyazi Berkes,[70] Mahmut Makal,[71] Ibrahim Yasa,[72] Mubeccel Kıray,[73] and Kemal Karpat[74] are significant resources that explain the organization of the rural economy, the level of mechanization and its impact on village life, the land ownership structure, the functioning of division of labor, and how the family and communal relationships were maintained.

"Peasants and peasant life" became popular research topics in Turkish rural studies as part wider debates on Marxism and the transition to socialism. The works of Oya Köymen,[75] Korkut Boratav,[76] Çağlar Keyder,[77] and Bahattin Akşit[78] deal with the fate of small peasantry: whether ownership by small families will disappear with the arrival of capital into rural areas or whether peasants will survive alongside agricultural capitalism by integrating into the system in their own ways, which is the famous

69 Behice Boran, *Toplumsal Yapı Araştırmaları: İki Köy Çeşidinin Mukayeseli Tetkiki* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi,1945).

70 Niyazi Berkes, *Bazı Ankara Köyleri Üzerinde Bir Araştırma* (Ankara: Uzluk Basımevi, 1942).

71 Mahmut Makal, *Bizim Köy: Bir Öğretmenin Notları* (İstanbul: Varlık Yayınları, 1950).

72 İbrahim Yasa, *25 Yıl Sonra Hasanoğlan Köyü Karşılaştırmalı Bir Toplumbilimsel Araştırma* (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, 1969).

73 Mübeccel Kıray, Ereğli Ağır Sanayiden Önce Bir Sahil Kasabası (İstanbul: Bağlam Yayınları, 2000).

74 Kemal Karpat, "Social Effects of Farm Mechanization in Turkish Villages," *Social Research* 27, no.1 (1960).

75 Oya Köymen, *Kapitalizm ve Köylülük: Ağalar – Üretenler- Patronlar* (İstanbul: Yordam Yayınları, 2008).

76 Korkut Boratav, *Tarımsal Yapılar ve Kapitalizm* (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 2004).

77 Çağlar Keyder, "The Cycle of Sharecropping and the Consolidation of Small Peasant Ownership," *Journal of Peasant Studies* 10, no. 2-3 (1983).

78 Bahattin Akşit, "Kırsal Dönüşüm ve Köy Araştırmaları: 1960-1980," *11. Tez* (1987).

Agrarian Question[79] in rural studies. However, seasonal migrant workers as a group within labor force were neglected in these studies. Instead, agricultural employment was mostly evaluated around themes of "family farming," "sharecropping," and "tenancy," and the only seasonal migrants described were those who were themselves small landowners who migrated to work in temporary jobs to earn extra income.

After 1980, interest in rural studies declined concurrent with the rapid urbanization of Turkey. In line with this, urban studies, rural-urban migration, and urban ghettos became the hot topics of the social sciences. The lively discussion focusing on some aspects of the peasantry in the 1960s and 1970s faded in the 1980s and 1990s with little exception. For instance, Murat Şeker analyzes the situation of agricultural workers by describing their living, working, and health conditions and problematizing their social integration into Turkish society.[80] Karacan examines the legal and social security status of temporary workers and their boundaries.[81]

However, the interest in rural studies was revitalized during the 2000s when importance of agriculture rose again, albeit with different aspects.

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79 The agrarian question refers to a nineteenth century debate in the literature that turned around how the rural would be restructured after or during the transition to a capitalist market. There were two competing approaches. The disappearance thesis argued that three peasant classes existed – namely, rich, middle, and poor peasants. According to this approach, these would transform into two: agrarian capital (rich peasants) and proletarian labor (poor peasants). The majority of middle peasants would join the latter and a minority would become involved in the former (Bernstein, 2009: 58). In contrast, the permanence thesis asserts that small independent peasantries can survive with the expansion of capitalism in agriculture by developing survival strategies such as the self-exploitation of family labor. In this way, they adapt themselves to the capitalist system without becoming a "capitalist entrepreneur." Farshad A. Araghi, "Global Depeasantization, 1945-1990." *The Sociological Quarterly* 36, no. 2 (1995).

80 Murat Şeker, *Türkiye'de Tarım İşçilerinin Toplumsal Bütünleşmesi* (Ankara: Değişim Yayınları, 1986).

81 Ali Rıza Karacan, *Tarım Kesiminde Geçici Tarım İşçilerinin Çalışma Koşulları, Ücret Sistemleri ve Çalışanların Sosyal Güvenlikleri Üzerine Bir Araştırma: Manisa Örneği* (Fredrich Ebert Vakfı, 1991).

Enumerating all the individual factors is not relevant but it will be useful to briefly explain the frame of recent seasonal migration literature. First, "health" has become an issue which is evaluated in public opinion - under the influence of media – with respect to the quality of food.[82] Urban consumers want to know what they are eating, whether pesticide is used, and if the seeds are genetically modified. Thus, organic food and other certified products – like the certification of Good Farming Practices - are being promoted by doctors on television and in Turkish books, newspapers, and magazines as it is in other countries. Rising interest in food has brought about a questioning of the corporatization of agriculture, environmental pollution, and accordingly, the importance of preserving nature.

The expense of organic food and other certified products have oriented urban consumers to seek healthy food and reasonable prices. As part of this process, alternative cooperatives that directly connect producers and consumers by cutting out middlemen have expanded in the cities, which has bolstered small and mid-scale farming. Though not corporately certified, such natural products produced using traditional seeds and old farming methods are generally considered to be good for health. Moreover, a return to natural products and nature has strengthened ecological movements and peasant activism.

Consequently, the number of studies on food sovereignty, the globalization of agriculture, alternative farming, agricultural cooperatives, and ecology has increased in recent years.[83] Furthermore, capturing the new

82 Keyder and Yenal (2013) point out the importance of the subject of "food" behind the rising interest in agriculture.

83 For instance, Mehmet Ecevit, Nadide Karkıner and Mehmet Ecevit, "Köy Sosyolojisinin Daraltılmış Kapsamından, Tarım-Gıda-Köylülük İlişkilerine," *Mülkiye* 33 (2009); Zafer Yenal, "Türkiye'de Gıda Üretiminin Yeniden Yapılandırılması," *Toplum ve Bilim* 88 (2001); Kenan Demirkol, "Beslenmenin Demokratikleştirilmesi," *Mülkiye* 33 (2009); Cemil Aksu, Sinan Erensü and Erdem Evren, *Sudan Sebepler: Türkiye'de neo-liberal su-enerji politikaları ve direnişler* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2016); Leah Temper, Mariana Walter, Iokiñe Rodriguez, Ashish Kothari, and Ethemcan Turhan. "A Perspective on Radical

diverse socioeconomic patterns in rural areas has taken a significant place in contemporary studies. Against this background, small peasantry's new ways of resisting neoliberal economic policies, the blurring of rural-urban boundaries[84] with increasing commercialism, the prevalence of transportation systems, and globalization of Turkish agriculture along with its impact on land ownership and the relations of production[85] have become topics for rural studies.

On the other hand, a sprawling literature on the new peasantry as provided significant tools to analyze the current agrarian picture through the lens of social and spatial changes that occur simultaneously with changing power relations related to macroeconomic policies that reshape rural life. However, the emerging "new labor regime" remains unstudied in these works. For instance, Öztürk et al. assert that capitalist penetration into agricultural production has not caused to disappearance of small peasantry farming which has managed to persevere by diversifying household income, whereby some household members take up urban employment, and by finding solutions to economic problems with the support of neighbors and communities – for instance, borrowing from fellow villagers instead of banks.[86]

The cheaper price of migrant labor depends on ethnic diversity of the labor force, and the small farmer's role as "employer" is lacking in these

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Transformations to Sustainability: Resistances, Movements and Alternatives." *Sustainability Science* 13, no. 3 (May 1, 2018): 747–64. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11625-018-0543-8.

84 See Murat Öztürk, Joost Jongerden, and Andy Hilton. "The (Re)Production of the New Peasantry in Turkey." *Journal of Rural Studies* 61 (July 2018): 244–54. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrurstud.2017.10.009; Çağlar Keyder and Zafer Yenal, *Bildiğimiz Tarımın Sonu Küresel İktidar ve Köylülük* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2011).

85 See Zülküf Aydın, "Neo-Liberal Transformation of Turkish Agriculture," *Journal of Agrarian Change* 10: 2 (2010); Zülküf Aydın, "The New Right, Structural Adjustment and Turkish Agriculture: Rural Responses and Survival Strategies," *The European Journal of Development Research* 14: 2 (2002).

86 The criticism of the New Peasantry literature on Turkish agriculture will be elaborated in the section "Towards a New Peasantry? or a New Agricultural Labor Force?" in Chapter 4.

studies. Rather the resistance of small peasantry is evaluated in relation to its adaptability to the new system via income diversification, contract farming, and solutions for indebtedness. The approach of studies on seasonal migrant workers,[87] on the other hand, fails to contextualize the reciprocal impact on employer worker relationships vis-à-vis global processes. Although a number of authors note the relevance of the global context, it is barely explored in their analyses. They mostly focus their work solely on the argument that seasonal migrant workers are an ethnic group that is discriminated against in labor relations.

Comparatively little attention has been dedicated to examining how the vulnerable status of migrant workers is changing vis-à-vis their legal status, level of dispossession and ethnicity, which have been essential to the neoliberal restructuring of Turkish agriculture. Filling this lacuna in the literature, examines the under-researched status of seasonal migrant workers in the agrarian transformation process and the reciprocal relationship between employer and worker and its impact on the changing sociospatial nature of the countryside. I offer a conceptual framework by analyzing how rural mobilities, dispossession, and the ethnicization of labor interweave to produce alternative understandings of rural space and of changing productive and reproductive relations.

§ 2.5 Concluding Remarks

This chapter first outlined the focal themes in migration studies. The main migration approaches – Push and Pull Factors, the Modernization

87 Uygar D. Yıldırım, *1980 Sonrası Türkiye Tarımında Yapısal Dönüşüm ve Mevsimlik Tarım İşçileri* (Ph.D. Diss., Istanbul University, 2014); Ayşegül Özbek, *New Actors of New Poverty: The "Other" Children of Çukurova* (M.A. Thesis. Middle East Technical University, 2007); Sidar Çınar, *Bağımlı Çalışma İlişkileri Kapsamında Mevsimlik Tarım İşçilerinin Malatya Örneği Üzerinden Analizi* (Ph.D. diss., Istanbul University, 2012). Deniz Duruiz, Seasonal Agricultural Workers in Manisa: Materialization of Labor, Bodies and Places through Everyday Encounters (MA Thesis, Bogazici University, 2011); Ayse Küçükkırca, "Etnisite, Toplumsal Cinsiyet ve Sınıf Ekseninde Mevsimlik Kürt Tarım İşçileri," *Toplum ve Kuram Dergisi* 6 (2012).

Approach, World System Theory, Network Theories and the Transnational Spaces Approach - were introduced along with their differing perspectives on the movement of people. This part presented the rich discussion around migration with regard to the motivations of migrants, the main routes of migrant flows, and the complicated position of migrants in between their homes and host places. Important insights and perspectives from this discussion will be used to an extent in the following chapters for the analysis of migration flows to Turkey and the Turkish countryside.

However, migration theories do not sufficiently examine the fluidity of migrants which has grown since the outset of the twenty-first century. The concept of "mobility" fills this gap in the literature. The new mobilities paradigm[88] explains the contemporary high mobility of people, goods, technologies, ideas, and items. With regard to rural mobilities; the integration of diverse migrants into agricultural labor market including refugees, asylum-seekers, documented workers, undocumented workers, local workers, and daily commuters; and rural space, new layers and differentiation has been created in the countryside. In this context, "ethnicity," "gender," and "citizenship" emerge as factors in creation of a segmented agricultural labor market.

The second part of the chapter elaborates on the impact of the neoliberalization of agriculture on the labor. It refers to Neiman and Quaranta's concept of a New Agricultural Regime, which explains the global transition to new production, marketing, trade and consumption patterns that require lower productions costs. In relation to the section on mobilities, new design of a segmented labor market with highly mobile migrants and the role of seasonal workers in the maintenance of the New Agricultural Regime will be referred to throughout the thesis. Migrants are included in the labor market but are socially excluded in different ways that fit the needs of the New Agricultural Regime since vulnerability allows the decrease in production costs.

88 Mimi Sheller and John Urry. "The New Mobilities Paradigm," *Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space* 38, no. 2 (February 2006): 207–26. https://doi.org/10.1068/a37268.

In the third part, different seasonal migration experiences in developed and developing countries and the relevant literature were introduced. In this context, the dominant migration type is characterized by the coexistence of documented and undocumented migration from abroad alongside special programs for importing temporary labor in developed countries. Temporality as an analytical category is reflected in the scholarly works. For instance, the legal framework of temporary labor programs, the social policy on the short stay of the workers, and workers' health and the safety of their camps are problematized in the literature. Moreover, internal migration within countries from economically poor to developed regions coexist with migration from abroad in developing countries. These diverse migration types and regulatory frames paved the way for a rich literature on seasonal migrant workers around the themes of poverty, exclusion, and unfree labor.

The final part illustrates the features of Turkish agriculture that distinguish it from other examples in developing and developed countries. It started with historical background of seasonal migrant work in Turkey and a literature review on peasantry and agricultural labor. In the literature particular to seasonal migrant work in Turkey, the workers were initially described as sharecroppers or small producers who migrate to other cities in order to earn extra income.[89] Recent rural studies explore the impact of the neoliberal transformation of agriculture by focusing on the survival strategies of small producers such as household income diversification and the increasing indebtedness of these producers who rely on their social networks to cope with competitive neoliberal market conditions.[90] They conceptualize the transformation of agricultural production and social relations in rural areas as a "new peasantry." However, these studies do not elaborate on the ethnicization of the labor market due to the variation of migrant influxes, which has provided producers with greater opportunities for profit maximization enabling them to better compete in the market.

89 Keyder, 1983; Boratav, 2004.

90 Öztürk et.al., 2018; Keyder and Yenal 2013.

On the other hand, studies that focus solely on seasonal agricultural workers in Turkey fail to contextualize the impact that global processes have on reciprocal employer-worker relations.[91] Instead, the extant literature mostly analyzes the ethnic dimension of seasonal migrant labor and the exploitative relations of production without sufficiently examining new patterns of agricultural production and rural mobilities. Filling this gap in literature, this thesis will examine the role of seasonal migrant workers in the agrarian transformation process and changing socio-spatial nature of the Turkish countryside.

91 Duruiz, 2015; Yıldırım, 2014; Küçükkırca, 2012; Özbek, 2007.

3

Geopolitics of Mobilities in Turkish Agriculture: Cartography, Actors, and Migration Governance

This chapter analyzes recent flows of migrants and immigrant to Turkey who are employed in seasonal agrarian jobs applying geopolitical analysis. As opposed to earlier periods during which migrant workers consisted only of local laborers and farmers and internal migrant groups - that were described and discussed in the previous chapter - this part will examine new agricultural migrant workers in the context of Turkey's shifting image from an origin of migrants to destination country for labor

migrants, refugees, and transit-migrants. Unlike earlier work on immigration to Turkey[1] and the literature on forced migration[2] which both examined primarily urban (im)migrant population, the focus is exclusively on the emergence of new agricultural labor classes.

The recent (im)migration flows are historically different from former experiences in terms of both underlying geopolitical causes as well as the consequences for Turkish society. Accordingly, this chapter will present a detailed analysis of how the changing policy of the Turkish state has encouraged and regulated unprecedented migration and immigration flows resulting in the reconstruction of power relations at the local, regional and international levels, which has significantly impacted migrant agricultural labor. Through the lenses of critical geopolitics, I focus not only the migration routes of workers but also on underlying mechanisms of antagonistic power poles and alliances that quantitatively and qualitatively affect agricultural migrant flows.

The first task was to deconstruct power struggles over particular territories. Yves Lacoste asserts that "geographic territory is essential in geopolitics but there is a need to go beyond the physical limits of the space to analyze the case of men and women who live there and the authorities

1 Ahmet Icduygu and Damla B. Aksel, "Turkish Migration Policies: A Critical Historical Retrospective," *Perceptions* 18, no. 3 (2013) : 167-190; Kemal Kirisci, "Mirage or Reality: Post-National Turkey and its Implications for Immigration" (CARIM Research Report 2009/14, European University Institute, The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, Florence) (available at http://cadmus.eui.eu/dspace/handle/1814/11415); Kemal Kirisci, "Disaggregating Turkish Citizenship and Immigration Practices," *Middle Eastern Studies* 36, no. 3 (2006): 1-22; Didem Danış, Jean-François Pérouse, and Cherie Taraghi. "Integration in limbo Iraqi, Afghan, Maghberi and Iranian Migrants in Istanbul" in Ahmet İçduygu and Kemal Kirişçi, ed. *Land of diverse migrations: challenges of emigration andimmigration in Turkey*. 1st ed. İstanbul Bilgi University Press, 2009.

2 Bilgin Ayata and Deniz Yukseker, "A belated awakening: National and international responses to the internal displacement of Kurds in Turkey," *New Perspectives on Turkey* 32 (2005): 5-42; Ayse Betul Celik, "Transnationalization of Human Rights Norms and its Impact on Internally Displaced Kurds," *Human Rights Quarterly* 27, no. 3 (2005): 969-997; Onder Canveren, "Policy Change for the Displaced Kurds in Turkey: Europeanization and Conditionality," *Turkish Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 3(1), 2016: 137-164.

they accept and those they fight against because of the historical narratives they rightly or wrongly tell themselves and the fears and representations they have of their distant or recent past and their distant or near future."[3] In this line, I aim to explore how movements are made meaningful and transformed into mobility through politics and ideology. The creation of new geopolitical images of "threat," "domination," "violence," "exclusion," "inclusion," "identity," all play a crucial role in the determination of migration policy preferences.

Geopolitical imaginations may also redefine potential enemies as potential allies and previous zone of conflict as potential areas of influence.[4] On this background, I am interested in how geopolitical relations and images make their way into the migration and immigration process in Turkey, influencing mobility and representations. To that in, I combine the conceptual, cartographic data as far as the conceptual and imaginary data - within the discourses on identity, perception, and prejudices - to unravel a distinct form of relationship between power and geography.

In this part of the thesis, I argue that the geopolitical approach to determining national, regional and international policy provides new insights for understanding political transformations in domestic and foreign relations. It allows us to identify the main actors and the power relations among them and provides tools to analyze representations in multiple fields such as cultural, linguistic, and gender. Therefore, I hold the idea that geopolitical analysis is necessary to conceive of a dynamic territory of seasonal migration and mobilities shaped by the different interests of diverse actors and their motivations with respect to challenging issues.[5]

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3 Yves Lacoste, "La géographie, la géopolitique et le raisonnement géographique," *Herodote* 130, no. 3 (October 2008): 27.

4 Bülent Aras and Hakan Fidan. "Turkey and Eurasia: Frontiers of a New Geographic Imagination," *New Perspectives on Turkey* 40 (2009): 194, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0896634600005276.

5 For detailed information about critical geopolitical analysis, see Stéphane Rosière, "Géographie politique, géopolitique et géostratégie: distinctions opératoires," *L'Information Géographique* 65, no. 1 (2001): 37, https://doi.org/10.3406/ingeo.2001.2732.

In this chapter, I will first sketch out the typology of the "Neo-Ottomanist" policy that has shaped the selective Turkish stance towards immigrants: whether they are eligible to be citizens, workers, residents or recipients of education and health services and other basic survival needs. After the end of Cold War, political strategies of states in the international arena have diversified in the context of a relative power vacuum. Starting in the 1990s, "Neo-Ottomanism" became an important political approach that represents a certain break from Kemalist foreign policy - which can be summarized as "peace at home peace in the world" - to more aggressive and assertive one. The primary concern that shaped this approach was a "Turkish-Muslim" political identity that close relations with countries in the formerly Ottoman geography and ultimately aspires to be the strongest regional power. Therefore, Turkey turned its eyes from the West to other parts of the world by favoring emigration from new Turkish Republics in the Caucasus after the collapse of Soviet Union and from Muslim Arabic countries in the Middle East.

Throughout the chapter, I argue that Neo-Ottomanism in domestic and foreign policy provides a useful tool for unfolding the complex relationship between geopolitics and migration. Locating Neo-Ottomanism at the center of the analysis, I examine two immigration waves with a special focus on national, regional and international dynamics as well as implications for the local level by unclosing the conflicts among various actors. I first explore an immigration wave from the Caucasus. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Turkish state formulated a new political discourse and foreign policy towards Caucasian countries, the target of which was to expand Turkey's interests is a security, energy, and new economic opportunities in the region. Furthermore, close politico-economic relations paved the way for immigration from Georgia and Azerbaijan to Turkey given their socioeconomic instability after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In fact, for centuries cultural and historical bonds traditionally play an important role in determining migration flows.[6] Those with shared ethnic and religious identities are welcomed

6 Saskia Sassen, *A Sociology of Globalization* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2007).

in accordance with the "Turk-Islam" character of the Neo-Ottomanist approach. The Turkish state encouraged circular immigration from the Caucasus by introducing a more flexible visa regime and increasing diplomatic contact and agreements with these countries, which has resulted in the intensification of immigrant seasonal wage labor in Turkish agriculture.

Second, Syrian refugee migration began around 2011 in parallel with worsening conditions due to escalating civil war. Turkey opened its borders to Syrian refugees from the beginning with rhetoric of helping "our Muslim brothers." By now, 3,6 million Syrian refugees have arrived in Turkey and the number continues to increase.[7] This part will deal with Syrian refugees as seasonal migrant workers from a geopolitical perspective. Third, the internal forced migration of Kurds during the 1990s will be examined. Due to skirmishes between Turkish security forces and the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in southeastern provinces, a state of emergency was announced in 1987 following which forced migration was put into effect. Thus, many Kurdish villages were evacuated, resulting in an immense wave of migration from east to west within Turkey. Most among this displaced population migrated to peripheries of metropolitan areas, but those who lacked kinship networks in western cities settled in urban centers east and south-east such as Batman, Diyarbakır, Şırnak and Mardin. Due to high unemployment, they quickly became seasonal migrant workers.[8]

Internal violence in the east and southeast of Turkey, the economic and political instability in the Caucasus, and civil war in Syria make distinguished the Turkish with respect to the geopolitical dynamics of seasonal agricultural migration and mobilities and also to the social relations in rural spaces after the arrival of immigrants, refugees and internally displaced people. These are shaped by political developments

7 UNCHR, Situation Syria Regional Refugee Response, accessed 10 March 2019, available online: [https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria], 2019.

8 Caglar Keyder and Zafer Yenal, *Bildigimiz Tarimin Sonu* (İstanbul: Iletisim Yayincilik, 2013), 145.

on a macro level and in turn also shape them. Hence, contemporary Turkish agrarian space provides new insights and perspectives for the study of migration and geopolitics.

§ 3.1 Neo-Ottomanism in Domestic and Foreign Policy: New Challenges for Turkey and the Middle East

In the last three decades, Neo-Ottomanist policies have been one of the major factors shaping diverse mobilities within, from, and to Turkey. Migration and mobilities have always been one of the main items on the political agenda since the mobilities of people are always political - beyond the simple acts and individual choices of the migrants.[9] Wars, conflicts, discrimination against certain groups, and as far as certain targeted locations are concerned, the offer of good job opportunities, high living standards in the cities and towns, and close relations between countries on the political level all play a crucial role in the determination of migrant flows. Besides the political motivations laying beneath mobilities, migration itself produces political consequences with respect to integration, assimilation, clandestine journeys, persecution, which can also be counted among the subjects of geopolitics. In this context, different migrant statuses such as those of refugees, trans-migrants, irregular migrants, temporary protected people, and labor migrants as well as specific economic and societal conditions are determined and redetermined in the current geopolitical context of Turkey.

Neo-Ottomanism is conventionally defined as an assertive Turkish foreign policy mostly vis-à-vis former Ottoman territories, especially Turkic and Islamic countries, which is characterized by the establishment of new links and relations in the realms of economics, politics, and culture. The most important political tool of this approach is reference to the Ottoman empire based on a common past reemphasized by shared

9 Jennifer Hyndman, "The Geopolitics of Migration and Mobility," *Geopolitics* 17, no. 2 (April 2012): 247-48, https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2011.569321.

language, religion and culture. In fact, this political approach is now almost exclusively associated with the government of former prime minister (and current president) Recep Tayyip Erdogan as well as the former minister of foreign affairs and prime minister Ahmet Davutoglu due to the explicit reference to this political approach during their rule.[10]

However, this account fails to explain the contemporary roots of neo-Ottomanism, which is based on economic and political rupture caused by the military coup of 1980 and by changing regional developments after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Thus, I will trace the continuities, ruptures, and challenges between the 1990s and the 2000s during three-decade rise of this neo-conservative power. Furthermore, I maintain Wastnidge's claim that neo-Ottomanism has also entailed a crucial domestic political shift, unlike the mainstream approach that analyzes neo-Ottomanism solely as a new foreign policy.[11] This domestic shift clearly affects the current socioeconomic position of migrants and refugees in the society as far as their level of acceptableness to Turkish residents and local actors in both urban and rural areas concerned. Building on this foundation, this section will start with the typology and historical evolution of neo-Ottomanism to lay bare to what this approach refers in different time-space conditions. Then, the determining impact of neo-Ottomanism on migration and immigration policy will be discussed.

3.1.1 *Historical Evolution of Neo-Ottomanism*

"Ottomanism" as a political approach gained momentum at the end of the nineteenth century in a vivid political atmosphere of nationalist and separatist movements occurring in different parts of the empire in answer to the question "how will the motherland be saved?" (memleket nasıl

10 Edward Wastnidge, "Imperial Grandeur and Selective Memory: Re-Assessing Neo-Ottomanism in Turkish Foreign and Domestic Politics," *Middle East Critique* 28, no. 1 (January 2019): 7-28, https://doi.org/10.1080/19436149.2018.1549232

11 See in, for example, Nagehan Tokdoğan, *Yeni Osmanlıcılık- Hınç Nostalji Narsisizm* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2018), 167-221.

kurtulur?) Domestic and external factors came into play in the dissolution of the previously dominant *millet* system.[12] On one hand, the French Revolution had a great and far-reaching impact on the world by spreading the ideas of liberty, equality, and nationalism. These ideas -which resulted in a range of separatist movements at the end of the century- quickly spread, especially among non-Muslim populations in Ottoman territories who were involved in commercial activities with western countries. On the other hand, the increasing number of higher education facilities in the nineteenth century was influential since the schooled population was impressed by Western ideas and adopted these notions into their intellectual discussions on the eve of the fall of empires.

Nationalism first sprouted in the Balkans - the Serbian Uprisings of 1804 and 1815 and the Greek War of Independence of 1821. In order to obstruct the spread of the separatist movements in the empire, Ottoman authorities promulgated a series of structural administrative changes alongside other reasons such as deficiencies in taxation and the military. During the reigns of Selim III (1789-1807) and Mahmut II (1808-1839), a range of military, educational and administrative reforms[13] were put into

12 During this time span, the millet system, based on the co-habitation of different Muslim and non-Muslim Ottoman communities was predominant. Each religious group called a millet, was headed by a religious leader and ruled over their respective community autonomously. Community members were subject to their own religious laws and rules and their relationship with the central authority in the empire was consisted mainly of paying taxes. In the second half of the nineteenth century, the millet system was not functioning properly owing to the pervasive of the rise of nationalism within different ethnic groups in the empire. See Erik Jan Zürcher, *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2002), 25.

13 The *Tanzimat* was a reformist rather than revolutionist movement. In 1839, the four principles of the Tanzimat Fermanı (Edict of Gülhane) were proclaimed: 1) guarantee of the rights to all Ottoman citizens regardless of religion or ethnic identity (in other words, everybody was to be equal before the law) 2) centralization of the taxation system 3) universal obligation of conscription 4) the sultan's guarantee of the people's safety of life and property. Following these four promises, a series of reform ranging from law to economy, education to regional administration, and military to taxation were put into effect between 1839 and 1878. For detailed information about the reforms, see Erik Jan Zürcher, *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin tarihi* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2002), 21-116.

practice. But the following period –called the Tanzimat era, referring to reorganization (1839-1878) -, was a decisive moment for the formation of a modern state characterized by structural changes to bureaucracy, law and the economy and a new intellectual environment from which the idea of Ottomanism arose.

On this background, Ottomanism as an ideology started to arise with a view of keeping all Muslim and non-Muslim population of the empire together under an Ottoman identity. It was an effort in the creation of a supra-identity to prevent possible separatist, nationalist movements. The bureaucracy *(Bab-i Ali)* as a class held the executive power to execute the reforms, which distinguished Tanzimat reforms from earlier attempts undertaken by the sultans. Bureaucrats who consisted of educated people who had travelled to Europe, spoke European languages and had a western style education, were the main actors behind the change.

Criticisms of reforms were directed at the responsible body, Tanzimat elites. Neo-Ottomans were the most important opposition, coming forward with strong critiques. Interestingly, most members of the group were former Tanzimat reformers who, in the course of time, came into conflict with the leading pashas[14] and started an opposition. They came to prominence around 1865 with a strong opposition to the Tanzimat elites, accusing them of being puppets who imitate the Western world without noticing Ottoman culture. They basically held the idea of combining Western political thought with Islamic-cultural values in a synthesis that would incorporate elements of Islam, pluralism, and imperialism to construct a new Ottoman subject that would be loyal to the empire.[15] To achieve this goal, they suggested and promoted constitutionalism. They provided a new way of thinking about nineteenth-century, European liberal concepts such as nation and liberty by adapting them to the

14 Especially, Ali and Fuat Pashas were leading figures in Tanzimat era.

15 Chien Yang Erdem, "Ottomentality: neoliberal governance of culture and neo-ottoman management of diversity," *Turkish Studies* 18, no. 4 (October 2017): 712-13. https://doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2017.1354702.

Ottoman context.[16] However, this model of Ottomanism model had two paradoxical challenges. First, specifying the nation geographically was a difficult task: where the nation they changed from time to time and person to person. Second, defining and infusing a shared identity was problematic. Endless discussions turned around Turkish, Ottoman, and Islamic identities.

Hence, today's political groups and parties who define themselves as neo-Ottomanist refer to a historical conflict between modernization reforms and opposition to the reforms and to Tanzimat elites. In fact, the subsequent period characterized by the conflict between Abdulhamid II and the Young Turks is also significant for the sake of understanding the contemporary discussion around neo-Ottomanism. Abdülhamid II is a worthy figure in Turkish history beyond his reign in the late nineteenth century. His supporters and opponents during his time and later and even today show their ideological positions on a divide between modernists/secularists and Islamist/conservatives, expressing where Abdulhamid positioned in their political approach. Therefore, understanding his rule and his ideology against for the diverse groups is still important for the discussion of contemporary politics.

In brief, Abdülhamid II came to power in 1876 via a military coup and a new constitution, but he shelved the constitution in 1878 using Ottoman-Russian war as an excuse. From 1878 to 1908, he held power as a

16 Although the community was ideologically heterogeneous, their common purpose was to establish Ottoman constitutionalism in opposition to the power of leading Tanzimat bureaucrats. In fact, they were active for only a limited period of time - 5 or 6 – years, but their short and long-lasting influence impinged upon sociopolitical changes in the late Ottoman and Republican eras. In the short run, their struggle for a constitution succeeded in 1876. The first constitution was declared following a military coup d'etat in 1876 that brought in Sultan Abdulhamid II in place of Abdülaziz. As a long-term influence, they spread the idea that constitutionalism is a right of the people and any interference should be stopped. Later, an opposition arose with the idea that "the sultan broke the law" when Abdülhamid suspended the constitution.

monarch; in other words, power had passed from the *Bab-ı Ali* to the palace, which is one of the distinctive features of his rule.[17] Another salient feature was the increasing role of emotions such as fear, skepticism, excessive need for security, and paranoia in his management style. At the beginning of his rule, Abdulhamid was influenced by witnessing the withdrawal of sultan even as he assumed his reign following a bloody coup d'état. He always feared losing his place, which resulted in skepticism and even paranoia with respect to any oppositional thinking.[18] He moved his palace from Topkapı to Yıldız due to security concerns. Moreover, he oppressed against any kind of criticism in the media. A civil servant *(sansür memuru)* was responsible for censoring the content of newspapers. The result was that if there were pages that implied anything negative about Abdulhamid or his reign, they were published blank.

The outstanding feature of his reign was his strong emphasis on Islam in his management coupled with populism and paternalism.[19] Several reasons triggered this rise of Islam in contrast with the Tanzimat era. Foremost was the lost territory after uprisings in the Balkans and the Ottoman-Russian War of 1877-1878, which resulted in a reduction of the non-Muslim population. Additionally, Muslim migrant groups (called *muhacir*) from the Caucasus and the Balkans immigrated to the Ottoman empire as consequence of Russian expansionism. Abdulhamid adopted a welcoming immigration policy towards Muslim *muhacirs,* instigation an "Ottoman style integration" by which they were provided with accommodations and a plot of land to cultivate. But they were not assimilated to a Turkish identity.[20] In other words, Muslim identity was the basic criterion for a migration that entailed linguistic heterogeneity but religious homogeneity in Ottoman territories. Thus, the demographic density of the Muslim population in Ottoman society notably increased.

17 Zürcher, *Modernleşen Türkiye*, 116-137

18 Nadir Özbek, "The Politics of Poor Relief in the Late Ottoman Empire 1876-19141," *New Perspectives on Turkey* 21 (1999):12. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0896634600006361.

19 Nadir Özbek, "Philanthropic Activity, Ottoman Patriotism, and the Hamidian Regime, 1876-1909," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 37, no.1 (2005): 59-81.

20 Eric Jan Zürcher, *Turkey A Modern History* (London, New York: IB Tauris, 1998), 81.

As a second reason, Abdulhamid did not trust the bureaucratic and military classes because he had lived through the Tanzimat period when the pashas bypassed sultans to enactment the reforms. He aimed to maintain the power alone; in other words, he was the "only man" in management *(tek adam yönetimi)*. He also witnessed a military coup that resulted in the overthrow of his uncle, Abdulaziz from the throne. Hence, he never trusted and instead, had close relations to religious authorities, called the *ulama,* heeding their opinions on domestic and foreign policy as well as socio-economic investment in realms such as education, health, and transportation.

He was the sultan who most used his status as caliphate status and Islamic references in the nineteenth century.[21] Islamism penetrated his rhetoric and governance and became embedded in the representations of his management practices. The best example is Hejaz railway constructed from 1901 to 1908 by an Islamic foundation that established a connection between Istanbul and Hejaz region, encompassing Mecca and Medina, which are sacred, symbolic locations for Muslims. By doing so, he provided Muslims with a way to participate in a religious activity by taking a part in the big project, strengthening the notion of Islam in society while simultaneously finding an economic solution to the expenses of the project.[22]

Opposition to Abdulhamid was organized under the name of the Young Turks *(Jön Türkler)* who consisted mostly of a well-educated, intellectual class in the Empire. They strongly criticized Abdulhamid's antimodern, monarchic and despotic management, which ended in their arrest and expulsion abroad, but they continued their political activities - gathering, discussing and publishing about the Ottoman Empire, even when they were not physically in the Empire. Their political discussion

21 Nora Seni, "Les Arabes, les Turcs; si loin si proche," *Hérodote* 160-161 (2016) : 323.

22 Another example, with respect to his different economic approach was that he pursued a populist relation to ordinary people *(reaya)* by sending gifts with the personal seal of Sultan Abdulhamid. In the eyes of the people, this created a "father" image of a sultan who cares and reaches even into their homes. See Özbek, "Philanthropic Activity," 59-81. This paternalist-populist style is still instrumental for politicians.

centered around an old question posed by Neo-Ottomans: how the motherland will be saved?

They ideologically positioned themselves within Ottomanism to sustain unity in the Empire in contrast to the sultan's pan-Islamism. Their opposition grew and resulted in a Second Constitution in 1908, the official ideology of which was Ottomanism. However, in the course of time, the dominant ideology shifted from Ottomanism to nationalism during the Balkan uprisings.[23] Especially, the separatist bride of the Albanian Muslim community influence what would become a prevalent opinion that Ottomanism was no longer feasible in the age of nationalism. Henceforth, the leading cadres of the republic focused on the geography in which Turkish people lived (later called *Misak-ı Milli*) and formulated foreign policy aimed at sustaining territorial integrity within the *Misak-ı Milli*, at "peace at home, peace in the world" and at the target of being part of the Western camp.

3.1.2 *Contemporary Neo-Ottomanism*

In the last three decades, Turkey has emerged as a regional actor in the neighboring Middle East, the Balkans and the Caucasus with its rhetoric of "Neo-Ottomanism." Turkey's mediation missions in the Middle East on such issues as the Arab-Israel conflict, the US invasion in Iraq, the Kosovo War and the Syrian civil war have underscored its role as a sometimes soft, sometimes strict, but always a certain regional power. In the academic and political milieus, this new presence in the areas surrounding Turkey has been variously characterized as Neo-Ottomanism[24] or Middle Easternization[25] and is further interpreted as an abandonment of the West in favor of the East. In relation to the previous two phases depicted

23 Zürcher, "Modernleşen Türkiye'nin," 186-193.

24 Henri J Barkey. "Turkish Foreign Policy and the Middle East," Science Po CERI Strategy Papers, CNRS Editions 10 (June, 2011): 1-14.

25 Tarik Oğuzlu, "Middle Easternization of Turkey's Foreign Policy: Does Turkey Dissociate from the West?," *Turkish Studies* 9, no. 1 (March 2008): 3-20. https://doi.org/10.1080/14683840701813960.

above, Neo-Ottomanism has inherited significant ideological and practical tools from its historical roots. Meanwhile, contemporary foreign and domestic factors have provided foundation on which to develop a new political approach that is distinct from past experiences. In this context, it is worthy asking what makes it new or neo.

What makes the recent Ottomanism new? What is the meaning of conjuring up the Ottoman Empire in the twenty-first century? How does the new imagination of politics operate and create new balances and antagonisms within and outside national borders? In this context, how are flows of people across borders being reshaped? Can we talk about Neo-Ottomanist migration flows with regard to agricultural workers? By questioning this new framework, I will first explain domestic and foreign factors for the rise of Neo-Ottomanism. Then, I will focus on the rough journey of Neo-Ottomanism since the 1990s. Afterwards, this chapter will continue with the impact of the Neo-Ottomanist approach on the geopolitics of migration flows to Turkey with regard to migrant agricultural employment.

3.1.3 *The Corner Stone: Military Coup d'Etat in 1980*

One major outcome of the 1980 military coup was the rise of political Islam in Turkey; a paradox given the conventional wisdom that the military has always been perceived as the guardian of secularism. The reason for this challenge was rising leftist movements, notably between 1960 and 1980, characterized by increasing labor unionization, strikes, student protests, and vivid intellectual discussion about socialism in a polarized world where Turkey was located adjacent the Soviet Union. The coup d'état mainly targeted the suppression of leftist movements by different means: arresting the members of leftwing political organizations, closing associations, parties, and labor unions and as well as censoring all publication activities.

At the same time, the junta sought to erase the "left" from the society by promoting a newly reconstructed identity: the Turkish-Islamic synthesis. In other words, Islam was reinterpreted and gradually and subtly reincorporated into the official Turkish nationalism. The military used

religion as a countermeasure against the leftist movement. Accordingly, state-sponsored Islamization of Turkish nationalism or the Turkification of the Islamic tradition first found its way into the discourses of military coup leaders. The head of the junta, Kenan Evren declared these words in a rally:

> All of us believe in the same god. We all have just one Prophet. We all look to the same Quran. We all are performing prayer with the suras of the same Quran. Then why there is a conflict?[26]

This speech symbolically shows the changing direction of Turkey after the military coup. The aim of the coup was two fold: 1) to realize neoliberal economic policies, not allowed by the strong labor unions, the workers of which mounted powerful strikes, and 2) to remove leftist political mobilization from the political arena leading by propagating fear of communism in the Cold War atmosphere. For the sake of this political purpose, the junta imposed religion on society as an antidote and this became a milestone for the process of the Islamization of Turkey. Indeed, coup leaders required military cadets to take courses on Islam, and their textbook demonstrated a close connection between Sunni Islam and nationalism and between the Prophet Muhammed and Atatürk.[27] In the 1982 Constitution prepared by the junta, Islamic education became obligatory for all high school students. While in the name of religious culture and moral knowledge, it should be emphasized that this Islamization through education did not concern general knowledge of Islam but rather the Sunni faction. As Fatih Yasli claims that this project been advocated a "Sunni-Nation" ideal for Turkey,

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26 The original text as follows: « Hepimiz ayni Allaha inaniyoruz. Bir peygamberimiz var. ayni Kurani kullaniyoruz. Ayni Kuranin sureleriyle namaz kiliyoruz. O halde ayrilik neden?" "Kenan Evren Islami Propaganda," URL: "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PH-uxSj39HY".

27 Hakan M. Yavuz, "Turkish identity and foreign policy in flux: The rise of Neo-Ottomanism," *Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies* 7, no. 12 (March1998): 30. https://doi.org/10.1080/10669929808720119.

3.1.4 *The Empowerment of Identities in a Unipolar World*

The Soviet bloc's collapse and Cold War's end have undeniably restructured international relations and relevant bodies for almost three-decades. This new era quickly manifested itself through a variety of crises in the 1990s: the 1991 Gulf War, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 and Yugoslavia in 1992 have been followed with a prevailing instability and ambiguity.[28] In this context, Turkey's position in the global politics took on new challenges given its multiregional geopolitical importance located at the hub of several conflict areas ranging from the Balkans to the Middle East and the Caucasus.

Its former alliances with meso-level actors such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and European Union (EU) as well as its bilateral relations with the US and European countries changed after the retreat of real socialism due to the new political interests. On the other hand, newly independent Turkic states in the Balkans, the Caucasus and Central Asia have paved the way for the development of a new course of politics around Turkish identity.

28 Şule Kut, "The contours of Turkish Foreign Policy in the 1990s" in Barry M. Rubin and Kemal Kirişçi (ed.) *Turkey in world politics: an emerging multiregional power* (Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001): 7.

Figure 3.1 Former Soviet Countries. Source: WorldAtlas[29]

Map in figure 3.1 shows former USSR countries that became independent after its dissolution. Among these, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan which have Turkish identities, have emerged as new neighbors close to Turkey. As such, the new politics based on a rising Turkishness identity arose between Turkey and formerly Soviet Turkic countries since the 1990s, which has been instrumental in the expansion of Neo-Ottomanism. The second factor that contributes to Neo-Ottomanism is the breakup of Yugoslavia. During its dissolution process, there were countless clashes among different ethnic and religious groups in a bloody process that lasted three years (1989-1992) characterized by war crimes including genocide, rape and crimes against humanity. And International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was even established by the United Nations (UN) in 1993 to adjudicate war crimes. The definition of "crimes against humanity" that emerged since the beginning of the war influenced public opinion all over the world. Turkey

29 "Former Soviet Union Countries." Worldatlas. Accessed March 1, 2019. https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/what-countries-made-up-the-former-soviet-union-ussr.html.

was one of the leading countries that showed solidarity with Bosnian war victims by propagating "Muslim brotherhood."

Numerous actors including the government, state agencies, political parties and NGOs organized national campaigns to provide medicine, food and clothing to Bosnia.[30] Political parties and other factions coordinated marches in cities throughout Turkey to condemn Serbs *(Sırpları tel'in mitingleri)*. Turgut Özal, the president at the time, said that what was happening in Bosnia-Herzegovina stained the honor of humanity. The government arranged a special one-hour program for Bosnians to express themselves on TRT-INT (the government's official television channel).[31] These efforts were far-reaching and mobilized people in different ways: participating in demonstrations, sending aid packages and praying for Muslim brothers. Hence, the breakup of Yugoslavia became an important domestic policy issue alongside an issue of foreign affairs.

The last event that contributed to the rise of Neo-Ottomanism within the body of external factors was the deportation of Muslims from Bulgaria. In brief, discrimination against Turks in Bulgaria intensified in the second half of 1980s as a result of an assimilation policy that included a ban on traditional Turkish clothing and even on speaking Turkish in public places, which led to mass demonstrations by Turks. Extreme violence ranging from the killing of some demonstrators to their impoundment in the notorious Belene Forced Labor Camp - were reportedly used to stop the protest.[32] Following the tension, the Bulgarian state started deportations. As a result, 300 thousand Turks were forced to emigrate in 1989. The prime minister, Turgut Özal, opened the borders to Bulgarian Turks with a welcoming political discourse. At this juncture, a close look at Özal

30 Fahriye Emgili "Bosna-Hersek Trajedisinde (1992-1995) Türk Birliği," *Güney-Doğu Araştırmaları Dergisi* 21 (2012): 71.

31 Şerif Turgut "Bosna TV Kanalı İstiyor", *Milliyet* Newspaper (28 January 1995).

32 Birgül Demirtaş-Coşkun, "Turkish-Bulgarian Relations in the Post-Cold War Era : The Exemplary Relationship in the Balkans," *The Turkish Year Book of International Relations* 32 (2001): 27. URL: http://dergiler.ankara.edu.tr/dergiler/44/672/8556.pdf.

is necessary since the contemporary roots of Neo-Ottomanism originate under his governance.

3.1.5 *Özal's Vision of Neo-Ottomanism*

Turgut Özal's personal life story is instructive to understand his political discourse and practice. First, he was a member of a Naqshbandi religious sect of Islam[33] that had always been important in shaping conservative Muslim policies. Second, his liberal economic vision was crucial for Turkey's changing politics. Prior mounting a political career in the Motherland Party, he worked as an undersecretary in the State Planning Organization (SPO), as a consultant in the World Bank, and as a senior manager in several private companies including Sabancı Holding.

These work experiences affected his economic approach that clearly favored a transition to a neoliberal economy. During Özal's time as prime minister, he was in charge of the privatization of state economic enterprises (Kamu İktisadi Teşekkülleri). He pursued a policy of welcoming policy foreign investment by streamlining taxation and bureaucratic processes. Furthermore, he favored the reduction of agricultural subsidies and in this way indirectly supported rural-urban migration in the 1990s. These structural changes to economic policies are defined as a transition from an import to export oriented model in the Turkish literature.[34] On this background, he is an important figure in Turkish history in terms of spreading not only Neo-Ottomanism but also neoliberalism.

In fact, Neo-Ottomanism and neoliberalism are complementary, mutually transforming and interacting with each other in a variety of ways. Neo-Ottomanist policies are fed by a neoliberal economic vision and vice versa. In this process, imagined geography as a target of influence- for both neo-Ottomanist and neo-liberal expansionist policies of Turkey - shaped the cognitive maps of political elites, and thus paving the ways for

33 Marcel Bazin and Stéphane de Tapia, *La Turquie: géographie d'une puissance émergente* (Paris: A. Colin, 2015): 290.

34 Korkut Boratav, *Türkiye iktisat tarihi, 1908-1985* (İstanbul: Gerçek Yayınevi, 1995).

naming regions (i.e., the Middle East and the Caucasus), constructing mental zones (i.e., East and West), and making a culture of geopolitics.[35] At this juncture, a question raises of the sphere of Turkey's influence beyond its physical territorial limits arises? In other words, where is the imagined geography in which it can assert its power? For Özal, the answer is found in his article "Türkiye'nin Önünde Hacet Kapıları Açılmıştır" (Sacred doors are opened in advance of Turkey) by Turgut Özal:

> We must be careful and get real to understand some important matters today while looking toward the geopolitical region which is the target space or our lead, which ranges from central Asia to the Balkan peninsula. That is where I am talking about, where Turkish communities live to a large extent, and given this, this region at the same time embodies a cultural world that we call the "Turkish world." However, there are also Muslim communities and countries that are not Turkish but lived under the Ottoman Empire as *rayah* for centuries. I mean that, in this region ranges from the Adriatic to central Asia, we can mention several big generations who reside in different locations in spite of the predominant shared characteristics and knitted like plait. It should be evaluated as circles overlapping each other producing large spaces of intersection. (…) This circle involves the Turkish communities and also non-Turkish but Muslim communities from the region spending Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Kosovo to Western Thrace. Moreover, Turkish and Kurdish communities from Northern Iraq and Syria should be included in this circle. You can also count Arabic and Maghreb countries, enlarging the circle. This is the regions, in essence, in which communities that share our historical

35 Bülent Aras and Hakan Fidan, "Turkey and Eurasia: Frontiers of a New Geographic Imagination," *New Perspectives on Turkey* 40 (2009): 193-94. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0896634600005276.

> and cultural features live, and so, these regions are our influence areas.[36]

Özal's target geography is socially constructed through shared ethnic and religious identities in the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Balkans, and the Middle East. The political discourse and rhetoric used to describe such a region heavily convey a new imagination, reinterpreting West and East following the end of the Cold War. Özal's imagination explicitly aims at being a regional power in former Ottoman territories. This imperial vision is based on a conceptualization of historical and cultural experience that diverges from a Kemalist foreign policy that always sought to be included in the Western camp through good diplomatic relations with the European countries and the US while neglecting other parts of the world.

Özal influenced subsequent political leaders even after his death in 1993. His successor, Süleyman Demirel pursued a neo-Ottomanist foreign policy in the Balkans but his attitude towards Neo-Ottomanist project was more deliberate than those in the previous and the subsequent period. Just two years after Özal's death, in 1995 , the conservative, pro-Islamist Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, or RP) ranked first in the elections, which became a turning point for the development of neo-Ottomanism.[37] The leader of the RP, Necmettin Erbakan became the prime minister of a coalition government comprised of the RP and minority partner, the True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi, or DYP).

Erbakan built up a more radical rhetoric of "Islamist cooperation" in opposition to pro-Western Kemalist foreign policy. The RP promoted the idea of the alternate economic and political collaborations and agencies, such as an Islamic NATO, Islamic UN, and the establishment of a common market and currency among Muslim countries by propagandizing anti-

36 Cited in Fatih Yaşlı, *AKP, Cemaat, Sunni - Ulus* (İstanbul: Yordam Kitap, 2014): 151.

37 Hakan M. Yavuz, "Social and Intellectual Origins of Neo-Ottomanism: Searching for a Post-National Vision," *Die Welt des Islams* 56, no. 3-4 (2016): 457. https://doi.org/10.1163/15700607-05634p08.

EU views.[38] In his first six months in power, Erbakan and his foreign policy team travelled only to Islamic countries with a two dimensional agenda: improving bilateral relations with selected Islamic countries and strengthening multilateral relations through a Turkish led D-8 Initiative, the aim of which was to gather the main middle powers from the Islamic world to constitute a bloc.[39]

Unlike Özal, the RP leadership placed Islam at the center of politics.[40] In fact, Erbakan took over the legacy of Özal but his imagination of the Ottoman was framed only by Islamism. In other words, the pillars of Turkish identity were not a priority for Erbakan. Rather, he pursued pan-Islamist policies. The RP's political Islamist approach was reflected in the domestic sphere, as well. For instance, Erbakan, the leaders of religious sects *(tarikat liderleri)* to dine at his home. Another example is, members of the Aczmendi, a religious sect, even held a demonstration with the motto "we want Sharia" in the courtyard of Ankara's Kocatepe mosque. The other important event was the organization of an "Al-Quds" night by the RP mayor in Sincan district of Ankara on 30 January 1997. The mayor, Bekir Yıldız, and his guest speaker Muhammed Reza Bagheri, who was the Iranian Ambassador, radically criticized Israel and secularism in Turkey[41] in a building decorated with the posters of Hamas and Hezbollah.

Following these events, the Turkish army sent thirty tanks to the streets of Sincan on 4 February. A day later, the President Süleyman Demirel sent a letter of warning to Erbakan. These events ended with the Turkish Military Memorandum. The National Security Council *(*Milli Güvenlik Kurulu, or MGK*)* held a meeting on 28 February 1997 that lasted for nine hours. The generals dictated to that Prime Minister Necmettin

38 Emirhan Yorulmazlar, The Role of Ideas in Turkish Foreign Policy: The JDP-Davutoglu paradigm and Its Role after 2002 (PhD Diss., Bogazici University, 2015): 109.

39 Philip Robins, "Turkish foreign policy under Erbakan," *Survival* 39, no. 2 (June1997): 88-89. https://doi.org/10.1080/00396339708442913

40 Yavuz, "Social and Intellectual," 459.

41 Robins, "Turkish Foreign Policy," 97.

Erbakan sign a document that included important decisions about secularism and political Islam.[42] After the memorandum, Erbakan resigned from the prime ministry. Currently, Mesut Yılmaz (the leader of the Motherland Party- Anavatan Partisi or ANAP) became the head of the government for two years. This postmodern military coup yielded a rupture in Neo-Ottomanist foreign policy, weakening Islamist political actors. In the following elections in 1999, the votes one by the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi, or FP), which succeded the RP, declined to 15.4 percent, and they did not take part in the government. In addition, their political narrative became more moderate, abondoning the RP's radical Islamic discourse.

In 1999, Bülent Ecevit's Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Parti, or DSP) ranked first in the elections and he became prime minister of a coalition government with the ANAP and MHP (Nationalist Movement Party, Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi). During the rule of this government (1999-2002), Turkish foreign policy was oriented directly towards the West. Several significant steps were taken toward Turkey's EU candidacy process.[43] Turkey progressed speedily to permanent candidacy status in this short period with remarkable reforms and a Western-oriented policy. However, a severe economic crisis in 2001 disrupted this process

42 The principal ones were: 1) the obligation to have eight years of primary school education, 2) the abolition of Tarikats 3) the ban of the hijab at universities iv) and new requirements for the university entrance exam vis-à-vis graduates of religious high schools (İmam Hatip Liseleri).

46 In brief, the EU granted candidacy status to Turkey on 10-11 December, 1999 at the Helsinki Summit. It later prepared a series of EU harmonization packages. The Turkish state began the Europeanization process in both domestic and foreign politics. During this process, several important reforms were put into practice including the abolition of the death sentence, the restriction of the court's ability to shut down political parties, the withdrawal of the requirement that broadcasts in Turkish, and the demilitarization of the National Security Council. NGOs became important actors in this process and served as driving force to push Turkey as well as the EU to accelerate and complete the candidacy process. For instance, "Europe Movement 2002" consisting of 175 NGO and many journalists, authors, and artists applied pressure on Turkey and the EU to follow the Copenhagen Criteria. Ali Balcı, "Türkiye Dış Politikası: İlkeler, Aktörler, Uygulamalar," *Türkiye Ortadoğu Çalışmaları Dergisi* 1, no. 2 (2014): 183-89.

which resulted in the rout of the DSP in the elections of 2002. The results of the election were surprising. Just two parties, CHP (19.42%) and the AKP (34.42%) won seats in the assembly, while earlier leading parties, the ANAP, DSP, and DYP, were let out. In this way, the AKP came to power without the need for a coalition.[44]

3.1.6 *The AKP's Neo-Ottomanism in Foreign and Domestic Politics*

Following the 2002 elections, Turkey entered a new phase with a single party government that brought about a retreat of opposition political parties with respect to their power and sphere of influence. Freedom of movement of the AKP over the executive process strengthened and expanded. In this new political atmosphere, Neo-Ottomanism served as a tool to form a new course in foreign and domestic politics.[45] The AKP represents itself as the successor to Turgut Özal instead of two Necmettin Erbakan and the Refah Partisi, which is interesting since the key figures in the AKP, including Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, came from the RP.[46]

In fact, their political discourse relied on differentiation from the RP to show a divide between two poles: namely the reformists and radicalists in the National Vision Movement (Milli Görüş Hareketi) in which historically and politically pro-religious movement of a series of Islamist

44 By the time of the 12 September military coup, the Turkish electoral system was designed with a D'Hondt threshold. According to the system, political parties needed to win more than 10% of the total vote in Turkey to the represented in the National Assembly. Then, the oresident assigns the leader of the political party with the largest ratio of boats in elections to form a government. The prime minister prepares the list of ministers from his party, other parties, and if necessary, from outside the assembly. He submits the list to the president and the assembly in turn. After receiving a vote of confidence in the assembly, the government can start to work. If a ratio of votes one by a political party in the elections exceeds half of the total, as in the case of 2002 elections, this party can rule as a single party government.

45 Edward Wastnidge, "Imperial Grandeur and Selective Memory: Re-Assessing Neo-Ottomanism in Turkish Foreign and Domestic Politics," *Middle East Critique* 28, no. (January 2019): 7. https://doi.org/10.1080/19436149.2018.1549232

46 He was elected mayor of Istanbul representing the RP in 1994.

parties in Turkey.[47] At the outset, the AKP came on the scene with the propaganda of moderate Islam, while Erbakan supporters were characterized as radicals. This moderate notion of Islam was constructed as image of "pro-Western," "pro-European," "pro-American," economically "liberal," and religiously "conservative" as opposed to the earlier anti-American, anti-Israel, and anti-Europe political stance of the RP.

A clear distinction was observed in the realm of foreign policy. The RP's foreign policy had thought to create alternate Islamist meso-level actors and collaborations like Islamist NATO and D-8. Conversely, the AKP set out a map of continuing with the EU candidate process, pursuing good relations with the US, preserving established relations with meso-level actors (NATO, EU, IMF, WB), and increasing Turkey's importance in the surrounding region by opening up new diplomatic relations. In this context, Özal's political vision was much more convenient to ground a new policy for the AKP. However, four significant differences between Özal and Erdoğan and their political rules in terms of Neo-Ottomanism are worth emphasizing:

47 Cihan Tuğal analyzes the divide between the moderate and radical wings in the Islamist movement in Turkey. He conceptualizes a "passive revolution" in the Islamist movement, which refers to the separation of moderate Islamists from the radical wing by making peace with neoliberal market values and formerly controversial global meso-level actors (like NATO, the UN and the EU) and countries (like the US and Israel). Cihan Tuğal, *Passive Revolution Absorbing the Islamic Challenge to Capitalism* (Stanford University Press, 2009).

	Ozalian Era		Erdoğan's period
1.	Neo-Ottomanism is a pragmatic political approach to foreign relations	1.	Neo-Ottomanism is a programmatic agenda of Muslim conservative society, the theoretical basis of which is a strategic depth doctrine formulated by Davutoğlu
2.	Political interest mostly limited to developing good relations with countries in the former Ottoman geography	2.	Strong emphasis on the Ottoman past and its key figures and symbols
3.	Lack of interest in developing Neo-Ottoman policy in domestic affairs	3.	Reorganization of society along Turkish-Muslim lines
4.	Modus operandi: soft power	4.	Modus operandi: transition from soft to hard power

First, unlike Turgut Özal, whose Neo-Ottoman policy was oriented only at foreign relations, Tayyip Erdoğan reinterpreted Neo-Ottomanism as an outlook referring to an ideal of a conservative, nationalist, Muslim society, the theoretical basis of which is the "strategic depth doctrine" formulated by Ahmet Davutoğlu (the former prime minister and minister of foreign affairs and who was the architect of this structural policy shift). According to Davutoğlu, Turkey should take its power from its geopolitical location surrounded by the Balkans and the Caucasus - "instable political geographies" that provide Turkey the opportunity to be the major driver in the region.[48] To achieve this goal, he suggests a "zero problem" policy with all neighbors[49] through new diplomatic relations and economic investments in place of past silence and ignorance of eastern countries. Beyond foreign policy, his new geopolitical approach also expresses a substantial criticism of republicans and suggest a new political existence for Turkey:[50]

48 Yavuz, "Social and intellectual origins", 461.

49 Seni, "Les Arabes" 322.

50 Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye'nin Uluslarası Konumu* (İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2009): 83.

> The major contradiction in Turkey is the conflict between the political-cultural accumulation of society due to its history and geo-cultural characteristics (as previously a political center of civilization) and the political system formed by the political elites in order to join another civilization. This case is almost unique to Turkey.

Based on a republican-conservative divide, he criticized Turkish foreign policy by accusing the republicans wing of wasting time by making the effort to join a Western civilization that is not compatible with Turkey's own historical and geo-cultural values. He also accuses former Turkish political elites of being "passive" in the face of political developments in the Middle East.[51] Instead, he proposes a more active foreign policy in the surrounding region based on Turkey's historical and cultural bonds taken over from the Ottoman Islamic civilization. As such, sustaining good diplomatic relations and pursuing new economic and cultural contacts with countries and people in this geography is as a first task that means overlooking the foreign relations established in the republican period. Thus, neo-Ottomanism should be analyzed as a programmatic agenda whose theoretical principles were discussed during the AKP era rather than as a pragmatic political response.

Second, compared to the time of Özal, the Ottoman past and its key figures, symbols, and Islamic values are intensely emphasized in the AKP period. In relation to the first difference depicted above, the AKP aimed to create a new historiography involving new national heroes, sacred narratives and official rituals. An analogy drawn between Tayyip Erdoğan and Abdülhamid II is especially remarkable since it challenges the official Kemalist narrative depicting Abdulhamid as a despot. Tayyip Erdogan

51 Nagehan Tokdoğan, *Yeni Osmanlıcılık- Hınç Nostalji Narsisizm* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2018), 7.

and his supporters glorify Abdulhamid who reigned over Ottoman territory as caliphate[52] at the end of the nineteenth century in accordance with a Muslim-oriented management style. The choice to construct this narrative on Abdulhamid among other sultans is purposeful due to his power and loss to the Young Turks.[53] It can be further interpreted as that the AKP targets to take a revenge from modernist wing by referring a historical conflict. Several examples show the constructed analogy between Abdulhamid and Erdogan. While fans of Erdogan draw an analogy between them with photos and slogans in social media and at the AKP rallies, Erdogan himself praised Abdulhamid in a retrospective reading of history from his perspective:

> Some people stubbornly make effort to separate us from our roots. These people insistently try to start the history of Turkey in 1923. History is not only a past record but also a compass for the future. We cannot be like these people who turn away from our history. Looking at history selectively is the biggest betrayal of a person's self and society.[54] We should give up interpreting the Ottoman period as contradictory to the Turkish Republic. Abdülhamid symbolizes peace between the Ottoman Empire and Turkish republic. In spite of campaigns opposing Abdulhamid Han, he remains as *Ulu Hakan* in the memory of our people. I commemorate *Ulu Hakan* Sultan Abdulhamid with mercy and gratitude.[55]

52 Nora Seni stressed that Sultan Abdulhamid used the caliphate status most in the late Ottoman era. Seni, "Les Arabes," 323.

53 For more information about the conflict between Abdulhamid II and Jon Turks, the section "Phase II: Jeunes Turcs vs Abdulhamid II: The Evolution of Ottomanism on the Eve of Twentieth Century

54 He purposefully uses the term "millet" instead of "nation," which clearly evokes the Ottoman era.

55 "Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan: Abdulhamid Han dünyanın son evrensel imparatorudur." Sabah Newspaper, February 10, 2018. URL : https://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2018/02/11/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-abdulha mid-han-dunyanin-son-evrensel-imparatorudur.

Erdogan refers to the disregard of Abdulhamid in the Turkish historical narrative in this speech. The Hamidian era was represented briefly as a rupture in a Turkish modernism that progressed from the Tanzimat to the republic in official narratives and textbooks. Historians and politicians briefly portrayed Sultan Abdulhamid as a despot, and an anti-modernist. On the other hand, conservative, pro-Islamic movements later glorified Sultan Abdulhamid as a great leader *(Ulu Hakan)* who reigned over a unified Ottoman territory.[56] Hence, being in favor of or against Abdulhamid indicates the political stance of people and fractions, even today. Admittedly, the preference to use "Ulu Hakan" in Erdogan's speech is a purposeful choice showing his political stance.

Abdulhamid became an inspiration for Erdogan in several ways such as bossism, close relations with religious leaders,[57] mega projects,[58] censorship of the media and suppression of opposition groups. However, Erdoğan's approach slightly differs from that of Abdulhamid, given the coexistence of Turkish-Muslim identities; Abdulhamid pursued a much

56 For the debate on Abdulhamid Period in detail, see Nadir Özbek, "Modernite, Tarih ve İdeoloji: II. Abdülhamid Dönemi Tarihçiliği Üzerine Bir Değerlendirme." *Türkiye Araştırmaları Literatür Dergisi* 2, no. 1 (2004): 71-90.

57 He referred frequently to the ulema in his declarations. For instance, he stated that instead of the juridiciary, ulema is in charge with making decisions regarding the headscarf ban. See in : « Erdoğan : Türbanda Söz Hakkı Ulemanındır, » Hürriyet Newspaper, November 16, 2005, URL: http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/erdogan-turbanda-soz-hakki-ulemanindir-3527074. The rhetoric is interesting with respect to what the ulema refers. First, he intentionally selects the word « ulema » instead of referring to diyanet, which is the modern state agency responsible for religious affairs. Second, he emphasized that ulema is a responsible agency that can consult and decide on an importan issue (like headscarf ban).

58 Like large projects in Hamidian era (for instance Hecaz railway, elaborated upon in the section: Phase II: Jeunes Turcs vs Abdulhamid II: The Evolution of Ottomanism on the Eve of Twentieth Century. Tayyip Erdoğan organized fashionable launches of large projects such as the Istanbul airport (the biggest in Turkey) and the Canal Istanbul Project (an artificial sea-level waterway that will connect the Black Sea and the Sea of Marmara).

more pan-Islamist politics. For Erdogan, assertin a historical Turkish identity is also a significant political tool alongside Muslimism. For instance, the photo -displayed in figure 3.2- was taken when the president of Palestine, Mahmud Abbas, visited Tayyip Erdoğan in his palace.[59]

Figure 3.2 The Photo of Mahmud Abbas' Visit Erdogan's Palace

Sixteen historical Turkish states are represented by these costums. In his political imagination, Turkish identity is a powerful tool for diplomatic relations and an assertive regional policy. Apart from foreign relations, a third pillar of Neo-Ottomanism also determines domestic affairs. Relevant examples inclused changes in education - marked by a remarkable

59 When Tayyip Erdoğan became the President, he chose not to live in Çankaya Palace where presidents had the right to live during their presidencies. Instead, he ordered the construct spell loan of a new palace (Ak Saray) in the Atatürk Forest Farm in Ankara. He currently lives there.

increase in the number of religious high schools *(imam-hatip liseleri)*[60] and obligatory religious courses in high schools,[61] the introduction of obligatory and elective Ottoman courses,[62] and changing national habits such as the 29 May celebration of the conquest of Istanbul as opposed to the less emphasized 19 May commemoration of Atatürk Youth and Sports Day.[63] The AKP has tried to construct a new cultural habitus in accordance with their Neo-Ottomanist approach in such ways as the theater plays about Ottoman history, religious music concerts and historical movies like *Fetih 1453,*[64] and these activities usually take place in new cultural centers the design of which are inspired by Ottoman architecture. All these attempts to weaken the secular character of Turkey paved the way for the polarization of society between so-called pro-Islamic and secular camps, which led to new tensions and clashes in social and cultural

60 According to a CHP report on education, the number of İmam-Hatip High Schools 3.3 doubled, and with an increase of 26 % just in 2017-2018, it reached 1458. See in "İmam hatip okullarının sayısı arttı, öğrenci sayısı düştü," *Sputnik,* November 12, 2017, URL: https://tr.sputniknews.com/turkiye/201711121030965365-imam-hatip-okul-ogrenci-sayisi/

61 In 2010, the AKP government decided to extend the duration of high school religious courses « Din Kültürü ve Ahlak Bilgisi » from one hour to two hours. In 2011, the hours of religious courses increased by multiples. Eleven year old, middle school students had to take different religious courses such as the life of Muhammed eight hours per week. The number of elective religious courses increased, and students have been forced to select from among these courses due to the lack of teachers for other optional courses. See details in « Zorunlu Din Dersi Tarihi ,» Aykırı Akademi, May 18, 2017, URL : http://aykiriakademi.com/dusunce-balonu/dusunce-balonu-gorus-analiz/zorunlu-din-dersi

62 During the AKP period, an Ottoman course became obligatory to the Imam-Hatip High Schools and Social Sciences High Schools. It is an elective in other high schools. "Liselerde Osmanlıca dersi veriliyor mu? Kaç Saat?" *Takvim,* URL: https://www.takvim2019.com/node/2223

63 Seni, "Les Arabes", 330.

64 The film is about the conquest of Istanbul in 1453. It had a huge production process, a huge budget of 17 million dollars. Erdogan declared his appreciation for this movie. See in: Erdem, Chien Yang. "Ottomentality: neoliberal governance of culture and neo-ottoman management of diversity," *Turkish Studies* 18, (October 2017): 710-28.

life. Nora Seni explains the rising tensions in her article, "Polarisation d'une société mutation culturelle."[65]

Finally, Neo-Ottomanism was a political strategy of using soft power to become a regional leader in the 1990s. However, the modus operandi of Turkey shifted from soft power to being an interventionist state in the course of time. For instance, in northern Syria the Turkish Armed Forces and the Free Syrian Army conducted a cross border operation together, code named Euphrates Shield (Fırat Kalkanı), in northern Syria in order to fight ISIS (The Islamic State of the Iraq and Syria) and PYD (The Democratic Union Party). Another example is the reinternment of Suleyman Shah, who was the grandfather of the founder of the Ottoman Empire, Osman I. The remains were moved from war-torn Northern Syria due to fear of ISIS attacks on a hill near the village of Esmesi that was under Turkish military control.[66]

Throughout this section, I outlined a general framework of the unique characteristics of the AKP's neo-Ottomanism. However, the AKP period from 2002 to today has not progressed in a linearly consistent manner in terms of the changing political alliances with macro-, meso-, and micro-level actors and political groups. Changes in political priorities and the different executive bodies and means of governing political affairs need to be analyzed individually, but this extends beyond the scope of this study. Hence, focusing on the changes to the political arena with regard to Neo-Ottomanism will be sufficient to explain its definitive impact on migration flows to Turkey.

Henry J Barkey divides the AKP period into two parts, referring to 2007 as a turning point.[67] In the first phase, 2002-2007, the AKP pursued a more balanced foreign policy among the EU, United States, and the rest

65 Seni, "Les Arabes."

66 « Süleyman Şah Operasyonunun Detaryları » *Milliyet Newspaper,* February 22, 2015, URL : http://www.milliyet.com.tr/suleyman-sah-operasyonunun-gundem-2017629/

67 Henry J. Barkey, "Turkish Foreign Policy and the Middle East.pdf". Accessed 10 May 2019.https://www.sciencespo.fr/ceri/sites/sciencespo.fr.ceri/files/n10_06062011.pdf. *CERI Strategy Papers*, Science-Po-CNRS Edition, n.10 (2011).

other countries. At the same time, several steps were taken in the EU candidacy process, increasing economic, political and diplomatic relations with the Caucasian, the Middle East and Asian countries were hallmarks of the "zero problem" policy. In the second phase, after 2007, Neo-Ottomanist policies shaped a stricter, more assertive regional policy, and the essential target area of Turkey's influence has turned towards the Middle East given a deterioration of relations with EU countries. According to Barkey, there are several reasons for this substantial policy change.

In 2007, Abdullah Gül's replacement of the previous president, Ahmet Necdet Sezer, who was an important Kemalist figure, was a turning point for the execution of a relatively free Turkish politics in the absence of a sitting Kemalist president. Second, the significant increase in the AKP's share of the vote to 47% in the 2007 elections was a key event that gave self-esteem to change the policy direction. In these years, the assertion of the AKP was that Turkey was a regional leader and even a central state in the global hierarchy.

In the international arena, the Arab Spring was a decisive event that contributed Turkey's regional claims. On one hand, Turkey had been developing warm ties with political authorities in Arabic countries for three decades - especially in AKP period. On the other, the people made protest and abandoned their leaders away. This challenge paradoxically improved in the relations between Turkey and its traditional Western allies that intervened in the Arab Spring.[68] Turkey's immediate policy response was to emphasize democracy in Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt in spite of close relations with overthrown leaders. The most difficult case for Erdogan is the Syrian conflict. Erdoğan's political rhetoric was based on an anti-Asad stance from the beginning, and he called for him to resign several times. The involvement of a plurality of actors - large and small jihadist groups, ISIS, the PYD and many others in Syria - made the war more complicated. Turkey intervened in the situation in Syria sometimes using soft and sometimes hard-power, as in the case of the *Fırat Kalkanı,* excused with fighting against PYD and ISIS in the official declarations by politicans.

68 Barkey, "Turkish Foreign", 12.

Thus, this policy clearly signals that the premises held by Davutoglu on regional peace and zero problem have failed, especially in the Syrian case, and have resulted in a huge influx of refugees to Turkey because the Syrian war has been protracted and political stability has not been restored.

Based on this background, I will continue with a description of three migration flows to Turkey with regard to seasonal agricultural migrant employment. First, the increasing migration flow from the Caucasus since the 1990s will be examined. Although this migrant flow includes Armenians, I will focus on Georgians and Azerbaijanis because these two migrant groups work as seasonal workers in Turkish agriculture, while Armenians mostly undertake urban domestic work. Second, the recent Syrian refugee influx will be discussed with a special focus on geopolitical dynamics that push refugees to become agricultural workers. The final migrant flow into agriculture, the case of internally displaced Kurdish people will then be elaborated upon.

§ 3.2 The First Migration Wave from the Caucasus after the Dissolution of the Soviet Union

Over the centuries, the history of two geographical neighbors - Turkey and the Caucasus – has been marked by intense economic and cultural exchange, as well as population movements, migrations, wars, and disputes over border regimes.[69] The last redefinition of the Caucasian-Turkish border was specified at the end of World War I after the October Revolution by the treaty of Kars. The return to Turkey of the provinces of Kars and Ardahan - under Czarist rule since 1871 –, the return of some regions of Georgia to the USSR and the withdrawal of Turkish troops from

69 Fabio Salomoni, "The Caucasian Borders, Labor Migrants and Refugees" in Nurcan Özgür Baklacioğlu and Yeşim Özer (eds) *Migration, Asylum, and Refugees in Turkey: Studies in the Control of Population at the Southeastern Borders of the EU* (Lewiston: Mellen, 2014): 339.

Armenian provinces were agreed upon.[70] There is a long history of mobility over the border since the eleventh century. Turkish Oğuz tribes set out from a region roughly corresponding to contemporary Azerbaijan to Byzantine Anatolia and population movement continued in both directions throughout the Ottoman era.[71] Especially, during the nineteenth century, Russian expansionism in the Caucasus led to massive migration to Ottoman territories.

From 1829 to 1914, about three million Turks and Muslims from the Caucasus, comprised of Circassians, Abkhazians, Azeris, Mesketian Turks, Chechens, Dagestans and Tartars found refuge in the territories of the empire.[72] This long history of mobility in the Turkish-Caucasian region was influential in the shaping of the demographic structure of Northeast Anatolia and its similar character to Caucasian regions.[73] Caucasian elements that have penetrated into the language, music, cuisine, and folklore show the interwoven, transitive historical relation between people of both regions.

During the Soviet Union period, mobilities were limited by strict control at the border. This changed in Gorbachev's perestroika era when the mobility of Soviet citizens increased and the Caucasian border became more porous. In 1988, Soviet citizens were allowed to cross to Turkey with a visa obtained at the border. Initially, the Georgian population, mainly ethnic Laz residing along the border, took advantage of this opportunity to renew relationships with ethnic kin.[74] Subsequently, the migration flow continued to grow. In 1990, 200 thousand Soviet citizens arrived in Turkey.

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70 Stefanos Yerasimos, *Milliyetler ve sınırlar: Balkanlar, Kafkasya ve Orta-Doğu*. Cağaloğlu, İstanbul: İletişim, 2000. p. 466.

71 Salomoni, "The Caucasian," 339-340.

72 Ibid., 340.

73 Michael E. Meeker, "The Black Sea Turks: Some Aspects of Their Ethnic and Cultural Background." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 2, no. 4 (1971): 318-345.

74 Salomoni, "The Caucasian," 343.

The collapse of Soviet Union in 1991 resulted in the independence of the Republics of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia. Turkey recognized the three republics, was one of the first countries to formally recognize Georgia's independence, and pursued diplomatic relations with Georgia and Azerbaijan. The dissolution of Soviet Union resulted in violent ethnic cleansing, military coups and wars. In brief, the series of events occurred as follows[75]:

- Ethnic clashes between Azerbaijanis and Armenians led to a war over the status of the former Autonomous Republic of Nagorno Karabakh, which claimed around 20 thousand victims and ended with a ceasefire in 1994;
- Wars in Abkhazia and South Ossetia (1992-2008)
- Two Russo-Chechen wars (1994-2000)

As a result of violent acts in that geography, large flows of refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs) migrated to different parts of the world including Turkey. The response of Turgut Özal to the migrant flows was affirmative in accordance with his Neo-Ottomanist views that favored increasing Turkish-Muslim element in society:

> When we look at this geopolitical space from the Adriatic Sea to Central Asia under the leadership of Turkey, we realize that this space is molded and dominated by Ottoman-Muslim and Turkic populations… These Ottoman-Muslim populations share the same historical legacy and fate as the Turks of Anatolia, and they still regard themselves as "Turk" in the religio-cultural sense. These groups live in Bosnia, Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia, the Caucasus and Western Trace.[76]

He takes the advantages of shared ethno-religious identities to pragmatically expand Turkish influence over the region by referring to an "imag-

75 Ibid., 345.

76 Turgut Özal, "Türkiye'nin Önünde Hacet Kapıları Açılmıştır," *Türkiye Günlüğü* 19 (1992): 14.

ined new geography" in his vision. At this juncture, international developments provided Özal with favorable opportunities to realize his goals of creating a proactive Turkish foreign policy and expanding the regional market for Turkish goods by eliminating to eliminate economic borders among Balkan, Caucasian, and Middle Eastern countries - allowing for a flow of goods, ideas and people.[77] Thus, Ottoman identity was the key element in the construction of discourses and politics:

> Just as during the Ottoman Empire, it is possible today to transcend ethnic differences through Islamic identity. I believe that the single most powerful constituent element of identity in this society is Islam. It is religion that binds Muslims of Anatolia and the Balkans. Therefore, Islam is a powerful cement of coexistence and cooperation among diverse Muslim groups. … Being a Turk in formerly ex-Ottoman space means being a Muslim and vice-versa.[78]

The identification of Turk and Muslim elements based on Ottoman identity was the formulation of his cognitive political map for foreign relations. From this starting point, Özal as a leader developed close politico-economic relations with Turkish and/or Muslim countries and communities in various ways. First, in the economic realm, Özal played a key role in the formation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, established in 1992 with the aim of empowering the business environment in the Black Sea region. The International Secretariat of Business Council settled in Istanbul. Moreover, Özal aimed to strengthen cultural ties apart from economic relations by joining the International Organization of Turkic Culture (TÜRKSOY), which brought Turkic-speaking countries of Central Asia and Azerbaijan, together with Turkic republics from the Russian federation.

In the military realm, Turkey and Georgia signed several mutual defense agreements. Turkish military forces helped modernize Georgian

77 Yavuz, "Social and Intellectual," 454.

78 Özal, "Türkiye'nin Önünde,"17.

military institutions; the Turkish Air Force visited Georgia to help construct the Georgian military airport and assist in the training of air force officers; Turkish and Georgian officers developed a joint military program to protect pipelines; Georgian soldiers operated under Turkish command in Kosovo as part of UN-led peace operations; and Turkish companies modernized Batum airport, which was opened for joint use by Turkey and Georgia.[79] In the first phase of AKP period, one major consequence of the visits of Prime Minister Erdoğan to Georgia was involvement in a number of railway projects among Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan. The Kars-Tbilisi-Baku railway project was approved by the three heads of the state in Georgia in 2007.

In 2008, the Russo–Georgian war in Ossetia led to a temporary break in economic and political relations. In accordance with Turkey's new regional policy, Turkish political authorities instituted a multilateral diplomatic initiative, the Caucasian Stability and Cooperation Platform, which consisted of Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey. Its target was to develop a shared regional perspective and policy instruments to deal with regional peace and security, energy security, and economic cooperation. However, Turkey's mediating role was difficult since Erdogan found himself caught between two important partners. On one hand, Turkey had supported Georgia economically and politically since it gained independence and it was a key partner for Turkey's pipeline and transit railway connection projects in Eurasia, but on the other hand, Russia was an important trade partner and a major supplier of natural gas.[80]

These economic and cultural developments were reflected in the bureaucracy and facilities for improving bilateral relations among these states and people. In 1996, a visa exemption agreement between Turkey and Georgia allowed citizens of both countries to visit for thirty days without a visa and this duration was extended to ninety days in 2006. Since 2011, a new protocol means that even passports are not needed for

79 Bülent Aras and Hakan Fidan, "Turkey and Eurasia: Frontiers of a New Geographic Imagination," *New Perspectives on Turkey* 40 (2009): 207. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0896634600005276.

80 Aras and Fidan, "Turkey and Eurasia," 2.

entry between Turkey and Georgia; an identity card is enough to pass over the border. The figure 3.3. indicates the total number of Georgian visitors to Turkey from 2001 to 2016.



Figure 3.3 Georgian Visitors to Turkey (2002-2017). Source: Ministry of Culture and Tourism. Map by the author.

Fieldwork studies show that Georgians usually prefer to come to Turkey during the harvest of tea and hazelnuts in the Black Sea region to do seasonal agricultural work.[81] They are an important labor source where there is a dearth of unpaid family members, a dominant feature of family farming in the Black Sea region. The first harvest of tea takes place in May, the second in July, and the third in September. The figure 3.4 illustrates that the number of entries into Turkey increase in July-August, which are the harvest times of tea and hazelnuts, respectively.

81 Saniye Dedeoğlu, *Türkiye'de Mevsimlik Tarımsal Üretimde Yabancı Göçmen İşçiler Mevcut Durum Raporu Yoksulluk Nöbetinden Yoksulların Rekabetine* (Kalkınma Atölyesi, 2016) ; Pınar Uyan Semerci et al., *Mevsimlik Gezici Tarım İşçiliği 2014 Araştırma Raporu* (Hayata Destek İnsani Yardım Derneği, 2014); Deniz Pelek, *Seasonal migrant workers in agriculture: The cases of Ordu and Polatlı* (MA Thesis, Bogazici University, 2010).



Figure 3.4 The Number of Foreign Visitors Who Crossed by Land at the Sarp Border Crossing by Months (2017). Source: Ministry of Culture and Tourism.

In fact, though not clearly declared by political authorities, the three month visa exemption provides an important advantage to producers and workers as it covers the harvest time since the political ambitions of authorities converged on the need of small and medium agricultural producers for cheap labor. According to a report entitled *Enhancing the Role of Georgian Emigrants at Home* (2014), especially women migrate to Turkey due to the gender-blind labor market in Georgia.[82] As such, the migration pattern of Georgians differs from that of other migrants. While Kurdish migrants from Eastern Turkey and Syrian refugees engaged in seasonal agricultural jobs migrate as families, Georgians migrate to Turkish agricultural fields as individuals. Women usually stay in the houses of the producers and save up money for their families in Georgia. For men, on the other hand, single rooms[83] are available in Ordu and Giresun.[84]

82 Dedeoglu, *Yoksulluk Nobetinden*, 86.

83 Bekar odasi

84 Deniz Pelek, Seasonal Migrant in Agriculture: the Cases of Ordu and Polatli, MA Thesis, Bogazici University (2010)

Interestingly, the mobility of Georgians has mostly intensified in the Black Sea geography. Historical ties since Ottoman times were revitalized through the new mobilities of the people and through factors that encourage migration such as the presence of a few Georgian villages, the ability of some Turkish people to speak Georgian, and shared cultural habits between two people. The attitudes of locals in the Black Sea region towards Georgians is welcoming compared to other migrant groups. For instance, their daily wages are higher than those of Turkish Kurds and Syrian workers.[85] The ostensible reason expressed by the employer-landowners is Georgians' familiarity with regional crops and their assiduousness.[86]

In a similar fashion, the flow of Azerbaijani migrants flow is welcomed in this political context. Since 1991, Turkish-Azerbaijan relations have been framed by a rhetoric of ethnic kinship, Turkishness, which is captured by "one nation, two states," a slogan used in a speech by Haydar Aliev in the Turkish parliament in 1995.[87] This phrase became a symbolic expression of different activities organized in both countries. Commemorations for the independence of Azerbaijan celebrated in various Turkish cities; "one millet two nations" conferences, concerts, and seminars organized in both countries;[88] and the Turkish brotherhood strongly emphasized by the leaders of both countries. For instance, Tayyip Erdoğan declared: "We are countries who possess seventy-eight different cemeteries for martyrs in twenty-four different countries. Azerbaijan is the country with the most with 1132 martrys. These martyrs represent the

85 Dedeoğlu, Yoksulluk Rekabetinden, 16.

86 Pelek, Seasonal Migrant in Agriculture, 101.

87 Salomoni, "The Caucasian Borders" 350.

88 See, for instance, « Azerbaycan'da 'Bir Millet İki Devlet' Sanat Gecesi Düzenlendi » *TRT Haber*, October 27, 2018, URL : https://www.trthaber.com/haber/kultur-sanat/azerbaycanda-bir-millet-iki-devlet-sanat-gecesi-programi-duzenlendi-391256.html and « Bir Millet İki Devlet Konseri CRR'de Gerçekleşti » *Habertürk*, December 13, 2018, URL : https://www.haberturk.com/bir-millet-iki-devlet-konseri-crrde-gerceklesti-2258806#

shared fate between the two countries."[89] Blood," "martyr," and "death" serves as key concepts for the construction of an imagined "millet" stretching over borders.

Good diplomatic arerelations reflected in the other fields like energy and the economy. Following the independence of Azerbaijan, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline became an important projects fo states like Turkey that desired to guaranteed access to vital energy resources. The BTC was finished in 2006 and became a vital export pipeline for Azerbaijan. The Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipeline was completed in parallel with BTC and carries Azerbaijani gas to Turkey.[90]

Turkey's good relations with Azerbaijan in the realms of energy, the economy, and diplomacy have facilitated a circular movement of Azerbaijanis migrant in and out of Turkish territory, as in the case of Georgians. While standard reasons for economic migration such as high unemployment and bad working conditions in their places of origin are important factors, the preference of Azerbaijani migrants or Turkey is closely related to the promotion of migration, a welcoming discourse, and bureaucratic facilitation of crossing the border.[91] According to the visa agreement between Turkey and Azerbaijan, Azerbaijanis can obtain a visa at to enter to Turkey at the border and stay for thirty days, which facilitates their travel back and forth and affects their preference to work in Turkey.[92]

89 "Erdoğan: İki Devlet Bir Millet Diyerek Sembolleştirdiğimiz Kemik Kardeşliğimizi İdrak Ediyoruz" *Haberler.com,* September 15, 2018, URL: https://www.haberler.com/erdogan-iki-devlet-bir-millet-diyerek-11236244-haberi/

90 Emre İşeri, "Geopolitics of Oil and Pipelines in the Eurasian Heartland," in *The Politics of Caspian Oil* edited by Bülent Gökay, (London: Routledge, 2001).

91 Dedeoğlu attracts attention on the increase in the number of irregular migrants from Azerbaijan and the easier visa procedure Saniye Dedeoğlu, *Türkiye'de Mevsimlik Tarımsal Üretimde Yabancı Göçmen İşçiler Mevcut Durum Raporu Yoksulluk Nöbetinden Yoksulların Rekabetine* (Kalkınma Atölyesi, 2016), 58 and 93.

92 Ibid., 57.



Figure 3.5 Azerbaijani Visitors to Turkey (2002-2017). Source: Ministry of Culture and Tourism. Map by the author.

The number of Azerbaijani visitors increased from 177 thousand to 606 thousand between 2001 and 2016. Similar to the working habits of Georgians, Azerbaijani migrants mostly work in husbandry in the Kars-Ardahan-Iğdır region of Northeastern Turkey which hosts a considerable Turkish-Azeri population. Kinship is an important factor for migrant flows since relatives of Azerbaijanis are settled in Nakhcivan and the Kars-Iğdır region.[93] Commuting between the two regions to visit relatives and enjoy social networks based on familial relations are catalysts that ease the migration. Thus, language, ethnic affinity, proximity and easily obtained visas increased the number of border crossings at the Dilucu checkpoint in August, which is the season in which animal husbands harvest hay and straw.[94] Moreover, Saniye Dedeoglu's study reveals that most Azerbaijanis stay in Turkey as irregular immigrants beyond the expiration of their visas. For them, temporary agrarian jobs in Kars are the first step to save money, and migrate to metropolises like Istanbul and

93 Ibid., 135.

94 Dedeoglu, *Yoksulluk Nobetinden*, 93.

Izmir, find a job in the urban market, and hopefully become a permanent resident.

These two migration flows from Caucasia to the agrarian fields of Turkey show the impact of the shift to Neo-Ottomanist policies. Specifically, the Turkish-Muslim direction of the geopolitical approach directly reflects a binary of "desired" and "undesired" migrants."[95] Yves Lacoste's assertion about positive and negative representations of migration is a useful explanatory tool. It perfectly shows how the relative evaluation of migration changes from context to context: positive representations of migrants are based on shared ethnic identity and language with host communities, while rising tensions are based on the differing religious and national identities of insiders and outsiders.[96]

Lacoste cites the case of francophone migrants in Quebec as example. The positive portrayal of people with a common language and shared ethnic identity resulted in the encouragement of migration; meanwhile, economic migration from former colonies and other economically underdeveloped countries to France is negatively represented based on religious and ethnic differences between these migrant groups and the host community. In this respect, rather than supporting integration with migrants, these migrant groups marked by their negative representation are a target of politicians. Lacoste's arguments are instructive for evaluating the complex migration situation in Turkey.

In Turkey, the negative image of migrants from Africa and the Middle East represents has resulted in their vulnerable "transit-migrant" or "undocumented" statuses, but Turkish migrants from Azerbaijan and Muslim refugees from Syria[97] are being incorporated into the society because of their positive representation at the political level. A shared Turkish identity with Azerbaijanis and a shared Muslim identity with Syrians are

95 Michel Agier, *Managing the Undesirables* (Polity Press, 2011).

96 Yves Lacoste, *Dictionaire de géopolitique* (Paris: Flammarion, 1993): 1024.

97 The case of Syrian refugees will be elaborated upon the next section.

pillars in the construction of a discourse of brotherhood.[98] This chapter will continue with the case of Syrian refugees as seasonal migrant workers and a geopolitical analysis of migration policy towards these refugees.

§ 3.3 The Second Migration Wave: Refugeeization of Seasonal Migrant Employment following the Syrian War

Unlike Georgian and Azerbaijani migrants, Syrians are refugees who have been coming to Turkey since 2011 due to the ongoing civil war in their own geography. To date, 3.6 million Syrian refugees have arrived in Turkey, and the number is increasing.[99] By virtue of its close proximity to Syria, a shared ethnic and religious identity, and the implementation of an open border policy, Turkey has become the most preferred destination for Syrian refugees among other countries -Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq. Depending on the level of insecurity and violence in Syria, refugee flows to Turkey have changed over the course of time. While the number of Syrian refugees was 14 thousand in 2012, it increased to 224 thousand in 2013 and it peaked at two and half million in 2015. Figure 3.6 illustrates the rising in the number of refugees in Turkey in time.

98 Another example is Bulgarian Turks who migrated to Turkey during the 1990s following the deportation of Muslims by the Bulgarian state. We can trace the positive representations of these growing migrant groups in the discourse of welcome, and good political relations between states with regard to such migration.

99 UNCHR, Situation Syria Regional Refugee Response, accessed 10 March 2019, URL: [https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria].


Migratory movement from Syria to Turkey in 2012
TURKEY
14.337
Syria
Legend:
Migratory movement in 2012
refugee camps and their activity
ACTIVE
CLOSED
CLOSEDE
Syrian frontier
Turkish frontier
100 0 100 200 300 400 km


Migratory movement from Syria to Turkey in 2013
224.655


Migratory movement from Syria to Turkey in 2014
1.519.286


Migratory movement from Syria to Turkey in 2015
2.503.549


Migratory flows from Syria to Turkey in 2016
3.834.441


Migratory flows from Syria to Turkey in 2017
3.426.786



Figure 3.6 Syrian Refugee Influx (2012-2018). Source: UNCHR. Maps by the author.

As the maps strikingly show the number of Syrian refugees has continually grown over the years, resulting in 3,6 million registered Syrians currently. The outstanding figures with regard to refugee influx, are the map 3 and map 4 showing "long summer of migration"[100] with the arrival of huge numbers led by the intensification of the close combat in the region resulted in a set of tough challenges for Turkey. As Francois Dumont asserts that Syrian conflict beyond the boundaries of the Middle East represents an extremely interesting case with all challenges, conflicts and actors at the global level.[101]

100 Gökçe Yurdakul, Regina Römhild, Anja Schwanhäußer, Birgit Zur Nieden, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, and Institut für Europäische Ethnologie. *Witnessing the Transition Moments in the Long Summer of Migration*. (Berlin: Berlin Institute for Empirical Integration and Migration Research (BIM), 2017).

101 Gérard-Francois Dumont,"Syrie et Irak: Une Migration sans Précédent Historique?" *Diploweb.com*, 2015, 1-17.

Particularly, this is not a simple war occurred between regime and anti-regime forces. Rather, a plural conflict[102] in local, regional and global scale has produced a more complex frame located Turkey at a hub of diverse relations of power. At the local scale, besides the Syrian army, YPG and ISIS, many large and small jihadist groups such as Hezbollah, Free Syrian Army, Al-Nusra, Free Idlib Army and Soldiers of Al-Aqsa[103] involved in the warfare. A large scale of the diverse conflicted groups amplified the regional instability and recalcitrance have given rise to a prolonged civil war in Syria. At the regional scale Middle Eastern countries such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Lebanon, Iran, Iraq all in the play with different interests and alliances. While Iran, Russia and Iraq supported Syrian national army, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey were on Free Syrian Army's side against the Esad regime. All the alliances and oppositions between the states have been re-configured with new deals throughout the war by the warfare balances beyond the national borders of Syria since it has become a global geopolitical issue in turmoil encompassing different states, regional and local organizations, societies and the people.

At the global scale, the major actor for making Syrian conflict as a global issue has been the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) which declared war everywhere. Following the occupation of Raqqa and its designation as a capital, ISIS declared war everywhere, organizing bomb attacks, and stabbings in different location throughout the world, from Paris to Sri Lanka and Ankara to Los Angeles. This influenced global public opinion in the introduction of stopping ISIS attacks. Thus, the fight against jihadism went beyond the national borders of Syria which resulted in a coalition of sixty-six countries collaborating to wipe ISIS away. Additionally, members of ISIS did not only from Middle Eastern countries; African, Asiatic and European citizens participated. Hence, it raised sociological issues with respect to Islam and the integration of minorities in other national contexts.

102 Ibid., 5-7.

103 There are many jihadist groups in Syria. Some are in conflict and some have allied to fight targeted "hostile" groups.

On this background, as maps 3 and 4 indicate, 2014 and 2015 were milestone years that witnessed severe attacks by ISIS, the global coalition against it, new deals between states, and peak numbers in terms of refugee flows. Turkey was at the top among Syrian refugee recipient countries, but flows to Europe, especially Germany, were also considerable in 2014 and 2015. Since this "long summer of migration,"[104] thousands of Syrian refugees have arrived at European borders and some tragically lost their lives in the Mediterranean Sea. The number of refugees that crossed European borders increased from 542,680 in 2014 to 1,255,660 in 2015. After this summer, on 29 November 2015, the EU and Turkey agreed on a Joint Action Plan. In exchange, the EU committed to reenergize Turkey's accession process by establishing a structured, more frequent and higher level dialogue with Turkey; by opening new negotiation chapters; by accelerating the lifting of visa requirements for Turkish citizens in the Schengen zone; and providing an initial 3 billion euros to improve the situation of Syrians in Turkey to curtail their further migration.[105]

As a result of the EU's effort to stop migration in Turkey, there was a considerable decline in the number of irregular border crossings between Turkey and Greece. But there has been little progress in the other targets of the agreement.[106] The EU perpetually delayed visa exemptions for Turkey by demanding action in six areas – changes to Turkey's anti-terrorism law, collaboration on criminal cases, an agreement with Europol, an elimination of corruption and a readmission agreement.[107] In November 2016, the EU Parliament voted to freeze talks on Turkey's candidacy due to criticism regarding human right violations in Turkey. As a

104 Yurdakul, *Witnessing the Transition.*

105 Ahmet İçduygu and Doğuş Şimşek, "Syrian Refugees in Turkey: Towards Integration Policies." *Turkish Policy Quarterly* 15, no. 3 (2016): 61.

106 Ahmet İçduygu and Doğuş Şimşek, "'Bargaining over refugees: Turkey's view' in Beyond the Migration and Asylum Crises" in Ferrucio Pastore (ed) *Beyond the Migration and Asylum Crises Options and Lessons for Europe*. (Aspen Institute Italia, 2017): 86.

107 Hürriyet Newspaper, « AB'ye vize mesajı : 'Kolaylaştırın' » 25 March 2019, accessed April 2019, available online : http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/dunya/abye-vize-mesaji-kolaylastirin-41160489

reaction, Erdoğan threatened to open the floodgates to Europe for millions of Syrian refugees.[108] Consequently, the future of the EU-Turkey migration deal seems uncertain.[109]

The EU-Turkey deal nevertheless continues because the 3,6 million refugees live in Turkey and the political situation in Syria has not totally stabilized. Turkey adopted an "open border policy" from the beginning of the civil war in Syria. Syrian refugees settled in Turkey under the guise of "temporary protection," by which they are provided with basic healthcare, language education, and humanitarian assistance. The precarious legal status of Syrians as a result of their lack of "refugee" status will be elaborated upon Chapter 5. With respect to the geopolitical analysis in this chapter, "temporariness" as a politico-legal condition is important because it creates a public perception that Syrians are guests who will one day return to their places of origin. Tayyip Erdoğan emulated Abdulhamid's policy[110] of welcoming Muslim *muhajirs,* basing his discourse of hosting Syrian refugees on "Muslim brotherhood." For instance, Erdoğan gave a speech about Syrian refugees in 2014 – at a time of intense armed conflict:

> We - as Turkey – are pleased, happy and proud of hosting you over four years. You became *muhajir.* You were obliged to leave your country. We became your *ansar* and pursued every means available for you. Whatever anyone says, you all never are a burden on us.[111]

According to conventional Islamic belief, muhajirs are those Muslim people who traveled to Medina from Mecca (Hegira) to escape violence

108 Deutsche Welle, « Erdoğan AB'yi tehdit etti : Sınırları Açarız » 25 November 2016, accessed September 2018, available online : https://www.dw.com/tr/erdo%C4%9Fan-abyi-tehdit-etti-s%C4%B1n%C4%B1rlar%C4%B1-a%C3%A7ar%C4%B1z/a-36519386

109 İçduygu and Şimşek, « Bargaining over refugees," 86.

110 See the section "Historical Evolution of Neo-Ottomanism" in this chapter.

111 « Erdoğan Suriyeli Sığınmacılara Seslendi » *Hürriyet Newspaper,* November 8, 2014, URL : http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/erdogan-suriyeli-siginmacilara-seslendi-27342780

against Muslims during the expansion of Islam; ansars are the people who helped to those muhajirs in Medina. The vocabulary and theological references used by Erdogan reveals the idiosyncratic characteristic of Syrian refugee migration and its divergence from other immigrant flows to Turkey. His deliberately Islamic rhetoric, as opposed to the modern concepts of refugee or immigrant and host state, perfectly fits his image as a paternalistic leader inspired by Abdulhamid, who also hosted Muslim migrants in the late Ottoman period. Hence, Muslim refugee migration plays an important role in the Neo-Ottomanist ideal construction by Erdogan and AKP.

The Neo-Ottomanist project in domestic affairs also influenced the socioeconomic position of migrants. Especially in migration management, Muslim-oriented NGOs have taken an active role in satisfying migrants' basic needs such as education, health, and accommodation are thereby impacting the integration process. According to Danış and Nazlı's study, AKP conducted a migration management system for Syrian refugees based on a "faithful alliance" between NGOs and the state.[112] Two pillars constitute the basis of this system. First, as the state reiterated in the neoliberal era, governance in collaboration with civil society actors should take responsibility for humanitarian assistance and beating the basic needs of refugees. Second, religiously-motivated associations became the principal agents in this migration regime. However, these NGOs serve as pro-governmental organizations rather than as civil society actors since they organize their activities in active collaboration with the state, using its funds, facilities and power.[113]

The integration of those under temporary protection into the labor market has become an important topic since the presence of Syrian refugees as turned to a long-term reality. A regulation on the Working Permits of Foreigners under Temporary Protection was published in the official

112 Didem Danış and Dilara Nazlı, "A Faithful Alliance Between the Civil Society and the State: Actors and Mechanisms of Accommodating Syrian Refugees in Istanbul" *International Migration* 57, no. 2 (2019): 143-57. https://doi.org/10.1111/imig.12495.

113 Ibid., 8-10.

gazette on 15 January 2016, allowing them to apply to the Ministry of Labor for work permits six months after their registration for temporary protection status. Only those working as seasonal workers in agriculture and husbandry are exempted from the work permit requirements (*Implementation Guide Regarding the Work Permits of Foreigners Provided with Temporary Protection*). The state's implicit encouragement of Syrian refugees to work in agriculture will considerably increase the already high number of Syrian agricultural workers in the foreseeable future.

As several studies[114] show, Syrian refugees work for lower wages, reside in worse accommodations and are prone to being attacked in rural areas, but the number of Syrian refugees working as seasonal migrant workers is continually increasing in the countryside of Turkey. Syrian refugees are in the Black Sea, Mediterranean, Aegean, Central Anatolian, and Marmara regions where a need for temporary agricultural workers is emerging. The lack of job opportunities in the cities, the state's implicit encouragement through legislation that provides an exemption from a work permit, the opportunity to find jobs and the accommodations in rural areas made Syrians decide to work seasonal jobs.[115]

§ 3.4 The Third Migration Wave: Kurdish Seasonal Migrant Workers after Forced Migration during the 1990s

The influx of Kurdish migrant workers evolved in a economic and political context. First, the neoliberal capitalization of the Turkish agriculture sector resulted in a de-peasantization process in Eastern and Southeastern Turkey. Faced with a lack of state support or subsidies, Kurdish farmers and sharecroppers could not convert their land to produce alternative crops. The farmland in the Eastern and Southeastern Turkey was not suitable in terms of its fertility, terrain, and climate to easily change to

114 See Dedeoğlu, *Yoksulluk Nöbetinden* (2016); Semerci, *Mevsimlik Gezici Tarım* (2014) and Pelek, *Seasonal Migrant Workers as Syrian*, (2018).

115 Working conditions and inequalities in the labor market with regard to Syrian refugees will be analyzed in detail in Chapter 5.

different crops. In many cases, this turned farmers into seasonal migrant workers.[116] Second, forced internal migration following the declaration of a State Emergency Rule in 1987 accelerated the de-peasantization process by creating a mobile, dispossessed, rural proletariat.

The forced migration of Kurdish populations is not a new phenomenon; it dates to as early as 1924 when the assembly passed a law that enabled Turkish citizens who wanted to reside in Eastern Turkey to appropriate the land of Kurdish citizens.[117] The migration of Kurds enforced by the new Turkish nation-state continued throughout the 1920s and 1930s, decades that witnessed the greatest levels of Kurdish migration to Central and Western Anatolia.[118] The essential target of forced migration was to homogenize the population according to the nationalistic policies of the early republican period. However, an intensified migration, which involved many Kurdish citizens, was experienced in the 1980s following the resurgence of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and its oppression by the junta government.

The military government established Law 8/2543 with the aim of preventing the support of the PKK by Syrian and Iraqi Kurdish factions. Kurds who lived in border villages had to migrate.[119] In addition, the implementation of the State of Emergency in 1987, which authorized the Regional Governor of the State of Emergency (Olağanüstü Hal Bölge Valisi) to evacuate villages and hamlets and to resettle population according to security needs due to the conflicts in the southeastern provinces accelerated the process of forced migration. As a result, forced migrations accelerated dramatically in the 1990s. The total number of individuals affected by the process including the deceased, individuals who migrated to other

116 Deniz Pelek, Seasonal Migrant Workers in Agriculture: The Cases of Ordu and Polatlı (M.A. Thesis, Bogazici University, 2010), 54-65.

117 Robert W. Olson and William F Tucker, *The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh Said Rebellion, 1880-1925* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2010): 91.

118 Mehrdad R. Izady, *The Kurds: A Concise Handbook* (Washington, DC: Crane Russak, 1992):106.

119 Seda Kartal, "Ethnic Identity and Turkey's Migrant Kurds in Urban Provinces," (Ph. D. diss., Northern Illinois University, 2008): 38.

countries, and those who were not forced to migrate but chose to flee the conflicts for their own security, is estimated to be around 1,5 million.[120]

According to findings of research on migration and displaced populations in Turkey conducted by the Institute of Population Studies at Hacettepe University, 31,6 percent of displacements took place between 1986 and 1990, 61,3 percent between 1991 and 1995, and the remaining 7 percent between 1996 and 2005. It was estimated that in 2005, only 10,1 percent of displaced populations was living in other rural settlements in the affected provinces, 15,6 per cent in rural settlements of other provinces, 40,4 percent in town centers in the affected provinces, and 33,9 percent in town centers of other provinces.[121] However, the exact number of people that have been subjected to forced migration is unknown. Claims are controversial. While Government institutions initially declared that about 300 thousand persons were displaced, Kurdish NGOs cite up to 3 million.[122]

The process of their evacuations generally started with ultimatums by the gendarme to leave their villages within a short period of time, from between a few hours to several days. Houses, sheep pens, stored grains, fields and trees were often burned during or soon after the eviction of the residents, either by the gendarmeries or by accompanying village guards, to make return to the villages impossible.[123] Burning villages and hamlets had twofold implications. On one hand, internally displaced people were forced to migrate permanently, enforcing a break from their homeland, their spatial habits, and the social relations embedded with their villages. On the other, agricultural production and husbandry were curtailed and

120 Abdülkerim Sönmez, "The Effects of Violence and Internal Displacement on Rural-Agrarian Change in Turkey," *Rural Sociology* 73, no. 3 (2008): 384. https://doi.org/10.1526/003601108785766534.

121 Hacettepe Üniversitesi Nüfus Etütleri Enstitüsü, *Türkiye Göç ve Yerinden Olmuş Nüfus Araştırması* (Ankara: Hacettepe Üniversitesi Nüfus Etütleri Enstitüsü, 2006): 60-62.

122 Djordje Stefanovic, Neophytos Loizides, and Samantha Parsons. "Home Is Where the Heart Is? Forced Migration and Voluntary Return in Turkey's Kurdish Regions," *Journal of Refugee Studies* 28, no. 2 (June 2015): 281. https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/feu029.

123 Bilgin Ayata and Deniz Yükseker, "A Belated Awakening: National and International Responses to the Internal Displacement of Kurds in Turkey," *New Perspectives on Turkey* 32 (2005): 16. https://doi.org/10.1017/S089663460000409X.

the Turkish agricultural map changed significantly given their absence in eastern and southeastern provinces.



Figure 3.7 Internally Displaced Kurdish People (in the 1990s). Map by the author

As the figure 3.7 shows, most among the displaced populations migrated to the peripheries of metropolitan areas, notably Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, and Adana. Those who lacked kinship networks in these urban centers settled in eastern and southeastern cities such as Batman, Diyarbakır, Şırnak, and Mardin.[124] Due to high unemployment rates in these centers, they quickly became seasonal migrant workers, working in northern and western regions of Turkey for six to eight months every year and spending winters unemployed in their original hometowns. As a result, starting in the 1990s, forced migration turned Kurdish farmers into the most important supply of agrarian labor. Many studies indicate that Kurdish workers earned the lowest wages and had the worst accomodations and

124 Uygar Yıldırım, *1980 Sonrası Türkiye Tarımında Yapısal Dönüşüm ve Mevsimlik Tarım İşçileri*, Ph.D. Diss. (Istanbul: Istanbul University, 2014): 202

working conditions.[125] However, this changed after the introduction of Syrian refugees who replaced Kurdish Turks at the bottom.

Before forced migration, people mostly did subsistence farming and animal husbandry in their villages. Sheep farming, which provided butter, cheese, and wool was more common in the region than agricultural productions due to the lack of irrigation infrastructure. Therefore, dry farming products were the only ones produced, including wheat, lentils, and barley. This production was not for market but mainly subsistence farming. After the evacuation of the villages, the rural economy was wholly disrupted. For those who settled in the city centers of eastern and southeastern provinces, there was no option other than border trade and seasonal agrarian work due to high unemployment in the region.[126] Thus, because of military pressure, the depeasantization of land, demographic changes vis-à-vis villages and urban centers, and a transition away from subsistence economic activities, Kurdish peasants found themselves in seeking for survival.

3.4.1 *Migration Management of the State: The Discourses of Denial and Development*

Governments changed following elections but the main discourse did not. Government officials accused the PKK of burning villages and causing evictions. Turkish political authorities also evaluated the issue with an "underdevelopment" approach that formulated the problem as insufficient economic opportunities and infrastructure in Eastern and Southeastern Turkey. The state avoided problematizing the "Kurdish question" in relation to forced migration. Even reports of the ministries do not admit that IDPs are Kurdish people.

125 See in Yıldırım, *1980 Sonrası Türkiye;* Ayşegül Özbek, *New Actors of New Poverty: The 'Other' Children of Çukurova*, MA Thesis, (Ankara: Middle East Technical University, 2007); Sidar Çınar, *Bağımlı Çalışma İlişkileri Kapsamında Mevsimlik Tarım İşçilerinin Malatya Örneği Üzerinden Analizi* (PhD dissertation, Marmara University, 2012).

126 This region has the highest unmeployment rate in Turkey. It is about 27% for the year 2017 according to TUIK statistics.

Given this dominant state discourse of denial and neglect, civil society actors have become important to position the forced migration issue and ensure that it remains on the agenda. The important domestic non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that worked on the issue in the 1990s included the Human Rights Association (İHD), the Human Rights Foundation (TİHV), the Association for Solidarity with the Oppressed (Mazlum-Der), and the Association for Solidarity with Migrants (Göç-Der), which undertook a number of activities to raise awareness of the situations of IDPs. Surveys were conducted, data was compiled, reports were published, conferences were held and petititons were brought before parliament and government agencies.[127]

International actors also contributed to the discussion of the problem of forced migration. From the 1990 onwards, Human Rights Watch regularly alerted the international public about forced displacement in Turkey.[128] In 1999, the US Committee for Refugees published a report examining both the process of village evacuations and the situation of Kurdish IDPs in the cities. Moreover, the London-based Kurdish Human Rights Project published reports and broadcast the claims of a number of Kurdish IDPs.[129]

However, as Ayata and Yükseker assert, internal displacement did not significantly affect Turkey's foreign relations. The activities of these domestic and international actors did not break the "wall of denial" regarding Turkey's displacement problem. UN agencies present in Turkey such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), did not address the IDP problem and kept silent in order not to antagonize the government.[130] The US, a close ally, cared the political "sensitivities" of

127 Ayata and Yükseker "A belated awakening," 18.

128 See the annual HRW Country reports on Turkey, available online: https://www.hrw.org/tr/world-report/2019/country-chapters/325436

129 Bilgin Ayata and Deniz Yükseker, "A belated awakening: National and international responses to the internal displacement of Kurds in Turkey," *New Perspectives on Turkey* 32 (2005), p. 25.

130 Ibid., 26.

Turkey and refrained from exerting significant pressure by merely addressing forced displacement in its annual State Department reports. European institutions often adopted inconsistent strategies. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) and the EU Parliament criticized the politics of denial with respect to displacement, yet more powerful institutions such as the EU Commission and the EU Council refrained from addressing the problem of displacement at an intergovernmental level.[131]

3.4.2 *European Union as an Important Actor in the Wake of 2000s for IDPs*

In 1999, Turkey was granted candidacy status for EU accession but needed to fulfill the Copenhagen Criteria including meeting a series of political and economic standards, during the accession negotiations. During this process, the EU brought the case of Kurdish IDPs onto the agenda with the force of effects of international and national civil society actors and diasporas abroad. While the first Accession Partnership Document between the EU and Turkey in 2001 did not mention internal displacement, a revision of the document in 2003 added the return of displaced people to their original settlements (as part of an effort to reduce regional disparities) to the list of priorities. However, the real milestone in this process was the visit of Special Representative Francis Deng to Turkey to examine the IDP situation.

Since neither the EU nor the UN Country Team in Turkey previously had a specific policy on internal displacement, Deng's report following his visit provided a framework for these institutions to engage the government more forcefully on this issue. Indeed, after Deng's visit a shift in government policy became apparent when Turkey entered into dialogue with international organizations to take steps to remedy the conditions of IDPs. In 2003, officials from the State Planing Organization (SPO), the

131 Ibid., 26.

Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had a series of meetings with the UN Country Team in Turkey to determine what could be done, and a number of initiatives were started.

In 2004, the Council of Europe's progress report concerning Turkey took a closer look at internally displacement problem and produced possible solutions such as the removal of obstacles to return to villages and specific policies targeting economic development in southeastern Anatolia.[132] To some extent, Turkey responded to both Deng's report and the report of the Council of Europe positively. In July 2004, the Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies took the responsibility of preparing a demographic study which was recommended in the Deng report to make an accurate count of the internally displaced population and to describe their current problems. Later that month, the "Law on Compensation of Damages Arising From Terror and The Fight Against Terror" (Law No. 5233) was passed by parliament. A framework document was issued by the Council of Ministers entitled "Measures on the Issue of Internally Displaced Persons and the Return to Village and Rehabilitation Project in Turkey" (2005), and the Van Action Plan was put into effect (2006).[133] But further actions recommended in the Deng Report, such as clearing mines, abolishing the village guard system, giving a greater role to national NGOs, and revising the role of the security forces in the region have not yet occurred.[134]

For internally displaced people who are seasonal migrant workers, the Return to Village and Rehabilitation project is more important. While the government has claimed that about one third of approximately 360 thousand IDPs have returned, the actual number may be much lower.[135]

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132 Dilek Kurban et.al., *Coming to terms with forced migration: post-displacement restitution of citizenship rights in Turkey* (TESEV, 2007), 114.

133 Özgür Sevgi Göral Birinci, *Enforced Disappearence and Forced Migration in the Context of Kurdish Conflict: Loss, Mourning and Politics at the Margin*, (PhD Dissertationi Ecole des Hatutes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, 2017).

134 Ayata and Yükseker "A belated awakening," 31

135 Kurban et.al., *Coming to terms ,* 317.

Based on the figures of the Hacettepe study, the ratio of IDPs who have returned to the total number of IDPs is only around 11,5 percent. There are several reasons. First, a limited number of villages have been allowed to return. There are still evacuated villages that have not been opened to return because of security concerns.[136] Second, returning home implies returning to one's homeland at the same time. However, the lack of job opportunities in the homeland, destruction of villages and hamlets during the war are important obstacles to sustaining a livelihood.[137] With the deterioration of EU-Turkey relations especially since 2007 in the second period of AKP, the subject of IDPs has not been on the political agenda. The intensification of Neo-Ottomanist policies in the direction of the Middle East have led to the retreat of IDP issue along with the retreat of relevant actors – international and national NGOs. In this respect, seasonal agricultural migration remains a vital option for IDPs to earn their livelihoods. The case of Kurdish IDPs as seasonal migrant agricultural workers will be analyzed further in a consideration of dispossession due to political factors in the section entitled "Political Geography of Dispossession" in Chapter 6.

§ 3.5 Concluding Remarks

In this chapter, I discussed the recent (im)migration flows to Turkey considering seasonal agrarian employment in relation to new power relations in the domain of geopolitics. I defined three main migration flows to Turkish agrarian field since the 1990s: immigrant workers from former Soviet countries, Syrian refugees, and internally displaced Kurdish people. The changing policy direction of Turkey with a reformulation of Neo-Ottomanism in the Özal and Erdogan periods reshape migrant flows by encouraging some groups to migrate to Turkey. The end result has been the emergence of new agricultural labor classes.

136 Ayata and Yükseker "A belated awakening," 35.

137 Kurban et.al., *Coming to terms* , 35

This chapter draws attention to different, concurrent types of migratory movement, highlighting a dynamic rural landscape and cartography of migration that detaches Turkish agriculture from earlier phases depicted in the previous chapter through reconstructed power relations at the macro, micro, and local scales. Beyond national borders, increasingly transnational relations of power shape the world of temporary agricultural work today. In this setting, migration management has involved meso-level actors working across the borders, such as the UN, international NGOs, and EU bodies. Hence, the case of today's seasonal agricultural migrant workers needs to be analyzed in a broader framework shaped by different alliances and conflicts at the national, international, and regional levels.

The contributions are two folded: 1) how different categories - that is to say, irregular migrants, refugees, immigrants, internally displaced peoples - are shaped by the current geopolitical imagination and approach of Turkey, and 2) the role of various actors in producing the necessary conditions to push people to work in temporary agrarian jobs. Thus, this chapter has provided substantial analytical tools for analyzing ethnic layers and related relations of power with regard to seasonal migrant employment that will be elaborated upon in ensuing chapters.

4

Transformation of Agriculture and Labor under Neoliberalization

This chapter examines the impact of ongoing agrarian transformation on rural labor with specific look at the expansion of seasonal migrant workers. I problematize relations of production and means of production under the pressure of neoliberal policies along with an emerging need for cheaper labor by both small, medium, and large scale farmers. The focus will be the neoliberal agrarian transformation experienced by producers which reshapes seasonal agricultural work and the changing demand for temporary workers. I will analyze the results of fieldwork conducted in Adana, Bursa, Manisa, and Mersin with regard to choice of employers to use manual labor. In the previous chapter on the geopolitics of agricultural migration flows, I defined three migration waves. This chapter will show how these migrant influxes have been embedded in agricultural production.

Turkey has undergone a profound agricultural transformation process since the 1980s. Zülküf Aydın points out that neoliberal policies implemented by the Turkish state in cooperation with the WB, the EU, and the WTO from 1980 onwards have strengthened the activities of transnational agribusiness companies and their control over the market. But the fundamental institutional changes to ensure the smooth internalization of the new Turkish agriculture were introduced since 1999 and inevitably

led to the impoverishment of the rural masses and to the abandonment of agriculture by small and medium-sized households.[1] The peasants experience of neoliberal transformations intensified in the 1990s in spite of the fact that structural changes started in the 1980s.

On one hand, the total share of the population working in agriculture decreased from 56.1% to 22.7% between 1980 and 2012. On the other, the need for agricultural workers increased, paralleling the expansion of cultivated crops that require manual labor. Thus, the demand for agricultural labor is paradoxically on the rise during a depeasantization process. The substantial demographical change has far-reaching consequences and serious implications for economic, political, sociological, and spatial changes in the countryside in relation to other, related realms in Turkish society, but these far exceed the scope of this study. I will focus only on the emerging need for seasonal labor in the production process of diversified crops. I will ask in what ways farmers continue agricultural production given the simultaneous fact of rural-urban migration.

Chapter 2 outlined survival strategies for small farmers such as adoption of new technologies to agricultural production, a shift in cultivated crops, crop diversification, and income diversification.[2] This particular literature- called the "New Peasantry" approach- is reflected in scholarly works analyzing the neoliberal agricultural transformation in Turkey. For instance, Öztürk et al. assert that the income diversification strategies of rural households - such as the temporary rural-urban migration of some family members who contribute remittances to the household budget - have provided the necessary survival conditions for family farms.[3] Additionally, new economic opportunities in the countryside such as ecotourism have created job opportunities for farmers in rural areas. Moreover, peasant with small and medium farming enterprises benefit from the

1 Zülküf Aydin, "Neo-liberal Transformation of Agriculture," *Journal of Agrarian Chang*e, 10 no. 2 (April 2010):149.

2 See, the section on "Theme 2: Survival Strategies of Small Farmers" in Chapter 2.

3 Murat Öztu̇rk, Joost Jongerden and Andy Hilton, "The (re)production of the new peasantry in Turkey," *Journal of Rural Studies*, forthcoming 61 (July 2018). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrurstud.2017.10.009.

ongoing traditional, sociocultural relations in their villages; in case of need, farmers prefer to borrow from neighbors or relatives instead of commercial banks.

Unlike this approach, I will focus in this chapter on the role of small farmers as employers and the advantage of hiring cheap labor. By filling this gap in the recent literature, this chapter will contribute to contemporary studies of Turkey's agriculture by changing the unit of analysis from peasant to worker. It asserts that the availability of seasonal migrant workers that has imposed certain survival conditions to small family farms and created greater profits for large agricultural enterprises. I will discern how small farmers survived in market conditions shaped by the contemporary lack of state support, by changing market demands according to consumer preferences, and by being subject to volatile global input prices.

In other words, this chapter will deal with how an International Food Regime[4] or New Agricultural Regime[5] -discussed in Chapter 2- was established in Turkish agriculture in relation to seasonal agricultural migration. Following up on the survival strategies underscored in Chapter 2, this chapter will deal with how these strategies have functioned vis-à-vis the employment of seasonal agricultural workers in a neoliberal agrarian transformation process. Accordingly, the parts of this chapter are devoted to each of the survival strategies.

In the following sections, I will first examine the causes of increasing demand for cheaper migrant labor during a depeasantization process in the neoliberal era. This part will demonstrate the key role of seasonal migrant workers in agricultural production for both small farmers and large farming units. The next section will show the adaptability of peasants to mechanization and agricultural technologies. Mechanization is particularly important since it blocks the possibility of employing wage workers. Therefore, this section will investigate the factors of affecting employers'

4 Henry Bernstein, *Class Dynamics of Agrarian Change* (Kumarian Press, 2013).

5 Guillermo Neiman and Germán Quaranta, "Restructuring and Functional Flexibilization of Agricultural Labor in Argentina," *Latin American Perspectives* 31, no. 4 (July 2004). https://doi.org/10.1177/0094582X04266255.

choices regarding whether machines or workers will be employed for the production. The subsequent section will deal with producers' preferences for the certain crops. I will focus farmers' strategy of changing crops in the face of price volatility and its impact on agricultural employment. As a last survival strategy, the income diversification of farm households will be elaborated upon the next section with a discussion of whether Turkey's agriculture has progressed towards New Peasantry or a New Agricultural Labor Regime.

§ 4.1 Increasing Demand for "Cheaper" Seasonal Migrant Workers

This part will show the increasing demand for cheaper migrant labor in Turkish agriculture, which has several causes such as the unavailability of unpaid family labor and more competitive market conditions in the neoliberal era. I purposefully choose the word "cheaper" instead of "cheap" to emphasize the never-ending search for ways to reduce the labor costs by creating different hierarchies and asymmetries among workers. These asymmetries are based on the diverse identities, ethnicities, and citizenships of workers. Thus, this section will focus on the central concern of procuring cheaper labor, which is no longer scarce given the migration waves to the Turkish countryside since the 1990s discussed in Chapter 3. Accordingly, in this chapter, subject is marked by the expansion of seasonal migrant employment with previously uncommon forms of employment; temporary, flexible, and seasonal labor have increasingly come to dominante locally-sourced labor and unpaid family workers.

Turkey has undergone a profound political-economic transformation since the 1980 military coup, by which redesigned the political field was redesigned by a new constitution and new legal arrangements, as pointed out in the previous chapter on geopolitics of mobilities. In brief, with the establishment of an oppressive regime, labor unionization and pro-labor political activities were suspended. Furthermore, the Import Substitution Industrialization model was abandoned and the economy was restructured in accordance with an export-oriented neoliberal model.

Global connections with new transnational actors such as the IMF, WB, and EU soon followed. The gradual retreat of the state from production and other services, reductions in subsidies, a transition from traditional to value crops, and the hamstringing of parastatal institutions -which formerly functioned as supporters of small, independent farms- have reshaped the countryside in the demographic, economic, social, and cultural realms.

The most immediate impact of the transformation has been noticeable demographic changes in the country. The figure 4.1 reveals a sharp decrease in the number of village and town dwellers in proportion to the total population, while the number of city dwellers grew strikingly.



Figure 4.1 The Population Involved in Agriculture as a Percent of the Total Population (1980-2013). Source: TÜİK.

The agricultural population decreased from 56,1% to 22,7 % during the 1980-2013 period. According to the numbers of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, the share of agricultural employment in 2018 is 18,4%.[6] Di-

6 "Tarım İş Gücü İstihdam." Tarım ve Orman Bakanlığı, 2018. https://www.tarimorman.gov.tr/Sayfalar/Icerikler.aspx?IcerikId=f0d3b296-4442-4c1e-aa46-5e8133b1d8c9.

verse reasons explain the massive movement from the countryside to urban centers; increased poverty in rural areas and a lack of state support for small and medium farmers have directed people seeking a better livelihood towards cities. On the other hand, better health and education facilities, advanced urban infrastructure, and cultural and art activities constitute important pull factors[7] in the post-industrialization era. Istanbul is the preferred migration destination. The table 4.1. indicates the net migration to Istanbul during the 1980s and 1990s.

Table 4.1 Net Migration to Istanbul

Years	Net Migration
1975-1980	288.653
1980-1985	297.598
1985-1990	656.677
1995-2000	407.448

SOURCE TÜİK

Particularly, members of young and unpaid family workforces who find education or job opportunities in Istanbul have constituted an important element of this urbanization process. Farmers who were had relied on this family labor experienced a more intense need for migrant labor while relatively large-scale farm owners continued to receive outside labor. This change is dramatic in Orhangazi (Bursa) where family farming and traditional production relations had been common. A woman and olive producer in Orhangazi (Bursa) region, told about the changing labor relations compared to earlier times in the village.

> When my father and my mother were alive, they worked their olive grove without hiring outside labor, and they also worked in their neighbors' orchards in exchange for their labor; *imece* system was prevalent in those times. They started to work in the other orchards after finishing with their own harvest. Neighbors

7 For details of the Push and Pull Factors Approach, see the section entitled "Conceptualization of Rural Migration and Mobilities" in chapter 2.

> and relatives also worked for us in our orchard. In this neighborhood, *imece* was common, but after the number of young people decreased, it ended. Thus, I started to hire outside labor.[8] (Producer 18, female, aged 50)

This is a typical explanation about the lack of unpaid family members which was also shared by other informants in Orhangazi where family farming was common and the fragmented land distribution favored small land ownership. The dependency on an external labor force has transformative effects on social relations. In the absence of *imece*, strong familial ties loosened and a particular neighborly relation characteristic of the harvest season disappeared. Instead, farm dwellers began spending time with neighbors in coffee houses (*köy kahvesi*).

Most of the conversations among villagers about olive production, workers, sales, and merchants I witnessed occurred in these coffee houses, where I conducted several interviews. It should be noted that these spaces for socializing are strictly for men. Women usually visit one another's homes when their husbands are in the coffee house. On one hand, social relations taking place in homes and coffee houses instead of gardens have become more isolated. On the other, male migrant workers in the Orhangazi district spend time in coffee houses with their colleagues after the end of the work day. In this way, encounters outside of work have become more frequent, paving the way for developing social relations between farm dwellers and newcomers in the coffee houses.

Olive production requires intense manual labor for harvesting in autumn – especially in November. Therefore, the specific character of the crop determines the organization of work relations:

- There is no massive migration flow as in the cases of Adana, Mersin, and Manisa; workers mostly come from neighboring cities -Balıkesir and

8 "Annem babam hayattayken onlar işçi kullanmazdı. Kendileri çalışıyorlardı hem kendi tarlalarında, hem de komşuların tarlalarında. Köy olarak imece yapıyorlardı. Kendi işlerini bitirdikten sonra, başkalarının bahçelerinde çalışıyorlardı, onlar da bizim bahçede çalışıyorlardı. Köyden gençler gidince imece de bitti. O yüzden ben işçi kiralıyorum." Interview by the author, tape recording in Turkish. Orhangazi (Bursa), 22.10.2013.

Çankırı- where the soil is infertile. Therefore, even if these workers own a plot of land, they need additional income.

- Both rainy climatic conditions and the absence of massive migration means that labor camps are lacking. Therefore, laborers generally stay in abandoned houses or rooms arranged for by the landowners.
- Daily wages are relatively higher than at the other fieldwork sites. In 2014, the rate was 50TL a day in the olive groves, while it fluctuated between 30-40TL during the high season in Manisa, Adana, and Mersin.
- Besides external workers who come from different cities, there are also permanent inhabitants who reside in the center of Orhangazi and commute to the villages for daily work. As one interviewee puts it[9]:

> Now, 60% of workers who work with me are originally from Bayburt or Erzurum,[10] but they have lived in Orhangazi for several years. They are not locals and are temporary agricultural workers in this region. They come to the orchards in the morning and go back home in the evening. Some own their own houses in the center; some pay rent for a flat. Here, there are no groups like those that travel from Urfa to Ordu to work for a time in the hazelnut orchards. There are just migrants from Balıkesir; they stay for 1-2 months and return to their cities after the olive harvest is complete. (Labor intermediary 7, male, aged 36)

The small story of Orhangazi shows us the transformation in employment from unpaid family workers to external migrants, which reflects the

9 "Şimdi benim işçilerin yüzde 60'ı Bayburtlu Erzurumlu. Orhangazi ilçe merkezinde oturuyorlar. Yerli işçi değil bunlar sezonluk, birkaç yıldır Orhangazi'de oturuyorlar. Sabahları bahçelere gelip akşam evlerine dönüyorlar. Bazılarının kendi ev, bazıları kirada oturuyor orada. Burada öyle diğer yerlerdeki gibi doğudan gelip çalışan işçi yok. Öyle Ordudaki Urfalılar gibi falan yok yani. Sadece öyle gelip-giden bir tek Balıkesirliler var, onları zeytin toplama zamanı geliyor bir iki ay kalıp dönüyorlar." Interview by the author, tape recording in Turkish. Orhangazi (Bursa), 24.10.2013.

10 Bayburt is located in northeastern Turkey and Erzurum is in the East.

underlying paradigm of the externalization of labor and proletarianization of the countryside[11] in this region as well as complex patterns that emerge from the separation of work in the villages and dwelling in the town centers. In fact, this case can be evaluated as a common experience in many countries such as Greece,[12] South Africa,[13] and Chili,[14] in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, in which rising rural proletarianization occurred due to a lack of unpaid family workers and their unwillingness to do agrarian jobs.

Conversely, agricultural production at the other research sites - Adana, Mersin and Manisa- has always been done with extensive use of waged migrant labor. However, structural inequalities experienced by farm owners and farm dwellers have molded the demand for labor in terms of the quantity of workers in the region and the work performed in the fields. First, as will be discussed in the next two sections in detail, farmers convert their lands to produce more profitable cash-crops in these regions - crops that require manual labor rather than mechanized production. Second, increasing competition in the market and a lack of state support mechanisms have forced farmers to reduce production costs, including labor costs. Against this background, the continuous search for ever cheaper labor has increased farmers' dependency on migrant waged laborer since the 1990s. The director of the Association of

11 Ruth Hall, Poul Wisborg, Shirhami Shirinda, and Phillan Zamchiya. "Farm Workers and Farm Dwellers in Limpopo Province, South Africa - Hall - 2013 - Journal of Agrarian Change - Wiley Online Library." *Journal of Agrarian Change* 13, no. 1 (January 2013): 47–70. https://doi.org/10.1111/joac.12002.

12 Jennifer Cavounidis, "Labor Market Impact of Migration: Employment Structures and the Case of Greece," The International Migration Review 40: 3 (2006), pp. 635-660.

13 Ruth Hall, Poul Wisborg, Shirhami Shirinda and Phillan Zamchiya, "Farm Workers and Farm Dwellers in Limpopo Province, South Africa," *Journal of Agrarian Change* 13:1 (2013), pp. 47–70.

14 Cristóbal Kay, "Chile's Neoliberal Agrarian Transformation and the Peasantry," *Journal of Agrarian Change* 2: 4 (2002), pp. 464–501.

Agricultural Intermediaries in Adana said the following about rising demand for Syrian refugees[15] as seasonal migrant workers in Çukurova:

> If Syrians did not come here, there would be the labor scarcity problem. The citrus harvest has been so large. It is impossible to harvest using only local workers.[16] (Director of the Association of Agricultural Intermediaries, male, aged 43, hometown: Bingöl)

He points out the necessity of outside labor that was filled by Syrian refugees. He refers to workers from Turkey with the term "local workers," since farmers historically hired outside temporary workers from Eastern and Southeastern Turkey, and he draws attention to the fact that the number of Turkey's migrant workers are not enough to provide the labor needed given crop change. In his region, Adana, the abondonment of cotton production due to dissatisfaction with market prices resulted in the cultivation of fresh fruit and vegetables, which requires labor for longer but intermittent periods, which will be analyzed in detail in section 4.3.

In Chapter 3, I discussed three migration waves, the first of which is the migrant flow from the Caucasus. For this migrant group, established networks of kinship have decided their migration routes and employment in agriculture, as is conceptualized in network theories[17] that claim that certain people's choices and actions are shaped by the influence of particular networks in which they are engaged through diverse relationships, ties, and interactions.[18] Georgian workers migrate to Northern Turkey to work during the hazelnut and tea harvests for three months

15 Syrian refugees refer to the second migration wave discussed in chapter 3 on Geopolitics of Migration.

16 "Eğer Suriyeliler gelmeseydi işçi sıkıntısı vardı. Bu kadar narenciye hasatı var. Sadece yerli işçiyle bu hasadı bitirebilmek mümkün değil." Interview by the author, tape recording in Turkish. Seyhan (Adana), 22.01.2015.

17 Network Theories and other main approaches are widely discussed in chapter 2.

18 Thomas Faist, "Lacunae of Migration and Pos-Migration Research," in *The Volume and Dynamics of International Migration and Transnational Social Spaces* (Oxford: Clarendon, 2004).

each year.[19] Cultural affinity between these two regions marked by the presence of Georgian villages in the Black Sea region, the ability of some Turks to speak Georgian and shared cultural practices like a common cuisine and music, which are analyzed in Chapter III, eased the migration. Similarly, Azerbaijanis work in temporary husbandry jobs in Kars and Iğdır where there is alreasy a considerable Turkish Azerbaijani population.[20]

On that score, agricultural workers supplied by the first of these migration waves could not be employed in Manisa, Adana, and Mersin. The need for labor in these regions was formerly fulfilled by local workers who commuted within or from nearby villages or neighboring cities for a short time as well as by Kurdish migrant workers from Turkey who constitute the third migration wave described in chapter 3. Although these worker groups have historically satisfied the need for labor need in these regions,[21] an emerging need for cheaper labor has met with Syrian refugees. The migration and employment motivations of these different groups of workers are changing according to their levels of landlessness. Based on the fieldwork results, the table 4.2 shows the landlessness ratio of workers:

19 Saniye Dedeoğlu, *Türkiye'de Mevsimlik Tarımsal Üretimde Yabancı Göçmen İşçiler Mevcut Durum Raporu Yoksulluk Nöbetinden Yoksulların Rekabetine* (Kalkınma Atölyesi, 2016); Pınar Uyan Semerci et al., *Mevsimlik Gezici Tarım İşçiliği 2014 Araştırma Raporu* (Hayata Destek İnsani Yardım Derneği, 2014); Deniz Pelek, *Seasonal migrant workers in agriculture: The cases of Ordu and Polatlı* (unpublished MA Thesis, Bogazici University, 2010).

20 Saniye Dedeoğlu, *Türkiye'de Mevsimlik Tarımsal Üretimde Yabancı Göçmen İşçiler Mevcut Durum Raporu Yoksulluk Nöbetinden Yoksulların Rekabetine* (Kalkınma Atölyesi, 2016), 57.

21 Please see the historical background on seasonal agricultural migration in Turkey in section 2.4 in chapter 2.

Table 4.2 Land Ownership of the Workers and Their Places of Origin

	Land Ownership (%)
Local workers	70%
Workers from Eastern and Southeastern Turkey	20%
Syrian workers	0

The majority of local workers whom I interviewed possessed land and undertake agricultural jobs for extra money. Local workers have an established life in their hometowns. Although income from their own harvests are not enough, they continue to cultivate their own fields. Their children go to school in their hometowns. Their primary target is just to earn additional income via seasonal agrarian jobs. Thus, this group is not suitable to satisfy the demands of employers since they neither stay long not nor and accept lower wages.

Kurdish workers, on the other hand, have partially complied with new labor demands since their bargaining power is lower than that of local workers. As table 4.1.2. illustrates their level of landlessness is higher. However, the work trajectory of some Kurdish workers is characterized by staying in one of several cities for around six months and then returning to their hometowns in eastern and southeastern regions where they own a house or rent a flat in the city center or their villages. Some Kurdish workers stay as a family in Adana and Mersin as permanent tent dwellers. This group meet some of the demand for "more precarious" and "cheaper" labor in the agricultural market, but it is still not sufficient. In this context, Syrian refugees –the second migration wave described in chapter 3- who are almost completely dispossessed and continuously searching for housing and work, presents a perfect solution to employers' demand for cheaper labor. Furthermore, the availability of more than one migrant group has created competition for jobs, resulting in a decrease in wages. Hence, employers and workers are mutually dependent on each other in the New Agricultural Regime.

Besides a lack of unpaid family labor and increasing labor demand because of crop change, employers' preferences are a significant determinant of changing labor demand and relevant labor relations. Deborah

Johnston argues that the employment of foreign farm workers cannot be reduced to generalized arguments such as dissatisfaction with the performance of local workers and family members. She changes the direction of the analysis of migrant employment by focusing on the employers' decisions. Employers prefer migrants not only for cheaper wages, but also because of their "docility" and "flexibility," two necessary factors for accumulation and reproduction.[22]

4.1.1 *What Pushes Small Producers to Seek "Docile" and "Flexible" Migrant Labor in Place of Local or Unpaid Family Workers?*

"Price" in both production and sales processes is a key matter expressed in interviews, indicating the changing role of the state, the ineffectiveness of parastatal organizations, the free play of market forces, and increasing competition in the market. Deregulation in the national agricultural sector has meant that rural producers have lost access to produce resources such as inputs, credits, and marketing facilities. It has been accompanied by increasing costs of production in agriculture, fluctuating commodity prices, and increasing indebtedness among farmes.[23]

In effect, the state sought to regulate the agricultural support scheme in 2006. Agriculture Law No. 9725 was promulgated, reorganizing state support for producers.[24] Although this law specified that the minimum level of support should not be less than 1% of the country's gross national product, the budget for agricultural support did not even reach this limit in ensuing years.[25] State support has not been sufficient to cover the production expenses in the basic realms of diesel and fertilizer.

22 Deborah Johnston, "Who Needs Immigrant Farm Workers? A South African Case Study," *Journal of Agrarian Change* 7: 4 (2007): 495.

23 Zülküf Aydın, "Neo-Liberal Transformation of Turkish Agriculture." *Journal of Agrarian Change* 10, no. 2 (2010): 181. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1471-0366.2009.00241.x.

24 Agriculture Law, 9725 (2006). http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.5.5488.pdf.

25 TZOB. *Zirai ve İktisadi Rapor 2007-2010* (Ankara, 2010), 656.

For instance, in 2010, farmers paid approximately 3,8 billion Turkish lire for fertilizer, but government support reached just 704 million Turkish lire, which is equal to only 18% of farmers' fertilizer costs.[26] In a similar vein, farmers use approximately 3,3 billion liters oil, but state support covered just 5% of the total, which is equal to only one quarter of the value added tax (katma değer vergisi, or KDV). Until 2011, farmers benefited from the advantage of rural diesel by paying less special consumption tax (özel tüketim vergisi, or ÖTV). New legislation on rural diesel abolished this practice in January 2011, and farmers are now compelled to use euro diesel by paying a higher ÖTV.[27] Today, the farmers' experience of this cost-price squeeze is dramatic due to the fluctuations of foreign currency and the devalutation of the Turkish lira. One dollar was equal to 1,2TL in 2001, 1,9TL in 2013, 2,1TL in 2014, 3TL in 2016. It is currently 5,8TL, a fact that directly affects farmers since Turkey is dependent on importing foreign raw materials for fertilizers[28] and foreign diesel. One interviewee with forty years of experience who has good experience in agricultural production argues:

> Per decare, I use 15TL woth of [diesel] oil, and the state gives me 1TL as "support." Is this a real support? Oil, electricity, and fertilizer costs are driving us to financial ruin. One sack of fertilizer costs 70TL. I use one sack per decare. Support for oil and fertilizer amounts to 16TL per decare. I use oil (that costs 60TL) and a sack of fertilizer (that costs 70TL). I use two sacks for maize production (which costs 140TL). I spend 200 TL for maize and 130 TL for other crops per decare, and the state gives 16 TL to me as "support" to cover my expenses. Is this valuable? I spend that money (16TL) just to go out to the field. Then the politicians say that "the state gives support for oil, support for fertilizer, of such and such

26 Ibid., 659.

27 "TBMM Genel Kurul Tutanakları," 19 March 2013: 63. https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/tutanak_g.birlesim_baslangic?P4=21914&P5=H&page1=63&page2=63.

28 TZOB. *Zirai ve İktisadi*, 88.

amount to peasants." It's a drop[29] in the ocean![30] (Producer 6, male, aged 53, hometown: Manisa).

The increasing cost-price squeeze has led to a common feeling of being at risk and insecurity among peasants.[31] Keyder and Yenal,[32] Zülküf Aydın,[33] and Derya Nizam[34] lay bare the fact that the lack of state support has resulted in peasant farmers lagging behind the market and has given way to an emerging danger that the peasantry will be unable to sustain itself. The deregulation of national markets, high costs of production in agriculture, and fluctuating agricultural commodity prices have led to increasing farmer indebtedness.[35] Since 1888, Ziraat Bankası (Agricultural Bank) has been the primary agent in charge of allocating loans to these producers.

In the course of time, several state and private banks and agricultural credit cooperatives were added to the list of lenders to these producers.

29 It is an expression, "Devede kulak!" in Turkish.

30 "Ben dekarda 15 TL mazot harcıyorum devlet bana 1 lt veriyor. bu yardım mı? bizi zaten mazot, gübre akaryakıt bitiroyor yan, cereyan. gübrenin çuvalı 70 TL. 1 dekara 70 TLlik gübre atıyorsun, mazot ve gübre desteği bir dekarda 16 TL. Dekarda 15 litre, 60 TLlik mazot kullanıyorum 70 TLlik de gübre 2 tane kullanıyorum mısır icin 140 TL 60 daha 200 TL masrafa karşı devlet bana 16 TL yardım yapıyor para mı bu? Yolda yakıyoruz onu zaten, ondan sonra da bağırıyorlar devlet şu kadar yardım ediyor çiftçiye mazot yardımı gübre yardımı devede kulak!" Interview by the author, tape recording in Turkish. Sazoba (Manisa), 23.08.2013.

31 Derya Nizam-Bilgic, "Geographical Indications in Commodity Chain Analysis: Policy and Resource Rents." (PhD dissertation, the University of Sydney, 2015), 196. https://ses.library.usyd.edu.au/handle/2123/13301.

32 Çağlar Keyder and Zafer Yenal, *Bildiğimiz Tarımın Sonu Küresel İktidar ve Köylülük*, İletişim Yayınları (2011)

33 Zülküf Aydın, "Neo-Liberal Transformation of Turkish Agriculture," *Journal of Agrarian Change* 10: 2 (2010):149–187.

34 Derya Nizam, "Place, Food, and Agriculture: The Use of Geographical Indications in Olive Oil Production in Western Turkey." *New Perspectives on Turkey* 57 (November 2017): 14. https://doi.org/10.1017/npt.2017.31.

35 Zülküf Aydın, "Neo-Liberal Transformation," 181.

Given the support of these agencies, small and medium farmers could obtain credits at low interest rates. However, neoliberal agrarian policies since the 1980s affected the monetary issues. In 1985, nine state and private banks provided loans with low interests, but the number decreased to three by 2000, and the share of credit for agricultural activities vis-à-vis the total volume of credit decreased to 9,5%.[36] Since 2001, these three banks do not offer favorable borrowing conditions, and Ziraat Bankası is no longer supportive of farmers.

In effect, the state purposefully pursued a policy of issuing loans rather than abolishing all support mechanisms. The support program by Ziraat Bankası for mid-sized and large agribusinesses (Tarımsal Orta ve Büyük İşletmeler, or TOBİ) were put into effect in 2008, allowing farmers who were engaged in large agribusiness to borrow with reasonable conditions. These support mechanisms only serve those whose annual income is from agriculture exceeds 750 thousand lire or whose requested line of credit for the planned investment exceeds 1 million Turkish lire.[37] Small farmers were excluded even though favorable borrowing conditions are crucial for their survival. Small farmers cannot accumulate the necessary capiral to reinvest in agricultural production due to their low income. In order to continue cultivating the land, they need to borrow until their products are sold. Thus, favorable borrowing options in terms of low interest rates and an easy, quick loan process have been essential for survive small farmers to survive.

Given the transformative effects of these changing borrowing policies on small peasants, they found themselves alone in the market, which mostly resulted in their severe indebtedness. Producers explained their indebtedness by drawing attention to their insecure position:

> People were dissatisfied when Ecevit[38] was in power. We even witnessed interest rates of 250%, but back then we could pay our debts - we did not sell our tractors, our fields. Now, all the fields in

36 TZOB. *Zirai ve İktisadi Rapor 2007-2010*. (Ankara, 2010), 120.

37 Ibid., 124.

38 He is referring to the years 1999 to 2002 when Bülent Ecevit was prime minister.

> Akhisar are burdened by mortgages to the banks. Thus, the fields of farmers are being transferred to banks. My situation is also not secure this year. I have to earn money this year and next year. I sowed this year, hoping to earn and get rid of my debt to the bank. The banks advertise "lower interests," but not everyone can afford to get credit. People are going bankrupt, people are committing suicide… Recently, a farmer committed suicide here because of his debt. The situation of peasants is miserable.[39] (Producer 1, male, aged 70, hometown: Manisa).

Another farmer relates:

> For the last 4-5 years, subsidy amounts for maize and soybean production has remained the same- it's never changed! But if you look at fertilizer and oil prices, you see a huge increase. We receive no state support. It exists around the world, but here, there is none! It has decreased honestly since 2000 during the AKP government period. This is the breaking point. This policy paves the way for big agricultural enterprises. Monopolization is being encouraged in agriculture. Small farmers not have no chance to survive. There

39 "Fiyatlar kötüye gitti, üretim arttı. üretim neden arttı: çiftçi borçluyuz biz daha cok üretiyoruz daha cok calışıyoruz daha çok üret,yorsak kendimizi kurtarmak için ama kurtaramıyoz yani begenmedikleri ecevit döneminde faizler %250 oldu biz borçlarımızı ödedik tarktörümüzü satmadık tarlamızı satmadık. şu anda akhisardan şeye kadar bütün tarlalar bankaya ipotekli. çiftçide tarla kalmadı bankalara geçiyor yani. biz de sallanıtıdayız ha bu sene kazancaz seneye kaancaz bu sene gene umutla ektik tarlayı kazanırız borçtan kurtuluruz bankadan. kurtulamıyoz yani. bankalarda faiz düşük diyor, 6 tane sıfır attıktan sonra. bankanın kredisini kimse ödeyemiyor iflas ediyor insanlar intihar ediyorlar insan gecen sergicinin biri şurda intihar etti borcundna dolayı. çiftçinin hali perişan." Interview by the author, tape recording in Turkish. Akhisar (Manisa), 22.08.2013.

> are countless problems in agriculture, but no one protests because of the general situation of Turkey.[40] (Producer 13, male, aged 45, hometown: Adana).

These two quotations point out dependency on banks in face of harsh market conditions that include increasing input costs, especially the costs of oil and fertilizer. They see the year 2000 as a turning point. On one hand, bankrupt and dispossessed farmers gave up agricultural production, accelerating the depeasantization. On the other, some farmers developed their own survival strategies and transformed their ways of production in accordance with the requisites of the new economic order.[41] This chapter will go on to look at new strategies with regard to mechanization.

§ 4.2 Workers With or Without Machines

In the processes of globalization, big and small-scale farmers have invested in modifying production processes and adopting new agrarian technologies with the hope of increasing their productive capacity and obtaining a competitive advantage. Zülküf Aydın, relying on fieldwork in Tuzburgazı and Kınık, shows that producers are reluctant to invest more capital in new, available technologies; instead, human labor is preferred

40 "4-5 yıldır destekleme rakamları mısır soya pamuk hepsi aynı rakam hiç değişmedi ama gübre işçilik mazota bakın nerden nereye gitti. aldığımız bizim devlet desteği diye bir şey yok bütün dünyada var iken bu hükümetin döneminde çok düştü. 2000li yıllar kırılma noktası oldu. 2000 öncesiyle karşılaştırın nerelere düştü. Kırılma noktasıysa kırılma noktası orası. Kar marjı çok düştü. Büyük işletmelerin önü açılıyor tekelleşmeye doğru gidiş var tarımda ufak çiftçinin orta çiftçinin ayakta kalma şansı yok. Tarımın sıkıntısı çoktur ama ülkedeki genel durumdan dolayı kimse sesini çıkarmıyor. Interview by the author, tape recording in Turkish. Tuzla (Adana), 06.09.2013.

41 Zülküf Aydın, "Neo-Liberal Transformation of Turkish Agriculture," *Journal of Agrarian Change* 10: 2 (2010): 181.

for activities such as hoeing, irrigation, weeding, and harvesting.[42] However, in my field sites in Bursa, Adana, Mersin, and Manisa, producers tend to employ the agricultural machines and other technological equipment instead of manual labor. Table 4.3. illustrates the use of agricultural machines in my research fields based on interviews with producers.

Table 4.3 Use of Machines and Agricultural Technologies

Location	Crops	Machines and Other Technological Equipment Used
Manisa (Akhisar, Salihli, and Gölmarmara)	Tomato, grape, pepper, water melon, maize cotton, melon, olive, and wheat	Drip irrigation Tomato harvester Wheat harvester Maize harvester Spraying machine Dipping machine Hoes with sensing devices Pesticide for opening cotton bolls Pesticide for weeding Cultivator Excavator machine for the roots of trees Rotovator Weeding machine Fertilizer machine
Bursa (Orhangazi)	Olive	Drip irrigation Olive picking machine Olive shaking machine live sorting machine Spraying machine
Adana (Ceyhan, Tuzla, Karataş, Yumurtalık, and Yüreğir) and Mersin (Yenice)	Soybean, lettuce, potato, white cabbage, and citrus fruit	Drip irrigation Potato harvester Potato sowing machine Combine harvester Stalk cutter machine Fertilizer machine Spraying machine

42 Zülküf Aydın, "The New Right, Structural Adjustment and Turkish Agriculture: Rural Responses and Survival Strategies," *The European Journal of Development Research* 14, no. 2 (December 2002): 198. https://doi.org/10.1080/714000427.

I observed that all employers tend to use machinery and updated technologies instead of waged labor. A comment below from an old interviewee who practices mechanized cotton and maize production is a good example of the trend:

> I own 14 hectares of land. I prefer to produce cotton and maize because its selling and production are easier than other crops. I am trying to reduce employment of seasonal workers. We are trying to abstain from using workers because of the increase in production costs. I prefer machines. I admire machines. I can't harvest cotton with workers; that is over. If you try to do it with workers, you cannot earn money. Seasonal workers are employed only for horticultural crops.[43] (Producer 25, male, aged 70, hometown: Manisa).

Another tomato producer expressed his preference for machinery and complained about problems preventing mechanization:

> A harvesting machine yields more profit than workers but the infrastructure in sauce factories is not suitable. They should provide a suitable infrastructure for the harvesters. With the harvesting machine, a little soil gets mixed in with the tomatoes. They should establish a picking system to separate it. Gradually, we are moving to mechanized agriculture in spite of the difficulties. The machines themselves are not enough; I mean, we are harvesting the products and sending them to sauce factories. There should be suitable infrastructure because all of the stages of production and

43 "140 dönüm toprağım var. Bana kalsa, ben mısırı ekmeyi, pamuğu ekmeyi terich ederim çünkü satışı üretmesi daha kolay. Işçileri azaltmaya çalışıyorum. Işçi ücretinden kurtulmaya çabalıyorum çünkü pahalıya geliyor. Ben makinaları tercih ederim. Makinaları çok beğeniyorum. Pamuk hasatını işçilerle yapamam artık, o iş bitti. Eğer işçilerle yapan olursa, para falan kazanamaz. Mevsimlik işçiler sadece bağ, bahçe işlerine alınıyor burada." Interview by the author, tape recording in Turkish. Salihli (Manisa), 13.08.2014.

> marketing are interconnected with each other.[44] (Producer 7, male, aged 35, hometown: Diyarbakır).

As the above quotations suggest, employers would rather use machines and other technological equipment in all stages of production insofar as possible. Farmers usually rent the machines instead of purchasing them. They express that using machines is more profitable than manual labor. Machines release employers from the responsibilities with respect to workers, such as their accommodation and travel as well as agreements with labor intermediaries. Another informant- who uses cotton harvesting machines- emphasizes that the duration of the harvest has shrunk after the mechanization:

> I have practiced mechanized agriculture for 3 years. I do not hire workers for harvesting anymore. Nowadays, the variety of seeds is more suitable for mechanized agrarian production. We start harvesting with the machine once some of the cotton bolls start to open. For the cotton bolls that did not open yet, we spray pesticides to open its leaves and bolls, and thus the field becomes all white. This pesticide has been available since we began using the harvesting machines. Thus, we could harvest our cotton all at once. Before, we used to harvest using workers at two or three different times. And all-at-once harvest is more profitable and it has caused multiple-stage harvesting to disappear. Technology brings advantages. Workers were picking cotton in a 10 hectare field for days. Now, it lasts just one day with the machine. This is a very big

44 "Makine işçiden daha karlı ama salça fabrikalarının alt yapısı buna uygun değil. Buna uygun hale getirmeleri lazım. Makineyle iyi kötü biraz toprak kaçıyor o sistemi kurmaları lazım, toprak ayıklama sistemini. Onun için yavaş yavaş da geçiliyor yani. Sadece sen makineyi aldın bitmiyor bu malı topluyorsun salça fabrikasına gönderiyorsun, salça fabrikasının da alt yapısını makineye uygun hale gelmesi lazım sistem birbirine bağlı gidiyor." Interview by the author, tape recording in Turkish. Akhisar (Manisa), 23.08.2013.

> advantage for us.[45] (Producer 4, male, aged 39, hometown: Manisa).

The shortened harvest time is a significant factor in producers' preferences. They express a desire to make the production process (hoeing, spraying, harvesting) short and practical. As one interlocutor puts it,

> Current sowing machines plant the seed where you want. In the past, workers were planting seeds every 5 square centimeters and then they were thinning them out. Now, the machine is doing it every 20 square centimeters. It has become quicker and the need for labor has diminished simultaneously.[46] (Producer 3, male, aged 40, hometown: Manisa).

Although all employers emphasize their satisfaction with machines that maximize time and money spent in the production process, in my fieldwork sites, labor-intensive crops were preferred to the crops, which can be cultivated by mechanized ways. At first glance, it seems paradoxical that farmers prefer to cultivate crops that require manual labor in spite

45 "Makinalı tarıma geçeli aşağı yukarı 3 sene oldu. İşçi çalıştırımıyoruz pamuk hasatında işçi olayı bitti. Tohum çeşitleri daha kaliteli oldu, makinalı tarıma elverişli tokumlar oldu, bunların buyuk etkisi var. Pamuğun açmış kısmı ile başlıyoruz, diğer kalan kısmına ilaç atıp yapraklarını veya kozalarını açtırıp bir seferde toplatıyoruz pamuğu. bir seferde hasat oluyor yani, eskiden 2. sefer 3. sefer gidiyordu şimdi öyle değil tek seferde bir seferde toplamak bizler için daha karlı daha avantajlı. Dönüp dönüp kademeeli hasadı ortadan kaldırdı. Pamuğun tüm kozalarını ilaç vasıtasıyla açtırarak tek seferde hasat elde ediliyor. Teknoloji beraberinde iyilkleri de getiriyor. Pamuk 100 dönüm dekarı eskiden günlerce gidip toplardık işçi olduğunda. ama şimdi makineyle 1 günde toplanıyor bitiyor. bu bizim için çok büyük bir avantaj." Interview by the author, tape recording in Turkish. Akhisar (Manisa), 23.08.2013.

46 "Şimdi tohum ekme makineleri istediğin santimetreye tohumu atıyor, mesela pamukta diyelim 20 santimetreye tohum gerekiyorsa öyle atıyor. Eskiden her 5 santimetreye bir atardı, 3-4 tanesini seyreltmek gerekirdi o da insan gücüyle yapılırdı. Makinalarla o türlü sorunlar ortadan kalktı işçilik azalıyor tabi bir yandan." Interview by the author, tape recording in Turkish. Akhisar (Manisa), 23.08.2013.

of their willingness to use machines. But, the major factor in the determination of which crops to cultivate is satisfaction with the prices. The next section will show the crop preferences of employers and their dependence on external seasonal migrant workers rather than machines.

§ 4.3 Conversion to Cash Crops and the Emerging Labor Need

One of the most common strategies among farmers to resist neoliberal market conditions is the conversion of their lands to more profitable cash crops. In Orhangazi (Bursa), the transition from olive to kiwi production has started recently. Producer 14 (male, aged 50, hometown: Bursa) says: "Kiwi production has become widespread in Orhangazi. Farmers who abondened the olive and started kiwi production seem satisfied."[47] The predominant crop in Orhangazi is still the olive, but as an alternate crop, kiwi is spreading gradually and can overtake the olive in the short to middle term if the dissatisfaction of olive farmers with market and input prices continues. The transition to another crop is proven to be a viable solution that is already practiced by some farmers in the region.

Adana, on the other hand, is historically known as the city of "white gold"[48] due to its extensive cotton production. The lily-white fields of Çukurova, which is known as the most fertile agricultural land in Turkey, inspired famous Turkish novelists like Yaşar Kemal[49] and Orhan Kemal.[50] However, the white has shifted to green today. The previous section showed that employers tend to prefer machines to manual labor in the production process. At first glance, it seems paradoxical that employers

47 "Orhangazide mesela kivicilik çok yaygınlaştı. Zeytini bırakıp kiviye geçen tanıdıklar memnun görünüyorlar." Interview by the author, tape recording in Turkish. Orhangazi (Bursa), 24.11.2013.

48 Beyaz altın in Turkish.

49 He describes Çukurova's pastures, mountains, plateaus, nature, and people, and the hopes and dreams of the people in his novels. He led a "Çukurova literature" in Turkish literature.

50 Orhan Kemal, *Bereketli topraklar üzerinde* (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1964).

would abandon a mechanized industrial crop -cotton- to sow labor-intensive crops like tomatoes, peppers, watermelon, honeydew, cantaloupe, and eggplants. In Manisa, Adana, and Mersin, all the employers justified their choices based on "price." After ceasing of cotton production, farm owners in Manisa, Mersin, and Adana, converted their lands to alternate crops, mainly fresh fruits and vegetables. A 70-years old savvy farmer from Akhisar in Manisa told his story of converting to horticultural produce:

> I am an agrarian producer since birth. I produced cotton and tobacco before, but they [the state] finished the cotton industry. Cotton didn't provide enough money, so I became a horticulturalist. I am cultivating tomatoes and peppers.[51] (Producer 1, male, aged 70, hometown: Manisa).

Similarly, an interviewee, who was a former cotton producer, told his story about leaving cotton production:

> I own thirty hectares of land. Now, the area is all vineyards. At one time, I used to sow mostly cotton. Honestly, I gave up cotton production about 10 years ago. I even told my wife, "If I say I am going out to plant cotton, lie down in front of the car. Don't let me go!" I prefer to leave the field uncultivated than harvest cotton. I also left 4 hectares of land uncultivated for 3 years. I sowed neither cotton nor maize for 3 years because I wouldn't earn money. At one time, I acquired good money from cotton production, but later I couldn't. It's not enough to cover the expenses of oil, pesticide. This downward trend started at the beginning of the 2000s, 2002

51 "Doğduğumdan beri üreticiyim. Tarımla ilgileniyorum. Önceden pamuk, tütün ektim ama pamuğu bitirdiler. Pamuk para etmedi ben de bahçıvan oldum şimdi. Domates biber ekiyorum." Interview by the author, tape recording in Turkish. Akhisar (Manisa), 22.08.2013.

> or 2003, and it continues today.[52] (Producer 26, male, aged 42, hometown: Manisa).

As these personal experiences of leaving white gold illustrate, the decrease in agricultural prices was the major factor under the influence of agrarian policies imposed by transnational actors such as the WTO and the EU. Turkey signed the Customs Union Agreement[53] on 1 January 1996. As a result, Turkey, like other Customs Union member countries, eliminated customs duties and tariffs on the export of textiles and cotton products to countries outside of the Customs Unions in accordance with negotiations with the WTO.[54] Thus, cotton became the only crop exempt from customs duty taxes, which led its sensitivity to fluctuations in the global market. The figure 4.2 shows the producer price index of raw cotton in Turkey clearly signaling the decreasing trend of the price of cotton.

52 "300 dönüm toprağım var, hepsi bağ. Önceden pamuk ekerdik. Açıkçası 10 yıl önce pamuğu bıraktım. Hatta karıma dedim ki, bir daha pamuk ekmeye gidersem, gel arabanın önüne yat, sakın gitmeme izin verme! Pamuk ekeceğime tarlayı boş bırakmayı yeğlerim. Zaten 40 dönümü 3 yıl ekmeden bıraktım. 3 yıl ne pamuk ektim ne mısır. Para kazanamadım çünkü. Önceden pamuktan çok iyi para kazandım aslında, ama sonradan bitti. Değil kazanmak, mazotu ilacı bile karşılamıyor. Bu düşüş 2000lerin başında, 2002, 2003 gibi başladı ve bugün de hala devam ediyor." Interview by the author, tape recording in Turkish. Salihli (Manisa), 16.08.2014.

53 The agreement is basically defined as "no customs duties" rather than as a free trade area. Members of the customs union impose a common external tariff on all goods entering the union. A precondition is that the European Commission negotiates on behalf of the union as a whole in international trade deals, such as with the World Trade Organization, rather than each member state negotiating individually.

54 Osman Orkan Özer and Ahmet Özçelik. "Tarım Ürünlerinin Gümrük Birliği Kapsamına Alınması Durumunda Pamuk ve Tekstil Sektörü Üzerinde Yaratacağı Etkiler: Bir Genel Denge Analizi," *Tarım Ekonomisi Dergisi* 15, no. 1 ve 2 (December 2009): 74.



Figure 4.2 Relative price movements for cotton (Index of prices received by farmers/wholesale, producers prices). Source: Boratav (2009:19).

According to Boratav, the index change for the years 1976-2006 it was -2.40; for 1976-1988 it was -2.04; for 1988-1998 it was 0.04, and for 1998-2006 it was -5.80 (Boratav (2009:19). Although the downward started in 1996, the transition from cotton to other crops occurred in the 2000s due to immense effect of the lack of state assistance on farmers. In 2000, the World Bank promulgated the Agricultural Reform Implementation Project (ARIP), which became a significant factor in the decrease of cotton production. After a series of bilateral negotiations, the ARIP was put into effect following the passing Special Law No. 4527 on 16 June 2000. The primary targets of the ARIP agreement were the withdrawal of price and input subsidies and the introduction of direct income support in their place as well as the elimination of subsidized agricultural credit, the privatization of state economic enterprises in the agricultural industry, and

the restructuring of sales cooperatives.[55] For Turkey, the turning point was not the Customs Union agreement (1996). Farmers suffered more from the effects of structural changes in 2002-2003 due to the withdrawal of state support mechanisms.

Until 2000, agricultural sales cooperatives (for cotton, Çukobirlik, Tariş Pamuk Birlik, and Ant Birlik) had supported purchases, and by doing so, they set a minimum market price that was satisfactory to producers'. The cooperatives also functioned as a retailer in the market balancing supply and demand by eliminating disadvantageous market conditions for producers.[56] According to new legislations enacted after the ARIP, state financial support for agricultural sales cooperatives was suspended.[57] Aydın suggests that this did not entail the abandonment of agricultural sales cooperatives altogether but was rather a process of defunctionalizing them by granting them "full autonomy." Without state support, cooperatives continue to exist but they do not function effectively as their capacity to extend credit and provide members with purchases has disappeared. Since then, cotton prices have not been "protected."

The devastating impact of the Customs Unions Agreement began in the 2000s when state support was withdrawn. As a result, the amount of cotton-rich areas have diminished by 44% in twelve years.[58] After an almost complete cessation of cotton cultivation in Adana and Mersin, different crop preferences emerged depending on climate conditions, the fertility of the soil, and the encouragement of state enterprises to cultivate specific crops. Farm owners turned to alternate crops including citrus fruits, lettuce, potatos, white cabbage, and watermelon, in accord

55 Çağlar Keyder and Zafer Yenal, "Agrarian Transformation, Labor Supplies, and Proletarianization Process in Turkey: A Historical Overview," *Austrian Journal of Development* 27, no. 1 (2011): 64.

56 TZOB, *Zirai ve İktisadi Rapor 2007-2010* (Ankara, 2010): 189.

57 Zülküf Aydin, "Neo-Liberal Transformation of Turkish Agriculture," *Journal of Agrarian Change* 10, no. 2 (2010): 162–63. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1471-0366.2009.00241.x.

58 TZOB, 185.

with the high fertility of the land and the favorable climatic conditions of the region.

According to TÜİK statistics, the total area in which cotton was sown in Turkey was 637 thousand hectares in 1992. This decreased to 416 thousand hectares in 2016. Yet while the total area of land diminished, yields increased from 241 to 505 kilograms per decare between 1992-2016, which shows the positive outcome of mechanization for cotton production. In fact the change in sown area significantly showed regional differences. The figure 4.3 shows the change in the area sown from 1995 to 2016 in Adana, Manisa, and Şanlıurfa:



Figure 4.3 Cotton Area Sown (hectare), (1995-2016). Source: TÜİK

While the area sown has been decreasing in the famous cotton cities of Adana and Manisa, Şanlıurfa has had an upward trend. In fact, the underlying reason for regional difference is related to the development policies

of the Turkish state. By virtue of the Southeastern Anatolian Project,[59] the irrigated areas have considerably increased in Şanlıurfa, which provided advantageous conditions for cotton production. On the other hand, more diverse crops are being cultivated in Manisa, Mersin, and Adana. Tomato and grape production have become common in Manisa. In Adana and Mersin, citrus fruits, lettuces, potatos, white cabbage, and watermelons are cultivated thanks vis-à-vis the high fertility of their territory and favorable climatic conditions. The most striking consequence of the transition to high value crops is the changing demand for labor in these regions. Particularly, citrus production needs intermittent manual labor for longer total period of time. Additionally, the insecure position of farmers in the market forced them to reduce production costs. Therefore, producers have become more dependent on "cheaper" and "precarious" waged migrant workers, which is continuously changing economic, social, and spatial relations in rural areas.

59 "The Southeastern Anatolia Project (*Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi*, GAP) is a multi-sector integrated regional development project based on the concept of sustainable development. GAP's basic aim is to eliminate regional development inequalities by raising incomes and living standards and to contribute to the national development targets of social stability and economic growth by enhancing the productive and employment generating capacity of the rural sector. The total cost of the project is over 100 billion Turkish lira. The project area covers nine provinces (Adıyaman, Batman, Diyarbakır, Gaziantep, Kilis, Siirt, Şanlıurfa, Mardin, and Şırnak). Current activities under GAP include sectors like agriculture and irrigation, hydroelectric power production, urban and rural infrastructure, forestry, education and health. Water resources development envisages the construction of 22 dams and 19 power plants (nine plants which corresponds to 74% capacity of total projected power output was reached by 2010) and irrigation schemes on an area extending over 17,000 square kilometres." Accessed 1 February 2019, http://www.gap.gov.tr/gap-nedir-sayfa-1.html.

§ 4.4 Towards a New Peasantry? Or a New Agricultural Labor Force?

Recent rural studies explore the impact of the neoliberal transformation of agriculture by focusing on the survival strategies of small producers such as the diversification of the income of and the increasing indebtedness of producers relying on social networks to cope with the competitive neoliberal market conditions.[60] They conceptualize the transformation of agricultural production and social relations in rural areas as the formation of a "new peasantry." One of the most common strategies expressed in the recent literature is the increase in off-farm activities in peasant households. As pointed out in the preceding section, the cost-price squeeze, the insecurity of farmers in the market, fluctuating input and output prices, and indebtedness force farming households to diversify their income. Accordingly, one or more members of the household search for alternate ways of generating additional income by working in neighboring towns and cities or even in a foreign country, which can take the form of seasonal migration, semi-permanent settlement, or permanent residency.[61]

Keyder and Yenal explain non-farm economic activities in relation to the opportunities in the regional economy.[62] For instance, one option is to work in hotels and other tourist-oriented businesses due to the boom in tourism; young villagers residing in coastal regions usually opt to work temporarily in such facilities. Similarly, Öztürk et al. state that plateu

60 Murat Öztürk, Joost Jongerden, and Andy Hilton, "The (Re)Production of the New Peasantry in Turkey." *Journal of Rural Studies* 61 (July 2018): 244–54. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrurstud.2017.10.009; Çağlar Keyder and Zafer Yenal, *Bildigimiz Tarimin Sonu*. Cağaloğlu, İstanbul: Iletisim Yayincilik, 2013.

61 Zülküf Aydın, "The New Right, Structural Adjustment and Turkish Agriculture: Rural Responses and Survival Strategies," *The European Journal of Development Research* 14: 2 (2002): 197.

62 Çağlar Keyder and Zafer Yenal, "Agrarian Transformation, Labor Supplies, and Proletarianization Process in Turkey: A Historical Overview," *Austrian Journal of Development* 27:1 (2011):14-15.

tourism (yayla turizmi) and summer villages (yaz köyü) are tourism alternatives for city dwellers who now can find accommodation in hotels in the countryside vis-à-vis advancements in transportation – new airports and better local road links.[63] These create job opportunities for farm dwellers not only in hotels but also in restaurants and gift shops.

I observed this pattern only during my fieldwork in the Bursa-Orhangazi region. Its proximity to Istanbul (about a two hour drive), fresh air, and high ratios of green space have nourished tourism. Interviewees stated that the number of luxury villas has considerably increased in recent years. Members of the upper class, mostly from Istanbul, bought parcels of land on which to construct villas and plant gardens - small farming areas in the village. They come and go on weekends and public holidays. Furthermore, there are new hotels and bed and breakfeasts that offer ecotourism, making new touristic zones of villages where restaurants serve local food and shops sell local products shops like olive oil and soap.

The rising tourism potential for tourism has attracted the attention of political actors. The Orhangazi municipality organized a meeting with the Orhangazi Chamber of Commerce and Industry, NGOs, and trade associations on the subject of tourism in Orhangazi.[64] They put forward a target to increase touristic investment and enterprises in the region. As political authorities try to reduce olive production areas with new legislation,[65] tourism is promoted to farm dwellers as an alternate income-generating sector.

In terms of the nature of business and its transformative effects on rural space, a different peasant profile gives way to a new debate on the agrarian question in the literature. Murat Öztürk et al. conceptualizes the new form taken by small farmland owners as a "new peasantry," which

63 Öztürk et al., "The (re)production," 9.

64 "Orhangazi'de Gelecek Turizm." *Bursa Hayat Gazetesi*, November 20, 2017. http://www.bursahayat.com.tr/haber/orhangazi-de-gelecek-turizm-114756.html.

65 Orkun Doğan, "Zeytin Ağacının Gölgesinde: Tarım ve Enerji Alanında 2023 Kalkınma Stratejileri," *Toplumve Bilim*, no. 138/139 (December 2016).

addresses to these peasants "insistent" stance against capitalist and modernist agricultural production relations.[66] Off-farm activities constitute a cornerstone in their analysis, that shows that these peasants are not totally separated from agriculture. Opposing the "disappearance thesis,"[67] they assert that the persistence of small farming refutes the classical expectation of an "inevitable split between labor workers and entrepreneur capitalists."

This approach, however, fails to explain the increasing "employer" character of family farming. This thesis and several studies[68] show the need for waged labor to compensate for the lack of an unpaid workfamily force and traditional production relations. Öztürk et al.'s analysis relies heavily on qualitative data on ecotourism, semi-permanent urban migration, and permanent returnees to rural lands. The main components of agrarian production (capital accumulation, labor, and reproduction) are absent. Instead, they describe new forms of peasantry, pointing out their diversified economic activities and spaces in between the urban and the

66 Öztürk et al., "The (re)production"

67 As explained in Chapter 2, the "disappearance thesis" is part of a larger debate. The "Agrarian question" refers to a nineteenth century debate in the literature that turned around how the rural would be restructured after or during the transition to a capitalist market. There were two competing approaches. The disappearance thesis argued that three peasant classes existed – namely, rich, middle, and poor peasants. According to this approach, these would transform into two: agrarian capital (rich peasants) and proletarian labor (poor peasants). The majority of middle peasants would join the latter and a minority would become involved in the former (Bernstein, 2009: 58). In contrast, the permanence thesis asserts that small independent peasantries can survive with the expansion of capitalism in agriculture by developing survival strategies such as the self-exploitation of family labor. In this way, they adapt themselves to the capitalist system without becoming a "capitalist entrepreneur." Farshad A. Araghi, "Global Depeasantization, 1945-1990." *The Sociological Quarterly* 36, no. 2 (1995).

68 See Uygar Yıldırım, *1980 Sonrası Türkiye Tarımında Yapısal Dönüşüm ve Mevsimlik Tarım İşçileri* (Ph.D. Diss., Istanbul University, 2014); Sidar Çınar, *Bağımlı Çalışma İlişkileri Kapsamında Mevsimlik Tarım İşçilerinin Malatya Örneği Üzerinden Analizi* (Ph.D. Diss., Marmara University, 2012); Umut Ulukan, *Türkiye Tarımında Yapısal Dönüşüm ve Sözleşmeli Çiftçilik: Bursa Örneği*, İstanbul: SAV Yayınları, (2000).

rural. Contrary to this, I argue that the concept of "peasantry" cannot be separated from agricultural production, and I problematize whether an entrepreneur in ecotourism can be labeled a "peasant" or "semi-peasant."

According to the definition in Agriculture Law No. 5488,[69] a peasant refers to a person who is farm owner, sharecropper, or tenant who is involved in agrarian production at least for one planting or harvest time each year. Apart from the legal definition, the Turkish literature has evaluated small family farming in relation to agrarian production, including subsistence farming, and the production og petty commodities for the market. Although dual and multiple residences and working habits signify differences in the forms of rural life from past patterns, this does not refute the arguments of the disappearance thesis, which depends mainly on an analysis of production relations.

Another aspect of the diversified economic activities of farm family households -in and out the villages- is the strengthening role of the "peasant-employer." Regardless of whether family members participate in off-farm activities, the continuation of agrarian production depends on delocalized labor (due to the lack of unpaid family workers) for hoeing and the harvesting of labor intensive crops. Thus, the main factor that allows small family farming to survive and the profile of small peasant to persist is the availability of a seasonal external labor force willing to work for cheaper wages. The increasing supply of labor will be discussed along with the parameter of dispossession in ensuing chapters.

§ 4.5 Concluding Remarks

In this chapter, I have examined increasing demand that accompanies the restructuring of agricultural production in the context of contemporary capitalism. First, I draw attention to the paradoxical situation of the dependence of small farmers on waged labor even as the agricultural population has been dissolving. This chapter of the dissertation discussed

69 Tarım Kanunu, no. 5488 (2006). http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2006/04/20060425-1.htm.

the emerging strategies of the small peasantry with a specific focus on mechanization, the crop preferences of employers, and income diversification in rural households. In brief, I concluded that farmers are keen to update their production process with new agricultural technologies to decrease labor costs and shorten the harvest period, which may give them a competitive advantage in the market. However, their crop preferences are not suitable for totally mechanized agriculture.

In effect, market prices are a decisive factor in the preferences of farmers. While the value of traditional crops such as cotton, maize, and wheat, which are suitable for mechanized harvesting, is low, the price of fresh fruits and vegetables that mainly require manual labor is more profitable in terms of price. Thus, the farmers' solution for economic hardship is to seek cheaper labor to reduce production costs even though they do not want to hire outside labor. The last strategy involves various means of diversifying the income of household members. Short term employment in urban areas and working in the ecotourism sector in villages is observable in some instances. However, the prime factor that allows peasantries to survive is the availability of migrant workers who work for cheaper wages. Rather than income diversification, agricultural production is sustained via the increasing employment of waged workers in the production of fresh fruits and vegetables. As such, this chapter contributes to the contemporary literature by indicating the increasing dependence of small peasantries on migrant workers and criticizes the assumptions of New Peasanty approach about the survival strategies of small peasantries, which exclude the role of migrant workers.

5

Syrian Refugees as Seasonal Migrant Workers: Re-Construction of Unequal Power Relations[1]

This chapter examines Syrian refugees as seasonal migrant workers in Turkey's agriculture. By isolating the particular case of Syrian refugees, this part of the thesis unfolds how unequal power relations among ethnically different groups of workers in the agricultural sector are (re)constructed and the consequences of the emergence of Syrian refugees as a new class.

As the previous chapter showed, the demand for cheaper labor has recently increased recently due to the unavailability of unpaid family labor and the new necessity of changing crop composition under the pressure of neoliberal agrarian policies. Local workers who commute between or within the villages and Kurdish migrants who comprised the main external labor source are not sufficient to fulfill the emerging demand for cheaper labor. In effect, the demand does not derive from fewer agricultural workers but from crises in agriculture that emerged when fluctuating market prices prompted employers and labor intermediaries to continuously look for cheaper labor.

1 The greater part of this chapter was published as Deniz Pelek, "Syrian Refugees as Seasonal Migrant Workers: Re-Construction of Unequal Power Relations in Turkish Agriculture," *Journal of Refugee Studies* (October 2018) https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/fey050.

In chapter 3, I defined three migration waves: a migration flow from the Caucasus since the 1990s that resulted in undocumented agricultural employment; a Syrian refugee migration following the begin of Syrian civil war in 2011, and the migration of internally displaced Kurdish people due to the evacuation of the villages and forced migration in the 1990s. In this section, I critically discuss the working and living conditions that foster vulnerability among the second migration group relative to local workers and the first and third of these migrant groups. Syrian refugees are subject to discriminatory practices in terms of wages, working hours, and the conditions of their accomodation.

This chapter explores the process and practice of an ethnically hierarchized agricultural labor market following the arrival of refugees by looking at how actors on the farms (workers, labor intermediaries, land owners, villagers, and state representatives) have responded to the current situation with regard to three controversial subjects: migrant employment, the legal framework, and the politics of Syrian refugees. I argue that the externalization of the labor force is realized by creating new layers, that necessitate the construction of new ethnic categories such as Syrian refugees.

In the following sections, I first provide background information on the arrival of Syrian refugees in Turkey, the legal framework of concerning their particular "refugee" status, and arrangements for the integration of Syrians into the Turkish labor market. This thesis outlines the reasons for Syrians' vulnerability stemming from an ongoing agrarian transformation process: their fragile legal status, the informality of job relations, and the need for a cheap, docile temporary labor force. Then, following a brief revisit to and refinement of the literature on migrant and rural studies, I analyze the results of my ethnographic fieldwork in the provinces of Manisa, Adana, and Mersin. In particular, I discuss inequalities in working conditions experienced by Syrian agricultural workers as well as their unique, vulnerable position in limbo in Turkish society.

§ 5.1 Arrival of Syrians to Turkey

Syrian civil war has led to an influx of asylum seekers to Turkey. This has reshaped economic, social, and political relations on global, regional, and national scales and produced new antagonisms between different actors in the labor market as well as within the society. The forced migration of Syrians began around 2011 in parallel with the worsening conditions due to the rising the civil war. Turkey currently hosts the largest Syrian refugee population with 3,6 million registered Syrian as of 2019 among others, Lebanon (938,531), Jordan (664,330), Iraq (253,371) and Egypt (132,473).[2]



Figure 5.1 Syrian People of Concern by Country of Asylum. Source: UNCHR. Map by author.

Turkish political authorities did not foresee such large quantities of refugee inflow at the outset of the war and implemented "open border pol-

2 UNCHR, "Situation Syria Regional Refugee Response," (June 2019). https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria.

icy" from the beginning. The scholarly works on refugee studies and related policymaking has mostly intensified on the legal issues and citizenship of Syrian refugees who especially reside in urban centers and refugee camps.[3] However, this migratory movement simultaneously meant a "labor migration" for Turkey, which keeps being a crucial yet understudied aspect of the phenomenon. Although it is clear that the refugees do not migrate in order to work in better conditions and/or have more job opportunities - that are basically the essential motivations of the labor migration-, they end up becoming actively involved in both urban and agricultural labor market.

This chapter aims to help fill this lacuna in the literature by analyzing the case of Syrian agricultural workers and problematizing their vulnerable position in the labor market. In particular, I argue how refugee migration differs from routine labor migration. In doing so, I pay particular attention how the category of Syrian refugees is embedded in broader socio-economic and political developments in Turkish agricultural landscape. In this sense, ethnic differences and Turkish politico-economic context are taken as two pivotal points to shed light on how the changing composition of the market shapes and informs emerging dynamics of power relations. The relation between ethnicity and migration has been

3 For instance, see in, Burcu Togral Koca, "Deconstructing Turkey's 'Open Door' Policy towards Refugees from Syria," *Migration Letters* 12, no. 3 (September 2015): 209–25. https://doi.org/10.33182/ml.v12i3.275; Asli Ikizoglu Erensu, and Zeynep Kaşli. "A Tale of Two Cities: Multiple Practices of Bordering and Degrees of 'Transit' in and through Turkey," *Journal of Refugee Studies* 29, no. 4 (December 2016): 528–48. https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/few037; Ahmet İçduygu, *Syrian Refugees in Turkey: The Long Road Ahead* (Washington: DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2015). https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/syrian-refugees-turkey-long-road-ahead; Eda Yakmaz, *Statü Belirleme Sürecinde Türkiye'de Bulunan Refakatsiz Sığınmacı Çocukların Durumu* (Ankara: Uluslararası Ortadoğu Barış Araştırmaları Merkezi, February 2014); AFAD, *Suriyeli Misafirlerimiz Kardeş Topraklarında* (Ankara: T.C. Başbakanlık Afet ve Acil Durum Yönetimi Başkanlığı, 2016).

studied widely in both urban and rural studies.[4] On the one hand, the ethnicity factor is determined by established economic, social and political structures in rural regions. On the other hand, the ethnicity itself is a generative category, shaping the existing mode of relations. Hence, I take ethnicity as a transitive and relational phenomenon.

Understanding how Syrian refugees get integrated and shuffled within the Turkish labor market necessitates analyzing both work relations and everyday life and tracking how the category of refugee has emerged and become embedded in discourses and negotiations between different agents and actors. Thus, I consider such evolving relations between refugees and their native counterparts as factors that perpetuate the vulnerability of Syrians. Moreover, I illustrate how this condition is embedded in national particularities in the Turkish context by underlining the need of cheaper labor force as an ethnically marginalized group, which is necessary for agrarian transition in a macro level. Ultimately, this chapter suggests that the arrival of Syrian war victims occupies specific niches in Turkish seasonal agrarian labor market and it re-constructs power relations through ethnic lines; therefore, the emerging phenomena should be argued within a coherent frame that brings "refugee" and "temporary migrant labor" themes together

4 Peer Smets and Saskia ten Kate. "Let's Meet! Let's Exchange! LETS as an Instrument for Linking Asylum Seekers and the Host Community in the Netherlands," *Journal of Refugee Studies* 21, no. 3 (September 2008): 326–46. https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/fen026; Djordje Stefanovic, Neophytos Loizides, and Samantha Parsons. "Home Is Where the Heart Is? Forced Migration and Voluntary Return in Turkey's Kurdish Regions," *Journal of Refugee Studies* 28, no. 2 (June 1, 2015): 276–96. https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/feu029; Kye Askins, "Crossing Divides: Ethnicity and Rurality," *Journal of Rural Studies*, De-centring White Ruralities: Ethnicity and Indigeneity, 25, no. 4 (October 2009): 365–75. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrurstud.2009.05.009; Liliana Suárez-Navaz, "Immigration and the Politics of Space Allocation in Rural Spain: The Case of Andalusia," *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 34, no. 2 (April 1, 2007): 207–39. https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150701516682; Philip Martin, "Mexican Workers and U.S. Agriculture: The Revolving Door," *International Migration Review* 36, no. 4 (December 2002): 1124–42. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7379.2002.tb00120.x.

§ 5.2 Legal Framework for Syrian Refugees

An 'open border policy' has been implemented since the first entrance of Syrians to Turkey. The policy enabled Syrians to cross the border through certain checkpoints. They do not hold refugee-status, but are classified under 'temporary protection' category, which means that

- they can seek asylum,
- they cannot be subjected to forced refoulement,
- there are no limitations on their duration of stay in Turkey during the war,
- they will not have citizenship status
- they are beneficiaries of humanitarian aid as long as they reside inside the camps. This politico-legal condition creates a public perception of Syrians as 'guests' who will return to their places of origin someday.

Two legal documents have informed the main policy framework governing the flows of immigrants and asylum seekers in Turkey. First is the 1934 Settlement Law, which explicitly favored the immigration of people of Turkish descent and culture. Although the 1934 Settlement law has since been replaced with a newer legislation, the preference for immigrants of "Turkish descent" remained a key element of Turkey's legal framework for decades.[5]

Second is the 1951 Geneva Convention, and its 1967 Additional Protocol on the status of refugees. Turkey is signatory to both but has maintained a geographical limitation that grants asylum rights only to Europeans. In 2013, the new arrangement put into effect; the new Law on Foreigners and International Protection was declared. It clarifies the conditions for submitting an asylum claim in Turkey, but still maintains the geographic

5 Ahmet İçduygu, *Syrian Refugees in Turkey: The Long Road Ahead* (Washington: DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2015), 4. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/syrian-refugees-turkey-long-road-ahead.

limitation of the 1951 Geneva Convention.[6] Thus, most of the non-European asylum-seekers are still not entitled to stay in Turkey, even if they gain refugee status through the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNCHR) procedures.[7]

As the political situation is not stabilized in Syria and Syrian refugees' long term presence has become a reality, the Turkish state has taken a number of steps to ensure refugees' access to basic rights such as education,[8] health services[9] while "housing" and "employment" remained as unresolved pressing problems. Turkish Asylum System does not offer housing or rental aid except for the refugee camp.[10] According to the latest statistics, 93 percent of Syrian refugees live outside of state-run refugee camps.[11] The camps had insufficient capacity to deal with the large numbers of refugees and Syrians' desired to be economically independent and live outside camps.[12] Furthermore, the Ministry of Interior recently closed six refugee camps, reasoning that these closures saved the

6 Kemal Kirişçi, "UNHCR and Turkey: Cooperating for Improved Implementation of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees," *International Journal of Refugee Law* 13, no. 1_and_2 (January 2001). https://doi.org/10.1093/ijrl/13.1_and_2.71.

7 İçduygu, *Syrian Refugees,* 5.

8 Maissam Nimer and Tuygun Oruç, "Sustainable Approaches to Humanitarian Assistance in the Field of Language Education for Adult Refugees in Turkey," IPC Mercator Policy Brief. Istanbul Policy Center Sabancı University, March 2019; Çetin Çelik and Ahmet İçduygu, "Schools and Refugee Children: The Case of Syrians in Turkey," *International Migration* 57, no. 2 (2019): 253–67. https://doi.org/10.1111/imig.12488.

9 Gabriele Cloeters and Souad Osseiran, "İstanbul'da Suriyeli Mültecilerin Sağlık Hizmetlerine Erişimi: Toplumsal Cinsiyete Duyarlı Bir Bakış Açısı," Istanbul Policy Center Sabancı University, March 2019.

10 Doğuş Şimşek and Metin Çorabatır, *Challenges and Opportunities of Refugee Integration in Turkey* (Research Centre on Asylum and Migration, 2016), 82.

11 "Yıllara Göre Geçici Kapsama Altındaki Suriyeliler." İçişleri Bakanlığı Göç İdaresi Genel Müdürlüğü, May 2019. http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik6/gecici-koruma_363_378_4713_icerik.

12 Içduygu, *Syrian Refugees.*

Turkish state 76 million 936 thousand 447 Liras. The closures resulted in almost 133 thousand refugees having to leave these camps.[13]

The integration into the labor market of those under temporary protection has become a growing concern as unemployment has upsurge among refugees. Regulation on Working Permit of Foreigners under Temporary Protection that was published in the official gazette on 15 January 2016 allowed them to apply to the Ministry of Labor for work permits six months after their registration for the temporary protection status. According to the legislation, refugees cannot be paid less than minimum wage; the ratio of refugee workers cannot exceed 10% of the total Turkish employees in the same workplace. However, those who work in agriculture and husbandry as seasonal workers are exempted from the work permit requirements (Implementation Guide Regarding the Work Permits of Foreigners Provided with Temporary Protection). Agriculture is the only exception, making it possible to estimate a rise in the number of Syrian agricultural workers in a foreseeable future. The state's implicit encouragement through the work permit exemption for agricultural jobs signalizes a forecasted rise in the number of Syrian agricultural workers in the foreseeable future in a sector where they are already many Syrian refugees working.

§ 5.3 Why do Syrians Wittingly Become Cheaper Laborers?

Generally speaking, refugees are in a situation derived from their political status. They are subject to exploitation in labor market, face social exclusion, and are open to hazards of stigmatizing and marginalizing due to their characteristic features unfamiliar to the locals such as language, cultural habits, or clothing but what makes the case of Syrian migrant agricultural workers unique in terms of vulnerability? What differentiates Syrian refugees from Mexican seasonal agricultural workers in the US, from Moroccan workers in French agriculture? or from Karen refugees as

13 Alican Uludağ, "3.5 Milyonu Aştı," *Cumhuriyet Newspaper*, November 22, 2018. http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/turkiye/1147768/3.5_milyonu_asti.html.

seasonal workers in Australian agricultural labor market? Turkish rural landscape has its own chaotic structure dominated by local actors and with specific power configurations between ethnicity and poverty. Hence, understanding the case of Syrian refugees in this context necessitates bringing together analytical tools both from migration and rural studies.

As in the discussed in Chapter 2, one of the most commonly referred approaches in migration studies searching a comprehensive answer to the question "why do people migrate?" is "push" and "pull" factors model. Briefly put, pull-factors refer to the migrants' desire to improve their working and living conditions, and access to education and health services. This approach considers the migrant as a person making purposeful "rational choices" to have a better life. Push-factors, on the other hand, signify the conditions that urge migrants to leave their hometowns due to economic problems such as extensive unemployment rates, high cost of living, inflation, and poverty; political reasons such as war and persecution of minorities; or natural disasters.

However, "push-pull effect" approach is criticized by many scholars for its overlook on the diversity of historical background of the countries and on the underlying causes of migration in relation with more complex social and political dimensions. Morice[14] argues that migration in precarious conditions is rising, resulting either in permanent wandering or in settlement initially believed to temporary but which becomes lasting, in particular in so-called "transit countries"-e.g., Morocco, Turkey and Ukraine- where nothing is done to provide shelter to migrants who find themselves trapped. In line with the criticism of Morice, especially pull-factors do not explain Syrian refugees working as seasonal workers in Turkey, since, especially in rural sectors, the former do not offer any favorable conditions except for the survival as Syrians are placed at the bottom in terms of working and sheltering conditions. In order to discuss the

14 Alain Morice, "Les Migrants dand le Monde," in *Atlas des migrants en Europe - 3e éd. - Approches critiques des politiques migratoires* (Paris: Armand Colin, 2017), 15.

particular case of Syrian refugees as seasonal workers, this chapter employ four concepts to further push-pull factors with regard to the puzzling dialectic of poverty and ethnicity in agricultural labor market.

First, the "bargaining power," suggested by Ben Rogaly,[15] determines working conditions and wages of workers. Differentiation in terms of work arrangements for the same job between different groups of workers depends on the level of poverty. Poorest section of workers make the worst job arrangements, for their bargaining power is weaker compared to others. In other words, the "relatively lesser poor" make better deals. While this perspective is useful to explain the inequalities depend on the poverty, it fails to explain diverse vulnerabilities between different groups who have the workers shared similar poverty levels. The analysis based solely on economic explanations disregard socio-political causes that are especially significant for the case of refugees separating them from other emigrants.

Second, the "fear of deportation" explains workers' weaknesses stemming from political factors. Basok et al.[16] problematizes deportability as a strategy, which hangs over workers like the sword of Damocles. As such, it serves discriminating migrant workers, leaving them with no option but agree to work in dangerous, dirty, and demeaning jobs (3D jobs) for low pay. Deportability operates to sustain workers' subjection to discipline either by external power or by self-discipline under the persistent threat of deportation. Even if deportation is merely a possibility, the fear itself is the main factor driving its effects. Furthermore, the fear of deportation reaches beyond economic anxieties, and conducts migrants' desires and public "visibility" with some sort of panopticon effect.[17]

15 Ben Rogaly, "Agricultural Growth and the Structure of 'Casual' Labour-hiring in Rural West Bengal," *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 23, no. 4 (July 1, 1996): 155. https://doi.org/10.1080/03066159608438622.

16 Tanya Basok, Danièle Bélanger, and Eloy Rivas. "Reproducing Deportability: Migrant Agricultural Workers in South-Western Ontario" *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 40, no. 9 (September 2014): 1394–1413. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2013.849566.

17 Ibid., 1407.

Third, the "status of paradox"[18] defines the devaluation of human capital and lowering of status of immigrants in hosting countries by employing them in low-skill jobs. Nieswand asserts that this is a purposeful strategy designed by the state to isolate migrants from the society. Similarly, Jackson and Bauder[19] describe this phenomenon by the concept of "occupational downward mobility," which leads to the feeling of powerless regarding to refugees' ability to improve their situation. At this point, it is worth to ask: why do people migrate in a seemingly witting manner to accept working under price compared to their local counterparts, living with continuous threat of deportation, taking the risk of devaluation? The last concept, "frame of reference" is useful to explain such contradictory migration choices. According to this, an immigrant makes a purposeful and logical decision by comparing the conditions of hosting country and his/her home country. Thus, even though migrants' wages are lower; they compare their earnings with the standards of their homeland rather than with the wages of their local colleagues or those from other backgrounds. They therefore tend to not demand equal work rights or wages.[20]

Although analytical tools from Push-Pull factors and the four theoretical concepts are illuminating to unclose the vulnerable case of Syrian refugees as seasonal migrant workers, there is still a need to further these explanations to analyze how the entrance of a refugee group feeds an already ethnically hierarchized agricultural labor market, constituting a structural component of re-construction of power relations. I assert the concept of "fear of death and violence" provides with a comprehensive

18 Boris. Nieswand, "Methodological Transnationalism and the Paradox of Migration," EASA Biennial Conference (2006): 2. http://www.urbanlab.org/articles/Nieswand%202006%20methodological_transnationalism.pdf.

19 Samantha Jackson and Harald Bauder. "Neither Temporary, Nor Permanent: The Precarious Employment Experiences of Refugee Claimants in Canada." *Journal of Refugee Studies* 27, no. 3 (September 2014): 367. https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/fet048.

20 Johan Fredrik Rye and Joanna Andrzejewska, "The Structural Disempowerment of Eastern European Migrant Farm Workers in Norwegian Agriculture," *Journal of Rural Studies* 26, no. 1 (January 2010): 48. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrurstud.2009.06.003.

understanding how a category of refugee can be incorporated into an analysis the contemporary forms of informalized work and employment in all diversity under the influence of neoliberal policies that always necessitates flexible work force. Differently from the "fear of persecution"[21] -which is a key term to define and acquire the refugee status in Geneva Convention- that refers to refugees' fearing of human right abuses in leaving places, I employ "fear of death and violence" in a broader sense in terms of the consequences of this feeling in the hosted places. Beyond the solely economy-based analysis in relation with poverty levels of the workers, deportation fear of refugees and high unemployment rates in the places of origin, rather the reference point relying on an emotion for the comparison between their own country and hosting places is having a memory on violence and war that determines refugee's specific position in the labor market and in the society, which also serves immediate solutions for the crises of capitalism by creating opportunities to some groups over hyper-exploitation of labor.

§ 5.4 Refugeeization of Labor Force

Refugees are being incorporated into labor market under indecent conditions in many countries. Dines and Rigo describe this particular situation of refugees with the concept "refugeeization of labor," which refers to a situation in the Italian context where human rights abuses outweight the abuse of workers rights.[22] Similarly, the vulnerabilities of Syrian refugees are embedded in a complex frame of "refugeeness" and "precariat labor" wherein these workers are positioned at the bottom of the agricultural work hierarchy. There are various factors responsible for Syrian refugees' weakest negotiating position vis-a-vis their employers and labor

21 Bill Frelick and Barbara Kohnen, "Filling the Gap: Temporary Protected Status," *Journal of Refugee Studies* 8, no. 4 (January 1995): 339. https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/8.4.339.

22 Nick Dines and Enrica Rigo, "Refugeeization of the Workforce: Migrant Agricultural Labor in the Italian Mezzogiorno," in *Postcolonial Transitions in Europe: Contexts, Practices and Politics*, edited by Sandra Ponzanesi, Gianmaria Colpani, Paul Gilroy, and Anca Parvulescu, (London, New York: Rowman & Littlefield International, 2016), 151-172.

intermediaries, as there are diverse processes leading to vulnerability of refugees in the labor relation. Especially, I will draw attention to: (1) poverty and dispossession, (2) fear of deportation, (3) dependency on labor intermediaries, (4) language problem, (5) conflicts between different worker groups and marginalization of Syrian refugees and finally (6) fear of death and violence.

First, I basically want to understand the underlining reasons for the inequalities regarding to Syrian refugees. Turning back to Rogaly's assumption on bargaining power, I ask, do the poorest workers actually make the worst job contract? In order to test the poverty level as a factor determining the bargaining power of various groups of workers, dispossession (which provides a foregrounded cause of poverty) can be distinguished in addition to economic and political motives that contribute together to the increase the vulnerability. In the case of Syrian refugees, dispossession plays a significant role for choosing migration. A young man interviewee from Aleppo told his story on passing the border:

> We set off in the night; we didn't take any clothes, food or pots and pans. Then, we passed a hole which had about 2-2,5 meter depth. We cut each other from the hole barely. When we passed the border, Turkish soldiers saw us but they didn't restrain us from getting to Turkey.[23] (Worker 67, male, aged 17, hometown: Idlib)

Like his case, most of the Syrian refugees is totally dispossessed, which accentuates their vulnerability in comparison to other workers who suffer from poverty. At first glance, this could have explained their position as the weakest in the labor market. However, during my fieldwork, I observed similar poverty levels regarding dispossession among Turkish Kurds, and especially, among the internally displaced population. A

23 "Gece vakti çıktık yola. Yanımıza herhangi bir eşya, bir yiyecek malzemesi, kap kacak almadık, sadece biraz elbise aldık. Aşağı yukarı 2-2.5 metre derinliğinde bir çukurdan geçtik. Birbirimizi zar zor çıkardık oradan. Türkiye'ye geçtiğimizde Türk askerleri bizi gördü, ama girişimizi engellemediler". Interview by the author, tape recording in Arabic. Akhisar (Manisa), 10.08.2014.

woman from Şırnak-Cizre who became a seasonal migrant worker after the evacuation of her village in 1994 told:

> We moved to Cizre in 1994 due to the evacuation of our village. Before, we had a land in our village, it was big and we hadn't go to another city as seasonal migrant workers. We had produced bean, lentil, wheat, barley, rice and tomatoes. We had done subsistence farming and we hadn't bought anything from Cizre except for oil. We had also produced walnut and sold a part of it in the market. Now, we just only have a house in Cizre. If we don't go to another city as seasonal migrant workers for 6 months, we will die due to the hunger.[24] (Worker 42, female, aged 40, hometown: Cizre/Şırnak)

She is 40 years old; her experience on the transition from subsistent farming to migrant employment due to the political reasons clearly shows that her survival depends on seasonal agrarian jobs, perhaps in a slightly different manner from Syrians, as the former have houses but no job opportunity in their hometowns, while sharing the threat of hunger with the Syrians. Although they have similar poverty levels, Syrians hold a "weaker" position in the bargaining process. This is clearly observed in the distribution of work conditions in terms of wages, working hours, and shelter. Syrians earn less and work longer hours for the same job, and compared to the other workers they live in tents with much worse conditions where basic infrastructure is completely lacking.

In this context, *bargaining power* seems to be the main factor, as local workers with their relatively confident economic situation do not accept staying in tents with insufficient infrastructure. If they reject working and/or sheltering conditions, they have an option to go back to their

24 "Biz Cizre merkeze 1994'te taşındık, köy boşaltılınca. Ondan önce köyde büyük toprağımız vardı. Öyle başka şehirlere falan gitmiyoduk. Fasulye, arpa, buğday, pirinç, domates ediyoduk toprağa. Kendi kendimize yetiyoduk. Cizreden yağ dışında hiçbir şey almazdık. Cevizde ekoyduk, onu satıyoduk bir de. Şimdi başka şehre çalışmaya gitmesek, acımızdan ölürüz. Yılın 6 ayı başka yerlerdeyiz." Interview by the author, tape recording in Turkish. Cizre (Şırnak), 12.02.2014.

homes where they can be employed in agricultural production. In fact, local workers usually have a small plot of land and they work in nearby villages for additional income. Thus, the difference between local workers and others confirms Rogaly's assumption that "lesser poor make better job agreement." However, it does not explain the difference between Syrians and Kurdish workers who are exposed to exploitation in different levels. In fact, creating *ethnic antagonism*[25] by splitting the agricultural labor market is not new to Turkey. For instance, in 2009, Turkish Kurds used to gain less per day than local workers for the same job.[26] With the entrance of Syrians to agrarian labor market, a different frame emerged within which socio-economic exploitative relations are recast. Syrians have substituted Kurdish workers at the bottom of the hierarchical order.

The question to be asked here is: what is it that places Syrians at the bottom of the class hierarchy? *"Fear of deportation"* is explanatory. Interviewed during my fieldwork in Manisa, a labor intermediary said that gendarmes came and asked if there were Syrian workers. Although he said "no," Syrian workers were actually employed in the field he oversaw. In his opinion, the inspectors know about the presence of Syrians but exercise their power only by enquiring, without any further enforcement. As a matter of fact, it is common knowledge that about three and half million Syrians live in Turkey and a considerable majority of them work in agriculture. If the government decided to deport them, their life and work experience in Turkey would end. Although no such decision has been made, the sheer *fear of deportability* is imposed on Syrians to leave them in a more fragile position and to reduce their *bargaining power*.

Fearing the state about illegalities in Syrian employment is not confined to Syrian workers, agrarian producers and labor intermediaries also beware gendarmerie patrols. During a visit to a labor camp in

25 Edna Bonacich, "A Theory of Ethnic Antagonism: The Split Labor Market." *American Sociological Review* 37, no. 5 (1972): 547–59. https://doi.org/10.2307/2093450

26 Deniz Pelek, *Seasonal Migrant Workers in Agriculture: The Cases of Ordu and Polatlı*, MA Thesis, Bogazici University, 2010, 26.

Akhisar district of Manisa, I had conducted several interviews with Syrian workers. As I finished my work, the employer came and I offered to interview him as well. When I asked about Syrians, he replied: "There are no Syrians here! They are from Turkey. Don't get me into trouble. There are no Syrians" (Producer 1, male, aged 70, hometown: Akhisar) Manisa).[27] He wanted to hide the presence of Syrians even at their presence. In rare occurrences, gendarmes ask for removing Syrians from the tents or fields. In Adana, I interviewed a labor intermediary contracting Syrian workers, who stated:

> Syrians were here from the 7th to the 8th month. I felt difficulties due to the gendarme controls. Following, I said, "We cannot struggle with the state. Go away for a few weeks" to them. After, they left and returned to Syria through the border in Urfa. They stayed in Syria for 10 days. Later, they went to İzmir and worked for 20-25 days but couldn't take their earnings there. They called me and told, "we will come to your place," and I replied, "okay."[28] (Labor intermediary 6, male, aged 45, hometown: Urfa)

As seen above, Syrians do not always work for lower wages; sometimes they even work free of charge. A young man, Syrian worker, told me that before coming to Manisa they were hoeing without payment in exchange for their meals in the sugar beet fields in Konya, and that they accepted the job because they had no other options to survive. During my fieldwork, they were working in tomato-picking for 30TL while it was 40TL for the other worker groups. He stated:

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27 "Kızım, burada Suriyeli falan yok. Hepsi Türk. Benim başımı belaya sokma! Burada Suriyeli yok." Interview by the author, tape recording in turkish. Akhisar (Manisa), 22.08.2013.

28 "7. aydan 8. aya kadar burdalardı, jandarma bize zor verdi. ben de kalktım bunlara dedim ki kardeşim, devletle uğraştırılmaz. gidin bir kaç hafta bir yere gidin burdan. gittiler bizim urfanın kapısından suriyeye geçtiler. gittiler bir 10 gün orda kaldılar. ordan izmire gittiler. izmirde 20-25 gün çalışmışlar. işlerine gelmemiş artık paralarını mı vermemişler. beni aradılar dediler amca yanına gelecez. dedim gelin bacım." Interview by the author, tape recording in Turkish. Karataş (Adana), 06.09.2013.

> I worked in Urfa and Adana. The farm labor intermediary escaped without paying our earnings, which was about 5.000TL. He is from Urfa. In Turkey, farm labor intermediaries are always the same. Syrians come and work here but they don't give money. Only the labor intermediary that we are working with now gives the money. We couldn't get paid in Urfa and Antep as well. I went to Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Algeria and Tunisia. All of them were good, but Turkey is dirty. I don't want to live in Turkey.[29] (Worker 68, male, aged 40, hometown: Kobane).

Another related instance described by a Syrian worker from Idlib points out a similar problem: "A farm labor intermediary brought 400 workers to the field and after the harvest he calculated the workers' total amount of money deceitfully. He embezzled 17,000TL belonging to the workers into his own pocket. I always fear that a farm labor intermediary will swindle our wages."[30] (Worker 104, male, aged 51, hometown: Idlib). The worker had his visitor card and showed it to me but he was desperate: he did not know his legal rights, he feared refoulement, and he was worried about how to verify his labor. Having *fear of deportability* was a salient obstacle to seeking rights and demanding equal conditions with other workers.

5.4.1 *Dependency on Labor Intermediaries*

Sustaining vulnerability in different levels is realized through the informal character of the labor market. All above interviews indicate the

29 "Adana'da çalıştım, Urfa'da çalıştım. Dayıbaşı 5 milyar paramızı ödemeden kaçtı. Türkiyedeki dayıbaşılar hep böyle. Suriyeliler geliyor çalışıyor, para vermiyorlar. Bir tek şu an çalıştığımız dayıbaşı para verdi. adanada çalıştık paramızı alamadık. urfa ve anteptte de alamadık. Lübnan'a gittim, Suriyeye gittim, Ürdüne gittim, Irak'a gittim, Cezayir'e gittim, Tunus'a gittim ve Türkiyeye geldim. Hepsi güzel, Türkiye pis. Türkiyede yaşamak istemiyorum. Interview by the author, tape recording in Kurdish. Akhisar (Manisa), 10.08.2014.

30 "Dayıbaşı bizimle beraber 400 işçi getirmişti. İş bitince, paramızı yanlış hesapladı, hile yaptı. 17 bin liramızı çaldı. Ben hep dayıbaşlarından korkuyorum, paramızı çalacaklar diye." Interview by the author, tape recording in Kurdish. Tuzla (Adana), 28.01.2015.

prominent role of farm labor intermediaries in constructing these networks. Relations between Kurdish labor intermediaries and Syrian Kurd refugees are particularly interesting for the absence of solidarity. They contact Syrian refugees from near the border where they first locate (the most common are Suruç, Hatay and Adana in the southern Turkey) or they get in touch with potential new workers via phone with the help of existing workers. Normally, one could expect development of solidarity and empathetic relations between Syrian refugees of Kurdish origin and Kurdish labor intermediaries who themselves had once faced with ethnic discrimination in the labor market. Instead, self-interest is a more common attitude among labor intermediaries, which ensures transferring poverty from one underclass group to the other newcomer in a circle of "poverty in turn."[31]

The dependency of Syrian refugees on labor intermediaries does not only derive from job search but also Kurdish and Arab labor intermediaries solve the language problem of the workers. On the one hand, they are among few people who can communicate with these refugees, thus making the latter's life much easier in Turkey. On the other hand, their dependency on labor intermediaries is catalyzed in this process. A labor intermediary that I interviewed in Adana complained about his indispensable role due to his language ability:

> I am working here as a labor intermediary. I speak Arabic. The landowners don't speak Arabic. Actually there is nobody here who speaks Arabic. If, I am not here, Syrians cannot work because the landowners and workers couldn't understand each other. Therefore, I stay here for a year uninterruptedly. Believe me, I couldn't

31 "Poverty in turn" is a concept used to explain the economic interest based relations between migrants in the Sultanbeyli district of Istanbul. It is used for urban migrants; however, it can now also explain unequal power relations in rural areas that have become ethnically more heterogenous. See Oguz, Işık, and M. Melih Pınarcıoğlu, *Nobetlese Yoksulluk* (Istanbul: Iletisim, 2001).

> go back to my hometown, Urfa, for 2 years because of Syrians.[32] (Labor intermediary 17, male, aged 42, hometown: Suruç/Urfa).

Isolation of sheltering spaces from urban centers and villages makes Syrian refugees more dependent on labor intermediaries with regard to the language problem, which blocks the possibility of communication with city dwellers. In Adana, there is a considerable Kurdish and Arab population living in the city center. Although it could be an opportunity for dialogue between Syrians and locals in their native tongue, this is not the case due to the isolated location of tent areas. Thus the labor intermediary is the only person available for communication.

5.4.2 *Language Problem*

Apart from the increasing dependency on labor intermediaries, language problem has also another dramatic impact on the lives of refugees: child labor. In fact, Syrian refugees mostly migrate to Turkey with all family members. All members of these families, including children, work in crop fields. Child labor is extremely common among Syrians, and other factors aside, language problem is one of the main reasons fostering the condition.

I have observed many child workers between the ages of 7-18 who are employed in tomatoes picking, grape harvest and other vegetable and fruit work in the field. A Syrian mother explained her case as follows: "My children work because the school is very far away from here and the courses are in Turkish. All children work here except for the youngest who cannot afford, they are staying in tents and an elder child take after

32 "Burada ağalar Arapça konuşmuyor. Bir tek ben Arapça konuşuyorum. Ben dayıbaşıyım. Benden başka arapça konuşabilen yok burada. Ben burada olmasam, Suriyeliler çalışamaz çünkü ağalar ve işçiler birbirlerini anlayamazlar. Bu yüzden bütün yıl yaz kış burada kalıyorum. İnan bana, 2 yıldır memleketim Urfaya gidemedim, sırf bu Suriyeliler yüzünden." Interview by the author, tape recording in Turkish, Yumurtalık (Adana), 29.01.2015.

them when we are working in the field"[33] (Worker 101, female, aged 44, hometown: Kobane). She stresses on her compelled situation to force her children to work because she does not see any other solution. The daily wage for children is usually equal with those of older workers. As for the piece rate basis, there is no separated salary for each worker. A labor intermediary gives the total earnings to the head of the family who is generally the father. In this case, the initiative belongs totally to the father and whether or how he distributes the money among family members is unclear.

Another instance related with the language problem is the devaluation of the professions of refugees in Turkey. During my fieldwork, I have encountered Syrians who had had qualified jobs in Syria perform agricultural jobs: their language problem prevented them from applying to work permit to do their own professions. A formerly English teacher told her case as follows:

> I was an English teacher at high school. I had a house in Syria. I had a good life there. After the war started and arrived to our province, I decided to go and I left everything behind. Now, I am picking tomatoes.[34] (Worker 2, female, aged 32, hometown: Aleppo).

I also interviewed a philosophy student, a civil servant, and a taxi driver from Syria, all of whom had become agricultural workers. The gap between their jobs in the two countries creates a *status of paradox* as there is not an effectual system enacted by the state to develop the grounds for them to practice their own professions in Turkey. Actually, occupational

33 "Benim çocuklarım çalışıyor tarlada. Okul çok uzak burdan. Dersler de Türkçe. Çocuklar burada kalıyor biz işteyken, içlerinden büyük olan diğerlerine bakıyor." Interview by the author, tape recording in Kurdish. Ceyhan (Adana), 26.01.2015.

34 "Ben lisede İngilizce öğretmeniydim. Suriyede evim vardı. Güzel bir hayatım vardı orada. Savaş bizim oraya kadar gelince, ben gitmeye karar verdim. Her şeyi arkamda bıraktım. Şimdi domates topluyorum işte." Interview by the author, tape recording in Arabic. Akhisar (Manisa), 22.08.2013.

downward mobility is very common among refugees as Jackson and Bauder[35] exemplify the similar cases by showing the profession change from psychologist to kitchen helper or from university professor to duct cleaner in Canada. However, Syrian refugee agricultural workers illustrate a different manner since they do not loose only their profession but also urban place. The scale between their professions is huge as the above quotation indicates that an English teacher is now picking tomatoes. They have to adapt their working and living habits in accordance with the rural life. Syrians whom I interviewed seem to accept this paradox instead of questioning and challenging with it. The primary issue for them is that survive in a quiet place staying away taking a risk of death.

§ 5.5 Conflicts between Different Worker Groups and Marginalization of Syrian Refugees

An additional factor that contributes the fragile status of Syrian refugees that reconstruct unequal power relations is the absence of solidarity between different actors. The discriminatory rhetoric adopted by their coworkers, representatives from NGOs, and farm owners is particularly illuminating. Most of interviewees who came from Syria are Kurds or Arabs. Thus, I had expected to observe a solidarity relation between Kurdish and Arabic workers from Turkey and Syria based on ethnic and religious affinity. On the contrary, conflicts stemming from discriminatory manners against refugees were widespread during my fieldwork. First of all, Syrians are blamed for the drop in income and causing unemployment. A woman worker from Urfa –located in the Southeastern Turkey- told me:

> Syrians make our situation worse this year. Our daily wage is 35 TL. They are working for 20TL. The labor intermediary is receiving

35 Samantha Jackson and Harald Bauder. "Neither Temporary, Nor Permanent: The Precarious Employment Experiences of Refugee Claimants in Canada," *Journal of Refugee Studies* 27, no. 3 (September 2014): 367. https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/fet048.

> 50% as a commission from them so the actual wage earned by Syrians is 10TL but our money is worthy in their hometown; 10TL is equal 100TL. I haven't been there but people are telling this situation. If they work for a year, they will buy a good house there because of the worthiness of Turkish Liras. If you work for 20TL and I work for 30TL, who will be selected for working by an employer? For an employer, all workers are the same if they do the same job. Syrians are more employed comparing to us. We are placed behind them in the order. Apart from employers, labor intermediaries also prefer Syrians for having more commission. Syrians make our situation worse; we have already been poor people. This year, we are wretched.[36] (Worker 15, female, aged 40, hometown: Urfa).

Another interviewee, a man from Urfa, told:

> Syrians made us awful. Think, somebody comes and strips of your job…When we arrive in Nevşehir, suppose that a daily wage is 30, 40 or 50TL, Syrians work for 15TL. In this case, farm owners don't employ us. They prefer Syrians. Syrian workers can't do agricultural jobs because they don't know how this job is practiced. Their Turkish is too little. They also don't know the crops. We don't want to see Syrians, we go to far away distances from Urfa with the hope of that we will not encounter with Syrians. For instance, we thought that Eskişehir is far so we will not see Syrians. When we arrived in Eskişehir, we saw that Syrians were more than us! They

36 "Suriyeliler bu sene mahvetti milleti. Bizim yevmiye 35, onlar 20 ye calsıyor bir de onu dayıbasına veriyor yarı yarıya onlara 10 tl kalıyor ama bizim para orada değerli 10 tl onlar için 100 tl gibi oluyor. Öyle diyorlar, ben kendim görmedim. 1 sene çalışsa orada güzel evleri alıyorlar, parası değerli olduğu için,. Sen 20 tl ye calıssan ben 30 a calıssam, sen kimi götürürsün? senin için işçi aynıdır. yani işini yaptıktan sonra, onları daha fazla işe alıyorlar yani. biz geride kalıyoruz. İşte onlar mahvetti biz zavallıları, bu sene çok perişanız." Interview by the author, tape recording in Turkish. Akhisar (Manisa), 26.08.2013.

> are in everywhere now.[37] (Worker 95, male, aged 54, hometown: Urfa).

A man from Diyarbakır, said:

> In the past, our daily wages were increasing 5 TL regularly every year but it has been made no progress after Syrians came here. In Tarsus, 5 boxes had been a daily wage but employers decided 15 boxes for a daily wage after Syrians.[38] (Worker 60, male, aged 33, hometown: Ceylanpınar/Urfa).

The displeasure of the workers about the presence of Syrian refugees in the labor market is also shared by the representatives from related NGOs. The Director of the Association of Agricultural Intermediaries in Adana declares a list about the wages of the workers every year. It also includes the amount of the commission taken by labor intermediaries. This document[39] does not have sanction power but employers usually do care about the amount specified in this paper. Aside from the amount of the wage, it is stated, 'to hire foreign workers is not allowed.' The term "foreigners" here clearly refers to Syrians. The Director explains why the employment of Syrians is a contentious issue:

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37 "Suriyeliler bizi mahvetti. Nasıl sizin işinizi gelip birisi elinizden alıyorsa, aynısı oldu. Mesela devlet memurusun aylığı 600 liraya çalışır mısın? çalışamazsın çünkü az yetmiyor. Bizimki de aynı böyle geçtik mi Nevşehire giderkene yevmiye diyelim 30, 40, 50 onlar 15 e çalışıyor. o zaman bizi almıyorlar, onları tercih ediyorlar. bir de iş yapamıyorlar çünkü bilmiyorlar. Türkçeleri zayıf. ürünü bilmiyorlar nasıl yapılacağını bilmiyorlar. Biz Suriyelileri görmek istemiyoruz. Mesela biz uzaklara gidiyoruz taa Urfadan gelip taa Eskişehire kadar gidiyoruz. diyoruz ki Eskişehirde Suriyeli bulamayız gidiyoruz, bir bakıyoruz ki bizden daha fazla. Artık her yerde varlar!" Interview by the author, tape recording in Turkish. Yüreğir (Adana), 24.01.2015.

38 "Eskiden eğer 5tl artıyorsa şimdi yerinde sayıyor. Tarsusta bir evde çalıştım normala kabale tutyoruz ya, 5 tane barakayı bir yevmiye kaldırırken Suriyeliler geldikten sonra 15 barakayı bir yevmiye saymaya başladılar." Interview by the author, tape recording in Turkish. Gölmarmara (Manisa), 06.08.2014.

39 See the sample of this document in the Appendix C.

> Under which conditions does the value of workers increase? If there are more workers, or less? Why would I want Syrians here? I don't want them because both the wages are down and my workers become unemployed. Why? The demand for workers is decreasing. The daily wage of my workers is 44 TL. Syrians make informal agreements and work for 30 TL. They are preferable. If there were less workers, the value of their labour would increase, but there are too many workers! And workers don't have any value in the eyes of employers. Although we are in dialogue with the employers, they don't care about us because there will always be new workers. Even if you are not here, there are too many workers![40] (The Director of the Association of Agricultural Intermediaries, male, aged 43, hometown: Bingöl).

He uses a nationalistic rhetoric blaming Syrians for working under price and substituting the place of Turkish citizens. He implies Turkish citizens with the term "my workers." He complains the lack of attention from landowners although they warned the latter about this issue. However, all farm owners are not the same. While some of them support the employment of Syrians, others strongly criticize again with reference to nationalist arguments. The statement below from an interview conducted with an agricultural employer is a clear example for the latter group:

> Syrians work as cheaper labor. A worker from Turkey earns 30 TL for a day but it is 15 or 20 TL for Syrians. This situation disturbs the balances here. I don't understand why the state turns blind eye to Syrians! Maybe it is because of Syrian policies. Local people

40 "Hangi durumda işçinin değeri artar? İşçi çok olursa mı işçinin değeri aratacak yoksa az olursa mı? Ben niye istiyim Suriyelileri? Hem yevmiye düşüyor. Hem de benim işçilerim şu an evde yatıyor. Neden? İşçiye talep azalıyor. Benim işçilerimin yevmiyesi 44 tl. Suriyeli gidip gizli bir şekilde anlaşma yapıp 30 tl ye çalışıyorsa daha fazla tercih edilecektir yani, bu böyledir. Eğer işçi az olsa, işçinin değeri artar ama çok işçi var. İşçilerin çiftçinin gözünde bir değeri olmuyor o zaman. Biz üreticilerle sürekli diyalog halindeyiz. Onlara söylememize rağmen bizi dinlemiyorlar çünkü sürekli yeni işçi var. Sen burada olmasan, başka bir sürü işçi var." Interview by the author, tape recording in Turkish. Seyhan (Adana), 22.01.2015.

> here don't approve this. I don't know how this situation will continue, I hope that there will not be problems for us in the region. So we are very uncomfortable. Syrians are traveling very easily here. I don't understand their comforts during their travel…. We are saying: "they are our neighbors," "they are our Muslim brothers" but the situation is going on another way. I don't approve the migration from Syria to Turkey with these huge numbers…There has already been problems deriving from Kurd migrants from eastern regions of Turkey; they have carried their own problems such as blood vengeance resulted in sometimes leaving this city. We have already couldn't solved our problems perfectly so added problems due to Syrians have made matters worse. This will bring different conflicts to the society. Eventually, everyone is struggling to increase his or her life standards. If someone come and take your bread from your hands, won't you be annoyed?[41] (Producer 28, male, aged 59, hometown: Adana).

This man typically constructs a discriminatory rhetoric that describes Syrians as "excess baggage" for Turkish nation and the Turkish state. His main argument is based on economic burdensome for ordinary people whose privilege is replaced by Syrians. The interesting point here is that he is not involved in this "disadvantaged group" since he has a position

41 "Suriyeliler ucuza çalışıyor. Türk bir işçi 30 lira alırken, Suriyeliler aynı işi 15-20 liraya yapıyor. Bu durum buradaki dengeleri bozuyor. Devlet neden gözünü kapatıyor ben anlamıyorum. Belki Suriye politikasından dolayı böyle yapıyorlar. Buradaki yerli halk bunu onaylamıyor. Bu durum nasıl böyle devam edecek bilmiyorum. Umarım bölgemizde sorunlar olmaz. Biz memnun değiliz bu durumdan. Suriyeliler burada çok rahat seyahat ediyorlar. Ben bunların böyle rahat seyahat etmelerini anlayamıyorum. Komşumuz diyoruz, Müslüman kardeşimiz diyoruz ama durum çok başka bir yere gidiyor. Ben Suriyeden Türkiyeye böyle büyük rakamlarla göçü onaylamıyorum. Zaten doğudan gelen Kürtlerle ilgili sorunlar vardı. Yani onlar kendi bölgelerindeki kan davası gibi sorunları buraya taşıyorlar, orayı terk ediyorlar. Biz daha kendi problemlerimizi tam olarak çözememişken, bir de Suriyeliler durumumuzu daha da berbat etti. Onlar da kendi problemlerini buraya taşıyacaklar. Sonuçta, burada herkes kendi hayatını kurtarmaya, güzelleştirmeye çabalıyor. Biri gelip, senin elinden ekmeğini alsa, sen de kızmaz mısın?" Interview by the author, tape recording in Turkish. Seyhan (Adana), 29.01.2015.

that technically can hire Syrians as laborers. However, the nationalist discourse guarding "priority" of Turkish citizens in the labor market lays a burden on the state that should focus solving economic problems of primarily its own citizens according to him. Although he emphasizes shared religious identity, economic interests shape nationalistic discriminatory discourse by discarding Muslimism. From his point of view, Kurdish Turks from eastern regions of Turkey also are burden in terms of carrying their problems to the employer's hometown but Kurds are preferable than Syrians in his order. Furthermore, he attracts attention implicitly on the very possibility of conflicts in this picture.

Apart from the discrimination relying on economic reasons, political arguments about their position in the war are also important factor that permeate the tensions between worker groups and consolidate the isolated and marginal figure of Syrian refugees in Turkey. To illustrate, a male worker from Mardin said: "If a person leaves their homeland, their honor, their land, this person is a traitor. They are the traitors." (Worker 49, male, aged 44, hometown: Kızıltepe/Mardin). He advised me not to talk with them. Another man asked, "Why are they coming here? They should defend their land!"[42] Additionally, there are other factors that have led to conflicts between two groups. For instance, a woman from Urfa said: "We don't want Syrians here. Syrian girls become second wives (*kuma*). In Urfa, many families were dissolved because of these Syrians. We don't want to see them!"[43] (Worker 15, female, aged 45, hometown: Urfa). A man from Urfa, also touched on the issue:

> We have good relations with everyone, except for Syrians. If they were a good tribe, they would have struggled for their homeland but they haven't done it. They came here and made Turkey messy.

42 "Eğer ki bir insan, kendi toprağını, onurunu, memleketini bırakıyorsa, o insan haindir. Bunların hepsi hain." Interview by the author, tape recording in Turkish. Akhisar (Manisa), 04.08.2014.

43 "Suriyelileri istemiyoruz biz burada. Bunların kızlar kuma oluyor. Urfa'da bir sürü aile yıkıldı onlar yüzünden. Onları görmek istemiyoruz!" Interview by the author, tape recording in Kurdish. Gölmarmara (Manisa), 26.08.2013.

> Tayyip Erdoğan gives more importance Syrians than us. If a Syrian says 'for Allah[44]', he can give his daughter or wife to you. If he says 'for Allah'… so they are not good people for their lands.[45] (Worker 58, male, aged 50, hometown: Urfa).

All of these tensions based on economic, social, and political challenges lead to implicit and explicit conflicts. In one labor camp in Mersin, I observed the separated tent area away from the other tents, a child worker explained the reason to me calmly as if he was telling an ordinary event. He told me about a fight at a marriage ceremony with brawls and guns between Syrians and other workers. After ceremony, the tents of the Syrian workers were separated from those of other workers to avoid further conflict. When the child described the departure of Syrians, his tone has become more poignant and his face shows the traces of remembering bad memory.

5.5.1 *Fear of Death and Violence*

Under these conditions, most of the Syrian workers to whom I asked about their ideas on returning expressed that if life in Syria was stabilized and secured, they would go back immediately, and yet the conditions are not suitable to return. A man worker from Idlib told:

> I want to go to back but if I return to Syria, I will be arrested because I didn't do my military service. It is not just me, all men from

44 "Allah için" is a religious expression. He implies that "Syrians can make an arrangement with Turkish men about Syrian women by making religious references. It is not a problem for them." He criticizes this situation ethically.

45 "Biz herkesle güzel geçiniyoruz, bir tek Suriyeliler hariç. Eğer onlar iyi bir kavim olsalardı, orada kalır savaşırlardı. Ama yapmadılar, Türkiye'yi karıştırmak için buraya geldiler. Tayyip Erdoğan bizden daha çok önem gösteriyor onlara. Bu Suriyeliler Allah için dediği zaman Suriyeli bunu diyor, allah için dediği zaman Türkiyeli müslümanın elinden yani geleceği en güzel nokta, sana kalkıp avradını da verebiliyor yani, Allah rızası için dediği zaman, öyle bir.. yani kendi toprağına yaramayan insan Türkiye'ye hiç faydası olmaz." Interview by the author, tape recording in Turkish. Gölmarmara (Manisa), 06.08.2014.

> my family shared the same fate. I can't go back until the war is totally over and they forgive our penalty.[46] (Worker 67, male, aged 17, hometown: Idlib).

Another woman worker from Kobani expresses her fear as follows:

> We escaped from the war in Syria and came to Turkey. ISIS did bomb attack and fired villages in Kobani. Then, kidnapped the girls. ISIS would cut off heads of women. I feared for my daughters and myself. I immediately decided to go away. I talked with my husband. Turkey was the easiest option for us. Then we arrived to Urfa and then Adana to work.[47] (Worker 101, female, aged 35, hometown: Kobani).

As the above quotations indicates the main motivation lied behind the migration is the war and violence. Their *frame of reference* about Syria consists of two options. The first is to fight in the war and risk death. For women, there are also other risks as kidnapping. The second is to keep being exploited by working in Turkey under inhumane conditions. *Pushing factors* for leaving their country consists of political reasons rather than economic ones. Syrians seemingly do not care much about their underpayment, working hours, poor sheltering, or discriminatory behaviors against them with regard to *frame of reference* shaped by the memory of war and they just wait to the day when all violent events will end. In fact, their obedience in the hosting places and accepting all ine-

46 "Ben Suriyeye dönmek istiyorum. Ama eğer dönersem şimdi, tutuklanırım çünkü askerden kaçtık geldik. Sadece ben değil, benim ailemdeki bütün buradaki erkekler böyle. Savaş bitene kadar dönemeyiz, savaş bitince bizim askerlik cezasını affederler." Interview by the author, tape recording in Arabic. Akhisar (Manisa), 10.08.2014.

47 "Biz savaştan kaçtık da geldik Türkiye'ye. Işid köyümüzü bombaladı, yaktı. Kızları kaçırdılar. Işid kadınların, kızların kafasını kesiyordu. Kızlarım ve kendim için korktum. Hemen gitmeye karar verdim. Kocama söyledim. Türkiye gitmek için en kolay yerdi. Önce Urfaya geçtik, oradan da Adanaya çalışmaya geldik." Interview by the author, tape recording in Kurdish. Karataş (Adana), 26.01.2015.

qualities in wittingly manner are in a close relation with their first motivation to force them to migrate. Having an experience with violence shape not only their departure but also their docility in labor relations that re-construct all relations between different actors.

This distinguishes their case from other seasonal migrant instances such as Mexicans in the US[48] or eastern European workers in Norway.[49] They are also different from the refugees who wait to be a citizen of the hosted country in the future. Thus, beyond the concept of *Fear of Deportation*, *Fear of Death and Violence* explains their disadvantaged position in the labor market. With the background of war, kidnapping, all kind of violence and death, they accept all conditions, which allows profit maximization for big agricultural employers, and provides necessary surviving conditions for small producers in the highly competitive neoliberal market as the chapter 4 showed the necessity of having cheaper-migrant labor. Turkish agriculture has been re-structured by the presence of Syrian refugees while creating new tensions among different worker groups as a result of increased competition.

§ 5.6 Concluding Remarks

Turkish agriculture is open to the seasonal employment of Syrians due to the fact that ongoing rural transformation since the 1980s has led to an increase in labor demand due to the loss of unpaid family workers with the effect of dissolution of agriculture and urbanization. The findings of this chapter show that -the second migration flow- Syrians face unfair working conditions in terms of wage, working hours, and accommodation in the sites of Manisa, Adana and Mersin where the field survey was

48 Philip Martin, "Mexican Workers and U.S. Agriculture: The Revolving Door." *International Migration Review* 36, no. 4 (December 1, 2002): 1124–42. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7379.2002.tb00120.x.

49 Johan Fredrik Rye, and Joanna Andrzejewska. "The Structural Disempowerment of Eastern European Migrant Farm Workers in Norwegian Agriculture." *Journal of Rural Studies* 26, no. 1 (January 1, 2010): 41–51. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrurstud.2009.06.003.

conducted. The mixed labor composition has led to complex relations between different groups of workers, which are shaped by several dynamics.

Although having the same ethnic and religious identity could have helped develop emphatic relations between Kurdish workers from Eastern Turkey and Syria, I observed that Turkish Kurds are uncomfortable with the presence of Syrians by emphasizing their drop in income due to the lower wages of Syrians and the difficulties to find a job because of the availability of more workers. Moreover, some women dislike Syrians due to the fact that some of them became second wives in Turkey. Besides economic and social factors, in some of the interviews, Syrians were accused of their political stance and escaping the war.

As for the relation with labor intermediaries and employers, the economic interests are more dominant in shaping the work relations. Swindling the wages of workers and dictating unfair working conditions were frequently expressed, which means that the presence of Syrian refugees in the labor market provides an opportunity to some for obtaining cheaper labor thanks to the precarious legal position and increasing dispossession of Syrians. All of these social, political, and economic variables have continuously reconstructed the dynamics of unequal power relations at local scale rural settings by placing Syrians in the lowest-ranking group.

The contributions of this chapter has sought to make are twofold. First, this part showed that Syrian agricultural workers are the most vulnerable group among seasonal migrant workers with regards to *push and pull factors* and the concepts of *bargaining power, fear of deportability*, *status of paradox, and frame of reference* that are useful to unravel the lowest rank of Syrian refugees in the work-hierarchy. However, putting the difference between refugee and migrant for the case of seasonal agricultural employment necessitates new analytical tools beyond economic and political causes since hyper-exploitability is going on unreasonably with new relations of power.

Thus, to further these concepts as a second contribution, I suggest that the concept "fear of death and violence" may explain the extremely

vulnerable case of Syrian refugees as seasonal agricultural workers surrounded by divergent interests of employers and labor intermediaries and asymmetries of power and conflicts between employer-worker-labor intermediary relationship and also between different worker groups. Continuing instrumentality of being a refugee based on "fear" illustrates the impact of an emotion to accept unequal conditions -even living under hunger limit as a family- gives a way to a formation of labor reserve army serves a core component of the need of neoliberal transformation of agriculture by fulfilling a gap for high value crop production providing with necessary profit to survive of small-medium sized farmers and greater profit of big agricultural enterprises.

6

New Patterns in Mobility, Space and Dispossession

This chapter discovers the new patterns in rural mobilities, space, and dispossession in Turkey's agriculture. The transformational shift at the production level- widely discussed in chapter 4- is used and fine tuned for new socioeconomic and spatial relations, reflecting the underlying paradigm on which approaches to the phenomena of a dispossessed rural proletariat and other migratory processes and patterns are constructed. This chapter sets out to explain the interaction of external pressures derived from the economic and political context and new characteristics of agricultural labor as well as the implications for socio-spatial relations and alternative means of livelihood in rural areas. The intention here is to go beyond previous explanations of seasonal migrant work in which the term "seasonal," which refers to the ad hoc nature of the work and of the presence of the workers, defines tests understanding of temporary agricultural workers.[1] While many seasonal agricultural la-

1 Philip Martin,"Mexican Workers and U.S. Agriculture: The Revolving Door," International Migration Review 36, no. 4 (December 2002): 1124–42. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7379.2002.tb00120.x; Tanya Basok, Danièle Bélanger, and Eloy Rivas. "Reproducing Deportability: Migrant Agricultural Workers in South-Western Ontario," Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 40, no. 9 (September 2014): 1394–1413.

borers work in temporary jobs, they reside throughout the year in permanent tent settlements that have newly emerged in Turkey's southern provinces including Adana and Mersin. This chapter will conceptualize these permanent tent neighborhoods as "rural ghettos."

I assert three underlying causes for the unprecedented socio-spatial changes that resulted in the formation of rural ghettos in contrast to earlier periods when workers in southern Turkey only stayed there temporarily. First, neoliberal agrarian transformation led to the retreat of the state from its protective role in the market, so farmers found themselves alone and developed survival strategies to maintain their competitiveness. One such strategy is the transition to alternate cash crops, which brought about a need for cheaper manual labor over longer periods as exemplified by the transition that occurred in the form of the shift from cotton to fresh fruits and vegetables in Southern Turkey, which was analyzed in chapter 4. Second, the extreme poverty and dispossession levels of contemporary Kurdish migrants working as seasonal laborers, discussed in chapter 3, compel their decisions not to return to their homes in winter months. Third, the persistent demand for cheaper labor in rural areas was met by Syrian refugees coming to Turkey who are in want of both work and accommodations. The previous chapter outlined the need for employing and housing this particular group, which is referred to as the second migration wave in chapter 3.

These foci raise several productive questions related to the field of migration and critical agrarian studies, presenting an opportunity to discuss how wider process of agricultural transformation, the Kurdish question, and the presence of Syrian refugees are connected in the shifting world of work and space. More specifically, this chapter asks how migrants and refugees, as agents, respond to changing socioeconomic conditions and what are the socio-spatial consequences of the transformation of formerly temporary settlements into neighborhoods are. This

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https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2013.849566; Leigh Binford, "From Fields of Power to Fields of Sweat: The Dual Process of Constructing Temporary Migrant Labour in Mexico and Canada," *Third World Quarterly* 30, no. 3 (April 2009): 503–17. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436590902742297.

chapter makes three key contributions by examining: 1) the ways in which ways the dispossession of the peasantry and rural proletarianization occur and how the emergence of a new profile of worker reshapes labor relations in the countryside, 2) how changing economic and political conditions have transmuted rural space, and 3) how the "ghetto" concept and be adapted to suit the rural context in the specific case of the Turkish countryside. Yet this thesis draws on the multiple transformations (of labor and space) draw to question the "temporary" aspect inherent in definitions of seasonal migrant workers given a context in which global market forces and the political agendas in Turkey are changing worker profiles, rural space, the patterns of rural populations, and relevant social relations.

This chapter is structured around four sections. I will first discuss diverse dispossession patterns among seasonal migrant workers. I separate economic and political reasons leading to a status of dispossession, which is essential for the formation of a rural proletariat. Capitalist expansion in agriculture under the influence of neoliberal policies has deeply divided the countryside. It is characterized not only by the prevalence of commercial agriculture and disappearance of subsistence farming and other traditional forms of labor relations but also by regional disparities and stark contrasts in different localities. This is exemplified by the twin processes of accumulation and underdevelopment; farmworkers suffer extreme poverty in the midst of increasing dependence on dispossessed, waged labor in commercialized agricultural fields in northern, western and southern regions.

In this context, recent extreme poverty and dispossession among rural masses, which forced former producers and sharecroppers to become seasonal migrant workers, will be discussed. By putting the varying dispossession levels of the workers at the center of analysis, diverse processes of proletarianization are investigated through regional dynamics such as water problems and paternalistic social relations in Urfa, infertility of the land in Balıkesir, and the adverse impact of the implementation

of tobacco quotas in Manisa. The following section will focus on the period of unemployment during winter months, which is an important parameter of the rural proletarianization process.

In this part, I will present the results of fieldwork in the Cizre district of Şırnak, which borders Syria and is at the periphery of Turkey both geographically and economically. This case is significant the distinctions between peasant and worker and between city inhabitant and farm dweller are blurred since the majority of Cizre's population lives in the city center during the winter when they are unemployed and work as a family in seasonal agrarian jobs in different cities. Historically, the main reason for the turn from a peasantry to a rural proletariat is the implementation of forced migration in the 1990s, which resulted in the evacuations of many Cizre villages and the disappearance of subsistence farming in the region. Hence, the objective of this part with regard to the formation of rural proletariat is to analyze links among the Kurdish question, the economic context of farming, and the emerging livelihoods of workers that affect the category of "seasonal agricultural migrant workers" in Turkey.

Rising dispossession among seasonal migrant workers has resulted in spatial changes in rural areas that will be discussed using the concept of a "rural ghetto" in subsequent sections. Following from Wacquant's conceptualization[2] of the ghetto- based on the three criteria of poverty, segregation, and ethnic clustering-, I argue that this concept fits for the rural context, as tent settlements are located in remote, segregated places far from villages and towns. The residence in tent settlements mainly consist of Kurds from Turkey - including both economic migrants and internally displaced people (IDPs) and, more recently, of Syrian refugees. These can both be considered economically disadvantaged and ethnically marginal groups, as is demonstrated throughout the dissertation. Based on these distinctions, permanent tent settlements share those characteristics that Wacquant attributed to ghettos, and I propose to label these

2 Loïc Wacquant, "Ghetto," in International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, edited by Neil J. Smelser and Paul B. Baltes (Oxford: Pergamon, 2004): 5-7. https://doi.org/10.1016/B0-08-043076-7/99103-4.

permanent tent neighborhoods – that are not addressed by the literature particular to seasonal migrant workers in Turkey – rural ghettos.

§ 6.1 Rising Rural Proletariat with Different Dispossession Patterns

This section argues how multiple economic and political transformations in Turkish society have created a new rural labor reserve army that is partly or fully dispossessed. It demonstrates how the interplay among local, regional, national, and international dynamics affect level of dispossession and people's movement. I investigate the reasons for dispossession by turning the lens toward the political geography where these workers were born and raised. The proletarianization of the peasantry has evolved in the twofold context of the neoliberalist capitalization of Turkish agriculture and of instable internal and external policies that resulted in the increase of the migrant labor force. In general, regional differences are rooted in the historical span of agrarian development and formation of classes in Turkey, in the scale of the country's transition to capitalist agriculture and industry, and in the extent of dispossession and political disorder. Relying on fieldwork results, figure 6.1. shows the hometowns of seasonal migrant workers.



Figure 6.1 Hometowns of the Workers. Map by the author.

Among others, Urfa is a prominent place of emigration. Both landless workers and small landowners from this city work as seasonal migrant workers in western Turkey. Geçgin[3] and İslamoğlu[4] also underscore that a considerable number of seasonal migrant workers come from Urfa. The lack of water in Urfa is a major factor that pushes people to seek temporary agrarian jobs. Workers 6[5] and 108[6] stated that although they own small plots, the land is not productive due to the lack of water. In fact, the

3 Ercan Geçgin, "Ankara-Polatlı Örneğinde Sosyal Dışlanma Açısından Mevsimlik Tarım İşçiliği," Ankara Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi 1, no. 1 (2009): 15.

4 Huricihan İslamoğlu, Alp Yücel Kaya, Elvan Gülöksüz, Derya Nizam, Ayse Çavdar, Ulaş Karakoç, and Göksun Yazıcı. "Türkiye'de Tarımda Dönüşüm ve Küresel Piyasalarla Bütünleşme Süreçleri." TÜBİTAK Proje, no. 106K137 (2008): 358.

5 Worker 6, male, ages 52, hometown: Urfa. Interview by the author, tape recording in Turkish. Akhisar (Manisa), 22.08.2013.

6 Worker 108, female, aged 55, hometown: Urfa. Interview by the author, tape recording in Turkish. Yumurtalık (Adana), 28.01.2015.

Southeastern Anatolia Project (Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi, or GAP) introduced 147,887 hectares of new irrigated land in the Sanliurfa-Harran plain.[7] The total water (meter cubes) distribution increased from 17,196,733 (2004) to 64,570,113 (2016)[8] cubic meters and the total area of irrigated agricultural land reached to 1,107,116 hectares in 2017. It is a paradoxical that small landowners and sharecroppers complain about a lack of water when the amount of irrigated land has been increasing and there is a considerable upward trend in total water consumption. The main reason behind this unbalanced picture is the distribution of land ownership, as it is observable in the table 6.1.

Table 6.1 Number of Agricultural Holdings and Total Land Areas, by Individual Plot Size of Agricultural Holdings in Sanliurfa.

Plot Size (decares)	Number of Holdings	Total Area (decare)
Total	50,406	9,821,677
<5	295	867
5- 9	375	2,565
10- 19	2,230	28,738
20- 49	9,700	325,347
50- 99	12,660	852,635
100-199	12,600	1,665,838
200- 499	9,667	2,679,931
500-999	2,088	1,442,601
1000-2499	747	1,103,427
2500-4999	43	148,628
>5000	1	1,571,100

SOURCE TÜİK, Agricultural holdings wage structure survey, 2006

According to the Turkish Statistical Institute, the leading group throughout Turkey is those who own 20-49 decares of land. Though what stands out is the concentration of agricultural holdings ranging in size from 50 to 499 decares. These 9,667 agricultural holdings account for 2,678,931

7 Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi Son Durum Raporu 2018, p.3.

8 TÜİK, Municipality Water Statistics

decares of land. Moreover, 2,088 holdings cover 1,442,601 decares of land, which clearly diverges from the general ownership structure in Turkish agriculture. More specifically, in Harran plain, farmers who own more than 500 decares make up only 3.5% of the total population but they possess 32.7% of the land. Small farmers who own up to 50 decares constitute 51.6% of the population but possess only 11.9% of the land.[9]

In brief, the region was historically dominated by tribes (aşiretler) in a system characterized by a group of families, based on kinship and blood relations, who shared common ethnic and religious identities, wielding power over a particular territory. The leader of the tribe –locally called an ağa –was the most powerful actor in the region, ruled over one or more villages, and usually had more than one wife and many children. The ağa was responsible for the security of the village, solving disputes within his aşiret, deciding on punishments for crimes, and dominating the rural economy within his territory. In some instances, ağas were also affiliated with certain religious sects (tarikats). All in all, there was a multifaceted exploitation of peasants in the aşirets based on the religious, economic, political, and social power of these tribal chiefs.[10] Ağas made different types of agreements for production and labor relations:[11]

- The first type was traditional sharecropping (*ortakçılık*) in which ağas provided a plot of land to landless tribe members in exchange for 1/8 or 1/10 of the share of the harvest.
- The second is a different type of sharecropping called *mellabayi* in which ağas provided land, seed, and animals for ploughing, and the sharecropper was responsible for the labor. In this type of arrangement, ağas confiscated ¾ of the harvest.

9 Zeynep Kadirbeyoğlu, Decentralization and Democratization: The Case of Water User Associations in Turkey (PhD dissertation, McGill University, 2009): 115-116.

10 Oya Köymen, "Kapitalizm ve Köylülük: Ağalar – Üretenler- Patronlar" Mülkiye 33, no. 262 (2009): 30.

11 Adnan A. Akçay, "Toprak Ağalığından Kapitalist İşletmeciliğe Türkiye Tarımında Büyük Topraklı İşletmeler," in 75 Yılda Köylerden Şehirlere, edited by Oya Baydar and Oya Köymen (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı, 1999), 124-125.

- The third, *sukhra*, refers to work without a wage. A large part of village land, called *malikane toprağı*, was dedicated to the ağa and it was sowed and cultivated by corvée labor (*angarya*). All villagers who were *aşiret* members had to do *angarya* for the ağa. If they refused , they were punished or forced to leave the village.

Ağas had been important political figures until the 1960s.[12] They sometimes sat in the national assembly as deputies and sometimes made secret or open agreements with political parties exchanging the votes of their aşiret for favors. Thus, they were not only local political actors but also actors on the national scale. The relationship between the state and the ağas had always been complicated: alliances between ağas and political authorities were sustained based on their individual interests and benefits. For instance, securing the votes of all aşiret members depended on maintaining good relations with ağa*s* during the election periods. On the other hand, in line with its aim to centralize power, the state attempted to abolish the aşiret system, reducing the regional inequality and destroying the archaic economic and social relations in the wake of Turkey's modernization process.

In 1945, a land reform passed in the assembly that distributed land to landless peasants, but they sold much of these properties to large landowners because they could not afford to cultivate them. Although the target was to divide up the ağas' properties, the land that was distributed remained limited to state owned lands because of the effective political opposition of the ağas in and out of the national assembly.[13] Another land reform legislation was enacted in 1973. The Land Reform Agency was given to authority to confiscate the land of landowners with more than 1,000 decares in order to redistribute them to landless peasants; however, this legislation was annulled by the constitutional court in 1978 and the

12 Oya Köymen, "Kapitalizm ve Köylülük: Ağalar – Üretenler- Patronlar" Mülkiye 33, no. 262 (2009): 27.

13 Erik Jan Zürcher, Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi (İstanbul: İletişim, 2002).

role of agency was transformed to that of a different kind of land redistribution, namely the reallocation of state lands to landless farmers.[14]

In the long run, inevitably, the aşiret system could not resist the capitalization of agriculture. Ağas who had the necessary means to invest updated their production processes with new technologies.[15] Former ağas became the new capitalist agrarian entrepreneurs. Surplus labor was forced to migrate from villages, and sharecropping gradually disappeared.[16] Additionally, the process of urbanization gained momentum after 1980. Young members of peasant families migrated to metropolitan areas in search for better work opportunities and education and healthcare services. Television became widespread and people saw that another life was possible in cities, inspiring many young aşiret members to migrate. However, these young migrants not only came from landless peasant and sharecropping families, the youth of ağas also chose to settle in cities. In this history of urbanization, developments in transportation also made this process considerably easier. Another factor for the disappearance of aşiret system was the inheritance law. In the course of time, lands were split up among heirs, resulting in the diminishing of the big land ownership structure.

However, ağas have not disappeared altogether from southeastern villages, as table 6.1. showed. In the unbalanced distribution of land in Urfa, middle and large-scale landownership have continued to dominate. Although the aşiret system has been weakened, ağas are still powerful actors in the villages of Urfa today. For instance, worker 6's job in Urfa corresponds to the second type of sharecropping, "mellabayi."

> We are doing *kürekçilik*[17] for cotton production in Urfa. All expenditures for the production are provided by the *ağa*. We do all the irrigation, hoeing, spading, and picking. At the end, we get 3/10

14 Zeynep Kadirbeyoğlu., "Decentralization."

15 Adnan A. Akcay, "Toprak Ağalığından," 126.

16 Ibid, 126.

17 Spading

> of the total harvest; the ağa receives the rest. By "ağa," I mean the landowner. Of course ağalık[18] is over, there is no ağalık dominate the entire region.[19] (Worker 6, male, aged 52, hometown: Urfa).

Workers still call landowners ağas in Urfa and in other cities in the region. As worker 6 explains, ağas have lost power in the course of time; however, they maintain their traditional economic and social power over peasants. Sukhra has ended but sharecropping is still practiced. Actually, sharecropping means that 50% of the harvest is given to the landowner and the rest to the laboring party in many other cities. Distinctively, in Urfa, the proportion favors the ağa, which is a relic of the time ağalık. Worker 94 explains the symbolic power of the ağa as follows: "I am not a landowner. *Ağa*s rule over us.[20] Ağas dictate to do this and that, and we do it. We are thus peasant-workers in Urfa. We are landless."[21] (Worker 94, female, aged 24, hometown: Urfa).

Peasants describe the dominance of the ağas without feeling any strict obligation to do his work or being forced to leave, as before. Working in or out of the village or working for the ağa via sharecropping is the prerogative of the peasants, who represent so-called "free labor,"[22] and who have the right to decide their place of work without extra-economic coercion. However, the lack of opportunities, the high unemployment in the southeastern cities, and the high cost of living have influenced the reproduction of pre-capitalist ağa-peasant relationships in new forms.

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18 In the noun form, it means "system."

19 "%30 pamuk tutuyoruz, Kürekçilik yapıyoruz. Masraf ağaya ait, onlara ait, ağaya ait, işçilik onlara ait. Çapa, sulama serikleme, kürekleme. Toplama onlara ait. 10 tonda 3 ton bizim, ağaya 7 ton kalıyor. Ağa derken tarla sahibi. Yoksa ağalık kalktı, çevreyi kapsayan bir ağalık yok." Interview by the author, tape recording in Turkish. Akhisar (Manisa), 22.08.2013.

20 "Bizim basimizda ağalar var."

21 "Bizim başımızda ağa var. Ağalar diyorlar bunu bunu yapın biz de onu yapıyoruz. Biz de buradaki gibi işçiyiz orda da. Kendi tarlalarımız yok yani." Interview by the author, tape recording in Turkish. Karataş (Adana), 24.01.2015.

22 See the debate: Jairus Banaji, "The Fictions of Free Labour: Contract, Coercion and So-Called Unfree Labour," Historical Materialism 11, no.3 (2003): 69-95.

The other important city that provides a temporary migrant labor force in the labor market is Balikesir. Although these seasonal workers own small lots of land, they move to work in other cities. The major obstacle hindering production in Balikesir is the physical geography of the region. Workers usually come from mountain villages where the land is mostly infertile. These arid areas lack advanced irrigation and the land is rocky. The people can only cultivate dry farming crops such as barley and wheat and working animal husbandry. Unlike local workers who commute to or settle for a particular time to do temporary jobs to earn additional income, they rely on seasonal agrarian jobs to survive.

In other words, they cultivate their lands in Balikesir as an additional source of income, but their main economic activity is seasonal agrarian work. They are not wholly dispossessed, but they are nevertheless the rural proletariat, their subsistence activity in their homeland notwithstanding. Some of the workers from Balikesir are Romani whose villages are usually located in these remote and infertile areas. I also conducted interviews with Romani workers from Usak. For instance, a worker 87[23] expressed that they do dry farming, producing wheat and barley, due to the lack of water.

In a similar vein, most local workers also suffer from the water problem, infertile land and an insufficient size of land. Seasonal migrant workers from Manisa tend to be local workers who commute daily for temporary agrarian jobs in neighboring villages, or else they live in the town centers and go back and forth to their village on a daily basis. Others stay at their places of work for a limited time in houses arranged by the employers. Based on the interviews, I deduce that the decrease in tobacco production has had a significant impact on the spread of local workers in Manisa.

The Tobacco Law of 2001 and the privatization of Turkish Tobacco and Alcoholic Beverages Company (Tütün, Tütün Mamulleri, Tuz ve Alkol İşletmeleri A.Ş Genel Müdürlüğü, or TEKEL that is the state institution

23 Worker 87, female, aged 40, hometown: Uşak. Interview by the author, tape recording in Turkish. Salihli (Manisa), 16.08.2014.

responsible for specifying the minimum price of tobacco and purchasing and processing tobacco in its own factories for export) paved the way for the reorganization of production and labor. Former pre-capialist forms were deconstructed. Mostly, family labor had been used for tobacco farming,[24] but the people began working in local mines and agrarian fields in Manisa following the sharp decrease in tobacco production. This restructuring of the tobacco sector as a whole had been targeted since the 1980s in accordance with a changing global-economic policy in Turkey that favors transnational companies.

In 1984, while Turgut Özal's government was in power, the ban on cigarette imports was lifted.[25] Tobacco imports were liberalized and the doors were opened to many transnational companies, especially from the US, in 1989. Three years later, the state monopoly of the tobacco market was ended, yielding the arrival of multi-partner enterprises that collaborated with TEKEL and other domestic and foreign capital companies in the market. These included Philip Morris-Sabanci (PhilSA) in 1991, BAT-Koç in 2002, and European Tobacco-Arbel in 2014.

Furthermore, the establishment of cigarette factories by R.J. Reynolds in 1992 and Imperial Tobacco in 2005 without Turkish partners established the dominance of private companies in the cigarette industry in Turkey.[26] During this period, TEKEL launched a new cigarette, mostly of American blend of 85% Virgina and Burley tobacco and just 15% of an oriental type, under the brand name "TEKEL 2000." Consequently, the share of imported tobacco in locally manufactured cigarettes increased from 6.7 to 40 percent between 1989 and 1999.[27] By these means, consumer tastes have deliberately been changed. Old cigarettes tasting of

24 See Deniz Duruiz, Seasonal Agricultural Workers in Manisa: Materialization of Labor, Bodies and Places through Everyday Encounters (MA Thesis, Bogazici University, 2011), 70. and Zülküf Aydın, "Neo-Liberal Transformation of Turkish Agriculture," Journal of Agrarian Change 10: 2 (2010): 152.

25 Tülay Özerman, "Tekel Özelleştirmesinin Sonuçları" Mülkiye 33. no. 262 (2009): 300.

26 Zülküf Aydın, "Neo-Liberal Transformation of Turkish Agriculture," Journal of Agrarian Change 10: 2 (2010): 173.

27 Ibid., 173.

oriental tobaccos, like the brands Samsun and Maltepe, were replaced by new American brands such as Marlboro and Winston at the front of the shelves.

As a result, Turkey began losing its share of the world tobacco market; exports decreased from 601 million dollars in 1997 to 499 million dollars in 2006.[28] The privatization of TEKEL was the last step in completely opening the domestic tobacco sector to the global market. In 2004, the beverage part of TEKEL was sold to Mey İçki Sanayi for 292 billion dollars (Later, in 2006, this company sold 90% of its shares to Texas Pacific Group.) And on 22 February 2008, the tobacco part of TEKEL was sold to British American Tobacco for 1.72 billion dollars.[29] This process was devastating for tobacco producers. The table 6.2 shows the changing amount of area devoted to tobacco cultivation, the amount of production, and the number of tobacco producers in 2000-2010.

28 Ibid., 173.

29 Abdullah Aysu, "Tekel'de Gözyaşı Döken Timsahlar." Bianet, January 28, 2010. https://m.bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/119705-tekel-de-gozyasi-doken-timsahlar.

Table 6.2 Tobacco Cultivation, Production and Producers

Years	Area Cultivated (Ha)	Production (Ton)	Number of Tobacco Producing Households
2000	237.722	208.002	583.474
2001	198.827	152.571	478.022
2002	199.458	161.314	401.236
2003	183.719	150.128	334.296
2004	192.711	156.767	285.444
2005	185.460	147.612	255.753
2006	146.166	117.634	222.414
2005	185.460	147.612	255.753
2006	146.166	117.634	222.414
2007	144.904	117.883	207.051
2008	146.872	118.940	194.282
2009	92.615	116.149	80.766
2010	80.977	63.975	65.339

SOURCE TZOB (2007-2010): 179.

Tobacco production sharply decreased, by 70%, in the years 2000-2010. Tobacco had been produced on otherwise barren land that was not conducive to being converted to alternate crops. This, in turn, accelerated the processes of rural proletarianization as former tobacco producers from Soma started to work seasonally in the nearby districts of Akhisar, Salihli, and Gölmarmara where alternative crop production is possible due to appropriate geographical characteristics. Worker 17 explained leaving from his own land as follows: "I abondoned tobacco production in 2003 because tobacco had turned to dust. We sold our land at a cheap price and as a family became seasonal migrant workers."[30] (Worker 17, female, aged 42, hometown: Manisa).

The most well-known district of Manisa with a high tobacco production was Soma. After the transformation of tobacco production, the area

30 "Tütüncülük bir zaman sonra para etmemeye başladı. Ondan bıraktık. 2003'te bıraktım ben. Toprakları yok pahasına sattık. İşçi olduk böyle, ailece." Interview by the author, tape recording in Turkish. Gölmarmara (Manisa), 26.08.2013.

became important for mining, and the most catastrophic mining disaster in Turkish history occurred there on 13 May 2014, leaving behind 301 dead. Coşku Çelik[31] and Fikret Adaman et al.[32] indicate that neoliberal developmentalism during the AKP era led former tobacco farmers to work in mines. Adaman refers to "pull factors" that explain the employment in underground mines after tobacco: the expansion of the energy sector based on investment in coal fueled thermal plants was a primary goal in the AKP era. The government encouraged private sector investment in coal production. A royalty system was put into effect which kept state ownership intact but opened mine operation to the private sector via subcontracting. The state leased mines to private companies and guaranteed the purchase of the produced coal.[33]

Thus, working in the mining sector in Soma was a good option to compensate for economic losses due to the cessation of tobacco production. Mining employment provided regular income, thus enabling former tobacco producers to stay in their home. Ali Bülent Erdem, president of the Tütün-Sen union, explained the direct relation between the dispossession of peasantry and the rise of extractivism in Soma:

31 Coşku Çelik, "Köylüden Proletere: Soma'da Kırsal Yaşamın Dönüşümü." Rural Research Network Meeting, January 20, 2018.

32 Fikret Adaman, Murat Arsel, and Bengi Akbulut, "Neoliberal Developmentalism, Authoritarian Populism, and Extractivism in the Countryside: The Soma Mining Disaster in Turkey," ERPI 2018 International Conference Authoritarian Populism and the Rural World (Conference Paper No. 63, 2018): 3.

33 Adaman et al., "Neoliberal Developmentalism," 9. Adaman et al.'s paper also stated that "Soma Kömür AŞ that was operating the site where the tragedy occurred, opted for the obvious path of increasing production levels, mainly relying on labour-intensive techniques, without paying much attention to prevention, mitigation and preparedness in case of a major mine incident. This was possible because the law entrusted the companies operating the mines the task of ensuring the implementation of appropriate safety measures, a task that was conveniently left unfilled in this case. That the company could get away with this choice was because the state by and large failed to duly perform its supervisory role. The rest is history; or, as was the case in Gabriel García Márquez's murder, the tragedy was already predestined."

> Old tobacco fields ceased being agricultural areas and tobacco producers couldn't find anything to do. This is the story of Soma. Think of it this way: Akhisar, Kırkağaç, Soma, Kınık, and Savaştepe were important tobacco zones. When tobacco producer families became unable to cultivate tobacco, they found the way to sustain their livelihoods by working the mines. They had to work in mines. The people, who died in Soma disaster, were mostly the children of former tobacco farmers. It led to a situation in which people who recently abondoned tobacco production began going into mining. They did not know how to organize, how to take collective action. They also couldn't succeed in changing the trade unions. They did exactly what they were ordered; they said yes to whatever the boss dictated. As a result, agrarian transformation played an important role in the Soma disaster. I remember one father from a village that we visited saying: "We were producing tobacco, we became indebted, and then we cultivated tobacco again. Instead of being able to repay our debt, we became 2000 lire more indebted. At this time, my son said to me, I can work in mines so we can pay back our debt, and I can retire early. I didn't want to let him go to mines, but I was so desperate that my yearning for money got the best of me. I am responsible for my son's death." He feels guilty.[34] (Ali Bülent Erdem, male, aged 60, hometown: Manisa).

34 "Eski tütün toprakları tarım alanı olmaktan çıktı, ve o tütüncüler yapacak hiçbir şey bulamadılar. somadaki hikaye de odur aslında. şöyle düşünün en önemli tütün üretim bölgelerinden biri akhisardı, kırkağaç, soma, kınık, savaştepe buraların önemli tütün merkezleriydi. oralar da tütün yetiştiren insanlar, tütün üretemez yetiştiremez hale gelince, mecburen madende çalışmak zorunda kaldılar. orada ölenlerin çoğu eskiden tütüncülük yapan tütüncülerin çocuklarıydı. tabi orada şöyle de bir durum ortaya çıktı, tarımdan yeni kopmuş, örgütlenmeyi bilmeyen, birlikte davranmayı beceremeyen insanlar gittiler ocaklara. sendikaların da değişimini sağlayamadılar. ne derlerse onu yaptılar. patronların her dediğine evet dediler ve sonuçta bu durumun ortaya çıkmasına böyle bir dönüşüm süreci neden oldu. aslında tarımdaki dönüşüm sürecinin önemli bir rolü oldu soma faciasında. somaya cumhuriyetle beraber kuruldu maden ocakları, kamu

On one hand, that former tobacco producers are employed in the mines of Soma instead of on their small plot of lands continues due to the lack of job opportunities in the region. On the other hand, proletarianization has not been limited to the mines. For males (the fathers, husbands and sons of a family), working in a mine was an option. Housewives, however, took up the responsibility of temporary agricultural work in order to have additional income.[35] Thus, dispossession in relation to the cessation of tobacco cultivation led to a complex picture in Manisa, where a considerable increase in rural proletarianization in the region has taken place in the frame of the feminization of temporary agrarian jobs.

I have discussed the dispossession process based on my qualitative survey, pointing out the accelerated expansion of seasonal migrant employment all over Turkey. In these cases, irrigation problems, infertility of the land, small landownership, and neoliberal agrarian policies are the primary factors, pushing people to migrate to remote villages or cities. I distinguish between the proletarianization process of migrants from Cizre and Syria and other examples by highlighting the factor of political geography. In line with the the famous idiom, "geography is destiny," for migrants from Cizre and Syria; political turbulence and conflicts in the homeland not only shape the motivation of people to migrate but also their level of socioeconomic in the places where they are hosted. In this respect, the case of Syrian refugees is comprehensively discussed in chapter 5. The subsequent section will focus on the case of Cizre which the similarities to Syrian refugees can be correlated: violence in daily life, insecurity for civilians, and poor living conditions. But the differences

çalıştırıyordu. aşağı yukarı tütünün bitmesiyle madende taşeronlaşma aynı yıllara denk geliyor. taşeronlaşma hızla akp iktidarıyla birlikte oldu. tütün yasası 2001 de çıktı. gittiğimiz köylerde oğlu ölen bir babayla konuştuk: " tütüncü onlar, biz borçlandık diyor. borçlanınca tütün ektik. borcumuzu ödeyeceğimize 2000 tl daha borçlandık. o zaman diyor oğlan dedi ki ben ocağa giriyim hem erken emekli olurum hem borcumuzu öderiz. ben madene girmesini istemiyordum ama o kadar çaresizdim ki diyor paraya tamah ettim ve oğlumun ölümüne ben neden oldum. kendini öyle suçlu hissediyor." Interview by the author, tape recording in Turkish. Akhisar (Manisa), 07.08.2013.

35 Coşku Çelik, "Köylüden Proletere: Soma'da Kırsal Yaşamın Dönüşümü." Rural Research Network Meeting, January 20, 2018.

will be stressed, as well, since the people of Cizre are neither refugees nor solely economic migrants.

§ 6.2 Political Geography of Dispossession

Cizre is located at the border of Turkey and Syria. Both its strategic position and the ongoing conflict between the PKK and Turkish security forces led to everyday violence in the region. Ethnically, the majority of the people in the region are of Kurdish origin. I conducted fieldwork in the region in February 2014 during a "peace process," that started in 2013 and lasted until 2015 and that included steps to be taken by both the PKK and the state towards a political solution of the Kurdish question. For instance, the PKK announced a ceasefire and withdrew its armed forces from Turkey to Northern Iraq on 25 April 2013. Following that, new legislation to stop terrorism and empower social cohesion[36] was passed in the assembly. A "committee of wise men" (akil adamlar komisyonu) was gathered to explain the solution process to the public and convince Turkey's citizens. It was therefore feasible to do fieldwork in Cizre at the time, as it was a demilitarized zone in 2014. Since July 2015, the state has declared random curfews many times in particular southeastern regions including Cizre. According to a report of People's Democratic Party (HDP) on Cizre, loss of life, damage to nature and the destruction of cities reached extreme levels after the implementation of curfews[37]:

> Thousands of hectares of forestland have been burned down; Silvan, Silopi, İdil, Nusaybin, Yüksekova, and especially Cizre and Sur have been destroyed with artillery shooting that continued for days. As a result of extensive detentions and arrests, more than 5,000 people have been detained, approximately 1,200 people

36 Terörün Sona Erdirilmesi ve Toplumsal Bütünleşmenin Güçlendirilmesine Dair Kanun, 6551 (2014). http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.5.6551.pdf.

37 People's Democratic Party, The Cizre Report (April 17, 2016), 1-7. https://www.hdp.org.tr/images/UserFiles/Documents/Editor/HDP'sCizreReport.pdf.

> were arrested, including 19 municipality co-mayors, 35 municipality vice co-mayors and aldermen… Official state sources reported that 355,000 citizen had to migrate, especially from Diyarbakır's Sur and Şırnak's Cizre and Silopi, since the beginning of conflicts in 2015. But according to nongovernmental organizations and local sources, this number is much higher. They report that at least 1,377,000 people's most basic rights to life, education, travel, and health were violated… During the Cizre Siege, 251 people, including 176 who died in the basements of horror, were slaughtered mercilessly. Among the dead there were 27 children, 20 women, and 79 people who have not been identified yet.

During the fieldwork, my objective was to understand the key role of forced migration and its corollary processes; spatial reorganization and the differentiation between the statuses of peasant and worker and city dweller and villager. My observations led to a new conceptualization of seasonal migrant workers in relation to political developments. I suggest that political factors are important for assessing future perspectives since seasonal agrarian jobs have been the only way to survive. As such, the consequences of forced migration can be useful to predict the possible impact of curfews since it resulted in forced resettlement within and beyond the region.

Among the disruptions that rural Kurdish society has undergone since Ottoman times, those brought about by forced migration and village evacuations are the most persistent in terms of their long term consequences. In chapter 3, I examined the case of Kurdish seasonal migrant workers whom I refer to as the third migration wave to Turkish countryside. A geopolitical analysis of the third migration wave[38] demonstrated that the Neo-Ottomanist turn in foreign and domestic policy since the 1990s has influenced the basic parameters of being a seasonal migrant worker, namely dispossession, the poverty levels of the households, and the location of resettlement. For instance, the return of internally displaced people to their villages via legislations and legal arrangements

38 See the section 3.4. in chapter 3.

was an important topic in the wake of the EU candidacy process in the early 2000s. However, predominant pursued of middle-easternization policies and the destruction of relations with the EU resulted in the IDP issue being put on the back burner, which has resulted in seasonal agricultural migration becoming a vital survival option for IDPs residing in eastern and southeastern regions as well as in rural ghettos.[39]

In brief, forced migrations during the 1990s accompanied by evictions from the villages turned many former farmers into migrant workers. Especially those who lacked social networks in metropolitan areas such as Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, and Adana migrated to the urban centers of eastern and southeastern cities and quickly took up seasonal agricultural work in different regions of Turkey because of high unemployment in the locations of the resettlement.

With specific regard to the region of Cizre, 91 villages were subjected to resettlement in Şırnak and 198 households from the villages of Aşağıdere, Bağlarbaşı, Güçlü, Kaya, Kuştepe, Tepeönü, and Ulaş- that were near Cizre- were evacuated. According to numbers from the governorship, a total of 12,991 people changed their place of residence due to the forced migration.[40] Most of the displaced population migrated to metropolitan areas, notably the peripheries of Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, and Adana.

Before the forced migration, the people of Cizre region were mostly occupied with subsistence farming and animal husbandry in their villages. Sheep farming, which provided butter, cheese, and wool, was more common in the region compared to agricultural production due to the lack of irrigation infrastructure. Therefore, only dry farming products were produced, including wheat, lentils, and barley. This production was not mainly for market; it was rather subsistence farming. After the evacuation of villages, rural economy was disrupted.

39 IDPs in rural ghettos will be examined in the next section.

40 Elif Başak Aksoy, Cizre Örneğinde Etnisite Içi Karşılaşma Biçimleri (PhD dissertation, Hacettepe University, 2013), 87.

For those who settled down in the center of Cizre, there were no options except for border trade and seasonal agrarian jobs due to the high unemployment rate in the region.[41]Diesel fuel had been allowed to be exported at the Habur border by an edict of prime minister. It was restricted in 2000 on the grounds that it was devastating for the domestic market; however, it continues today in the form of smuggling. Thus, given military pressure, the depeasantization of land, demographic movement from villages and the center, and the transition away from subsistence economic activities, Kurdish peasants found themselves seeking survival in a catastrophic tide.

Figure 6.2 The Photo of Cizre from Above. Photograph by the author (12.02.2014).

Almost everyone with whom I conducted interviews in Cizre told me that they had left their villages and moved to the county seat in 1994 when forced migration occurred in this part of Turkey. Before, they had been

41 This region has the highest unemployment rate in Turkey. It was about 27% in 2017 according to TÜİK statistics.

engaged in subsistence farming in their villages, but now most of this population was occupied with seasonal migrant work. Most indicated that their migration route was to the Gölmarmara, Salihli, and Turgutlu districts of the province of Manisa in the period from April to October each year. I made a point of asking why they preferred to work only in Manisa, and their responses usually pointed to the role of labor intermediaries. One labor intermediary said that

> when we came here from the villages, Cizre was foreign to us. We did not have necessary conditions for survival since our financial situation was so bad; we had no money. Then we decided to set off towards the west. We made contact with Manisa first because one guy who had gone before knew an employer. Thus, we continued going to Manisa in the following years. I became the labor intermediary. I selected workers from friends and relatives - 3 people from this household, 5 people from that household… I did not include strangers. 90% of the workers were even my relatives. You know, there has not been any other work opportunity here, such as factories. Especially in cases where there was not a man of the household, they couldn't put bread on the table, so the girls in these families came and still come to work with us. They have provided their families with a livelihood by saving money for winter.[42] (Labor intermediary 8, male, aged 45, hometown: Cizre/Şırnak).

As the labor intermediary puts it, social relations are important in Cizre. Workers and labor intermediaries are usually relatives increasing the importance of social capital in work relations. Like in Urfa, ağalık exists to

42 "Biz köylerden geldiğimiz zaman bize buralar yabancıydı, madem durumumuz düşük olduğu için imkanlarımız yoktu. Paramız yoktu. biz de batı tarafına çalışmaya gittik, 3 kişi ordan 5 kişi burdan işçileri komşulardan tanıdıklardan yabancılardan değil, %90 akrabalardan işçi bulduk o tarafa onlar da zaten bu tarafa fabrika falan kurmadığı için iş yok. Biliyorsun bizim bu tarafta iş yok. Kimi evde erkek olmadığı için geçinemiyordu. Orda kızlar gidip orda 4-5 ay çalışıp gelip burda kış zamanı yiyorlar." Interview by the author, tape recording in Kurdish. Cizre (Şırnak), 12.02.2014.

some extent. A woman worker said, "I am a member of the Botan aşireti that is the biggest aşiret in the world."[43] (Worker 77, female, aged 39, hometown: Cizre/Şırnak). However, ağas are not rich as in Urfa due to violence, the lack of irrigation infrastructure, and the infertility of the land. Rather, ağas have symbolic power to maintain communal relations and solve disagreements among families.

I visited a village where village guards (köy koruculari)[44] settled, located in between the Cudi and Gabar mountains. Interviewees told a similar six-month migration in Manisa as those living in Cizre. They had no plots of land to sow because it was a village of guards, so there was no agrarian activity in the village. As for those living in Cizre, they have similar living conditions to those in the villages. They live in houses that lack sufficient electrical and plumbing infrastructure; power and water cuts are frequent. The toilets are usually outside of the house in the yard. The roads and streets are dirty and narrow. The major change in their life compared to the time that they were in their own villages was their migration. They migrate for 6-8 months and stay in Cizre during the winter. Worker 39[45] told the dispossession of the household: "We do not work in winter; we spend our savings. Usually it is not enough to sustain our life and we take loans from a labor intermediary and work it off in the summer.". (Worker 39, female, age: she does not know, hometown: Cizre/Şırnak). Although conditions in Cizre are harsh, the people are attached to it.

43 "Ben Botan aşiretindenim. Bizim aşiret, dünyanın en büyük aşiretidir." Interview by the author, tape recording in Kuridsh. Salihli (Manisa), 12.08.2014.

44 Village guards are a paramilitary force in towns and villages. Their responsibilities are to protect people from attacks and curtail PKK actions and activities in the region. They were originally set up and funded by the Turkish state in the mid-1980s under the direction of Turgut Özal. They served as an additional military force to support Turkish Army.

45 "Kışın çalışmıyoz, oturuyoz böyle. Yazın çalıştıklarımızdan yiyoz. Ama genelde yetmiyor. O zaman dayıbaşından borç alıyoz, yaza da borca çalışıyoz." Interview by the author, tape recording in Kurdish. Cizre (Şırnak), 12.02.2014.

> We moved from our village to the city. The most beautiful place to us is our village. I swear to God! People talk about returning, but I am not sure. Our village was so beautiful. Why did they do this to us? Why did they exile us from our villages?[46] (Worker 70, female, age: she doesn't know, hometown: Cizre/Şırnak).

> No man loves his schakles, be they made of gold. Although Cizre is bad place, it is beautiful for us. You can look at it on the internet. Although it is bad, we prefer our motherland.[47] (Worker 69, male, aged 24, hometown: Cizre/Şırnak).

The end result of forced migration is the allocation of space at the centers of the district to migrant populations. Their occupation of these locations is not only temporary but also demarcated in terms of symbolic affinities for the empty villages. This gradual segmentation is a part of a wider effort to "put certain migrant groups in their place." In this way, socioeconomic inequalities are reified in certain ghettos of both at the margins of cities in the east as well as in rural ghettos at peripheries of villages near western cities, which will be elaborated upon in the next section.

§ 6.3 Ghetto Concept in the Rural Context

In this and the next sections, I will discuss the adaptability of the concept of ghetto to the rural context in the particular case of Southern Turkey by examining the permanent populations of labor camps and their everyday

46 "Köyümüzden olduk göç ettik Cizreye, bizim için en güzel yer köyümüz. Valla Allah nasip ederse, dönülecek diye bir konuşma var da bilmiyoruz. Köyümüz çok güzeldi, niye böyle yaptılar? neden çıkardılar?" Interview by the author, tape recording in Kurdish. Gölmarmara (Manisa), 11.08.2014.

47 " Bülbülü altın kafese koymuşlar yine de vatanım demiş! Cizre kötü bir yer olsa da, bizim için güzeldir. İnternetten bakabilirsiniz. Çirkin de olsa, biz her zaman kendi vatanımızı tercih ederiz." Interview by the author, tape recording in Turkish. Gölmarmara (Manisa), 11.08.2014.

lives. By doing so, I will suggest a new way of thinking about the temporary nature of seasonal agricultural migration given its permanent aspects.

Ghetto is an old concept which extends back to the Jewish quarters in Europe[48] and black neighborhoods in Chicago.[49] Loïc Wacquant explains that ghettos are characterized by urban poverty, segregation, and ethnic clustering.[50] Ghettos are segregated areas in which ethnically "marginal" groups live and suffer from insufficient space, high density, and economic exploitation. Wacquant argues that not all deprived places inhabitated by ethnic groups can be labeled as a ghetto; some gay neighborhoods, gated communities, and refugee camps are also segregated areas, but they cannot be called ghettos in the same way. In effect, the term ghetto has been adapted to the urban context based on the aforementioned criteria to define certain areas within a city. However, contemporary international migration and mobilities to the countryside require a rethinking of how rural settlements are discussed, and the concept of ghetto may offer insights to further this discussion.

The increasing monopolization by agricultural enterprises,[51] and the globalization and financialization of agricultural process in the neoliberal era[52] have been met by a new profile of workers. This new profile, char-

48 Louis Wirth, "The Ghetto," American Journal of Sociology 33, no. 1 (October 2015): 57–71. https://doi.org/10.1086/214333.

49 Janet Abu-Lughod, "The Specificity of the Chicago Ghetto: Comment on Wacquant's 'Three Pernicious Premises'," International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 21, no. 2 (June 1997): 357–62. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2427.00078.

50 Loïc Wacquant, "Ghetto," in International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, edited by Neil J. Smelser and Paul B. Baltes (Oxford: Pergamon, 2004), 5-7. https://doi.org/10.1016/B0-08-043076-7/99103-4.

51 Johan Fredrik Rye and Sam Scott, "International Labour Migration and Food Production in Rural Europe: A Review of the Evidence." Sociologia Ruralis 58, no. 4 (2018): 930. https://doi.org/10.1111/soru.12208.

52 Alessandra Corrado, Carlos de Castro, and Domenico Perrotta, Migration and Agriculture Mobility and Change in the Mediterranean Area (London: Routledge, 2016), 4.

acterized by their vulnerable legal status and poor living conditions, includes asylum-seekers, refugees, internally displaced persons, transit-migrants, irregular migrants, and economic migrants. In many cases, the arrival of labor migrants to the countryside has reshaped the economic and sociocultural dynamics of rural societies.[53] Migrant agricultural workers earn low wages, work long hours, and live in poor conditions, and are susceptible to health hazards as demonstrated in various research studies.[54]

Additionally, inequalities are perpetuated through wage differentiation among workers based on ethnicity,[55] dividing the labor market in the favor of employers and enabling them to maximize their profit in competitive neoliberal market conditions. The marginalized position of agricultural migrant workers in the labor market is linked to their wider social marginality.[56] In the case of Italy, transit-migrants and refugees who work in temporary jobs live in abandoned houses with inadequate conditions in large and small slum-like ghettos near agricultural villages.[57] In the case of Mexico, economic migrants live permanently in marginal neighborhoods close to agricultural fields so as to work intermittently in

53 Johan Fredrik Rye, "Labour Migrants and Rural Change: The 'Mobility Transformation' of Hitra/Frøya, Norway, 2005–2015," Journal of Rural Studies 64 (November 2018): 190. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrurstud.2017.12.003.

54 For example, see in Keith Hoggart and Cristóbal Mendoza, "African Immigrant Workers in Spanish Agriculture," Sociologia Ruralis 39, no. 4 (1999): 538–62. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9523.00123; Alejandro I. Canales and Carlos Pérez, "Inclusion and Segregation: The Incorporation of Latin American Immigrants into the U.S. Labor Market," Latin American Perspectives 34, no. 1 (2007): 73–82; Hubert Carton De Grammont and Sara María Lara Flores. "Productive Restructuring and 'Standardization' in Mexican Horticulture: Consequences for Labour," Journal of Agrarian Change 10, no. 2 (2010): 228–50. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1471-0366.2009.00246.x.

55 Edna Bonacich, "A Theory of Ethnic Antagonism: The Split Labor Market," American Sociological Review 37, no. 5 (1972): 547–59. https://doi.org/10.2307/2093450.

56 Rye, "Labour Migrants," 191.

57 Domenico Claudio Perrotta and Devi Sacchetto. "Migrant Farmworkers in Southern Italy: Ghettoes, Caporalato and Collective Action" 1, no. 5 (2014): 75–98.

temporary agricultural jobs.[58] These cases demonstrate that slum neighborhoods close to villages and fields serve as important places of accommodation for temporary agricultural workers. Unlike these examples, the present research will describe the permanent tent settlements of workers using the analogies of home and tent as well as labor camp and neighborhood.

The emergence of rural ghettos in different parts of the world with diversified migration types ranging from forced migration to transnational mobilities challenges conventional definitions of seasonal agricultural migrant workers used in rural studies. The term seasonal refers to the temporary work and stay of the workers. The permanent character of the places of accommodation raises several questions such as: How is the temporality of the phenomenon of seasonal migrant work transformed? What are the novel spatial practices in the countryside? How do the processes and outcomes of contemporary mobilities and agrarian transformation affect socio-spatial relations? Against this background, I analyze how the processes of rural ghettoization are shaped by the contemporary agricultural transformation and migration influx to the Turkish countryside as well as the ways macro-level transitions take shape at the micro-level in the everyday lives of migrant workers.

§ 6.4 Ethnic Residential Segregation among Seasonal Migrant Workers: From Temporary Tents to New Rural Ghettos in Southern Turkey

There are various factors responsible for the emergence of rural ghettoization in southern Turkey as there are diverse processes leading to changes in rural space and in socio-cultural relations. I will draw attention respectively to 1) a change in crop composition represented by the transition from cotton to citrus production and the increased demand for low-wage migrant workers, 2) the influx of Kurdish workers - consisting

58 Sara María Lara Flores and Hélène Le Doaré. "Espace et territorialité dans les migrations rurales : Un exemple mexicain." Migrations Societe 115, no. 1 (2008): 107–23.

of both economic migrants and IDPs - since the 1990s, and 3) Syrian refugees and their incorporation as labor in agricultural fields starting in 2012.

In the section 4.3 "Conversion to Cash Crops and Emergent Labor Need" in chapter 4, the devastating impact of neoliberal agrarian policies that resulted in the near cessation of cotton production in Southern Turkey was explained in detail. After the termination of cotton cultivation in Adana and Mersin, different crop preferences emerged depending on climate conditions, the fertility of the soil, and encouragement from state enterprises to plant specific crops. Farm owners turned to alternate crops including citrus fruits, lettuces, potatoes, white cabbage, and watermelons due to the high fertility of the land and the favorable climate conditions in this region. The most striking consequence of the transition to high value crops is the changing spatio-temporal character of seasonal agrarian jobs, which need to be redefined in new terms. With the introduction of new crops, agricultural tasks, seasonal working periods, and the periods when migrants are present changed accordingly. A farm owner from Adana explained the effects of citrus production on the length of the working period:

> In the past, this region was a cotton area known as the place of "white gold." In the course of time, cotton production ended due to the wrongheaded agrarian politics of the state. The plains have taken on a new identity since then. This region, which is located to the south of Çukurova and the south of Yüreğir, will be the "green city" of the future. In every part of the region one is faced with green. Citrus has become common day by day. It created new job opportunities for the workers who reside here. During the period from September to the end of March, seasonal workers are employed for the harvest of lemons, navel oranges and other citrus fruits. In the citrus sector, seasonal workers can find a job easily. It has constructed a new order here. After March, there are also pruning jobs that last 1-2 months. Unqualified people can work in

> pruning, citrus, or irrigation. These jobs don't require any qualifications. They can find jobs for a longer period here.[59] (Producer 12, male, aged 40, hometown: Adana).

He evaluates the prevalence of citrus production optimistically for unqualified temporary agricultural workers described; they are available to employ in the fields. His argument about the additional job opportunities for seasonal workers that accompanied the extended working periods or different crops is confirmed by the experience of other workers.

> We are from Urfa. We used to go and back to Urfa when we worked in cotton, but for 5-6 years, we have not returned to our homeland in the winter. Here, there is perpetual need for labor all 12 months. There are the harvests of eggplants, peppers, tomatoes, watermelons, cantaloupe, and peanuts. We are finding intermittent jobs

59 "Bu bölge eskiden beyaz altın olarak bilinen pamuk bölgesiydi. Bu bölge zamanla pamuğun tarım politikalarındaki yanlışlıklarla devletin neyse işte artık o yanlışlardan dolayı pamuk bitti gibi. Ova farklı bir kimliğe büründü. Şu an sizinle röportaj yaptığımız bu bölge geleceğin yeşil kenti. Çukurova'nın güneyi yüreğin güneyi hemen hemen her toprağı yeşille buluşuyor yeni yeni narenciye işleri geliyor. Bu da burada yaşayan tarım işçilerine yeni bir iş alanı yarattı. şu mevsim itibariyle martın sonlarına yakın buradaki tarım işçileri limon portakala Washington dediğimiz meyve çeşitlerinin toplamıyla günlük ücret karşılığı onların da biraz pozisyonları günlük gidiş gelişleri araçlar vs de ufak tefek donanımlar oluştu eskiden römorkla traktörle gidilen yerlere şimdi çok iyi şartlarda olmasa da otobüslerle gidiliyor. Bu da iyi gelişme. Çukurova pamuktan uzaklaşıyor ama tarım işçilerine destek verecek, tarım şu an narenciye olarak devam ediyor çünkü pamuk yok, toplama işi de bitti. Ama narenciyeden de ciddi bir şekilde buradaki tarım işçileri iş bulabiliyorlar. Bu da burada tekrar yeniden bir denge oluşturdu. Marttan şubattan sonra da geçlere burada budama dediğimiz tekrar bahçelerin ıslahı düzenlenmesi gibi budama dediğimiz süreç başlıyor 1-2 aylık bir süreç başlıyor. Bunlar da buradaki insanların burada kalabilmesi için meslek olmayınca biz bunlara vasıfsız işçi diyoruz ama burada iyi ve kötü anlamında demiyoruz herkes iyi. Ama mesleği olmayan vasfı olmayan ya budama yapacak ya tarımda sulama yapacak, veya pamuk toplayacak, daha uzun süre iş bulabilecek." Interview by the author, tape recording in Turkish. Yüreğir (Adana), 06.09.2013.

throughout the year, so we are here permanently.[60] (Worker 27, female, aged 35, hometown: Urfa).

Citrus production requires temporary labor in winter months, presenting an opportunity for migrants to stay permanently in their temporary accommodations. In this case, the survival strategy of farm owners in the face of declining cotton prices, - namely turning to alternate crops, mainly citrus - has resulted in changes to the landscape of the countryside. I infer that the emergence of rural ghettos is directly linked to changing crop composition, as this phenomenon is absent when mono-crop production is prevalent as with hazelnut production in Ordu in northern Turkey[61] or apricot production in Malatya, in eastern Turkey.[62] The need for labor over a longer period each year in southern Turkey was met by the flows of Kurdish migrant workers and Syrian refugees - the second and the third migration waves described in the chapter 3.

The proletarianization of the peasantry has evolved in a twofold context for Kurds, as the previous section demonstrated. First, the neoliberal capitalization of the Turkish agriculture sector resulted in a depeasantization process in the eastern and southeastern regions of Turkey. Faced with a lack of state support and subsidies, Kurdish farmers and sharecroppers could not convert their land to produce alternate crops. The farmland in the east and the southeast was not suitable in terms of fertility, terrain and climate conditions to easily switch to other crops, as in the case of Adana. In many cases, they turned from independent farmers into seasonal migrant worker. Second, forced internal migration -following the State Emergency Rule declared in 1987 and justified by the skirmishes

60 "Biz Urfalıyız. Taa pamuk zamanından beri gidip geliyoruz. Ama 5-6 yıldır hiç dönmüyoruz Urfaya. Burada 12 ay hep iş var. Patlıcan, domates, kavun, karpuz, fıstık.. İş buluyoruz sürekli ama bir bitiyor, sonra bazen ara oluyor biri başlıyor, bazen hemen başlıyor. Öyle olunca, biz de çadırlarda sürekli kalmaya başladık." Interview by the author, tape recording in Turkish. Karataş (Adana), 06.09.2013.

61 Deniz Pelek, Seasonal Migrant Workers in Agriculture: The Cases of Ordu and Polatlı (M.A. Thesis, Bogazici University, 2010)

62 Sidar Çınar, Bağımlı Çalışma İlişkileri Kapsamında Mevsimlik Tarım İşçilerinin Malatya Örneği Üzerinden Analizi, (PhD diss., Marmara University, 2012)

between Turkish security forces and the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and as a result of violence in the east and southeast during the 1990s - accelerated the de-peasantization process by creating a mobile, dispossessed rural proletariat.

Thus, the current population of Kurdish seasonal agricultural workers consists of both economic migrants and IDPs since upward mobility opportunities are limited in eastern provinces. Kurdish migrants evaluate living permanently in tents as a rational, logical decision as the cost of travel to and their homelands are reduced and they pay no rent.

> For 24 years, in the past, we used to return back to Urfa every year and stay there for 2 months. We haven't gone backed for the last 5-6 years. We stay in tents permanently now. It is very problematic here, especially in bad weather. For example, the other day there was a storm; all the rain came into the tents. We can't afford the expenses of travel to go to Urfa. Some migrants here can afford it. They stay here for 4-5 months, but people like me who cannot pay travel costs have to live in tents. I wish to go back to our home; Urfa is the most comfortable location for me. Would you want to stay in a tent in winter? Who would want that? When the wind blows, I think "what will I do if this tent flies away from over me?" Would you like rain on your head, dripping, and striking you? If I were in my home, my hometown, I would never know how it rains, but here I know how [bad] it is. (Worker 99, male, aged 43, hometown: Urfa).[63]

63 "Urfalıyız. 24 yıldır buraya gelip gidiyorduk. Ama 5-6 yıldır da gitmiyoruz hiç, hep burda kalıyoruz, hep bu yerde (çadır). Ama çok sorun yaşıyoruz. O gün fırtına geldiği zaman görseydin halimizi. Evi güzel olan, gelir 4-5 ay burda kalır gider, ama benim gibi imkanı olmayanlar kalır burada. Ben dönmek istiyorum memlekete. Urfa başka, şimdi en rahatın olduğu yer. Şimdi ister misin bu çadırda oturmak kışın? İster misin rüzgar geldiği zaman, dersin yarabbi bu çadır fırlarsa şimdi ben ne yapıcam. İster misin bir damla yağmur güm diye başına vurursun. Memlekette olsaydım evimde olsaydım, nasıl bir yağmur yağıyor, bilmiyorsun yağmurun yağdığını. Içerdeydim ama burda nasıl yağdığını çok iyi biliyorsun çünkü yağmur üzerimize yağıyor." Interview by the author, tape recording in Turkish. Karataş (Adana), 26.01.2015.

This interviewee expresses his discomfort with staying indefinitely in tents and compares it to his homeland where he desires to return. However, the economic capacity of the household is the basic factor impelling the decision to continue living in tents designed for short-term stays. A similar decision is expressed by another informant as follows:

> We had resided in the center of Suruç, which is the district of Urfa. We sold our house and household goods and came here. We haven't gone back to our hometown since 2000. We have been living in tents permanently. Our children were born in these tents. We stay in tents because we can't afford to pay the rent for a flat and there are no jobs for us in the center of the city. Going back to Urfa and Adana was too expensive for us. So we decided to stay here permanently. (Worker 110, male, aged 45, hometown: Urfa).[64]

In Turkey, Kurdish migrant worker groups mostly work as a family,[65] which is a distinctive characteristic of the Turkish case distinguishing it from single household member migration (usually a man) that marks other examples of seasonal agricultural migration, such as the Bracero in the United States[66] and the SAWP in Canada[67] - that are introduced in chapter 2. Hence, the decision of older family members to live permanently in a tent in a labor camp due to economic impoverishment is also

64 "Biz Urfa-Suruç'ta oturuyorduk. Evi barkı sattık memlekette gelip dönmedik bir daha hiç, öyle çadırdayız. 2000'den beri burdayız, çadırdayız. Çocuklarımız burda doğdu büyüdü. Burada ev tutamadık çünkü çalıştığımız bizim boğaza yetmiyor nasıl ev kirası verelim. Bir de iş de yok nerede çalışacaz. İş bir tek burada var. Urfaya gitmek gelmek de çok pahalı, karşılayamıyoruz. O yüzden çadırda kalıyoruz böyle sürekli." Interview by the author, tape recording in Turkish. Yumurtalık (Adana), 29.01.2015..

65 Iclal Ayşe Küçükkırca, "Etnisite, Toplumsal Cinsiyet, Sınıf Ekseninde Mevsimlik Kürt Tarım İşçileri." Toplum ve Kuram 6 (2012).

66 Philip Martin, "Mexican Workers and U.S. Agriculture: The Revolving Door," International Migration Review 36, no. 4 (December 2002): 1124–42. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7379.2002.tb00120.x.

67 Tanya Basok, Danièle Bélanger, and Eloy Rivas, "Reproducing Deportability: Migrant Agricultural Workers in South-Western Ontario," Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 40, no. 9 (September 2014): 1394–1413. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2013.849566.

a decision on behalf of the household that affects family life. As the quotation above shows, this family's children were born and grew up in a tent settlement in lieu of a home in a village or urban neighborhood. While the collective family life in these settlements turn their temporary place into a neighborhood, household members have distinct identities that are neither villager/peasant nor city dweller. A new way of living has brought about new hybrid identities between peasant and proletarian and between villager and camp-inhabitant. This paradoxical situation is further complicated by the refugee identity of Syrian seasonal migrant workers who reside in these labor camps.

As the chapter 5 illustrated, Syrian refugees are extensively employed in Turkish agriculture, work for lower wages, and reside in the tents with poor living conditions in the countryside. The temporary agricultural work solves the employment and housing problem of refugees in spite of the bad conditions. The father of a family from Aleppo explained how they ended up in a rural ghetto:

> We crossed the border on foot 10 months ago. First, we arrived at the Suruç refugee camp. There were no jobs, but we learned from some people about the warn weather in Adana and that there are some available jobs. Then we came to Adana to find a job. We set up tents ourselves here. We will not move to another city. In the mornings, dayıbaşıs (labor intermediaries) come here to select workers. Sometimes we work 15 days with all members of the family including children. Sometimes, nobody comes. We sit in the tents for 1 month without doing anything. For example, only my daughter is working currently, but my family consists of 9 people. So nothing is certain. Every day the job situation is changing. (Worker 98, male, aged 50, hometown: Aleppo).[68]

68 "Biz 10 ay önce geldik Türkiye'ye. Sınırı yürüyerek geçtik. Önce Suruçtaki kampa gittik. Orada hiç iş yoktu. Sonra duyduk ki, Adana'da işler varmış, hava da sıcakmış. Biz de iş bulmaya Adana'ya geldik. Çadırlarımızı kurduk buraya. Başka bir şehre de gitmiyoruz,

As Worker 98 stressed, the working situation is precarious. In different periods, their situation ranges from full employment of all family members to partially employment to intervals of unemployment. Besides the new spatial patterns, the dispossession levels of Syrian refugees and Kurdish workers force them into a new, circular migration trajectory which shows the situation of homelessness as well as lack of permanent tent habitation. In some instances, workers are always on the move and stay in rural ghettos in different cities throughout the year. I conceptualize this particular situation as a "New Nomadism."

6.4.1 *New Nomadism*

To distinguish another current pattern, which also differs from past patterns, I employ the term "new nomadism": the non-stop circulation of seasonal farm workers around Turkey. I prefer to use "nomadism" instead of "circular migration" to emphasize the continuous mobility. For instance, circular migrants can possess a home or a permanent tent and circulate for six to ten month periods. However, what I am describing is a new phenomenon of people constantly on the move searching for jobs in the fields and settling only temporarily, just like nomads. I call them new nomads because they are not members of a specific group or tribe, as is the case or classical nomadism, but they are always on the move just like the *yörüks*[69] of Turkey. A Syrian male worker from Idlib explains, "we

hep buradayız, burada kalacağız. Sabahları dayıbaşılar geliyor, işçileri seçmek için. Bazen hepimiz 15 gün çalışıyoruz. Bazen kimse gelmiyor, çalışmıyoruz. Çadırın içinde hiçbir şey yapmadan oturduğumuz 1 ay oldu. Mesela bizim aile 9 kişi ama şu an bir tek kızım çalışıyor. Hiçbir şey belli değil yani. Sürekli değişiyor." Interview by the author, tape recording in Kursdish. Tuzla (Adana), 26.01.2015.

69 A cultural-historical name for Turcoman and other tribes who have a pastoral way of life and always depend on new grazing land for their subsistence.

don't have a home in Turkey. We are working in agricultural jobs in different cities. We are always circulating – rain or shine."[70] (Worker 68, male, aged 30, hometown: Idlib).

New nomads are not only comprised of Syrians. A male worker from Mardin states that "we didn't go back to our home between 1997 and 2000. We were circulating from Bursa to Balıkesir, from Ankara to Sakarya, from Izmir to Manisa… We had to migrate persistently because of terror and for political reasons. They dictated to us to leave from our hometown."[71] (Worker 57, male, aged 32, hometown: Mardin) This is a solution to the economic hardships experienced by most Syrians that is relatively less often used by Kurdish internal migrants. This makes the concept of new nomadism ethnically significant. With the emergence of rural ghettos and new nomadism, contemporary rural space provides the condition for survival and accommodation to disadvantaged ethnic groups. On the other hand, they have resulted in new types of stratification among workers in terms of status and habitation.

As such, tents provide free shelter to Syrian refugees and Kurdish migrants, either temporarily or permanently even if they do not work. The cohabitation of Turkish Kurds and Syrian refugees as permanent tent settlers has paved the way for a new type of neighborhood life in the camps. The next subsection will focus on the everyday life of the workers in rural ghettos.

70 "Bizim burada evimiz yok. Böyle başka başka şehirlerde, yaz kış demeden sürekli tarlalarda çalışıyoruz." Interview by the author, tape recording in Arabic. Akhisar (Manisa), 10.08.2014.

71 "1997 ve 2000 arası eve hiç gitmedik. Bursadan Balıkesire oradan Ankaraya Sakaryaya hep dolaştık. Terör ve politik olaylardan dolayı göç etmek zorundaydık çünkü. Bizi köyden çıkardılar." Interview by the author, tape recording in Turkish. Gölmarmara (Manisa), 06.08.2014.

6.4.2 *Everyday Life in the Rural Ghettos*

Seasonal agricultural migrant workers occupy the most marginalized position in rural communities in terms of their low salaries, the precariousness of their jobs and bad work and living conditions. However, they are not mere victims; they are actors that command a certain scope of action.[72] As Rye and Scott, and Rogaly argue, the high level of vulnerability of these migrants does not imply an absence of agency.[73] Workers produce alternate ways to cope with socioeconomic hardships in the microspaces of their work and life. I suggest evaluating the emergence of rural ghettos in southern Turkey from the perspective of migrants' agency. Kurdish and Syrian workers are able to create a home life in the tents and a neighborhood life in the labor camps. In this section, I will provide a thick description of rural ghettos by drawing analogy between homes and tents as well as between labor camps and neighborhoods.

Workers live in tents in rural ghettos. Different types of tents are evident; some are made of tarpaulin and others are wrapped with plastic and cotton covers. The seasonal working period is an important criterion for the selection of tent material. While short-term inhabitants prefer plastic, long-term and permanent tent dwellers use durable tarpaulin materials and design their tents' interiors like a home. A piece of material is cut in the shape of a door, and when people enter the tent, they should take off their shoes at this door just like visitors or residents would in a home. Rugs and carpets are spread on the ground partly to conceal the dirt and to make it more comfortable to sit on. Inside the tents, people sit on the floor, a carpet or a cushion. Generally, one family stays in each tent and all family members sleep together under the same tarpaulin. During the day, the foam or cotton mattresses used to sleep on are amassed in a

72 Jorg Gertel and Sarah Ruth Sippel. Seasonal Workers in Mediterranean Agriculture the Social Costs of Eating Fresh, (Routledge, 2017), 247.

73 Johan Fredrik Rye and Sam Scott. "International Labour Migration and Food Production in Rural Europe: A Review of the Evidence." Sociologia Ruralis 58, no. 4 (2018): 938. https://doi.org/10.1111/soru.12208 and Rogaly, Ben. "Spaces of Work and Everyday Life: Labour Geographies and the Agency of Unorganised Temporary Migrant Workers." Geography Compass 3, no. 6 (2009): 1984. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-8198.2009.00290.x.

corner of the tent. Toilets and bathrooms are also covered by tent materials (see the photo below). These places are lack basic water infrastructure. Workers carry water in buckets from a creek or canal to the toilets, which clearly causes health problems. Many tent inhabitants prefer to go to empty areas for their toilet needs.

Figure 6.3 Toilet in a Labor Camp in Mersin, September 2013. Photo by the author.

Daily routine in the tents is similar to that in the houses. Women in the camps usually cook meals outside. First, they make a fire and place three or four iron bars in parallel lines over it. Then they cook the meal in a pot placed on these bars. Also, women spend much of their time in the labor camps baking flat breads. They call it bread, but it differs from the standard bread made in bakeries. Women roll the dough until it becomes a thin sheet and then cook it on a concave iron plate. One often witnesses women baking these flat breads immediately in front of their tents in the labor camps. This is a social space for the women where they chat while cooking. Breakfast and dinner are usually eaten had inside the tents.

The permanent inhabitants of the labor camps consist of Kurdish and Syrian workers, while local Turkish farm workers usually stay in worker houses allocated by the employer. These are usually just one room that serves as the kitchen, living room, and bedroom at once place. Their constrcution is mostly unfinished, made of brick walls with nothing but cardboard or plastic covering the windows and a door (see the figure 6.5).

The roof is covered with galvanized metal which offers relatively better conditions of accomodation than the tents since there is occasionally access to water and electricity and it is better safeguarded against the elements.

Figure 6.4 Local Workers' Accommodations in the Salihli District of Manisa, 2014. Photos by the author.

In all the field sites, this ethnic residential segmentation is commonly "normalized" in the utterances of farm dwellers as follows: "local workers usually don't want to stay in tents: they don't accept it, but the migrants find a solution on their own initiative." In this way, socioeconomic inequalities are reified and inscribed into inter-ethnic space.

In local terms, the places that migrants set up their tents and live are usually called the "labor camp" or "campsite." The term "camp" denotes refugee camps, detention camps, transit camps, and deportation camps. Generally speaking, the camp is defined with its boundaries as an enclosed area, which has spatial limits, strict rules, and unsuitable living conditions. At this point, I should distinguish the case of seasonal migrant workers from the others. Although many refugees and internally displaced people settle in labor camps and work as temporary agrarian laborers, their work and habitation in tents does not result from a coercion like penalty or slavery conditions. There is no extra-economic coercion directing these people to the labor camps. Keeping this difference in mind, there are, of course, similarities between labor camps and refugee camps in terms of the segregated location, the ethnic composition of the population, and the poor living conditions. Camps are often located far

from the center of villages, strictly demarcating the local population from the seasonal workers.

In Adana and Mersin, it was difficult to find the location of the labor camps as they were far outside the villages and cities. It was necessary to find a local who knows the region, working places, and labor camp districts. Sometimes, a villager, farm owner, or labor intermediary acted as a contact person and helped me to gain access to the camps. This person relied on his "local" status, which also helped in establishing mutual confidence with the workers to facilitate communication. With these local people's help, I was able to visit many labor camps in the districts of Ceyhan, Karataş, Sarıçam, Yumurtalık, and Yüreğir in Adana and in the vicinity of Yenice in Mersin. In each of these sites, the number of tents ranged from tens to hundreds, depending on their proximity to working area, water supply, and nearby highways. Labor camps are generally located on the land of the General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works (DSI) near drainage and irrigation canals that make washing clothes and dishes and bathing easier. The water source also marks a physical border; the tents stretch along the creek or canal as is visible in the figure 6.6.

Figure 6.5 A Labor Camp in Adana's Ceyhan District, September 2013. Photo by the author.

A survey by the Adana Governorship and the co-authors' survey[74] shows the neighborhood is observable in the table 6.3, by the lack or presence plumbing and electrical infrastructure and availability of school shuttles for children. The state strived to capture the basic problems of the labor

74 The survey was conducted as a part of Legislative regulations under the Project for the Improvement of the Working and Living Conditions Lives of Seasonal Migratory Agricultural Workers (Mevsimlik Gezici Tarım İşçilerinin Çalışma ve Sosyal Hayatlarının İyileştirilmesi Projesi- METIP). This survey outlines the current problems in the settlement camps such as the lack of infrastructure, namely water and electricity, and the lack of educational facilities for children. I asked for the results of Adana Governorship et al's survey during my visit to Turkish Employment Agency in Adana and collected the necessary reports and documents that shows the current problems in 43 labour camps in Adana. The official results of the survey have not announced in any publication. It is the only survey that shows the number of tents, the number of tent-inhabitants separately and the current problems such as lack of infrastructure or school service in almost all labour camps in Adana. I drew the tables used in this paper from the findings of the reports. See, the sample document from the survey, Appendix D.

camps to improve the living conditions. Although the scope of this surveys is limited and efforts so far are not enough to solve the problems of seasonal migrants, for my purposes, it is significant that the survey approaches these settlements and assesses their need for state services just as it would for a village or a city district.

Table 6.3 Major Problems of the Workers

	Child labor	Unhealthy toiletry conditions	Insufficient electricity and water	Soft ground causing mudslides	Others (remote location of the camps, security, and ns*)
Number of labor camps	8	16	3	10	6
Total number of labor camps		43			
Total number of inhabitants		50< (n=2), 50-100 (n=12), 100> (n=19), ns (n=10)			
Total number of tents		~1742			
Total number of inhabitants		~9640			

ns*: not specified

SOURCE Adana Governorship's Survey.

As the table indicates, water is an important issue because the water supplies are usually polluted with chemicals and fertilizers which cause serious diseases, especially among child workers.[75] In the camps, drinking water is supplied via trucks or water well pump. However, workers complain about the absence of clean water for drinking. One worker said,

> We are drinking water from the canal. We use a water well pump. There are small worms in the water. Even though we can see the worms, we drink the water because we have no other choice. Our children are getting sick because of the water and we are going to

75 Ayşegül Özbek, New Actors of New Poverty: The 'Other' Children of Çukurova (MA Thesis, Middle East Technical University, 2007); Pınar Uyan Semerci et al., Mevsimlik Gezici Tarım İşçiliği 2014 Araştırma Raporu (Hayata Destek İnsani Yardım Derneği, 2014).

> the hospital to see the doctor. (Worker 71, female, aged 50, hometown: Şırnak).[76]

Electricity is provided by generators. A labor intermediary or an employer rents to the electrical generator and recoups the cost from the workers. Tent inhabitants pay the labor intermediary or the employer for electricity. A labor intermediary is a key figure in the labor camps since he is the contact person to find a job, get electricity, and solve language problems for workers who need translators. Labor intermediaries also usually live in a tent in the labor camp with their families.

Children go to school with a shuttle service if provided. As the table 6.3 shows, state agencies noted the absence of this service in labor camps. Occasionally, mobile education is provided in a tent in the camps[77] but only for elementary school students. Thus, the shuttle is important in terms of continuing on with middle school, of meeting other children who are not living in tents, and of getting an education in a building instead of in mobile tents. One child who lives permanently in a tent and is a student in a middle school in the center of district in Adana, said:

> Me and my [twin] brother are going to school by shuttle every weekday. We are working in the fields on the weekends. I have a total of nine brothers and sisters. They are also working the fields, and some of them are going to school. We used to go back to and forth from here. Then, four years ago, we settled here permanently. My uncles and grandfathers are also here; they are living in the next tents over. We visit our village in Urfa for 5-6 days and

76 "Kanal suyu içiyoruz, içinde ufak kurtlar var. Suyu kuyudan çekiyoruz. Kurtlu suyu içiyoruz mecburen. Çocuklar hastalanıyor, doktora götürüyoruz, napalım mecburuz, fakirliktir." Interview by the author, tape recording in Turkish. Gölmarmara (Manisa), 11.08.2014.

77 Semerci et al., Mevsimlik Gezici, 93.

> then we are, back to Adana. I want to live in Adana for the rest of my life. (Worker 91, male, aged 13, hometown: Urfa)[78]

Workers are aware of the disadvantages as well as advantages of living tents permanently. For instance, the children of seasonal migrant workers who stay in the labor camps temporarily usually leave school prior to the summer holiday and start the new year late due to the overlap with the harvest season. However, children that live permanently in rural ghettos follow their courses of instruction without interruption, which can create upward mobility opportunities for those households in the long run. Moreover, living in tents with relatively lower rent and utility expenses can allow the workers to save money to move to the city center and towards the desired goal of more secure, stabile work and accommodation in a house.

Syrian refugees decide to live in rural ghettos rather than refugee camps so they can work and save money that can provide them further advantages if they decide to migrate to another city or country. Therefore, workers' agency in everyday life shows a purposeful stance wih regard to to the political and economic causes that pushed them to live in rural ghettos. Although the strategies of migrant workers are far from unionized struggle against inequalities in the labor market and their daily lives, migrant workers as subjects transform labor camps into neighborhoods – to the extent that the state even had to recognize them and provide them with basic services- by changing socio-spatial relations and practices in the rural areas with their persistent presence.

78 "Ben ve kardeşim her gün okula servisle geliyoruz. Hafta sonları tarlada çalışıyoruz bazen. 9 kardeşiz. Onlar da tarlada çalışıyor. Bazıları okula gidiyor. Biz adanaya hep gidip geliyorduk. Ama 4 yıldır, hep buradayız. Amcamlar ve dedemler de burada. Yandaki çadırda kalıyorlar. Urfaya yılda 5-6 gün gidiyoruz. Ben hep Adana'da yaşamak istiyorum." Interview by the author, tape recording in Turkish. Karataş (Adana), 23.01.2015.

§ 6.5 Concluding Remarks

In this chapter, I discovered and discussed new patterns in seasonal agricultural migration in Turkey that have not been addressed in the particular literature. Based on the results of the initial fieldwork, I first examined diverse dispossession processes and the structural causes that shape them. In this scope, water scarcity in Urfa, the infertility of the land in Balıkesir and Afyon, and the cessation of the tobacco production in Manisa emerged as prominent factors in turning former peasants into wage workers. Then, I focus on political factors by examining the results of the fieldwork conducted in Cizre. The main stimulus pushing people to migrate as seasonal workers was the implementation of forced migration in 1994, which resulted in resettlements to Cizre's center, which is at the margins of Turkey both economically and geographically. As such, a new profile of worker emerged. These workers either own a house or reside in a rented house in the city center and are unemployed during the winter. They work as a family during the harvest seasons in different regions. This part of the thesis illustrated that this new type of workers is neither a city inhabitant nor farm dweller, but is certainly a waged migrant worker - usually totally dispossessed – employed with temporary agrarian jobs.

After drawing the diverse patterns of dispossession, I analyzed the changing character of tent settlement areas in accordance with changing worker profiles and transformed socio-spatial relations in southern Turkey. In this scope, three interrelated fields of research are investigated: the impact of agrarian transformation on labor demand, the Kurdish migrant flow in Turkey, and recent influx of Syrian refugees. Obviously, the idiosyncratic character of the case limits the transferability of the findings and reflections to other contexts. In effect, the coexistence of agrarian transformation, internal violence in eastern and southeastern Turkey and the war in Syria makes analyzing the novel forms of agricultural work and rural space in the Turkish case context-specific. Additionally, traditional dwelling practices are important for distinguishing the particular-

ities of Turkey from those of other contexts. For instance, Kurds from Turkey and Syrian refugees live permanently in tents in labor camps, while migrant agricultural workers in Italy stay in abandoned houses in marginal neighborhoods, which can be called "rural ghettos" as well.[79]

In spite of the different patterns of dwelling in different countries, the common ground is the permanency of the settlement and the precariousness of the work in locations that are still called host locations This poses a challenge to conventional definitions of seasonal migrant workers that highlight the temporary nature of the stay and work. Thus, the contribution is twofold. First, this chapter showed the adaptability of the ghetto concept to the rural context in the specific case of Turkey by examining the permanent population of labor camps and their everyday lives. Second, this chapter suggests a rethinking of the temporary aspect of seasonal agricultural migration given its permanent nature, especially in the context of the Global South continuing political conflicts are still generating large migrant flows, and 85 percent of the world's displaced people live in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East.[80] Unprecedented in rural areas, the need for cheaper wage labor is being filled by workers with varying statuses - refugee, asylum-seeker, transit-migrant, internally displaced person, and clandestine worker. Hence, rural ghettoization in Southern Turkey crystalizes some of the socio-spatial consequences of agricultural transformation processes and contemporary rural mobilities, yet it is expected that this will emerge with variations in other local and national contexts.

79 Perrotta, Domenico Claudio, and Devi Sacchetto. "Migrant Farmworkers in Southern Italy: Ghettoes, Caporalato and Collective Action" 1, no. 5 (2014): 75–98.

80 Lea Müller-Funk, Osama Alaa Aldien, Arij Basrak, Weam Ghabash, Mustafa Hatip, Rand Shamaa, and Mouran Tourkmani. "Researching Urban Forced Migrants in Turkey and Lebanon: Alternative Ways to Study a Vulnerable Population in Fragile Political Contexts." International Migration Institute Network, February 2019.

7

Conclusion

This thesis answers the question of how the meaning and importance of seasonal migrant agricultural workers has been revitalized since the 1990s while paradoxically, agriculture has been in a process of sharp transformation. It first focused on a lacuna in the literature that underestimates the key role of seasonal migrant workers in the restructuring process of agricultural production. Accordingly, it was argued that obtaining cheaper labor went hand in hand with emergent new migrant categories such as internally displaced people, irregular migrants, and refugees which in turn made possible to transform agricultural production, labor relations, and related sociocultural life.

The analysis of the phenomenon of seasonal migrant workers in this dissertation has been examined in three major fields: 1) migrant flows in relation to changing geopolitics and the foreign and domestic policies followed, 2) the impact of agrarian transformation on production and producers, which has reshaped the labor structure, 3) within this transformation process of migration and production, emergent patterns in rural space, migratory movement, and new migrant profiles. To this end, the chapters of this dissertation are dedicated to unfolding the links and conflicts among agricultural production, migration policies, the geopolitical context of migration, and the livelihoods in rural households of both farm

dwellers and workers. This chapter starts with the central themes emphasized in the chapters. I will conclude and make recommendations for future research.

§ 7.1 Major Findings and Implications

A number of themes about seasonal migrant workers and Turkey's agriculture emerge from this dissertation. First, a geopolitical analysis in chapter 3 showed which dynamics shape selective migration policies. Shifting political directions in line with Neo-Ottomanism have encouraged migrants with Turkish or Muslim identities, which has reshaped the ethnic makeup of agricultural labor market. I identified three main migration waves: undocumented workers from Georgia and Azerbaijan starting in the 1990s, Syrian refugees who have been arriving since 2011, and Kurdish IDPs following forced migration during the 1990s.

The coexistence of different migrant groups - refugees, undocumented workers, and IDPs- has redefined rural space via a new set of relations based on the differing vulnerability levels of workers that change according to ethnicity, citizenship, shared identities, bargaining power, and existent social networks. Moreover, the geopolitical analysis of seasonal agricultural migrations demonstrated the enlargement of the circle of micro, macro, and meso-level actors and explained their alliances and conflicts in the newly transnationalized rural space.

The direction of Turkish policy is a significant factor that determines the importance of particular actors that affect agricultural migrant flows. For instance, the EU was a decisive actor for IDPs during Turkey's candidacy process because some important steps were taken, namely negotiations and harmonization packages such as allowing return to the villages and damage compensation, which could be pursued as an alternative to working as seasonal agricultural workers. But after the intensification of Middle Easternization policies and the deterioration of relations with the EU, IDPs have not been on the political agenda. Another example is Turkish foreign policy on the Syrian civil war, which has directly affected seasonal migrant employment. Expectations that the war would soon finish

were mistaken, and the lack of a refugee integration policy with respect to housing and employment has prompted Syrians to work and find accommodation in rural areas.

Theme 1: New agricultural labor classes. The end result of the geopolitical analysis of recent migrant flows is the emergence of new agricultural labor classes with different categories that are reshaping the Turkish countryside today. The penetration of different migrant groups in the agricultural labor market as well as in rural communities illustrate differences based on ethnicity, poverty, nationality, and exploitative relations are reconstructed on this background. Thus, the fragility of migrant workers necessiates a rethinking of rural class structure. Kassimis[1] and Rye[2] call such workers as a rural underclass and Avallonne[3] termed them "the new international proletariat" with regard to their hyper exploitability and their utility impact on the global market. In this context, the Turkish case can be evaluated as part of a global framework in which new agricultural classes with diverse vulnerabilities have been emerging as the new conditions of the International Food Regime[4] has been established. It should be emphasized that this dissertation also draws attention to the particular agricultural structure (chapter 4) and political context (chapter 3 and 5) of Turkey where the ongoing process of rural transformation makes the case idiosyncratic.

Chapter 4 problematized the survival of small peasantries in the neoliberal era. Contrary to the assumptions of the New Peasantry approach on the revitalization of traditional relations in rural areas, this part showed that farmers continue with their agricultural production, but

1 Charalambos Kasimis, "Survival and Expansion: Migrants in Greek Rural Regions," Population, Space and Place 14, no. 6 (2008): 511–24. https://doi.org/10.1002/psp.513.

2 Johan Fredrik Rye, "The Western European Countryside From An Eastern European Perspective: Case Of Migrant Workers In Norwegian Agriculture," European Countryside 6, no. 4 (December 2014): 327–46. https://doi.org/10.2478/euco-2014-0018.

3 Cited in Johan Fredrik Rye and Sam Scott, "International Labour Migration and Food Production in Rural Europe: A Review of the Evidence," Sociologia Ruralis 58, no. 4 (2018): 928–52. https://doi.org/10.1111/soru.12208.

4 Henry Bernstein, Class Dynamics of Agrarian Change (Kumarian Press, 2013), 82-83.

with a new set of rules. They are eager to adopt updated agricultural technologies in spite of the low level of mechanization in Turkish agriculture. Findings from fieldwork conducted in Manisa, Adana, Mersin, and Bursa show that the main factor lying behind farmers' preferences for crops that require manual labor is input and market prices. The argument of the New Peasantry literature - that farmers tend to revert to traditional labor relations in times of insecurity - do not explain this motivation. Rather, it seems cost and the marketing price of crops are the primary factor. Moreover, farmers are adopting new technologies for in plowing, irrigation and spraying fertilizers insofar as the crop being cultivated allows. Thus, farmers make production decisions using the a concern of capitalist logic of the contemporary market. In this context, farmers' dependency on waged labor is rising due to the insufficient number of unpaid family workers.

Theme 2: Increasing demand for cheaper labor. Shifting state policies that left small-medium farmers "unprotected" from the market have resulted in the development of survival strategies on the part of farmers. Contrary to the claims of the New Peasantry approach that taking advantage of traditional social and cultural relations enables peasantries to survive,[5] I argued that the logic of the responses that farmers' developed is "more capitalist." Their crop change strategy is realized through the availability of migrant workers instead of through traditional solidarity relations or exploitation of family labor. Small farmers are deprived of the necessary conditions to reinvest, leading them always be seeking "cheaper" labor. Work conditions also changed according to the new requirements of newly cultivated crops. Particularly, the transition from cotton to citrus production has necessitated a longer albeit intermittent presence of wage workers and temporary employment each year, for which the profile of dispossessed and vulnerable workers willing to accept more precarious work as ideal. New demands on temporary agricultural workers is well suited to the profile of Syrian refugees.

5 Öztürk, Murat, Joost Jongerden, and Andy Hilton. "The (Re)Production of the New Peasantry in Turkey." Journal of Rural Studies 61 (July 1, 2018): 244–54. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrurstud.2017.10.009.

Theme 3: Refugeeization of the labor force. Chapter 5 argued that a place was opened for Syrian refugee employment in Turkish agriculture. Syrians experience indecent working and living conditions in Manisa, Adana, and Mersin and they are exposed to discrimination from employers, local residents, and other migrant groups. The particular case of Syrian refugees that distinguishes them from other migrants necessitates a rethinking of the economic and political reasons that create the conditions for the hyper-exploitability of these workers.

In effect, for Syrian refugees, human rights violations are more decisive than worker rights abuses. This case is conceptualized as the "refugeeization of labor force" in the literature.[6] In this chapter, I suggest that the concept "fear of death and violence" refers to the impact of the emotions and memory of war and violence. This explains the acceptance of unfair conditions dictated to refugees, which has created favorable conditions for different rural actors like employers and labor intermediaries. The neoliberal transformation of agriculture is realized through the availability of a labor reserve army, which paved the way for the survival of small peasantries and for greater profits for large agricultural enterprises.

Theme 4: Diverse dispossession patterns. Chapter 6 introduced diverse dispossession patterns among seasonal migrant workers. First, water problems, the infertility of the land and the unconduciveness of the homelands of the laborer households to being converted to cash crops are structural causes that turn former peasants and sharecroppers into seasonal migrant workers. Second, forced migration during the 1990s is the major political cause that resulted in the depeasantization of Eastern and Southeastern Turkey and increased rural proletarianization in other areas with the availability of Kurdish Internally Displaced workers.

In this part, the findings of fieldwork conducted in Cizre illustrated the profile of a new worker who resides in Cizre's city center for six to

6 Nick Dines and Enrica Rigo, "Refugeeization of the Workforce: Migrant Agricultural Labor in the Italian Mezzogiorno," in Postcolonial Transitions in Europe: Contexts, Practices and Politics, edited by Sandra Ponzanesi, Gianmaria Colpani, Paul Gilroy, and Anca Parvulescu, , (London, New York: Rowman & Littlefield International, 2016), 151-172.

eight months and works as a temporary agricultural laborer in different cities. On one hand, this profile of workers is between peasant and worker; they were formerly peasants who engaged in subsistence farming and their current economic activity is again working in agricultural jobs. Furthermore, this group of workers have created a kind of village life in Cizre with their daily routine while staying in tents for around six months when they are working. This challenges the binaries of peasant/worker and rural/urban settlers. Likewise, the profile of Syrian refugee workers is compatible with the needs of the agricultural market given their low bargaining power and high dispossession.

Theme 5: Rural ghettoization. Chapter 6 examined the phenomenon of rural ghettoization in Southern Turkey, which refers to workers' permanent settlement in tents throughout the year as opposed to the earlier trends of adhoc stays and work. I asserted three underlying causes for this unprecedented socio-spatial change. First, the transition from cotton to citrus production (chapter 4) has necessitated temporary workers who would work intermittently but for a longer period of time over a year. Second, the extreme poverty levels of Kurdish migrant workers derived from both the adverse impact of neoliberal agrarian policies in their places of origin and political causes such as forced migration and violence in southeastern regions have resulted in high levels of dispossession, leading to their permanent stay in the tents of the migrant labor camps. Third, temporary agricultural work became a solution to the housing and employment problem of Syrian refugees. Although labor camps in southern Turkey offer indecent conditions of work and accommodation, basic shelter have satisfied the needs of Syrian refugee households.

To sum up, these themes all show the changing social, economic, and spatial nature of the Turkish countryside. The major findings support the view that rural transformation has become dependent on migrant workers. The implications of this structural change are twofold. On one hand, the ethnicization of the labor market and rural space have allowed small farmers to survive, which means that traditional village structures are maintained to some extent vis-à-vis the low wages of migrant workers.

On the other hand, new worker profiles and new working and accommodation practices are challenging conventional definitions of seasonal migrant workers (since "deseasonal" elements are increasingly apparent) and changing the established socioeconomic relations in the Turkish countryside.

§ 7.2 Discussion of Further Research

This study suggests multiple directions that future studies on seasonal migrant agricultural workers might take. This study is limited by the qualitative data due to the informal nature of the field. If quantitative data is obtained, regional differences with respect to the "migrant" factor can be analyzed numerically. Moreover, the impact of different ethnic groups as seasonal workers may be examined with the Split Labor Market Theory, Dual Labor Market Theory, or Group Conflict Theory, which would make a significant contribution to the literature.

In another realm, this dissertation is mostly focused on the complicated relations between agricultural transformation and labor migration. The key themes outlined in the previous section can each be separate subjects for future studies. To name a few, more ethnographic studies on rural ghettoization can be conducted to study how local encounters between farm dwellers and migrant workers redefine rural space, how the populations of villages and neighboring labor camps get in contact with each other in everyday life, and how agricultural studies define rural space.

Qualitative studies on refugeeization of labor force, can further investigate aspects such as the quotidian life of Syrians in labor camps and the integration of refugees in rural space. I believe that keeping the focus on Syrian refugees in rural areas is valuable since their situation has become protracted phenomenon and studies on Syrians in Turkey mostly focus on urban refugees. Therefore, there is an urgent need to conducting more research on Syrian refugees and problematize their case in the rural context, which necessitates different theoretical perspectives and ethnographic designs than urban studies.

Moreover, different worker groups and rural actors can be examined individually. For instance, women workers, child workers, and labor intermediaries may be individual subjects for theses or dissertations in this field. Additionally, the relation between labor intermediaries and workers may be analyzed by qualitative research since this relation is specific in terms of paternalistic and functional characteristics highlighted in this dissertation.

On the other hand, the case of seasonal migrant workers represents a vital subject beyond the scope of scholarly works in the social sciences. This study can be a resource for works on migrant agricultural workers in a broader frame. In effect, the journey of seasonal workers - their travel, work and stay - has inspired writers, directors, painters, and photographers over the years. However, the need to produce more work in art and literature is ongoing since the global inequalities are continuously reconstructed with different relations for these workers. John Steinbeck published *The Grapes of Wrath* in 1939. Today, Mexicans, Jamaicans, Africans, Kurds, Syrians, Arabs, and many other groups of workers are in the place of the *Okies* and deserve the same attention they received in the 1930s.

Appendix A Photographs from the Fieldwork

Appendix B Sample Document Concerning Workers' Wages in Manisa

S A L İ H L İ
ZİRAAT ODASI
BAŞKANLIĞI

SAYI:2014/154 05.06.2014
Konu :İşçi yevmiyeleri

05.06.2014 Tarihinde Salihli Ziraat Odası 228 Nolu Meclis Kararı ile 2014 yılı ürünü pamuk çapalama işçi ücretleri ve 2014 yılı Biçer döver ücretleri tespiti yapılmış ve aşağıda belirtilmiştir.

1. 2014 Yılı **pamuk çapalama** 1 günlük işçi ücreti **32,00** TL işçi ücreti+**3,00** TL dayıbaşı ücreti olmak üzere toplam **35,00** TL ödenmesine,
2. **35 Kişiden fazla** işçi çalıştırılması halinde posta başı **için 45,00** TL yevmiye verilmesine, ayrıca 1 damcı, bir sucu ücreti ödenmesine,
3. **35 Kişiden az** işçi çalıştırılması halinde posta başı ödenmemesine damcı veya sucu ücreti ödenmesine,
4. **Mahalli işçilere 32,00** TL işçi ücreti+**3,00** TL dayıbaşı ücreti olmak üzere toplam **35,00** TL ödenmesine,
5. **Yatılı işçiler** için yalnız **GİDİŞ** yol ücretinin işveren tarafından ödenmesine,
6. 2014 Yılı **Biçer-Döver** ücretinin, hububatta (buğday,arpa,yulaf vs.) dekar başına ovalarda **15,00** TL,kırlarda **13,00** TL ödenmesine
7. **Saman** (800 kg toz saman arabası) **60,00** TL, 25 kg'lik balyalar için 1,25 TL ödenmesine
8. İşçilere farklı ödenecek uygulamalardan dayı başılar sorumludur.
9. Yevmiyelerde çalışma 8 saat esas alınmıştır.Çalışma saatleri şu şekilde uygulanabilir.

   Sabah 08:00-13:00 Öğle 14:00-17:00

   Sabah 06:00-10:00 Öğle 10:30-14:30

Oy birliği ile karar verilmiştir.

SALİHLİ ZİRAAT ODASI

Tel : 0.236.713 29 35 Faks : 714 13 21

Appendix C Sample Document Concerning Workers' Wages in Adana

24.07.2014 tarihinde işçi temsilcileriyle yapılan toplantı neticesinde aşağıda yer alan kararlar tavsiye edilmiştir.

1) Narenciye hasadında yabancı işçi çalıştırılmamasına,

2) Belgesi olmayan servis araçlarının çalıştırılmamasına,

3) İş-Kur kaydı olan elciler ile çalıştırılmasının teşvik edilmesine,

4) 2014-2015 narenciye sezonunda işçilik yevmiyesi 44,00 TL. içerisinde elcilik ücreti dahildir,

5) 20 - 30 Ağustos 2014 tarihleri arasında üretici, elci ve ihracatçıların katılacağı, geniş katılımlı bir toplantı yapılmasına ve bu toplantıda daha ayrıntılı konuşulmasına,

6) Servis ücretlerinin 220 TL. olarak ödenmesine oy birliği ile karar verilmiştir.



Appendix D Sample Document from Adana Governorship and co-author's Survey

Bölgede 7'si Suriye'den gelen göçmenlere ve 2'si de Şanlıurfa-Siverek'ten gelen mevsimlik tarım işçilerine ait olmak üzere toplamda 9 çadır bulunmaktadır. Çadırlarda yaklaşık 50-60 kişi yaşamaktadır. Tarım işlerinde çalışan işçi sayısı ise 30 kişi civarındadır. Günlük 37 TL yevmiye almaktadırlar.

Çadırlarda su ihtiyacı su tulumbasından karşılanmakta, elektrik ise aboneliği işveren adına alınmış olup ücreti çadır sakinleri tarafından ödenmektedir.

Prefabrik tuvalet ve banyo ihtiyacı karşılamaktadır.

Okul çağındaki çocuklar okula servisle götürülmektedir.

Bölgede marul paketleme iş yapılmaktadır.

İşçiler yeşil kart sahibi olup herhangi bir acil durumda da işverenin kendilerini hastaneye götürdüğünü, bu konuda sıkıntıları olmadığını belirtmişlerdir.

Görüşler:

Çadır Bölgesinde görüşmüş olduğumuz [redacted], kaldıkları çadırlarda TV, buzdolabı ve çamaşır makinesi olmadığını ve çadır yerine konteynır ya da prefabrik benzeri yapılarda kalmalarının daha uygun olacağını tarafımıza iletmiştir.

Bölgede görüştüğümüz çiftlik sahipleri [redacted], 2009 yılında Kaymakamlık tarafından ihale yöntemiyle tuvalet, banyo, işçilerin boş vakitlerinde sohbet amaçlı bir araya gelebilecekleri ayrı bir çadır yapıldığını, bunları 2 sene kadar kullandıklarını, daha sonrasında ise Kaymakamın değişmesi sonucu ihaleyi alan firmanın çadırı sökerek götürdüğünü ve mağdur olduklarını ifade etmişlerdir. Ankara- Beypazarı ve

Polatlı'daki çadırların örnek alınarak bir düzenleme yapılmasının da olumlu olacağını söylemişlerdir.

Sazak Köyü Drenaj Mevkii:

Tarım Aracısı [redacted] tarafından getirilerin işçilerin barınmakta olduğu bölgede tuvalet ve banyo çadır içlerinde bulunmakta, elektrik işveren tarafından ücreti işçiler tarafından ödenmek suretiyle sağlanmakta ve su tulumbası bulunmaktadır. Okul çağındaki çocuklar servisle okula gitmektedir.

Sirkenli:

Tarım Aracılığını [redacted]'in yapmış olduğu bölgede, [redacted]'le görüşülmüştür. Bölgede 6 çadır bulunmakta ve 50-60 kişi yaşamaktadır. 30 kadar tarım işçisi vardır. Elektrik Tedaş'tan aboneliği işverene ait olmak üzere alınmıştır. Su ihtiyacı su tulumbasından sağlanmaktadır. Çocuklar Sirkenli Köyü'nde eğitimlerini sürdürmektedirler.

Bölge sakinleri, çadırların kanal kıyısında olmasından dolayı yağışlar esnasında kanalın taştığını ve çadırları su bastığını ifade ederek, parke döşenmesini ve çadırlarda yaşam koşullarının uygunsuz olması nedeniyle prefabrik konutlar yapılmasını talep etmişlerdir.

Kızıltahta Köyü:

Köy Muhtarı [redacted] eşliğinde ziyaret edilen Kızıltahta Köyü'nde çadır bölgesinin Tarım Aracılığını yapmakta olan [redacted]'la görüşülmüştür. Bölgede şu anda 13 çadırda yaklaşık 50 kişi yaşamaktadır ancak 1 ay sonra pamuk işinde çalışmak üzere gelecek işçilerle beraber 20-25 çadır olacağı ve 70 kadar kişinin daha geleceği belirtilmiştir. Elektrik işveren tarafından sağlanmıştır. Şebeke suyu kullanılmaktadır. Bölge sakinleri Belediye Otobüslerinin güzergahının

300 metre kadar uzatılıp çadırkente ulaşımın sağlanmasını ve çadırların yanma tehlikesi bulunduğundan prefabrik konutlar tedarik edilmesini istemişlerdir.

Adalı Köyü:

Bölgede şu anda tarım işçisi bulunmamakla beraber köy sakinlerinden edinilen bilgiye göre işçilerin mayıs ayından itibaren bölgeye geldikleri ifade edilmiştir.

Bahçe Köyü:

Tarım Aracılığını [redacted]'ın yapmakta olduğu bölgede [redacted]la görüşülmüştür. Su ihtiyacı Bahçe Belediyesi tarafından, elektrik ihtiyacı ise işveren tarafından karşılanmıştır. Bölge 40 çadır için uygun olmasına karşın şu anda bölgede 100 çadır bulunduğundan elektrik ve kanalizasyon yetersiz kalmaktadır. Kanalizasyonun yaklaşık 2 aydır tıkalı olduğu belirtilmiştir. Okul çağındaki çocuklar için servis bulunmamakta ve çocuklar yaklaşık 2,5 km'lik yol kat ederek Bahçe'de bulunan okula gitmektedir. Aynı zamanda okulda tüm gün eğitim verilmekte ancak öğle yemeği verilmemektedir. Bu sorunların çözümü talep edilmektedir.

27.02.2014

Nur YILDIRIM

S. Sinem GÜRSEN

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