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Fear and Loathing on the Campaign Trail 2016-18

Migrants, Refugees and the rise of Far Right Populism

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" *To infinity and beyond*"

Buzz Lightyear, *Toy Story I*

Abstract

This PhD Thesis is comprised of three chapters that analyse the electoral and behavioural responses of natives' interactions with immigrants and refugees. The first chapter analyses the impact of a relatively large and homogeneous shock of Polish immigrants in the United Kingdom and what impact said shock had on the Brexit vote in 2016. I find that Polish migration to the United Kingdom has increased voting for Brexit, but not enough to sway the vote for Leave. In order to achieve exogenous variation in the allocation of Polish immigrants I rely on the formation of migrant networks close to War Resettlement Camps created for Polish soldiers after WWII, which I collect from the National archives. In the second chapter[1] I use the dismantlement of the illegal Migrants camp close to Calais and the subsequent redistribution of migrants to study the impact to the exposure to few migrants over a short amount of time. I find that the exposure to few migrants decreases the voting for the Front National (France's Extreme right party), but that this effect dissipates if large migrant groups are resettled. In this case contact as well as relative group size play an important role in explaining native's reactions to migrants. In the last chapter[2] I analyse the impact of the refugee crisis on the demand and supply of politics in Italy. I show that the opening of small reception centres for migrants in Italy have decreased voting for the extreme right, decreased hate crimes against immigrants as well as increased votes for left wing parties. The effects are mostly driven by municipalities, which are less connected to the internet. This shows the differential amplification effect digital media can have vis-a-vis traditional media. Furthermore, I find that mayors from extreme right wing parties close and are less likely to open reception centres than other politicians, rationally reacting to their decreased political support.

[1]Co-authored with Paul Vertier.
[2]Co-authored with Matteo Gamalerio and Mario Luca.

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Introduction

As record numbers of refugees arrive to the shores of the European Union,[5] the southern border of the United States as well as the eastern border of Turkey and Central Europe it becomes key to analyse how the interaction between natives and immigrants will, or if at all, influence anti-immigrant sentiment in the host nations. In the future there will be many more migrations, both across as well as within countries. Those migrations might occur through differing economic realities or climate change, which will render some places on the world more desirable to live in and some completely inhabitable. This phenomenon will be coupled with a constant increase in population on the planet. Therefore interactions between migrants and natives will become even more common and understanding how natives shape their sentiment towards migrants will be of great importance. Immigrants will be part of the labour force, affect public goods as well as participate in commercial transactions. All those economic activities are of vital importance for welfare considerations and examining how they are affected by anti-immigrant sentiment will challenge scholars for future generations. Immigrants affect the host nation at the *macro* or at the *micro* level. The former can occur mostly through media coverage and political rhetoric. Be it news outlets covering immigration or political leaders, often from the extreme right, scapegoating immigrants for every *malaise* in the country. When looking at the micro level exposure, a very simple decomposition might be useful: If we abstract from the composition of the immigrant groups, we can differentiate between the *length* of exposure and the *size* of the inflow. Which or if at all we should find differences between the effect of those different types of exposure depends on which underlying theoretical framework we consider. Important is also to analyse, which mediating variable then subsequently causes the according change in anti-immigrant sentiment. The economic and political sciences literature has proposed issues such as the labour market (Borjas [2003]), public finance (Gott and Johnstone [2002]) public amenities (Card, D. and Dustmann, C. and Preston, I. [2012]), public goods provision Algan et al. [2016]), effects on the composition of the population (Card et al. [2008]) and crime (Mastrobuoni and Pinotti [2016]). Additionally one might also want to estimate the *direct* effect of interaction and contact with immigrants Allport [1954].

[5]In the last years, the number of asylum applications in the European Union increased significantly, peaking in 2015 to close to 1.3 million, which is double the amount of the peak asylum application during the Yugoslavian conflict in the 1990s (Eurostat [2016])

This thesis is composed of three chapters that will try and shed light on the formation of anti-immigrant sentiment by natives through the interaction with immigrants.

The first chapter considers a large immigration inflow over a relatively short-amount of time. Specifically, I examine what impact the inflow of Polish migrants had after the EU Accession in 2004, had on the decision of the United Kingdom to leave the EU by referendum (Brexit). Polish migrants increased from around 40 000 before to accession to more than 1 Million in 2016 and now form the major immigrant group. The Brexit vote can be seen as a populist as well as identity based vote, given the false promises made by the "Leave.EU" organization on the Campaign Trail (Browning [2018]). Additionally, immigration was an important factor mentioned by the Leave campaign before the referendum. Polish migrants were also a particularly scrutinized migrant group during and after the referendum, facing identity based hate crimes (for example Express [2016]). In this chapter, I causally show that for the increase of one percentage point of Polish migrants there is an increase of 2.72 to 3.12 percentage points in favour of Brexit. A back of the envelope calculation shows that this increase is not sufficient to explain a sway of votes away from remaining in the EU to leaving the EU. In order to achieve exogenous variation of the allocation of Polish migrants within the United Kingdom I make use of a natural experiment and an instrumental variables approach. Tracing back the history of Polish immigrants in the UK we find that their exile government was based in London and that the second most prominent country of origin in the British forces in World War 2 was of Polish origin. This meant that Churchill allowed the soldiers and their families to temporarily settle to the UK awaiting repatriation to Poland (Polish Resettlement Act 1947). About 200 000 Polish soldiers and their families integrated into War Resettlement Camps, which were often temporary Nyssen Huts established in rural areas all across the UK (National Archives [1932-1959]). To the best of my knowledge there is no document at the National Archives (available to the public), which specifies intentionality in the location of the War Resettlement Camps and contradicts its provisional nature. In fact, many of the Polish immigrants decided to stay in the UK, mainly for the fear to return to Stalin-occupied Poland. They thus integrated in the local communities and build migrant networks after WWII. Given the historical background, the initial location of the War Resettlement Camps can be seen as plausibly exogenous. I collect the location of those camps from the National Archives of the United Kingdom and use the distance to the camps (from the municipality centroid) as an instrument to predict the allocation of Polish immigrants in the future. In order to test the exclusion restriction empirically I carry out a falsification test on the local elections in 1973. Through the Local Government Act in 1972 a vast redrawing of Local Government Authorities (Unit of observation) occurred, which also increase the Local Authorities considerably and thus makes it possible to match them to current local authorities, without loosing too many observations. Potentially lawmakers could have redrawn the local authorities in a way that takes into account or is correlated with the location of the War Resettlement Camps. Since at that point in time

only Labour and Conservatives were the two parties running, I compute the difference between those two election results to check whether the instrument can predict political competition in different districts. Both regressing the 2SLS estimate and the instrument itself on this variables gives no significant results.

The second feature of this design is the natural experiment provided by EU-accession in 2004 of the "Accession 8 countries", amongst those Poland. The UK under Tony Blair was one of the only European countries to allow full labour mobility for the new accession countries immediately in 2004. As a result of that, and also because of the aforementioned historical background, many Polish immigrants moved to the UK, some of them migrating to certain areas for economic reasons, but some also close to their ancestors, who had established themselves close to the War Resettlement camps more than 50 years before. Given this sudden "shock" of immigrants, I am able to estimate the impact of a large shock over a short amount of time, rather than the long-term exposure to large immigrant inflows of Polish migrants. Apart of the impact in favor of Brexit, I find no effect on Turnout and interesting results concerning potential mechanisms. For this exercise, I recode the British Election Survey in 2015 and specifically consider the first question, which asks the interviewee an open-ended question about the major issues facing British politics today. If the respondent mentions migration, I recode it as a 1, otherwise 0. I find that for a 1 percentage point increase in Polish immigration, about 5 percentage points of people mention immigration to be key issue facing British politics today, in line with the results of the main empirical analysis. Additionally I find no differential evidence that differential trust in politicians or political institutions, incumbency or the NHS could play a role. In order to make sure that Polish immigration is not causing outmigration and thus a change in the composition of the Population, which could render the outcomes on the mechanism less reliable, I check for this explicitly in the chapter, but find no evidence of displacement.

It is important to underline that my results carry through only for Polish immigrants and in this regard I construct several robustness checks to make sure my instrument is historically valid and I am only considering the robust effect of Polish immigrants. First of all, the distance to the closest War Resettlement Camp is not able to predict Non-Polish immigrants. Therefore the instrument only picks up the variation induced by a change in allocation of Polish migrants and not of other migrants. To see whether the Polish immigrants are still able to explain significantly a part of the Brexit vote, I carry out several other checks. I run the main regression and also control for all other migrant groups and the effects are still similar and significant. Then I construct an instrument based on Card [2001] by using the share of Non-Polish immigrants in 2000 to predict the non-Polish immigrants in 2014 and also when I include this variable as a control the effects are still of a similar magnitude and significant.

This paper related to several strands of the literature.

The most relevant one is the stream examining the impact of immigration on extreme right and populist voting. The most recent publication is by (Barone et al. [2016]). In this paper the authors causally estimate the impact of immigration on three national elections using the prior allocation of immigrants before 1992 as an instrumental variable. The exclusion restriction being that a political scandal ("Mani Pulite") led to the creation of completely new parties in 1993. In (Halla et al. [forthcoming]), the authors study the impact of immigration on voting in favour of the extreme right in the 1980s to 1990s. To obtain exogenous variation in the allocation of immigrants they use the prior settlement patterns of immigrants in the 1960s. (Harmon [forthcoming]) determines the impact of immigration to Denmark to have had a positive impact on votes in favour of anti-immigrants nationalist parties. His instrumental variables strategy uses the historical housing stock to address issues of endogeneity. (Otto and Steinhardt [2014]) study local elections in Hamburg under periods of high immigration to determine that in right wing xenophobic parties gained considerably. On the other hand (Mendez and Cutillas [2014]) show that the rise of Latin American immigrants led to an increase in votes for the major Left wing party, but an increased immigration from Africa led to more votes for the major right wing party. (Brunner and Kuhn [2014]) is the only paper that considers referendum outcomes. They determine the impact of cultural distance of immigrants to the native population on referenda about immigration. They instrument for the share of immigrants in the municipality by using local labour market conditions. What most of those papers have in common is that the instrument used to achieve exogenous variation in the allocation of new immigrants relies on the "shift-share" instrument introduced by Card [2001]. This chapter in this instance goes two steps further. First of all there is a clear facilitation of immigration post-2004, which renders it easier to distinguish between new immigration shocks (in this case post-2004) and the exposure to continuous migration (in aforementioned cases). Also the historical specificity of the initial allocation of Polish migrants post WWII gives rise to a plausibly more exogenous initial settlement of immigrants.

Other (more recent) papers have started studying the role that politics play in im-migration policy (Gamalerio [2018]) as well as studying the role the refugee crisis has had on extreme right voting (Steinmayr [2018] and Vertier and Viskanic [2018]). Both papers find negative effects of refugees on Far Right Nationalist parties in Austria and France respectively. The instruments used are very similar, (Steinmayr [2018]) uses group housing to instrument for the allocation of refugees, whereas (Vertier and Viskanic [2018]) use holiday villages all over France.

Many papers have in turn analysed the impact of immigration to the UK, especially on the labour market.(Dustmann et al. [2014]) use data from the British Labour Force survey to

estimate the impact of immigration in both a theoretical and empirical fashion. They find the skillset of immigrants to be very similar to the one of natives and no strong effects on aggregate employment, participation, unemployment and wages. Specifically (Manacorda et al. [2011]) find that the mild effects of immigration on the UK labour market are due to the imperfect substitutability between natives and immigrants. Related to this, Gilpin et al. [2006] use the 2004 accession wave of immigration and find no discernible evidence on unemployment claims. The authors paint a picture of a flexible UK labour market that has seen a modest, but broadly positive impact of immigration on the economy. (Nickell and Saleheen [2015], analyse the specific occupational impact of immigration, they find small negative effects on wages but a strong impact of immigration on wages in the semi-skilled/unskilled occupational group. (Wadsworth [2015]) provides a comprehensive review on the general impact of immigration on the UK Labour market

More specifically, this paper is related to a stream in the literature trying to determine the root causes of Brexit, arguably one of the most important political decisions of the UK's and Europe's history. Papers in this regard mostly offer evidence as correlations (Becker et al. [2016] and Arnorsson and Zoega [2016]). I add to these studies by providing an identification strategy to estimate the causal impact of immigration on the Brexit vote outcome. A relatively new avenue of research considers the impact of rising trade exposure on electoral outcomes and thus more in general on the determinants of populism. (Autor et al. [2016]) show that increased Chinese competition has led citizens to elect more extreme house representatives by examining congressman's voting records. Dippel et al. [2017] and Malgouyres [2017] examine the impact of rising trade exposure directly on election outcomes and find a positive effect on extreme right wing parties in Germany and France respectively. Other studies in political science such as Clarke et al. [2016] or Arzheimer [2009] have shown that anti-immigrant sentiment can give rise to votes in favour of extreme right wing parties.

Having those streams of the literature in mind, my contributions are both methodological and in terms of data generation.

First of all, I study one the most important political election in Europe's history and show the causal impact of large immigration inflows on the Brexit vote.

Secondly, I causally estimate the impact of large immigration inflows using a presumably exogenous instrument, which relies on pre-existing settlements. In the process of constructing the instrument I generate new data regarding the location of War Resettlement Camps, which could help further research in reconstructing migrant group earlier than available censuses.

In the second chapter[6] I try and answer a question, which is so far understudied in the literature. How do *small* refugee inflows shape anti-immigrant sentiment by natives? We might expect the interaction with few migrants to be different than with many. First of all, relative group size might be important, given that natives might feel threatened by larger groups. Similarly, also absolute group size might be important, as a smaller group has more incentives to integrate with another community rather than a large homogenous group. At the same time there is potentially, without segregation, a higher probability to interact with an immigrant if the group is larger. The interaction with the immigrant could then shape anti-immigrant beliefs by natives. I test whether the exposure to small migrant inflows might affect anti-immigrant sentiment using an event study coupled with an instrumental variables approach.

Concretely, I analyze the question of whether the exposure to few migrants in the aftermath of the dismantlement of the "Calais Jungle" has influenced voting for the Front National, our proxy for anti-immigrant sentiment. We find that hosting a temporary migrant centre (CAO)[7] causally *decreases* anti-immigrant sentiment. With our instrumental variables approach we find that municipalities that hosted a CAO experience a negative growth rate in percent vote share for the Front National by 12.3 percentage points. Given that the Front National vote share increases 20% over that period, hosting a centre causally decreases about 60% of the increase in anti-immigrant sentiment (about 3.9 percentage points). Municipalities that surround the CAO (within a 5 km radius) also experience a decrease in voting for the Front National. Therefore there is evidence for spill-over effects. These results point towards direct effects of exposure to migrants consistent with the contact hypothesis (Allport [1954]). Indeed, migrants were meant to stay for a short period of time (typically less than three months), and they were also unlikely to affect the local economy for several reasons. First, the cost of relocation was fully taken charge of by the government. Secondly, they did not have the right to work and received no financial transfers. In fact, we show that their arrival does not seem to have impacted local economic activity. Overall, we also find a stronger decrease of vote shares of the Front National in more diverse municipalities with a larger share of younger people. On the other hand effects are dampened in municipalities which were exposed to more migrants in the CAOs and where the Front National was historically strong. Additionally we find that municipalities next to migrant entry points, particularly those close to the *Vallée de la Roya*,[8] experience a lower decrease in votes for the Front National. This is consistent with findings by Hangartner et al. [forthcoming,a], Hangartner et al. [forthcoming,b] and Steinmayr [2018]. Our main interpretation of our findings is that citizens developed a greater degree of acceptance towards migrants and hence were less likely to vote for the

[6]This chapter is co-authored with Paul Vertier.

[7]"Centre d'Acceuil et Orientation": A first stage reception centre of migrants, literally translated as "centre for reception and orientation" in French.

[8]One of the most mediatized entry points, at the border between France and Italy, and encompassing the municipality of Vintimille

Front National. These results seem to be confirmed by the fact that we observe an increase in the share of votes received by the far-left party *Front de Gauche*, which has a more open stance towards migrants, but similar political platform on social and economic issues.

Importantly our calculations suggest that in municipalities that received over 32 migrants per 1000 inhabitants the impact on the Front National vote outcome is positive. This finding reconciles the fact that large inflows of immigrants contributed to the rise of Right wing parties.

We analyse those very general questions with an event study of a natural experiment featuring very attractive characteristics. Two main challenges to estimate the impact of migrants on anti-migrant sentiment by natives are needed to determine causality. The first challenge, which we overcome with an instrumental variables strategy, is the fact that some municipalities might have been chosen to host "CAOs" for some observable or unobservable reasons. If those municipalities would be on different trends in terms of voting for the Front National, then we could not identify the causal impact of the CAOs as it would be confounded. In this case we use the presence of a "Holiday Village"[9] to instrument for the location of a CAO. A holiday Village is a structure owned by a public company in France, where employees are able to usually spend their summer holiday in. Since those structures were mostly empty during the dismantlement and state-owned, they were intended to host migrants for a short amount of time as numbers of arrivals were uncertain. Important to mention here is that many structures were in the end not used, but it was rather a factor to keep in mind if more migrants than anticipated arrived and thus could not be housed in collective housing or other empty housing in the municipality. They were also built in the 1970s and certainly not with the purpose of hosting migrants.

One other main challenge is to try and identify exactly the effect of the interaction of migrants and natives on Front National voting and not the effect of migrants through a mediating variable. In many of aforementioned studies the measured effects are likely to be *indirect*. Indeed, large and sustained migration waves are likely to affect different intermediate variables, such as amenities, public spending, the labor market or the local economy in a broader sense, which can in turn have an effect on voting.

However, the *direct* effect of contact (Allport [1954]) is also likely to play a role. In the European context of migrant reception and distribution across territories, knowing the conditions under which contact of local populations with migrants fosters or dampens the rise of radical votes *per se* is of particular interest.

In this paper we try to fill this gap by examining an event study providing exactly this setting. We focus the dismantlement of the Calais "Jungle", an encampment just outside the city of Calais, in the North of France. During the migrant crisis this illegal

[9] "Village Vacances" in French.

squatter camp increased in population reaching nearly 6,400 inhabitants in October 2016 (Le Monde [2016]), shortly before it was closed and the inhabitants, mostly migrants, relocated. Between October 2015 and October 2016, those migrants were relocated to more than 300 temporary migrant centres called *Centres d'Accueil et d'Orientation (CAOs)* all over the country. The number of those centers being inconsistent across government documents, we manually collected information about their location through a systematic analysis of national and local newspapers (using Factiva), and combined them with a dataset that was publicly released by the CIMADE (the main association helping migrants) at the time of the final dismantling, on October 24th 2016.

Among the 361 municipalities which we find to have a CAO, we evaluate that 31 migrants could be hosted at the same time (for an equivalent of 18 migrant per 1000 inhabitants). We link municipality level variation in the exposure to small numbers of migrants to electoral outcomes. We focus specifically on the vote share of the Front National (National Front), the major far-right wing party in France. During the campaign prior to the presidential election in May 2017 the Front National's rhetoric was generally anti-immigrant, which brought the migrant crisis at the heart of the presidential debate. This was demonstrated most prominently in the general media, but also on the party's social media, their public gatherings as well as election manifesto.[10]

We add to the literature in two ways. First of all, this paper is part of a large strand of literature documenting the electoral repercussions of immigration. Whereas most of the literature has focused on large and long-lasting impacts of immigrants on voting behavior, little is known about the effects of short and small-scale exposure to migrants. Studies examining large inflows of immigrants have generally found a positive impact on far-right votes (Barone et al. [2016], Halla et al. [forthcoming], Harmon [forthcoming], Otto and Steinhardt [2014], Mendez and Cutillas [2014], Brunner and Kuhn [2014], Viskanic [2017], Edo et al. [2018]). Most of those papers rely to some degree on the instrument proposed by Card [2001], which uses the prior allocation of immigrants as way to obtain exogenous variation in immigrant allocation and thus solve the issue of geographical selection.

In the wake of the migrant crisis, recent contributions analyzed the effects of exposure to migrants on voting behaviors and attitudes toward migrants with diverging results. More specifically, Hangartner et al. [forthcoming,b] and Hangartner et al. [forthcoming,a] found that voters on Greek Islands which were more exposed to large inflows of migrants were more likely to develop hostility towards them, and to vote for the Golden Dawn party, one of the major far-right parties in Greece. Conversely, Steinmayr [2018] shows that municipalities of Upper Austria which received migrants were less likely to vote for far-right parties. On the other hand Dustmann et al. [2016] show that the effects of exogenous migrant relocation on voting behavior in Denmark are heterogeneous and

[10]See for example La Croix [2017], BBC [2017] and Le Monde [2017] amongst others.

depend crucially on the characteristics of the localities: in particular, while positive effects on anti-immigration parties are found in rural areas, this effect is reversed in urban areas. There results highlight the importance of taking into account both municipality characteristics and the intensive margin of exposure to migrants.

Our paper combines these approaches by focusing on the electoral effects of receiving a small number of migrants (typically a few dozens), conditionally on long-term exposure to immigrants. Furthermore, our rich dataset allows us to explore how the results vary at the intensive margin (number of migrants) and depending on the characteristics of the population. From this point of view, the threshold effect that we find (above 32 migrants per 1000 inhabitants, the Front National vote increases), reconciles it with findings in the literature on large inflows of migrants.

Secondly, our framework allows us to isolate a direct effect of migrant relocation on voting behavior, which is unlikely to occur through intermediary variables. A large literature in economics has considered the links between immigration and the labour market (Card [1990], Altonji and Card [1991], Borjas [2003], Ortega and Peri [2009], Ottaviano and Peri [2012], Guriev and Vakulenko [2002], among others), public finance (Gott and Johnstone [2002], OECD, [2015], Vargas-Silva [2015]) or crime (Moehling and Piehl [2009], Bianchi et al. [2012], Mastrobuoni and Pinotti [2016]), which in turn are likely to affect electoral outcomes. In particular, variations on the labour market affect extreme votes, notably through trade shocks (Autor et al. [2016], Malgouyres [2017], Dippel et al. [2017]), or unemployment (Algan et al. [2017]). In this paper, we argue that our results are not affected by variations on the labour market or in local public finance. Overall, while national exposure to immigration shapes attitudes towards migrants (Hainmueller and Hopkins [2014]), we show that small-scale contacts are also likely to play an important role.

The third chapter[11] can be seen as a follow-up paper to the second chapter aiming at uncovering different mechanism with the use of new data. In this chapter we examine how the reception of municipalities of a relatively few refugees over a short to medium time frame can influence hate crimes against immigrants as well as voting for extreme right parties. We show what role the internet plays in the amplification of this effect and examine how local politicians react to those new political realities.

We implement the analysis using data from Italian municipalities and exploiting specific features of a program for the relocation of refugees called "The Protection System for Asylum Seekers and Refugees" (SPRAR). The Italian Home Office manages the SPRAR program, whose main goal is the relocation of refugees and asylum seekers in small reception centres across Italian municipalities.

[11]Co-authored with Matteo Gamalerio and Mario Luca.

The empirical analysis studies the effect of the number of refugees and asylum seekers hosted in a specific SPRAR centre on the change in the support for extreme-right parties between the 2013 and the 2018 national elections. It also studies the effect of the number of refugees and asylum seekers hosted on the change in hate crimes against foreigners between 2013 and 2017. The results are obtained both through ordinary least squares (OLS) and instrumental variables (IV) estimates. The IV analysis is developed to deal with the endogeneity of the number of refugees and asylum seekers hosted in a specific SPRAR centre, given that municipal governments can decide whether to open or not refugee centres on the their territory. The IV approach exploits a specific feature of the SPRAR program: while municipalities decide how many refugees to host in the SPRAR centre that they open, the Home Office establishes the maximum number which depends on specific population thresholds. Thus, as described below, we use this institutional feature and we instrument the number of refugees and asylum seekers hosted with this theoretical maximum number imposed by the Home Office, which is heterogeneous across Italian municipalities depending on the size of the municipal population.

The main results of the empirical analysis show that hosting refugees has a negative effect on both voting for extreme-right parties and hate crimes against foreigners. More specifically, IV estimates indicate that doubling the number of refugees hosted reduces the growth rate in the vote shares for extreme-right parties by 9 per cent (about 1.6 p.p). IV estimates also show that increasing by 1 per cent the number of refugees hosted leads to a reduction of about 19 per cent in the change in hates crime over the period between 2013 and 2017. The heterogeneity analysis indicates that the effect on extreme-right voting is driven by municipalities, which have less access to the internet, which is instrumented using the closest distance to an ADSL tower as in Campante et al. [2018]. The results are robust controlling for municipal population, municipal socio-economic characteristics, local politicians' characteristics and pre-trends in voting during the national elections run before 2013.

This paper aims to contribute to the recent literature in three ways.

The first strand of the literature is the one related to the impact of immigration or refugees on extreme right voting. Most of the literature has focused on the exposure to large immigration inflows over a long amount of time. Important papers in this literature (Barone et al. [2016], Halla et al. [forthcoming], Harmon [forthcoming], Otto and Steinhardt [2014], Mendez and Cutillas [2014], Brunner and Kuhn [2014], Viskanic [2017], Edo et al. [2018]) have found that large immigration inflows spur the far-right vote. Most of these papers also rely on a variant of an instrument pioneered by Card [2001]. The main intuition being that some new migrants will allocate where their ancestors did and if those moved in an area for reasons exogenous to the dependent variable in question, the issue of spatial selection is arguably resolved.

A more recent strand of the literature has been analysing the repercussion of the refugee crisis. Hangartner et al. [forthcoming,b] and Hangartner et al. [forthcoming,a] find that exposure, but not necessarily contact, between inhabitants of the Greek islands and refugees arriving as sea arrivals can increase anti-immigrant sentiment and voting for the extreme right. On the other hand Steinmayr [2018] finds that actual contact between refugees and natives matters. Considering the region of Upper Austria, he shows that the Extreme Right party of Austria (FPO) lost out considerably in places, where more refugees were hosted. Closely related to this Vertier and Viskanic [2018] find that contact with refugees from the "Calais Jungle" has decreased voting for the Front National (extreme right wing party in France), but only if the number redistributed was small enough. In addition to this Dustmann et al. [2016] show that the electoral repercussions of migrant relocations depend crucially on the characteristics of the municipalities. The more rural a place, the more stronger the impact in favour of extreme-right parties. These studies imply that both municipal characteristics as well as size of exposure must be taken into account when analysing the electoral repercussions to the exposure to refugees.

In this case we add to literature by using another variable to measure anti-immigrant sentiment such as hate crimes against migrants. This variable gives additional evidence of the benefit of contact between refugees and migrants and shows that natives do not only "privately" react to the contact with migrants (voting booth), but also "publicly" (hate crimes). All aforementioned studies also struggle with finding direct evidence of indirect contact. There is a possibility of a reversal of opinion by natives, when friends/family talk about positive experiences with immigrants or when traditional or digital media outlets report about it. In the first case, it is very hard to measure this empirically. In our paper we show how connectedness to the internet affects those spillovers effects, which is an element lacking specifically in Steinmayr [2018] and Vertier and Viskanic [2018].

Another part of the literature studies the potential determinants of hate crimes and the relationship between immigration and hate crimes. A first contribution to this literature is the paper by Glaeser [2005], who theoretically studies under which circumstances politicians have incentives to supply hate-creating stories to discredit opponents whose policies benefit minorities. The main prediction of the theoretical model is that hatred declines when voters have incentives to learn the truth and that interactions with minority groups may provide those incentives. Our paper can be seen as an empirical test of the theory developed by Glaeser [2005].

While both in the past and in recent years the literature has produced extensive empirical evidence about the relationship between immigration and crime (e.g. Bell et al. [2013]; Pinotti [2017]; Amuedo-Dorantes et al. [2018]), the empirical evidence on the potential determinants of hate crimes against foreigners is more recent. Among the potential determinants of hate crimes and negative attitudes against migrants we find terrorist

attacks (Hanes and Machin [2014]), social media and internet (Chan et al. [2016]; Mueller and Schwarz [2018a] and Mueller and Schwarz [2018b]), exposure to religious minorities (Colussi et al. [2017]) and large inflows of refugees and asylum seekers (Hangartner et al. [2017]; Sola [2018]). The evidence produced by this literature indicates that on average all the factors studied have a positive effect on hate crimes and negative attitude toward migrants. We contribute to this literature by showing that the exposure to a small amount of refugees has a negative effect on hate crimes against foreigners. Our results suggest that the contact between the native population and small inflows of refugees and asylum seekers can generate positive reactions by the local population and that some of it is also driven by the exposure of hate crimes against immigrants and and media coverage in general.

Second, we analyse the role of media in amplifying the effect of refugee reception on voters' behaviour and attitudes, which is a channel understudied in the literature given scarce data availability. The literature on the role of media in politics highlights the strong role of mass communication in influencing people's opinions. Mass media are found effective to spread political propaganda (Enikolopov et al. [2011], Durante and Knight [2012] and DellaVigna and Kaplan [2007]) as well as inflame xenophobic sentiment (Adena et al. [2015], DellaVigna et al. [2014] and Yanagizawa-Drott [2014]). The increased access to internet together with the deep change of the media landscape that it provoked has oriented the research towards a deeper analysis of social media. Access to broadband internet can increase anti-establishment (Campante et al. [2017]) and populist (Schaub and Morisi [2019]) movements, increase affective polarization (Lelkes et al. [2017]), impact political participation (Falck et al. [2014] and Czernich [2012]), spread fake-news (Allcott and Gentzkow [2017]) as well as contribute to polarization trough a echo chamber effect (Barberá [2015] and Barberá et al. [2015]). However, little is known on how online media changes how people react to immigration, which is undoubtedly among the most relevant topics in the political debate. Müller and Schwarz [2018] find that the online presence of the German far-right movement AfD on social media can spread anti-migration sentiment and increase hate crimes offline. The link between hate speech online and hate crimes is also highlighted in Williams et al. [2019] who find a positive correlation between racist content on Twitter and racially motivated crimes in the United Kingdom. Our paper integrates the role of internet with the contact theory, showing that direct contact with migrants has a pro-migrant effect and that higher consumption of internet can decrease this. Importantly, we are able to analyse differing effects of traditional vs. digital media in the transmission mechanism of interaction with migrants. Additionally, given that our main measure of internet access is considered to be exogenous, our interpretation of the heterogeneous effect is arguably causal rather than just of correlation nature. Especially (Steinmayr [2018] and Vertier and Viskanic [2018]) stress the importance of contact with migrants as an important variable in determining anti-immigrant sentiment by natives,

but lack data to measure the impact of "superficial contact" between refugees and natives through media.

The third way how we contribute is to analyse not only the way how refugees influence the demand side of politics, but also how the supply side reacts. Specifically, in the second part of the empirical analysis, we use a regression discontinuity design (RDD) based on mixed electoral competitions to show that extreme-right mayors are less likely to open SPRAR refugee centres. This evidence shows that extreme-right politicians do manipulate local migration policies to foster their own political benefits, which in turn might not be aligned with the welfare of the municipality's inhabitants (Gamalerio [2018]). This result contributes to a recent literature which studies the political determinants of immigration policies. More in detail, O. [2014] shows that increasing the seat share of anti-immigration parties in municipal councils in Sweden significantly reduces the number of refugees hosted by the municipality. Our result on Northern League mayors is consistent with the result by O. [2014], even though in the Italian context the role of municipal governments seems to be more relevant in setting up the refugee policy compared to Swedish municipalities, where small parties elected through a proportional system enjoy a greater degree of power. Facchini and Steinhard [2011] and Casarico et al. [2018] study the determinant of the voting behaviour of the U.S. Congress in relation to the legalization of undocumented migrants. Differently from these papers, our analysis is focused on the behaviour of municipal governments and on the reception of refugees rather than on the legalization of undocumented migrants. Morelli and Negri [2019] theoretically study which electoral systems lead to more open immigration policies. The analysis in the second part of our paper analyses a similar topic from a more empirical point of view. Mayda and Facchini [2008], using survey data, show that in countries where the median voter is more opposed to migrations tend to implement more restrictive immigration policies. Our analysis shows that also the identity of politicians and the preferences of political parties matter for migration policies, and not only the identity of the median voter.

Finally, three papers study the reception of refugees in Italy. Genovese et al. [2016] use survey data from Italian Regions to study how public attitudes about non-EU immigration are influenced by the central government's distribution of refugees across different regions. Our paper differs in that they study the effect of the reception of refugees on attitudes using survey data, while we use data on hate crimes and on voting behaviour measured at municipal level. Bratti et al. [2017], using data on Italian municipalities and on the 2016 Italian Constitutional Referendum, show that the geographical proximity to refugee reception centres leads to an increase in turnout and in the share of anti-government votes measured by the votes share of "no" to the Constitutional Reform. Our paper differs from theirs in that we focus on the opening of a refugee centre within a municipality, rather than on the opening of refugee centres in neighboring municipalities. This different focus enables us to study the effect of direct contact between the local population and the

refugees hosted, rather than the indirect contact studied by Bratti et al. [2017]. Bracco et al. [2018] show that migrants inflows at municipal level are lower towards municipalities with Northern League mayors. Our paper differs for two reasons: first, we study how voters react to the reception of refugees, while Bracco et al. [2018] focus on how migrants react to the election of extreme-right mayors; second, we study how extreme-right mayors manipulate immigration policies to gain votes, while Bracco et al. [2018] analyse how extreme-right mayors adjust fiscal policies to make their municipality less appealing for migrants.

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CHAPTER 1

Did Polish Immigration Cause Brexit?

Abstract

Can large immigration inflows impact electoral outcomes and specifically, what impact did immigration have on the vote in favour of leaving the European Union (Brexit) in the United Kingdom? In particular, I focus on how the increase in Polish immigration, the major group of immigrants post 2004, affected votes in favour of leaving the EU. I find a percentage point increase in Polish immigration to the UK to have caused an increase in votes in favour of Brexit of about 2.72-3.12 percentage points, depending on the specification. To obtain exogenous variation in Polish immigration, I collect data from the archives that reveals the location of Polish War Resettlement Camps after Word War II, which location is plausibly exogenous to current political outcomes. Discussing potential mechanisms, I examine public opinion data in the British Election Study 2015 and find evidence of adversity towards immigration to be a root cause. Other considerations such as the National Health Service (NHS), incumbency and the general trust in politicians as well as the political institutions seem not to play a role.

1.1. Introduction

Do large immigration inflows causally affect voting for right wing and populist parties? Specifically, I analyse what role Polish immigration played in the vote in favour of leaving the European Union (Brexit) in the United Kingdom (UK).

On the 23rd of June 2016 the UK decided by referendum to exit the European Union (EU). Given the that on the campaign trail a disproportionate amount of erroneous information (fake news) and false promises were made by the "Leave.EU" campaign, voting in favour of Brexit can be considered as a proxy for populist and identity based voting (Browning [2018]). A major topic in the debate prior to the referendum was the impact of increased immigration to the UK in recent years, especially from Eastern and Central European countries many of which joined the EU in 2004. Specifically, proponents of leaving the European Union wanted to regain control of their borders ("Take back control") and thus mitigate migration flows, which is not possible when being part of the EU, given the free

movement of people within the EU. The UK's membership of the EU meant that the free movement of people in Europe was non-negotiable. Exiting the EU however would allow the UK to independently determine its immigration policy. Throughout the campaign there was increased scrutiny of migrant communities, especially the Polish community.[1]

In this paper I show that a percentage point increase in Polish immigration post 2004 led to a statistically significant increase in votes in favour of Brexit of 2.72-3.12 percentage points, depending on the specification. I find a discernible effect of immigration on shaping political preferences of the native population. Overall, for every percentage point of Polish immigration, there is a 5 percentage point increase in people mentioning immigration to be the most important issue that politics in Britain faces today as answered in the first open ended question in the British Election Study 2015. I cannot find evidence that other competing reasons such as incumbency, general trust in politicians or investment in the NHS had any effects on the Brexit vote. On the other hand there is evidence that the vote on Brexit was not a protest vote and Local Authorities (LAs) with increased Polish immigration actually have a higher trust in British politicians in general. Those results are indicative that immigration played a root cause in the Brexit vote.

In order to estimate the causal impact of immigration I rely on an instrumental variable analysis. After World War 2 Polish army officers fighting in the Royal Air Force and general infantry were allowed to move with their families to the UK. The government then assigned them to War Resettlement Camps, which location is arguably orthogonal to political outcomes in the 21st century for many reasons. First of all the camps were meant to be temporary allowing for Polish families to slowly repatriate to their home country. To the best of my knowledge and after several visits to the national archives in London, there is no document that determines the choice of location of the camps. All those camps were mainly composed of Nyssen Huts, hence of a temporary nature. Therefore it is relatively safe to assume that the initial location of the War Resettlement Camps is orthogonal to local political preferences. The second reason is that only 200 000 Polish soldiers and families were relocated to the UK after the Polish Resettlement Act in 1947. This number is relatively small and an upper bound for the number of Polish people that remained as many repatriated. Therefore the initial migration stock is unlikely to have shaped political opinions locally. In section 5.2 I test an implication of this statement empirically. The last main reason is that Polish immigration is greatly facilitated through the free movement of people at the point of its EU-Accession in 2004. This means that up until then it was quite complex for a Polish citizen to live in the UK. Hence the effect I am picking up is a sudden rise in the inflow of Polish immigrants and not the long-term exposure to Polish chain migration. A majority of migrants relocated through the Polish Resettlement Act though decided to stay in the UK (Biegus and Biegus [2013]). They then integrated in the local communities and presumably kept links with the mother

[1]See amongst others: Express [2016], BBC [2016] or Vox [2016].

country. Based on previous pioneering work by Card [2001], who showed statistically that new migrants allocate close to established immigrant networks, I predict that some new Polish migrants should allocate close to where their ancestors were resettled after WWII. When the EU-accession occurred in 2004, some new Polish migrants will allocate to certain areas for certain, presumably economic, reasons and some will allocated close to their ancestors. If the the ancestors are located in certain areas that for aforementioned reasons are orthogonal to political preferences, then I am able to estimate the *causal* impact of Polish immigration on voting for Brexit.

This paper relates to several strands of the literature.

The most relevant one is the stream examining the impact of immigration on extreme right and populist voting. The most recent publication is by Barone et al. [2016]. In this paper the authors causally estimate the impact of immigration on three national elections using the prior allocation of immigrants before 1992 as an instrumental variable. The exclusion restriction being that a political scandal ("Mani Pulite") led to the creation of completely new parties in 1993. In Halla et al. [forthcoming], the authors study the impact of immigration on voting in favour of the extreme right in the 1980s to 1990s. To obtain exogenous variation in the allocation of immigrants they use the prior settlement patterns of immigrants in the 1960s. Harmon [forthcoming] determines the impact of immigration to Denmark to have had a positive impact on votes in favour of anti-immigrants nationalist parties. His instrumental variables strategy uses the historical housing stock to address issues of endogeneity. Otto and Steinhardt [2014] study local elections in Hamburg under periods of high immigration to determine that in right wing xenophobic parties gained considerably. On the other hand Mendez and Cutillas [2014] show that the rise of Latin American immigrants led to an increase in votes for the major Left wing party, but an increased immigration from Africa led to more votes for the major right wing party. Brunner and Kuhn [2014] is the only paper that considers referendum outcomes. They determine the impact of cultural distance of immigrants to the native population on referenda about immigration. They instrument for the share of immigrants in the municipality by using local labour market conditions. What most of those papers have in common is that the instrument used to achieve exogenous variation in the allocation of new immigrants relies on the "shift-share" instrument introduced by Card [2001]. This paper in this instance goes two steps further. First of all there is a clear facilitation of immigration post-2004, which renders it easier to distinguish between new immigration shocks (in this case post-2004) and the exposure to continuous migration (in aforementioned cases). Also the historical specificity of the initial allocation of Polish migrants post WWII (more details further) gives rise to a plausibly more exogenous initial settlement of immigrants.

Other (more recent) papers have started studying the role that politics play in immigration policy (Gamalerio [2018]) as well as studying the role the refugee crisis has had on extreme

right voting (Steinmayr [2018] and Vertier and Viskanic [2018]). Both papers find negative effects of refugees on Far Right Nationalist parties in Austria and France respectively. The instruments used are very similar, Steinmayr [2018] uses group housing to instrument for the allocation of refugees, whereas Vertier and Viskanic [2018] use holiday villages all over France.

Many papers have in turn analysed the impact of immigration to the UK, especially on the labour market.[2] Dustmann et al. [2014] use data from the British Labour Force survey to estimate the impact of immigration in both a theoretical and empirical fashion. They find the skillset of immigrants to be very similar to the one of natives and no strong effects on aggregate employment, participation, unemployment and wages. Specifically Manacorda et al. [2011] find that the mild effects of immigration on the UK labour market are due to the imperfect substitutability between natives and immigrants. Related to this, Gilpin et al. [2006] use the 2004 accession wave of immigration and find no discernible evidence on unemployment claims. The authors paint a picture of a flexible UK labour market that has seen a modest, but broadly positive impact of immigration on the economy. Nickell and Saleheen [2015] analyse the specific occupational impact of immigration, they find small negative effects on wages but a strong impact of immigration on wages in the semi-skilled/unskilled occupational group.

More specifically, this paper is related to a stream in the literature trying to determine the root causes of Brexit, arguably one of the most important political decisions of the UK's and Europe's history. Papers in this stream mostly offer evidence as correlations (Becker et al. [2016], Arnorsson and Zoega [2016] and Goodwin and Heath [2016]). I add to these studies by providing an identification strategy to estimate the causal impact of immigration on the Brexit vote outcome.

A relatively new avenue of research considers the impact of rising trade exposure on electoral outcomes and thus on the determinants of populism. Autor et al. [2016] show that increased Chinese competition has led citizens to elect more extreme house representatives by examining congressman's voting records. Dippel et al. [2015] and Malgouyres [2017] examine the impact of rising trade exposure directly on election outcomes and find a positive effect on extreme right wing parties in Germany and France respectively.[3] Other studies in political science such as Clarke et al. [2016] or Arzheimer [2009] have shown that anti-immigrant sentiment can give rise to votes in favour of extreme right wing parties.[4][5]

[2] Wadsworth [2015] provides a comprehensive review on the general impact of immigration on the UK Labour market.
[3] In a Vox column O'Rourke [2016] makes the case for historical impacts of Globalisation to have been a major factor in the Brexit vote outcome.
[4] Whitaker and Lynch [2011] study specifically the rise of UKIP in Britain.
[5] A review on the Economic determinants of Electoral outcomes is compiled by Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier [2015].

Having those streams of the literature in mind, my contributions are both methodological and in terms of data generation.

First of all, I study one the most important political election in Europe's history and show the causal impact of large immigration inflows on the Brexit vote.

Secondly, I causally estimate the impact of large immigration inflows using a presumable exogenous instrument, which relies on pre-existing settlements. In the process of constructing the instrument I generate new data regarding the location of War Resettlement Camps, which could help further research in reconstructing migrant group earlier than available censuses.

The next section outlines the historical context, Section 3 formulates the empirical and identification strategy, Section 4 provides the main empirical results, Section 5 presents some robustness checks and a falsification exercise (5.2) and Section 6 concludes.

1.2. Historical Context

The largest group of Non-British troops that fought in the Royal Air Force and general infantry during World War 2 were born in Poland. Also, occupied Poland's exiled government was located in London. As a result of the service of the Polish people in the British army, Churchill told parliament in 1945: "His Majesty's government will never forget the debt we owe to the Polish troops. I earnestly hope it will be possible for them to have citizenship and freedom of the British empire, if they so desire." Pittsburgh-Post-Gazette [Mar 2, 1945].

The legislative consequence of this was the Polish Resettlement Act of 1947. This allowed Polish troops and their families to move to the UK after WW2 and find initial shelter in one of the War Resettlement Camps located across the country. It was expected that Polish troops and their family (about 200 000 (National Archives [1932-1959])) would relocate within a year to Poland. Given Stalin's occupation of Poland and the employment opportunities caused by a lack of male labour force after the war, some Polish people decided to stay. Since the initial settlement was deemed temporary only Nissen huts and tents were established as location for the relocated soldiers and families. Within the National Archives and to the best of my knowledge there is no document, which gives evidence of any choice of location or census of the camps. A list of location of the camps is the only document used to construct the instrument. Given this sporadic planning and lack of documentation the initial assignment seems to be orthogonal to political preferences after the war. Section 5.2 will also offer a falsification test to corroborate those claims.

After some time a majority of Polish people integrated to the local communities around the location of the camps and hence became migrant networks for potential new arrivals post-2004 (Biegus and Biegus [2013]).

In order to validate the regressions presented below it is important to keep in mind that extensive post- and pre-accession controls i.e. the logarithm of Unemployment rates per LA in 2004 and 2014, the logarithm of Gross Value added (GVA) in 2014 and 2004 for the NUTS1, NUTS2, NUTS3 region, Latitude and Longitude as well as the logarithm of Population in 2014 are included. In the robustness checks I also include further controls related to the shares of natives. It is also important to mention that new LAs were defined and merged as a result of the Local Government Act of 1972. Therefore the allocation in 1947 cannot be related to any historical political force that prevails in those communities now. This complete redrawing of LAs brakes any potential political persistence that prevailed in those communities. In Section 5 I provide graphical evidence for the large scale redrawing of LAs as well as a randomisation exercise (Section 5.2) showing that the instrumented coefficient is not significant on political outcomes after the redrawing in 1973 as well as that the Distance to the closest War Resettlement Camp (my instrument) is also unrelated to political outcomes in 1973. This is to make sure that LAs have not been re-drawn in a way to take into account the distance to the War Resettlement Camps. This provides additional evidence of the fact that the initial allocation of War Resettlement Camps did not impact political preferences at the local level before 2004.

The 1951 census counted 162,399 people born in Poland in the UK and thus demonstrates the relatively low rate of repatriation after the war (about 20%).

After the EU-Accession of Poland in 2004, the number of Polish born immigrants in the UK increased rapidly, as can be seen in Figure 1.1 and Figure 1.2. In Figure 1.1 we can clearly see that Polish born residents have now overtaken Indian born residents as the largest immigrant group. In Figure 1.2, one can observe how relatively little immigrants from other A8 countries[6] migrated to the UK, yielding initial evidence of the "special" relationship between the UK and Poland. As we can see pre-accession levels of Polish born residents are about 50 000, which probably are post-WW II ancestors.

In 2016, the number of Polish born residents reached about 1 million, which at the time of writing makes it now the largest group of immigrants in the UK. This is implied by "overtaking India".

[Figure 1.1 about here]

[6]Accession 8 countries are all the Eastern and Central European countries that joined the EU in 2004: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.

[Figure 1.2 about here]

1.3. Empirical Specification and Identification

In this paper I will estimate the causal impact of Polish immigration post 2004 on the Brexit vote and turnout outcomes in each LA with the following equation:

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \frac{Polish_i}{Population_i} + \beta_k \Omega_i + \epsilon_i \tag{1.3.1}$$

In this case $\frac{Polish_i}{Population_i}$ will be the amount of people born in Poland that live in a certain LA over the total population in that LA expressed in percentage points.[7] Ω_i are both current and past economic, social as well as geographic controls i.e. the natural logarithm of Gross Value Added in 2004 and 2014 at the NUTS1, NUTS2 and NUTS3 level as well as Unemployment in 2004 and 2014 per LA together with Latitude and Longitude and the natural logarithm of Population in 2014. Y_i is either turnout or the share of votes in favour of leaving the EU (Leave) in percentage points.

For reasons of geographic selection β_1 might be biased. New Polish immigrants might allocate to certain LAs because of some observable or unobservable characteristics that could be correlated with political outcomes in that place. For this reason I propose to use the Distance to the closest War Resettlement Camp as an instrument for the share of Polish immigrants. The idea being that new Polish Immigrants, approximated by the shares of foreign-born Polish people in 2014, will partially allocate close to where their ancestors after WW2 did. The ones that allocated closer to the War Resettlement Camps will allocate there because of ties to the ancestors. The further away the Polish immigrants allocate from those War Resettlement Camps, the less likely it is that they allocated there because of reasons of ancestry, but rather because of other factors such as for example better employment opportunities. This instrumental variables approach claims that, controlling for aforementioned controls, the Distance to the War Resettlement Camps can lead to filtering out the exogenous component in Polish immigrant allocation. The underlying assumption is that the distance to the War Resettlement Camps is per se

[7] In general, the best approach would be to subtract the Polish residents in 2003 to the residents present in 2014 and divide those by population in order to obtain the share of immigrants between 2003 and 2014. The problem with this approach is that for many LAs the share of Polish residents is not defined in 2003. I thus use the stocks of Polish born residents in 2014 to have as many observations as possible. Using the Census in 2001 would lead to inconsistent data sources and since it was conducted in 2001 it would also be measuring Polish residents 2-3 years too early. Examining Figure 1 we can see that this will not be problematic, given the low number of immigrants in 2003, which as mentioned before will probably be the people that moved to the UK because of the Polish Resettlement Act in 1947.

unrelated to trends in political preferences, which is corroborated by the vast redrawing of LAs in 1972 together with the randomisation exercises carried out on the local elections in 1973 (5.2). The reason why I use distance and not for example a dummy in the regressions is that there are only 37 resettlement camps, where some of them are in the same LA. Since the location was temporary and rural, the distance to the centroid of the closest LA should be the best proxy to predict allocation of Polish immigrants in the future, as this is were their ancestors allocated before. The UK also has a very low number of LAs and hence distance creates more statistical power.[8]

The first stage regression includes the same controls as the second stage regression i.e. NUTS1, NUTS2, NUTS3 Gross Valued Added and Unemployment both pre- and post accession (2004 and 2014) together with Latitude and Longitude and the logarithm of Population in 2014.[9]

The first stage in the 2 Stage-Least-Squares regression can thus be written as:

$$\frac{Polish_i}{Population_i} = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 Distance_i + \beta_k \Omega_i + \varepsilon_i \tag{1.3.2}$$

Where $Distance_i$ is the distance to the closest War Resettlement Camp. The controls are the same as in the main specification. Given the aforementioned reasons I expect γ_1 to be negative and highly significant, given that new immigrants should partially sort towards prior established immigrant networks. I fit both a linear first stage (as specified) as well as one using $Distance_i$, $Distance_i^2$ and $Distance_i^3$ as instruments.[10] The reason being the shape of the data shown in Figure 1.4.

1.4. Empirical Results

In the following sections I present the data description, summary statistics, the main results as well as the main mechanism for the findings. In section 5 I will provide Robustness checks and randomisation exercises (5.2).

[8]There is some anecdotal evidence that some Polish immigrants were employed in mining and other types of unskilled work after WW2. I have not been able to get the exact number of Polish employees per company, but for future work it could be interesting to weight the distance potentially by industry share or economy strength in order to get a more fine grained measure to predict Polish immigrants allocation. It is unclear though whether this economic weighting might not result in additional concerns of endogeneity as it is not reported, which job the majority of Polish workers performed after WW II.
[9]Some scholars (notably Davies [2016]) have shown that the Leave Vote was especially strong in places, where historically Labour was stronger. With the randomisation exercises in 5.2. on elections in 1973, I avoid this critique.
[10]Higher powers of $Distance_i$ than n = 3, do not increase the fit.

1.4.1. Data Description and Summary Statistics. Using the Office for National Statistics (ONS)[11] micro dataset I am able to obtain data on population by country of birth as well as many socio-economic variables i.e. Unemployment, Gross Value Added (at the NUTS1, NUTS2 and NUTS3 level) both post- and pre-accession per LA in the United Kingdom, which I include as controls in all the regression. The earliest complete data for every LA in England and Wales is 2004, whereas the most recent available is 2014.[12]

From the national archives in the United Kingdom in Richmond, I have collected the location and address of the camps, where former polish soldiers were allocated after WW2. In order to calculate the distance from the LA to the War Resettlement Camp I use the centroid of the municipality.

The public opinion data is retrieved from the British Election study in 2015 collected by Fieldhouse et al. [2016]. This is a survey on political attitudes carried out on a representative part of the British electorate. Here I recode certain variables and aggregate them to the NUTS2 level and assign them to the LAs in question (further details below).

Table 1 refers to the 287 LAs for which detailed migration data is available.[13] For all others in the sample only data on the amount of British-born residents and total population were available.

We can see that the size of LAs is fairly heterogenous. General economic indicators improved from 2004 to 2014 and unemployment also increased during that time. The share of Polish people averages at 1.21%, and the share of British people at 88.03% with strong heterogeneity across LAs. Turnout is comparatively high and the share of votes in favour of leaving the EU is high at over 54% in the sample. Latitude and longitude are my two included geographical controls, which pinpoint the centroid of the LA.[14]

[Table 1.1 about here]

[11] www.ons.co.uk

[12] Except for the variable on Polish born residents, which are still missing at some Local Authorities even in 2014.

[13] Given some data constraints in terms of birthplace and economic/social controls, the used sample includes only LAs in England and Wales.

[14] In the whole discussion so far, there is no political variable used as control. The most relevant seem potentially the outcomes for European elections. I will explain why including them makes little sense here. In Becker et al. [2016] the authors show that the UKIP vote outcomes for the European Elections in 2014 are very good predictors of the Brexit Vote in 2016. This is consistent with the estimation here. The fact is that in this setting using the outcome of European elections in 2014 as a control, would be committing a fallacy known as "bad control" (Angrist and Pischke [2009]). The UKIP vote outcome in 2014 is probably caused by the very same immigration taking place post-2004. As a result any political outcome post-2004 can be seen as an outcome variable and generally be influenced by immigration. Before 2004, there are no strong right wing parties that could predict the Brexit vote outcome.

1.4.2. The First Stage. Figure 1.3 provides some initial graphical evidence for a quasi-random location of the War Resettlement camps in 1947. The locations are spread all over England and Wales, but not in an apparently deterministic way. Later in the paper I will show that this initial allocation is not related to any political outcomes as well as that the first stage does not significantly differ if controls are included or not.

Figure 1.4 shows a clear negative pattern, whereby the shorter the distance to the closest War Resettlement Camp, the higher the concentration of Polish born immigrants in the LA. Given the shape of the plot I will use two different specifications in the first stage. One specification will be the linear distance. Given some graphical evidence of non-linearity I also fit a model with the square and the cube of the distance[15] to the closest War Resettlement Camp. In the end, the effects of both instruments are very similar.

Fitting the first stage in the linear case gives a parameter estimate that is negative and highly significant. The parameter size is -1.15 with standard error of 0.30 (Table 1.2). Parameter estimates do not significantly differ with or without controls. An F-Test for the excluded instrument with controls is 14.7, which puts me in a relatively safe zone for inference. Nevertheless, I will also provide Conditional Likelihood Ratios (CLRs) that are valid even under weak instruments.

[Figure 1.3 about here]

[Figure 1.4 about here]

1.4.3. Main Results. Table 1.2 contains cross-sectional evidence of the correlation of Polish immigrants with turnout and outcomes on votes in favour of Brexit. Polish immigrants sort significantly more, but not largely, towards areas, where less people voted but those that did, voted more in favour of Brexit (Column 3 and 6). A reason for this could be that new Polish migrants often immigrate without many financial resources Okolski and Salt [2014] and might therefore allocate to places that are relatively less well-off.[16] Using the linear instrument, we can see that a one percentage point increase in Polish immigrants has causally led to an increase in votes in favour of Brexit of about 2.72 percentage points (Column 4). Using the non-linear first stage, I find the effect of an increase in one percentage point of Polish immigrants to increase votes in favour of Brexit

[15] I.e. with $Distance_i$, $Distance_i^2$ and $Distance_i^3$ as the three instruments.
[16] This is corroborated by the fact that most of the economic controls are negatively correlated with the vote in favour of Leave and positively with turnout.

by about 3.12 percentage points (Column 5) and in this case the Conditional Likelihood Ratio also excludes 0. We can also see that there is a negative non significant impact of immigration on voter turnout.

Performing a back of the envelope calculation I try to determine whether the 3.12% swing in votes caused by Polish immigration could have reversed the Brexit vote outcome. This is an approximate calculation and should not be taken as hard evidence. In my dataset, I find that 199 LAs have a positive share of Polish born residents and those LAs have an average size of about 202,000.[17] Taking into account a 3.12% swing, average Turnout at 73.77% and an adult population share of around 75% for national Statistics [2011], we have the following potential swing vote:

$$3.12\% \times (199 \times 202,000) \times 73.77\% \times 75\% \approx 693905$$

693 905 is about two thirds of the actual difference between Brexit and Remain votes of 1 Million. Therefore we can see that Polish immigration could have not accounted for the total swing in Brexit votes. At the same time it is important to keep in mind that those calculations are very stylised and rely importantly on the assumption of a linear effect.

[Table 1.2 about here]

1.4.4. Mechanism: Examining Public Opinion Data. One major mechanism through which immigration can shape electoral outcomes is by affecting political preferences. A good way to proxy this is to rely on public opinion surveys. In the following part I re-code parts of the British election study 2015 collected by Fieldhouse et al. [2016] and use them as outcome variables aggregated to the NUTS2 level to measure the impact of Polish immigration on political opinion.

I replace the Leave and Turnout outcomes with variables regarding immigration, the case of a protest vote, trust in in British politicians, naming the Secretary General of the UN correctly, raising or lowering spending on the NHS, people's attitude towards the future and towards democracy. The detailed description and re-coding of those variables can be found in the appendix.

Overall we can clearly see that for a percentage point increase in Polish immigrants there is a 5 percentage point increase of people mentioning immigration as the main problem

[17]The exact number is 201,945.

facing Britain today. Therefore areas where more Polish people exogenously allocated, there is an increase in immigration resentment. This corroborates the evidence that Polish immigration had some effect on shaping electoral preferences of the native population. This is shown in Column 1 in both Tablees 1.3 and 1.4 and the effect is more pronounced with the non-linear first stage. Together with this also subjects described their last vote not to be a protest vote (Column 2). On average people also have slightly higher trust in politicians and about three percentage points of people are on average better at naming the Secretary general of the UN (per percentage point increase in Polish immigration) as can be seen in columns 3 and 4. There is no significant difference in public opinion on the NHS, nor on considerations of the future or about how satisfied individuals are about democracy (Columns 5, 6 and 7). Tables 1.4 includes the results for the non-linear first stage. What one can draw from this empirical evidence is the fact that LAs affected by higher Polish immigration, see immigration as the main issue facing British society. At the same time, they do not seem to be affected by their future hopes, their belief in democracy and their views on other social issues such as the NHS. On the other hand people seem more aware politically speaking i.e. they did not cast a protest vote, trust their politicians to a greater extent and they are on average more able to name the secretary general of the United Nations. This evidence suggests that the increased vote in favour of leaving the European Union is actually due to additional concern for immigration caused by Polish immigration.

[Table 1.3 about here]

[Table 1.4 about here]

1.5. Robustness

In this section I offer a battery of robustness checks and a falsification exercise (5.2). Section 5.1. deals with the possibility that I might be picking up effects of many groups of immigrants and not necessarily the one of Polish immigrants. The next subsection looks at whether the initial allocation of Polish War Resettlement camps is related to historical political outcomes and thus checks if I am not picking up a pre-eminent political trend. I also show graphical evidence of the redrawing of LAs that brakes potential pre-eminent trends in political preferences.

1.5.1. Other Immigrant Groups. In order to show that the War Resettlement Camps uniquely predict the share of Polish people, I run the first stage using as a dependent variable the share of immigrants of all countries except for Poland in Table 1.5. The importance of this exercises is to show that the impact is of only Polish immigration and not corroborated with any other share of immigrants. The instrument should be specific to Polish immigration. We can observe that the distance to the closest War Resettlement Camp does not reliably predict the share of immigrants of other countries. This evidence strongly corroborates the validity of the instrument.

[Table 1.5 about here]

Additionally, I perform a Robustness check that deals with the possibility that election outcomes might be caused by other immigrant groups and not specifically by the impact of Polish immigration. Given data limitations, specifically on the number of Non-Polish immigrants, I carry out Robustness checks taking the number of British born people as reference. Taking into account other specific immigration groups such as for example other A8 accession countries or Indian residents creates too much attrition in observations.[18]

The first exercise is to run the main specification controlling for the logarithm of the share of British people. In Table 1.6 we can see those results. The effects on Turnout still remain non-significant and the impact on Brexit vote is very similar to our main result. This is the inverse exercise as including all other migrants groups.

Additionally, I carry out another analysis by constructing an instrument based on Card [2001] for the share of British people. I take the latest share of pre-Accession British natives available (2000) to instrument for the share of British people in the year 2014 and use this as an additional regressor in the main specification. In Table 1.7 we can see that the results are more pronounced, but of similar magnitude. They remain significant on the Leave vote and not significant on Turnout.

[Table 1.6 about here]

[18]Per se, data on other immigrant groups is as readily available as for Polish residents, but this is very heterogenous across LAs. Having information on many immigrant groups simultaneously for one LA causes the attrition of observations.

[Table 1.7 about here]

1.5.2. Predicting Outcomes in the local election of 1973. I would be picking up a pre-eminent trend in political preferences if the distance to the closest War Resettlement Camps were related to political outcomes in the past. For example if the War Resettlement Camps were located in certain areas because of some political considerations. We already know that about 20 years after Polish people were allocated to the War Resettlement Camps all LAs were re-drawn and this would theoretically brake this initial political persistence if it existed. Figure 1.5 provides evidence of vast redrawing of LAs. On the other hand, the re-drawing of those LAs might have been deterministic. In the following regression I take as an outcome variable the Difference between Conservative and Labour votes (The only two major parties standing for election in 1973) to show that the instrument is unrelated to political competition in 1973. In Table 1.8 we can see that the 2SLS coefficient is not significant on the difference between votes for Conservative and Labour candidates in 1973 local election and also the plain OLS regression of the Distance to the closest War Resettlement Camp yields a very imprecise point estimate.[19] Therefore the redrawing of districts has not been deterministic and thus the validity of my instrument is unaffected.[20] The first column is the OLS regression and columns (2) and (3) use the linear first stage and the non-linear first stage respectively.

[Figure 1.5 about here]

[Table 1.8 about here]

1.5.3. Outmigration. Immigration can have effects on the composition of the voting population across areas. In this section I test whether the immigration of Polish people has possibly led to the displacement of natives. It could be that Polish immigration displaced native voters, which in turn could affect voting outcomes if natives do not have representative political opinions. In Table 1.9 one can see the result of regressing the instrumented share of Polish people on the share of net outmigrants defined by

[19] I use the outcome in local elections as they are aggregated at the LA level. Parliamentary election results are aggregated at the electoral constituency level.

[20] Some observations are missing, given that subsequent Government Acts do not allow to match all LAs in 2014 with LAs in 1973. Before LAs were even larger, making the matching impossible to perform statistical analysis.

$\frac{Population^{2014} - Population^{2004}}{Population^{2014}}$. Using both the linear and the non-linear first stage we can see that the effect is very small and highly inaccurate. Therefore there is no evidence that Polish immigration had effects on the composition of the voting population in LAs.

[Table 1.9 about here]

1.6. Concluding Remarks

A large and homogenous immigration in a relatively short amount of time could increase populist voting. Specifically, I have shown that Polish immigration has causally increased the Brexit vote by 2.72-3.12 percentage points depending on the specification. Carrying out a back of the envelope calculation I show that the movements of vote shares could not have avoided leave from being preferred to remain. Examining potential mechanisms I find that the effect is mostly due to people's concern for immigration and that other often cited considerations do not seem to play a role.

The contributions of this paper are threefold. First of all, I propose a credible identification strategy to estimate the causal impact of immigration on voting outcomes when precise census data is not available. Furthermore I explain partially one of the most important elections in Britain's and also the EU's history. In the process of data collection of this paper I generate new original data from the archives, which contributes to the digitization of historical data to be used in the social sciences.

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Appendix

Detailed coding of the public opinion questions.

- **(1) Issue-Immigration**: What is the most important issue facing Britain today? This is an open-ended question asked in the survey. I look at every single of the about 3000 observations and if it is related to immigration I code a 1.[21] Otherwise I code a 0.

- **(2) Protest-Vote** Was your vote a protest vote? If the response is yes I coded a 1, otherwise 0.

- **(3) Trust-Politicians** How much do you trust British politicians generally? 0 is equivalent to no trust and 10 is equivalent to trusting them a lot. The few times where the information is missing I recode it as a 5.

- **(4) UN-SG** Who is the secretary general of the United Nations (UN)? 1 if Ban Ki Moon (*The Secretary General of the UN at that time*) is identified correctly, 0 if any other name is guessed or no information is provided. I include this question in the survey in order to check whether LAs affected by Polish immigration could be less aware of current political developments and thus in some sense deprived.

- **(5) NHS-Investment** What is your view about putting money in the National Health Service (NHS)? Very important that it should be done is coded as 1, fairly important is coded as 2, it does not matter and "don't know" is coded as 3, fairly important that it should not be done is coded as 4 and very important that it should not be done is coded as 5.

- **(6) Future-Optimism** Over the next ten years, how likely or unlikely is it that you will improve your standard of living? Very likely is coded as 1, somewhat likely is coded as 2, "don't know" is coded as 2.5, somewhat unlikely is coded as 3 and very unlikely is coded as 4.

- **(7) Democracy** On the whole, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way the democracy works in this country? Very satisfied is coded as 1, fairly satisfied is coded as 2, "don't know" is coded as 2.5, a little dissatisfied is coded as 3 and very dissatisfied is coded as 4.

[21] I am very restrictive with coding a 1. The answer must clearly identify immigration as the main issue. If it is "foreigners" I include it, but if it is "overpopulation", I do not.

Figures and Tables

Figure 1.1. Polish Immigration in comparison with other immigrants; Polish people are now the largest group of immigrants; the vertical line divides time in pre- and post-accession.



Figure 1.2. The evolution of A8 Migrants since the year 2000; the vertical line divides time in pre- and post-accession.



Figure 1.3. Location of War Resettlement Camps in England and Wales in 1947.



Figure 1.4. Percentage of Polish immigrants plotted on distance to closest War Resettlement Camp.



Figure 1.5. Pre-1972 Local Authorities in thin black lines and present LAs in thick pink lines.



Table 1.1. Summary statistics for the LAs with detailed Migration data.

Variable	Mean	Std.Dev.	Min.	Max.
Population	171.28	115.91	33	1094
log(GVA2004 - NUTS1)	11.54	0.48	10.53	12.34
log(GVA2004 - NUTS2)	10.27	0.47	8.89	11.37
log(GVA2004 - NUTS3)	8.90	0.58	7.45	10.53
log(GVA2014 - NUTS1)	11.85	0.53	10.78	12.81
log(GVA2014 - NUTS2)	10.58	0.51	9.16	11.95
log(GVA2014 - NUTS3)	9.20	0.61	7.64	11.18
Turnout	73.77	4.96	59.25	83.57
Leave	54.55	9.95	21.38	83.57
Share of British	88.03	11.18	43.79	100
Unemployment 2004	4.38	1.88	1.8	13.1
Unemployment 2014	5.81	2.02	2.34	12.47
Distance	0.40	0.26	0.0007	1.44
Share of Polish	1.21	1.34	0	6.90
Latitude	52.03	1.12	50.26	55.15
Longitude	-1.36	1.34	-5.07	1.74

The observed Unit is the LA. GVA is calculated using the income approach and I take the natural logarithm. Unemployment, Turnout, vote in favour of Leave and shares of immigrants/natives are measured in percentage points. Population is measured in thousands. Distance as well as latitude and longitude are directly taken from Google Maps. NUTS1, NUTS2 and NUTS3 are different classifications for territorial units.

Table 1.2. The first stage regressions together with the effect of Polish immigration on Brexit votes.

	(1) $\frac{Polish}{Population}$	(2) $\frac{Polish}{Population}$	(3) Leave	(4) Leave	(5) Leave	(6) Turnout	(7) Turnout	(8) Turnout
$Distance_i$	-0.73***	-1.15***						
	(0.25)	(0.30)						
$\frac{Polish}{Population}$			0.62**	2.72*	3.12**	-0.29**	-0.71	-0.56
			(0.31)	(1.55)	(1.52)	(0.13)	(0.49)	(0.48)
CLR				[-0.29,7.69]	[0.13,10.81]		[-2.12,0.32]	[-4.57,0.92]
Regression	OLS	OLS	OLS	2SLS(1)	2SLS(3)	OLS	2SLS(1)	2SLS(3)
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	287	287	287	287	287	287	287	287
Adjusted R^2	0.017	0.132	0.541	0.468	0.438	0.805	0.794	0.800

Robust Standard errors in parentheses. The observed unit is the LA. Columns 1 and 2 are the first stage regressions whereas the the other columns are two stage least squares regressions with controls on voting outcomes. Columns 5 and 8 use the non-linear first stage. CLR is the conditional Likelihood Ratio. Controls include ln(GVA) for NUTS, NUTS2 and NUTS3 and ln(Unemployment) for 2004 and 2014 as well as Latitude and Longitude and ln(Population) in 2014.
The F-Statistic for the excluded instrument is 14.6 (Column 2).
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 1.3. The effect of Polish immigration on public opinion with the linear first stage.

	(1) Issue-Immigration	**(2)** Protest-Vote	**(3)** Trust-Politicians	**(4)** UN-SG	**(5)** NHS-Investment	**(6)** Future-Optimism	**(7)** Democracy
$\frac{Polish}{Population}$	0.05***	-0.08***	0.16**	0.03**	-0.05	-0.02	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.08)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
CLR	[0.02,0.13]	[-0.18,-0.04]	[0.02,0.40]	[0.01,0.08]	[-0.15,0.01]	[-0.07,0.01]	[-0.05,0.02]
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	287	287	287	287	287	287	287
Adjusted R^2	.	.	0.391	.	0.387	0.381	0.605

Robust Standard errors in parentheses. The observed Unit is the LA. The outcome variables are described in the Appendix All regressions are 2SLS regressions carried out with the linear first stage. CLR is the conditional Likelihood Ratio. Controls include ln(GVA) for NUTS, NUTS2 and NUTS3 and ln(Unemployment) for 2004 and 2014 as well as Latitude and Longitude and ln(Population) in 2014. The F-Statistic for the excluded instrument is 14.6.
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 1.4. The effect of Polish immigration on public opinion with the non-linear first stage.

	(1) Issue-Immigration	**(2)** Protest-Vote	**(3)** Trust-Politicians	**(4)** UN-SG	**(5)** NHS-Investment	**(6)** Future-Optimism	**(7)** Democracy
$\frac{Polish}{Population}$	0.06***	-0.08***	0.18**	0.03**	-0.03	-0.03	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.08)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)
CLR	[0.03,0.21]	[0.03,0.21]	[0.04,0.52]	[0.01,0.20]	[-0.21,0.02]	[-0.144, 0.00]	[-0.20,0.03]
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	287	287	287	287	287	287	287
Adjusted R^2	.	.	0.350	.	0.441	0.308	0.595

Robust Standard errors in parentheses. The observed Unit is the LA. The outcome variables are described in the Appendix. All regressions are 2SLS regressions carried out with the non-linear first stage. CLR is the conditional Likelihood Ratio. Controls include ln(GVA) for NUTS, NUTS2 and NUTS3 and ln(Unemployment) for 2004 and 2014 as well as Latitude and Longitude and ln(Population) in 2014.

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 1.5. Distance of the closest WRC as a predictor of Non-Polish Immigrants

	(1) $\frac{Non-PolishImmigrants}{Population}$
Distance	-1.96
	(1.26)
Regression	OLS
Controls	Yes
Observations	287
Adjusted R^2	0.758

Robust Standard errors in parentheses.
The observed unit is the LA.
Controls include ln(GVA) for NUTS1, NUTS2 and NUTS3 and ln(Unemployment) for 2004 and 2014 as well as Latitude and Longitude and ln(Population) in 2014.
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 1.6. The impact of Polish Immigration on Brexit and Turnout controlling for the share of British natives

	(1) Leave	(2) Leave	(3) Leave	(4) Turnout	(5) Turnout	(6) Turnout
$\frac{Polish}{Population}$	1.02***	3.28**	3.50**	-0.17	-0.60	-0.35
	(0.30)	(1.61)	(1.49)	(0.11)	(0.49)	(0.49)
CLR		[0.28, 8.58]	[0.47, 9.37]		[-2.07, 0.43]	[-2.31, 1.03]
Regression	OLS	2SLS(1)	2SLS(3)	OLS	2SLS(1)	2SLS(3)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes
Observations	287	287	287	287	287	287
Adjusted R^2	0.590	0.510	0.494	0.823	0.811	0.821

Robust Standard errors in parentheses. The observed Unit is the LA. All regressions control for the natural logarithm of the share of British people. Regressions in columns (1) and (4) are OLS. 2SLS regressions use the linear first stage in columns (2) and (5) and the non-linear in columns (3) and (6). CLR is the conditional Likelihood Ratio. Controls include ln(GVA) for NUTS1, NUTS2 and NUTS3 and ln(Unemployment) for 2004 and 2014 as well as Latitude and Longitude and ln(Population) in 2014.
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 1.7. The impact of Polish Immigration on Brexit and Turnout using a Card [2001] type instrument for the share of British people

	(1) Leave	(2) Leave	(3) Leave	(4) Turnout	(5) Turnout	(6) Turnout
$\frac{Polish}{Population}$	1.66***	4.95**	5.08***	0.11	-0.35	-0.02
	(0.33)	(1.96)	(1.80)	(0.11)	(0.55)	(0.54)
$\frac{British}{Population}$	0.45***	0.82***	0.83***	0.17***	0.13**	0.16***
	(0.09)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Regression	OLS	2SLS(1)	2SLS(3)	OLS	2SLS(1)	2SLS(3)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	287	287	287	287	287	287
Adjusted R^2	0.590	0.458	0.447	0.835	0.824	0.834

Robust Standard errors in parentheses. The observed Unit is the LA. The share of British people is instrumented with its past share in 2000. Regressions in columns (1) and (4) are OLS. 2SLS regressions use the linear first stage in columns (2) and (5) and the non-linear in columns (3) and (6). No Conditional Likelihood Ratios are provided as they apply to cases with only one instrumented variable. CLR is the conditional Likelihood Ratio.
Controls include ln(GVA) for NUTS1, NUTS2 and NUTS3 and ln(Unemployment) for 2004 and 2014 as well as Latitude and Longitude and ln(Population) in 2014.
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 1.8. Validity of the instrument: Local elections in 1973

	(1) $Con^{1973} - Lab^{1973}$	(2) $Con^{1973} - Lab^{1973}$	(3) $Con^{1973} - Lab^{1973}$
$Distance_i$	-4.67		
	(4.39)		
$\frac{Polish}{Population}$		3.16	2.70
		(3.18)	(3.18)
Regression	OLS	2SLS(1)	2SLS(3)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	253	253	253
Adjusted R^2	0.282	0.262	0.270

Robust Standard errors in parentheses. The observed Unit is the LA. Both regression are 2SLS, column (1) uses the linear first stage and column (2) the non-linear first stage. $Con_{1973} - Lab_{1973}$ is the difference between vote shares for Conservative and Labour candidates n the 1973 local election. Controls
include ln(GVA) for NUTS1, NUTS2 and NUTS3 and ln(Unemployment) for 2004 and 2014 as well as Latitude and Longitude and ln(Population) in 2014.
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 1.9. The effect of Polish immigration on the share of Net Outmigrants.

	(1) $\frac{Population^{2014}-Population^{2004}}{Population^{2014}}$	(2) $\frac{Population^{2014}-Population^{2004}}{Population^{2014}}$
$\frac{Polish}{Population}$	0.03	-0.12
	(0.78)	(0.80)
CLR	[-2.25, 1.55]	[-4.10, 1.43]
Regression	2SLS(1)	2SLS(3)
Controls	Yes	Yes
Observations	287	287
Adjusted R^2	0.431	0.412

Robust Standard errors in parentheses. The observed Unit is the LA. Both regressions are 2SLS and column (1) uses the linear and column (2) the non-linear first stage. CLR is the conditional Likelihood Ratio. Controls include ln(GVA) for NUTS1, NUTS2 and NUTS3 and ln(Unemployment) for 2004 and 2014 as well as Latitude and Longitude and ln(Population) in 2014.

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

CHAPTER 2

Dismantling the "Jungle": Analysing the impact of small refugee inflows in France[1]

Abstract

Large migrant inflows have in the past spurred anti-immigrant sentiment, but is there a way how small inflows can have a different impact? In this paper we exploit the redistribution of migrants in the aftermath of the dismantling of the "Calais Jungle" in France to study the impact of the exposure to few migrants. Using an instrumental variables approach we find that in the presence of a migrant centre (CAO), the percentage growth rate of vote shares for the main far-right party (Front National, our proxy for anti-immigrant sentiment) between 2012 and 2017 is reduced by about 12.3 percentage points. Given that the Front National vote share increased by 20% on average between 2012 and 2017 in French municipalities, this estimation suggests that the growth rate of Front National votes in municipalities with a CAO was only 40% the one of municipalities without a CAO (which corresponds to an increase lower by 3.9 percentage points). These effects, which dissipate spatially and depend on city characteristics and crucially on the size of the inflow, point towards the contact hypothesis (Allport [1954]).

2.1. Introduction and Background

Given record high numbers of migrants reaching the shores of Europe[2] and the future increased projection of immigration both across and within countries, anticipating how natives shape their political opinions and respond in attitude to interactions with immigrants becomes crucial. Migrants will influence the composition of the labour force, interact with natives in many commercial transactions and influence politics both on the supply and demand side. They will form important parts of the electorates, create interest groups as well as potentially run as candidates.

[1] Chapter coauthored with Paul Vertier.

[2] In the last years, the number of asylum applications in the European Union increased dramatically from 431 thousand in 2013 to 627 thousand in 2014 and close to 1.3 million in 2015.(Eurostat [2016])

How migrants shape native's sentiments and beliefs towards them will have important short-term and long-term effects on the welfare of a society. Understanding those behavioural responses and being able to capture differential impacts based on the inflow characteristics becomes very important.

Grasping how those effects (if at all) depend on the size of the migration inflow and the length of exposure, abstracting from the composition, will specifically play an important role in shaping economic and social policy in the world. So far it is poorly understood if *small* immigration inflows shape differently anti-immigrant sentiment of natives. Examining the differential impact in terms of size will be the subject of study of this paper.

Specifically this paper seeks to answer the question of whether the exposure to few migrants in the aftermath of the dismantling of the "Calais Jungle" has influenced voting for the Front National, our proxy for anti-immigrant sentiment. We find that hosting a temporary migrant centre (CAO)[3] causally *decreases* anti-immigrant sentiment. With our instrumental variables approach we find that municipalities that hosted a CAO experience a lower growth rate in percent vote share for the Front National of 12.3 percentage points. Given that the Front National vote share increases 20% over that period, hosting a centre causally decreases about 60% of the increase in anti-immigrant sentiment (about 3.9 percentage points). Municipalities that surround the CAO (within a 5 km radius) also experience a decrease in voting for the Front National. Therefore there is evidence of spill-over effects.

Regarding potential policy implications, European politics has been largely concerned with finding a redistribution mechanism for migrants. Relocation of migrants is often refused by countries as they fear anti-immigrant resentment in places where migrants would be distributed. This paper's message is that, given the small size of migrants, the government should rather encourage redistribution. It would be welfare enhancing to distribute migrants across localities to increase contact and reduce anti-immigrant sentiment.

Abstracting from the composition of the immigrant population an important distinction in analyzing the impact of immigration on anti-migrant sentiment can be the one of *size* and the *length of exposure*.

So far the literature has often analyzed the impact of large inflows of immigration over a prolonged time frame on anti-immigrant sentiment (frequently proxied by extreme right voting) and found an increase of support for extreme right parties (Barone et al. [2016], Halla et al. [forthcoming], Harmon [forthcoming], Otto and Steinhardt [2014], Mendez and

[3] "Centre d'Acceuil et Orientation": A first stage reception centre of migrants, literally translated as "centre for reception and orientation" in French.

Cutillas [2014], Brunner and Kuhn [2014], Viskanic [2017], Edo et al. [2018]). Relatively little is known on the impact of small immigration flows.

Other parts of the literature have examined the electoral repercussion of the refugee crisis in Europe. Hangartner et al. [forthcoming,a] and Hangartner et al. [forthcoming,b] show that exposure to migrants on the Greek islands, but not contact with them, increases hostility of natives towards them and voting for the "Golden Dawn" the xenophobic extreme right wing party in Greece. On the other hand Steinmayr [2018] shows the interaction between migrants and natives in Upper-Austria has led to a decrease in votes for the Extreme Right "FPÖ" party in Austria. Compared to those aforementioned studies we claim that contact with migrants is important in shaping anti-immigrants sentiment, but that this effect might be reversed when the group is too large. Our rich empirical framework allows us to reconcile the literature on large immigration inflows and anti-migrant sentiment. The results allow us to significantly nuance and establish a main driver in anti-migrant sentiment, which relates both contact and relative group size.

As we have observed in the spectrum of European and world politics, in recent years both more extreme (right wing) parties have experienced increased electoral success (represented by parties such as the FPÖ (Austria), AfD (Germany) or Lega Nord (Italy)) as well as political figures are more extreme on their views within parties. Evidence of the latter is the increase in IV nominate scores (Poole, K. and Rosenthal, H. [2007]) of elected members of the house of representatives in the United States as well as culminated in the election of Donald Trump to the white house. This political and social development has coincided with the refugee crisis and thus more coverage as well as more migrants reaching the shores of Europe. Put into this light our paper does not only answer an important question regarding the interactions between natives and migrants, but also sheds light on very recent political and social developments and analyses one potential root cause of the rise of the extreme right.

We analyse those questions with a natural experiment featuring very attractive characteristics. Two main challenges to estimate the impact of migrants on anti-migrant sentiment by natives are needed to determine causality. The first challenge, which we overcome with an instrumental variables strategy, is the fact that some municipalities might have been chosen to host "CAOs" for some observable or unobservable reasons. If those municipalities would be on different trends in terms of voting for the Front National, then we could not identify the causal impact of the CAOs as it would be confounded. In this case we use the presence of a "Holiday Village"[4] to instrument for the location of a CAO. A "Holiday Village" is a structure owned by a public company in France, where employees are usually able to spend their summer holiday in. Since those structures were mostly empty during the dismantling and are state-owned they were intended to host

[4] "Village Vacances" in French.

migrants for a short amount of time as numbers of arrivals were uncertain. Important to mention here is that many structures were in the end not used, but it was rather a factor to keep in mind if more migrants than anticipated arrived and thus could not be housed in collective housing or other empty housing in the municipality.[5] They were also built in the 1970s and certainly not with the purpose of hosting of migrants. In the following sections we will discuss in more detail the exogeneity of municipalities with holiday villages and section 6 will provide proper falsification exercises.

One other main challenge is to try and identify exactly the effect of the interaction of migrants and natives on Front National voting and not the effect of migrants through a mediating variable. In many of aforementioned studies, the measured effects are likely to be *indirect*. Indeed, large and sustained migration waves are likely to affect different intermediate variables, such as amenities, public spending, the labor market or the local economy in a broader sense, which can in turn have an effect on voting.

However, the *direct* effect of contact (Allport [1954]) is also likely to play a role. In the European context of migrant reception and distribution across territories, knowing the conditions under which contact of the local populations with migrants fosters or dampens the rise of radical votes *per se* is of particular interest.

Yet, little is known about such direct effects. First, the extent to which the size and duration of exposure to migrants[6] affects the political preferences of local populations is *ex ante* unclear. Indeed, with large inflows the host population might have a higher degree of interaction and contact, but there might also be greater potential residential segregation (Card et al. [2008]). Furthermore, identifying the direct effects of immigration is empirically challenging, as it requires a very specific setting in which indirect effects are likely to be negligible. Such a situation is likely to be warranted in case of short-term exposure to small waves of migrants.

In this paper we try to fill this gap by examining an event study providing exactly this setting. We focus on the dismantling of the Calais "Jungle", an encampment just outside the city of Calais, in the North of France. During the migrant crisis this illegal squatter camp reached nearly 6,400 inhabitants in October 2016 (Le Monde [2016]), shortly before it was closed and the inhabitants, mostly migrants, relocated. Between October 2015 and October 2016, those migrants were relocated to more than 300 temporary migrant centres called *Centres d'Accueil et d'Orientation (CAOs)* all over the country. The number of those centers being inconsistent across government documents, we manually collected information about their location through a systematic analysis of national and

[5]We do not use structures such as collective housing or empty apartments as an instrument as it might be correlated to many other variables and potentially extreme right voting in the past. We control for those variables (as well as a proxy for the level of tourism) in all our regressions.
[6]Without considering the composition of the migrant group.

local newspapers (using Factiva), and combined them with a dataset that was publicly released by the CIMADE (the main association helping migrants) at the time of the final dismantling, on October 24th 2016.

Among the 361 municipalities which have a CAO, we find that 31 migrants could be hosted at the same time (for an equivalent of 18 migrant per 1000 inhabitants). We link municipality level variation in the exposure to small numbers of migrants to electoral outcomes. We focus specifically on the vote share of the Front National (National Front), the major far-right wing party in France. During the campaign prior to the presidential election in May 2017 the Front National's rhetoric was generally anti-immigrant, which brought the migrant crisis at the heart of the presidential debate. This was demonstrated most prominently in the general media, but also on the party's social media, their public gatherings as well as election manifesto.[7]

In order to achieve exogenous variation in the exposure of French municipalities to relocated migrants we instrument the presence of a CAO with the presence of a holiday village in the same municipality. The reason why we expect a high positive correlation between the presence of the CAO and the holiday village is the fact that one of the many criteria of the location of the CAOs was potential additional space in those holiday villages, given that the "Jungle" was shut down mostly in October 2016. The holiday villages would be unoccupied at that time and could thus be used as temporary shelters for migrants. At the same time the stock of holiday villages is determined much before the current migrant surge that led to the creation of the CAOs. Thus our exclusion restriction is likely warranted and we are thus able to estimate the causal effect of the migrant relocation on votes in favour of the Front National. Our regressions take into account many potential covariates (explained in the following sections) and the presence of a holiday village is likely to give us this additional exogenous variation in the allocation of a CAO.

Carrying out our empirical analysis, we find the presence of a CAO to have a negative effect on the vote share of the Front National. The growth in vote share of the Front National between the 2012 and 2017 presidential elections is decreased by 12.3 percentage points in those municipalities (12.2 according to our reduced form estimates). Given that the average increase of FN votes over this period corresponded to about 20%, this indicates that the increase in Front National vote of municipalities with a CAO was 40% that of municipalities without a CAO. These results point towards direct effects of exposure to migrants consistent with the contact hypothesis (Allport [1954]). Indeed, migrants were meant to stay for a short period of time (typically less than three months), and they were also unlikely to affect the local economy for several reasons. First, the cost of relocation was fully paid by the government. Secondly, they did not have the right to work and

[7]See for example La Croix [2017], BBC [2017] and Le Monde [2017a] amongst others.

received no financial transfers. In fact, we show that their arrival does not seem to have impacted local economic activity.

Our main interpretation for our findings is that citizens developed a greater degree of acceptance towards migrants and hence were less likely to vote for the Front National. These results seem to be confirmed by the fact that we observe an increase in the share of votes received by the far-left party *Front de Gauche*, which has a more open stance towards migrants, but a similar political platform on other issues. Furthermore, we find spillover effects of the presence of the CAOs on neighboring municipalities. Municipalities within a five km radius had a lower growth rate of vote share for the Front National by about 1.6 percentage points. Overall, we also find a stronger decrease for vote shares of the Front National in more diverse municipalities with a larger share of younger people. On the other hand effects are dampened in municipalities which were exposed to more migrants in the CAOs and where the Front National was historically strong. Additionally we find that municipalities next to migrant entry points, particularly those close to the *Vallée de la Roya*,[8] experience a lower decrease in votes for the Front National. This is consistent with findings by Hangartner et al. [forthcoming,a], Hangartner et al. [forthcoming,b] and Steinmayr [2018].

Importantly our calculations suggest that in municipalities that received over 32 migrants per 1000 inhabitants the impact on the Front National vote outcome is positive. This finding reconciles the fact that large inflows of immigrants contributed to the rise of Right wing parties as will be discussed in the following paragraphs.

We add to the literature in two ways. First of all, this paper is part of a large strand of literature documenting the electoral repercussions of immigration. Whereas most of the studies have focused on large and long-lasting impacts of immigrants on voting behavior, little is known about the effects of short and small-scale exposure to migrants. Studies examining large inflows of immigrants have generally found a positive impact on far-right votes (Barone et al. [2016], Halla et al. [forthcoming], Harmon [forthcoming], Otto and Steinhardt [2014], Mendez and Cutillas [2014], Brunner and Kuhn [2014], Viskanic [2017], Edo et al. [2018]). Most of those papers rely to some degree on the instrument proposed by Card [2001], which uses the prior allocation of immigrants as a way to obtain exogenous variation in immigrant allocation and thus solve the issue of geographical selection.

In the wake of the migrant crisis, recent contributions analyzed the effects of exposure to migrants on voting behaviors and attitudes toward migrants with diverging results. More specifically, Hangartner et al. [forthcoming,b] and Hangartner et al. [forthcoming,a] found that voters on Greek Islands which were more exposed to large inflows of migrants were more likely to develop hostility towards them, and to vote for the Golden Dawn

[8]One of the most mediatized entry points, at the border between France and Italy, and encompassing the municipality of Ventimiglia

party, one of the major far-right parties in Greece. Conversely, Steinmayr [2018] shows that municipalities in Upper Austria which received migrants were less likely to vote for far-right parties. On the other hand Dustmann et al. [2016] show that the effects of exogenous migrant relocation on voting behavior in Denmark are heterogeneous and depend crucially on the characteristics of the localities: in particular, while positive effects on anti-immigration parties are found in rural areas, this effect is reversed in urban areas. There results highlight the importance of taking into account both municipality characteristics and the intensive margin of exposure to migrants.

Our paper combines these approaches by focusing on the electoral effects of receiving a small number of migrants (typically a few dozens), conditionally on long-term exposure to immigrants. Furthermore, our rich dataset allows us to explore how the results vary at the intensive margin (number of migrants) and depending on the characteristics of the population. From this point of view, the threshold effect that we find (above 32 migrants per 1000 inhabitants the Front National vote increases), reconciles it with findings in the literature on large inflows of migrants.

Secondly, our framework allows us to isolate a direct effect of migrant relocation on voting behavior, which is unlikely to occur through intermediary variables. A large literature in economics has considered the links between immigration and the labour market (Card [1990], Altonji and Card [1991], Borjas [2003], Ortega and Peri [2009], Ottaviano and Peri [2012], Guriev and Vakulenko [2002], among others), public finance (Gott and Johnstone [2002], OECD, [2015], Vargas-Silva [2015]) or crime (Moehling and Piehl [2009], Bianchi et al. [2012], Mastrobuoni and Pinotti [2016]), which in turn are likely to affect electoral outcomes. In particular, variations on the labour market affect extreme votes, notably through trade shocks (Autor et al. [2016], Malgouyres [2017], Dippel et al. [2017]), or unemployment (Algan et al. [2017]). In this paper, we argue that our results are not affected by variations on the labour market or in local public finance. Overall, while national exposure to immigration shapes attitudes towards migrants (Hainmueller and Hopkins [2014]), we show that small-scale contacts are also likely to play an important role.

The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides the institutional framework and data description, section 3 presents the empirical specification and identification, Section 4 presents the main results on the allocation of the migrants together with the main results on the vote share of the Front National, section 5 provides some heterogeneous effects, the effects on other parties and a discussion of the mechanism, robustness checks as well as falsification exercises can be found in section 6, while section 7 concludes.

2.2. Institutional Framework and Data

In the following subsections we first provide qualitative and quantitative details on the Calais Camp and its dismantling. We then outline the functioning of the French presidential elections and explain our various data sources used and controls employed.

2.2.1. Migrants and the Calais "Jungle". The Calais "Jungle" was an informal migrant camp, which first took form in the late 1990s, was progressively extended during the 2000s, and grew massively following the European migrant crisis in 2014-2015, reaching a peak of more than 7,000 inhabitants in late 2015 (Figure 2.1). Following this massive inflation of the "Jungle", the government decided to progressively dismantle the camp starting from October 2015, by the creation of CAOs (*Centres d'Accueil et d'Orientation*). These centres, whose creation was ordered on October 27th 2015, aim at receiving migrants who have not yet started any procedure to obtain refugee status. Migrants allocated to the CAOs are thus meant to stay only for a short period of time, typically for less than three months. During this period, they are offered administrative assistance and bed and board, but they do not receive any financial allocation (nor do they have the right to work legally). The average cost of a day in a CAO is about 25 euros. However, it is the government and not the municipalities which pay for it (Ministère de l'Intérieur [2017]). The migrants who have started a procedure to obtain a refugee status are redirected to the CADA (*Centres d'Accueil pour Demandeurs d'Asile*), which also offers bed and board together with administrative assistance, while awaiting decision. The first of these centres were created in the 1970s, and could host up to 25,000 migrants as of 2015. (Ministère de l'Intérieur [2017]). Between 2015 and 2017, the number of places in CADA increased to around 40,000 places (La Cimade [2017]). Although the network of CADAs is the largest structure used to host asylum-seekers, other structures were created over time, such as the AT-SA (*Accueil Temporaire du Service de l'Asile* - 6,000 places as of 2017), the HUDA (*Hebergement d'Urgence des Demandeurs d'Asile* - 15,000 places as of 2017), the CPH (*Centre Provisoire d'Hebergement* - 2,300 places as of 2017), and PRAHDA (*Programme d'Accueil et d'Hebergement des Demandeurs d'Asile* - 5,351 places as of 2017) (La Cimade [2017]).

[Figure 2.1 about here]

The dismantling of the Calais camp occurred in several stages from October 2015 to October 2016. Overall, the government reports having relocated 13,366 migrants since October 2015, and more than 7,000 inhabitants during the sole dismantling of October

2016. This event received considerable media attention, as we can see from Figure 2.2, showing the number of Google searches for "Jungle de Calais" ("Jungle of Calais") over time.

[Figure 2.2 about here]

Focusing on the dissolution of the "Jungle" raises different challenges.

First of all, to the best of our knowledge, the French government did not provide official information on the location of the CAOs. In fact, the total number of CAOs created between October 2015 and October 2016 is itself uncertain [9]. In order to circumvent this issue, we combine manual collection of information with a public database released by the *CIMADE* in October 2016. Our methodology was the following: using Factiva, a database of newspaper articles containing both local and national layouts, we systematically searched for newspaper articles mentioning the terms "CAO" for each of the French *départments*, between October 2015 and the 2017 Presidential Election. For each CAO we found, if the information was available, we also recorded the number of migrants that were sheltered at the time the article was written. Such a methodology enabled us to uncover 291 CAOs. We combined this information with a dataset provided by the CIMADE after the final dismantling of October 2016, providing 210 centers and their capacity (i.e. the number of available beds). The union of these two datasets leaves us with 361 centers, which is remarkably close to the number mentioned by the government in January 2017 (Ministère de l'Intérieur [2017]) and which is in the range of the figures mentioned above. *If* there are still some CAOs missing, there should therefore be few of them. Since in this case we are assigning some treated municipalities into the control group, it should slightly reduce the observed differences between treated and non-treated municipalities.

[9]For instance, the 2016 Activity Report of the French Office for Immigration and Integration (OFII) (French Office for Immigration and Integreation (OFII) [2016]), reports that 168 CAOs were created between January 1st 2016 and October 24th 2016, while 197 CAOs were mobilized during the final dismantling that occurred between October 24th and October 28th 2016. This document does not detail whether the two sets of CAOs overlap: under a scenario of total absence of overlap, the total number of CAOs created to dismantle the Calais jungle would then amount to 365. In November 2016, the Ministry of Interior (Ministère de l'Intérieur [2017]) mentioned that 167 CAOs were opened between November 2015 and September 2016, and that 283 CAOs were opened in October 2016, leading to a total of 450 CAOs. This number is much higher than that of a joint a statement from the ministry of the interior and the Minister of Housing in January 2017(Ministere de l'Interieur [2017], who argued 374 CAOs sheltered 7418 migrants in October 2016 (301 being for adults, and 73 for teenagers), for a total of 13,366 between October 2015 and January 2017. Associations and the government also tended to report very different figures, as highlighted by Le Monde [2017c] in October 2017:"*the CIMADE, the main association helping migrants, and the OFII provide diverging numbers. The latter affirms that "there were 427 CAOs [as of October 2017], while there were 301 during the final dismantling of the Calais Jungle".*

Using the information contained in both datasets, we also create a measure of CAO capacity through the following procedure. For CAOs recorded only in our manually collected dataset (150), we define the capacity of a CAO as the maximum number of migrants that was ever recorded to reach among all articles mentioning it. For CAOs belonging only to the CIMADE dataset (68) or to both our manually collected dataset and the CIMADE dataset (142), the capacity is measured through the number of beds contained in the CIMADE dataset.[10] This measure of capacity cannot give information about the *total* number of migrants that were sheltered in a given municipality between October 2015 and the 2017 Presidential Election, or the length of their stay.[11] However, it informs about the *maximum* number of migrants that could be hosted *within a CAO* at any point in time.[12]

The second challenge is that the criteria of allocation of the CAOs have not been clearly defined, which makes the use of an instrument for its assignment mandatory. During the final dismantling of October 2016, even though the government announced that the allocation of CAOs across regions would be based on "socio-demographic criteria" (Ministère de l'Intérieur [2017]), no comprehensive list of factors was provided. Therefore our paper will also be devoted to documenting, on observables, which municipalities were chosen to host migrants. The only indication that was given was that the Parisian agglomeration (Ile-de-France) and Corsica would not be considered. Those two regions are thus excluded from our analysis and Corsica will be used as an additional robustness check in section 6. Since no migrants were allocated to Corsica, if our instrument is valid, then holiday villages in Corsica should not be systematically related to any political outcomes.

[10]Reassuringly, even though our capacity measure is not defined in the same way whether the data come from our manual collection or from the CIMADE dataset, its internal consistency seems warranted. To do so we compare, among CAOs observed in both datasets, the maximum number of sheltered migrants observed in our manually collected dataset and the capacity registered in the CIMADE dataset. Excluding outliers for which the difference between the two measures is more than two standard deviations away from the mean in absolute value, i.e. less than 10% of cases, the correlation between the two measures is 88%. Regressing the capacity measure of our manually-collected dataset on the measure from the CIMADE yields a regression coefficient of 0.93, for a R^2 of 0.77. Therefore, our capacity measure is likely to indicate the number of migrants that were actually sheltered in CAOs.

[11]Such numbers would be in any case hard to assess since we do not observe every wave of migrants arrival, nor their length of stay.

[12]This point is particularly important since they were also used to welcome migrants from other places. Two sets of mediatized relocations involving CAOs occurred after the dismantling of the Calais camp. The first one involves 1,000 migrants, who were relocated to CAOs in April 2017, after the camp of Grande-Synthe caught fire in April 2017 (Le Monde [2017b]). The second one involves migrants located in Paris (notably in the neighborhood called Stalingrad): 3,800 of them were relocated in November 2016 (Europe 1 [2016]) and 1,600 of them were relocated in May 2017 (Europe1 [2017]. Even though these events are important in terms of magnitude, such facts are unlikely to jeopardize our event study for several reasons. First of all, CAOs were explicitly created for sheltering migrants from Calais. Secondly, while collecting our data, we found extremely scarce evidence that new CAOs were created only for the purpose of sheltering migrants from other places. Finally, many of these migrants were actually people who avoided the evacuation of the Calais camp, or who were evacuated but who fled CAOs (Europe 1 [2016]).

Finally, a last issue to consider is the extent to which the mayors of concerned municipalities were involved in the process of the allocation of the CAOs. Although many mayors were contacted to receive migrants (Le Monde [2015], Association des Maires de France [2016]), during the final dismantling, the then Minister of Interior, Bernard Cazeneuve, entrusted the final decision to the local representatives of the government i.e. the *préfets*.[13] The *préfets* would first identify suitable premises without prior consultation of the concerned municipalities, and then negotiate with the mayors. In our analysis, even though the compliance of mayors is not generally observed, we exploit additional information about a list of mayors who publicly declared, in September 2015, their willingness to welcome migrants. We do this in order to investigate whether the effects are stronger in those municipalities.

2.2.2. French Presidential Elections. French presidential elections are held every five years since 2002, using a two-round majoritarian system. After the first round, if no candidate received more than 50% of the expressed votes, a second round is held between the two candidates with the largest vote share. We collect the vote shares of all the candidates in the presidential elections in 1995, 2002, 2007, 2012 and 2017, for each French municipality.

Our main outcome of interest is the share of votes received by the Front National candidates in the first round of the presidential election. The candidates from this party over the last three decades were all members of the Le Pen family: Jean-Marie Le Pen (founder of the Front National) was candidate from 1988 to 2007, while his daughter Marine Le Pen was candidate in 2012 and 2017.[14] Figure 2.4 shows the geographic repartition of FN voters in the presidential elections of 2012 and 2017 in France. The Front National's strongholds are located in the south-eastern and north-eastern parts of France, where more than 30% of the population voted in favour of Marine Le Pen both in 2012 and 2017. As indicated by the common scale of colours used for both maps, the Front National vote increased substantially between 2012 and 2017 (by 20% on average).

[Figure 2.4 about here]

2.2.3. Other Data Description. In order to conduct our empirical analysis we use multiple data sources. Presidential election results in 1995, 2002, 2007, 2012 and 2017 at

[13]The *préfets* have authority at the provincial level of the *département*.

[14]The Front National was not the only far-right party represented in these elections. Other conservative candidates, sharing some of the rhetoric of the Front National were also present in the 2007 election (Philippe de Villiers), as well as in the 2012 and 2017 elections (Nicolas Dupont-Aignan).

the municipality level are taken from the Ministry of Interior. In each of those elections the vote share of the Front National is expressed in percentage points. The location and size of holiday villages is taken from the 2016 survey on tourism capacity at the municipal level carried out by the French national statistical institute (INSEE). From the same data source we also collect the number of hotel beds per municipality, which we introduce as a control in order to filter out the component in migrant relocation not related to tourism.

Holiday villages are defined as individual or collective housing, with common sports and entertainment facilities, dedicated to host leisure stays for a fixed fee. Our dataset lists the number of holiday villages and how many beds they contain per municipality in 2016.

In order to proxy the compliance of French mayors in the implementation of the CAOs we use a list of mayors who declared to be willing to welcome migrants as of September 2015. This dataset, which is taken from the National French Television (France Télévision [2015]), is neither official nor exhaustive, but contains 417 municipalities.

We use the 2013 French Census from the INSEE. In particular, we consider the total population, the share of vacant housing, of home owners and social housing for each municipality. We also collect the share of individuals aged between 15 and 29, 30 and 44, 45 and 59, 60 and 74, or over 75 respectively per municipality. We consider the share (among the population above 15 years-old) of individuals belonging to each of the eight official socio-professional categories (farmers, independent, white collars, intermediary professions, employees, blue collars, retired and inactive). Similarly, we consider the share of unemployment among the population aged between 15 and 64. Finally, we also report the share of migrants within the total population of the municipality, where migrants are defined as individuals who are foreign-born but live in France. From the 2013 version of the INSEE file on disposable income, we also collect information on the median disposable income by consumption unit in Euros at the municipality level. Those are available only for municipalities of more than 50 inhabitants. All the aforementioned variables are also collected for 2006 and we we use the variation over time as controls as well as their stock in 2013 in our regressions in order to capture the evolution of municipalities after the 2008 financial crisis as well as current economic conditions.

From the INSEE we also collect information about the type of each municipality, which can be either central, suburban, independent or rural.

All the aforementioned socio-economic characteristics are part of the controls in our regressions. In order to extensively control for political characteristics of the municipalities, we collect background information on the mayors, using the *Repertoire National des Elus* from the Ministry of Interior. This dataset provides information on the occupation of the mayor i.e. if she is a private employee or a civil servant, a teacher, a farmer, or a an individual working in an industrial or liberal occupation. It also indicates the age of the

mayor, and her party affiliation which we reclassify in 5 categories: left wing, right wing, extreme left, extreme right or others.

From the *CIMADE*, we also collect information on the presence of other types of migrant centres (as of July 2017) including CADA, HUDA, AT-SA, CPH and PRAHDA. The data is most detailed for the CADA, where we are able to obtain the number of places between 2012 and 2016 on a yearly basis. This allows us to compute the evolution of the number of places in the CADA at the municipality level during this period. Combining all this information with a GIS dataset of French municipalities (provided by the French national geographic institute (IGN)) we are able to compute for each municipality, the distance to each of these centres i.e. the distance to the closest centre among all CADA, HUDA, AT-SA, CPH and PRAHDA. Furthermore, we also use this GIS data to compute for each municipality the distance to the closest CAO, which is used used to estimate spillover effects.

Finally, in order to identify whether our results can be attributed to a variation of economic activity at the local level, we use a dataset from Trendeo - Observatoire de l'investissement et de l'emploi [2017], which reports job destructions and creations at the municipal level in France between January 2009 and June 2017. This dataset has the advantage of providing a measure of local employment dynamics at the municipal level with higher frequency than traditional indicators. However, in the context of our study, it might suffer from two drawbacks. First, since it is based on monitoring, it might only cover job destructions and creations that are of a magnitude to be mentioned in local media (for example local newspapers). Furthermore, this data is likely to be more accurate in depicting labor markets at the level of the employment zone than at the level of the municipality, which is the administrative unit of interest in this paper. We therefore do not include this data in our main analysis, but we investigate their relationship to migrant inflows in Section 5.3.

2.3. Empirical Specification and Instrumental Variable Approach

We estimate the effect of temporary migrant centres on the evolution of the FN vote between 2012 and 2017. We therefore estimate the following equation:

$$\Delta FN \equiv log(FN_{2017})_i - log(FN_{2012})_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 CAO_i + \delta X_i + \epsilon_i \tag{2.3.1}$$

Where $log(FN_{2017})_i - log(FN_{2012})_i$ is the difference of log voting shares for the Front National in 2017 and 2012; CAO_i is a dummy equal to 1 if the municipality i has a CAO and 0 otherwise, while X_i are control variables for municipality i, which were outlined in the data description. Particularly we use all the socio-economic controls (notably their evolution between 2013 and 2006), the log of distance to the closest permanent migrant

centre, the evolution in the number of CADA places between 2012 and 2016, the log of hotel rooms, as well as political and administrative characteristics of the municipality and demographics of the mayors. The standard errors are clustered at the *département* level.

However, the assignment of the CAOs is not random, and is likely to be endogenous to political outcomes. First of all, as we show in the next section, municipalities which volunteered to receive migrants and with historically lower levels of Front National vote were also more likely to eventually receive a CAO. Since this measure is only an imperfect measure of municipality compliance, and as we do not observe the bargaining which might have taken place between municipalities and the government, simple OLS estimates are likely to be biased towards zero, given that citizens of volunteering cities are arguably more tolerant toward migrants and less likely to be affected by the presence of a CAO. Furthermore, many CAOs were established in vacant buildings owned or rented by the state such as for example old military bases or hospitals, and as we show in the next section, they were also more likely to be located in places with a higher number of vacant housing units and in rural areas. Simple OLS estimations might therefore capture part of these effects which are likely to be factors increasing the share of votes in favour of the Front National over time.

Consequently, in order to circumvent these potential biases, we propose to instrument the probability of location of a CAO with the presence of holiday villages (or *"Village Vacances"*, thereafter noted VV) i.e. the aforementioned holiday villages, as of 2016. Even though several types of venues were considered by the government, a strong emphasis was put on holiday villages (and especially the ones belonging to companies such as *La Poste* or *EDF*) (Libération [2016]). We argue that, controlling for overall tourism (i.e. the number of sleeping places in hotels), holiday villages provide a good instrument to achieve exogenous variation in the assignment of migrants. The residency in those holiday villages is seasonal rather than permanent and thus most likely not associated with any differential trends in political characteristics of a municipality. What re-enforces this argument is that the holiday villages were established historically in the past and certainly not for the purpose of hosting migrants. In fact, the stock of beds in holiday villages seems to be very stable over time: for example, the correlation coefficient between the number of beds in a municipality in 2014 and in 2016 is equal to 0.98. On the other hand ancient military bases or hospitals as well as total vacant units might indicate a progressive isolation of the municipality. We therefore think that holiday villages can capture exactly this exogenous variation in migrant allocation that we are looking for. Table 2.3 gives a graphical representation of the First Stage, where the red dots are the CAOs and the black shadings in the number of beds in holiday villages.

[Figure 2.3 about here]

We take advantage of the binary nature of our instrumental variable by using a methodology proposed by Wooldridge [2010]. More specifically, we run a 2SLS regression, where the instrument is the predicted value of the treatment variable, taken from a Probit regression where the latter is regressed on our instrument (namely, a dummy variable indicating the presence of a holiday village in the municipality). Our first stage therefore writes:[15]

$$CAO_i = \beta_0' + \beta_1' C\hat{A}O_i + \delta' X_i + \epsilon_i' \tag{2.3.2}$$

where $C\hat{A}O_i$ is the predicted value of CAO_i taken from the following Probit model:

$$Pr(CAO_i) = \Phi(VV_i, X_i) \tag{2.3.3}$$

To confirm the validity of this instrumentation strategy, we run several tests in Section 6. In particular, we show that before the dismantling of the Calais camp, municipalities with a CAO did not seem to be on different electoral pre-trends than municipalities without a CAO, and that controlling for past evolutions of FN vote does not affect our results. We also show our results are unaffected by instrumenting with the number of beds in holiday villages in 2014. Finally, we run a falsification test using the particular case of Corsica: while this region has several holiday villages, it did not receive any CAOs. Yet, in this region, we do not find that municipalities with a presence of a holiday village had different trends of vote for the Front National between 2012 and 2017.

Finally, we investigate the presence of spillover effects of migrant relocation by estimating the effect of distance to the closest CAO (using radiuses of 5km, 10km and 15km). In order to estimate spillovers we have to assume that the decision to create a CAO in a given municipality is unrelated to politics in localities in the radius of 5km, 10km and 15km. This assumption seems warranted given the high number of observations and is re-enforced when looking at our empirical results: the estimate of β_1 is affected only slightly when spatial dummies are introduced.

2.4. Empirical Results

In the following sections, we first show the main drivers behind the migrant relocation. We then show the main estimates of the migrant relocation on voting shares of the Front National in the 2017 presidential election.

[15]We estimate this specification using the *ivtreatreg* routine in STATA.

2.4.1. Where were the migrants relocated? In this subsection, we examine our rich dataset to document the characteristics of municipalities which received migrants in CAOs between October 2015 and October 2016. Those municipalities differ in many observable characteristics. Importantly for our identification strategy, municipalities with CAOs include many more holiday villages as well as beds in those holiday villages than other municipalities. However many of the differences in in characteristics are largely driven by compositional effects. Indeed, if we regress the probability of having a CAO on these variables in a Probit model a few variables remain negatively or positively correlated and significant to different degrees:

The most significant predictors of the allocation of a CAO in a municipality (significant $p < 0.01$) are the presence of a holiday village, the fact of whether your mayor volunteered to receive refugees, a larger number of hotel rooms in that municipality and a larger share of vacant housing. Conversely, chosen municipalities had a lower level of votes share for the Front National in 2007.

Other significant variables (significant $p < 0.05$) lead to municipalities receiving a CAO that have a higher number of people in their CADAs, are on average closer to any other type of centre used for housing migrants, where the evolution of median income between 2006 and 2013 was negative and where the mayor is less likely to be right wing.

Variables marginally significant (significant $p < 0.1$) that determine the allocation of a CAO are an increased probability of the mayor being from an extreme left party and the city is supposed to have less civil servants than on average, the trend for the evolution of vacant housing is negative between 2006 and 2013 and the municipality is more likely to be rural.[16]

2.4.2. Main Results. In Table 2.1 one can see that our first stage is very strong, the F-Statistic for the excluded instrument with controls is 20.5, which is much higher than the customary value of 16.38 and the weak instrument guidelines given in Stock and Yogo [2005]. We observe a negative, but not significant, correlation between the presence of a CAO and the evolution of Front National voting shares when looking at the OLS regression (Column 2). When we use our instrumental variables approach, the effect is more negative and highly significant. As we previously discussed, not instrumenting the allocation of CAOs biases our estimates towards zero. The presence of a CAO decreases the growth rate of Front National votes by 12.3 percentage points (Column (4)). Our reduced form in Column 3 is very similar, the coefficient of the Pr(CAO) is very significant and of 12.2 percentage points. Since the FN vote increased by 20% on average in French municipalities between 2012 and 2017 (which corresponds to a 5.1 points increase on average), this estimation suggests that the growth rate of FN vote in municipalities with a

[16]This regression can be made available upon request.

CAO was only 40% the one of municipalities without a CAO (corresponding to an increase lower by about 3.9 points - which amounts to what we find using shares as outcome variables rather than logs).

This specification controls for the type of the city, many locality level covariates (political, socio-economic) and the log of hotel beds in the municipality.[17] Considering spillover effects we can see that localities in a five km radius also experience negative impact on the Front National vote, but not as strongly as the municipalities that actually have a CAO. This effect dissipates spatially.

[Table 2.1 about here]

2.5. Further Analysis of the Effects of Migrant Relocation

In the following sections we estimate heterogeneous effects of migrant relocation in order to determine particular factors that are driving our results. We also estimate the impact on other electoral outcomes, particularly the impact of votes on the extreme left. Lastly, we analyse whether our results could be driven by enhanced economic activity brought by migrants or whether evidence rather points towards the contact hypothesis

2.5.1. Heterogeneous Effects of Migrant Relocation. As part of our main analysis we conduct regressions showing heterogeneous effects in Table 2.2. We interact our prediction from the first stage with various indicators provided at the micro level to instrument for the interaction terms outlined in Table 2.2 following the procedure in Wooldridge [2010].[18] We want to test whether communities with certain characteristics respond in differing ways to receiving migrants. First, we try to see whether migrants have a stronger effect on communities when there are already many immigrants to begin with. In column 1 we can see that the decrease of votes for the Front National is more pronounced in places with a higher share of immigrants. This could be the case as pre-existing communities from the same country of origin as the migrants facilitate initial contact. We also find a stronger decrease in municipalities with a larger share of younger inhabitants (column 2). This could be due to the fact that younger people have less fortified opinions towards migrants and thus might be more willing to get in touch with the

[17] A full list of controls is outlined in the data description and mentioned in the associated notes under the tables.

[18] In this table, all the interaction effects are expressed with respect to the mean value of the interacted variable, except for the capacity of the CAO per 1,000 inhabitants (where it is compared to the minimum CAO capacity), and for voluntary mayors (which is a dummy variable).

new people joining their municipality. Furthermore, we find that the effect is less strong in places where the Front National was historically strong. This could be the case for two reasons: one is that places where people historically voted for the Front National, and not only in recent times, might find it more difficult to switch away from voting for that party. Interestingly, the effect on the vote share of the Front National is also decreased in places where more migrants were allocated. The analysis of the intensive margin yields important results for the understanding of electoral reaction to migrant inflows. We indeed find that the negative effect on FN vote is stronger in municipalities with fewer migrants in the CAOs per inhabitant (column 6). Based on this heterogeneity analysis, we estimate that municipalities which decreased their FN vote upon receiving migrants were those that had less than 32 migrants per 1,000 inhabitants. Above this threshold, which corresponds to a bit less than twice the average capacity per inhabitant of observed CAOs and which is inferior to the average share of migrants in municipalities in the 2013 Census (39 per 1,000 inhabitants), the effect of CAO on FN vote seems to be positive. This is in line with a large literature on the impacts of large inflows of immigrants on political outcomes. This could be the case as together with the already present immigrants they create some kind of a "Tipping point". Also a larger group of migrants in the CAOs would probably group more often rather than interact with the local community. We also find that effects on the Front National vote share are less strong in municipalities close to routes that immigrants take such as the *Vallee de la Roya*.[19] The further away from this entry point, the stronger the decrease. This finding is in line with findings from **?** in Austria. Finally, whether mayors of the municipalities volunteered or the size of the municipality does seem to play a role in determining heterogenous effects. Overall once we introduce all interactions in a main estimation what remains significant is the coefficient for the Front National share in 2007, the coefficient on immigration, and the coefficient on CAO capacity.[20]

[Table 2.2 about here]

[19]We measure the distance to this area which was an important entry point of migrants at the border between France and Italy through the distance of each municipality to Breil-sur-Roya, the central municipality in the area

[20]In Table 2.9 in the Appendix, we run the same regressions with standardized variables, in order to directly compare the magnitude of these interaction effects: we find that the interaction effects of the share of immigrants and of the share of young people are of the same magnitude (one standard deviation above the mean reinforces the treatment effect by respectively 3 percentage points and 2.3 percentage points). The interaction effect on the distance to the Roya Valley is slightly higher (one standard deviation above from the mean distance increases the treatment effect by 6.7 percentage points). The two biggest interaction effects are those involving the share of votes for the Front National in 2007, and the capacity of the CAO per 1,000 inhabitants: one standard deviation above from the mean FN vote dampens the treatment effect by 15.8 percentage points, while one standard deviation above from the minimum capacity of CAO per inhabitant dampens the treatment effect by 18.7 percentage points. Here again, combining all interaction terms together, we obtain significant results only for the share of immigrants, the vote share in favour of the Front National in 2007, and the capacity of the CAO.

2.5.2. The impact of Migrants on Turnout and the Front the Gauche. In this subsection, we refine our analysis by investigating what impact the relocation of migrants had on abstention and votes on the extreme left-wing political spectrum (particularly the votes of the Front de Gauche). In Table 2.3 we can see that the location of a CAO is associated with a slightly lower abstention, therefore a higher turnout, but not significantly so. There seems to be some evidence that migrants have causally increased turnout in those municipalities. Controlling for the change in abstention, we can see that the electoral effects on the vote for the *Front National* are unaffected (Column3). Also, CAOs do not seem to be located in municipalities with differing shares of votes for the Front de Gauche. After instrumenting, we find a pronounced effect in favour of votes of the *Front de Gauche*, which is similar in magnitude to the negative effect on the votes for the *Front National*.[21] Therefore we can establish that the causal impact of migrant relocation has led to a decrease in votes for the *Front National* and an increase in both turnout and votes in favour of the major left-wing pro-immigrant party. The next section will outline and discuss two potential mechanisms behind those findings.

[Table 2.3 about here]

2.5.3. Mechanism: Local Economic Activity and Anecdotal Evidence on the Contact Hypothesis. In this section, we analyse two potential alternative mechanisms, which are the impact of migrants on local economic activity and the contact hypothesis. Indeed, while migrants in CAOs do not legally have the right to work on the French territory and do not receive any monetary allocation, their arrival might have an effect on local activity through increased demand in the catering or building sectors for example. In turn, these potential variations in local economic activity might affect electoral outcomes. To check that these effects are unlikely to drive our results, we use a dataset provided by Trendeo - Observatoire de l'investissement et de l'emploi [2017], which indicates the number of job creations and destructions at the municipality level from January 2009 to June 2017. Using this data, we compute the net job creation per inhabitant at the municipality level for three time periods: from 2012 to 2014, after the beginning of the whole relocation process (from October 2015 to June 2017), and after the beginning of the final step of the dismantling (from October 2016 to June 2017). In Table 2.4, we estimate whether CAO creations are related to different labor market dynamics in the following months. Whether we consider OLS or IV estimates, controlling for previous

[21] We do not carry out a separate analysis for electoral outcomes in favour of centre-left and centre-right parties, given that the candidacy of Emmanuel Macron, an ex-socialist minister and self-proclaimed centrist, makes it difficult to compare those votes with the election in 2012.

net job creation per inhabitant over the period 2012-2014, does not lead to any significant relationship between the presence of a CAO and net job creation. Similarly, controlling for net job creation per inhabitant before and after the creation of a CAO does not affect our IV estimate of the impact of CAOs on the evolution of the FN vote.

[Table 2.4 about here]

On the other hand when collecting our data on the location of the CAOs we came across many instances of anecdotal evidence where integration specifically between migrants of the CAOs and the local community has taken place. Given that our analysis is carried out at the municipality level, which includes about 30 000 observations, it is to our knowledge impossible to find a survey that contains migrant attitudes that is representative at that level. Also, given how recent the presidential elections occurred (in 2017) makes it difficult to find any survey data even at higher levels of government that contains valuable information for this study.

However, anecdotal evidence suggest that the interactions between migrants and local populations were generally successful. At the onset of the dismantling process, protests seemed to be widespread (La Depeche [2016]), and sometimes violent (La Croix [2016]). Yet several newspaper articles mention that local populations regret migrants have to leave after only a few months, even within municipalities were protests took place upon their arrival (Liberation [2017], Charente Libre [2018]).

In fact, many forms of interactions seemed to emerge, through charity dinners (La Nouvelle Republique du Centre Ouest [2017]), car-pooling (Liberation [2017]), or football games. Several officials of small municipalities argued that the arrival of migrants helped revitalize football teams in rural areas which lacked players to compete in amateur leagues (20 Minutes [2016]).

Although we are not able to carry out a systematic analysis of those events of integration in French municipalities subsequent to the establishment of the CAOs, these events do not seem to be rare and come up repeatedly in local as well as national newspapers. A map released by Le Monde [2017d] shows that initiatives helping migrants being integrated were far from scarce.[22]

[22]One pathway for future research could be to systematically investigate newspapers mentioning the local presence of migrants and carrying out sentiment analysis of these texts using text-mining methods.

2.6. Falsification Exercises and Robustness checks

In the following sections we carry out a battery of falsification exercises and robustness checks. First, we test the validity of our instrumental variable by regressing our main instrumented treatment variable on the past evolution of the Front National vote and we control for differential trends in the Front National vote. Subsequently we examine the case of Corsica, where we show that an OLS regression of the presence of a holiday village has no impact on the vote share of the Front National between 2012 and 2017 (given that Corsica received no CAOs). Furthermore we show that our results are not sensible to the inclusion of Department fixed effects and whether we control for past vote shares of the Front National linearly, in a non-parametric way or in terms of polynomials (both for 2007 and 2012). Lastly we carry out a sensitivity analysis by excluding groups of control variables i.e. migrant hosting infrastructure, city characteristics, evolution of city characteristics, evolution and level of city characteristics as well as mayor characteristics. We also carry out the main regressions by using the presence of a holiday village in 2014 rather than 2016 as in the rest of the paper and the results are virtually unchanged.[23]

2.6.1. Falsification Exercises. In this section we carry out three main falisification exercises, which then will be supplemented by additional robustness checks in the next section. First we consider whether we might be picking up a pre-eminent electoral trend in certain municipalities. To do so, we run a panel regression at the municipality level, where we evaluate the effect of CAO presence on various elections between since the last presidential election (namely, the Presidential elections of 2012, the European elections of 2014, the Regional elections of 2015 and the Presidential election of 2017), controlling for municipality and election fixed-effects. In Figure 2.5, where the effect of CAO in the Presidential elections of 2007 is normalized to be zero, the coefficient on CAO is never statistically different from zero except for the 2017 Presidential elections. This gives us some evidence that the treated municipalities were not on different political pre-trends prior to the election. We focus on the elections since 2012 as other robustness checks and falsification exercises will consider more dated voting outcomes for the Front National.

[Figure 2.5 about here]

In Table 2.5 we regress our main CAO coefficient on past change in vote shares for the Front National in the three prior Presidential elections using our instrumental variables

[23]The point estimate on the instrumented CAO coefficient is 12.64; this regression is available upon request.

approach (Columns 1 to 3). In this case we make sure that our instrument is unrelated to past evolutions of the Front National vote share. In columns 4 to 6 we add, one by one, different Front National voting share trends starting with the difference between 1995 and 2002 up to 2007 and 2012. We find that our point estimate of the main instrumented coefficient still remains highly significant and of a very similar magnitude.

[Table 2.5 about here]

As a last check we consider Corsica (Table 2.6), which represents an interesting indirect test of our exclusion restriction. Indeed, no migrants were relocated to Corsica, but given its appeal as a holiday destination, it contains many holiday villages. In order to re-enforce the fact that our regressions are not picking up a pre-eminent trend in very touristic places, we regress our instruments on voting outcomes for the Front National vote in the French Presidential elections. Table 2.6 shows that no coefficient is significant. These additional regressions underline the validity of our instrumental variable approach.

[Table 2.6 about here]

2.6.2. Robustness checks. We also carry out some Robustness checks. In Table 2.7 we carry out our main instrumental variables regression of the change in vote shares for the Front National between 2017 and 2012 introducing Department fixed effects (Column 1), controlling for the Front National vote in 2007 in a non-parametric matter (Column 2) and controlling for the Front National vote in 2007 up to the third polynomial in order to make sure our results are not driven by some non-linearities or other statistical anomalies. Carrying out those regressions with our instrumented coefficient gives us very similar results in magnitude and precision to our main estimation. In Columns 4 to 6 we control for the Front National vote outcome in 2012 first linearly, then in a non-parametric manner and then up to the third polynomial. Our instrumented CAO coefficient still remains significant, but effects are stronger. This could potentially be due to the case that we control for the votes for the Front national in 2012, which is already included in our main outcome variable.

[Table 2.7 about here]

Table 2.8 shows the CAO coefficient of our main instrumental variables regression on the vote share difference of the Front National between 2017 and 2012 considering different sets of control variables. We divide our control variables under several groupings. One is the infrastructure that should determine or be correlated to hosting the migrants in a CAO. In this grouping ("Infrastructure") we have the log number of hotel rooms, the share of votes for the Front National in 2007, the minimum distance to any other form of government sponsored centre hosting refugees, the evolution of migrants hosted in CADAs as well as the dummy of whether the municipality (through its mayor) had volunteered to receive migrants. In the grouping "City characteristics" we include all the main characteristics of the municipalities, mostly derived from the Census such as population, vacant housing units, population structure, employment structure, unemployment rate, share of home owners and social housing as well as share of immigrants in 2013 as well as a dummy indicating whether the municipality is rural, independent or centre (Suburb being the excluded category). $\Delta City characteristics$ on the other hand are the aforementioned characteristics, but in evolution between 2006 and 2013. Lastly, mayor characteristics are all the characteristics associated with the mayor of a municipality, i.e. her political affiliation, age as well as the main employment of the mayor. The first column presents the baseline regression and as we can see first by excluding all infrastructure controls, then excluding city characteristics, then excluding the change in city characteristics before excluding both the stock and evolution in city characteristics and lastly the mayor characteristics we find that the point estimate on our instrumented CAO coefficient does not change much in precision nor in size.

[Table 2.8 about here]

2.7. Concluding Remarks

In this paper we have tried to answer some important questions regarding both the assignment of migrants subsequent to the dismantling of the Calais "Jungle" and the impact of the relocation of those migrants on electoral outcomes in the 2017 Presidential election. We find a negative effect on the share of votes for the Front National which is consistent with the contact hypothesis. We provide some anecdotal evidence that supports this claim and also exclude the local economic impact as a possible mechanism for those findings. We also show heterogeneous effects, as stronger negative effects on the vote share for the Front National occur in municipalities with a younger population and with more migrants as well as places further away from migrant routes. However in municipalities where the Front National was historically stronger the effect is dampened. Finally, the

effect is particularly negative for cities which received fewer migrants. This paper thus gives some indication on the small scale impact of immigration and nuances the debate on the electoral impact of migration. Overall our results suggest that there exists a difference in perceived immigration through the media compared with actual immigration, and that the electoral reaction to actual migration seems to depend crucially on the size of the inflow.

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Figures and Tables

Figure 2.1. Evolution of the number of migrants in the Calais camp



Figure 2.2. Google Trends for the expession "Jungle de Calais"



Figure 2.3. CAOs and density of holiday villages capacity



Figure 2.4. FN vote shares in the first round of 2012 and 2017 presidential elections



(a) FN vote share - 2012



(b) FN vote share - 2017

Figure 2.5. Absence of Pretrends



Table 2.1. Main Results on the impact of migrants on the Front National Vote

	(1) Pr(CAO)	(2) Δ_{FN}	(3) Δ_{FN}	(4) Δ_{FN}	(5) Δ_{FN}
VV	0.463***				
	(0.100)				
CAO		-0.009		-0.123***	-0.133***
		(0.008)		(0.038)	(0.037)
Pr(CAO)			-0.122***		
			(0.034)		
Spillover(5km)					-0.016***
					(0.004)
Spillover(10km)					-0.003
					(0.003)
Spillover(15km)					-0.006
					(0.004)
Regression	Probit	OLS	OLS	IV	IV
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
F-Statistic				20.5	20.5
Observations	27922	27938	27920	27920	27920
Adjusted R^2		0.073	0.074	0.069	0.069

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Column 1 is the probit first stage regression showing the coefficient of the presence of a holiday village on the CAO variable. Columns 2 to 4 are the second stage run in OLS, then in Instrumental variables and in instrumental variables adding different perimeter rings respectively. The rings denote municipalities within the 5, 10 and 15 km radius respectively. All regressions control for municipality sociodemographic characteristics (in 2013 and in evolution between 2006 and 2013), the log of the number of hotel rooms, whether the municipality volunteered to receive migrants, the log of distance to the closest permanent migrant center, the evolution of the number of places in CADAs, the mayor's party and characteristics. Standard errors clustered at the *département* level in parentheses.

Table 2.2. Heterogeneous Effects of the impact of migrants on the Front National Vote

	(1) Δ_{FN}	(2) Δ_{FN}	(3) Δ_{FN}	(4) Δ_{FN}	(5) Δ_{FN}	(6) Δ_{FN}	(7) Δ_{FN}	(8) Δ_{FN}
CAO	-0.075*	-0.064	-0.138**	0.019	-0.124	-0.118***	-0.128***	-0.066
	(0.041)	(0.051)	(0.056)	(0.063)	(0.088)	(0.036)	(0.041)	(0.130)
CAO $\times \frac{Immigrants}{Population}$	-0.764*							-1.871***
	(0.444)							(0.573)
CAO $\times \frac{Young(15-29)}{Pop(over15)}$		-0.513**						-0.234
		(0.226)						(0.449)
CAO $\times Voluntary - Mayors$			0.023					0.077
			(0.045)					(0.056)
CAO $\times FN_{2007}$				0.029***				0.034***
				(0.008)				(0.009)
CAO $\times log(Population)$					0.000			0.047
					(0.014)			(0.031)
CAO $\times \frac{CAO-migrants}{Population} \times 1000$						0.004***		0.005*
						(0.001)		(0.003)
CAO$\times dist.Roya$							-0.034***	-0.018
							(0.011)	(0.012)
Regression	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	27920	27920	27920	27920	27920	27920	27918	27918
Adjusted R^2	0.071	0.072	0.068	0.069	0.069	0.069	0.069	0.064

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

All columns correspond to second stage IV regressions where the presence of a CAO is instrumented by the presence of a holiday village, and where the outcome variable is the difference between log FN vote shares between 2012 and 2017. Interaction terms of the presence of a CAO and a covariate are instrumented with the interaction of VV and the covariate following Wooldridge [2010]. All interaction terms are expressed with respect to the mean value of the interacted variable - except for the number of places in CAO and voluntary mayors. The coefficient for the distance to the la Roya Valley is multiplied by 100 and thus expressed in units of 100 km. All specifications control for municipality sociodemographic characteristics (in 2013 and in evolution between 2006 and 2013), the log of the number of hotel rooms, whether the municipality volunteered to receive migrants, the log of distance to the closest permanent migrant center, the evolution of the number of places in CADAs, the mayor's party and characteristics. Standard errors clustered at the *département* level in parentheses.

Table 2.3. Effect of migrant Relocation on Abstention and Extreme-left wing votes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Δ_{Abst}	Δ_{Abst}	Δ_{FN}	Δ_{FG}	Δ_{FG}
CAO	-0.009	-0.170***	-0.087**	0.012	0.187***
	(0.009)	(0.053)	(0.038)	(0.008)	(0.060)
Δ_{Abst}			-0.005		
			(0.007)		
Regression	OLS	IV	IV	OLS	IV
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
F Statistic					
Observations	27926	27908	27906	27925	27907
Adjusted R^2	0.018	0.013	0.063	0.019	0.016

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Column 1 reports the coefficients of an OLS regression where the variation of abstention rate between the presidential elections of 2012 and 2017 is regressed on the presence of a CAO. Column 2 reports the coefficient of CAO on the variation of abstention after instrumenting it with the presence of a holiday village. Column 3 reports the second stage of the main instrumental variable specification, where the outcome variable is the variation of FN log vote shares between 2012 and 2017, but controlling for the variation in the abstention rate. Column 4 reports the CAO coefficient in an OLS regression where the outcome variable is the variation in log vote shares obtained by the *Front de Gauche* between 2012 and 2017. Column 5 reports the estimated effect of CAO on the variation of the Front de Gauche vote share after instrumenting it with the presence of a holiday village. All specifications control for municipality sociodemographic characteristics (in 2013 and in evolution between 2006 and 2013), the log of the number of hotel rooms, whether the municipality volunteered to receive migrants, the log of distance to the closest permanent migrant center, the evolution of the number of places in CADAs, the mayor's party and characteristics. Standard errors clustered at the *département* level in parentheses.

Table 2.4. Effect of Migrant Relocation on Net job creation

	(1) NJC $Post-10/2015$	(2) NJC $Post-10/2016$	(3) NJC $Post-10/2015$	(4) NJC $Post-10/2016$	(5) Δ_{FN}	(6) Δ_{FN}
CAO	0.574	0.526	-4.486	-1.769	-0.085**	-0.085**
	(1.276)	(0.895)	(3.091)	(2.083)	(0.038)	(0.038)
Regression	OLS	OLS	IV	IV	IV	IV
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls: $NJC_{2012-2014}$	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls: $NJC_{Post-10/2015}$	No	No	No	No	Yes	No
Controls: $NJC_{Post-10/2016}$	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
F-Statistic						
Observations	27940	27940	27922	27922	27920	27920
Adjusted R^2	0.025	0.016	0.023	0.015	0.063	0.063

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Columns 1 and 2 report the coefficients of an OLS regression where we regress the net creation rate per 1,000 inhabitants after October 2015 (Column 1) and after October 2016 (Column 2) on the presence of a CAO. Columns 3 and 4 report the coefficients of the same specification where the presence of a CAO is instrumented by the presence of a holiday village. Columns 5 is an instrumental variable regression where the outcome variable is the variation of log FN vote share between 2012 and 2017, where we control for the net creation rate per 1,000 inhabitants after October 2015. Column 6 is the same specification as Column 5, but controlling for net creation rate per 1,000 inhabitant after October 2016. All regressions control for municipality sociodemographic characteristics (in 2013 and in evolution between 2006 and 2013), the log of the number of hotel rooms, whether the municipality volunteered to receive migrants, the log of distance to the closest permanent migrant center, the evolution of the number of places in CADAs, the mayor's party and characteristics. Standard errors clustered at the *département* level in parentheses.

NJC stands for Net Job Creation (per thousand inhabitants)

Table 2.5. Pre-Trends: CAO Coefficients on Past Presidential Elections and Controls for Different Front National Trends

	(1) $\Delta FN_{2007-2012}$	(2) $\Delta FN_{2002-2007}$	(3) $\Delta FN_{1995-2002}$	(4) $\Delta FN_{2012-2017}$	(5) $\Delta FN_{2012-2017}$	(6) $\Delta FN_{2012-2017}$
CAO	-0.074	0.088	-0.084	-0.080**	-0.083**	-0.098**
	(0.052)	(0.055)	(0.059)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.037)
Regression	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls: $\Delta FN_{1995-2002}$	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
Controls: $\Delta FN_{2002-2007}$	No	No	No	No	Yes	No
Controls: $\Delta FN_{2007-2012}$	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
F-Statistic						
Observations	27914	27906	27880	27878	27904	27914
Adjusted R^2	0.051	0.173	0.083	0.063	0.063	0.109

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Columns 1 to 3 are instrumental variables regression lagging the dependent variable in our standard specification by one, then two and then three presidential elections respectively. Column 4 to 6 are instrumental variables regressions controlling first for the evolution of the vote share of the Front National between 1995 and 2002, then 2002 and 2007 and then 2007 and 2012 respectively. All specifications control for municipality sociodemographic characteristics (in 2013 and in evolution between 2006 and 2013), the log of the number of hotel rooms, whether the municipality volunteered to receive migrants, the log of distance to the closest permanent migrant center, the evolution of the number of places in CADAs, the mayor's party and characteristics. Standard errors clustered at the *département* level in parentheses.

Table 2.6. No Link between Holiday Villages and FN trend in Corsica

	(1) Δ_{FN}	(2) Δ_{FN}
VV	-0.009	-0.065
	(0.082)	(0.087)
Regression	OLS	OLS
Controls	No	Yes
Observations	352	199
Adjusted R^2	-0.003	0.188

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Columns 1 to 2 report the results of OLS regressions of the variation of log FN votes between the presidential elections of 2012 and 2017 on the dummy for a holiday village (VV). The regression in Column 2 controls for municipality sociodemographic characteristics (in 2013 and in evolution between 2006 and 2013), the log of the number of hotel rooms and mayor's party and characteristics. Standard errors clustered at the *département* level in parentheses.

Table 2.7. Main Results Controlling for Department Fixed Effects and Past Front National Vote

	(1) Δ_{FN}	(2) Δ_{FN}	(3) Δ_{FN}	(4) Δ_{FN}	(5) Δ_{FN}	(6) Δ_{FN}
CAO	-0.140***	-0.122***	-0.113***	-0.237***	-0.232***	-0.240***
	(0.024)	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)
Regression	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Department fixed effects	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Controls: FN_{2007}	No	Non-parametric	Polynomials	No	No	No
Controls: FN_{2012}	No	No	No	Yes	Non-parametric	Polynomials
F-Statistic	25.1	21.2	21.2	20.8	19.7	20.2
Observations	27497	27920	27914	27920	27920	27920
Adjusted R^2	0.128	0.068	0.072	0.141	0.132	0.150

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

All columns show the main instrumental variables regression of the log difference in vote shares of the Front National on the presence of a CAO. In Column 1 we control for department fixed effects. In Column 2 we control non-parametrically for the Front National Vote share in 2007. In Column 3 we control for the log of the Front National vote share in 2007 up to the third polynomial. In Column 4 we control for the Front National vote share in 2012. All regressions control for municipality sociodemographic characteristics (in 2013 and in evolution between 2006 and 2013), the log of the number of hotel rooms and mayor's party and characteristics. Standard errors clustered at the *département* level in parentheses.

Table 2.8. Sensitivity Analysis: Main Results varying the Type of Controls

	(1) Δ_{FN}	(2) Δ_{FN}	(3) Δ_{FN}	(4) Δ_{FN}	(5) Δ_{FN}	(6) Δ_{FN}
CAO	-0.123***	-0.140***	-0.103**	-0.101**	-0.119**	-0.120***
	(0.038)	(0.033)	(0.047)	(0.040)	(0.059)	(0.039)
Regression	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV
Controls: Infrastructure	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls: City characteristics	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Controls: Δ city characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
Controls: Mayor characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
F-Statistic						
Observations	27920	27920	27920	30052	33248	28127
Adjusted R^2	0.069	0.058	0.022	0.052	0.004	0.068

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

All columns show the main instrumental variables regression of the log difference in vote shares of the Front National on the presence of a CAO. In Column 1 we control for all major groups of controls, which is exactly the baseline specification. In column 2 we do not control for infrastructure in cites related to the hosting of migrants. In column 3 we exclude city characteristics in 2013. In column 4 we exclude the change in city characteristics between 2006 and 2013. In column 5 we exclude both city characteristics in 2013 and its evolution between 2006 and 2013. In Column 6 we exclude characteristics of the Mayor. Standard errors clustered at the *département* level in parentheses.

Appendix

In the next page you will find the table with heterogenous effects with standardized variables.

Table 2.9. Heterogeneous Effects of the Impact of Migrants on the Front National Vote, with standardized variables

	(1) Δ_{FN}	(2) Δ_{FN}	(3) Δ_{FN}	(4) Δ_{FN}	(5) Δ_{FN}	(6) Δ_{FN}	(7) Δ_{FN}	(8) Δ_{FN}
CAO	-0.075*	-0.065	-0.138**	0.018	-0.124	-0.112***	-0.127***	-0.079
	(0.041)	(0.051)	(0.056)	(0.063)	(0.087)	(0.034)	(0.041)	(0.133)
CAO $\times \frac{Immigrants}{Population}$	-0.030*							-0.075***
	(0.018)							(0.023)
CAO $\times \frac{Young(15-29)}{Pop(over15)}$		-0.023**						-0.011
		(0.010)						(0.020)
CAO $\times Voluntary - Mayors$			0.023					0.077
			(0.045)					(0.056)
CAO $\times FN_{2007}$				0.158***				0.186***
				(0.044)				(0.051)
CAO $\times log(Population)$					0.000			0.061
					(0.018)			(0.041)
CAO $\times \frac{CAO-migrants}{Population} \times 1000$						0.187***		0.200*
						(0.056)		(0.117)
CAO$\times dist.Roya$							-0.067***	-0.034
							(0.023)	(0.023)
Regression	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	27920	27920	27920	27920	27920	27920	27918	27918
Adjusted R^2	0.071	0.072	0.068	0.069	0.069	0.069	0.069	0.064

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

All columns correspond to second stage IV regressions where the presence of a CAO is instrumented by the presence of a holiday village, and where the outcome variable is the difference between log FN vote shares between 2012 and 2017. Interaction terms of the presence of a CAO and a covariate are instrumented with the interaction of VV and the covariate following Wooldridge [2010]. All interaction variables are standardized. All interaction terms are expressed with respect to the mean value of the standardized interacted variable - except for the number of places in CAO and voluntary mayors. All specifications control for municipality sociodemographic characteristics (in 2013 and in evolution between 2006 and 2013), the log of the number of hotel rooms, whether the municipality volunteered to receive migrants, the log of distance to the closest permanent migrant center, the evolution of the number of places in CADAs, the mayor's party and characteristics. Standard errors clustered at the *département* level in parentheses.

CHAPTER 3

Finding the Warmth of other Suns? Refugee Reception, Extreme Votes and Hate Crimes[1]

Abstract

Does refugee reception lead to more hate crimes against foreigners? What is the impact of refugee reception on extreme-right voting and which role does the media and specifically internet play in the transmission? Using data on Italian SPRAR refugee centres we show that the reception of refugees across Italian municipalities leads to a decrease in extreme-right voting and hate crimes against foreigners. Using an instrumental variables approach, we find that doubling the number of refugees hosted reduces the growth rate in the vote shares for the extreme-right parties by 9 per cent (about 1.6 p.p). We also find that increasing by 1 per cent the number of refugees hosted leads to a reduction of about 19 per cent in the change in hates crime over the period between 2013 and 2017. The effect on extreme voting is mainly driven by municipalities which have less internet access, hence have presumably more access to traditional vs. digital media.

3.1. Introduction and Background

The refugee crisis has been at the centre of the global debate during the last years and will remain for future generations. Amongst many factors such as inequality and climate change, certain areas will become more attractive than others and some places will become inhabitable. Therefore an increased likelihood of migration is to be expected both across as well as within countries. Analysing how natives respond to interactions with migrants and how anti-immigrant sentiment is formed will become key in understanding welfare repercussions for current and future generations.

In Europe, the salience of the topic has been a consequence of the wide political rhetoric and the increasing number of asylum applications of asylum status in recent years (Figure 3.1). The debate about the relocation of refugees across and within European countries has proven a politically strenuous exercise. As a result, evidence about the electoral and social repercussions of the redistribution of refugees can inform policy making in this regard.

[1]Chapter coauthored with Matteo Gamalerio and Mario Luca.

If we accept hate crimes and extreme right votes as good proxies for anti-immigrant sentiment, then examining how those variables are affected by the interactions between natives and migrants will inform policy makers about a feasible redistribution mechanism of refugees.

In this paper we examine how the reception of municipalities of a relatively few refugees compared to natives over a short to medium time frame can influence hate crimes against immigrants as well as voting for extreme right parties. Furthermore we show what role the internet plays in the amplification of this effect and examine how local politicians react to those new political realities.

We implement the analysis using data from Italian municipalities and exploiting specific features of a program for the relocation of refugees called "The Protection System for Asylum Seekers and Refugees" (SPRAR). The Italian Home Office manages the SPRAR program, whose main goal is the relocation of refugees and asylum seekers in small reception centres across Italian municipalities.

The empirical analysis studies the effect of the number of refugees and asylum seekers hosted in a specific SPRAR centre on the change in the support for extreme-right parties between the 2013 and the 2018 national elections. It also studies the effect of the number of refugees and asylum seekers hosted on the change in hate crimes against foreigners between 2013 and 2017. The results are obtained both through ordinary least squares (OLS) and instrumental variables (IV) estimates. The IV analysis is developed to deal with the endogeneity of the number of refugees and asylum seekers hosted in a specific SPRAR centre, given that municipal governments can decide whether to open or not refugee centres. As explained in more detail in sections 3.2 and 3.4, the IV approach exploits a specific feature of the SPRAR program: while municipalities decide how many refugees to host in the SPRAR centre that they open, the Home Office establishes the maximum number which depends on specific population thresholds. Thus, as described below, we use this institutional feature and we instrument the number of refugees and asylum seekers hosted with this theoretical maximum number imposed by the Home Office, which is heterogeneous across Italian municipalities depending on the size of the municipal population.

The main results of the empirical analysis show that hosting refugees has a negative effect on both voting for extreme-right parties and hate crimes against foreigners. More specifically, IV estimates indicate that doubling the number of refugees hosted reduces the growth rate in the vote shares for extreme-right parties by 9 per cent (about 1.6 p.p). IV estimates also show that increasing by 1 per cent the number of refugees hosted leads to a reduction of about 19 per cent in the change in hates crime over the period between 2013 and 2017. The heterogeneity analysis indicates that the effect on extreme-right voting is driven by municipalities, which have less access to the internet, which is instrumented

using the closest distance to an ADSL tower as in Campante et al. [2018].The results are robust controlling for municipal population, municipal socio-economic characteristics, local politicians' characteristics and pre-trends in voting during the national elections run before 2013.

This paper aims to contribute to the recent literature in three ways. The first strand of the literature is the one related to the impact of immigration or refugees on extreme right voting. Most of the literature has focused on the exposure to large immigration inflows over a long amount of time. Important papers in this literature (Halla et al. [forthcoming], Harmon [forthcoming], Otto and Steinhardt [2014], Mendez and Cutillas [2014], Brunner and Kuhn [2014], Viskanic [2017], Edo et al. [2018]) have found that large immigration inflows spur the far-right vote, and this is true also for the context of Italian municipalities (Barone et al. [2016]). Most of these papers also rely on a variant of an instrument pioneered by Card [2001]. The main intuition being that some new migrants will allocate where their ancestors did and if those moved in an area for reasons exogenous to the dependent variable in question, the issue of spatial selection is arguably resolved.

A more recent strand of the literature has been analysing the repercussion of the refugee crisis. Hangartner et al. [forthcoming,b] and Hangartner et al. [forthcoming,a] find that exposure, but not necessarily contact, between inhabitants of the Greek islands and refugees arriving as sea arrivals can increase anti-immigrant sentiment and voting for the extreme right. On the other hand Steinmayr [2018] finds that actual contact between refugees and natives matters. Considering the region of Upper Austria, he shows that the Extreme Right party of Austria (FPO) lost out considerably in places, where more refugees were hosted. Closely related to this Vertier and Viskanic [2018] find that contact with refugees from the "Calais Jungle" has decreased voting for the Front National (extreme right wing party in France), but only if the number redistributed was small enough. In addition to this Dustmann et al. [2016] show that the electoral repercussions of migrant relocation depend crucially on the characteristics of the municipalities. The more rural a place, the more stronger the impact in favour of extreme-right parties. These studies imply that both municipal characteristics as well as size of exposure must be taken into account when analysing the electoral repercussions of the exposure to refugees.

In this case we add to literature by adding as another variable to measure anti-immigrant sentiment hate crimes against migrants. This variable gives additional evidence of the benefit of contact between refugees and migrants and shows that natives do not only "privately" react to the contact with migrants (voting booth), but also "publicly" (hate crimes). All aforementioned studies also struggle with finding direct evidence of indirect contact. There is a possibility of a reversal of opinion by natives, when friends/family talk about positive experiences with immigrants or when traditional or digital media outlets report about it. In the first case, it is very hard to measure this empirically. In our paper

we show how conceitedness to the internet affects those spillovers effects, which is an element lacking in the aforementioned papers.

Another part of the literature studies the potential determinants of hate crimes and the relationship between immigration and hate crimes. A first contribution to this literature is the paper by Glaeser [2005], who theoretically studies under which circumstances politicians have incentives to supply hate-creating stories to discredit opponents whose policies benefit minorities. The main prediction of the theoretical model is that hatred declines when voters have incentives to learn the truth and that interactions with minority groups may provide those incentives. Our paper can be seen as an empirical test of the theory developed by Glaeser [2005].

While both in the past and in recent years the literature has produced extensive empirical evidence about the relationship between immigration and crime (e.g. Bell et al. [2013]; Pinotti [2017]; Amuedo-Dorantes et al. [2018]), the empirical evidence on the potential determinants of hate crimes against foreigners is more recent. Among the potential determinants of hate crimes and negative attitudes against migrants we find terrorist attacks (Hanes and Machin [2014]), social media and internet (Chan et al. [2016]; Mueller and Schwarz [2018a] and Mueller and Schwarz [2018b]), exposure to religious minorities (Colussi et al. [2017]) and large inflows of refugees and asylum seekers (Hangartner et al. [2017]; Sola [2018]). The evidence produced by this literature indicates that on average all the factors studied have a positive effect on hate crimes and negative attitude toward migrants. We contribute to this literature by showing that the exposure to a small amount of refugees has a negative effect on hate crimes against foreigners. Our results suggest that the contact between the native population and small inflows of refugees and asylum seekers can generate positive reactions by the local population and that some of it is also driven by the exposure of hate crimes against immigrants and and media coverage in general.

Second, we analyse the role of media in amplifying the effect of refugee reception on voters' behaviour and attitudes, which is a channel understudied in the literature given scarce data availability. The literature on the role of media in politics highlights the strong role of mass communication in influencing people's opinions. Mass media are found effective to spread political propaganda (Enikolopov et al. [2011], Durante and Knight [2012] and DellaVigna and Kaplan [2007]) as well as inflame xenophobic sentiment (Adena et al. [2015], DellaVigna et al. [2014] and Yanagizawa-Drott [2014]). The increased access to internet together with the deep change of the media landscape that it provoked has oriented the research towards a deeper analysis of social media. Access to broadband internet can increase anti-establishment (Campante et al. [2017]) and populist (Schaub and Morisi [2019]) movements, increase affective polarization (Lelkes et al. [2017]), impact political participation (Falck et al. [2014] and Czernich [2012]), spread fake-news (Allcott

and Gentzkow [2017]) as well as contribute to polarization trough a echo chamber effect (Barberá [2015] and Barberá et al. [2015]). However, little is known on how online media changes how people react to immigration, which is undoubtedly among the most relevant topics in the political debate. Müller and Schwarz [2018] find that the online presence of the German far-right movement AfD on social media can spread anti-migration sentiment and increase hate crimes offline. The link between hate speech online and hate crimes is also highlighted in Williams et al. [2019] who find a positive correlation between racist content on Twitter and racially motivated crimes in the United Kingdom. Our paper integrates the role of internet with the contact theory, showing that direct contact with migrants has a pro-migrant effect and that higher consumption of internet can decrease this. Importantly, we are able to analyse differing effects of traditional vs. digital media in the transmission mechanism of interaction with migrants. Additionally, given that our main measure of internet access is considered to be exogenous, our interpretation of the heterogeneous effect is arguably causal rather than just of correlation nature. Especially (Steinmayr [2018] and Vertier and Viskanic [2018]) stress the importance of contact with migrants as an important variable in determining anti-immigrant sentiment by natives, but lack data to measure the impact of "superficial contact" between refugees and natives through media.

The third way how we contribute is to analyse not only the way how refugees influence the demand side of politics, but also how the supply side reacts. Specifically, in the second part of the empirical analysis, we use a regression discontinuity design (RDD) based on mixed electoral competitions to show that extreme-right mayors are less likely to open SPRAR refugee centres. This evidence shows that extreme-right politicians do manipulate local migration policies to foster their own political benefits, which in turn might not be aligned with the welfare of the municipality's inhabitants (Gamalerio [2018]). This result contributes to a recent literature which studies the political determinants of immigration policies (Folke [2014], Facchini and Steinhard [2011], Casarico et al. [2018], Morelli and Negri [2019] and Mayda and Facchini [2008]).

More in detail, Folke [2014] shows that increasing the seat share of anti-immigration parties in municipal councils in Sweden significantly reduces the number of refugees hosted by the municipality. Our result on Northern League mayors is consistent with the result by Folke [2014], even though in the Italian context the role of municipal governments seems to be more relevant in setting up the refugee policy compared to Swedish municipalities, where small parties elected through a proportional system enjoy a greater degree of power. Facchini and Steinhard [2011] and Casarico et al. [2018] study the determinant of the voting behaviour of the U.S. Congress in relation to the legalization of undocumented migrants. Differently from these papers, our analysis is focused on the behaviour of municipal governments and on the reception of refugees rather than on the legalization of undocumented migrants. Morelli and Negri [2019] theoretically study which electoral

systems lead to more open immigration policies. The analysis in the second part of our paper analyses a similar topic from a more empirical point of view. Mayda and Facchini [2008], using survey data, show that in countries where the median voter is more opposed to migrations tend to implement more restrictive immigration policies. Our analysis shows that also the identity of politicians and the preferences of political parties matter for migration policies, and not only the identity of the median voter.

Finally, three papers study the reception of refugees in Italy. Genovese et al. [2016] use survey data from Italian regions to study how public attitudes about non-EU immigration are influenced by the central government's distribution of refugees across different regions. Our paper differs in that they study the effect of the reception of refugees on attitudes using survey data, while we use data on hate crimes and on voting behaviour measured at municipal level. Bratti et al. [2017], using data on Italian municipalities and on the 2016 Italian Constitutional Referendum, show that the geographical proximity to refugee reception centres leads to an increase in turnout and in the share of anti-government votes measured by the votes share of "no" to the Constitutional Reform. Our paper differs from theirs in that we focus on the opening of a refugee centre within a municipality, rather than on the opening of refugee centres in neighboring municipalities. This different focus enables us to study the effect of direct contact between the local population and the refugees hosted, rather than the indirect contact studied by Bratti et al. [2017]. Bracco et al. [2018] show that migrants inflows at municipal level are lower towards municipalities with Northern League mayors. Our paper differs for two reasons: first, we study how voters react to the reception of refugees, while Bracco et al. [2018] focus on how migrants react to the election of extreme-right mayors; second, we study how extreme-right mayors manipulate immigration policies to gain votes, while Bracco et al. [2018] analyse how extreme-right mayors adjust fiscal policies to make their municipality less appealing for migrants.

The structure of the paper is the following. Section 3.2 describes the institutional background, while section 3.3 the data used. Section 3.4 explains the identification strategy, section 3.5 describes the results and section 3.6 concludes.

3.2. Institutional Setting

In the following sections we will first outline the way how devolution is organised in Italy, i.e. what are the differing spending and public policy realms of municipalities. Then we will outline the government policy of how the allocation of refugees works across Italian municipalities. Lastly we will briefly cover the functioning of Italian National elections. Most of the information reported in this section comes from Gamalerio [2018].

3.2.1. Italian municipalities. In Italy, there are around 8000 municipalities, which represent the lower level of government. Municipalities have an important role in the Italian institutional setting, given that they manage important public services like municipal police, transport, welfare, public utilities (e.g. water, waste collection) and environmental services (e.g. parks).

Before the 2008 financial crisis and the 2011 public debt crisis, municipal services were funded through a mix of local taxes and grants from higher levels of government. However, following the financial and public debt crisis, the central government has reduced many municipal grants. The main sources of municipal revenues today are fees on public services and taxes like the property tax and a surcharge on the national personal income tax ("Addizionale Irpef").[2] Municipal expenditures represent approximately 10 per cent of total public expenditures.

Starting from 1993,[3] Italian mayors are directly elected by the voters. Municipalities with more than 15,000 inhabitants use a dual ballot system, while those below that threshold use a plurality system. The coalition of the winning candidate receives 60 % of the seats of the municipal council in municipalities above 15,000 and 66.66 % below the threshold. The electoral term lasts five years, and second-term mayors cannot be immediately re-elected. Finally, Italian municipalities are governed by three possible types of coalitions: 1) centre-left; 2) centre-right; 3) "Civic Lists".[4]

3.2.2. The allocation system for refugees. This paper studies how the opening of refugee reception centres affect voting for extreme-right parties and hate crimes. We focus on a type of reception centres called "The Protection System for Asylum Seekers and Refugees" (SPRAR). SPRAR centres constitutes the second level of reception, which is meant to host refugees and asylum seekers coming from the first level of reception.[5] The goal of SPRAR centres is to teach the Italian language to refugees and asylum seekers, to help them to find a job and to integrate in the society.

When the Home Office wants to open new SPRAR centres, it issues a call for competition. The Home Office decides the timing of these calls, and this normally depends on the need

[2]Today, the property tax is called "IMU", while in the past was known as "ICI". The surcharge on the national personal income tax is called "Addizionale Irpef".

[3]See Law 81 in 1993

[4]"Civic Lists" are local parties independent from national political parties.

[5]In Italy, the first level of reception is represented by the following types of centres: first, the "Centri di primo soccorso e accoglienza", i.e. First aid and hospitality centres (CPSA). CPSA host migrants just arrived in Italy. Second, we have the "Centri di accoglienza", i.e. Hospitality centres (CDA). CDA check the regularity of the presence of migrants in Italy. Third, we have the CARA ("Centri di accoglienza per richiedenti asilo", i.e. Reception centres for asylum seekers) centres, which receive migrants from CPSA who applied for asylum. Finally, we have the "Centri di accoglienza straordinaria", i.e. Centres for extraordinary reception (CAS), which have been introduced in 2014 to deal with the emergency created by the refugee crisis. See **?** for more information.

to allocate refugees from the first to the second level of reception. While the timing of the calls is established by the Home Office, the decision of opening a refugee centre is taken by the municipal governments. Municipalities can open three types of centres: first, ordinary centres, for refugee without specific issues. Second, centres for unaccompanied minors. Third, refugee centres for disabled refugees and asylum seekers. Municipalities can open only one type of centre, however, some calls gave the opportunity to open one centre for minors or one centre for disable refugees in addition to one ordinary centre.

The Home Office establishes the maximum number of places for refugees that centres can provide. This number is established through the rules determined by the call for competition and it depends on population. Table 3.2 reports the minimum and the maximum number of places that a centre can provide by tender. As we can see, with the exception of the last two tenders studied, the maximum number depends on population. As described in more details in section 3.4, in the empirical analysis we exploit this institutional set up to build our instrumental variables approach.

The central government transfers grants to the municipalities that open a SPRAR centre. These grants are meant to cover the costs of the centre and to pay firms and cooperatives that work with the centre, with potential benefits for the local economy in terms of employment. For example, the cooperative "In Migrazione" has estimated that approximately 8 professionals are hired every 20 refugees hosted.[6] In addition, Gamalerio [2018] shows that opening a SPRAR centres has fiscal benefits in terms of increased expenditures funded with grants coming from higher levels of government.

We focus our main analysis on the SPRAR centres opened in the period 2014-2017, which are the years during which the refugee crisis became more intense, as shown by the increasing number of asylum seekers who arrived to EU countries (Figure 3.1). In these years, also participation to the SPRAR program grew more. In fact, as shown by Table 3.3 and Figures 3.2 and 3.3, both the number of municipalities that entered the SPRAR program and the number of places made available and refugees hosted increased intensively starting from 2014.

3.3. Data

The main source for the data used is the paper by Gamalerio [2018], from which we extract data on all Italian municipalities for the years 2014-2017. The data comes from different sources. First, the data contains information about the SPRAR calls for competition issued in the period 2013-2017 (Table 3.1). The main sources are: 1) the Home Office,[7] 2)

[6]See the document "Accoglienza rifugiati: un'ordinaria emergenza" (inmigrazione.it)

[7]The Home Office publishes on its webpage detailed information about all the calls for competition. See the link: http://www.interno.gov.it/it/amministrazione-trasparente/bandi-gara-e-contratti.

The SPRAR webpage,[8] and 3) the "Briguglio archive",[9] which reports different documents about migration.

Second, data on hate crimes are provided by *Lunaria*, which is a non-profit association that promotes peace, social justice, equality and integration for minorities.[10] Since January 2007, *Lunaria* has been building a database ("Cronache di ordinario razzismo", see: Cronachediordinariorazzismo.org) on hate crimes against immigrants that occur in Italian municipalities. The database has been constructed collecting information about hate crimes from local and national newspapers. For every hate crime it is possible to know the exact date and the municipality. In addition, *Lunaria* provides a summary of the text of the newspapers' articles used to identify attacks against immigrants. *Lunaria* divides hate crimes in categories, and specifically it is possible to identify hate crimes committed on social media, by newspapers and local media, by single individuals, by organised groups, and by politicians, political parties and institutional actors.

Third, the data reports also information about municipalities' characteristics. The main sources are the Home Office and the Italian Statistical Office (ISTAT). The Home Office publishes electoral data from elections contested both at local and national level, and for this paper we collected data about Italian national elections contested in 2018, 2013 and 2008, 2006, and 2001 for the election to the chamber of Deputies only.[11] ISTAT provides data[12] on the total municipal population, the foreign population legally resident in Italy by municipality and year,[13] the educational level of the municipal population, the percentage of children and elderly, and socio-economic variables like unemployment rate, number of firms and income. Finally, the Home Office publishes data on the characteristics of municipal politicians[14] like age, gender, past occupation, educational level and political experience.

Data on the proxy for internet usage at municipal level comes from the paper by Campante et al. [2018].[15]

As explained below, the final sample contains information about 7094 Italian municipalities for which we observe all the five SPRAR tenders issued starting from 2013.

[8]SPRAR reports are published every year by the Home Office and the Association of Italian Municipalities (ANCI), and can be downloaded from http://sprar.it/.
[9]http://briguglio.asgi.it/immigrazione-e-asilo/index.html.
[10]See webpage: https://www.lunaria.org
[11]This is due to the fact that there is a minimum age for voters to elect the Senate and thus votes for the Chamber of Deputies are are a preferred measurement of citizens' political preferences.
[12]Link: http://dati.istat.it/
[13]Link: http://demo.istat.it/.
[14]Link: http://amministratori.interno.it/.
[15]We are grateful to Campante et al. [2018].

3.4. Identification strategy

This section describes the two identification strategies employed in the paper. In the first part of the empirical analysis, we use an instrumental variable (IV) approach to estimate the effect of the number of refugees hosted on voting for extreme-right political parties and on hate crimes against foreigners. In the second part, we use a regression discontinuity design (RDD) based on close mixed electoral competitions to analyse the effect of electing extreme-right mayors on the probability of hosting refugees and asylum seekers.

3.4.1. Instrumental variable approach. The first goal of this paper is to study the effect of hosting refugees and asylum seekers on voting for extreme-right political parties and on hate crimes against foreigners. The analysis is implemented focusing on SPRAR refugee centres opened in the years 2014-2017, which is the period in which the European refugee crisis escalated, with the arrival of more than one million refugees and asylum seekers in 2015 alone. In fact, as we can see from Table 3.3, this is the period in which the majority of SPRAR centres has been opened, to deal with the increasing number of refugees and asylum seekers who arrived to Italy. Focusing on these years enables us to study how voters' attitudes changed with the arrival of new asylum seekers in a period in which migration became a salient topic in politics and in the media.

The first baseline estimation that we run in this paper is the following, which is run by OLS:

$$Y_i = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 asinh(\#RefugeesHosted_i) + \alpha_2 asinh(Pop_i) + \alpha_k X_{k,i} + \epsilon_i \qquad (3.4.1)$$

where Y_i captures two different dependent variables. The first dependent variable is equal to $\Delta_{Right} \equiv log(extreme - right_{2018}) - log(extreme - right_{2013})$, which is the change of log voting shares for extreme-right parties between the 2018 and the 2013 national elections.[16] The second dependent variable is $\Delta Hate - Crime \equiv (Hate - crimes_{2017}) - (Hate - crimes_{2013})$, which is the change in the number of hate crimes during the same period.[17] The vector $X_{k,i}$ contains municipal and mayoral characteristics that can be potentially correlated with both the dependent and the treatment variables and is outlined in the data description.

The main treatment is $asinh(\#RefugeesHosted_i)$, which is the inverse hyperbolic sine of our measure for the number of refugees and asylum seekers hosted in the SPRAR centres opened during the years 2014-2017. Our measure for the number of refugees and asylum

[16]We consider the following extreme-right political parties: Lega Nord, Fratelli d'Italia, Casa Pound, La Destra, Forza Nuova, Fiamma Tricolore and Rinfondazione Missina.

[17]We decided to use hate crimes until 2017, because 2017 is the last year for which hate crimes have been collected for the entire year.

seekers hosted is the number of places made available by every SPRAR centre during the period of interest. In fact, the data collected on SPRAR centres does not contain the number of individuals effectively hosted in every single SPRAR centre. However, the Home Office gives information about the number of places made available in every SPRAR centre. Given that, as shown by Figure 3.2, the aggregate number of individuals and the number of places made available in SPRAR centres are highly positively correlated, we think that the number of places made available by every SPRAR centre represents a good proxy for the number of refugees hosted.[18] More specifically, under the assumption that individuals hosted in a SPRAR centre remain approximately one year, we calculate the total number of places made available per refugee centre over the entire period of opening, and then we calculate the average of the number obtained across the four years studied in our data (see Table 3.1).[19]

Given that the decision of opening a SPRAR centre with a specific number of places is decided by the mayor, to deal with the potential biases in the OLS analysis we turn to an instrumental variables (IV) approach. More specifically, we exploit an institutional feature of the SPRAR program, which is that the minumum and the maximum number of places that can be made available in a single SPRAR centre are decided by the Home Office through the rules established for every specific call for competition. More in detail, as indicated in Table 3.2, the minimum and maximum number of places imposed by the Home Office are different across the 5 tenders studied. Interestingly, for 3 of the 5 tenders studied, the maximum number of places depends on different population thresholds. This institutional arrangement creates an interesting variation across municipalities in the theoretical maximum number of places that the municipalities have been able to create.

As suggested by Figure 3.4, this theoretical maximum number of places imposed by the Home Office is highly correlated with the actual number of places made available by the municipalities, and it can thus be used as an instrument for our treatment variable in the following first stage regression:[20]

[18]The yearly average ratio between number of individuals hosted and number of places made available is 1.80 for the years starting from 2006, and 1.26 for the years from 2014. The number of individuals hosted is larger than the number of places because refugees may stay in a SPRAR centre for less than one year.
[19]For example, SPRAR centres opened during tender 1 remained active for 3 years (2014-2016). Thus, in our calculations, for a centre with 10 places available every year we considered a total of 30 places and an average of 7.5 (i.e. 30 divided by 4 years) places for the entire period of opening. Calculating the average number of places in this way should enable us to better approximate the number of refugees hosted by the SPRAR centre.
[20]Some dots in Figure 3.4 are above the 45 degrees red line, suggesting that some municipalities made available a number of places bigger than the maximum allowed. This behaviour can be explained by the fact that, under some exceptional circumstances, the Home Office asked to some specific municipalities to concede extra-places to be used in case of emergency (i.e. in the case of big number of individuals to allocate).

$$asinh(\#RefugeesHosted_i) = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 asinh(\#PredictRefugees_i) + \gamma_2 asinh(Pop_i) + \gamma_k X_{k,i} + u_i \tag{3.4.2}$$

where $asinh(\#PredictRefugees_i)$ is the inverse hyperbolic sine of the average number of theoretical maximum places that a municipality can made available across the 5 tenders.[21] To control for the fact that $asinh(\#PredictRefugees_i)$ is determined by population thresholds, we control for the inverse hyperbolic sine of the municipal population (i.e. $asinh(Pop_i)$). In this way, we can exclude that the effect of $asinh(\#PredictRefugees_i)$ on $asinh(\#RefugeesHosted_i)$ is driven by the size of the municipal population.

The decision of implementing the IV approach using the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation derives from the suggestion made by Clemens and Hunt [2019], who have shown how, in a context similar to ours, using the ratio of refugees and asylum seekers over total population can lead to spurious relationships and to the "blunt instruments" problem Bazzi and Clemens [2013] in first stage regressions. The use of the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation allows to circumvent this issue while still controlling for the size of the municipal population. In addition, regression coefficients obtained on variables transformed with the inverse hyperbolic sine can be interpreted identically to those obtained using the logarithmic transformation, but with the advantage that observations which take value zero can be retained.

Then, under the exclusion restriction assumption that $asinh(\#PredictRefugees_i)$ can affect voting and hate crimes only through $asinh(\#RefugeesHosted_i)$, we run the following second stage regression:

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 asinh(\#\hat{Refugees}Hosted_i) + \beta_k X_{k,i} + \eta_i \tag{3.4.3}$$

where $asinh(\#\hat{RefugeesHosted_i})$ is the predicted value of $asinh(\#RefugeesHosted_i)$ obtained from equation 3.4.2. The exclusion restriction seems warranted in this context for three main reasons. First, the maximum number of places that a municipality can made available in a SPRAR centre is decided by the Home Office through the rules established by the calls for competition, and the mayors have no possibility to manipulate this number. Additionally, as can be seen in Figure 3.4, there is no particular group of municipalities that seems to be taking more refugees than others. At every threshold there

[21] As done for the treatment $asinh(\#RefugeesHosted_i)$, we first calculate the total number of theoretical maximum places that can be made available per refugee centre over the entire period of opening, and then we calculate the average of the number obtained across the four years studied. So, for example, for a municipality with less than 5000 inhabitants that is considering to apply for a SPRAR centre during tender 1, the maximum number of places that can be made available over the 3 years of opening is 45 (i.e. 15 multiplied by 3). Implementing this calculation should enable us to better approximate that maximum number of individuals that the municipality can potentially host during the opening period of the centre.

are municipalities applying for refugees and hence results do not seem to be driven by certain subgroups of municipalities of a certain size. It is important to keep in mind that although municipalities across thresholds might differ on average in terms of observable and non-observable characteristics, they are on parallel trends considering extreme right voting (as shown in future sections). In order to identify the effect of hosting refugees on extreme right voting it is not necessary that voting levels should be the same, but that there is no differential evolution of those voting shares over time. A similar point can be made about differing legislative thresholds. Although at many population thresholds in Italy different laws apply (such as for example electoral laws for local elections) said laws are constant over time. The only way our identification would be endangered in this case is if one of those laws over the time period considered, would change and apply to different thresholds. To the best of our knowledge this is not the case. Therefore, also given the extensive controls used in our regressions, we are confident that β_1 can estimate the causal effect of an additional refugee hosted on voting for extreme-right parties and on hate crimes against migrants.

3.4.2. Regression discontinuity design based on mixed electoral competitions. The second goal of the paper is to study the effect of extreme-right mayors on the probability of hosting refugees and asylum seekers, which we estimate using regression discontinuity design (RDD). In fact, given that municipalities that elect extreme-right mayors are probably different from municipalities that elect mayors with a different ideological position, estimates by OLS are likely to be biased.

To avoid the endogeneity bias of OLS estimates, we implement a RDD strategy based on close mixed electoral competitions, in which extreme-right mayoral candidates run against non-extreme-right mayoral candidates. In fact, under certain assumptions, it is plausible to assume that in mixed electoral competitions decided by a narrow margin the ideological position of the elected mayor is as good as randomly assigned. More in detail, we estimate the following model:

$$D_{i,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 ExtremeRight_{i,t} + \beta_2 MV_{i,t} + \beta_3 MV_{i,t} * ExtremeRight_{i,t} + \epsilon_{i,t} \quad (3.4.4)$$

where the dependent variable $D_{i,t}$ is equal to 1 if the mayor from municipality i opens a refugee centre at time t, and 0 otherwise. The treatment variable is $ExtremeRight_{i,t}$, which is equal to 1 for extreme-right mayors, and 0 otherwise.

The assignment to treatment is determined only by the margin of victory $MV_{i,t}$, which is the difference between the vote share of the extreme-right mayoral candidate and the vote share of the non-extreme-right mayoral candidate. At the zero threshold $MV_{i,t} = 0$ the ideological position of the elected mayor sharply changes from 0 to 1.

Model 3.4.4 is estimated by local linear regression, using only the subsample of municipalities in the bandwidth $MV_{i,t} \in [-h, +h]$, which is calculated using the Calonico et al. [2017] optimal bandwidth selector. The main parameter of interest β_1 captures the average treatment effect (ATE) of an extreme-right mayor at the threshold.

The are two main assumptions that need to be tested to verify the validity of the RDD approach. First, there must be no manipulation of the running variable $MV_{i,t}$ at the zero threshold. This is tested in Figure 3.5, which shows that there is not any discontinuity in the density of the running variable $MV_{i,t}$ at the zero threshold. This evidence seems to exclude any possible manipulation of the running variable at the threshold.

Second, pre-treatment covariates must be balanced at the threshold. This is tested in Table 3.9, which shows that pre-determined municipal characteristics are balanced across the zero threshold.

3.5. Main Results

In this section we discuss our main results. In the first part, we present various regressions showing the impact of hosting refugees on the vote shares of extreme-right parties. Then, we look at the impact of the reception of refugees on the vote shares of centre-left political parties[22] and hate crimes. In addition, we implement a heterogeneity analysis, which enables us to study which factors drive the effect of the reception of refugees on voting for extreme-right political parties. Finally, in the last subsection, we present the results of the RDD analysis, which is implemented to study how extreme-right mayors affect the probability of hosting refugees and asylum seekers.

3.5.1. Refugees and Voting for the Extreme Right. In this section we discuss our main empirical results. As we can see in Table 3.4 the number of predicted refugees by the government is highly correlated with the number of actual refugees both with and without controls (column 1 and column 2). In addition, looking at the reduced form regression, we can see how the number of predicted refugees has a negative effect on the change in the vote shares of extreme-right political parties (column 4).

Looking at the effect of the actual number of refugees hosted, a clear pattern emerges: both the OLS coefficient (column 3) and the IV one (column 6) suggest that increasing the number of refugees and asylum seekers hosted reduces the growth rate of the vote shares of extreme-right parties. Given that mayors can apply to receive refugees and they are few, we would expect the effect of introducing refugees against the extreme right vote to be biased downwards. This is due to the fact that introducing few migrants into a

[22]In this setting, the centre-left coalition will include votes from the Partito Democratico, Piu Europa and Centro Democratico.

community that already has a high degree of acceptance towards migrants should not correct anti-immigrant sentiment down.

In terms of magnitude, the coefficient of the IV exercise in column 6 suggests that a 100 per cent increase in the number of refugees would reduce the growth rate (i.e. the difference between the 2018 and 2013 votes shares divided by the 2013 vote share) in the vote shares for extreme-right parties by $\hat{\beta}_1 * log[(100 + 100)/100] = (-0.23) * (0.69) = -0.15$. This calculation indicates that doubling the number of refugees hosted would reduce the growth rate of the vote shares of extreme-right parties by approximately 15 percentage points. Considering that the average growth rate of the vote shares of extreme-right parties has been 161 per cent over the period consider, doubling the number of refugees hosted would reduce it by approximately 9 per cent.

In addition, columns 5 and 7 confirm that this effect is not due to differential pre-treatment trends. First, the actual number of refugees hosted is not correlated with the change in the vote shares of extreme-right parties between 2013 and 2008 national election (column 5). Second, controlling for the lag of the dependent variables does not change the main results (column 7).

Finally, Table 3.5 indicates that the results are similar if we repeat the exercise excluding the municipalities that do not host refugees (i.e. if we look at the intensive margin only).

[Table 3.4 about here]

[Table 3.5 about here]

3.5.2. Refugees and Hate Crimes. In this section we examine the impact of refugee reception on hate crimes.

Our results are obtained by using the change in hate crimes over the period 2017-2013 as a dependent variable and can be consulted in Table 3.7. Running an OLS regression of the number of refugees on the change in hate crimes gives no significant point estimate (Column 1). Once we directly introduce the predicted number of refugees (our estimate for the reduced form), we find a slight negative effect on Hate crimes against immigrants. Once we carry out our two-stage-least-squares regression we find that there is a significant

and negative effect. Again the bias goes into the same direction as expected in the case for extreme right voting.

In terms of magnitude, the coefficient of the IV exercise in column 3 suggests that a 1 per cent increase in the number of refugees would reduce the average change in hate crimes between 2017 and 2013 by $\hat{\beta}_1 * log[(100 + 1)/100] = (-0.18) * (0.00995) = -0.00179$. Compared to the average change in hate crimes over the period considered (i.e. -0.0093), this calculation suggests that increasing the number of refugees hosted by 1 per cent would reduce the average change in hate crimes by approximately 19 per cent.

[Table 3.7 about here]

3.5.3. Heterogeneous effects of Refugee Reception on Voting for the Extreme Right. Our main result on heterogeneous effects of hosting refugees on Extreme Right votes are shown in Table 3.8. In this case we interact the variable of interest with the number of refugees hosted and instrument this with said variable interacted with the predicted number of refugees. Thus the variable is interacted with the treatment and instrumented with its interaction with the instrument. Also, we maintain the number of refugees instrumented with the predicted number of refugees and include it in all regressions (line 1). Obviously all the interacted variables are in our baseline controls. In this case every regression has two instruments and two variables to be instrumented and thus the treatment and the interaction of the treatment with the covariate are exactly identified.

More in detail, we interact our treatment variable with the following variables: the pre-treatment share of the municipal foreign population, the log of the municipal population, the number of non-profit association per capita (times 1000), the number of hate crimes reported by local media, and our proxy for the use of internet at municipal level. We introduce every single interaction term one at the time, and then, as a robustness check, we add all of them together in the last column of Table 3.8. As we can see, the only mechanism that comes out to be significant is the proxy for the use of internet at municipal level, with the coefficient in front of the interaction term that indicates how a more intense use of internet at municipal level reduces the negative effect of the reception of refugees on the vote shares of extreme-right political parties. The variable used here is actually the instrument used in Campante et al. [2018] for internet use.[23] Therefore we arguably have a causal interpretation of this interaction term. Our interpretation of this finding is

[23]The internet connection at the local level is not available due to a disclosure agreement signed by Campante et al. [2018].

the following: If the interaction between refugees and natives decreases anti-immigrant sentiment then this can occur either *directly* or *indirectly*. Directly is through the contact with refugees and indirectly can be spillover effects through peers and/or the media. In this setting the inter-personal spillover effect is impossible to measure. Though, compared to Steinmayr [2018] and Vertier and Viskanic [2018], we can show that the effect is dampened in places that have a higher connectivity to internet.[24] In this case, there is a higher use of digital media, rather than traditional media such as newspapers for example. News on the internet are usually more polarised and biased than in traditional news and more importantly rather represent national rather than local news. At the national level the Extreme Right gains considerably, mostly by exploiting populist rhetoric on the refugee crisis, which might contradict local realities of refugee integration. Those interpretations are to take with a pinch of salt, though it remains the case that arguably the interpretation of the interaction term is causal.

[Table 3.8 about here]

3.5.4. Refugees and voting for left wing parties. In this section, we replace our outcome variable with the vote shares in favour of the centre left coalition. Since Italy did not have any major Extreme Left wing party at the election we focus on the votes of the centre left, which groups together progressive social democratic parties as well as some centrist civic lists and liberal parties. The results of this exercise are reported in Table 3.6. In this case we see that there is no effect running a standard OLS regression (Column 1). Once we introduce the number of predicted refugees directly into our main regression, we find a significant and positive effect, but especially running our two-stage-least squares estimation we find a significant and positive effect on the change in the vote shares of centre-left parties.

[Table 3.6 about here]

3.5.5. RDD analysis: the effect of extreme-right mayors on the reception of refugees. In this subsection, we report the results of the RDD analysis, implemented

[24]We have result testing directly for news readership of several newspapers in Italy, but those results are omitted as not significant.

to study the effect of extreme-right mayors on the probability of receiving refugees and asylum seekers. The results of this analysis are reported in Table 3.10 and Figure 3.6.

As we can see from both Table 3.10 and Figure 3.6, electing an extreme-right mayors has a negative and significant effect on the probability of opening a refugee centre. More specifically, extreme-right mayors have a probability of opening a refugee centre which is approximately 3 percentage points lower compared to mayors with a different ideological orientation (column 1). The estimated coefficient is virtually unchanged if we add control variables to the RDD analysis (column 2).

[Table 3.10 about here]

[Figure 3.6 about here]

3.6. Concluding Remarks

In this paper we have shown three main results that contribute both to understanding the formation of anti-immigrant sentiment by natives as well as how contact with refugees shapes both the supply side and demand side of politics and what role the media plays in this. Concretely, we have shown that the introduction of few refugees over a short time span causally decreases voting for the extreme right as well as hate crimes against immigrants. Those effects are dampended in places that have, according to our interpretation, more access to digital vs. traditional media. In the last part of the paper we show that extreme right wing local politicians realize their electoral losses and react rationally by closing refugee centres that their predecessors opened. Therefore forgoing important financial resources for their municipalities for their personal electoral gains.

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Figures and Tables

Figure 3.1. Number asylum seekers in EU Countries



Notes. Asylum-seekers in EU Countries (thousands). Source: Gamalerio [2018] and Eurostat.

Figure 3.2. Number of places and refugees in SPRAR centres



Notes. Sources: Gamalerio [2018] and SPRAR report "Atlante Sprar", published on the SPRAR webpage sprar.it. The graph reports the number of places made available and the number of refugees and asylum seekers hosted every year from 2006 up to 2016.

Figure 3.3. Number of SPRAR municipalities



Notes. Sources: Gamalerio [2018] and Home Office and SPRAR. Net change is equal to the net inflow of municipalities that enter the SPRAR program in a specific year (i.e. net change = entry - exit). Stock indicates the total number of municipalities that in a specific year have an active refugees' centre in their territory. See also Table 3.3.

Figure 3.4. First stage: number refugees vs theoretical maximun number of refugees



Notes. Sources: Home Office and SPRAR. The red line is 45 degree line.

Figure 3.5. RDD: density running variable



Notes. Electoral mandates between 2004 and 2017, density of municipal elections. The running variable $MV_{it} > 0$ when the winning candidate is from a extreme-righ party, $MV_{it} < 0$ otherwise. Discontinuity p-value: the p-value for the null hypothesis of discontinuity of the density of the running variable at the zero threshold is 0.84.

Figure 3.6. RDD: Effect of extreme-right mayors on the reception of refugees



Notes. Electoral mandates between 2004 and 2017. The running variable $MV_{it} > 0$ when the winning candidate is from a extreme-righ party, $MV_{it} < 0$ otherwise. The dependent variable is equal to 1 for municipality i that opens a refugee centre at time t, and 0 otherwise.

Table 3.1. The timing of SPRAR tenders

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Tender	Year	Date starts	Date ends	Date opens	Years active
1	2013	04/09/2013	19/10/2013	29/01/2014	2014-2016
2	2015	23/05/2015	22/07/2015	04/12/2015	2016
3	2015-2016	14/10/2015	14/02/2016	31/05/2016	2016-2017
4	2016	27/08/2016	30/10/2016	19/01/2017	2017-2019
5	2016-2017	31/10/2016	31/03/2017	01/07/2017	2017-2020

Notes. Sources: Gamalerio [2018], Home Office and SPRAR. Description columns: 1) In column 1, Tender is the number of the tender assigned for this paper; 2) In column 2, Year is the year in which the tender is issued by the Home Office; 3) The starting date of the tender is indicated in column 3 (Date starts); 4) The deadline for application to the tender is indicated in column 4 (Date ends); 5) The date of opening of the refugee centre is indicated in column 5 (Date opens); 6) If municipality i participates to the tender, then the refugee centre remains active for the years indicated in column 5 (Years active).

Table 3.2. Number of places in refugee centres by tender

(1)	(2)	(3)
Tender	Minimum number of places	Maximum number of places
1	15 for all municipalities	15 places until 5000 inhabitants 25 between 5001 and 40,000 50 between 40,001 and 200,000 100 between 200,001 and 1,000,000 150 between 1,000,001 and 2,000,000 250 from 2,000,001
2	6 for all municipalities	10 places until 5000 inhabitants 20 between 5001 and 15,000 30 between 15,001 and 50,000 40 between 50,001 and 200,000 50 between 200,001 and 500,000 70 from 500,001
3	10 for all municipalities	25 places until 20,000 inhabitants 40 between 20,001 and 40,000 50 between 40,001 and 200,000 100 between 200,001 and 1,000,000 150 between 1,000,001 and 2,000,000 250 from 2,000,001
4	10 for all municipalities	60 for all municipalities
5	10 for all municipalities	60 for all municipalities

Notes. Sources: Home Office and SPRAR. Description columns: 1) Tender is the number of the tender assigned for this paper; 2) Minimum number of places: minumum number of places for refugees and asylum seekers that needs to be guaranteed in the SPRAR centre; 3) Maximum number of places=maximum number of places for refugees and asylum seekers that can be provided in the refugee centre.

Table 3.3. Number of SPRAR municipalities

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Year	Stock	Net change	Entry	Exit
2005	86	0	0	0
2006	141	55	60	5
2007	101	-40	8	48
2008	103	2	8	6
2009	127	24	33	9
2010	127	0	0	0
2011	172	45	51	6
2012	172	0	0	0
2013	172	0	0	0
2014	569	397	412	15
2015	569	0	0	0
2016	1184	615	615	0
2017	1227	43	154	111

Notes. Sources: Gamalerio [2018], Home Office and SPRAR. Year=calendar year. Stock (column 2) indicates the total number of municipalities that in a specific year have an active refugees' centre in their territory. Net change (column 3) is equal to the net inflow of municipalities that enter the SPRAR program in a specific year (i.e. net change=entry-exit). Entry (column 4) is the number of municipalities that enter the SPRAR program in a specific year (i.e. municipalities that open a refugees' centre), while exit (column 5) indicates the number of municipalities that leave the SPRAR program in a specific year (i.e. municipalities that close refugees' centre). See also Figures 3.3.

Table 3.4. Refugee reception and voting for extreme-right parties

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	$\#NumberofRefugees$	$\#NumberofRefugees$	$\Delta ExtremeRight$	$\Delta ExtremeRight$	$\Delta ExtremeRight_{t-1}$	$\Delta ExtremeRight$	$\Delta ExtremeRight$
$\#PredictedRefugees$	1.971***	1.887***		-0.446***			
	(0.230)	(0.255)		(0.127)			
$\#NumberofRefugees$			-0.030***		0.002	-0.236***	-0.235***
			(0.010)		(0.049)	(0.072)	(0.061)
$\Delta ExtremeRight_{t-1}$							-0.758***
							(0.023)
Regression	OLS	OLS	OLS	RF	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	7093	7093	7093	7093	7093	7093	7093
Adjusted R^2	0.217	0.283	0.447	0.447	0.161	0.396	0.625

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

In the first two columns we run the first stage OLS regression first without then with controls with a dependent variable the number of refugees hosted. Columns 3 to 7 are our second stage specification. The outcome here are votes for all Extreme Right wing parties most prominently the Lega Nord. All regressions include all the main controls outlined in the Data description (except for Column 1). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the local labour market level.

Table 3.5. Refugee reception at the intensive margin

	(1) $\Delta ExtremeVotes$	(2) $\Delta ExtremeVotes$	(3) $\Delta ExtremeVotes$	(4) $\Delta ExtremeVotes$
$\#Refugees$	0.024		-0.496**	-0.398**
	(0.023)		(0.220)	(0.181)
$\#PredictedRefugees$		-0.687***		
		(0.211)		
$\Delta ExtremeVotes_{t-1}$				-0.691***
				(0.056)
Observations	1144	1144	1144	1144
Adjusted R^2	0.393	0.395	0.180	0.571

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Regressions exclude municipalities that do not host refugees and asylum seekers. The outcome here are votes for all Extreme Right wing parties most prominently the Lega Nord. All regressions include all the main controls outlined in the Data description. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the local labour market level.

Table 3.6. Refugee reception and voting for the Left

	(1) $\Delta Centre - Left$	(2) $\Delta Centre - Left$	(3) $\Delta Centre - Left$
$\#Refugees$	0.003		0.059**
	(0.004)		(0.025)
$\#PredictedRefugees$		0.111**	
		(0.045)	
Regression	OLS	RF	2SLS
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	7093	7093	7093
Adjusted R^2	0.298	0.298	0.270

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

The outcome here are votes for all centre-left parties. All regressions include all the main controls outlined in the Data description. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the local labour market level.

Table 3.7. The impact of refugee reception on hate crimes

	(1) $\Delta HateCrimes$	(2) $\Delta HateCrimes$	(3) $\Delta HateCrimes$
$\#Refugees$	-0.014		-0.179**
	(0.009)		(0.083)
$\#PredictedRefugees$		-0.337**	
		(0.150)	
Regression	OLS	RF	2SLS
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	7093	7093	7093

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

The outcome variable is the change in hate crimes between 2017 and 2013. All regressions include all the main controls outlined in the Data description. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the local labour market level.

Table 3.8. The heterogeneous impact of refugee reception

	(1) $\Delta ExtremeRight$	(2) $\Delta ExtremeRight$	(3) $\Delta ExtremeRight$	(4) $\Delta ExtremeRight$	(5) $\Delta ExtremeRight$	(6) $\Delta ExtremeRight$
$\#Refugees$	-0.232***	0.674**	-0.271***	-0.234***	-0.301***	1.019
	(0.070)	(0.338)	(0.089)	(0.075)	(0.091)	(0.696)
$\#Refugees \times \text{Foreign born}_{\frac{}{TotalPopulation}}$	-0.411					2.114
	(0.330)					(1.409)
$\#Refugees \times \log(\text{Population})$		-0.201**				-0.314
		(0.090)				(0.195)
$\#Refugees \times \frac{NonProfitAss. \times 1000}{Population}$			-0.022*			0.057
			(0.012)			(0.043)
$\#Refugees \times HateCrimeMedia_{2013}$				0.039		-0.036
				(0.030)		(0.067)
$\#Refugees \times \Delta toADSLtower$					-0.005***	-0.020*
					(0.002)	(0.011)
Observations	7093	7093	7093	7093	7093	7093
Adjusted R^2	0.399	0.023	0.383	0.397	0.362	.

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

All regressions are instrumental variables regressions instrumenting the number of refugees hosted by the number of predicted refugees. For the interaction variables listed from lines 2 onwards we instrument the interaction of refugees hosted and the variable with the interaction of predicted refugees and said variable. All regressions include all the main controls outlined in the Data description. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the local labour market level. Standard errors clustered at the local labour market level.

Table 3.9. RDD: balance tests

VARIABLES	(1) Log population	(2) Share graduate	(3) Share<18	(4) Share>65	(5) Share Unemployed	(6) Area	(7) Past sprar
Conventional	-0.033	-0.002	-0.006	0.008	-0.007	0.689	-0.004
	(0.120)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(6.736)	(0.014)
Bias-corrected	-0.047	-0.002	-0.006*	0.009	-0.005	0.242	-0.002
	(0.120)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(6.736)	(0.014)
Robust	-0.047	-0.002	-0.006	0.009	-0.005	0.242	-0.002
	(0.137)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(7.919)	(0.017)
Observations	1,771	1,771	1,771	1,771	1,771	1,771	1,392
BW Loc. Poly. (h)	0.195	0.193	0.239	0.195	0.152	0.166	0.145
Effective Observations	1055	1045	1190	1053	881	944	711

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Notes. The estimated coefficients capture the effect of a extreme-right mayor. Estimates reported: conventional RD estimates with a conventional variance estimator (Conventional), bias-corrected RD estimates with a conventional variance estimator (Bias-corrected), and bias-corrected RD estimates with a robust variance estimator are reported (Robust). The sample includes close mixed electoral competitions over the period 2004-2017 within the optimal bandwidth selected by one common MSE-optimal bandwidth selector (Calonico et al., 2017) around the zero threshold. Standard errors clustered at local labour area level in parentheses.

Table 3.10. RDD: Effect of extreme-right mayors on the reception of refugees

Dependent variable	= if open refugee centre	
Covariates	No	Yes
Conventional	-0.028**	-0.031**
	(0.014)	(0.013)
Bias-corrected	-0.029**	-0.033**
	(0.014)	(0.013)
Robust	-0.029*	-0.033**
	(0.016)	(0.015)
Observations	1,771	1,771
BW Loc. Poly. (h)	0.179	0.173
Effective Observations	997	974

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Notes. The estimated coefficients capture the effect of a extreme-right mayor. Estimates reported: conventional RD estimates with a conventional variance estimator (Conventional), bias-corrected RD estimates with a conventional variance estimator (Bias-corrected), and bias-corrected RD estimates with a robust variance estimator are reported (Robust). The sample includes close mixed electoral competitions over the period 2004-2017 within the optimal bandwidth selected by one common MSE-optimal bandwidth selector (Calonico et al., 2017) around the zero threshold. Standard errors clustered at local labour area level in parentheses.

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Peur et haine dans la campagne électorale 2016-18

Migrants, réfugiés et la montée du populisme d'extrême droite

Max Viskanic

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Defendu a Paris le 17 Octobre 2019

Jury :
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Abstract

Cette thèse doctorale se compose de trois chapitres qui analysent les conséquences électorales et comportementales de l'interaction d'autochtones avec des immigrés et réfugiés. Le premier chapitre analyse l'impact d'un afflux relativement large et homogène d'immigrés polonais sur le Royaume Uni et quel effet ce choc a eu sur le vote Brexit de 2016. Je trouve que l'immigration polonaise au Royaume Uni a augmenté le vote Brexit mais pas assez pour expliquer la décision de quitter l'union européenne. Afin d'obtenir une variation exogène dans la répartition des immigrés polonais je me base sur le développement de réseaux de migrants proches des camps de réinstallation de guerre crées pour les soldats polonais après la deuxième guerre mondiale dont je collecte la localisation dans les archives nationales. Dans le deuxième chapitre [1] j'utilise le démantèlement de camps de migrants illégaux proche de Calais et la répartition de migrants s'en suivant pour étudier l'impact d'une exposition à peu de migrants pendant une courte période de temps. Je trouve que l'exposition a peu de migrants réduit le vote Front National (le parti d'extrême droite français) mais que cet effet se dissipe si de grands groupes de migrants sont relocalisés. Dans ce cas, le contact ainsi que la taille relative du groupe jouent un rôle important dans la réaction des autochtones aux migrants. Dans le dernier chapitre [2] j'analyse l'impact de la crise des réfugiés sur la demande et l'offre politique en Italie. Je montre que l'ouverture de petits centres d'accueil de migrants en Italie a réduit le vote d'extrême droite, les crimes de haine contre les immigrés ainsi qu'augmenté le vote en faveur des partis de gauche. Les effets proviennent principalement de municipalités qui sont moins connectes à internet. Ce résultat indique le pouvoir d'amplification différentiel que les médias digitaux peuvent avoir vis-à-vis des médias traditionnels. De plus, je trouve que les maires de partis d'extrême droite ferment et sont moins susceptibles d'ouvrir des centres d'accueil que d'autres politiques car ils réagissent de manière rationnelle à un soutien politique en baisse.

1. Co-écrit avec Paul Vertier.
2. Co-écrit avec Matteo Gamalerio et Mario Luca.

Introduction

Alors qu'un nombre important de réfugiés débarquent sur les côtes de l'Union Européenne [3], la frontière sud des États-Unis ainsi que la frontière est de la Turquie et de l'Europe Centrale, il devient primordial d'analyser si et comment les interactions entre les autochtones et les immigrants influenceront les sentiments hostiles à l'égard des immigrés dans les pays les accueillants. Il y aura dans le futur de plus en plus de migrations humaines à travers ainsi qu'à l'intérieur des pays. Ces migrations seront peut-être dues à des réalités économiques différentes ou au changement climatique qui rendront certains endroits du monde plus attrayants alors que d'autres deviendront inhabitables. Ce phénomène sera accompagné d'une croissance soutenue de la population mondiale. Par conséquent, les interactions entre migrants et autochtones deviendront plus fréquentes et comprendre comment ces derniers forment leur sentiment à l'égard des migrants sera d'une grande importance. Les immigrés feront partie du marché du travail, altéreront les biens publics ainsi que participeront aux transactions commerciales. Toutes ces activités économiques sont essentielles à une réflexion sur le bien-être sociétal. Analyser comment elles seront affectées par les sentiments hostiles à l'égard des immigrés sera un défi pour les chercheurs dans les années à venir. Les immigrés affectent le pays les accueillant au niveau macro ou micro. Le premier niveau peut opérer principalement à travers la couverture médiatique et la rhétorique politique qu'il s'agisse d'articles de presse traitant de sujets liés à l'immigration ou de responsables politiques souvent provenant de l'extrême droite qui font des immigrés les boucs émissaires de tous les malaises du pays. Lorsque l'on se concentre sur le niveau micro de l'exposition aux immigrés, il est utile de faire une décomposition élémentaire : si l'on ne tient pas compte de la composition des groupes d'immigrés, il est possible de différencier entre la longueur de l'exposition aux immigrés et la taille de leur afflux. Quelles différences d'impact, s'il y en a, apparaitront entre les deux types d'exposition dépendra de la structure théorique sous-jacente que l'on étudiera. Il sera aussi important d'analyser quelle variable aura un effet médiateur provoquant un changement dans les sentiments hostiles à l'égard des immigrés. La littérature économique et politique a présenté des enjeux tels que le marché du travail (Borjas [2003]), la finance publique (Gott and Johnstone [2002]), les infrastructures publiques (Card, D. and Dustmann, C. and Preston, I. [2012]), la provision des bien publiques (Algan et al. [2016]), l'impact sur

3. Au cours des dernières années, le nombre de demande d'asile dans l'Union Européenne a augmenté de manière significative atteignant son maximum en 2015 à près de 1.3 millions de demandes ce qui revient au double du nombre de demande d'asile pendant le conflit Yougoslave des années 90 Eurostat [2016]

la composition de la population (Card et al. [2008]) et la criminalité (Mastrobuoni and Pinotti [2016]). De plus il serait intéressant d'estimer l'impact direct de l'interaction et du contact avec les immigrés (Allport [1954]).

La thèse est composée de trois chapitres qui vont mettre en lumière le développement chez les autochtones des sentiments hostiles à l'égard des immigrés à travers leur interaction avec ceux-ci.

Le premier chapitre étudie une immigration importante ayant eu lieu pendant une période de temps relativement courte. Plus précisément, j'examine quel impact l'afflux de migrants Polonais après l'accession à l'UE de 2004 a eu sur la décision du Royaume Uni de quitter l'UE par referendum (le Brexit). Le nombre de migrants Polonais a crû d'environ 40 000 avant l'accession à plus d'1 million en 2016. Ils sont à présent le groupe d'immigrés majoritaire. Le vote Brexit peut être compris comme un vote populiste ainsi qu'identitaire étant donné les fausses promesses faites par l'organisation «Leave.EU» pendant la campagne électorale (Browning [2018]). De plus, l'immigration était un sujet important mentionné par la campagne soutenant la sortie du RU avant le referendum. Les migrants Polonais étaient un groupe particulièrement attaqué pendant et après le referendum, faisant face à des crimes de haine identitaires (par exemple (Express [2016])). Dans ce chapitre, je montre causalement qu'une hausse du nombre de migrants Polonais d'un point de pourcentage mène à une hausse de 2.72 à 3.12 points de pourcentage en faveur du Brexit. Un calcul approximatif montre que cette hausse n'est pas suffisante pour expliquer un changement de majorité en faveur de l'UE vers une sortie. Afin d'obtenir une variation exogène de la répartition des migrants Polonais au sein du Royaume-Uni, j'utilise une expérience naturelle et une approche avec variable instrumentale. Si l'on retrace l'histoire des migrants Polonais au RU il apparait que leur gouvernement en exile était basé à Londres et que le deuxième pays d'origine le plus important au sein des forces britanniques armées pendant la deuxième guerre mondiale était la Pologne. Cela a amené Churchill à autoriser les soldats et leur famille à s'installer de manière temporaire au RU en attendant d'être rapatrié en Pologne (La loi sur la réinstallation des Polonais de 1947). Environ 200 000 soldats Polonais et leur famille ont intégré des camps de réinstallation de guerre qui étaient en fait souvent des baraquements construits dans les parties rurales du RU (National Archives [1932-1959]). À ma connaissance, il n'y a aucun document aux archives nationales (accessible au public) qui indiquerait une intentionnalité dans la localisation des camps de réinstallation de guerre et contredirait sa dimension temporaire. En fait, beaucoup de migrants Polonais ont décidé de rester au RU principalement par peur d'un retour en Pologne occupé par Stalin. Ils se sont donc intégré dans les communautés locales et ont construit des réseaux de migrants après la deuxième guerre mondiale. Étant donné le parcours historique, la localisation initiale des camps de réinstallation de guerre peut être considérée comme étant exogène. Je collecte la localisation de ces camps aux archives nationales du Royaume-Uni et utilise la distance aux camps (du centre de la

municipalité) comme instrument pour prédire la répartition des migrants Polonais dans le futur. Afin de tester la restriction d'exclusion empiriquement je fais un test de falsification sur les élections locales de 1973. À la suite de la loi de gouvernement local de 1972 a eu lieu un redécoupage des autorités de gouvernement local (l'unité d'observation) ce qui a aussi eu comme effet d'agrandir les autorités locales de manière non-négligeable rendant une correspondance avec les autorités locales actuelles possible et ce sans perdre trop d'observations. Les législateurs ont peut-être redécoupé les autorités locales de telle sorte à ce que la localisation des camps de réinstallation de guerre soit prise en compte ou soit corrélée avec ce redécoupage. Étant donné qu'à cette époque les seuls partis politiques se présentant aux élections étaient les partis travaillistes et conservateurs, je calcule la différence entre ces deux résultats a l'élection afin de tester si l'instrument peut prédire le niveau de compétition politique dans différentes zones. Aucun résultat significatif n'est obtenu quand je régresse l'estimateur des doubles moindres carrés et l'instrument même sur cette variable.

La deuxième caractéristique de ce projet est l'expérience naturelle découlant de l'accession à l'UE en 2004 de 8 pays entrants y compris de la Pologne. Le RU de Tony Blair était l'un des rares pays de l'Union Européenne à autoriser une mobilité des travailleurs totale pour les nouveaux pays entrants dès 2004. Par conséquent, et ce aussi à cause du passé historique mentionné avant, beaucoup de migrants Polonais se sont installés au RU. Certains d'entre eux ont migré vers des endroits pour des raisons économiques alors que d'autres encore ont choisi de s'installer proche de leurs ancêtres qui s'étaient eux-mêmes installés à proximité des camps de réinstallation de guerre plus de 50 ans auparavant. Avec ce soudain afflux d'immigrés, je suis capable d'estimer l'impact d'un large choc au cours d'une courte période de temps plutôt que l'exposition à long terme à un large afflux d'immigrés Polonais. Mis à part l'impact en faveur du Brexit, je ne trouve aucun effet sur la participation électorale mais des résultats intéressants en ce qui concerne les potentiels mécanismes sous-jacents. À cette fin je recode l'enquête des élections britanniques de 2015 et plus particulièrement me focalise sur la première question qui demande à la personne interviewé une question ouverte sur les problèmes principaux auxquels doit faire face le RU. Si la personne évoque l'immigration, je le recode avec le numéro 1, sinon 0. Je trouve qu'une hausse d'un point de pourcentage de l'immigration polonaise est accompagnée d'environ 5 points de pourcentage de personnes mentionnant l'immigration comme étant un problème majeur auquel fait face la politique britannique de nos jours conformément aux résultats de la principale analyse empirique. De plus, je trouve aucune preuve que la confiance dans les politiques ou les institutions politiques, les titulaires ou le NHS (le service national de santé) jouent un rôle quelconque. Afin de m'assurer que l'immigration Polonaise ne cause pas une émigration qui changerait la composition de la population rendant les conclusions sur le mécanisme moins fiable, je teste l'hypothèse d'un déplacement de manière explicite dans ce chapitre mais ne trouve aucune preuve la soutenant.

Il est important de souligner le fait que mes résultats ne sont valables que pour les migrants Polonais. Afin de m'assurer que mon instrument est historiquement légitime je construis plusieurs tests de robustesse et je ne prends en compte que l'effet robuste des migrants Polonais. Tout d'abord, la distance au camp de réinstallation de guerre le plus proche n'est pas capable de prédire les immigrés non polonais. Par conséquent l'instrument ne capture que la variation due au changement de répartition des migrants polonais et non des autres migrants. Afin de vérifier si les immigrés Polonais sont capables d'expliquer une part significative du vote Brexit, je fais plusieurs autres tests. Je procède à la régression principale en tenant compte de tous les autres groupes de migrants. Les effets sont quasiment inchangés et toujours significatifs. Je construis ensuite un instrument à la (Card [2001]) en utilisant la part des immigrés non polonais en 2000 pour prédire les immigrés non polonais en 2014. Les effets sont toujours de magnitude équivalente et significatifs si je tiens aussi compte de cette variable.

Ce papier est associé à plusieurs parties de la littérature.

La plus pertinente est celle analysant l'impact de l'immigration sur l'extrême droite et le vote populiste. La publication la plus récente est de (Barone et al. [2016]). Dans ce papier les auteurs estiment de manière causale l'impact de l'immigration sur trois élections nationales en utilisant la répartition antérieure des immigrés avant 1992 comme variable instrumentale. La restriction d'exclusion est basée sur l'hypothèse qu'un scandale politique (« Mani Pulite ») a mené à la création de partis politiques complètement nouveaux en 1993. Dans (Halla et al. [forthcoming]), les auteurs étudient l'impact de l'immigration sur le vote en faveur de l'extrême droite des années 80 à 90. Afin d'obtenir une variation exogène de la répartition des immigrés ils se servent des tendances d'installation des immigrés dans les années 60. (Harmon [forthcoming]) trouve un impact positif de l'immigration vers le Danemark sur le vote en faveur des parties nationalistes hostiles aux immigrés dans le pays. Sa méthode de variable instrumentale utilise le stock historique de logements afin de tenir compte des problèmes d'endogénéité. (Otto and Steinhardt [2014]) étudie les élections locales à Hambourg pendant des périodes de forte immigration et trouve que les parties de droite xénophobes en ont bénéficié considérablement. D'un autre côté (Mendez and Cutillas [2014]) montre que la hausse d'immigrés d'Amérique Latine a mené à une hausse de votes en faveur du parti de gauche principal alors qu'une hausse de l'immigration d'Afrique a mené à plus de votes pour le parti de droite principal. (Brunner and Kuhn [2014]) est le seul papier qui analyse les résultats de referendums. Ils évaluent l'impact de la distance culturelle des immigrés aux autochtones sur les referendums liés à l'immigration. Ils instrumentent la part des immigrés dans la municipalité en utilisant les conditions du marché du travail local. Ce que la plupart de ces papiers ont en commun est que l'instrument utilisé pour obtenir une variation exogène dans la répartition des nouveaux immigrés provient de l'instrument « shift-share » (déplacement de part) développé par (Card [2001]). Ce chapitre parvient à aller deux étapes plus loin. Tout d'abord il y a une

facilitation de l'immigration après 2004 qui rend plus facile la distinction entre des chocs de nouvelle immigration (dans ce cas après 2004) et l'exposition à une migration continue (dans les cas mentionnés avant). De plus la spécificité historique de la répartition initiale des migrants Polonais après la deuxième guerre mondiale permet d'avoir une installation initiale d'immigrés probablement plus exogène.

D'autres papiers plus récents ont commencé à étudier le rôle que la situation politique joue dans la politique d'immigration (Gamalerio [2018]) et le rôle que la crise des réfugiés a eu sur le vote d'extrême droite (Steinmayr [2018] et Vertier and Viskanic [2018]). Les deux papiers trouvent un effet négatif des réfugiés sur les partis d'extrême droite nationaliste respectivement en Autriche et en France. Les instruments qu'ils utilisent sont très similaires, (Steinmayr [2018]) utilise les logements groupés pour instrumenter la répartition des réfugiés alors que (Vertier and Viskanic [2018]) utilise les villages vacances en France.

Beaucoup de papiers ont analysé l'impact de l'immigration au RU, en particulier sur son marché du travail. (Dustmann et al. [2014]) utilise des données de l'enquête sur la population active Britannique pour estimer l'impact à la fois théorique et empirique de l'immigration. Ils trouvent que les qualifications des immigrés sont équivalentes à ceux des autochtones et qu'il n'y a aucun effet fort sur l'emploi agrégé, la participation, le taux de chômage et les salaires. Plus particulièrement (Manacorda et al. [2011]) trouvent que les faibles effets de l'immigration sur le marché du travail au RU sont dus à la substituabilité imparfaite entre les autochtones et les immigrés. De la même manière, (Gilpin et al. [2006]) utilisent la vague d'immigration découlant de l'accession de 2004 et trouvent aucune preuve d'effet sur le niveau de demande d'allocations chômage. Les auteurs montrent que le marché du travail au RU est flexible et que l'immigration a eu un impact positif quoique modeste sur son économie. (Nickell and Saleheen [2015]) analyse l'impact spécifique de l'immigration selon la catégorie professionnelle des personnes. Ils trouvent de faibles effets négatifs sur les salaires mais un fort impact de l'immigration sur les salaires dans la catégorie professionnelle de personnes peu ou non qualifiés. (Wadsworth [2015]) offre un résumé complet de l'impact général de l'immigration sur le marché du travail au RU.

Plus précisément, ce papier est lié à un courant de la littérature qui essaie de déterminer les causes profondes du Brexit qui est probablement une des décisions politiques les plus importantes dans l'histoire du RU et de l'Europe. Des papiers sur ce sujet trouvent principalement des corrélations (Becker et al. [2016] et Arnorsson and Zoega [2016]). Je contribue à ces travaux en proposant une stratégie d'identification pour estimer l'impact causal de l'immigration sur les résultats du vote Brexit. Une partie de la recherche relativement récente traite de l'impact d'une hausse d'exposition aux échanges commerciaux sur les résultats électoraux et donc de manière plus générale les déterminants du populisme. (Autor et al. [2016]) montrent en analysant les registres de votes des membres du Congrès

qu'une plus grande compétition chinoise a mené les citoyens a élire des représentants plus extrêmes. (Dippel et al. [2017] et Malgouyres [2017]) examinent l'impact d'une hausse d'exposition aux échanges commerciaux directement sur les résultats électorats et trouvent un effet positif sur le vote en faveur de partis d'extrême droite respectivement en Allemagne et en France. D'autres travaux en sciences politique comme (Clarke et al. [2016] ou Arzheimer [2009]) ont montré que l'hostilité a l'égard des immigrés peut mener à une hausse de votes en faveur des partis d'extrême droite.

Si l'on tient compte de ces parties de la littérature, mes contributions sont d'ordre méthodologique et de constitution d'une nouvelle base de données.

Tout d'abord, j'étudie une des élections politiques les plus importantes dans l'histoire de l'Europe et montre l'impact causal d'un large afflux d'immigrés sur le vote Brexit.

Deuxièmement, j'estime causalement l'impact d'un large afflux d'immigrés en utilisant un instrument exogène qui dépend de l'installation antérieur d'immigrés. Lors de la création de l'instrument je génère de nouvelles données contenant la localisation des camps de guerre de réinstallation qui pourraient aider de futurs travaux à récupérer des informations sur des groupes de migrants non répertoriés par les recensements accessibles.

Dans le deuxième chapitre [4], j'essaie de répondre à une question qui jusqu'à présent a été peu étudiée dans la littérature. Comment est-ce qu'un petit afflux de réfugiés peut façonner les sentiments hostiles que les autochtones ont à leur égard ? On pourrait s'attendre à ce qu'une interaction avec un petit nombre de migrants soit différente qu'avec un grand nombre. Tout d'abord, la taille relative du groupe pourrait être importante étant donné que les autochtones pourraient se sentir menacé par un grand groupe. De la même manière, la taille absolue d'un groupe pourrait être importante dans la mesure où un petit groupe a plus d'incitations à s'intégrer à une autre communauté qu'un plus gros groupe. En même temps, s'il n'y a pas de ségrégation, la probabilité d'interagir avec un immigré qui fait partie d'un groupe relativement grand est potentiellement plus élevée. L'interaction des autochtones avec un immigré pourrait façonner des sentiments hostiles envers les migrants. Je vérifie si une exposition à un petit afflux de migrants peut affecter ces sentiments en utilisant une approche évènementielle accompagnée d'une méthode à variable instrumentale.

Plus concrètement, j'examine si l'exposition à peu de migrants au lendemain du démantèlement de la jungle de Calais a eu un effet sur le vote Front National qui est notre indicateur du niveau de sentiments hostiles à l'égard des migrants. Nous trouvons que l'accueil d'un centre temporaire de migrants (CAO) [5] a mené causalement à une baisse de sentiments hostiles à l'égard des migrants. Grâce à notre approche de variable instrumentale, nous

4. Ce chapitre est co-écrit avec Paul Vertier.
5. "Centre d'Accueil et Orientation" : un premier stade d'accueil des migrants.

trouvons que les municipalités qui ont accueilli un CAO ont eu un taux de croissance de pourcentage de vote négatif en faveur du Front National de 12.3 points de pourcentage. Étant donné que le vote Front National a cru de 20% pendant cette période de temps, l'accueil d'un centre a réduit de manière causale environ 60% de la hausse de sentiments hostiles à l'égard des migrants (environ 3.9 points de pourcentage). Les municipalités voisines d'un CAO (au sein d'un rayon de 5 km) ont aussi eu une basse de vote en faveur du Front National. Par conséquent nous prouvons l'existence d'effets de débordement. Ces résultats suggèrent l'existence d'effets directs découlant d'une exposition aux migrants conforme à l'hypothèse de contact (Allport [1954]). En effet, les migrants étaient censés rester pour une courte période de temps (normalement moins de trois mois) et ils ont aussi probablement pas affecté l'économie locale pour diverses raisons. Tout d'abord, le coût de réinstallation était totalement financé par le gouvernement. Deuxièmement, ils n'avaient pas le droit de travailler et recevaient aucun transfert financier. En fait, nous montrons que leur arrivée ne semble pas avoir impacté l'activité économique locale. De manière générale, nous trouvons aussi une plus forte baisse de la part de votes pour le Front National dans des municipalités plus diverses avec une plus grande part de jeunes. D'un autre côté, les effets sont atténués dans les municipalités qui étaient exposés à plus de migrants dans les CAOs et où le Front National était historiquement plus fort. De plus, nous trouvons que les municipalités proches de points d'entrées de migrants, en particulier celles proche de la vallée de la Roya [6] ont eu une baisse mois forte du vote Front National. Cela est conforme avec les résultats de (Hangartner et al. [forthcoming,a], Hangartner et al. [forthcoming,b] et Steinmayr [2018]). Notre interprétation principale est que les citoyens développent un niveau d'acceptation plus grand des migrants et sont donc moins amenés à voter pour le Front National. Ces résultats semblent être confirmés par le fait que l'on observe une hausse de la part de votes obtenue par le Front de Gauche qui a une vision plus ouverte envers les migrants mais un programme qui est par ailleurs similaire en ce qui concerne les problématiques sociales et économiques.

Il est important de noter que nos calculs suggèrent que dans les municipalités qui ont reçu plus de 32 migrants pour 1000 habitants l'impact sur le vote Front National devient positif. Ce résultat est cohérent avec le fait que de grands afflux d'immigrés contribuent à un gain pour les partis de droite.

Nous analysons ces questions d'ordre général avec une approche évènementielle sous forme d'expérience naturelle qui a des caractéristiques très attrayantes. Deux défis principaux doivent être réglés afin de déterminer causalement l'impact des migrants sur le sentiment hostile des autochtones à leur égard. Le premier défi, que l'on surmonte grâce à une stratégie de variable instrumentale, est lié au fait que certaines municipalités pourraient être choisies pour accueillir des CAOs pour des raisons observables ou non. Si ces municipalités étaient

6. Un des points d'entrees le plus mediatisee a la frontier entre la France et l'Italie qui contient la municipalite de Vintimille

sur des trajectoires différentes en termes de vote en faveur du Front National nous ne pourrions pas identifier causalement l'impact des CAOs car celui-ci aurait été faussé. Afin de régler ce problème, nous utilisons la présence de villages vacances pour instrumenter la localisation des CAOs. Un village vacance est une infrastructure appartenant à une entreprise publique en France et dans laquelle ses employés peuvent passer leurs vacances. Étant donné que ces infrastructures étaient principalement vides pendant le démantèlement et sont des propriétés publiques, elles ont été utilisées pour accueillir des migrants pour une courte période de temps alors que le nombre d'arrivées était incertain. Il est important de mentionner ici que beaucoup d'infrastructures n'étaient au final pas utilisées mais que celles-ci auraient pu l'être dans le cas où plus de migrants qu'anticipés seraient arrivés et qu'ils n'auraient donc pas pu être logés dans des structures de logement collectif ou d'autres logements vacants de la municipalité en question. Ils ont aussi été construits dans les années 70 et ce certainement pas dans le but de loger des migrants.

Un autre défi principal est d'essayer d'identifier exactement l'effet de l'interaction des migrants et autochtones sur le vote Front national et non l'effet des migrants à travers une variable médiatrice. Dans beaucoup de travaux mentionnés avant, les effets mesurés sont probablement indirects. En effet, les vagues d'immigrations larges et durables affectent probablement différemment des variables intermédiaires tels que les infrastructures, la dépense publique, le marché du travail ou l'économie locale dans le sens plus large du terme. Ces variables peuvent à leur tour avoir un effet sur le vote.

Cependant, l'effet direct du contact (Allport [1954]) peut aussi jouer un rôle. Dans le contexte européen de l'accueil et de la répartition des migrants à travers les pays, il est intéressant per se de connaitre les conditions sous lesquelles le contact de la population locale avec les migrants accroit au faiblit la montée du vote radical.

Dans ce papier nous essayons de contribuer à la recherche en analysant une étude de cas qui offre exactement ce genre de paramètres. Nous nous focalisons sur le démantèlement de la jungle de Calais, un camp au dehors de la ville de Calais dans le nord de la France. Pendant la crise migratoire ce campement d'occupation illégale a crû en taille jusqu'à atteindre près de 6,400 occupants en Octobre 2016 (Le Monde [2016]) juste avant d'être fermé et que ces derniers, principalement des migrants, soient relocalisés. Entre les mois d'Octobre 2015 et d'Octobre 2016, ces migrants ont été répartis dans plus de 300 centres temporaires d'accueil de migrants appelés Centres d'Accueil et d'Orientation (CAOs) partout en France. Étant donné que le nombre de centres reporté varie selon le document gouvernemental utilisé, nous collectons manuellement l'information sur leur localisation à travers une analyse systématique de journaux nationaux et locaux (en utilisant Factiva) et nous les combinons avec une base de données qui a été partagé publiquement par le CIMADE (l'association principale aidant les migrants) au moment du démantèlement du 24 Octobre 2016.

Sur les 361 municipalités pour lesquelles nous trouvons la présence d'un CAO, nous estimons que 31 migrants pouvaient y être logé au même moment (pour un équivalent de 18 migrants pour 1000 habitants). Nous associons le niveau de variation dans l'exposition d'une municipalité à un petit nombre de migrants aux résultats électoraux. Nous nous focalisons spécifiquement sur le vote Front National, le plus important parti d'extrême droite de France. Pendant la campagne électorale précédant les élections présidentielles de Mai 2017, la rhétorique du Front National était de manière générale très hostile à l'égard des immigrés et a mis la crise migratoire au cœur du débat présidentiel. Cela était particulièrement visible dans les médias mais aussi sur les réseaux sociaux du parti et dans leurs réunions publiques ainsi que leur programme électoral. [7]

Nous contribuons à la littérature de deux manières. Tout d'abord, ce papier fait partie d'une grand courant de la littérature qui documente les répercussions électorales de l'immigration. Alors que la majeure partie de la littérature s'est focalisée sur l'impact d'une exposition durable à un large groupe d'immigrés sur les tendances de vote, les effets d'une exposition courte à un petit nombre de migrants est peu connu. Les papiers étudiant de grand afflux d'immigrés ont généralement trouvé un impact positif sur le vote d'extrême droite (Barone et al. [2016], Halla et al. [forthcoming], Harmon [forthcoming], Otto and Steinhardt [2014], Mendez and Cutillas [2014], Brunner and Kuhn [2014], Viskanic [2017], Edo et al. [2018]). La plupart de ces papiers est basé dans une certaine mesure sur un instrument développé par (Card [2001]) qui utilise la répartition antérieure des immigrés pour obtenir une variation exogène de leur répartition actuelle et de ce fait résoudre le problème qu'une sélection géographique poserait.

À la suite de la crise migratoire, des travaux récents ont analysé les effets de l'exposition aux migrants sur les tendances de vote et les comportements envers les migrants sans trouver de consensus. Plus particulièrement, (Hangartner et al. [forthcoming,a] et Hangartner et al. [forthcoming,b]) ont trouvé que les électeurs des iles grecques qui étaient le plus exposées à un afflux important de migrants étaient plus susceptibles de devenir hostiles à leur égard et de voter pour le parti de l'Aube Dorée, un des plus importants partis d'extrême droite grecque. En revanche, (Steinmayr [2018]) montre que les municipalités de la haute Autriche qui ont reçu des migrants étaient moins susceptibles de voter pour des partis d'extrême droite. D'un autre côté (Dustmann et al. [2016]) montre que les effets d'une répartition exogène de migrants sur les tendances de vote au Danemark sont hétérogènes et dépendent de manière cruciale des caractéristiques des localités :

en particulier, alors qu'ils trouvent des effets positifs sur les partis hostiles à l'égard des immigrés dans les zones rurales, l'effet devient négatif dans les zones urbaines. Ces résultats mettent à jour l'importance de la prise en compte aussi bien des caractéristiques municipales que de la marge intensive de l'exposition aux migrants.

7. Voir par exemple (La Croix [2017], BBC [2017] et Le Monde [2017]).

Notre papier combine ces approches en se focalisant sur les effets électoraux de la réception d'un petit nombre de migrants (normalement une dizaine) conditionnellement sur une exposition de long terme aux immigrés. De plus, notre base de données détaillée nous permet d'explorer comment les résultats varient à la marge intensive (le nombre de migrants) et selon les caractéristiques de la population. De ce point de vue, l'effet de seuil que nous trouvons (à plus de 32 migrants pour 1000 habitants le vote Front National croît) est conforme aux résultats de la littérature sur les grands afflux de migrants.

Deuxièmement, notre cadre d'étude nous permet d'isoler les effets directs de la répartition des migrants sur les tendances de vote car ils sont peu susceptibles d'opérer à travers des variables intermédiaires. Une grande partie de la littérature économique a étudié les liens entre l'immigration et le marché du travail (entre autres Card [1990], Altonji and Card [1991], Borjas [2003], Ortega and Peri [2009], Ottaviano and Peri [2012], Guriev and Vakulenko [2002]), la finance publique (Gott and Johnstone [2002], OECD, [2015], Vargas-Silva [2015]) ou la criminalité (Moehling and Piehl [2009], Bianchi et al. [2012], Mastrobuoni and Pinotti [2016]) qui sont à leur tour susceptibles d'affecter les résultats électoraux. En particulier, les variations sur le marché du travail influencent le vote radical notamment à travers des chocs commerciaux (Autor et al. [2016], Malgouyres [2017], Dippel et al. [2017]) ou le taux de chômage (Algan et al. [2017]). Dans ce papier nous soutenons que nos résultats ne sont pas affectés par les variations sur le marché du travail ou la finance publique locale. De manière générale, alors qu'une exposition nationale à l'immigration façonne les comportements envers les migrants (Hainmueller and Hopkins [2014]), nous montrons que des contacts de petite ampleur sont aussi susceptibles de jouer un rôle important.

Le troisième chapitre [8] peut être vu comme une continuation du second chapitre car il essaie de mettre à jour un mécanisme diffèrent en utilisant une nouvelle base de données. Dans ce chapitre, nous étudions comment la réception de relativement peu de réfugiés pendant une petite à moyenne période de temps peut influencer les crimes de haines contre les immigrés ainsi que le vote pour les partis d'extrême droite. Nous montrons quel rôle internet a joué dans l'amplification de cet effet et étudions comment les politiques locaux ont réagi à ces nouvelles réalités politiques.

Nous faisons cette analyse en utilisant des données de municipalités italiennes et utilisons les caractéristiques particulières d'un programme de répartition de refugiées nommé « Le système de protection pour les demandeurs d'asile et les réfugiés » (SPRAR). Le ministère de l'intérieur italien est en charge du programme SPRAR dont le but principal est la répartition des réfugiés et des demandeurs d'asile dans des petits centres d'accueil dans les municipalités italiennes.

8. Co-écrit avec Matteo Gamalerio et Mario Luca

L'analyse empirique étudie les effets du nombre de réfugiés et demandeurs d'asile logés dans un centre SPRAR sur l'évolution du soutien envers les partis d'extrême droite entre les élections nationales de 2013 et 2018. Elle étudie aussi l'effet du nombre de réfugiés et de demandeurs d'asiles sur l'évolution des crimes de haine contre les étrangers entre 2013 et 2017. Les résultats sont obtenus aussi bien à travers une méthode des moindres carrées ordinaires qu'une approche à variable instrumentale (VI). L'analyse VI est développée pour résoudre le problème d'endogénéité du nombre de réfugiés et demandeurs d'asile logés dans un centre SPRAR qui vient du fait que les municipalités peuvent décider si elles veulent ouvrir ou non des centres de réfugiés sur leur territoire. L'approche VI exploite une caractéristique du programme SPRAR : alors que les municipalités décident du nombre de réfugiés à loger dans le centre SPRAR qu'elles ouvrent, le ministère de l'intérieur en définit le nombre maximum. Ce nombre dépend d'un seuil de population spécifique. Nous utilisons donc cette particularité institutionnelle, voir ci-dessous, en instrumentons le nombre de réfugiés et demandeurs d'asile logés avec cette limite théorique imposée par le ministère de l'intérieur qui est hétérogène au sein du territoire car il dépend de la taille de la population d'une municipalité.

Les résultats principaux de l'analyse empirique montrent qu'accueillir des réfugiés a un effet négatif à la fois sur le vote en faveur des partis d'extrême droite et les crimes de haine contre les étrangers. Plus spécifiquement, les estimateurs VI suggèrent qu'un doublement du nombre de réfugiés logés réduit le taux de croissance de la part de vote en faveur des partis d'extrême droite de 9 pourcent (environ 1.6 p.p.). Les estimateurs VI montrent aussi qu'une hausse d'un pourcent du nombre de réfugiés accueillis amène à une réduction d'environ 19 pourcent de crimes de haine pendant la période allant de 2013 à 2017. L'analyse hétérogène indique que l'effet trouvé sur le vote extrême droite provient de municipalités qui ont un moindre accès à internet, instrumenté avec la distance la plus proche à une tour ADSL comme dans (Campante et al. [2018]). Les résultats sont robustes à la prise en compte de la population municipale, des caractéristiques socio-économiques de la municipalité, des caractéristiques des politiques locaux et des tendances antérieurs de vote pendant les élections nationales précédant 2013.

Ce papier essaie de contribuer à la littérature récente de trois manières.

Le premier courant de la littérature est celui lié à l'impact de l'immigration ou des réfugiés sur le vote d'extrême droite. La majeure partie de cette littérature s'est focalisée sur l'exposition à un grand afflux d'immigrés pendant une longue durée. Des travaux importants (Barone et al. [2016], Halla et al. [forthcoming], Harmon [forthcoming], Otto and Steinhardt [2014], Mendez and Cutillas [2014], Brunner and Kuhn [2014], Viskanic [2017], Edo et al. [2018]) ont trouvé qu'un large afflux d'immigrés accroissent le vote d'extrême droite. La plupart de ces papiers se basent sur une variante de l'instrument développé par (Card [2001]). L'intuition principale est que certains nouveaux migrants

s'installeront là où leurs ancêtres l'ont fait et que si ces derniers se sont installés dans un endroit pour des raisons exogènes à la variable d'intérêt, le problème de sélection spatiale devrait être résolu.

Un courant plus récent de la littérature a analysé les répercussions de la crise des réfugiés. (Hangartner et al. [forthcoming,a] et Hangartner et al. [forthcoming,b]) trouvent que l'exposition, sans qu'il y ait nécessairement de contact, entre les habitants des iles grecques et les réfugiés arrivant par la mer peut accroitre les sentiments hostiles à leur égard ainsi que le vote d'extrême droite. D'un autre côté (Steinmayr [2018]) trouve que le contact entre les réfugiés et les autochtones est particulièrement important. En se concentrant sur les régions de la haute Autriche, l'auteur montre comment le parti d'extrême droite autrichien (FPO) a faiblit considérablement dans les endroits où les réfugiés étaient accueillis. (Vertier and Viskanic [2018]) trouvent en lien avec cela que le contact avec les réfugiés provenant de la jungle de calais a fait baisser le vote Front National (le parti d'extrême droite français) seulement si le nombre de personnes relocalisées était assez bas. De plus, (Dustmann et al. [2016]) montre que les répercussions électorales de la relocalisation des migrants dépendent crucialement des caractéristiques des municipalités. Le plus un endroit est rural, le plus fort sera l'impact en faveur des partis d'extrême droite. Ces travaux suggèrent qu'aussi bien les caractéristiques municipales que la taille d'exposition aux migrants doit être pris en compte lorsque l'on analyse les répercussions électorales dues à l'exposition à des réfugiés.

Ici, nous contribuons à la littérature en utilisant une autre variable, tel que les crimes de haine contre les migrants, pour mesurer le niveau d'hostilité à leur égard. Cette variable donne une nouvelle preuve des avantages d'un contact entre les réfugiés et les autochtones et montre que ces derniers ne réagissent pas seulement de manière privée au contact avec eux (dans les urnes) mais aussi de manière publique (à travers les crimes de haine). Tous les travaux mentionnés ci-dessus ne parviennent aussi pas à trouver une preuve claire de contact indirect ou superficiel. Un changement d'opinion des autochtones est possible quand des amis/la famille parle d'expériences positives avec les immigrés ou quand des médias traditionnels ou digitaux en parlent. Le premier cas est très difficile à mesurer empiriquement. Dans notre papier, nous montrons comment la connexion à internet affecte ces effets de débordement, ce qui est un élément manquant des travaux de Steinmayr [2018] et Vertier and Viskanic [2018].

Un autre courant de la littérature étudie les déterminants potentiels des crimes de haine et le lien entre immigration et crimes de haine. Une première contribution dans la littérature est le papier de (Glaeser [2005]) qui étudie théoriquement sous quelles conditions les politiques sont incités à partager des histoires de haine en vue de discréditer des opposants ayant un programme favorable aux minorités. La prédiction principale de ce modèle théorique est que la haine baisse quand les électeurs ont des incitations à connaitre la

vérité et que les interactions avec des minorités peuvent créer ces incitations. Notre papier peut être compris comme un test empirique de la théorie développé par (Glaeser [2005]).

Si la littérature a offert des preuves empiriques importantes sur le lien entre l'immigration et le crime aussi bien dans le passé que plus récemment (Bell et al. [2013], Pinotti [2017], Amuedo-Dorantes et al. [2018]), la preuve empirique sur les déterminants potentiels des crimes de haine contre les étrangers est bien plus récente. Parmi les déterminants potentiels des crimes de haine et des attitudes négatives envers les migrants on trouve

Les attaques terroristes (Hanes and Machin [2014]), les réseaux sociaux et internet (Chan et al. [2016], Mueller and Schwarz [2018a] et Mueller and Schwarz [2018b]), l'exposition à des minorités religieuses (Colussi et al. [2017]) et l'afflux important de réfugiés et de demandeurs d'asile (Hangartner et al. [forthcoming,b], Sola [2018]). Les preuves apportées par cette littérature suggèrent qu'en moyenne tous les facteurs étudiés ont un effet positif sur les crimes de haine et négatif sur les attitudes envers les migrants. Nous contribuons à cette littérature en montrant que l'exposition à un petit nombre de réfugiés a un effet négatif sur les crimes de haine contre les étrangers. Nos résultats indiquent que le contact entre les autochtones et un petit afflux de réfugiés et de demandeurs d'asile peut générer des réactions positives chez les autochtones. Une partie de ce phénomène est due à la révélation des crimes de haine contre les immigrés et à la couverture médiatique plus générale.

Deuxièmement, nous analysons le rôle des médias dans l'amplification des effets de l'accueil des réfugiés sur les tendances de vote et les attitudes. Ce canal est sous-étudié dans la littérature étant donné la faible disponibilité de données. La littérature sur le rôle des médias en politique insiste sur l'importance de la communication de masse dans le façonnement des opinions des gens. Les médias de masse arrivent à véhiculer la propagande politique efficacement (Enikolopov et al. [2011], Durante and Knight [2012] et DellaVigna and Kaplan [2007]) ainsi que d'accentuer des sentiments xénophobes (Adena et al. [2015], DellaVigna et al. [2014] et Yanagizawa-Drott [2014]). L'accès accru à internet accompagné du changement profond de l'environnement médiatique qui en découle a poussé la recherche à se pencher plus sérieusement sur l'analyse des médias sociaux. L'accès à internet peut accroitre les mouvements anti-institutionnels (Campante et al. [2017]) et populistes (Schaub and Morisi [2019]), accroitre la polarisation émotionnelle (Lelkes et al. [2017]), impacter la participation politique (Falck et al. [2014] and Czernich [2012]), disperser de fausses informations (Allcott and Gentzkow [2017]) ainsi que contribuer à la polarisation à travers un effet de chambre à écho (Barberá et al. [2015] et Barberá [2015]). Cependant, la manière des médias digitaux de changer la réaction des gens face à l'immigration est peu connue alors qu'elle est sans doute un des sujets les plus importants du débat politique actuel. (Mueller and Schwarz [2018a]) trouvent que la présence digitale du mouvement allemand d'extrême droite AFD sur les réseaux sociaux peut disperser des

sentiments hostiles à l'égard des immigrés et accroitre les crimes de haine physiques. Le lien entre les discours de haine sur internet et les crimes de haine est aussi démontré dans (Williams et al. [2019]) qui trouvent une corrélation positive entre les contenus racistes sur Twitter et les crimes racistes au Royaume Uni. Notre papier intègre le rôle d'internet avec la théorie du contact en montrant que le contact direct avec les migrants a un effet pro-migratoire et qu'une consommation plus élevée d'internet peut en baisser l'effet. Nous sommes aussi capables d'analyser les effets différentiels des médias traditionnels par rapport aux médias digitaux sur la transmission du mécanisme d'interaction avec les migrants. De plus, étant donné que notre mesure principale d'accès à internet est jugée exogène, notre interprétation des effets hétérogènes est probablement causale et va au-delà de la simple corrélation. (Steinmayr [2018] et Vertier and Viskanic [2018]) insistent particulièrement sur l'importance du contact avec les migrants en tant que variable déterminant les sentiments hostiles des autochtones

mais manquent de données pour mesurer l'impact d'un contact superficiel entre les réfugiés et les autochtones découlant des médias.

Notre troisième contribution découle du fait que notre analyse étudie non seulement la manière dont les réfugiés influencent la demande politique mais aussi la manière dont son offre réagit. Plus spécifiquement, nous utilisons un modèle de discontinuité de la régression (MDR) à partir de compétitions électorales mixtes dans la deuxième partie de l'analyse empirique afin de montrer que les maires d'extrême droite sont moins susceptibles d'ouvrir un centre de réfugiés SPRAR. Ce résultat montre que les politiques d'extrême droite manipulent les décisions politiques d'immigration locale afin de satisfaire leurs propres ambitions. Celles-ci ne sont pas forcément en accord avec le bien-être sociétale des habitants de la municipalité en question (Gamalerio [2018]). Ce résultat contribue à la littérature récente sur les déterminants de la politique migratoire. De manière plus détaillée (Folke [2014]) montre qu'accroitre la part des sièges de partis hostiles à l'égard des migrants dans les conseils municipaux suédois réduit significativement le nombre de réfugiés accueillis par municipalité. Notre résultat sur les maires de la ligue du nord est conforme aux résultats de (Folke [2014]) même si le rôle des gouvernements municipaux dans le contexte italien semble plus important dans le façonnement de la politique d'accueil des réfugiés que les municipalités suédoises où de petits partis élus à travers un système proportionnel bénéficient d'un plus grand degré de pouvoir décisionnel. (Facchini and Steinhard [2011] et Casarico et al. [2018]) étudient les déterminants des tendances de vote dans le congrès américain en lien avec la légalisation de migrants sans papiers. En contraste avec ces études, notre analyse se focalise sur le comportement des gouvernements municipaux et sur l'accueil des réfugiés au lieu de la légalisation de migrants sans papiers. (Morelli and Negri [2019]) étudient de manière théorique quels systèmes électoraux amènent à plus de politique ouverte à l'immigration. La deuxième partie de notre papier étudie un sujet similaire d'un point de vue plus empirique. (Mayda and Facchini [2008]) trouvent

en utilisant des données d'enquête que les pays où l'électeur médian est plus opposé à l'immigration tendent à mettre en place des politiques d'immigration plus restrictives. Notre analyse montre aussi que les préférences des politiques et les celles des partis sont importants pour la politique migratoire et non seulement pour les préférences de l'électeur médian.

Enfin, trois papiers étudient l'accueil des réfugiés en Italie. (Genovese et al. [2016]) utilisent des données d'enquête des régions italiennes pour comprendre comment les attitudes publiques sur l'immigration non européenne sont influencées par la répartition des réfugiés à travers différentes régions par le gouvernement central. Notre papier diffère de cette étude dans la mesure où elle analyse l'effet de l'accueil des réfugiés sur les attitudes en utilisant des données d'enquête alors que nous utilisons des données sur les crimes de haine et sur les tendances de votes au niveau municipal. (Bratti et al. [2017]) montrent en utilisant des données sur les municipalités italiennes et sur le referendum constitutionnel de 2016 que la proximité géographique aux centres d'accueil des refugies amène à un accroissement de la participation électorale et de la part de votes contre le gouvernement. Ce dernier est estimé avec la part de votes exprimés contre la réforme constitutionnelle. Notre papier diffère de cette étude dans la mesure où nous nous focalisons sur l'ouverture d'un centre de réfugiés au sein d'une municipalité au lieu de leur ouverture dans des municipalités voisines. Cet axe d'étude différant nous permet de tester l'effet d'un contact direct

et non indirect, étudié par (Bratti et al. [2017]), entre la population locale et les réfugiés. (Bracco et al. [2018]) montrent que l'afflux de migrants au niveau municipal est plus bas dans les municipalités ayant des maires de la Ligue du Nord. Notre papier diffère de ce papier pour deux raisons : tout d'abord, nous étudions comment les électeurs réagissent à l'accueil de réfugiés alors que (Bracco et al. [2018]) se focalisent sur la réaction des migrants à l'élection de maires d'extrême droite ; deuxièmement, nous étudions comment les maires d'extrême droite manipulent la politique migratoire pour gagner des votes alors que (Bracco et al. [2018]) analysent comment les maires d'extrême droite ajustent leur politique fiscale afin de rendre leur municipalité moins attrayante aux yeux des migrants.

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