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Businessmen and Protection Patterns in Dangerous Contexts

Putting the Case of Guadalajara, Mexico into Perspective

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To Hiram, Felo and Dany
whose joy and curiosity about the world
are my utmost inspiration

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anything we do that leads to learning
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Acronyms

AFO	*Cártel de los Arellano Félix o Cártel de Tijuana* / Arellano Félix Organzation
AGN	*Archivo General de la Nación* / General Archive of the Nation
BARAPEM	*Batallón de Radiopatrullas del Estado de México* / State of Mexico Police Cruiser Battalion
CANACO	*Cámara de Comercio de Guadalajara* / Guadalajara Chamber of Commerce
CCE	*Consejo Coordinador Empresarial* / Business Coordinating Council
CCIJ	*Consejo de Cámaras Industriales de Jalisco* / Jalisco Industrial Chambers Conseil
CEJ	*Centro Empresarial Jalisco* / Jalisco Business Centre
CEPAL	*Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe* / United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
CIA	US Central Intelligence Agency
CIDE	*Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas* / Center for Teaching and Research in Economics
CISEN	*Centro de Investigación y Seguridad Nacional* / Center of Investigation and National Security
CJNG	*Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación* / Jalisco New Generation Cartel
CMHN	*Consejo Mexicano de Hombres de Negocios* / Mexican Businessmen's Council
CNH	*Consejo General de Huelga* / National Strike Council
CONCAMIN	*Confederación de Cámaras Industriales* / National Federation of Chambers of Industry
CONCANACO	*Confederación de Cámaras de Comercio* / National Federation of Chambers of Commerce
COPARMEX	*Confederación Patronal de la República Mexicana* / Employer's Federation of the Mexican Republic
DDF	*Departamento del Distrito Federal* / Federal District Administrative Department
DEA	Drug Enforcement Administration
DEM	*Diccionario del Español de México* / Mexican Spanish Dictionary
DFS	*Dirección Federal de Seguridad*/Federal Security Directorate

DHIAC	*Desarrollo Humano Integral y Acción Ciudadana* / Integral Human Development Civil Association
DIPS	*Dirección de Investigciones Políticas y Sociales* / Direction of Political and Social Investigations
DOF	*Diario Oficial de la Federación* / Official Journal of the Federation
DRAE	*Diccionario de la Real Academia Española* / Dictionary of the Royal Spanish Academy
DSP	*Departamento de Seguridad Pública* / Public Security Department
DTO	Drug Trafficking Organization
EMP	*Estado Mayor Presidencial* / Presidential Guard
ENSI	*Encuesta Nacional sobre Inseguridad* / National Survey of Insecurity
ENVE	*Encuesta Nacional de Victimización de Empresas* / Crime Against Business National Survey
ENVIPE	*Encuesta Nacional de Victimización y Percepción sobre Seguridad Pública* / National Survey of Victimization and Perception of Public Security
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FEG	*Federación de Estudiantes de Guadalajara* / Guadalajara Students Federation
FER	*Frente de Estudiantes Revolucionarios* / Students Revolutionary Front
FRAP	*Fuerzas Revolucionarias Armadas del Pueblo* / Revolutionary Armed People's Forces
GDP	*Producto Interno Bruto* / Gross Domestic Product
GMA	*Zona Metropolitana de Guadalajara* / Guadalajara Metropolitan Area
ICESI	*Instituto Ciudadano de Estudios sobre la Inseguridad* / Institute for Studies of Insecurity
INCD	*Instituto Nacional para el Combate a la Drogas* / National Institute to Combat Drugs
INEGI	*Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática* / National Institute for Statistics, Geography and Informatics
INM	*Instituto Nacional de Migración* / National Institute of Migration
IPN	*Instituto Politécnco Nacional* / National Polytechnic Institute
ISI	*Industrialización por Sustitución de Importaciones* / Import Substitution Industrialization
LC23S	*Liga Comunista 23 de Septiembre* / 23rd of September Communist League
MC	*Partido Movimiento Ciudadano* / Citizen Movement Party
MFJP	*Policía Judicial Federal* / Mexican Federal Judicial Police

MORENA	*Movimiento Regeneración Nacional* / National Regeneration Movement
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
OFAC	Foreign Assets Control
ONC	*Observatorio Nacional Ciudadano* / Citizen National Observatory
PAN	*Partido Acción Nacional* / National Action Party
PF	*Policía Federal* / Federal Police
PGR	*Procuraduría General de la República* / General Attorney Office
PNR	*Partido Nacional Revolucionario* / National Revolutionary Party
PRI	*Partido Revolucionario Institucional* / Institutional Revolution Party
SAT	*Servicio de Admnistración Tributaria* / Tax Administration Service
SE	*Secretaría de Economía* / Economy Ministry
SE-SNSP	*Secretariado Ejecutivo del Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública* / Executive Secretariat of the National Public Security System
SEDENA	*Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional* / National Defense Ministry
SEMAR	*Secretaría de Marina* / Secretariat of the Navy
SHCP	*Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público* / Ministry of Finances
SSP	*Secretaría de Seguridad Pública* / Public Security Secretariat
UIF	*Unidad de Inteligencia Financiera* / Finance Intelligence Unit
UNAM	*Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México* / National Autonomous University of Mexico
UP	*Unión del Pueblo* / People's Union
VIP	Very Important People
WVS	World Values Survey

Map *i*: Guadalajara Metropolitan Area, Jalisco, Mexico



Source: Elaborated by Hiram Romero for this research.

Introduction

"Every economic enterprise needs and pays for protection, both against the destruction or armed seizure of its capital and the forceful disruption of its labor"

Frederic C. Lane[1]

The scene takes place at the regular Sunday gathering of a Mexican family. It could be almost any middle-class neighbourhood in any town in the country. The stage is composed of loud mixed-voice conversations, a noisy soccer game on TV in the background, food spread on the table, and children running around or playing hide-and-seek. Suddenly, someone rings the door-bell. The 30 year-old son stands to answer it: "Mom, it's *el poli*", he yells. The mother walks all the way from the kitchen to the front door, holding a 20 peso[2] bill. Like every Sunday, she hands it over to "*el poli"*, short for *policía* (police officer), although the man receiving the money is not exactly a police officer. He is what the mother would call a "*policía de barrio*" (neighbourhood police). A man in his late 50s, wearing what used to be a black uniform, now greyish after having been washed hundreds of times. With no more equipment than a bike, *el poli* is in charge of patrolling the streets in exchange for what neighbourhood families agree to pay him. He belongs neither to a public police institution, nor to one of those private security firms that abound in the country. Apparently, he works on his own, with the informal approval of the municipal government. His adscription is uncertain for the family, yet, it never seems to bother them. *El poli* watches out and protects the neighbourhood, even though it is not clear exactly what the threat is, or how he might handle one. In fact, one night, when a man pulled over to sleep off his drunkenness on a street in their neighbourhood, *el poli* was not able to make him leave. Instead, the male neighbours gathered outside and managed to move the drunk individual out of their *barrio*. So, why pay 20 pesos a week to someone who is unable to handle a sleepy drunk man? "It's only 20 pesos and he makes rounds the whole night keeping an eye on the house when we leave", is the father's answer. Eventually, the neighbours paid for the installation of a solid gate in order to close off the entrance to their block. But *el poli* remains. He is still patrolling what is left of open streets in the *barrio*, trying to make his 20 pesos per house every Sunday.

[1] Lane, F.C. (1979)[1942]. *Profits from power: readings in protection rent and violence-controlling enterprises*. NY: State University of New York Press.

[2] About 1,02 USD, considering the exchange rate of 19,42 pesos for each dollar (SAT, September 17th, 2019).

Another scene could be added to this picture. It would be situated in a middle-sized businessman's office, after his assistant received a call from a man claiming he was "*Commander Z-24*", a high-ranking member of the drug trafficking organization (DTO) called *Los Zetas*. With this threatening presentation, the alleged *Commander Z-24* roughly requests a deposit of 50 thousand pesos through a money order service, or the businessman's factory would be set on fire. Nervous and scared, the assistant alerts her boss who immediately calls one of his childhood friends, a high-level federal public officer, asking for help. A couple of hours later, the businessman is explaining the situation to a Federal Police (PF) agent over the phone. The agent asks him a series of questions and runs some tests only to conclude that the call was made from a prison and the alleged *Commander Z-24* was only using the violent reputation of *Los Zetas* and dropping random hooks to extort money. The businessman eventually stopped worrying about the situation as it was indeed a "fake attempt of extortion", as the police agent would call it. Nevertheless, the proprietor decided to install supplementary CCTV cameras outside the firm's facilities, and to hire a private security company to manage the surveillance of the building's points of access. As for his childhood friend, caught up in the amount of calls he received from relatives dealing with similar situations, he decides to use his proximity to the head of the PF in order to prompt an information campaign for the general public to shed light on the nature of fake attempts to extort.

Real racketeering experiences are also part of the picture, the one in which a landmine owner punctually pays a monthly fee to a 12 year-old child who comes to collect the money on behalf of a criminal organization which grants protection from a series of threats, including its own violence. Another example could be one of a driver who reluctantly pays highly organized *franeleros*[3] to watch his car while it is parked on a public street. The driver knows that giving money is the only way to be able to park on his own street which mainly prevents the *franelero* from vandalizing the car himself.

~

[3] Mexican term to refer to people guarding cars parked on the streets of big cities in exchange for a tip. The term comes *franela* (flannel), a piece of fabric they use to wash the cars and wave it around, while giving parking indications.

The prior anecdotes come from the observation of the urban landscape in Mexico. All of them depict stories of how people try to protect themselves. These narratives are perhaps familiar to any individual inhabiting, visiting or observing the country. Yet, in each frame, wide variation is found among the threat, the protector and the protected, the agreement between them (or the lack of it), the resources available to grant protection, and finally the demand for it. Some of these scenes occur in public spaces while others are private. In some cases, the government is alluded while in others, it is omitted, although not necessarily absent.

In the Mexican context, where newspapers report how violence reaches unprecedented levels every month, and robberies and burglaries are the "daily bread" of the urban landscape, it is fair to state that those who own goods, have revenue or represent a link on a value chain might confront predation or threats. Consequently, they have incentives to seek protection, which is, avoiding harm or falling prey.

This research has been primarily inspired by the interest to closely observe how such a dangerous context has affected society. In an early stage, I realised that "society" was not a straightforward category and, as most of the Mexican studies devoted to analysing violence and social order, there was a risk of considering entire communities, neglecting the possibility that diverse social groups could be affected in different ways. Thus, focusing on a specific socio-professional group seemed an optimal path to work within "society".

In that direction, there is a group which despite their power, is especially vulnerable to security threats: businesspeople. Certainly, their condition as an economic elite and their financial resources have granted them both a position of power and the potential to receive threats. Building on this paradox, it is pertinent to focus our analysis on such an intriguing subject. By doing so, it will also be possible to collect information about other collective or individual protection patterns. Although as will be discussed in detail further along, the literature tends to either completely neglect businessmen or reduces them to victims when it comes to security threats and the delivery of protection.

Mexican businessmen offer an interesting enigma as they both represent the powerful men and the victims in the same picture. Yet, in order to unravel this paradox, there are some pertinent questions that need to be formulated. First, to what extent is the perilous context of (in)security perceived by businessmen not only as *a* problem but as *their* problem and,

consequently, merit tailor-made solutions? How do they frame what a threat consist of? Once recognizing a potential threat and considering that the business sector has become more influential in transforming the economic and political landscape, how do they participate in a field which is usually seen as the exclusive competence of the state? How do businessmen's tailor-made solutions affect the offer of public security at the local level?

Building on these questions, three complementary hypothesis are proposed for this research:

Hypothesis I. Problematizing the threat. In a context of insecurity and violence, businessmen perceive, frame and formulate potential threats as a concern for their sector. Thus, even if criminal threats might affect other groups, businessmen convert them into their own problem and, consequently, put forward their security needs depending on the interests of their socio-professional group.

Hypothesis II. The demand for protection. As a group with particular security needs, businessmen receive protection from an ensemble of varied suppliers in which the government, although very much present, is only one of them. Thus, businessmen participate either as beneficiaries or as customers in an atmosphere where public-private and legal-illegal divisions are blurred. If that is the case, the locus, prerogatives and constraints of each protection supplier would be constantly (re)defined and (re)negotiated, entailing a dynamic in which the state, as the regular protector, is in constant reconfiguration which businessmen take part in.

Hypothesis III. The coproduction of protection. Beyond being victims, businessmen are actors with multiple resources which allow them to actively participate in the process of producing protection. Thus, they become one of the suppliers, establishing another divide, namely, the protection provider-receiver. Therefore, while coproducing tailor-made protection, they participate in shaping policing and, ultimately, social control.

Guided by this set of hypotheses, this research aims to contribute to policing and protection theorization, favouring the analysis of the proprietor's role within a complex configuration of protection providers. I argue that protection is an arena with fuzzy boundaries in terms of "public-private", "legal-illegal" and "provider-receiver" divisions. This implies a grey area in which the actors involved constantly (re)define and (re)negotiate their position through coalition, collusion or collision dynamics.

I claim that the constantly (re)configured realm of protection has not resulted from the retreat of the state but, conversely, from its relocation along with a variety of other actors. Even in cases where businessmen purchase protection as any other commodity, the government is not absent, to the contrary, its presence is quite visible. Indeed, neither government, nor alternative providers are clear-cut figures while providing protection. In addition, several cases will demonstrate that legal and illegal means are used to protect both, legal and illegal transactions.

Furthermore, this approach opens an opportunity to discuss to what extent capitalizing on such complex configurations, businessmen transcend their role as victims to become part of the production of their own protection, mobilizing a wide range of resources. Although the picture starts with businessmen identifying a problem that affects them and their sector, it ends with these local notables shaping the (in)security landscape for everyone else.

The following pages introduce the research; first, providing a broad discussion on the essential notions already evoked: protection, policing, and social control. Such concepts are framed by theoretical principles that call for a critical literature review in order to fill a theoretical gap: the active role of businessmen in shaping protection patterns. Second, the notion of "businesspeople" as a social group shall be clarified. Beyond the idea of an elite group facing security threats, a more accurate profile will be provided.

Building on the empirical gap (the overlooked Mexican business sector), two main endeavours will be carried out. First, in order to avoid hasty generalizations and banalizations regarding Mexico, I propose to analyse the business sector in the third most important urban centre in the country: Guadalajara, Jalisco. Alongside its importance in the economic landscape, Jalisco is one of the states most touched by violence. Second, observing *Tapatio*[4] businessmen implies exploring a population whose history goes back centuries. Thus, an effort to delimit the chronology must be undertaken.

The last section is devoted to the methodological path behind the research. Three main purposes will drive this part of the discussion: 1) an exercise of accountability and provision of minimal tools for replicability; 2) making explicit the scopes and limits of the research associated to the methodological decisions made and; 3) exploring what the process revealed

[4] Demonym to refer people from Guadalajara Metropolitan Area, GMA. (DRAE, 2019). More details on the term as well as the city are provided in that section.

about the field and the population under study. Finally, the chapter overview will go into more detail regarding how the argument is presented.

i. Protection, multilateralization of policing and the state relocation

In his classic text, Frederic Lane (1979) [1942] argues that producing protection "is one of the functions of a special association or enterprise called government" (p. 22). It ought to be noted that protection "is supposed to make ownership of goods and services safe from theft and make their contractual exchange enforceable" (Skaperdas, 2001: 174). Therefore, this service is not exclusively provided by police bodies, since judicial authorities are also able to protect citizens from spoliation or police abuse (Lane, 1979 [1942]). Thus, due to the presence of certain threats, businessmen call upon government agencies to maintain order and enforce property rights and compliance with agreements. Like any other citizen, they pay for this service by means of taxation.

Based on this principle, in order to understand the protection mechanisms which businessmen resort to while facing threats, it may be sufficient to explore the labour of law enforcement agencies of the state which has monopolized the legitimate use of force. From there, authors such as Razo (2008) proposed to inquire if distinct regimes entail different policing and protection methods or how formal and informal[5] institutions grant such public services. Regardless, from this perspective, protection is a public good granted by public entities.

However, it has been widely proven in the literature that "state protection is never complete, which is a function of how difficult it is to attach an owner to property and then protect it from theft" (Varese, 2001: 24). Alongside public officers, nongovernmental agencies and agents are in the position to provide security services.

The multiplication of agencies that undertake the production of protection has been discussed at large. Around the late 1970s, a group of authors focused on the expansion of the private security sector, considering its rising number of employees, the multiple functions these companies carried out and the proliferation of spaces they protected. The analysis was highly oriented by the association of this pattern with the transformation of the economic model

[5] Informal meaning untaxed and unregulated (Reno, 2013). As Misse (2007) notes, although the distinction between "formal" and "informal" economic activities lies on the level of its subordination to be regulated by the state, "the mistake of thinking these to be clearly separate realms of activity, constituting well-demarcated 'sectors'" must be avoided (p. 143).

(Kempa et al., 1999), considering the growth of the private security sector as one of the three expressions of the globalization phenomena, along with the fiscal crisis of the states and the expansion of the minimal state ideology (Ocqueteau, 2004). Within that perspective, it has been claimed that protection, which used to be a service assured by the government, has experienced a process of "commodification" (Kempa et al., 1999; Loader, 1999). Hence, rather than being exclusively a public good, security has become a commodity, explaining that police corps are "merely one actor in the provision of security" (Neocleous, 2007: 348). This entails the devolution of public order[6] from social control structures (Huggins, 1997) and the emergence of a protection market in which various providers offer security. Certainly, this implies a transformation in the way the government exercises power as "the state is said to have gradually abandoned or been stripped of its commanding heights, so security has become more of a private enterprise" (Neocleous, 2007: 346). The previous perspective assumes public and private fields are clearly different. Thus, the gap between the state's will and capacity to provide protection creates a space for the emergence of private security (Donald in Neocleous, 2007).

This perspective, in light of the Weberian state model, relates the presence of non-state protection providers with the state retreat (Strange, 1996), weakness, absence, even decay entailing the loss of its monopoly on violence. Nevertheless, diverse critiques have been formulated regarding this approach, most of them outlining the flaws of the state's normative preconception, which assumes the existence of a "limited statehood", relies on the divide of public and private realms (Agudo Sanchíz, 2017).

Thus, ignoring the connections between government and non-government actors and neglecting how governments promote power devolution towards multiple entities, its leading role in designing public security policies or public budget management remains. (Diphoorn, 2016) This perspective fail to qualify as "state decline" what is, indeed, "part of the process of continual formation of the state" (Hibou, 2004: 3). Thus, according to Hibou, (2004) the state delegates part of its tasks (notably security) to actors that, instead of challenging its power, are products of the state's formation. Hence, "privatization of violence and of part of the taxation system, far from signifying a loss of state control, [is] proof of the strength of a state handling its authority and influence with skill through its flexible and adaptable relations

[6] In the sense of transfer or delegation of power. On the devolution process see Huggins, 2000b.

with various segments of the society" (Hibou, 2004: 27). Hence, rather than "retreat of the state" we are witnessing the "state redeployment", along with the growing participation of private intermediaries in a variety of functions, which implies blurring the frontiers between the "private" and the "public" realms (Agudo Sanchíz, 2017). Even further, daily policing experiences could be characterized not only as resulting from private and public actors sharing a field of protection, but also as "twilight policing", or multifaceted forms of policing which are "neither public, nor private, but something 'twilight'" (Diphoorn, 2016: 314)[7].

Shedding light on the entanglement between public and private realms has made it possible to observe a sort of "grey policing" (Ocqueteau, 2004: 33), which evokes the idea of avoiding inflexible and deceiving analytical categories (Auyero, 2007). A series of empirical studies, produced mostly during the 1990s, studied private agencies which replaced public entities to supposedly create a more complex rapport within the ensemble of security agents producing complementation, competition, compromise or circumvention (Nigel South, 1991 in Ocqueteau, 2004). Thus, the blurry boundaries between public and private sources calls into question conceiving protection from the "public-private" binomial which is better focused pairing "providers-receivers" (Volkov, 2002); thus, reordering public-private ties (Grajales, 2016).

For some authors, this is not a novel idea since private and public actors have historically shared the provision of security. In fact, the first bodies of protection can be traced to the private rather than the public arena (Forst and Manning, 1999); thus, jeopardizing the principle of protection as a "natural monopoly" of the state (Lane, 1979 [1942]: 23).

In addition, taking into account the multiplication of agencies (providers) required to meet security needs, the paradigm of police privatisation ignores the transformation of those able to offer and authorise protection (auspices)[8] (Bayley and Shearing, 2001). Considering these limits, David Bayley and Clifford Shearing (2001) have developed a more comprehensive approach, arguing that rather than a process of "privatisation", the transformation can be understood as the "multilateralization of policing".

[7] Certainly, Diphoorn is building on the notion of Twilight Institutions coined by Christian Lund (2006) referring to the entities that "are not the state but they exercise public authority" (p. 673) and which contours are difficult to distinguish.

[8] I will return to the notions of "auspices" and "providers" in Bayley and Shearing (2001) later in the following paragraphs.

To better understand this argument, it is first necessary to examine the basic notions, for instance, *policing*. Since the duties of police bodies are closely associated to responding to street offences, implementing techniques and other institutional capacities to investigate crimes (Tanner in Light et al., 2015), it is complex to distinguish between *policing* and the closely related concept of *police*[9]. In a general sense, policing has been defined as "what is done to identify and manage [security] risks" (Ericson and Haggerty, 1997: 3); however, stretching the concept could make it elusive. In that sense, Bayley and Shearing (2001) suggest the difference between *social control* and *policing* must be considered. According to the authors, the former refers to "all the means by which human beings provide safety for themselves" (p. 2) while *policing* is the function of "providing security through physical constraint" (p. 5). Therefore, a focal point in their work includes what they refer to as "intentional attempts to regulate the distribution of physical security produced by an actual or potential use of force" (p. 2).

Following Bailey and Shearing (2001), observing policing[10] would be a pertinent way to explore the demand and provision of protection services. Nevertheless, the core of their contribution demonstrates that during the late 20th Century, rather than witnessing policing privatization, it has been a *multilateralization,* giving rise to a whole new paradigm on security governance: one in which both the demand and supply of sources of policing have multiplied and denationalized. To support such a claim, the authors call our attention to the difference between two actors: 1) *auspices*, or those who authorize policing and 2) *providers*, those who actually grant "the policing solicited" (p. 3). Although in some cases, both figures can be located in the same agency or actor. Hence, policing auspices and providers are no longer expected to be exclusively of government origin since one or both functions could be carried out by nongovernment agencies or actors. Protection auspices and providers could be embodied by public, private or hybrid agents (Ocqueteau, 2004).

[9] The distinction between the two terms might be evident for English native speakers, since both words are clearly different in their language. Nevertheless, while the term *police* is able to be translated into Spanish as *policía,* the translation of *policing* is more difficult, since a one-word equivalent does not exist. Apart from the semantic remark, what is significant for the purpose of this research is to outline how even the language is a sample of the strong association between both terms, which conditioned not only policing practices but the way we analyse them.

[10] From this point forward I will not use italics while evoking the term policing, since it was only a resource to emphasize the discussion of its meaning.

The multilateralization of policing implies two main features; on the one hand, the diversification of public agencies able to offer a modality of protection (due to law enforcement system fragmentation) and; on the other hand, the multiplication of nongovernmental protection providers (Martínez and Passos, 2019).

So far, hybridizing potential suppliers of protection adds complexity to the analysis; however, it is assumed that services are offered on a legal basis (although, sometimes, through informal means). Conversely, a large body of literature has devoted attention to illegal protectors[11] and, in doing so, these authors have laid the foundation for a better understanding of criminal organizations (notably the Mafia), and more importantly the idea of protection as an asset.

Economic theory, building on Becker's model (1968), has made a remarkable contribution to explaining criminal groups based on the assumption that criminals are rational agents seeking specific rents in an operational setting. Thus, their decision-making process can be understood by analysing a set of social and economic variables (Becker, 1968). Although Becker's approach focuses on individuals rather than organizations, according to this perspective, criminal organizations must be seen like any other enterprise. This rationalist approach is also endorsed by Thomas Schelling (1984 [1971]) who suggests that at the centre of criminal rent extraction, we find the imposition of protection under the threat of violence directed towards both legal and illegal enterprises. Thereby, the monopoly that criminal organizations seek to establish is twofold: to act as suppliers of protection regarding both, violence control and public agent corruption. In other words, Schelling (1984 [1971]) assumes the centralized control of the illegal market. This assumption has been revisited by authors such as Peter Reuter (1983) who argues that the Mafia is less centralized and structured than we have historically thought. He demonstrates that illegal markets can be controlled by much smaller and more fragmented enterprises and may be managed by the same agents behind legal market administration.

Critical to the rational choice perspective dominant in Becker and Schelling works, Lane (1979) [1942] offers an approach which is from an economic standpoint, yet is more sensitive to the importance of history. Building on early modern period, his inquiry is regarding the effect the government exerts on the economy and vice-versa. Thus, he points out that the

[11] Although authors as Gambetta (1993) and Varese (2001) explain that type of protection under the "private protection" concept, and due to the previous discussion, I will privilege such "non-government provider".

source of protection is not distinguishable from the source of the threat, producing "'black-market' protection in return" (p. 52). Due to a lack of clear boundaries, Lane proposes that governments delivering protection might be engaged not only in public policy to grant security but also in a sort of racketeering imposing rents through violent threats.

Lane's reasoning is continued by Tilly (1985) who, from a historical sociology approach, argues that "if protection rackets represent organized crime at its smoothest, then war making and state making, (quintessential protection rackets with the advantage of legitimacy) qualify as our largest examples of organized crime" (p. 169). Thus, in other words, war-making interacts with extraction and capital accumulation to make the state.

Protection is seen as a double-edged phenomenon in Tilly's essay as it has a "comforting" side, as well as an "ominous" one. The former evokes the image of "a shelter against danger, provided by a powerful friend" while the latter refers to the racket, when the "strong man forces merchants to pay a tribute in order to avoid the damage the strong man himself threatens to deliver" (p. 170). According to Tilly (1985), in opposition to the normative perspective which qualifies state protection as legitimate through the monopoly of the use of force, such an attribute relies on how distanced the threat's emergence (and its control) is from the protection provider.

On this premise, he distinguishes three types of suppliers: 1) the racketeer (producing both danger and shelter); 2) the legitimate protector (producing refuge without control of the appearance of the threat) and; 3) the supplier of "reliable, inexpensive shielding from local racketeers and outlaws" (p. 171).

In addition, Tilly (1985) argues that the government mobilizes protection within commerce, as a government subordinated to the dominant classes tends to maximize the benefits of a protection monopoly, adjusting the protection prices according to the interest of those classes. However, protection is also deployed as one the activities that government agents perform under the notion of "organized violence", along with war-making, state-making and obtaining resources to be able to fulfil the other three activities.

Building on Lane's and Tilly's work, the neo-institutional approach made enormous progress towards understanding the weight of protection within criminal organizations due to Diego Gambetta's (1993) research on outlaws within the Sicilian Mafia.

In his seminal text, Diego Gambetta proposes interpreting the Mafia as a "specific economic enterprise or an industry which produces, promotes, and sells private protection" (1993: 1). Analysing the Sicilian case, he demonstrates that protection can be likened to an enabler of economic exchanges within a context of unstable and distrustful agreements. Since an economic actor may assume a counterpart will be misleading, protection must be assured regardless of whether the market is orderly or not. Thus, in competition with the state (since both deal with the same commodity), racketeers play the role of local-enforcer, protecting certain sectors from its own dishonest practices, assuming a sort of social function informally controlling and imposing rules.

Visualizing the Mafia as "a particular *trademark* of the protection industry"[12], (Gambetta, 1993: 153) the author explains the Mafia's weight not by its alleged centralized structure or potential use of violence, but via its "successful commercial identity as a supplier of genuine protection" (p. 153).

Unlike other criminal groups, the Mafia has specialized in protection as a commodity and, consequently the term "Mafia" may travel from the Sicilian context to other fields (Varese, 2001), despite time and geographic distance.

Regarding the Mafia's potential consumers of protection, Gambetta claims that the list is long and diverse, apart from the fact that it pertains to both legal and illegal businesses: "landowners, herdsmen, olive and orange growers, peasants, entrepreneurs, politicians, doctors, shopkeepers, pursue snatchers, smugglers, drug traffickers, arms dealers, all of which at some point or another have been protected" (1993: 54). Such a remark outlines another permeable frontier, one which supposedly separates "legal" from "illegal", when referring to the provision of protection.

Although from a normative perspective both arenas might be clearly different, empirical evidence proves that this distance is not as clear in practical terms in, at least, two respects: 1) as already explained, "the mafia is willing to offer protection both for *legal* (yet poorly protected by the state) and *illegal* transactions"[13] (Varese, 2001: 5) and; 2) the *Mafiosi* protection provision is not necessarily illegal, although, according to Gambetta (1993) always entails some degree of infringement.

[12] Italics from the original
[13] Italics from the original

In reference to the first assumption, it must be underlined that, regarding legal transactions, the opportunity of the Mafia as an efficient provider is closely related to the state's inability to meet such a demand. Conversely, in the so-called underworld, efficient mafia protection is mutually enforced by illegal markets, meaning, the more illegal markets there are, the more protection is needed and the more likely another illegal market is to emerge (Varese, 2001).

The second assumption most likely relies on the difficulty of uncoupling notions of "Mafia" and "criminality". However, more recent work about the origins of the Italian Mafia argues that it emerged within a legal market. When the health properties of citrus fruit became more widely known, lemon farmers faced the rising demand and their product became more expensive. Since walls and fences were not enough to isolate lemon trees from predators, a business opportunity to protect the citrus production, as well as to become an intermediary between retailers and exporters arose. The Mafia would emerge within a highly profitable market, a weak rule of law, a high level of local poverty and low levels of trust among economic agents (Dimico et al., 2017).

Rather than trying to observe the so-called "underworld", to better appreciate the Mafia as a protection provider, the emphasis must be placed on property rights guarantees. The arrival of the market economy, and consequently of private property, offers a precious opportunity to analyse criminal protection providers, especially within a weak environment of law enforcement. In that regard, the work of Federico Varese (2001) on the Russian mafia is enlightening.

Exploring the transition from a state-oriented to a market economy, Varese (2001) argues that the emergence of the Russian mafia was "a consequence of an imperfect transition to the market" (p. 17). According to the author, the development of market transactions that were supposed to have been protected by the government were only partially accompanied. Being mostly a "predatory, erratic and non-impartial supplier of protection" (p.25), the government barely met the need for protection, opening the space for alternative nonstate providers.

From a strictly economic perspective, the previous claim might be summarized as the classic principle of the market suppling what the state is not able to. Thus, if analysed from an economic viewpoint, protection must be at the core since it is "the defining economic activity of organized crime" (Skaperdas, 2001: 174). That standpoint is, however, significantly narrow.

Varese (2001), for instance, considers the demand for protection and the unsatisfactory public supply as necessary but not a sufficient condition to explain the emergence of alternative protection agencies. Additionally, he shows that the use of violence (training), as well as access to certain weapons (equipment), play an important role. Thus, force and the potential use of violence appears to be a fundamental resource in the provision of protection. Coinciding with Gambetta (1993), in terms of the illegal protector, violence is a means to gain the reputation of a credible threat and, in that extent, to supply protection.

In that direction, cases such as Colombia or Mexico are illustrative. The long-lasting conflict between the Colombian Army and groups such as paramilitary, self-defence, *guerrilla* and drug traffickers, left behind a sort of specialized violent "labour force", able to sell their expertise, such as security services, either to economic actors or to train young people from slums in cities like Medellín (De León Beltrán, 2014; Bedoya, 2010). In Mexico at present, the number of active-duty, off-service and retired military and police officers, gang members, or young adolescents willing to bear firearms, that have been utilised as violent experts, has been equated to a "real working-class" (Mendoza, 2018: 47).

Besides, considering the diversity of violent actors, it must be recalled that those able to provide protection through the (actual or potential) use of force were neither exclusively government agencies nor criminal groups. Also based on the Russian context, Vadim Volkov (2002) proposes a more comprehensive notion encompassing organizations specialized in the use of force as a way of making a living: *violent entrepreneurs.* To that end, the author defines *violent entrepreneurship* as "a set of organizational solutions and action strategies enabling an organized force (or organized violence) to be converted into money or another valuable asset on a permanent basis" (p. 27).

Whereas a robbery represents economic gain for the offender and it might entail a deployment of force, the actor is not considered a violent entrepreneur since as asserted by Volkov (2002), the thief does not establish "a permanent tributary relation with the inhabitants of his domain and provide certain services that justify his demand of tribute" (p. 28). In other words, he is just a predator, while a violent entrepreneur exchanges a service with his "customer".

Protection is precisely one of those services violent entrepreneurs claim to offer, as well as "'justice', 'government' (and) 'enforcement'" (Volkov, 2002: 28)[14]. Thereby, a person who gets protection pays for it, whether through taxes (state), as a fee (private company) or as a racket (when the source of protection is also the source of threat)[15].

To clearly display the variety of protection suppliers, Volkov (2002) offers what he calls "a typology of 'roofs'"[16]. Considering the profile of the provider of protection, there exists a classification built on two axes: 1) one that considers the "roof" as either a legal or an illegal actor (*x*-axis), and; 2) one that points out that it is either public or private (*y*-axis) (Figure *i*). While observing the previous discussion on the public-private dimension, I dare to re-label the latter axis as "Government-Nongovernment" in order to favour a *multilateralization* vs. *privatization* perspective. I also replaced the continuous axis-lines for dashed lines aiming to represent the blurred boundaries between such scenarios, which has also been argued previously.

Reading this Cartesian plane clockwise, it can be highlighted that the violent entrepreneur title includes four profiles: government agencies providing protection as a public good (quadrant I); private security companies (quadrant II); criminal groups, such as the Mafia, among others (quadrant III) and; a selective use of public coercion, or "privately sold state protection" (Varese, 2001: 59) (quadrant IV).

Scholars underline that aforementioned suppliers might be in continuous interaction, making it challenging to sharply distinguish them. That is what Volkov (2002) styles "combined roofs" (p. 170). It has been documented that this overlap of public-private-illegal territorial control leads to the emergence of niches that entail criminal and private profit (Mendoza, 2018). Furthermore, entrepreneurs of violence are not necessarily alike regarding sociologic profiles due to distinct possible contexts (Briquet and Favarel-Garrigues, 2008). The multiplicity of actual or potential combinations also relies on the variety of interactions

[14] Quotation marks from the original.
[15] In Mexican argot it is mostly known as "cobro de piso" (lit. floor's fee) or "piso", probably influenced by the Italian term *le pizz*o, which refers to the amount of money requested by racketeers (Sciarrone, 2008). The commonly used term regarding this illegal tribute changes from one context to other. For instance, the urban gangs in Central America ask for *renta* (lit. rent) (Fontes, 2016), while in Colombia it is known as *la vacuna* (lit. "vaccine") (Bedoya, 2010) and *pedágio* (lit. toll) in Brazil (Araújo, 2001).
[16] *Roof* is the literal translation of the Russian term *Krysha.* As already explained in Chapter 1, it is a colloquial word to refer a private protection arrangement. According to Varese (2001), it involves the "protection against ordinary criminals and 'unprofessional' racketeers, unruly business partners and competitor" (p. 59). "(I)t denotes the service provided by violence-managing agencies" (Volkov, 2002: 168).

between the political actors and violent entrepreneurs. Hence, governmental, regulated, semi-regulated, informal nongovernment agencies, and even illegal groups, are able to provide protection to those who require it.

Figure *i.* Protection supplier typology



Source: Elaborated by the author based on Volkov (2002: 169).

The interaction between such agents defines what security is and what constitutes a threat, in addition to who shall be protected and by which mechanisms. The protection agents' interaction, ultimately, shapes "the norms that govern legitimate violence" (Avant and Haufler, 2018: 7).

Although most of these patterns of protection are long-term agreements (Volkov, 2002; Varese, 2001; Gambetta, 1993), one-time exchanges are also possible. For instance, both extortion and racketeering could be defined as activities in which protection is offered to deter the threat of violence or damage, while the source of the threat is the protection supplier himself. However, extortion is a particular act, a one-time offense, in contrast, "protection racket is an institutionalized relationship" (Volkov, 2002: 29)[17]. Thus, in the latter case, the

[17] According to Varese (2001) in social science extortion is also defined as "the forced extraction of resources for services that are promised but *not* provided" (p. 350) (italics from the original). However, the author also argues that "this definition is not universally adopted", neither by scholars nor by legal frameworks. As will be

violent entrepreneur sets up a schema where a business owner will pay monthly a proportion of his revenues, for instance.

It must also be noted that a long-term relationship might entail changing the rules of the game, as participants are able to continuously modify them (Sciarrone, 2008). Thus, victims are able to question and renegotiate the domination-subordination relationship determined by the racketeers, in other words, they exercise agency (Moncada, n.d.).

Thus far, it has become clear that reviewing protection mechanisms is part of violent entrepreneurs' profiles, resources and actions. In addition, the interaction patterns agreed upon by the wielders of force is key to observe, since it might dynamically depend on *coalition*, *collision* or *collusion*. Yet, it also encompasses two critical variables: 1) the class of transaction enforced or protected and how that calls for distinctive protection scenarios; 2) the interdependent set of "relations of exchange between violence-managing agencies (wielders of force) and economic subjects" (Volkov, 2002: 25), meaning potential customers.

a. Multiple protectors of multiple transactions

Coercive instruments might be applied to protect or enforce exchanges and agreements whether legal or illegal, calling into question state sanction (Frye and Zhuravskaya, 2000). Consequently, to the typology offered by Volkov (2002), it is possible to add a third analytical dimension (*z*-axis), as shown in Figure *ii*.

The insertion of the legal-illegal transaction axis yields eight combinations or scenarios (Table *i*) that, as the quadrants discussed before, might overlap with one another.

The ensemble of scenarios shows the mainstream image that clearly divides an upper and under-world. The former is constituted by legal actors that, through legal means, enforce legal transactions (*x,y,z* plane). For instance, when conciliation boards intervene to manage an employee-employer dispute, based on a labour contract, and protects the compliance of an agreement. The latter is composed of criminal actors who protect illegal exchanges (*-x,-y,-z* plane).

seen in Chapter 4, the one-time protection service could be granted in exchange for a protection fee. Thus, I remain attached to Volkov's (2002) distinction between extortion and racketeering.

Figure *ii*. Protection pattern typology



Source: Elaborated by the author based on literature review.

A landmark case could be illustrated by the *Sicarios* imposing tribute payments to protect or monitor drug trafficking chain activities (shipments, clandestine landing strips, etc.) (Grajales, 2016). Despite the common assumption that no one dares to threaten drug cartels, Mendoza (2018) refers to a case along the border of Sonora (North Mexico), where the *bajadores*[18] used to assault drug cargo trucks. The local people considered them the "twisted of the twisted (…) the illegality of the illegality" (p. 40).

Beyond drug trafficking activities, *Sicarios* also protect revenue obtained from the illegal market, such as prostitution, gambling, human trafficking, illegal logging, among others (Mendoza, 2018). For instance, it has been documented that Chinese gang members, active in New York City, continue to protect gamblers from both, police actions and robbery, but they also protected gambling houses scrutinizing customers, maintaining order and collecting gambling debts (Chin, 1996). In the end, an illegal market is an opportune space to sell

[18] *Bajadores* comes from *bajar* (lit. to take down), colloquial Mexicanism used to take or to steal something from someone (DEM, 2019).

protection or, in other words, to generate the incentives to respect agreements and to reduce distrust and suspicion (Gambetta, 1993).

Figure *ii* also emphasizes that legal actors and legal means could be involved in the illegal enforcement of transactions (*x,y,-z* plane). Such could be the case of the so-called *arrêgos*, the illicit exchanges settled between police officers and drug traffickers in Brazil (Misse, 2013) or the protection that political elite exert over drug cartel activities (Lessing, 2018; Palacios and Serrano, 2010; Snyder and Durán-Martínez, 2009; Pimentel, 2000) and other corrupt exchanges between politicians and the *mafiosi* (della Porta and Vannucci, 1999). Thus, diverse political-criminal configurations, with different modes of Mafia permeation into the political realm, can be visualized (Briquet and Favarel-Garrigues, 2008). Concerning illegal transactions enforced by legal protection providers, it must be noticed that such agreements do not necessarily occur in illicit markets. Misse (2013) illustrates this case evoking bribes granted to police in order to avoid traffic tickets.

In addition, criminal groups supplying protection for legal deals *(-x,-y,z* plane) is also a possibility. The Mexican *narcos* collecting debts resulting from commercial agreements signed by two economic actors, exemplifies this plane. Contracting a debt and its collection process are, *a priori,* legal acts located within the legal arena. However, to use a criminal group to perform a *levantón*[19] as overdue portfolio recovering is not[20].

Private protection is a growing industry whose presence may be confirmed through the gated neighbourhoods or the surveillance gadgets installed in stores (*x,-y,z* plane). Besides, this kind of protection allows for the emphasis of two additional intricacies: 1) private guards could be hired to deter a diversity of threats, other than property crimes; 2) in the name of protection, private guards might become actual death-squads[21].

[19] *Levantón* is an abduction allegedly performed by Drug Trafficking Organizations.
[20] This case will be wider discussed on Chapter 4.
[21] There is no consensus on how to define death squads, specially trying to differentiate them from other groups performing extra-legal violence, such as *vigilantes* (Campbell, 2000). Some authors understand them as paramilitary groups (Mazzei, 2009) while others conceived them as part of a continuum of vigilantism, located next to on-duty extra-legal police violence. Different from other groups they were highly organized, holding deep connections with police bodies and exerting planned rather than spontaneous violent acts (Huggins, 1997). Here, I refer to (semi)clandestine irregular organizations, generally supported by government (either by act or omission), which executes violent acts against specific individuals or groups, being murder its main, and possibly unique, activity (Campbell, 2000).

Table *i.* Protection patterns' scenarios

			Protection pattern	
Typology of "roofs"		**Type of transaction *z-axis***	**Plane**	**Illustrative Example**
Quadrant I	State protection	Legal transaction	*x,y,z*	Conciliation and arbitration boards on a labor dispute
		Illegal transaction	*x,y,-z*	*Arrêgos** between police officers and drug traffickers
Quadrant II	Private Security Agencies	Legal transaction	*x,-y,z*	Installation of video-surveillance cameras in a factory
		Illegal transaction	*x,-y,-z*	Private guards expelling peasants from occupied lands
Quadrant III	Criminal Groups	Legal transaction	*-x,-y,z*	*Narco*** on security services or collecting legally-agreed debts
		Illegal transaction	*-x,-y,-z*	*Sicarios**** extracting rents from undocumented migrants, human smugglers, prostitution or gambling
Quadrant IV	Informal state 'roofs'	Legal transaction	*-x,y,z*	Auxiliary police on transfer and custody of valuables
		Illegal transaction	*-x,y,-z*	Paramilitary groups on social cleansing

Source: Elaborated by the author based on literature review and fieldwork findings. *Arrêgos: illicit exchanges between police officers and drug traffickers in Brazil (Misse, 2013); **For a discussion on *Narco*'s notion see Chapter 2, ***S*icarios:* thugs or hitmen

For instance, in Brazil, studies in regards to the landless social movement *Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem-Terra* (MST)[22] have documented how landowners tend to hire private guards, known as *pistoleiros*, to expel "*índios e posseiros*" (indian and squatters) (Fernandes, 1988: 6). Aiming to avoid land occupations, armed guards risk becoming *pistolagem*, a name attributed to hitmen that large landowners recruit to kill rural workers (*x,-y,-z* plane). In the same direction, in the late 1950, groups called *Homens Corajosos* (brave men), coming from militarized police bodies, used to break into Rio de Janeiro slums to abduct and kill poor people, accused of having committed a crime (Huggins, 2000a) (*-x,y,-z* plane). Then, in these cases, threat is not represented by thieves or kidnappers but by dissent peasants and "the poor 'dangerous classes'"[23](Huggins, 1997: 221). In other words, what starts as protection delivering takes on extermination features and violent actors (either off-duty police agents or private guards) become a sort of death squads (Huggins, 2000a).

It must be noticed that, although Brazilian *pistoleiros* use to be private guards (mercenaries), they are often of state knowledge and supported by the Army (Fernandes, 1988). That could also be the case regarding Mexican *Pistoleros* (Piccato, 2017; Smith, 2009), *Guardias Rurales* (Vanderwood, 2014 [1982]) and other armed groups that (used to) sell protection against cattle rustling or banditry in Mexico[24]. In Colombia, an ensemble of private enterprises, settled in high risk areas, and in close collaboration with the Army, established the so-called *Convivir* (living together)[25]. Such militarized private groups were used as counter-insurgency measures (Grajales, 2016). In fact, some of the violent groups described above, might even qualify more as hybrids than strictly nongovernmental.

Concerning privately sold state protection, the Mexican Auxiliary Police could be a good example. These private police bodies, generally attached to local police departments, were created back in the 1920s to meet the security demand of certain economic actors, notably the financial sector (*-x,y,z* plane). Payed by private individuals, these bodies used to be in

[22] On the MST see Bleil, 2012.
[23] Quotation marks from the original.
[24] I will discuss these groups later on Chapter 4.
[25] According to Grajales (2016) *Convivir* may be translated to French as *vivre ensemble* (living together) (p. 199) while Moncada (n.d.) suggests the translation "living in harmony" (p. 5) stressing the paradox that the name and kind of group assumes. I stick to Grajales' translation since it is closer to the regular use of the word in Spanish, which does not assume "harmony" as an inherent attribute (RAE, 2019).

charge of protection duties, such as watching over bank branches during the transfer of valuables[26].

The eight planes drawn out in Figure *ii*, as previously indicated, may overlap since violent actors might cross from one quadrant to another, being able to perform and protect legal and illegal actions. Indeed, some of the precedent examples clearly illustrate that the border dividing private guards and private armies illegally endorsed by the state are extremely porous. Even beyond, based on journalistic sources, archives and interviews, Martha K. Huggins documented the easy flow of on-duty police agents to rent-a-cops activities and, ultimately, to death squads members, either selling protection to land owners or avenging their murdered colleagues (Huggins, 2000a; Huggins, 1997). The Colombian *Convivir*, for instance, were formed to protect land owners (Grajales, 2016) and some of those groups are currently running protection organizations using racketeering in some neighbourhoods in the city of Medellin (Moncada, n.d).

Furthermore, the violent entrepreneur groups considered in the figure above are highly dynamic, as they are likely to change regarding their members' profiles, actions, resources, motivations, incentives, levels of organization or rapport with other (non)government violent actors, among other variables. In this direction, the case of the Brazilian *Comandos* is informative: what started as an ensemble of ex-cons, minor offenders and impoverished teenagers offering protection over the illegal gambling called *Jogo do Bicho* (Animal Game), became the dominant drug trade networks in Rio de Janeiro, the *Comando Vermelho*. Its operation lies on the friendship or kinship bonds of their leaders (who are generally serving jail terms), the retailers living in shantytowns and local police agents who protect them (Misse, 2007). The Chinese gangs operating in New York City might be another example, since they play the role of protectors in the prostitution market, but they also became operators and even investors in the Asian commercial sex business (Chin, 1996).

In such a context of policing multilateralization, one of the questions that the literature has barely answered is under what conditions are protection necessities satisfied rather by one or another violent entrepreneur. For instance, it remains unclear the variables that explain the decision of political elites to guarantee protection through an extra-legal group instead of via

[26] 5to. Batallón de la Policía Auxiliar del D.F. (October, 1956). [Boletín Informativo]. This police bodies are discussed in Chapter 4.

the on-duty agents (Campbell, 2000). From the "protection consumer" perspective, it could be advanced that the potential victim may chose the cheapest way to reduce damage, which be probably be to pay the original source of threat (the racketeer) (De Long, 2018). However, the elements to estimate what is cheap, or not, might be variables that deserve a deeper discussion.

Ideally, across this research, we should be in the position to examine the eight planes mentioned beforehand, since all of them are theoretically possible. Although protection transactions might be regular on actors' accounts, some of them are more likely to be kept secret, whether lawful or not (De Long, 2018), rendering the collection of empirical evidence on each of these cases difficult.

Even so, vast information allows to dive into five out of eight planes. The three potential scenarios where scarce information does not allow a complete analysis are the cases in which non-government agents protect illegal transactions (planes *x,-y-z; -x,-y-z; -x,y,-z*). Since the present research mostly relies on the accounts of businessmen and their perceptions, as will be detailed later, it is fair to say that my interlocutors are able to speak about state and non-state (even illegal) protection suppliers because, regardless of the nature of the provider, they (consumers) still see themselves as being located in the upper-world: they are still on the "good guys" side. It is also fair to consider that the interviewees would tend to omit possible practices of protecting illegal transactions because they would not be only seen as potential victims demanding protection, but also as active parties in these illegal transactions. Hence, complementary research is needed where the methodological design surpasses the inherent constraints of giving priority to the voice of this profile of businessmen. For instance, interviewing businessmen sentenced for some of these offenses could be a way to complete the landscape.

By now, and despite the identified flaw, the present research is able to offer a rich picture of protection partners' scenarios in which businessmen are part of. It must be kept in mind that the lack of information on certain planes of the figure does not necessarily mean that these protection scenarios do not occur in the field.

The exploration of the protection patterns' scenarios must certainly focus on multiple protection providers. Yet, it is important not to lose sight of the relations of exchange they and their (actual or potential) "clients" settle.

b. Protection providers and their (un)willing customers: a poorly explored rapport

Protection providing, as early evoked, may concern multiple potential customers: bus drivers paying "rent" to gang members in El Salvador (Martínez d'Aubuisson, 2015), the construction sector that, systematically transfer 10% of every contract value to drug cartels in Morelia, Michoacán (Martínez Trujillo, 2014), the agro-industrial sector in *Tierra Caliente* Michoacán (LeCour Grandmaison, 2019b) and even the migrants crossing from Central America to the US border, on the top of a cargo train (Mendoza, 2018). If anyone could need and demand protection, how to characterize the rapport between business sector and violent entrepreneurs?

Albeit being a key element on the protection market, businessmen understanding is largely neglected by scholars. A large corpus of academic research which deals with private militias, and other policing bodies, pays attention on them only marginally. If there is a constant approach it would be that, when it comes to protection patterns, businessmen could be reduced to militias sponsors, assuming that business sector's only resource is money. Even if, in some cases, the willingness of the economic sector on paying for protection is not taken for granted, the sector's (re)actions are generally overlooked. If anything, landowners or shopkeepers' resistance to pay an extortion is evoked only as it yields the creation of a self-defense group of whom, once again, economic elites are seen as funders.

While analysing paramilitaries and self-defence groups in Colombia[27], different authors show that businessmen, especially breeders, represented a key financial source for the army groups (Koessl, 2015; Rodrigues Fernandes, 1991). When J. Mazzei (2009) argues that behind paramilitary groups there is "a 'triad' of allied forces"[28] (p. 22) that provides what the violent groups need to carry out their activities, she claims that under such schema "a faction of the economic elite, provides finances, training sites and organizational necessities" (p.22)[29].

Despite how appealing the notion of "organizational necessities" sounds, since it might imply managerial or other skills attributed to businessmen profile, the author mostly refers to

[27] Literature about paramilitary and other violent actors in Colombia is vast. Some research on the topic evoked in this text are Koessl, 2015; De León Beltrán, 2014 and; Grajales, 2016.
[28] Quotation marks from the original.
[29] Along with the economic elite, the other two elements of the 'triad' are *i*) Political elite, who provide sense of legitimacy and impunity and; *ii*) Security Forces, who granted weapons and training. (Mazzei, 2009).

material supplies; according to Huggins (1997), in São Paulo in the late 1960s, a businessmen association paid for protection to a death squad, led by a police officer, while in Rio de Janeiro, in the mid-to-late 1970, a supermarket chain owner hired a similar violent group to protect his stores (Huggins, 2000b); Varese's (2001) research on Russian Mafia, discussed earlier, examines the protection that Mafiosi grant to the kiosk and small shops, while Chin (2003) argues that Taiwanese businessmen offer to gangsters "money making opportunities" (p. 17) in exchange of private security.

Although violent entrepreneurs and contexts evoked are largely different, in these cases, businessmen, landowners and shopkeepers are strictly seen as protection (un)willing customers, in a broad sense.

Conversely, and studying Calabrese Mafia, Rocco Sciarrone (2008) offer a whole customer typology (Table *ii*) where businessmen might adopt three possible attitudes regarding Mafia: 1) Victims, being completely subordinated to the conditions that criminal groups fix to provide protection; 2) Collusive, where businessmen agree on the exchange rapport with Mafia, seeking for a benefit; 3) Mafioso, meaning that business sector and Mafia are mixed. The typology shows that the agreements between Mafia and businessmen might range from the free negotiation of both parts (according to everyone interests) to an extortion schema where one part forces the other to participate in the deal, concurring with Misse's (2013) remarks on the Brazilian *arrêgo.*

Despite being research focused on how businessmen react facing the Mafia order, Sciarrone (2008) makes use of the customer standing point (through the discussion on the relations settled between providers and receivers of protection), to explore Mafia territorial control and social embeddedness. Consequently, businessmen's lead is only a useful window through which to observe the Mafia's performance.

Table *ii.* Typology of Mafia's protection customers

Businessmen type	Protection mode	Businessmen sub-type	Mafia-Businessmen rapport
Subordinated *(Victim)*	*Passive protection*: the only (provisional) guarantee that businessmen receive is to be able to continue exerting their activity	Oppressed	Dominance relation: the only option is to pay the requested "tribute". Businessmen are autonomous on the market.
		Dependent	They have to ask permission to keep working on their business. Their business opportunities are defined by the Mafia. Privileged rapport if the enterprise is able to provide supplies to mafioso-enterprises.
Collusive *(Accomplice)*	*Active protection*: businessmen seek a mutual exchange based on benefits, reciprocal collaboration, duties and loyalty	Instrumental	Businessmen are powerful enough to establish an agreement of exchange with Mafia members. The agreement lies on mutual economic interests based on the instrumental context and utilitarian evaluation. Every participant keeps his autonomy and the cooperation is conditional and contingent, hence pact tends to be constantly renegotiated and time-limited.
		Clients	Businessmen settle an exchange pattern in which they are customers. Stable and sustained (even personal) relationships among participants. Businessmen share *mafiosi* values and intentions supported by the collusion: "economic fraternity".
Mafioso	Mafiosi conduct entrepreneurial activities whether in the legal or illegal market		The enterprise depends on illegal rents. Mafia is the employer.

Source: Elaborated by the author based on Sciarrone (2008).

In his study on the institutionalized and normalized extortion that Chinese gangs exert over New York City communities, Ko-Lin Chin (1996) argues that shopkeepers' decision to pay or resist the extortion attempts depends on variables attributed to gang members (basically, how credible the threat is), but also on the retailers' profile. Hence, for example, if the gang member contacts the potential victim during the store's opening ceremony, a more conservative Chinese owner might prefer to pay and to avoid trouble, under the traditional belief that what happens on the first day of the store will condition the whole business destiny or; a business owner who speaks English fluently is more likely to report the threat to the police, while a former gang member who owns a store would deter extortion through their old networks. In other words, Chin outlines that the relationship settled between racketeers and their potential victims has vernacular components and might be explained considering not only the nature of the criminal actor, but also that of the economic actors.

Both, Sciarrone (2008) and Chin (1996) offer some leads that deserve deeper explanations. On the one hand, it is possible to presume that businessmen are not only passive victims who demand (or accept) protection from a diversity of possible providers. On the other hand, it seems like the profile of the economic sector, alongside the features of violent entrepreneurs, explain the different shapes of protection patterns.

More recently, Moncada (2017) builds on the political economy framework to inquire how the availability of certain political and economic resources could explain the diverse resistance patterns that firms adopt as racketeering victims. Thus, the level of access to coercive state agents autonomous from criminal actors (political resources) and legal sources of capital (economic resources) explain why some victims refuse to pay protection fees while others might negotiate their conditions of domination with victimizers. From there, Moncada breaks resistance down into two dimensions, visibility and intent[30], to provide four types: structural resistance, subversive resistance, everyday resistance and hidden resistance.

Moncada's research lays the foundations to analyse the racket victims' resistance from their available resources, assuming a pattern in which multiple protection providers (the regular included) might contribute to shaping the resistance dynamic. However, he does not go

[30] "Visibility refers to whether resistance is carried out privately beyond the eyes and ears of dominant actors, or publicly as part of the interaction between rulers and subjects. Intent refers to whether the objective is to end the asymmetric relationship or only to mitigate the terms of domination" (Moncada, 2017: 324)

deeper into the entanglement of the protection suppliers and how it also conditions victims' reactions.

Although the literature grants some attention to businesspeople as protection consumers, from the previous review, it is fair to state that a twofold gap is identifiable. On the one hand, despite the increasing research building on the entanglement of plural protection providers, its rapport with businessmen as potential consumers remains relatively unexplored. On the other hand, scholars dominantly conceive proprietors as victims of unwilling protection arrangements in which, in the best scenario, their margin to manoeuvre is defined by their capacity to purchase protection. Instead, the possibility of the economic elite mobilizing a wide ensemble of resources to fulfil their protection necessities and doing so, taking part in the protection production process, is a field mostly neglected.

Aiming to contribute to reducing this theoretical gap, the present research will focus on businessmen's protection patterns, enlarging the scope from their role as victims to active players on the field. Since the Mexican business sector is quite a broad category, it deserves a delimitation in both geographic and chronological dimensions,

ii. Guadalajara and its businessmen: defining the object of study

As previously mentioned, this research focuses on the case of the *Tapatio* business sector, although it puts it into the perspective of a wider landscape. This section provides a discussion to support the decision of selecting Guadalajara as the main field. First, a general review of the literature concerning Mexican businessmen will be informative on establishing basic notions regarding this population yet, simultaneously, sheds light on the remaining empirical gaps. Second, I provide some elements to support the selection of Guadalajara businessmen as a worthwhile case to study, and to delimit the time frame of the analysis. Finally, I provide a characterization of *Tapatio* businessmen through their own narratives (emic definition) and other sources that contribute to better understand the kind of actor we are dealing with.

Studies about the Mexican business sector have been largely fed by, at least, three non-mutually exclusive perspectives. In first place, the history of enterprises has contributed to characterizing its organizational transformation from the economic units and trading houses (*casas mercantiles*) settled since the Colonial period, to the large multinational firms, characteristic of globalization (Marichal, 2007). Secondly, situated as an elite group,

proprietors have been analysed as part of those exerting power, disentangling the breeding grounds for the emergence of a network of power, as well as the links settled with other groups of power (Gómez Valle, 2018; Hurtado and Cortés, 2004; Camp, 2002; Puga, 1993; Camp, 1990). The analysis of the state-business relations has been another quite prolific avenue to inquire about the sector, especially during the mid-1990s (Montesinos, 2005; Thacker, 2000; Heredia, 1996; Alba Vega, 1996; Alba, 1993; Alba and Krujit, 1988). The latter approach is particularly useful for this research, as the rapport settled between government and the business sector is the backdrop of the protection patterns settled, at least, from what can be retrieved from the prior theoretical discussion.

The variety of studies considering, from a historical perspective, the relationship settled between political and economic realms are consistent on stating long periods in which business sector has passed from subordination to contestation and from there to strategic alliances.

In broad terms, it is possible to start the account from the post-revolutionary state formation and the foundation of the National Federation of Chambers of Commerce (CONCANACO), founded in 1916, and the National Federation of Chambers of Industry (CONCAMIN), founded in 1917. Both business federations, that nested businessmen from the two main sectors, achieved an agreement with the Government according to which the economic elite would take part in the political decision-making process only through the collaborative instruments agreed on by the government (Montesinos, 2005). For the government, that would mean the beginning of corporatisation and alignment of the economic sector. For the businessmen members of the federation this signified being part of an organization able to affect the political and economic landscape in a period of high instability. Towards the late-1920s, the government had the initiative to promulgate the Federal Labour Law and, from there, to corporatize the working classes integrating them into the emerging National Revolutionary Party (PNR) (Montesinos, 2005) precedent of the Institutional Revolution Party (PRI), which ran the country for more than 70 years. Consequently, the *Grupo Monterrey*[31] headed the creation of the Employer's Federation of the Mexican Republic (COPARMEX), which served the aim to protect employees from the effects of the government's moves and, in that sense, dissent with the government. Tensions were

[31] *Grupo Monterrey* is an ensemble of 19 families that were originally organized by distributing among themselves the productive activities of the Mexican northern city of Monterrey, Nuevo León (Basañez, 2002).

reinforced during the President Lázaro Cárdenas's (1934-1940) administration, especially as he promulgated the nationalization of the petroleum industry, seen as an affront to proprietors (Montesinos, 2005; Alba Vega and Krujit, 1988).

In 1941, the Government of Manuel Ávila Camacho (1940-1946) promulgated the *Ley de Cámaras* (Chambers' Ban)[32], through which the Chambers's federations became corporatists, centralized and hierarchical (Tirado, 2006) and mandatory nested all businessmen in two main groups: CONCANACO and CONCAMIN (Mizrahi, 1992).

The law contributed to demarcate the business sector's margin to manoeuvre, channelling their influence towards the economic realm, constraining their participation via consultative councils where they could bring their concerns. As the affiliation to a federation was compulsory and the Government had the prerogative to dismantle or create such entities, they achieved to discourage political participation (Basañez, 2011 [1981]; Tirado, 2006; Mizrahi, 1992). The corporatization of the sector through the federation membership laid the foundations of the so-called "*alianza para las ganancias"* (*Mutual profits alliance),* institutionalizing a pattern of collaborative bonds between businessmen and government that would last for around 30 years: "The alliance presupposed a tacit division of labour between the economic and political realms. Businessmen agreed to have a low profile and tolerated the PRI's revolutionary and anti-business rhetoric, in exchange of the guarantee of an economic environment that allow them to do good business" (Mizrahi, 1992: 748). The alliance also meant two main (and not mutually exclusive) kinds of relationships with the government, the corporatist (through the federations) and the personalized individual contact established with public officers. Businessmen became a pressure group, although constrained to economic policy and far from, for instance, electoral issues (Mizrahi, 1992).

The alliance was not free from tension and progressively other organizations employing voluntary membership basis, gained importance. Thus, COPARMEX and the Mexican Businessmen's Council (CMHN) represented the multiplication of more independent, even dissenting, participation spaces (Tirado, 2006; Thacker, 2000).

The 1970s represented the outdated version of the developmental economic model and the emergence of deeper fissures within the alliance settled between the government and

[32] Ley de Cámaras de Comercio e Industria, Diario Oficial de la Federación, Ciudad de México, August 16th, 1941.

businessmen. The Business Coordinating Council (CCE), founded in 1975, was evidence that the business sector actually had a political-ideological position (Alba Vega, 1996) which, beyond economic policy, was related to issues that used to fall out of their agendas, such as government foreign policy (Montesinos, 2005) or domestic policy regarding the uprising of *guerrilla* movements and the unsatisfactory way the government was handling it (Alba Vega, 1996). The role that the business sector was playing in the political realm was about to change.

The 1980s economic crisis, which began the so-called "lost-decade", deepened the conflicts between the *priista*[33] government and businessmen, which crystallized with the nationalization of the bank decree in 1982 by President José López Portillo (1976-1982)[34]. For his successor, Miguel de la Madrid (1982-1988) the challenge was to restore the alliance with the business sector within a context in which market-oriented reforms would start taking place (Heredia, 1996). Such transformations were consolidated during the administration of President Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-1982), a period in which rather than the conciliation with the business sector in general terms, a little ensemble of businessmen were privileged with the profitable privatization of public enterprises (Alba Vega, 1996). A new business sector was coming together, more diverse and willing to participate in politics. The expansion of international capital mobility and the arrival of multinationals represented several nuances in what has been described as the "ups and downs" of the state-business relationship.

Despite how informative and significant the literature evoked has been, there are two patterns that shall be noticed and which represent a sort of blind spot. First, this analysis is prone to read diverse cycles as clear-cut periods or either "alliance" or "tension" between economic and political powers. Even when recognizing the tension during the periods of collaboration or the other way around, diving deeper into these apparent counter-wise behaviours remains poorly explored. On the other hand, although the Northern city of Monterrey, Nuevo Leon has historically been the main industrial pole of the country, the significance granted to the

[33] Adjective to refer PRI members.
[34] In his sixth and last State of the Nation Address, the President José López Portillo (1976-1982) announced his decision to nationalize banks as a measure to temper the damages of the increasing economic crisis. That decision led to the breaking of ties between the political elite and bankers that had been established and cultivated for almost 60 years (Isunza Vera, 2001; Basañez, 2011).

Northern businessmen obscures the weight of other regions of the country and, consequently, particular dynamics coexisting with the "big picture" describe above. Since not all businessmen from the distinct regions were equally benefited by the alliances (or affected by the tension) settled with the government (Alba Vega, 1992), devoting a deeper analysis through a regional perspective seems pertinent.

If the state-business bonds have been widely discussed, the effect of this on the (in)security and violence context is much less explored. This entails a significant loophole as the economic elite have accredited as key actors in shaping the economic and political landscape, but practically neglected when referring to analyse on criminality and violent patterns observed in Mexico.

Reduced to the role of wealthy victims of property crimes, some of the economic elite have been marginally analysed, although in recent years, amidst the proliferation of studies and publications regarding the increasing criminal violence observed in the country since 2007, certain light has been shed upon businessmen. The stand point of this initial analysis is, broadly speaking, to consider that due to the weakness of Mexican organized civil society, the cases in which citizens achieve advancing their concerns regarding crime rates and violence patterns, or to positively affect the panorama are those in which the business sector is active and able to mobilize their resources to address the problem. Aligned with the evoked inclination to concentrate observations on Northern cities, cases as the border cities of Ciudad Juárez, Tijuana and Monterrey have already been explored (Moncada, 2017; Medeiros Passos, 2018; Signoret, 2008; CIDAC, 2015; Conger, 2014).

Some of these studies, in the form of policy papers, outline how Northern businessmen succeed to establish fruitful dialogue with law enforcers and other authorities to express their concerns and to settle citizen observatories able to monitor public agency performance and to report crime figures and other information to the public (CIDAC, 2015; Conger, 2014). More than solid findings, what these documents provide are illustrative cases and, more crucial, they appeal to questions worthy to address through a deeper analysis. Precisely, academic research has started going in this direction, inquiring on the importance of the business sector in shaping public security policies, including the controversial intervention of the Army to manage the increasing violence patterns and the creation and reform of local police bodies (Passos 2018; Signoret, 2008). It seems, then, that the business sector could affect the criminal and violent context, at least more than raising their collective voices. In

addition, from their role as "victims", it has been advanced that they are able to exert certain agency regarding their extorters (Moncada, 2017), which makes it relevant to observe in greater detail what being a "victim" implies.

Despite its valuable contributions, two limitations are visible in this work. First, as already advanced, it is focused on the performance of the contemporary business sector, delimited by a violence crisis triggered in the 2007, when the then President Felipe Calderón launched a Security Strategy which, through deploying Armed Forces in several regions, confronted the main DTOs and its leaders[35]. Without neglecting the importance of these measures and their possible effects, starting the analysis at this point means overlooking a longer and more significant trajectory regarding both, crime and violence patterns and the business contribution in shaping or transforming them. For instance, in a recent article based on archival work, Flores Pérez (2019) claims that, in the 1930s, outstanding businessmen from Monterrey in alliance with other opponents to Lázaro Cárdenas's government (1934-1940) contributed to enabling smuggling routes, mostly seeking to bring fire-arms from the US, to support a rebellion attempt of the General Juan Andrew Almazán, precisely military head of the Northern region. These routes were, eventually, used for drug trafficking. Such an interesting finding seems like the tip of a long-forgotten iceberg. Little, if anything, is known about the business sector's role in the establishment of the drug trafficking market and the violence recently associated with this market. The same pattern is observable regarding other violent periods, such the 1970s when *guerrilla* movements and counter-insurgency state policy bathed the country. Indeed, Flores Pérez himself brings such information to the table in an aim to review the collusive links that the political elite and drug traffickers had historically settled. Thus, businessmen (more accurately, a set of Northern industrialists) are incidental characters in his account. However, this finding emphasizes the importance of surpassing the conjectural violence perspective and enlarge the scope to better understand current violence and crime patterns, the political-criminal configurations and, ultimately, the role that businessmen had played in such configurations.

Secondly, as in the literature devoted to the relationship between the state and businessmen, attention has been concentrated on the Northern region providing rich information meanwhile other areas remain barely explored. Certainly, cities such as Ciudad Juárez,

[35] Some details on the strategy launched during Calderón's administration will be provided later in the text.

Tijuana and Monterrey have experienced unprecedented levels of violence in the last ten years, however, nowadays this situation is unfortunately found in many other areas of the country.

Thereupon, the selection of the present case has been selected based on being: 1) a region with a significant presence of businessmen; 2) a city in which some nuances in the state-businessmen rapport can be observed and; 3) one in which insecurity and violence has reached significant levels.

Considering these factors, I propose to address the case of the businessmen established in the city of Guadalajara, more accurately, the six municipalities that constitute the Guadalajara Metropolitan Area (GMA): Guadalajara, Zapopan, Tonalá, Tlajomulco, Tlaquepaque and El Salto (See Map *i*)[36].

Guadalajara, the capital city of the Western state of Jalisco, is the third largest Metropolitan Area of the country with a population around 4'500,000 inhabitants, ranking only behind Mexico City and Monterrey. It is also the third economic pole as the GMA contributes with about the 4% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Although, as mentioned, the Metropolitan Area has six municipalities, most of the economic units are concentrated in municipalities of Guadalajara (43.6%) and Zapopan (21.6%)[37].

Jalisco's economic history will be discussed considering some important turning points which will be useful to visualize the sector and, most importantly, to serve as a foundation for the chronological delimitation of the research.

Although the commercial activity has been on the Jalisco landscape since it was the *Neva Galicia* in colonial times, the 20th Century represents the consolidation of the state as an economic centre. In the 1930s, a market constituted by small capital, abundant labour force and about five routes connecting the state with the rest of the country, established Jalisco as a producer and trader of basic consumer goods (Arias, 1999). In the 1970s, the Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) economic model enabled the development of a domestic industry, highly protected by the state and, in these terms, Jalisco was not exceptional. In the late 1970s, however, the ISI began to display signs of faltering, thus, the 1980s represented

[36] In some cases, there are considered as "external" the municipalities of *Ixtlahuacan de los Membrillos* and *Juanacatlán*. However, they will not be considered in this research as their industrial and business activity is marginal regarding the other six "central" municipalities.
[37] "Zona Metropolitanas de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos*"* (INEGI, 2014).

a stage of several transformations for the *Tapatio* business sector, for instance, due to the enormous economic crisis of 1982, the lack of regional development projects brought the extinction of medium-size business which was unable to survive without the government assistance; commercial companies from Monterrey and Mexico City opened branches in Guadalajara, bringing business competition and challenging the family-owned firms that had proliferated. The commercial openness that occurred during the 1990s, represented the arrival of some multinational companies and, despite not being a border state, assembly plants (*maquilas*) especially in the sector of Information Technologies (Martínez Réding, 2005; Arias, 1999), establishing what nowadays is known as the "Mexican Silicon Valley"[38].

Concerning the second criteria of selection for the case, the relationship between businessmen and local government in Jalisco does not fit with the precedent account. Indeed, to some extent, *Tapatio* businessmen have gone in a distinct direction from their peers from other regions. For instance, while their membership to CONCANACO and CONCAMIN inhibited the participation of businessmen in the political arena for purposes other than the economic agenda, *Tapatio* businessmen settled different mechanisms opposite to such a trend. Hence, Guadalajara was the only case in which the municipality has, along with an elected mayor, an appointed vice-mayor (*vicepresidente municipal*), a position usually occupied by a member of the business elite. *Tapatios* also founded different entities in which they shared chairs with the local government, such as the *Banco Refaccionario*[39] and the Municipal Collaboration Council[40] (Alba Vega, 1992). Currently, its diversity is also expressed in a number of different business chambers as well as those who decided not to take part in the associations.

In association with crime and violence patterns, Jalisco has been specially affected. This subject will be discussed in-depth in the next chapters, as Jalisco has serious problems with forced disappearances. Indeed, the Governor Enrique Alfaro (2018-2024) recently recognized a figure of about 7,117 missing persons (ONC, 2019) revealing this as a major problem in the entity. Homicides had grown 95,58% from 2015 to 2018 which, according to

[38] "El Silicon Valley mexicano está en Jalisco". (March 13th, 2017). *El País*; "Guadalajara, Ciudad Inteligente", (August, 2014); *Gazette Bank of Images 1970-2016*.
[39] A *crédito refaccionario* refers to a credit coming from money invested in manufacturing or repairing something with profit not only for the subject to whom it belongs, but also for other creditors or individuals interested in it (RAE, 2019). The bank was created in 1930 with 80% of public capital and 20% of private associates (Martínez Réading, 2005).
[40] This entity will be discussed later in Part II.

the press could be attributed to the so-called *Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación* (CJNG). Press releases have also pointed out the existence of clandestine graves within abandoned houses located in shantytowns in Guadalajara[41]. Certainly, the accuracy of the previous figures merits discussion as they could imply significant bias, due to the fact that offenses are under-reported and crimes such as forced disappearances (and kidnapping) are quite difficult to determine. In addition, it is not evident the way these trends could affect businessmen. However, these statistics are part of a general landscape that allowing us to consider Jalisco in general, and Guadalajara in particular, as a dangerous context.

That said, a time frame shall be defined because, as mentioned previously, *Tapatio* businessmen possess a long-lasting socio-professional profile. The following section aims to explore how, the 1980s-1990s were turning points for the business sector in Mexico and Jalisco, offering strong elements to consider it a reference to delimit the study and settle some contextual conditions which underpin the *Taptio* business sector.

a. Chronological delimitation: the 1980s-1990s as a turning point

The 1980s and 1990s were years in which deep changes to the Mexican landscape took place regarding, at least, two dimensions: the economic model and the political field. In both transformations, businessmen played significant roles which, at the same time, entailed the reshaping of their own profiles.

After the Washington Consensus[42], the CEPAL[43] economic development model gave way to one based on deep reforms, betting on the liberalization of market forces (Ocampo, 2008). This new paradigm started reducing the size of the government. Between 1982 and 1988, either through privatisation, fusion or liquidation, the government dis-incorporated 155 state firms, and another 155 between 1988 and 1992 (Rogozinski, 1998). For businessmen, the accelerated process of public agency privatization involved the expansion of not only their

[41] "En Jalisco, 5 mil casas abandonadas son tierra fertile de fossa clandestinas". (September 21st, 2018). *Reporte Índigo*; "Las fosas a un lado de tu casa". (June 26th, 2019). *Amapola*.
[42] Decalogue formulated to synthesize what was considered as the financial reform agenda that Latin American countries should adopt (Altimir et al., 2008)
[43] Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL). It was characterized by a strong state intervention in the economic life. It implied the state financing of selected industrial sectors, as well as a new tax base supported mostly on domestic activity (Ocampo, 2008).

autonomy of decision (Heredia, 1996) but also the puzzling process of running their firms without the government's protection[44].

Notwithstanding the marked-oriented economy and the privatisation some proprietors benefited from, they were able to participate in new (and quite profitable) markets, the unequal distribution of such advantages mirrored the ancient asymmetries within the sector (Heredia, 1996). Thus, while some businessmen observed how their fortunes grew while they introduced themselves in new markets, others had to close or reinvent their companies[45].

Mexico's entry into the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994 reinforced the challenge as it progressively eliminated the protection barriers that covered the national firms, forcing them to operate within competing trade rules, although under uneven conditions regarding both, international capital and the small ensemble of businessmen benefited from the privatization process (Thacker, 2000).

The state-businessmen rapport also shifted. In contrast to the tension businessmen had experienced with the *priista* governments until the early 1980s, the NAFTA negotiation allowed technocratic bureaucrats to set up a "competing trade policing coalition" with certain business sectors who were included in the trade agreement signing and implementation process (Thacker, 2000). Once again, such a fruitful alliance only included a few outstanding profiles.

In the political arena, this was "a period of a significant change in the institutional setting in which Mexican politics took place" (Serrano, 1998: 7). Along with electoral system reform, a gradual opening to partisan competition occurring at that moment, among other effects, implied transformation within political parties. The historical opposition parties finally became actual rivals for the hegemonic PRI. For the National Action Party (PAN), this signified an increasing ambition to win elections, yet implied assuming the cost of jeopardizing its internal unity and platform coherence (Serrano, 1998) as the political party opened their doors to new profiles.

Precisely, the *quintessential* of those "new profiles" were businessmen who, as explained before, had had a limited participation in the electoral field. It must be recalled that the PAN is a political party founded in 1939 in opposition to the post-revolutionary regime, advancing

[44] More details on privatization pattern and its consequences for business sector are discuss across the text.
[45] This point will be more widely developed later in the text.

the principles of humanism and mostly related with conservative pro-religious profiles and situated at the centre-right on the ideological spectrum. PAN was described as a "loyal opposition" since it was a political force that supported the interests of a minority but amidst the limits of the institutional rules (Loaeza, 1974). Offering a place for businessmen who were seeking ways of participating that chambers and federations did not grant, the party took in pragmatic and non-ideological profiles (Mizrahi, 2003; Loaeza, 1999).

It must be underlined that the PAN, despite the strength of its ideology, was a small and weak structure when the medium-sized and small regional businessmen joined the party (Mizrahi, 2003). Consequently, the party experienced numerous internal conflicts between the "traditionalist" wing, (ideology oriented), and *"neopanistas"*, those encouraging more active participation in local politics (Nuncio, 1986) and mostly oriented towards winning elections. Even considering that the party's political ideology was not totally alien to businessmen, *neopanism* implied the re-signification of the *panista* identity.

Although the PAN was the oldest opposition party, this risk-averse organization was not close to winning elections until the early 1980s (Loaeza, 2010). The electoral reforms that took place since the late-1970s yielded *panistas* the opportunity to be competitive at the ballot box (Mizrahi, 2003) which is where businessmen's participation was crucial.

Between 1983 and 1988, the structure of the PAN grew across the country, wining municipal elections and developing what the scholars called *neopanismo* (Modoux, 2006; Mizrahi, 2003; Loaeza, 1999) a term that refers the politicization of businessmen (Loeza, 1999) or more precisely, the participation of proprietors in partisan life. In 1989, Ernesto Ruffo Appel, a long-standing businessman in Baja California, became the first Governor coming from the ranks of the opposition party. He had joined the PAN in 1984 and with only a two year career, he won the municipal elections becoming mayor of Ensenada, Baja California's capital city. Ruffo's victory as Baja California Governor became the first of many successive *neopanista* electoral conquests*:* Carlos Medina in Guanajuato (1991-1995); Francisco Barrio in Chihuahua (1992-1998); Vicente Fox in Guanajuato (1995-1999); Alberto Cárdenas in Jalisco (1995-2001) and; Francisco Canales in Nuevo León (1997-2003). Additionally, in 1988 PAN contested for the Presidential Election represented by Manuel Clouthier, a businessman that was actually competitive regarding the candidate of the hegemonic party and whose campaign confirmed PAN's transformation.

Certainly, *neopanismo* represented a new opposition as their new members' profile meant diverse perspectives, experience, resources and organizational skills (Loaeza, 1999; Mizrahi, 1992).

Beyond the radicalization of certain businessmen, *neopanismo* also meant businessmen's access to government positions as they participated in electoral campaigns and/or were appointed to participate in local cabinets (Gómez Valle, 2018; Loaeza, 1999; Mizrahi, 2003). Simultaneously, this represented the explicit overlapping of these two realms or, at least, enabled a sort of revolving door as businessmen became public officers and, although they used to leave their firms under the authority of some else (usually a family member), they were still businessmen and, in fact, some of them eventually returned to lead their firms.

Crowdfunding was another opportunity for businessmen to take advantage of within the partisan structure. In that regard, the association *Amigos de Fox* ([Vicente] Fox's Friends) is quite informative. Aiming to collect financial support to drive Vicente Fox to the Presidential election in 2000, a group of businessmen created *Amigos de Fox.* Using marketing strategies, they launched a campaign towards the public, becoming crucial in the victory that Fox obtained.

The 1980s-1990s was clearly a period defined by the arrival of businessmen to partisan life and explicit political participation. Yet, it was also a period of resurgence in the region (Isunza Vera, 2001), the municipalization of politics (Lujambio, 2009; Loaeza, 1999) as municipalities and states were the privileged poles where the main political transformations occurred. This implied bringing to life the old discussion about the Federal Pact, or the agreement of sovereignty of each of the states integrating the Mexican Federal System. The centralism exerted by the PRI for more than fifty years was contested once opposition parties started winning positions of power at the local level, enabling a discussion around a new Federal Pact (Díaz Cayeros, 1995).

In Jalisco, the *neopanismo* experienced PAN first victory at the state level was in 1995, when Alberto Cárdenas ran for Governor and won. The candidates of his party also conquered two-thirds of the seats in the local Congress (Arellano Ríos, 2011; Arellano Ríos, 2014) and 52 out of 123 municipalities of the state, including those of the GMA[46]. According to Modoux

[46] México Electoral. Estadísticas Federales y Locales, 1970-2004 [compact disc]. Estudios Económicos y Sociopolíticos, Banamex.

(2006), Jalisco is a delayed case in terms of PAN's victories at the municipal level, due to a *petite bourgeoisie* that tried to hold on to its privileges, adopting an ambiguous attitude towards the party, offering on and off support to this right-oriented party. Nevertheless, *Tapatio* businessmen accessed PAN ranks even before Cárdenas' victory, as they had been contributing since the late 1980s during the presidential campaign of Manuel Clouthier (Valle Gómez, 1995). Through an association called Integral Human Development Civil Association (DHIAC) *Tapatio* businessmen got involved in Clouthier's campaign but, mostly, in other agendas such as "the permanent struggle for responsible freedom against statism" (Gómez Valle, 1995: 23).

The mid-1990s represented the direct and explicit participation of businessmen in Jalisco's political arena, not only through their labour within the campaign financing committees, but also because the new Governor Alberto Cárdenas included some of them in his cabinet.

The victory of Alberto Cárdenas has been described as unexpected as well as bathed in the enormous legitimacy that the electoral process granted to the first *panista* administrations across the country. However, scholars also claim that Jalisco's electoral alternation was not a programmatic but a pragmatic transformation of the political field (Arellano, 2011). The expectation that a businessman would run the state's administration with the efficiency they led their companies, became a critical view towards characters that were described as amateurs (Arellano, 2011). The two subsequent *panista* administrations, namely, Francisco Ramírez Acuña's (2000-2006) and Emilio González Márquez's (2006-2012), did not improve this impression.

Concerning public security, the period of the 1980s and 90s was also a turning point in Jalisco. Indeed, Cárdenas' electoral victory has been partially explained by the PRI's incompetence to manage a severe security crisis and the increasing violence the state was confronting then (Arellano, 2011; Arellano, 2004).

The administration of Guillermo Cossío Vidaurry (1989-1992) was "the expression of the prototype of the classical *priísta* (PRI's member or supporter), politician of the *ancien régime*" (Arellano, 2004: 89), as it was characterized by corruption and nepotism. In 1992, a dozen of gasoline ducts in the sewage system exploded in a centric district of the city, leaving an aftermath of 200 dead, almost 70 missing persons and more than 1,400 injured. The

catastrophe, which exhibited a corrupt government unable to prevent the explosions and to manage the crisis[47], prompted the ousting of Cossio from office[48].

The Acting Governor Carlos Rivera Aceves (1992-1995) inherited the insecurity crisis and devoted the next three years to temper the social unease. However, the security crisis escalated and became more complex due to the confrontation of drug trafficking cartels, which provoked violent episodes in broad daylight, among which the assassination of the Cardinal Juan Jesús Posadas Ocampo was probably the more impressive for the public.

Although some of the prior episodes will be detailed in the next chapters, thus far, it is possible to observe how market-oriented reforms and *neopanismo* concurred with an insecure and violent context. In other words, determining factors were set to witness the increasing participation of businessmen in the public security agenda.

Considering the importance of the period (1980s-1990s) as a turning point at the national and local level, I propose using it as an analytical point of reference. This research will consider a decade before such turning point to be able to better observe the potential changes occurring then. Although the delimitation of time will be from the 1970 to nowadays, the reader will notice that, sometimes, a backward glance is provided since it grants a better perspective on current dynamics.

Once stated that the *Tapatio* businessmen will be the population of study, this socio-professional category will be explored in greater detail. The following subsection aims to describe some of the main attributes of this group, which will serve as the basis of the rest of the discussion.

b. Characterizing Tapatio *businessmen*

Jalisco, since its origin, has been associated with conservative values, due mainly to the influence that the Catholic Church has exerted historically in the region (Vaca, 2006). Although Jalisco's identity might have change over time, there are three features which are still visible: the historical distance from the country centre, the importance of catholic

[47] La mañana en que Guadalajara parecía zona de guerra. (April 22nd, 2017). *El Universal*.
[48] Cossio's resignation was a direct result of the general crisis in Jalisco, albeit it is not exceptional regarding the national landscape of those times. By way of illustration, it is important to remember that during former President Carlos Salinas' administration, 17 governors left the power before the end of their mandate. Among them, five cases were related to major conflicts (Martínez Assad, 2001).

principles within private and public life and their self-perception as *castizos*[49] within *castizos* (Doñán, 2011; Vaca, 2006). These are also attributes of the business sector.

Even though *Tapatio,* the demonym of Guadalajara inhabitants, is supposedly of indigenous origin (coming from triad or triplet) (Doñán, 2011), *Tapatios* proudly recall how racial mixing and religious syncretism[50], which has marked the country since the Spanish Conquest, was marginal in *Nueva Galicia* (nowadays Jalisco), where the Spaniards settled at will[51]. In addition, studies on *Jalisciense* identity has emphasized how the region remained distant from Mexico's construction during both, the Independence War (1810-1921) and the Mexican Revolution (1910-1917[52]), two milestones in Mexican history (Doñán, 2011; Vaca, 2006; Murià, 2006). Conversely, while the post-revolutionary government promulgated a secular regime across the country, in Jalisco and other western states, the armed resistance known as *Cristera Rebelion* (1926-1929) arose confronting catholic peasants and *rancheros*[53] with the anti-clergy Federal Government (Pérez-Rayón, 2004)[54].

These factors help explain the deep roots of Catholicism, along with the emergence of regional pride and the historical rejection local elites show towards central domain, and even certain autonomist intentions in some periods. Paradoxically, Jalisco is the cradle of the seminal symbols of Mexican identity, namely *tequila*, *mariachi* and *charros* (Alarcón Menchaca, 2006). *Tapatios,* then, inhabit a space where there has been a historic tension between two notions: "Jalisco is Mexico"[55] and "*Jaliscienses,* mostly *güeritos*[56]*,* are those who look the least Mexican"[57].

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[49] "Well-born or from a good caste" (DRAE, 2019)

[50] Being aware of the discussions that the term "syncretism" raises among anthropologists as it could be pejorative or assume the superiority of one culture over the other, I use it to evoke a cultural mixture resulting in fusion and colloids (Stewart, 1999).

[51] Interviews conducted with Andrés González (Pseudonym), Service Sector Businessman. (October, 30th, 2015); Javier Hurtado, Scholar. (January 19th, 2017). Zapopan, Jal.; Juan José Doñán, Journalist. (October 3rd, 2015), Guadalajara, Jal. The methodological details on the interviews will be provided in the next section.

[52] There is no consensus on the ending of the Mexican Revolution. For some authors, 1917 is the end of the armed conflict marked by the Constitution promulgation. Others consider as part of this historical chapter the institutionalization of the regime which replaced the oligarchic and neo-colonial State settled in the S. XIX (Garciadiego, 2008). For a general revision on Mexican Independence War see Jáuregui (2008) and Vázquez, (2008).

[53] The term *ranchero* refers to people owning (or living) in ranches, mainly dedicated to farms production. (DEM, 2019). On the *ranchera* society in Mexico see Barragán López et al., (1994)

[54] For a detailed revision on *Cristera Rebelion* see the three volumes of Meyer (1973).

[55] Phrased coined for the Jalisco's Government in 1995 to reinforce tourism sector (Alarcón Menchaca, 2006).

[56] Mexican term to refer a blond person (*güero*). *Güerito* as its diminutive (DEM, 2019).

[57] Interview conducted with Andrés González (Pseudonym), Service Sector Businessman. (October, 30th, 2015).

Businessmen are not excluded from such features. A systematic review of the *Gaceta Mercantil*, the internal Chamber of Commerce publicaton[58], shows that from the 1970s to the early 1990s, the bond between the elite clergymen and businessmen was close and quite visible. For instance, every year, when the new Chamber's board members take possession, in a kind of ceremony, they visit what they refer to as the "Jalisco authorities", namely, the mayors of Guadalajara and the Zapopan municipalities, the Governor of Jalisco and the Cardinal, demonstrating how clergy was seen as part of the local figures of authority for the association's members. Indeed, the Gazette also reports that the clergy was usually invited to meetings or events that took place in the Chamber and businessmen used to evoke them in their speeches. Progressively, these kinds of images disappeared from the Gazette pages, but the affection that part of the business sector had towards the Catholic elite remains[59]. Actually, even the youngest businessmen are alumni of private schools closely related to *Opus Dei* and other religious oriented entities. This is significant considering that since the 1950s, socialization spaces such as catholic seminaries or religious organizations in which they used to be members, were determinant to bond the future regional elite (Alba, 1993). Even if young *Tapatio* businessmen were not as devoted as their predecessors, religious affiliation is still an influence in their social and professional relations.

At this point, the reader will note the overuse of the term "business*men*" to refer to the group we are interested in. This is not due to a lack of sensitivity regarding gender equality enforced through language. Instead, it is an intentional way to put the reader in context amidst a men's world, such as the *Tapatio* business sector. The *Gaceta Mercantil* mirrors the scare presence of businesswoman within their ranks. From 1970s until the 2000s, women appeared in the Gazette pages playing two main roles: 1) As part of businessmen's staff, performing female related jobs, such as receptionists and secretaries, and receiving a space in the revues pages as beneficiaries of training courses offered by the Chamber or; 2) as businessmen's wives, fulfilling the role of their husbands' companions at elegant events or charitable ladies taking part of philanthropic causes[60].

Although businesswomen have gained importance in the *Tapatio* landscape in the last decades (Ocampo Jiménez, et. al. 2009), their profiles show how the *status quo* has not

[58] Gazette Bank of Images 1970-2016. The methodological details of the Gazette systematization are provided in the next section.
[59] Interview conducted with Javier Hurtado, Scholar. (January 19th, 2017). Zapopan, Jal.
[60] Gazette Bank of Images 1970-2016.

changed much as the business world is still a men's domain. To support such claim, it is possible to outline three features of the *Tapatia* businesswomen: 1) There are barely a dozen, recognized by their male peers as being "successful cases" yet they are not associated with the sector's transformation[61]; 2) Women's participation in the sector is mostly concentrated in micro-enterprises or constrained by their "limited ambitions" (Ocampo Jiménez et al. 2009: 411), when it comes to their career project. Even when they own large firms, the activity of such companies is not necessarily far from the influence of female roles. Thus, they participate in the industrial sector baking cakes on a large scale or sewing fancy clothes. Even when they run a more male-oriented firm, it is as heirs of their father's company[62]; 3) generally, women running important firms in Guadalajara are either single or divorced, reinforcing the idea of the incompatibility of leading a firm and raising a family. In the rare cases in which a married woman is also the head of a big company, her husband is most likely, leading a large multinational[63]. In other words, although those women accessed higher professional spheres, the asymmetry this dimension entails between husband and wife within home is not disrupted[64].

Businessmen see themselves as an outstanding group, different from others, not necessarily based on their wealth, but perhaps related to their level of education, their lineage and their role in the picture of Mexican progress. Effectively, the emic characterization of businessmen stands on three main pillars[65]: their profile as producers; their leaders' halo and; their social contribution.

First, businessmen describe themselves as *creators* and *creative*, since they formally produce something or diversify what is usually produced, building on their innovative perspective and their capacity to invest financial capital and infrastructure in such an endeavour. This is not constrained to industrialists since, according to them, commerce and service sector entrepreneurs also create concepts, markets and processes. In some cases, businessmen

[61] Fieldwork carnet, various dates intentionally omitted for anonymization purposes.
[62] *Idem*
[63] Informal conversation conducted with the researcher Alicia Ocampo Jiménez. (October 19th, 2015). Zapopan, Jal.
[64] For a discussion regarding the preservation of gender biased hierarchies and the different value granted to men and women performance in the field of employment see Kergoat (2001). On a larger perspective of Mexican businesswomen see Zabludovsky, (2004; 2001).
[65] I refer as "emic" the way in which *Tapatios* businessmen describe themselves and their peers as they are characterizing the system from inside. Following paragraphs are built in an ensemble of semi-structured interviews conducted with medium and large-size businessmen settled in Guadalajara. The methodological details of the interviews are provided later in the next section.

assume that their talent is to be able to seize opportunities and transform them into transcendental projects. Among the youngest businessmen, their perspective on their elder peers is that they were assemblers improving someone else's process or products, while belonging to their generation means being "ceaselessly creative"[66].

From these attributes, it is possible to realize that businessmen visualize themselves as key elements in the production system, going above and beyond possessing the means of production. Innovation, which aligns with the Schumpeterian approach to define businessmen (Schumpeter, 1983), is quite present in their accounts, illustrating how they embrace their role in transforming their production process and, simultaneously, the national economic landscape. It also can be noticed that, through this definition, they emphasize the difference between them and those inhabiting the informal sector. Thus, businessmen assume themselves to be legal players who are able to pay the costs of following the rules, which could condition their accounts towards a socially desirable position, overstating lawful compliance.

The second pillar refers their personal profile, rather than the characteristics of their firms. Hence, they picture themselves as talent managers or developers, leaders, risk takers with a great frustration to tolerance. Reading together the prior attributes, the image of a man who turns a small initiative into a large firm, after facing so many challenges can be visualized. That lays the foundations of the "self-made" man who yields a difference between them and the so-called *new rich,* who might be wealthy but not necessarily born into wealth. This aspect will be widely discussed across this research, however, at this point, the importance of family affiliation and certain social trajectory as variables explaining cleavages within business sector must be noted.

Finally, *Tapatio* businessmen evoke their contribution to economic and social landscape, while doing their job. Aside from philanthropic endeavours, which will be retrieved later in the dissertation, they interpret part of their firms' outcomes and business decisions as contributions for the collective. Thus, they enlist variables as jobs creation, tax payment, wealth-generating, and triggering economic growth as evidence proving that their personal profit seeking does not vies with benefiting society. Certainly, their contribution, if any, is approached from development paradigm rather than wealth fair (re)distribution frame.

[66] Interview conducted with José Julio Huerta, Industrial Sector. (October 17th, 2015). Zapopan, Jal.

Despite that, from this pillar, they reinforce the image of a gap separating them from reprehensible entrepreneurs, whose are looking forward of nothing but making money. It also catches the eye how, while describing themselves, political participation barely appears in their accounts albeit, as explored before, *Tapatio* businessmen have been major actors within the political field. Furthermore, that supposes an image of political and economic spheres as clearly delimited and separated, assumption that will be deeply contested throughout this research.

The emic definition entails that businessmen, beyond their talents, see themselves as outstanding role models, who deserves social recognition (Puga, 1993). The three pillars sustaining the self-description are quite telling in such regard, however, they share an element that shall be noticed: the identification of different kinds of *tapatios* doing business, namely the formal (contrasted with informal), those with a linage and trajectory (different from the *new riches*) and those producing collective wealth and not only individual profits.

This precedent set of cleavages recognized within the sector could be referred as "inner-divides", which show that the label "*Tapatio* businessmen" entail a diverse group. As will be explained in the following chapters, other of their characteristics, related to such diversity, arise from this point.

Jalisco's economy, as early stated, is considered one of the most diversified of the country (Kahn, 2017; Alba, 1993), going from the classic consumption good production to the information technology vibrant industry. That entails different profiles and modes to understand and exert the businessmen's trade.

One of the contrasts between the diverse type of businessmen has to do with the associative life's weight. Some proprietors, mostly the elders, are quite active in business associations, settling deep bonds with their peers and shaping the image of the whole sector. Business chambers has been historically significative as politicization spaces, meaning both, a breeding ground for political positions and preferences expressions, but also a spot enabling particular ties with political elites (Gómez Valle, 2018; Basañez, 2011 [1981]; Puga, 1993; Mizrahi, 1992). In 1996, the business chambers federations' membership became facultative, witnessing the emergence of a variety of regional and national chambers and association. Some rich and powerful, others barely visible (Tirado, 2006).

In Jalisco business chambers and associations abound, although they are not equally distributed in the state but mostly concentrated in Guadalajara Metropolitan Area (Gómez Valle, 2018). According to the Federal register of the Economy Ministry (SE)[67], in Jalisco there were 17 chambers and business association in 2016, being the second state with a biggest number of groups, just after Mexico City (39 associations). The number of associations settled in Jalisco gains importance while comparing whit the 4 associations registered in the Northern economic pole, Nuevo León. Certainly, the official register might under-report the associations. Indeed, in his 2016-2017 work plan, the President of the Jalisco Industrial Chambers Conseil (CCIJ) counts 16 associations grouping industrialists[68], which must be added to the commerce, service and other sectors chambers.

Anyhow, the extended number of associations mirrors the sector's diversity. Thus, while the "prestigious and powerful" (Gómez Valle, 2018: 254) Guadalajara Chamber of Commerce (CANACO), founded in 1888, has drawn the sector's image as mostly collaborative with local and Federal power, the Jalisco Business Centre (CEJ), as a branch of COPARMEX, is more confrontative and openly seeking to influence over the decision-making process regarding local and regional issues that concerns them (Gómez Valle, 2018). The CCIJ, in its turn, attempts to agglutinate the various industrial chambers and associations, trying to bring some unity and ideological coherence to the sector, especially since, according to its president (2016-2017), "the biggest and the smallest industrials in Jalisco do not eat together at the same table"[69], yielding privileges for the former and exclusion for the latter, although all contribute to the regional economy.

If there are internal cleavages that separates some businessmen from certain profiles to whom they do not consider as peers, for *tapatios* businessmen there are also an important difference between them and those settled in other parts of the country (intra-divides), which serve to reinforce their own identity. Thus, while describing themselves, sometimes *tapatios* mobilize the archetype of the Northern businessmen, especially those from Monterrey. According to

[67] Secretaría de Economía. (2016). *Directorio de Cámaras Empresariales autorizadas de SE.* Available at: http://www.gob.mx/se/. Retrieved: September 12th, 2019.
[68] Curiel Rodríguez, D. (2016). *Representatividad Industrial en Jalisco: Propuesta de Plan de Trabajo, 2016-2017, CCIJ.* Available at: www.ciaj.org.mx; Retrieved: September 12th, 2019.
[69] *Idem*

them, the *regios*[70] businessmen are a small ensemble of families who historically holds the local economy control. In other words, it is not divers but weighing group of wealthy people tied by family bonds. Such description, aside of been aligned with some scholars' observations (Alba Vega, 1996; Mizrahi, 1992; Alba, 1993), is also telling on the actual (or at least perceived from inside) local economic elite cohesiveness and the closeness, both attributes that, in a certain point, seems that some *Tapatio* businessmen wistfully miss.

Nevertheless, and despite its diversity, Guadalajara does have its own small group of mighty families or renowned businessmen (Alba Vega and Kruijt, 1988), constituting another feature of the inner-divides: "businessmen in both regions [Guadalajara and Monterrey] had used marriage alliances as a privileged way to consolidate their fortunes" (Alba, 1993: 156). Hence, while studying *Tapatio* businessmen will be quite visible the existence of an elite within the elite, *la crème de la crème*, those who has been association's leaders, highly recognized by their peers and with privileged relations with other powerful actors.

A first glance on *Tapatio* business sector provides leads to contest the idea that they are nothing else but pragmatic and rational players seeking to maximize their profits to build on the assumption that it is a complex entity, significant in shaping the economic, social and political realms (Gómez Valle, 2018; Puga, 1993). From there, they shall be analyzed considering their complexity to better understand the protection patterns surrounding them and, ultimately, their influence on delineating social control.

The precedent sections shed light on two main gaps. From the theoretical perspective, the role of business sector on shaping protection patterns and, consequently, affecting social control seems unexplored, despite the numerous efforts to disentangle policing practices by observing a comprehensive ensemble of (violent) actors. From the empirical perspective, studies focusing on business sector attending its complexities is also an endeavour to do. This research aims to contribute on reducing these lacunae. Certainly, an intricate study object (businessmen), in addition with the complexity of the study subject (protection patterns), merits a rigorous research design, detailed in the following section.

[70] Short for *regiomontano*, demonym for people from Monterrey, NL. It shall be noticed that "*regio*" in Spanish comes from "royal" and evokes magnificence and richness. Indeed, in Monterrey the term also refers wealthiest city inhabitants (DEM, 2019).

iii. Research design: how to study businessmen's protection practices

Despite the fact that experiments and statistical models may offer precious leads to the understanding of protection practices, the prior literature review has clearly shown that (in)security and violence, and consequently, policing and protection mechanisms are far to be a clear-cut study objects, able to observe sharply in the field. Thus, the operationalization of a social dynamic to transform it into a variable that fits within a dataset, able to analyse through statistical models, does not seem the more pertinent way, especially since it could neglect *a priori* the porosity of the borders between public-private and legal-illegal realms, advanced before.

Consequently, a qualitative method able to provide a view from inside the business sector (inter)actions would be the most appropriate. Due to its capacity to settle the researcher amidst rituals, representations, (un)structured interactions between different actors, even perceptions and emotions at the individual level, ethnographic research has proven to be a fruitful tool to study insecurity, violence, policing and protection around the globe (Jones and Rodgers, 2019; Diphoorn, 2013; Rodgers, 2007). In addition, studies on capitalist enterprises, commercial transactions, mass consumption or the production process have been approached through economic ethnographies in which the social conditions of the economic activities are inquired (Weber, 2008; Dufy and Weber, 2007). In that vein, an ethnography could seem a pertinent epistemic guide to conduct this research. Nevertheless, it is not that optimal bearing in mind the population of interest, namely, *Tapatio* businessmen.

Since, in order to achieve knowing his study object, a professional ethnographer is supposed to "live in the native village, stay a 'sufficient' amount of time, use the vernacular, and investigate certain recurrent subjects" (Clifford, 1983 in Wästerfors, 2008: 236), such procedure was unable in this research mainly because to "live in" the businessmen world is not reachable only by moving where they cohabit. Beyond being a socio-professional category, "businessman" is a label that implies inhabiting certain, mostly exclusive, social spaces, or had studied in certain schools and belonging to certain families.

One alternative would be to conduct an ethnography through managing an internship or doing professional practices in a firm, then it would be possible to observe the company from inside for a long period (Reygadas Robles Gil, 2011). However, it would not be a proper window to witness neither proprietors' regular habits and rituals, nor the protection practices they

adopt, since the intern (still an outsider) barely have access to observe the firm's head practices, especially if the latter is fear of falling victim of crime. In addition, one case would result not enough to observe what we expect to be a variety of protection demanding patterns.

Despite the above, the aim of the fieldwork still was to be able to closely observe businessmen and the protection mechanisms they resorted under certain circumstances. The question became where to be allocated in order to observe relevant facts and features or collect information in that regard (Dufy and Weber, 2007). From this epistemic guide, the middle point between the desirable and the possible was to conduct a shorter immersion in which the aim was to collect businessmen accounts, perceptions, experiences and opinions.

The fieldwork, then, relies on an immersion that could be visualized in three different scenarios: 1) Two stages in Guadalajara Jalisco lasting four and two months, respectively; 2) A two-month stage in Querétaro, a growing city located in the country's central region and; 3) Several itinerant visits to Mexico City.

According to the original research plan, both Guadalajara and Querétaro would be fields of study. However, conducting interviews and observations in the two cities led me to make my focus Guadalajara, leaving temporarily aside the information collected in Querétaro. The decision was made based on the abundant information in Guadalajara which deserved a more detailed analysis within a solid socio-historical framework, widening the time frame and, consequently, leading me to conduct more significant archival and documentary work.

Additionally, the case of Querétaro would be better understood in light of what could be learnt studying Guadalajara. Considering that the Querétaro business sector has been shaped by national and international individuals who have chosen to migrate there, during the fieldwork[71], it became clear that the perception that violence witnessed years prior in their hometowns was now arriving to Querétaro was shared. If this city was experiencing a delayed effect in this pattern of violence, this would make Guadalajara a pioneer. Thus, deeply understanding the latter revealed itself as an indispensable step to be able to explore the former.

Nevertheless, it has to be emphasized that throughout the entire research process, findings and observations in Querétaro were quite useful as points of reference. Thus, the way I

[71] I conducted 31 interviews with businessmen settled in Querétaro, from October to December 2015.

contacted the interviewees or the fluency of their accounts was always kept in mind while retrieving Guadalajara's peculiarity. Something similar is fair to say concerning the fieldwork conducted for six months in Morelia, Michoacán, in the context of my Master's thesis. Learning from several mistakes, I could adjust the lens for this experience. I may say that the 22 interviews carried out in Morelia in 2014 were crucial to improve my research design[72].

Nevertheless, despite the theoretical and contextual arguments that support the case selection, it must be said that Guadalajara gained its place as a relevant case in relation to the other experiences.

In the next pages, I will elaborate on the stages in Guadalajara, not without first stating that several visits to Mexico City were crucial to contact and interact with individuals with complementary profiles that agreed to discuss the subject, either through a formal interview or within informal (although quite informative) conversations. In addition, part of the archival work and the journalistic source revisions would be not have been possible to carry out without staying in Mexico City for several weeks.

The fieldwork in Guadalajara was based on semi-structured interviews conducted in two moments (between August-November, 2015 and January-February, 2017, respectively) with businesspeople settled in the GMA and other complementary profiles, as well as detailed observation exercises. The first period consisted in the fundamental work, while the second period was a complementary step to clarify some insights, to enrich some observations or to fill certain gaps in the data. Hence, during the first period, the immersion protocol progressively gained precision in its aim and the steps to follow, while the second immersion was highly targeted and, consequently, shorter.

In order to better discuss the methodological choices and the subsequent implications, the fieldwork experience will be described in detail in the following pages considering three different stages, the preparation (before the immersion), the data collection (during the immersion) and the data analysis (after the immersion).

[72] In Morelia, I conducted 22 interviews with businessmen from January to March, 2014. More details could be seen in Martínez Trujillo (2014).

a. Preparation stage and fieldwork protocol

Preparing the fieldwork consisted in three main endeavours: 1) defining the profile of potential informants; 2) designing the query guidelines; 3) establishing contact with possible entry points.

The first challenge has to do with defining the potential informants. In other words, to identify those who fit into the category "businessperson", on whom the research would be built.

In Mexico, the concept of "businessman" is usually applied to anyone who owns a small store or any self-employment initiative. Indeed, according to the Economic Census (INEGI, 2014), 96% of the economic units registered in such exercise are micro-enterprises (with 10 employees or less). Yet, the indiscriminate use of the term poses some problems regarding the present research. Considering proprietors as key actors of the configurations we are about to explore, the kind of threats confronted and consequently, the protection they could get, must be different when it comes to a small business, compared to a large firm. Thus, to define the profile of the potential interlocutors, it is pertinent narrow down the concept.

For the purposes of this research, a businessperson must go beyond the landowner figure or the one participating, somehow, in the productive value chain. Instead, the discussion is built on those who are able to create new products and new processes, those who affect the equilibrium of the circular flow of economic activity and take it to a new level, through a new combination of production factors, innovation and opportunities (Schumpeter, 1983). We could also consider those who, "creatively destroy" the *status quo,* and contribute to the transformation of their production process and the economic system itself (Orwa Bula, 2012; Schumpeter, 1983). Despite the fact that in emergent economies, rather than innovation, it is more likely to observe a creative imitation process (Orwa Bula, 2012; Drucker, 1985); whereas, an entrepreneur has a tendency to pioneer new initiatives (Reisman, 2004). Consequently, the informants' sample[73] will be constraint to medium and large business owners, that is to say economic units with more than 50 employees, following the criteria determined by the National Institute for Statistics, Geography and Informatics (INEGI)[74].

[73] Hereafter, I employ the term "sample" to refer a small amount of a lager body, taken to obtain information about the body itself (Oxford Dictionary, 2019). It shall be emphasized that the term does not imply being statistically representative as it was not randomly taken.

[74] According to INEGI, a micro-enterprise has less than 10 employees; between 11 and 50 employees is considered a small enterprise; between 51 and 250 employees is a medium-size firm, while having more than 250 employees is considered a large company (INEGI, 2014). Although INEGI also considers the revenue of

In Jalisco, 3,153 economic units are registered as medium-sized and large enterprises (INEGI-2014)[75]. It shall be said that 84.5% of this set have between 51 and 250 employees (medium-size), while 15.5% reports having more than 250 employees (large). Considering that the sample of businesspeople did not aim to be representative, the prior distribution allows us to anticipate that, since there are fewer large businesses (498 across Jalisco state), it might be a challenge to reach their proprietors, coupled with the possibility that they are less accessible. However, some of the "biggest names" had to be included in the sample in order to observe their particularities, compared to less visible profiles.

That said, another pertinent consideration is related to with the firms' activity. Although Jalisco (and Guadalajara in particular) have been largely associated with a vocation for trade, the industrial and service sectors are also significant in the local economy (Table *iii*). Furthermore, it must be tested if the kind of firm, besides its size, could contribute to explain the fear of crime and, consequently, the protection measures adopted or adapted.

Table *iii.* Jalisco's Economic Units Distribution by size and sector

Sector/Size	Medium *(between 51 and 250 employees)*		Large *(more than 250 employees)*		Total	
	Number	*%*	*Number*	*%*	*Number*	*%*
Industrial	779	29	222	45	1,001	32
Commerce	793	30	76	15	869	27
Services	703	26	144	29	847	27
Other	390	15	56	11	446	14
Total	2,665	100	498	100	3,163	100

Source: Elaborated by the author based on INEGI-Economic Census, 2014.

From the Census methodology review another decision about the sample's features emerged: informal economic units would fall out of this research. Although the informal economy represented 22.7% of the GDP in 2017[76], the research will be constrained to the formal business sector since one of the purposes is to observe how those who supposedly inhabit a well-delimited legal arena, in fact, take part of the grey area that protection supply-demand might constitute.

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the entity to build its classification, I set aside the financial aspect both from the questions formulated to the interlocutors and the selection process, seeking to minimize participant rejection due to any suspiciousness.

[75] Cities-disaggregated data by size and sector are not available, thus Jalisco, instead of Guadalajara, would serve as sample guide (INEGI, 2014).

[76] *Sistema de Cuentas Nacionales*, INEGI (2017). The proportion has been steady in the last years. In 2015, year of the first immersion in the fieldwork, the proportion was 22.8%.

As previously advanced, the sample shall be accompanied by the analysis of judicial files or interviews conducted with prosecuted businessmen (on trial or sentenced), in order to get more information about actors who are not only playing the role of crime (potential) victims or well-meaning actors adopting protection mechanisms, but also from those who appealed to violent entrepreneurs to protect illegal transactions or who incurred in self-defence practices. However, in Mexico, access to files from legal proceedings is limited, or rather impossible, as seminal parts of the files are only accessible to the prosecutor and the defendant and systematic reviews cannot be undertaken either. Furthermore, in a country where the probability that a person who allegedly commits a crime confronts the judicial system is about 1% (IGI-MEX, 2018)[77]; therefore, the probability that a businessperson be imprisoned or sentenced seems minuscule.

While the businessmen's profile was anticipated, although adapted during data collection, the complementary profiles were targeted based on fieldwork findings. This entailed adapting the immersion protocol by widening the informants' contact path and drawing in documentary repositories in which consultation was not originally planned.

The semi-structured questionnaire allowed for the collection of a set of more varied and developed answers than those resulting from a closed end questionnaire and, at the same time, it allows to situate the conversation within a frame useful to compare interviewee accounts on similar topics.

The query guidelines, although flexible, were divided into four main parts: *i)* their career and history of the firm (main challenges and experiences); *ii)* their own position regarding the business sector; *iii)* their relationship with the government (as law enforcer, taxes collector, potential client or as a source of financial founding) and; *iv*) their relation with other actors such as labour unions, religious leaders and the media[78].

The comprehensiveness of the questionnaire allowed to collect a variety of accounts although framed within predefined topics.

Opening with the business career was expected to be a pertinent way to establish a rapport with the interviewee, situating them as their own story tellers. Thus, they would talk about

[77] According to IGI-Mex (2018), Mexico registers 69.84 points over 100 on the Impunity Index, while Jalisco 69.69 qualifying both as high level of impunity. On diverse ways to estimate impunity see Zepeda Lecuona, 2004.
[78] The original queries guideline is available at the Methodological Appendix *QG*.

what they know, in the terms they prefer. Eventually, every interlocutor would feel more comfortable to discuss other issues. In addition, from their history and trajectory, it is possible to visualize some features of their action, as well as certain factors that might guide their thoughts, values and ultimately, their choices within the business realm (Weber, 1996).

It shall be noticed that neither crime threats nor protection mechanisms were explicitly included in the query guidelines in order to observe the interlocutor's propensity to put the topic on the table and the way they approach it, as will be discussed later. Nevertheless, two general question were prepared in case the interviewee ignored the topic in their spontaneous account: How would you describe Guadalajara's situation in terms of insecurity? And; to what extent does such situation affect you as businessperson?

Preparing an immersion is also related to observing researcher predispositions. In this sense, the preconceived idea of facing dangerous fieldwork was behind the entry point explorations, as well as the way to introduce the research and its aim to potential interlocutors and the intermediaries who allowed me to reach the former. As will be seen in the next sub-section, the main challenge was to inquire about perceived crime threats and protection mechanisms although not presenting the research as another project on drug traffic-related violence.

b. Conducting semi-structured interviews

During the two periods of fieldwork, 70 people were formally interviewed, among whom 53 were businesspeople settled in Guadalajara while 17 were complementary profiles, namely, former or current public officers (7), journalists (4), scholars or writers (4), one social activist and one kidnapping-and-ransom consultant. In cases in which businessmen had also been elected or appointed public servants, they are counted first and foremost as businesspeople[79]. In one of the encounters, the interview was conducted simultaneously with three businessmen (the father and company's founder, as well as his two sons, currently in charge of the firm). In two other cases the company founder was accompanied by his son (and inheritor) during all or part of the interview. In another case, the informant started the interview, he interrupted

[79] The list of interviews is available in the Methodological Appendix *LI*. Although the kidnapping-and-ransom consultant is also proprietor of a private security company, he is excluded from the businessperson sub-set as he is not settled in Guadalajara and was contacted as consultant.

it due to time constraints, but the interview was retaken by his business partner[80]. That is to say, the interview corpus comprises 65 interviews[81].

The potential informants were contacted using the same paragraph, either written or spoken, which presented the research in general (virtually vague) terms, as well as some aspects of the attempted interview:

> *I'm a PhD student in Political Science from Sciences Po, Paris. My research is devoted to understanding the Guadalajara business sector and businessmen as social agents, rather than exclusively economic ones. As you are part of the business sector,* ***I seek to situate your experience and trajectory in a wider perspective considering your regular interactions with other key actors within the Guadalajara landscape.***
>
> *For this reason, it is with all due respect I address you asking for an encounter to conduct* ***a semi-structured interview that would last for about one hour and a half.*** *I fully understand that your schedule is quite complex and, being the case, I could adapt the encounter to the time you consider pertinent.*
>
> *I shall emphasize that, during the interview,* ***I do not ask any questions regarding your finances or those of your firm*** *and that all the information collected will be part of a corpus that I will personally analyse with* ***the highest research standards***[82].

Although I presented the research in a quite a general sentence, I explicitly explain that the financial situation of the proprietor and his firm will not be included. Along with some logistic details, these pieces of information were generally enough to be able to set an appointment with the informant to be. Exceptionally, they asked me for more details such as "have you seen anyone else?" or "are you conducting interviews in other cities?" At any rate, basing the encounter on the interlocutor's experience and career seemed an optimal way to establish contact with them.

The first attempt to make contact with a businessperson able to be interviewed occurred after sending emails to five business associations established in Guadalajara. No replies were received, except in one case in which they rejected my request through an e-mail[83].

Conversely, contacting a businessperson was possible through two main routes, both belonging to my own social or professional network. Two of my friends (who do not know

[80] Some possible effects and implications of the multi-interlocutors' interviews will be discussed later in the section.
[81] Two informants were recontacted granting in total three and two interviews, respectively. However, in the inventory all the encounters with the same informant are considered as one (large) interview, although the interview content is differentiated according to the date the encounter took place.
[82] The Spanish version of the text is available in the Methodological Appendix *CM*. Translation is mine.
[83] Fieldwork carnet, August 1st, 2015; August 10th, 2015.

each other) put me in contact with two women who became the main entry points into this fieldwork, as can be seen in Appendix *SB*. The first woman, my friend's aunt, "is from European origin and part of the Guadalajara *Socialité*", according to her niece's description. She sent an email to a dozen of her friends asking them, as a personal favour to her and her niece, to assist me, either agreeing to grant me an interview or to reaching other potential informants[84]. Although the call did not seem very successful at the beginning, one of the email recipients, a well-known businessman who did not grant me an interview himself, encouraged two of his peers to contact me, becoming the two first interviews achieved. It shall be mentioned that these three businessmen were all from European origin. Although it is not clear to what extent their foreign origin acts as a source of constraint[85] of this ensemble of businessmen, it should not be overlooked that such origins are still an attribute that informants outline when referring to a certain part of the sector, especially in a state proud of being the least mestizo of the Mexicans (Doñán, 2011).

The second woman who enabled my access to the field, Armida Romero[86], was described by her childhood friend as someone who "knows every wealthy person in Guadalajara"[87], as she grew up attending the most exclusive schools. She turned out to be the perfect contact point for me since she put me in contact with several friends and acquaintances, some of whom agreed to meet me and be interviewed. This confirms schools as key socialization spaces in which friendships are established but, mostly, where the powerful elite are shaped (Camp, 2002).

From the prior description, it shall be also noted that businessmen in Guadalajara are closely associated with the wealthiest and, in that extent, the strategy to reach them depends on approaching them not necessarily form the socio-professional arena (chambers or associations) but through their social spaces.

Once these two women opened the doors to the field, the rest of the interviewees were reached through the so-called 'snowball effect' or 'chain' sampling technique, it means, "informants refer the researcher to other informants, who are contacted by the researcher and then refer her or him to yet other informants, and so on" (Noy, 2008: 330). Certainly, the

[84] Fieldwork carnet, August 12th, 2015; August 21th, 2015 and August 24th, 2015.
[85] According to Converse (2006 [1964]: 7), the constraint is "a sort of glue to bind together many more specific attitudes and beliefs, and these postures are of prime centrality in the belief system as a whole".
[86] Pseudonym. The procedure to create the informants' pseudonyms will be explained later in the section.
[87] Fieldwork carnet, August 10th, 2015.

interviewees were not randomly selected and, consequently, it shall not be assumed that their profiles and narratives are statistically representative of the Guadalajara business sector. In addition, this technique could entail a number of selection biases, as one informant would be more prone to contact the researcher with a specific profile rather than with others. Despite this (or perhaps, due to this same reason), the contact path mirrors the interactions between the members of this social network and, in that extent, is highly informative. For the prior reason, it is pertinent to shed some light on the contact's path.

As Noy (2008) argues, the snowball effect path, beyond a technique to build an informants' sample, mirrors power relations amidst a network. For instance, in one specific case, a very respected businessman called one of his friends and, more than asking him if he was able to accept the encounter, he practically ordered him to set up an appointment with me, and he did, showing the hierarchy that one of them could exert over the other, even being peers. Observing businessmen closely, which is aim of the research aims, it is possible to explore the conditions or factors explaining these informal hierarchies.

There is one case of a businessman who became a key node in the interviewee's network, as he led me to about 25 businessmen among whom 19 agreed to meet and be interviewed. The young industrialist Alfonso Magadán[88], actively participates in four business associations where he has been able to meet several businessmen, some of whom have acted as his "teachers and mentors"[89], as he said.

Three main elements call one's attention to Magadán's willingness to put me in contact with several of his peers. First, it was a way to show his effective communication channel with a diverse ensemble of members of the sector and, doing so, his own position within the wealthiest. At a certain point, he even asked me what kind of profiles were missing to complete my sample, checking on his mobile who could fit that description to provide me some names. Thus, when I said "an owner of middle-sized firm within the information technology industry", he answered "let me see, [scrolling his cell phone's screen] yes, there… this one, from the enterprise *X*"[90], delivering the contact and some details on the proprietor and the firm. Secondly, he used three different means to put me in touch with his

[88] Pseudonym.
[89] Interview conducted with Alfonso Magadán (Pseudonym), Industrial Sector. (September 23rd, 2015). Zapopan, Jal. On the importance of mentoring in the formation of Mexican power elites see Camp, 2002.
[90] Fieldwork carnet, September 23rd, 2015. Hereafter, the allusion of the encounter with Alfonso Magadán come from the same source. Otherwise specified.

peers, namely, *Whatsapp*, emails (written at the moment or later during the week) and phone calls. With every potential informant, he decided which means could be more pertinent to use, launching phrases as "this one, let's send him a *Whats*" or "About *X*, I'll send him an email, just remind me to do so". Hence, he reserved the email or phone calls to more formal contacts or to reach the ones who are not quite accustomed to using *Whatsapp*, showing once again that he is an inner-circle actor who knows these businessmen and the most optimal way to establish communication with them. Finally, he put me in touch with peers he had met either within business associations or at the private University he graduated from. So, this case confirms the importance of certain social spaces as a source of social capital for an industrialist such as Magadán: business associations and private schools. However, it must be emphasized that the chambers' membership requires a highly active participation to turn into profitable source of social relations, as will be discussed later in the text[91]. Regardless, Magadán shows that being an inner-player does not necessarily result from being a businessman, but from knowing how to be a part of these circles.

Due to their importance to better understand one of the cases that will be discussed, one businessman was contacted two additional times (he granted three interviews in total), while another one granted two interviews. These cases show informants' willingness to feed with more details the episodes or experiences they shared before. As for me, it enabled me to complement and compare the accounts collected interviewing the same person in different moments (a sort of panel-survey design). Consequently, it is possible to distinguish the information they delivered the first time, from the one they offered to complete in a second account, the language and frames they employed speaking for the first time about a subject, and how it changed once they had had the opportunity to think about what they said and what they would have said.

Around twenty potential informants decline being interviewed arguing three main reasons: 1) time constraints or being temporarily unavailable; 2) unwillingness to talk about their firms and careers with a stranger, exceptionally arguing security reasons; 3) agreeing to grant the interview at the beginning, but unable to actually set the appointment.

Considering the available information of those who refused to participate in the research, it is not possible to depict those more (or less) prone to accept the encounter. In some cases,

[91] Fieldwork carnet, September 23rd, 2015.

their aura of big figures, almost celebrities, could explain the fact they were unapproachable. However, this observation is not consistent as some big names were included in the actual sample, while lower-profile businesspeople joined the rejection sub-set using similar claims.

On the refusal rationale, the marginal place of "insecurity" requires attention. Although there is an extended fear of being crime victims, as will be discussed later, this claim discretely appears. It might be related with two features of the process used to contact the prospective interviewees. First, since initial communication clarified their financial conditions would not be mentioned during the interview, enabling them to play the card of the "low-profile" businessman which, as will be discussed lately, is one of the strategies businessmen adopt to minimize the risk of falling victim to a crime. Secondly, contact through acquaintances was useful peer experience could serve as a shortcut to fill in the information gaps or neutralize a certain lack of trust. Indeed, in some cases, when a potential informant was hesitant on agreeing to the encounter, knowing that his or her friend had already granted the interview cleared up any doubts.

Comparing Guadalajara with the other fieldwork experiences (namely cities as Morelia and Querétaro), there are two elements that may help to distinguish *Tapatio* businessmen from others in terms of contact patterns: 1) While in Morelia Michoacán, my way into the fieldwork relied on being seen as part of a local family; whereas, in Guadalajara the key element was to approach someone who belonged to and was able to navigate within the wealthiest realm; 2) In Querétaro, the "snowball effect" was triggered at the business association and it remains among the associated, suggesting that *Queretano*[92] businessmen, as constituted mostly by national immigrants, move mostly within professional networks while *Tapatios,* are deeply anchored in wider social spaces: schools, neighbourhoods, families.

Regarding the complementary profiles, meaning, those outside the business sector category, the contact path is also informative, as can be appreciated in Appendix *SB*.

Public officers (especially *Tapatio* law enforcers) were extremely difficult to reach and the "snowball effect" technique was not fruitful, since the elected or appointed public officers that I was able to interview in no case led me directly to another peer.

[92] From the Mexican state of Querétaro (DRAE, 2019).

Although I made requests, the businessmen interviewed rarely connected me with public officers, which does necessarily mean bonds do not exist. In fact, as will be widely discussed in this work, the social capital of businessmen might include integrating public officers yet they may not share access to this public sphere. Hence, the small number of interviews conducted with public officers were achieved due to the intermediation of former co-workers or friends who share professional or partisan bonds with the potential informants. For instance, I was able to interview a former Governor of Jalisco with the help of a former co-worker who belongs to the same political party (PAN). He contacted us via email[93], starting an exchange of messages, which lasted some days[94]. Under such a format, the former governor provided some answers, although not showing availability to be interviewed via *Skype*, since I was not in Mexico at that time. Eventually, both in Mexico City, he accepted to grant me a nearly three -hour face-to-face interview which was quite enriching.

I tried unsuccessfully to reach many other off or on-duty law enforcers, either by sending formal emails to their professional address or searching for a personal contact within my own network. The former was useful only to contact a local congressman, while three other appointed public officers refused or did not answer the request[95]. As the congressman is an elected figure, he is more likely to answer a constituent request, while the appointed public officers are not. Another possibility, not necessarily mutually exclusive, is that the congressman was interested in stating his position on the topic, while those belonging to the local Attorney's Office, the Public Security Secretariat or police bodies, had the opposite will. Indeed, an interview as *quintessential* of the interest of information collection (even revealing), is opposite to public servants' desire to keep some of this information unknown, thus the meeting could enforce a "purposive hiding and masking" (Simmel, 1950: 330). In that case, informal and spontaneous encounters might be more fruitful, although they would entail other ontological and methodological challenges.

Nevertheless, the difficulty in reaching law enforcers mirrors a certain tendency towards discretion, even obscurity, among the bureaucrats operating within law enforcement agencies.

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[93] Fieldwork carnet, January 17th, 2017. The author acknowledges Oscar Vega Marín for his kind intervention to achieve this interview.
[94] Fieldwork carnet, January 18th to 22nd, 2017.
[95] Fieldwork carnet, November 28th, 2017; December 15th, 2017; November 23th, 2018. Some of these rejection cases will be discussed later in the Chapters as they contribute to develop part of the discussion.

The precedent claim is vividly illustrated by an anecdote concerning a retired public officer who used to serve at the local Attorney's Office. I contacted him through his daughter, a childhood friend of one of my informants, asking him only to review one of the schemas I had elaborated to show the transformation of law enforcement scaffolding in Guadalajara. Seeking for the approval of someone who had actually witnessed those changes, what I found instead was the following statement: "my father would be glad to help you but as it is quite a delicate topic, he prefers to see you in person"[96]. Although he did not decline the encounter, it was clear that he was not comfortable with dealing remotely what he explicitly considered "a delicate matter". It shall be emphasized that my request did not imply any confidential information (the schema evoked was built on public documents), which stresses how anything related to law enforcement might trigger this cautious reaction.

Journalist, scholars and other complementary profiles were included in the sample mostly to enrich or contrast some of the accounts delivered by businessmen. In those cases, they were opened to sharing their experiences, perceptions and intuitions.

The interviews, with businessmen and complementary profiles, were conducted face-to-face, mostly in the informants' offices, although in some cases we met in restaurants or in their houses. That allowed me to observe their work space, as well as the devices or any other measures they adopted to protect their firms' facilities and themselves[97].

On two occasions, the interview was conducted with more than one interlocutor simultaneously. In both cases, the participants were the father (and founder of the company) and his son(s), currently in charge of the firm[98]. This collective interaction could imply some bias in informants' opinions, since someone could condition other's words (or silences). As in a focus group, this effect could be buffered if we consider, as part of the analysis, the personality of each participant, as well as the hierarchies and roles played during the encounter. For instance, in the interview conducted with the industrialist Alberto Alcántara

[96] Fieldwork carnet, September 13th, 2018.
[97] Due to geographical distance constraints, only two over the 65 interviews were conducted via *Skype.* It shall be said that, during these interviews I followed the same protocol that in the face-to-face encounters. If the application technique, rather than the data-collection instrument is mostly the source of bias (Muntanyola and Romero, 2013), it could be assumed that these interviews remain comparable to the rest of the corpus. However, the observation exercise is limited and even impossible.
[98] Interviews conducted with Alberto, Alcántara Jr. and Antonio Alcántara (Pseudonyms), Industrial Sector. (September 9th, 2015). Zapopan, Jal. and; Máximo Ballesteros and Máximo Ballesteros Jr. (Pseudonyms), Private Security Company owners. (October 16th, 2015). Zapopan, Jal.

and his sons Alberto Jr. and Antonio, the father was highly open in his narrative. Being a sort of leader speaker, he also used to encourage his sons to share some anecdotes, or to add details they were omitting while accounting certain episodes. Then, this three-way interview gave me precious information that individual interactions would not have been able to offer. In addition, it also allowed me to observe how, regarding the same experience, the Alcantaras were unequally open to participating. That lead, however, will be follow later in the text[99].

Based on previously prepared query guidelines, the interviews lasted an average of one hour and twenty minutes, although two of them lasted about three hours and one other 28 minutes[100].

As explained before, the questionnaire did not explicitly handle subjects such as insecurity, violence, threats, protection or policing. However, those emerged in almost all the cases, brought to the table by the interlocutors. As the interview started by the businessmen recollecting their career path and their firm's history, a certain empathy was established from the beginning. Then, they described themselves as businessmen and, when they spoke about their challenges, insecurity and violence regularly appeared, allowing me to build from there.

When businesspersons alluded to property crime or other potential threats as part of their challenges, the conversation naturally flowed towards how they dealt with the situation, either individually or as part of the business sector. That regularly opened the avenue to talk about their perception on law enforcers and other measures they take, if any, to address such problems. It turned out to be useful to situate themselves as part of a wider sector because, they narrated their own experiences as well as what they considered organized businesspersons do or should be doing, in their opinion.

The totality of the interviews was audio-recorded, with the prior authorization of the interlocutor. Certainly, that could entail a of social desirability bias in their responses, especially while addressing sensitive subjects[101].

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[99] Fieldwork carnet, September 9th, 2015.

[100] Interviews conducted with J. J. Doñán, Journalist. (October 3rd, 2015). Guadalajara, Jal.; Alberto Cárdenas Jiménez, former Jalisco Governor. (April, 22nd, 2018). Mexico City ; Alejandro Pacheco (Pseudonym), Industrial Sector. (October 7th, 2015), respectively.

[101] The Social Desirable Bias (SDB) is the tendency to deny social unacceptable behaviours or assume socially desirable ones (Chung and Monroe, 2003). That kind of bias is mainly visible in self-reported ethic conducts or around sensitive subject included in surveys or interviews (Chung and Monroe, 2003; Krumpal, 2013). The SDB tends to be higher when the situation is more unethical, and some profiles could have more biased answers than others (Chung and Monroe, 2003). The SDB is important regarding the interpretation and understanding

Even if it could condition their answers, once agreeing to the interview, businessmen seemed quite open to share their experiences and to speak about diverse topics. In certain cases, proprietors seemed use to granting interviews to journalists, showing up on press pages as "success stories". Indeed, some of them have such pages decorating their offices walls. Those who have been interviewed by the press demonstrate what I dare call a "media training effect", as if they knew their narrative by heart and were able to fluently repeat it. However, when topics such as certain fear of falling victims of crime, their own experiences in this regard and the measures they have taken due to this context, the fluent speech is replaced by short silences, hesitations and less organized accounts. Yet, they exceptionally asked me to turn the recorder off.

The prior observation suggests that businessmen are not used to being inquired regarding the topic, even those who have been interviewed by journalists more than once. In other words, that pictures how businessmen are not seen as potential informants to better understand protection patterns, although they hold a leading role in such a landscape. Thus, neither journalists, nor scholars have collected the perspectives of businessmen probably due to a certain degree of research myopia, rather than informant inaccessibility.

The "media training effect" is also visible among public officers, who are constantly watching their words, and delivering political statements in their narratives. That shall be kept in mind while restoring their accounts as they speak as public characters and, doing so, their words must be read within certain political context.

The position and predispositions that researchers take while conducting an immersion in the field is also determinant to the kind of observations and findings obtained (Rawlinson, 2008). Being aware of that could contribute to minimize or at least to advance its effects.

It is true that researching on crime and protection implies doing complex fieldwork (Rawlinson, 2008), which is often *sui generis*. Since the principal interlocutors are businesspeople, who supposedly belong to the upper-world, the risks commonly associated with observing violent entrepreneurs, racketeers or protector suppliers, were not visible. In

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of findings. Different technics are frequently adopted to minimize such bias, for instance self-administration methods, which aim on limiting interviewer presence effect (Krumpal, 2013). However, in this case, businessmen delivered these answers face-to-face, on-the-record (otherwise specified) and with explicit terms. Although the SDB is a high risk around these accounts, it must be said that they did not answer a closed questionnaire, the subject emerged in a fluent conversation, where they spoke as much as they wanted. If a relevant question precedes the account, it will be specified.

that extent, this does not look like such a dangerous immersion. However, the risk of interviewing *Tapatio* businesspeople resides in what an informant states during the interview: "the problem in Guadalajara is that you never know who you are talking to"[102], as legal-illegal divides are quite uncertain. Across this research, some of the implications of this claim will be discussed. For the time being, it is important to bear in mind that the porosity between the realms of "good" and "bad" cannot be overlooked. While studying crime and protection, the preconception of who those "good" and "bad guys" are also implies a source of risk for the researcher.

Also related to researcher's position on the field, it is pertinent to outline how "being a foreigner" is a relative category, affecting the data collection process. Born and raised in Mexico, I have never considered myself as a foreigner in the field I was about to enter. However, probably due to my accent or physical features, several interviewees asked me if I was *Tapatio*. My negative answer yielded a rapport in which the informants assumed they had to explain in detail "how things are in Guadalajara" and "how the *Tapatios* are", stressing my condition of outsider. After all, this position contributed to the informer's proneness to share abundant information which most importantly allowed me to collect extensive accounts of how *Tapatio* businessmen perceive, represent and describe their own context.

Along the same lines, as a woman discussing on a man's world reinforced my image as an outsider leading to the gathering of detailed (and sometimes condescend) explanations of Guadalajara history and current situation. In addition, while asking questions about the firm could be threatening to informants in terms of industrial espionage, being a woman gave me the aura of someone inoffensive to whom plenty information could be granted. Besides, as part of the "snowball effect" technique, three businessmen (among the youngest) put me in contact with successful businesswoman. One of them even stated "as a woman, I imagine you are interested in meeting some businesswomen"[103]. This leads to picturing how, among the youngest businessmen, there is a certain awareness concerning gender issues, assuming that a female researcher is certainly interested in women's professional careers.

Besides the formal interviews, based on a query previously defined and recorded, numerous informal encounters fall within the qualitative data corpus collected during fieldwork. Thus,

[102] Interview conducted with Josefa Domínguez (Pseudonym), Industrialist. (October 14th, 2015). Guadalajara, Jal.
[103] Fieldwork carnet, September 23rd, 2015.

unrecorded conversations held with people who I interacted with during the stage in the field (for instance, taxi drivers, roommates, caterers) are restored with an analytical purpose as they are informative about the context. Considering other points of reference allows to observe the way in which some Guadalajara inhabitants, different from businessmen, perceive and describe certain issues or situations.

c. Analysis and restitution of collected narratives

Although interview analysis was an ongoing exercise that will continue even after completing this present research endeavour, it can be divided into four stages: note taking after the interview, the transcription of interview audio-recordings, the codification and discussion of the transcribed interviews and the selection and restitution of interview quotations. Each phase provides the opportunity to appreciate the interview from a different perspective.

Note taking has led to a reflection on the features that have called my attention at a first glance containing the restitution of off-the-record conversations. Whether because they occur during the encounter's preamble/closure, or because the interviewee explicitly asked me to turn the recorder off. Certainly, quotations written down in the Fieldwork carnet might not be literal as they have been based on my recall of the words. However, the systematic review of the notes at the end of each workday reduces the risk of bias or inaccuracies.

The transcription allowed for a better appreciation of nuances and tones within the discourse, as well as the detection of analytical leads that I did not notice while conducting the interview. The entirety of the interviews was fully transcribed, seeking to transform the oral communication register into a text. Thus, the words and tones employed by the interlocutors were respected; short pauses and unfinished sentences were represented by ellipsis, while long silences and other (re)actions, such as laughing or backgound noises, are placed into square brackets[104].

Once transcribed, the interviews were processed through a detailed codification and discussion process, carried out via the qualitative data analysis software *Atlas Ti*. The codification process partially followed the principles of the grounded approach, under which

[104] I personally transcribed 55 over the 65 interviews. In order to standardize the transcription of the ten interviews of which I received support, I elaborated a protocol and I reviewed in detail and corrected the transcription confronting the text with the audio-records. The transcription's protocol is available in the Methodological Appendix *TP*. I am deeply grateful for the kind support granted by Aurora Martínez Trujillo, Juan Carlos Estrada, Daniela Ramírez, Ana María González, Rebeca Rodríguez and Pablo Cervantes to achieve this part of the process.

analytical leads (codes) emerge rather from the interviews than from research preconceptions (Noaks and Wincup, 2004). As the semi-structured interviews were originally based on pre-existing theoretical and empirical expectations, this stage was not fully inductive, thus, some codes come from the interview guidelines, while others arose from interlocutors' words. The codification then consists of dissecting the interviews into several quotes (where they were associated to as many codes as pertinent) according to their content[105]. When relevant, quotations coming from one interview have been purposefully related to those coming from other interviews, whether those links are complementary or contradictory. Simultaneously, some quotations were widely discussed in the comments box that the software template provides, advancing some intuitions and interpretations.

Finally, during the writing process, the quotations were classified under the corresponding code(s) and its associated comments were recovered, organized and selected to feed the argumentation with solid empirical evidence rigorously analysed. Hence, as the reader will notice, in some cases the interviews will appear in the text as a set illustrated through schemas or individually as both, general references or longer quotation excerpts. When the interviews are restored as in aggregate form (schemas), I intentionally omit the number of cases fitting certain criteria or the percentage of similar responses, in order to avoid an incorrect interpretation of data as a representative proportion of the interviews or, even further, of the business sector. Being a qualitative study, respondents' selection method, already discussed, implies a bias that nullifies all expectations of statistical representativeness. However, it should be recalled that the aim of a qualitative research is not statistical representativeness of the accounts, but the richness associated to their diversity and depth.

Regarding the quotations excerpts, they were translated from Spanish to English, clarifying some vernacular terms in the footnotes[106]. Anticipating that translation implies certain interpretation and, consequently, possible bias and inaccuracies, a version of the quotations in its original language is available in the Appendix *Q*. Thus, Spanish-speakers are able to observe the interviewees' original discourse. On the quotations, bold font represents author's emphasis, useful to guide the discussion, especially considering that every quotation has several edges that might be worth discussing.

[105] Considering all the interviews, I coded 4,344 quotations in 253 non mutually exclusive codes.
[106] Translations are mine. Every quote has a unique identifier to easily find the original on the Appendix.

Aiming to guarantee the research participant's confidentiality, a process of anonymization was conducted, replacing or delating key identifiers, but attempting not to lose contextual or essential information that could potentially be valuable for the research (Rock, 2001). Therefore, the anonymization comprised four levels, ranking from replacing direct identifiers to omitting entire episodes shared during the interviews (Figure *iii*).

Figure *iii*. Levels of anonymization scheme



Source: Elaborated by the author based on the anonymization protocol employed.

First, to render businessmen non-identifiable, their names, as direct identifiers, were replaced by pseudonyms[107]. These are composed of first names and last names to preserve the image of characters that, besides owning a firm, belong to certain families and social circles. Since fictitious names could imply any bias or unconsciously evoke somehow the real name of the source, the list of pseudonyms was randomly created. Thus, the names do not come from the author's imagination but from a random process in two stages. The first one to choose the name and the other one to choose a last name. Using a 1996 phonebook of a municipality of the State of Mexico as a guide, in the first stage, the name of a person was chosen according to a random number of the phonebook's page and a random number of a person listed on the selected page. Then, the same procedure was followed to extract the last names. When the

[107] Hereafter, all of businessmen's names are pseudonyms.

gender of the real and the randomly selected names did not match, the latter was substituted with the subsequent coincidental name listed in the same phonebook's page[108].

It must be noticed that complementary profiles, such as public officers, journalists and scholars, were asked and consented to retain their real names since they answered the interview from its public speakers' position. However, the criteria is not followed in certain specific episodes or anecdotes over which the informant explicitly asked to be anonymous or if the author considers pertinent to omit their names to guarantee their safety.

The second level of anonymization comprised nesting indirect identifiers by transforming specific features into grouped categories. For instance, the businessmen's age becomes age group or the kind of firm turns into a sector. Thus, that is still informative although impeding tracking the interlocutors from these attributes.

The last two anonymization levels have to do with removing or replacing certain episodes, either partially or completely, in order to preserve the involved characters identity. It was especially the case when unique profiles (mostly among the complementary) shared some episodes that, despite being valuable for the analysis, revealed their identity.

d. Other information sources

The semi-structured interviews were complemented with the observation exercises and the subsequent daily note taking. Data coming from the fieldwork carnet has been restored during the analysis to contextualize or better picture the field.

Regarding the documentary sources, the research relies on the systematic revision of the Gazette published by Guadalajara Chamber of Commerce (*Gaceta Mercantil*), the non-systematic revision of local and national press[109] and the targeted consultation of some files

[108] Using as a sampling frame an address book from a municipality other than Guadalajara, the likelihood of including well-known *Tapatio* last names within the pseudonyms is minimized. In addition, since State of Mexico's immigration pattern does not over represent Jalisco's natives, it is possible to assume that *Tapatio* last names are not more likely to be included in its municipalities' phonebooks than any others. The author acknowledges Aurora Trujillo for her helpful support to find a phonebook (nowadays practically a museum piece) and to patiently extract the names from the phonebook's pages.

[109] Local and national press were consulted aiming to contextualize and enhance the analysis. In some cases, the newspapers and journals were retrieved through the publications' digital repositories (vgr. *Reforma-Mural, Proceso, El Informador)*, while others were accessed through physical archives (vgr. *Excélsior, Uno Más Uno, Público, Siglo XXI).*

available in different archives located in Guadalajara and Mexico City[110] or accessed through the right-to-information requests addressed to local and federal public offices[111].

As historians know (more than sociologists and political scientists), some repositories are available and ready to be accessed, while others must be "invented" (Israël, 2012: 177), as the researcher built a corpus devoted to specific research and its simultaneous construction to project progression in the thought process. In this research, a similar process was followed looking for documentary evidence able to account part of the history of the *Tapatio* business sector and, from there, to better understand it. That is how I decide to rely on the well-preserved collection of the *Gaceta Mercantil.*

The Gazette (*Gaceta Mercantil*) has been a means of internal communication elaborated by the Chamber of Commerce and distributed among its associates[112]. The content of the Gazette is retrieved as illustrative of the interests and concerns of the business sector. To support the prior assumption, three potential bias must be advanced: 1) the chamber only represents the commerce sector, excluding industry and services. However, industrial or service sector businessmen could be associated to the Chamber of Commerce since their ultimate objective is to sell a product or service; 2) Only businessmen who decide to participate in associations are represented, which could render a more proactive profile; 3) the Gazette could have an editorial policy (which could change with each president of the chamber) which could condition the topics included in the coverage, as well as the way they are addressed. That said, I systematically examined 1,104 available issues of the Gazette (*Gaceta Mercantil*) published from 1970 to 2016, reviewing very page and taking notes and photographs when it was pertinent. The criteria to select and discriminate the information was progressively refined, on the basis of getting to know the source and clarifying the aim of data collection. The notes and images collected in this endeavour were organized in a bank of images, hereafter quoted as Bank of Gazette Images 1970-2016[113].

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[110] The General Archive of the Nation (AGN), the National Newspaper Archive (*Hemeroteca Nacional-UNAM)*, the Jalisco Congress General Archive (*Archivo General del H. Congreso de Jalisco*) and the Jalisco Public Library "Juan José Arreola" (*Biblioteca Pública del Estado de Jalisco "Juan José Arreola").*

[111] On the Mexican Access to Information Regulations see García García, 2016.

[112] The Gazette periodicity has changed across time, depending of the Chamber's President decision. Thus, some years it has been weekly, fortnightly or monthly published.

[113] The author acknowledges Evelia Hernández, head of the Chamber's Library *Instituto Cultural Ignacio Dávila Garibi*, for the facilities provided in order to, despite the time constraint, achieve to systematize the *Gaceta Mercantil*, including her willingness to extend the library service hours and even opening on her days-off.

Secondary sources are also mobilized alongside the research, for instance, crime official registers and victimization surveys conducted by the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI). In these cases, a brief methodological discussion accompanied the data restitution.

The mosaic of sources upon which the discussion is drawn enables certain historical perspective to better situate current observations, especially useful in a period in which studies devoted to Mexican ongoing trends of violence and insecurity abound. Indeed, businessmen's accounts dating from 2015-2017, will be retrieved as contemporary narratives, albeit attempting to emphasise when they fulfil a long-lived dynamic.

Ultimately, the principle behind the fieldwork protocol was to collect information favouring pertinence in answering the main research questions, in terms of availability and accessibility. Certainly, some limits, potential bias or inaccuracies will be discussed throughout the text if those could directly affect or condition the discussion.

iv. Chapter overview

This dissertation is organized into seven chapters that, together, attempt to portray a comprehensive image of the protection provision-demand in which *Tapatio* businessmen take part and, in some extent, contribute to the understanding of these complex configurations beyond the Mexican landscape. The chapters are grouped into three parts to progressively draw the alluded image.

Part I situates businessmen regarding actual or perceived threats, a prerequisite to requiring protection. Chapter 1 discusses crime patterns as catalysts of the tendency for businesspeople to be (un)willingly protected, building on a critical appraisal of the official figures as well as weighing fear. Chapter 2 takes up one of the leading characters among the contemporary studies on Mexican violence: the *Narco* and the *narcos*. Throughout a historically oriented discussion, the aim is to sketch this personage as potential challenge for the business sector. However, the endeavour entails, rather than describes as well as analytically revisits what seems a solid script.

Consisting of three chapters, Part II looks extensively at the complex configuration of businessmen receiving protection from an entanglement of suppliers, demonstrating that it is a field in which public-private and legal-illegal divides are uncertain and constantly

renegotiated and reconfigured. Chapter 3 concerns the regular protection provider, namely, law enforcers, arguing that instead of the state fading, what the local landscape has witnessed is the consolidation of a polycentric system which lays the foundation of personalized ties between government and businessmen. Chapter 4, addresses the commodification and purchase of protection, whether it is government agencies selling the service, the private security industry reinforcing the sense of self-preservation or the deployment of illegal means to preserve businessmen's integrity or to achieve other interests. Chapter 5 departs from the *narco* epitome to unravel how businessmen deal with such threat. I argue that, rather than being associated with their reputation as violent actors, it is the strident *narco* way of being what businessmen seek to keep distance from. In addition, I demonstrate how, despite their accounted efforts to avoid it, businessmen and *narcos* share the main socialization spaces on a daily basis, blurring the border between them.

In the third and final part, together Chapters 6 and 7 make the case of the *Minerva 1997,* a protection group created, about twenty years ago, *by* and *for* businessmen. As a result, this part provides solid insights on businessmen acting not only as protection receivers but as co-producers and, consequently, engaging in the suppliers' entanglement. To do so, the first chapter is devoted to the genealogy and main features of the group. In closing, it will be demonstrated how *Tapatio* businessmen, while coproducing their own protection, deeply contribute to shape local social order.

Part I. Businessmen and Protection Claims: Genealogy and Evolution of Security Threats

> *"The doctor kept talking, there was no way to make him stop talking. Fear was the main ailment of the* Bogotanos[114] *of my generation, he told me. (...) He never managed to comprehend that I wasn't interested in a rational explanation and much less the statistical aspect of these violent palpitations, or the instantaneous sweating that in another context would have been comical, but the magic words that could make the sweating and palpitations disappear, would be the mantra allowing me to sleep through the night".*
>
> Juan Gabriel Vázquez[115]

"Guadalajara used to be a very peaceful city, a good place to live, but everything fell apart with Calderón, because the organized [criminal] groups were disintegrated and then, they [criminals] started killing families"[116], according to María Emma Santillán[117], a young lady who runs a philanthropic association and who grew up in the city. "Now, she added, there are muggings everywhere, vehicle robberies, armed robberies…[118] it is our daily bread! You have to watch out for yourself". We were having an informal meeting over a cup of coffee and unavoidably the subject came up in conversation.

Some months prior, the city had been the center of a series of so-called *narcobloqueos,* which are blockades allegedly conducted by members of the *Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG)*[119] to limit access to a specific area, either to isolate the space where they supposedly operate or to challenge federal and local authorities. On May 1st, in record time, in less than two hours, more than 39 blockades were carried out at different strategic points in

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[114] "Adjective. From Bogotá, Colombia's Capital" (DRAE, 2018).
[115] Vázquez, J. G. (2011). *El Ruido de las Cosas al Caer.* Mexico: Alfaguara, p. 58. Translation from the English edition.
[116] Fieldwork carnet, September 11th, 2015. Quotations taken from fieldwork notes might not be literal. However, the systematic review of the notes at the end of each workday reduces the risk of bias or inaccuracies.
[117] As explained in the Introduction, the interlocutors met during fieldwork are quoted under pseudonyms. Otherwise specified.
[118] On the quotes, hereafter ellipsis represents a short silence or an unfinished idea, mostly to start developing another one. If the pause is significantly longer, then is marked as "[silence]", and most often it showed hesitation or respondent's effort to find the correct way to frame his speech. For me, while formulating questions, the unfinished idea and subsequent silence became a strategy to bring some subjects to the table, without contaminating their answer. In other words, I launched some "hooks" to induce them to evoke and start developing the subject.
[119] Jalisco New Generation Cartel is the current dominant drug trafficking organization in Jalisco. Details about its emergence and main features are provided in Chapter 2.

approximately 20 municipalities. Additionally, 11 bank branches and 5 gas stations were damaged as well as 36 vehicles set on fire; even a helicopter belonging to the *Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional*[120] (SEDENA)'s was forced to land[121]. While the local authorities qualified these as acts of vandalism orchestrated by organized crime (Portilla Tinajero, 2016), the press suggested that it was CJNG's reaction to a federal operation referred to as *Operación Jalisco*[122]. Even though the press had been reporting the presence of blockades in Monterrey and Tamaulipas since 2010, it was only in 2011 that roadblocks appeared in Guadalajara. The one previously described was probably the most violent[123]. Therefore, this episode was forefront in the minds of many of my interlocutors during my first immersion in the field, which is why they commonly made reference to it while describing the scenario regarding security issues in the state[124].

While referring to the *narcobloqueos* and how afraid she remembered being then, María Emma made a pause, took a sip of her fancy coffee and said: "At least, those *Narcos*[125] are not so evil. I mean, they could have hurt the people traveling on the buses they burned. Instead, before setting a bus on fire, they made people leave it".

Beyond the anecdote, the conversation with María Emma illustrates a common narrative about insecurity and violence in Jalisco, namely, the fact that Guadalajara used to be a safe place to live and suddenly, everything fell apart.

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[120] National Defense Ministry.

[121] "39 bloqueos en Jalisco, Guanajuato, Colima y Michoacán tras operativo federal". (May 1st, 2015). *Animal Político*.

[122] "18 municipios bajo ataque". (May 2nd, 2015). *Mural*; "Fracasa captura: incendian Jalisco". (May 2nd, 2015). *Mural*; "Continúa código rojo en Jalisco; hubo 39 bloqueos. (May, 2nd, 2015). *Excelsior*.

[123] "Fue el narcoataque de más daño". (May 3rd, 2015). *Mural*.

[124] According to Zaller (1992), responses on survey questions are determined by the mix of considerations resulted from available information (aggregate-level), different level of attention to this information and individual predispositions. "Which of these considerations is available at the top of the head at the moment of confronting survey questions determines responses to these questions" (p. 39). Following Zaller, it is possible to claim that, during the interviews I conducted, the answers could be somehow conditioned by the recent *narcobloqueos*, changing them from quotidian patterns where those episodes are not that present. In other words, *narcobloqueos* could increase the level of awareness respondents had about insecurity and violence during the interview. However, due to its design -and different from survey questions-, semi-structured interviews could be less affected by the measurement errors warned by Achen (1975) and might be less likely to collect from respondents what Converse (1970) called "doorsteps opinions".

[125] According to the Spanish Academy Dictionary (DRAE, 2018) "*narco"* is currently the shortening of the word *narcotraficante* (drug trafficker). In Mexico, it has become a multi-purpose prefix to qualify whatever is allegedly related with DTOs (vgr., *narcobloqueos, narcofosas, narcomantas, narcocorridos, narcoseries, narcomoda* or *narcoliteratura*). Rather to specific persons, Narco refers the drug trafficking business as well as certain attributed "social hierarchies, the aesthetic and attitudes" (Mendoza, 2018: 169) Here after, the label *Narco* (with capital "N") refers to the market, group or structure, while *narco* (in low-case "n") refers the actors qualified as such. A deeper discussion about the term and its use is offer lately in Chapter 2.

If we carefully analyze the words of this *Tapatia*[126], the daughter of a wealthy businessman, it is possible to recognize many assumptions that need to be disentangled in order to understand how insecurity and violence became a threat in the minds of the population, especially for the economic elite.

According to María Emma's account, peace in Guadalajara was disturbed by former President Felipe Calderon's (2006-2012) decision to launch a set of military operations, commonly referred to as the "war on drugs" in several regions of the country to confront drug trafficking organizations (DTOs)[127] leading to the fragmentation of these criminal groups. This prompted the empowerment of criminal groups which fomented property crimes and nullified some of the ethical limits *Narcos* had previously displayed. They kill families but at least, while burning buses, they respect travelers. The environment, she considers, has affected everyone and driven them to seek protection.

The four elements which stand out in the extract of this conversation include: 1) the alleged former peace in Guadalajara; 2) the rise in property crime with mention of those affected; 3) the role and transformation of the *Narco* as a threat for *Tapatios*, particularly, businessmen; 4) the idea that a threat could explain the need for protection among the affluent.

This part aims to explore the evoked assumptions to show that the risk of being a crime or violence victim rather than being based on previous experiences, businessmen's claims for protection are supported by the perception of a threat. This awareness relies on dominant narratives reinforced by intermediation dynamics and a crime-prone context. Furthermore, I argue that such narratives shape the way the threat is perceived and consequently, the kind of protection conceived to be necessary.

In the first chapter, I review the context of crime and violence since the 1970s, discussing the belief that Guadalajara had been "a peaceful place". I also argue that, beyond experiences of

[126] The reader will notice that *Tapatio* used as an adjective in a compound noun does not change despite the gender or plurality of the noun. Conversely, when it takes the place of a noun, it follows gender and number.
[127] Former President Felipe Calderón claims that reducing the security strategy he implemented under the label "war against drugs" is at least inaccurate, as his priority was not to confront drug trafficking but to recover security in specific areas of the country (Calderón Hinojosa, 2014). For a description of Calderón's administration Strategy and its axis also see Poiré (2012), Kenny and Serrano (2012) and Chabat (2010). Significative literature inquiring on the effects of the military presence on violence levels will be evoked in Chapter 2.

victimization, factors such as “fear” and “risk” have had a seminal role in businessmen’s self-perception as potential crime victims and, ultimately, in their claim for protection.

Chapter 2 is an overview of the dominant narrative about *Narcos,* especially in Guadalajara, to understand their place on the landscape. The chapter offers a critical review on the history of the *Narco* in Guadalajara, arguing that this extended narrative had drawn a caricature image of the *Narcos*, which would eventually be seen as a threat towards businessmen.

Chapter 1. Crime and Violence in Guadalajara: Businessmen as Victims

> *"Everyday life in Mexico has been vilified by violence. Fear has begun to grow. Although violence has always been present, I did not grow up in such a horrific environment of crime, above all, due to fear (...) what is really difficult in Mexico is how people live, ignoring reality, turning their back on it"*
>
> Antonio Ortuño, *Tapatio* Novelist[128]

Reminiscing about his first novel *El Buscador de Cabezas* (The Head Hunter), the award winning novelist Antonio Ortuño states that at the time his work debuted in 2006, it reflected a sort of "game of political fiction" that has now become a kind of "twisted social realism". According to critics, the writer's account was unique in its field since crime and violence were virtually absent from Mexican fiction at that time and most writers within his generation were unprepared to draft a political novel (Lemus, 2006)[129]. Considering the overwhelming number of texts devoted to crime and violence nowadays in Mexico, it is difficult to believe that in 2006 such a topic was considered innovative. The year the literary piece was published seemed prophetic, especially because as was mentioned Felipe Calderón took office and launched his public security strategy which analysts, journalists and scholars generally consider to be a starting point.

The writer, who was born and grew up in the Guadalajara of the 1980s, asserts that crime and violence in his hometown were never like what they are today. If Ortuño is right, why has it become such an important topic? Is it a matter of a greater number of crimes or is it related to the severity? Is the level of available information what has catalyzed this perception? Are we more vulnerable or more afraid regarding crime? Even further, what could it mean for people to not "turn their back" on reality?

This chapter describes the nature of the criminal threat towards Guadalajara's inhabitants since the 1970s, shedding light on this time period in order to understand how crime and violence have become a threat, "vilifying" daily life for *Tapatios*, especially for businessmen.

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[128] Correa, S. (Radio host). (August 9, 2018). Antonio Ortuño [On-line radio emission]. In Cosmo-Estación Sur. Berlin, Germany: WDR. Accessed in: August 10th, 2018 at https://www1.wdr.de/mediathek/av/audio-antonio-ortuno-100.html

[129] Although authors such as Elmer Mendoza have published novels about violence and crime since the late 1990s, Lemus (2006) argues this was considered hardboiled fiction, a classic genre. That clearly changed in 2008 when Mendoza published *Balas de Plata* (Silver Bullets) where he goes beyond that genre, exploring the intricacy between public power and crime. For further discussion related to Mendoza´s literary production, see Zavala (2018).

I argue that crime figures are only one factor which define the feeling of vulnerability among businessmen. The other factor is fear, more precisely, the risk of becoming a victim. Subsequently, businessmen see themselves as potential victims and, in consequence, assume their need for protection.

In the endeavor to disentangle the context of crime in Guadalajara, we must ask if the year 2006 would be an accurate starting point. The evidence suggests that it is not. Regarding insecurity, and based on available crime figures to be discussed, three turning points in Guadalajara's history can be distinguished: the early 1980s, the mid-1990s and around 2010. During these periods, either both public insecurity and violence had acquired unprecedented dimensions, or the face of crime somehow changed. Subsequently, I review these pivotal moments following a specific line of thought, namely, how different faces of crime have pierced the business sector.

The chapter is divided into three sections. In the first, I offer a general review of political violence surrounding the *guerrilla* and the counterinsurgency that took place in the 1970s. The aim is to explore the precedent of the first turning point (1980s) arguing that in this context, the main violent actors, both state and non-state, jeopardized the business sector. The second section is a critical discussion of patterns of property crime affecting businessmen since the 1980s, commonly associated with economic crises. I argue that measures of crime reflect the way governments conceived some offenses rather than the expression of crime *per se*. The third section focuses on fear, more precisely, on risk as a determining factor in the perception of a threat and, consequently, on the idea of the need for protection.

1.1 The 1970s: Guadalajara as a "stronghold for the urban *guerrilla* and a cathedral of political violence"

Before the deep economic crisis and its effects in the 1980's also known as the "lost decade" (Buffie, 1989), violence and crime in Guadalajara used to be mainly a product of political violence generated by the *guerrilla* and subsequent confrontations, both official and unofficial. In such a context, three actors could be identified as sources of violence and, ultimately, as a threat for the business sector. Namely, the Guadalajara Student Federation (FEG)[130] and the criminal groups acting under its protection, the *guerrilla* groups which

[130] Federación de Estudiantes de Guadalajara.

emerged and consolidated in Guadalajara and finally the Government which officially or not, undertook severe measures to confront dissident groups. Due to the violence generated by these actors, the 1970s saw Guadalajara transform into "one of the primary centers of revolutionary activity", in fact "one of the nation's most brutal epicenters of counterinsurgency" (Herrera Calderón, 2018: 155). The city has even been called "a stronghold of the urban *guerrilla movement* and a cathedral of political violence" (Aguayo Quezada, 2001: 145).

Founded in 1949, the FEG was an organization located in the University of Guadalajara[131] that controlled the student population "reproducing the vices of the *priista* way of governing" (Aguayo Quezada, 2001: 151). Practitioners of the *priista equilibrismo-político*[132]*,* this group may have had truly leftist convictions (such as a radical nationalism, anti-imperialism and anti-clericalism), which coexisted with violence towards revolutionary students. In the early 1980s, the FEG was described as being "theoretical Socialism and practical gun law" (*Socialismo teórico, pistolerismo práctico*)[133].

Protected, supported and rewarded not only by the Governor and the Commander of the Military but also by the President, the FEG had considerable means to exert violence which can be illustrated by the following. First, since the 1950s, most of its members have carried weapons and received the Army's protection. For instance, one of its presidents, José Guadalupe Zuno Arce[134], has always carried a weapon but, according to the Federal Security

[131] Universidad de Guadalajara, U de G.

[132] Through the notion "*priista* way of governing" Aguayo Quezada (2001) refers to the "politico-ideological balancing act" (*equilibrismo ideológico-político)* (p. 153) that characterized political actors during the *priista* regime, since their cohesion relied on political interests even if that implied ideological tensions or contradictions. A more comprehensive approach to the "*priista* way of governing" comes from the classic essays of Cosío Villegas (1972; 1974) where the author emphasizes the features of the *priista* regime and its effects (patronage, hegemonic party system, and the extent to which it relied on the Presidents figure, among others). A more contemporary review to the "*priista* way of governing" might be fruitful, since the political party stayed in power almost thirty years after Cosío published his texts.

[133] Aguilar Camín, H. (October 20th, 1981). "De la FEG, el primer discurso de campaña de Miguel de la Madrid sin palabras de agresión", *Unomásuno*.

[134] José Guadalupe Zuno Arce (*Pepe* Zuno) was son of José Guadalupe Zuno Hernández, former governor of Jalisco (1923-1926), founder of *Universidad de Guadalajara* (1925) and the patriarch of one of the two most important families in the local political arena. *Pepe* Zuno was FEG's leader during the 1950s, but he lost power since his support to the railroad strike drove him to prison in 1958. (Aguayo Quezada, 2001; Interview conducted with J.J. Doñán, Journalist. (October 3rd, 2015). Guadalajara, Jal.). *Pepe* was also the younger brother of María Esther, married with the President Luis Echeverría (1970-1976), and Rubén Zuno, who was convicted in 1992 for being involved in the kidnapping and assassination of the DEA agent Enrique Camarena (Valdés Castellanos, 2013). For more details on the Camarena Case see Text Box 2.1

Directorate (DFS)[135] archives, he was exempt from being arrested or disarmed as he also carried an identity card issued by the regional military force (Aguayo Quezada, 2001). Additionally, the *golpeadores* (beater) were essential FEG elements in charge of the "dirty work"[136] organizing shock brigades and beating up students or any other opponents (Aguayo Quezada, 2001).

During the late 1960s and 1970s, besides several violent episodes FEG members staged due to inner conflicts[137], they provoked many violent confrontations between students' organizations (Regalado Santillán, 2012)[138], mostly targeting the Student Revolutionary Front (FER) and one of the most influential local gangs, the *Vikingos*[139]. Both groups were organized during the late 1960s to confront the FEG[140].

In the 1970s, during the time of the so-called *Guerra Sucia*[141], the FEG was the armed wing of the repressive regime. Thus, the group became a sort of military-police organization, through which University elites retained their power as a political-ideological apparatus in

[135] The *Dirección Federal de Seguridad*, DFS was the Mexican intelligence agency. More details about this office and its role on this violent period will be developed further in the chapter.
[136] The notion "dirty work" was developed by E. C. Hughes (1996). From the sociology of labour, Hughes coins the term to refer either the professions or the tasks that, as part of a profession, are physically disgusting or that symbolises a degrading or humiliating action. It can also make reference to activities against the heroic moral conceptions. According to Hughes, this professions or tasks are delegated reflecting not only the organization of work but also technical and social cleavages, as well as moral differences. Since delegation is a key element of this concept, the "dirty work" might be also understood through the interaction between actors that it entails (whether physically present or not). In this example, the exert of violence against regime's dissidents was the activity delegated from FEG leaders to the beaters but also, as will be stated later, delegated from government security agencies to the FEG, as part of the unofficial methods to confront insurgency.
[137] The conflicts within the FEG, especially around the leadership, were constant since the student's group also represents the rivalry between the two most important families in the local political arena and their patriarchs: José Guadalupe Zuno Hernández and Margarito Ramírez Miranda (Interview conducted with J.J. Doñán, Journalist. (October 3rd, 2015). Guadalajara, Jal.).
[138] For a review on the tensions and disputes between different students' groups within Guadalajara University, since its creation, see Herrera Calderón (2018).
[139] The FER was "composed of a broad range of individuals from an array of political back-grounds" (Herrera Calderón, 2018: 157). Created by Andrés Zuno Arce, after his family lost FEG's control face to Ramírez Ladeviw dynasty, they nourished the movement with the Zuno Arce family reputation and political capital but also through the local gangs such as the *Vikingos.* (Interview conducted with J. J. Doñán, Journalist. (October 3rd, 2015). Guadalajara, Jal.). On the other hand, the gang *Vikingos* had "long historical roots in the working-class neighbourhood of San Andrés" (Herrera Calderón, 2018).
[140] For some details about the creation of the FER, the radicalization of *Los Vikingos,* the link between both groups and the role of Zuno Arce family at the juncture, see Aguayo Quezada (2001) and Herrera Calderón (2018).
[141] The "Dirty War" refers to the violent actions Mexican PRI-ruled government put in place against *guerrilla* groups in the 1960s and 1970s, including disappearances, torture and executions. (Herrera Calderón and Cedillo, 2012). During this period executive power granted to intelligence agency, armed forces and police bodies an extended use of violence which used in some cases to get profits through extorsion and drug trafficking (Piccato, 2017).

Jalisco (Gil Olivo, 2006) and the government confronted the *guerrilla* and other dissident groups.

> *During the Mexican Student Movement of 1968 ... here in Guadalajara, the FEG was given the task, particularly by the Federal Government,* ***to repress any signs of sympathy with the mobilized students***[142]*. They [FEG members] were even allowed to use death threats. Ah! Because they [the government] allowed the FEG ... to arm themselves. Back then,…* ***weapons appeared within student organizations; weapons given to them by the Army… clandestinely****, I mean with Government permission! Thus, rumor has it... there were people… students from the schools of Economics as well as Philosophy and Literature... members of the National Strike Council (CNH) of the UNAM*[143]*… so, they came [to Guadalajara]… so, rumor has it… FEG leaders or FEG gunmen, took the students… kidnapped them… drove them to the* Barranca[144]*, and simulated an execution… so, basically, that was their function and it was rewarded!*
>
> Juan José Doñán, Journalist
> Guadalajara, Jal., October 3rd, 2015
> *(Q 1-1)*[145]

Despite various student groups existing in Guadalajara during the effervescent year of 1968, the FEG and their link to federal security agencies explains the absence of significant student protests in the city, as FEG members launched diverse radical measures to eliminate dissident students. For instance, they used to patrol the schools discouraging any support for either the CNH or the protests taking place in Mexico City. (Aguayo Quezada, 2001; Herrera Calderón, 2018).

According to Doñán, a clear symbol of the Government's acknowledgment of the FEG contribution throughout these turbulent times might be when President Gustavo Díaz Ordaz (1964-1970) took off his own expensive watch (an Omega Constellation) in the middle of an official ceremony to offer it to FEG's president while pointing out what an upstanding Mexican citizen he was[146].

Albeit the clear mention by Doñán that FEG's main targets were student organizations, violence at that time also reached the business sector. In fact, the FEG was also known as

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[142] Here after, on the quotes, bold font represents author's emphasis.
[143] National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM). The CNH was created in 1968 in response to the repressive actions that government undertook against student community. It was composed by students from the UNAM, National Polytechnic Institute (IPN) and other universities. For a basic review of the Tlatelolco massacre and the 1968 protests see Scherer, J. and Monsivais, C. (1999).
[144] He refers to a ravine, which used to be an isolated lonely place.
[145] As explained in the introduction, the Spanish original version of every quote is available at Appendix Q. Every quote has a unique identifier to easily find the original on the Appendix. The identifier is created with the letter "Q" meaning *quote*, a first number that refers to the chapter to which the quote belongs and a second number that represents the number of the quote within the respective chapter.
[146] Interview conducted with J.J. Doñán, Journalist. (October 3rd, 2015). Guadalajara, Jal.

"the mafia" because they were extorting business proprietors, specifically wholesalers or small grocery store owners (Gil Olivo, 2006).

An extract from a 1979 Chamber of Commerce Gazette *(Gaceta Mercantil)*[147] illustrates the mechanism through which allegedly FEG members approached business owners to collect this illegal quota. It narrates that a group of young people contacted a tradesman asking for a "donation" by using either a veiled or an explicit threat. According to the Gazette, the students started by presenting a letter allegedly signed by the president of the FEG, where he introduced the bearer of the text as a *compañero* (schoolmate), who needed to address an issue regarding the student campaign to elect new representatives.

As Figure 1.1 shows, the then president of the FEG published a press release aimed at denying that FEG members were asking for money within the business sector. In the Gazette, the Chamber of Commerce took the opportunity to remind its associates there was "no obligation to give any donations" to the student organization, warning that this kind of practice could become "real attempts of extortion" (*verdaderos intentos de extorsión)*.

Figure 1.1 "Have you been asked for 'donations'?", the Chamber of Commerce warns its associates about attempts of extortion



4

¿LE HAN SOLICITADO "DONATIVOS"?

Aunque la Federación de Estudiantes de Guadalajara dio a conocer, mediante comunicado firmado por su presidente Horacio García Pérez publicado en la prensa local, que **no ha autorizado ni autorizará a sus miembros a solicitar ayuda económica o de bienes**, algunas empresas han estado recibiendo la visita de presuntos estudiantes amparados en cartas como la que reproducimos en esta página.

Se dan casos en que los portadores recurren a la amenaza velada —e inclusive abierta— cuando no son satisfechas sus pretensiones de "ayuda".

Desde luego **no hay obligación alguna de efectuar donativos**, en efectivo o en especie, a estudiantes en particular o a organismos estudiantiles.

El Comercio Organizado de Guadalajara reprueba enérgicamente la practica de solicitar ayudas o 'donativos', pórque da lugar a verdaderos intentos de extorsión y da una triste imagen del estudiantado tapatío.

FEG

Por este conducto nos dirigimos a Usted, con la finalidad de saludarle y a la vez presentarle al compañero: GUSTAVO GARCIA PEREZ quien a sido nombrado candidato a ocupar la presidencia de la ESCUELA DE AGRICULTURA DE LA UNIVERSIDAD DE GUADALAJARA, quien le tratara el asunto relacionado con su campaña.

Agradecemos de antemano las finas atenciones que se sirva prestar a la presente, nos es propicio reiterarle la seguridad de nuestra mas alta consideración y respeto.

FEG

A T E N T A M E N T E
" POR LA DIVULGACION DE LA CULTURA "
Guadalajara, Jal., Agosto de 1979.

PRESIDENTE — EL DIRECTOR DEL DEPARTAMENTO DE RELACIONES PUBLICAS.

HORACIO GARCIA PEREZ. — RAUL MARTINEZ LOERA.

LJJ/

Source: Gazette Bank of Images 1970-2016. August 27th, 1979.

[147] Gazette Bank of Images 1970-2016.

From the example shown, it is possible to highlight some mechanisms of the collection of illegal quotas back in the 1970s. First of all, whether the racketeers were real members of the FEG or not, what is clear is that the student organization had a reputation of being a credible threat to the extent that, on its behalf, someone could try to extort shop owners. The date of the case should be noticed (1979) as it coincides with the downfall of the FEG, just before its extinction (in the mid-1980s)[148]. This suggests that its reputation as a violent actor, which was earned over more than a decade, still remained once the violent capacity of the organization diminished.

Regarding FEG's reputation, violence might not be its only mechanism. The example also reveals that somehow members were able to establish direct contact with proprietors expecting to receive financial gain. What kind of incentives could a business owner receive when visited by the alleged students? If the FEG was taken as a violent group, fear could be a sufficient reason to succumb to their demands. However, it is also pertinent to understand the position of this student organization as a local political actor. FEG's close ties with political and military elites, as discussed, had some clandestine features, but it also displayed very explicit and visible manifestations. For instance, until 1983, when an FEG president took office the Military Commander in charge of the 15th Military Region was always present (Aguayo Quezada, 2001) showing support for the organization. In addition, the link between civilian *Priistas* and the FEG was solid. As an example, FEG's president routinely became a local representative and from the 1950s to the late 1970s, about thirty FEG members had become local or federal congressmen, while others were appointed for different public offices[149]. Thus, while talking to FEG members, businessmen could have also been interacting with an expression of political power.

Since the Gazette was a means of internal communication between the Chamber of Commerce and its associates, it can be assumed that it represented the interests and concerns of the business sector, as explained in the introduction. Therefore, the image suggests that

[148] According to Aguayo Quezada (2001) the FEG disappeared when its violence became non-functional to the political regime. That coincided with the extinction of the DFS and the transformation of federal security bodies. The FEG officially disappeared in 1991, but its extinction as political force and violent actor is set in the mid-1980s. In fact, some signs of the distance between the students' organization and the PRI were clear since the last-1970s ("La UdeG en manos de la mafia encabezada por Padilla". (March 11, 2002). *La Jornada*).

[149] "La UdeG en manos de la mafia encabezada por Padilla". (March 11, 2002). *La Jornada*; Interview conducted with J.J. Doñán, Journalist. (October 3rd, 2015). Guadalajara, Jal.

this kind of extortion was a frequent practice that troubled the business sector rather than an incidental case.

It also stands out that despite the quotation marks attached to the word "donations", in this publication, the Chamber of Commerce does not call the practice "extortion". Since a threat reinforced the pressure on business owners to give the alleged students money, it could be considered as so. However, this continued to be registered as a donation or aid to refer to the facts. Even further, they accepted being afraid that such practices could become eventually "real extortion". Therefore, it is possible to say that even when store owners were, in fact, victims of this crime, they were not fully aware of it.

Another threat the business sector faced during the *Guerra Sucia* was kidnapping committed by urban *guerrilla* groups.

During the 1970s, Guadalajara was home to three of the most relevant *guerrilla* groups in the country: The Revolutionary Armed Forces of the People (FRAP) [150], The People's Union (UP)[151] and the 23rd of September Communist League (LC23S) [152] (Zamora García, 2014), the last being the largest Marxist-Leninist *guerrilla* movement in the country (Herrera Calderón, 2018).

At that time, in addition to the violence usually brought on by FEG members, the urban *guerrilla* groups made their presence known. In fact, some of the FER and *Vikingo* members, old FEG opponents, joined the 23rd of September Communist League, which heightened their capability of violence (Aguayo Quezada, 2001). Although FER members and *Vikingos* lacked ideological motivation, their deep knowledge of the city, the identification with their neighborhoods known as "*barrio* consciousness" (Herrera Calderón, 2018: 162), their capacity for violence and their long-time conflict with the FEG and eventually with the political regime, made them ideal candidates to expand the ranks of the urban *guerrilla*. "They contributed with their combativeness, their immediate disposition to *echar balazos y madrazos* (to drop bullets and beat up others). They were great at committing robberies (…)", as remembered by a former member of the 23rd of September Communist League" (Hirales Morán in Aguayo Quezada, 2001: 172).

[150] Las Fuerzas Revolucionarias Armadas del Pueblo.
[151] La Unión del Pueblo
[152] La Liga Comunista 23 de Septiembre.

Similar to other contemporary *guerrilla* groups in Latin America, the urban *guerrilla* which settled in Guadalajara used kidnappings to finance their operation, to obtain the release of their imprisoned comrades, to spread their claims, but also, to prove what they interpreted to be the vulnerability of the enemy of the working class (Zamora García, 2014; Herrera Calderón, 2018).

A victim of kidnapping used to be an outstanding figure, a powerful member of the elite. In fact, according to DFS archives, the FRAP kept a file entitled *Directorio Burgués* (Bourgeois Address book), a list of rich and powerful people that would eventually be "kidnapped and annihilated" (Aguayo Quezada, 2001: 207). Probably, the first important coup was the kidnapping of the North American Consulate officer in Guadalajara, Terrance George Leonhardy, perpetrated by the FRAP in May 1973 (Aguayo Quezada, 2001)[153].

In that context, a number of *Tapatios* businessmen were also kidnapping victims. The Industrials Fernando Aranguren (1973) and Pedro Sarquis Marrawe (1974) were, perhaps, the most shocking cases since they died during their captivity (Zamora García, 2014). Nonetheless, businessmen were not the only targets of *guerrilleros*: politicians, diplomats and other outstanding profiles completed the target population. For instance, in 1974 the FRAP kidnapped the well-known José Guadalupe Zuno Hernández[154] (Gil Olivo, 2006) and in 1976 the LC23S tried to kidnap Margarita López Portillo, sister of the then elected President José López Portillo (1976-1982) (Aguayo Quezada, 2001).

Although a more detailed revision regarding these kidnappings and their mechanisms is provided in Part III, it is relevant to say that at that time business owners were victims of an urban *guerrilla* war because they were part of the so-called oligarchy of exploitation. Figure 1.2 shows a letter received by the businessman Alberto Javelly Manuel[155] owner of the department store *El Nuevo París,* allegedly sent by FRAP members and filed by DFS.

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[153] For a general landscape of Leonhardy kidnapping and release see: "Demasiado peligrosos los liberados a cambio del Cónsul T. Leonhardy". (May 6th, 1973). *El Informador*; "LEA se encuentra indignado por secuestro". (May 6th, 1973). *El Informador*; "Atienden a demandas de los secuestradores". (May 6th, 1973). *El Informador*; "Aún no es puesto en libertad el Cónsul". (May 7th, 1973). *El Informador*; "Se abstiene la policía de investigar en el caso del Cónsul Leonhardy". (May 7th, 1973). *El Informador*; "Llegaron a Cuba los 30 presos". (May 7th, 1973). *El Informador*; "Sano y Salvo fue liberado el Cónsul de EEUU". (May 8th, 1973). *El Informador.*

[154] For a profile of José Guadalupe Zuno see the footnote 134 of this chapter. For more details about Zuno Hernández kidnapping see Gil Olivo, 2006; Oikión Solano, 2011; Zamora García, 2014.

[155] From French origin, Javelly Manuel was an institution for the business and financial sector. He died in 2012 when he was 97 years old ("Falleció Alberto Javelly, un empresario como ya no los hay". (March, 10th, 2012). *El Informador*).

Figure 1.2 Letter allegedly sent by FRAP to the businessman Alberto Javelly

We inform you that, according to the investigation that has been carried out by the FRAP Comando de Ajusticiamiento *(Execution Command)… [you] have been found guilty by popular jury, along with other important members of the city's exploiting oligarchy, of the following crimes: bourgeois, promoter of foreign currency flight, imperialist, foreigner, tyrant, proletarian class' exploiter, reactionary and enemy of Socialism… we inform you that the Urban Army Command "Commander Genaro Vázquez" has resolved to execute you.*

October10th, 1974

Source: Aguayo Quezada, 2001: 181. Translation is mine.

Although the authenticity of the FRAP members as the authors of the letter could be debatable (or, at least, not taken for granted), the sample broadly illustrates the attributes *guerrilla* groups associated to the business sector and the reasons why they were potential victims of kidnapping. As the letter indicated, a popular jury accused the businessmen of crimes such as being a bourgeois, a foreigner and an enemy of Socialism. Hence, kidnapping was part of the punishment, the urban *guerrilla's* way of doing justice.

Despite the fact that kidnappings represented a financial resource for *guerrilleros,* monetary benefits were only one aspect of this practice. This gains importance when these crimes are compared to the kidnapping-for-ransom businessmen suffered during the 1990s, which were almost exclusively financially driven. The comparison between both kinds of kidnapping is, however, addressed in Part III.

Political violence occurring in Guadalajara, as explained before, was the result of the confrontation between different non-state groups, namely the FEG and the urban *guerrilla*. On the one hand, the violence of FEG practices encountered a response in groups as FER and *Vikingos,* which eventually joined *guerrilla* groups[156]. On the other hand, the FEG was used by state security agencies to confront dissidents to the regime. In fact, around 1973, some former FEG gunmen and *golpeadores* were recruited to be part of a sort of paramilitary group, created by the Commander of the Military Region to confront *guerrilleros* (Aguayo Quezada, 2001). However, as could be expected, the contribution of Army forces and state security bodies (as DFS or Judicial Police) to the violent environment was not only by

[156] Interview conducted with J. J. Doñán, Journalist. (October 3rd, 2015). Guadalajara, Jal.

clandestinely delegating the "dirty work" to the non-state actors. A set of severe actions that included forced disappearance, torture and homicides, were also undertook by PRI-ruled Government agencies (Aguayo Quezada, 2001; Herrera Calderón and Cedillo, 2012).

Important research has been carried out on the *Guerra Sucia* and the multiple violent and illegal actions state security bodies have launched against *guerrilla* groups (Herrera Calderón and Cedillo, 2012; Aviña, 2016; Pensado and Ochoa, 2018)[157]. However, the direct impact that state agent violence has represented for the business sector is almost unexplored. Some clues suggest that the intricate tie between state and non-state violent actors have enabled official agents to become a direct threat for business owners. In that regard, the case of General Federico Amaya Rodríguez, Commander of the 15th Military Region in those years[158], might be illustrative.

According to DFS archives collected and analyzed by Aguayo Quezada (2001) General Amaya Rodríguez[159] created a clandestine group made up of gunmen and criminals by the name *Agentes Confidenciales* (Confidential Agents) to deliver threats to businessmen, warning of their kidnapping. They were false alarms that in the context, were highly credible. So, the General offered his protection to the threaten businessman, in exchange for

[157] The scientific production about *Guerra Sucia* and *guerrilla* movements increased after the President Vicente Fox (2000-2006) ordered the relocation of DFS archives –in the custody of the CISEN- to the General Archive of the Nation (AGN) in November 2001 (Acuerdo A/317/06 por el que se disponen diversas medidas para la procuración de justicia por los delitos cometidos contra personas vinculadas con movimientos sociales y políticos del pasado. Diario Oficial de la Federación, Mexico City, Mexico, November 27th, 2001). as part of his policy of truth and justice regarding the period. The decision was consistent with voters' expectation of finally being under a democratic regime, as this implied that files of the federal agencies would be available for the public. However, CISEN stayed in charge of the archives allegedly training AGN staff, but also managing what the users could and could not accessed. AGN, as an office attached to Interior Ministry –such as CISEN- had little scope for manoeuvre. That could change with the recently promulgated Act that granted autonomy to the AGN applicable since June, 2019 (Ley General de Archivos. Diario Oficial de la Federación, Mexico, Mexico City, June 15th , 2018). Being the case, scholars would have a precious repository to work with.

[158] The Commander of the Military Region was the most important military figure on the state. For the role that some of this militaries played in the smuggling and drug trafficking markets settlement since the 1920s see Flores Pérez, 2013.

[159] General Amaya Rodríguez was born in Iturbide, Nuevo León in 1902. He was a Military and Politician who started his career in the early 1920s, the post-revolution period, so he was another member of the Revolutionary family. He was Mexican Ambassador in Guatemala and Yugoslavia during the 1950s and Senator from Nuevo León in the early-1980. As part of the Army, he also was Commander of the VII Military Region (Monterrey) and the XV Military Region (Guadalajara). He died in 1992. (Diario de los Debates, December, 1992; Martínez Salazar et al.,1999). In the early-1980s, Margarito Ramírez implicated Amaya Rodríguez in the murder of his son Carlos Ramírez Ladewig – FEG's chief consigliere and ideologue, killed in 1975-. (Interview conducted with G. Monterrubio, Scholar and Journalist. (October 5th, 2015). Guadalajara, Jal.).

compensation[160]. It is clearly a case of racketeering, since the Military was the source of both threats and consequent protection.

To provide the agreed protection, Amaya Rodríguez commissioned military personnel under his command. In that sense, he was offering businessmen a sort of selective protection through public resources and receiving unofficial financial compensation. This modality of close protection has been documented through the Russian case under the name of "Red Roof" (Cox, 2001: 121). The term "roof", according to Volkov (2002) is "a colloquial term for a private protection arrangement or an 'enforcement partnership'" (p. 168). When the providers of private protection were top-level law enforcement and intelligence agencies, this was referred to as "Red Roof" (Cox, 2001). This sort of private VIP protection (O'Connor, 1996) set in motion by General Amaya Rodríguez is not the only observable example in Mexico, which is why a complete section has been devoted to selective protection in Chapter 4.

Considering the example of General Amaya Rodríguez, it is also pertinent to underline that the context of political violence which dominated Guadalajara during the 1970s made it feasible that a letter received by the *El Nuevo París* owner (Figure 1.2) might have been sent by the FRAP members, as presumed by DFS and reproduced by Aguayo Quezada (2001). Yet it is also likely that it was one of the alarms put in place by a powerful state actor who was able to control threats and protection.

General Amaya was probably not an exception. The Chief of Police Carlos Aceves (*El Manchado)* was seized without being prosecuted since besides being the head of the Secret Police, he used the agents to threaten and extort "everyone"[161], according to a former Governor Flavio Romero de Velasco (1977-1983).

It must be stressed that racketeering implemented by Military and civil security agents was feasible mostly due to the fine line between violent state and non-state actors. This schema will be a constant finding through this research.

[160] The DFS file presented by Aguayo Quezada (2001) documents that General Amaya Rodríguez implemented this practice in Monterrey, when he was in charge of that Military Region. However, the DFS pieces of evidence also suggest that he replicated the model once he was appointed to be in charge of the 15th Military Region (which includes Guadalajara).

[161] "Memoria viva: Flavio Romero de Velasco". (March 26th, 2012). *Mural.*

Although the *Guerra Sucia* and its associated political violence seem to be a part of a chapter of Mexican history that has finalized, extortion, racketeering and kidnapping remain a threat for the business sector in Mexico, particularly in Guadalajara. Although further chapters contain a deeper discussion on such offenses, a general description of contemporary figures is seen in Text Box 1.1.

To summarize, within the context of political violence in the 1970s, both non-state agents (FEG members and *guerrilleros*) and state agents (Military actors and law enforcement agents) victimized businessmen. Extortion, racketeering and kidnapping were the mechanisms of such a menace.

In the 1980s, the face of the threat changed as actors and motives were no longer necessarily related to the urban *guerrilla* and the Mexican Dirty War. This time, property crimes and criminal bands were, as De la Barreda Solórzano (1985) stated, "ghosts inhabiting the streets" of large cities (p.117), which is the main issue of the next section.

Text Box 1.1 Twenty years of extortion and kidnapping figures in Jalisco

Official statistical records of extortion and kidnappings are available since 1997, both at the national and state level. The breakdown at the municipal level was reported by authorities only in 2011.

In Jalisco, as shown in the upper graph, the preliminary investigations related to extortion progressively increased after the year 2000, reaching the highest point in 2010, 12.90 extortions per 100,000 inhabitants. A sharp fall was observed the year after (6.38 per 100,000 inhabitants) and there have been fluctuations (6.38-10) per 100,000 inhabitants since then.



According to a common interpretation of figures, the rise in extortion rates is related to the effects of the "war on drugs" and the so-called *Kingpin Strategy* launched by President Felipe Calderón (2006-2012) yet this could be a short-sighted explanation.

The mainstream narrative assumes that cutting the head off a powerful DTO should have led to the fragmentation of criminal organizations and the diversification of their criminal activity, going from drug trafficking to offenses such as extortion, racketeering, kidnapping, human trafficking and others.

Certainly, the former explanation relies on weak assumptions that are debatable, such as considering that all registered extortions have been committed by DTOs, ignoring other criminal profiles; that every fragmented organization would venture to commit other crimes; that different organizations all over the country would be damaged in a similar manner once they lose a leader and, likewise, they will react with the same strategy, to name a few.

In fact, the lower graph shows that the pattern of kidnappings in Jalisco are significantly different, not only from extortion figures, but also from what was registered in Nuevo León, the second financial center of the country.

The arguments based on criminal organization dynamics and law enforcement action, although relevant, neglect the limits and scope of the official sources.



To exemplify, the sources of extortion, could be reflecting more cases that were registered after agencies made an effort to report, and also the widening of the category which nowadays includes telephonic fraud, threats via phone call or in person contact as well as racketeering.

Regarding kidnapping, the category could consider different modalities, for instance, kidnapping-for-ransom, hostage situations, express kidnappings, abductions attributed to DTO's and forced disappearances.

Sources: SESNSP and INEGI.

1.2 Property related crime patterns: the scope and limitations of available data

Muggings, robberies, shoplifting, in other words, property crimes became a concern for the business sector during the early 1980s. Although these were not the only kind of offenses harmful to society, they are relevant in terms of analyzing the emergence of a security threat for business owners, since possessing material goods could make them especially vulnerable to crime.

Despite the fact that they had always taken place, property related crimes did not seem worthy of business owners' attention, at least not as much as they do nowadays.

The systematic analysis of the Gazette reveals that during the 1970s, crimes on property were occasionally reported to Chamber of Commerce associates[162]. In 1971, for instance, two statues from the urban landscape were stolen upsetting enterprise owners, who considered it unacceptable in a city as peaceful as Guadalajara. Later, in 1975, the association warned its members about check fraud attempts affecting some retailers. Therefore, the Gazette's content suggests that property crimes were neither systematic nor necessarily targeting the business sector.

At that time, if proprietors feared for their physical integrity and assets, it was due to violence related to the *Guerra Sucia*, as explained earlier. While it was true that smuggling, so-called *autos chocolate*[163], and the expansion of the informal economy led business owners to compel law enforcement agencies to improve the observance of the rule of law[164], it was mostly because such practices represented a risk of damaging their profitability. These offenses entailed unfair competition in the sector, rather than a real threat to their assets, families or themselves. The pattern seemed to change in the early 1980s, when property crimes became a direct threat for the business sector.

Official crime statistics have been the primary tool employed to analyze criminality, being generally accepted that they constitute the precise measure of the problem (Philippe et al., 1999). Ideally, a sentence, as the last step in the judicial process, would reflect what a judicial authority determines as a committed crime, discarding alleged offenses. The length of the process as well as the high rates of impunity undermine the value of those numbers, rendering

[162] Gazette Bank of Images 1970-2016.
[163] It refers to cars irregularly carried to Mexico from the United States.
[164] Gazette Bank of Images 1970-2016.

police reports and preliminary investigations (the first steps of a legal process) the main sources of official figures.

Frequently, an additional limitation of official figures is the lack of long-term data series, which is problematic since historical perspective could be useful to scrutinize changing patterns and, ultimately, to better understand criminality (Beltrán and Piccato, 2004). Regarding Mexico, fortunately, figures concerning individuals sentenced and indicted for a crime were on record since the mid-1920s, or what is considered the post-revolutionary period (Lajous and Piccato, 2018). The dataset by Piccato et al. (2018) displays the outcome of several scholars' long-term efforts to collect the information published in annual statistical digests from various Ministries.

Long-term time series are not always consistent since the original sources could utilize different criteria in the register, classification and report of offenses and these guidelines, at the same time, could change across time. Therefore, this sort of archaeological endeavor implied not only bringing together diverse and widespread primary sources, but also assuring the comparability of data, before including all tabulates in the same Excel spreadsheet. In that sense, authors decided to keep the classification of offenses that each primary source had used (Piccato et al., 2018).

Since data could be broken down in terms of crime, state and year, we are able to isolate the figures corresponding to those sentenced and indicted in Jalisco due to robbery from 1926 to 2008[165]. Doing so, it is possible: 1) to avoid any likely bias due to the diversity of criteria which considered whether a deviant act was or was not included in the tabulates; 2) to focus on property crime patterns (at least one of them), excluding other kinds of offenses and; 3) to compare Jalisco's sentence and indictment rate patterns[166].

As shown in Graph 1.1, rates of sentenced individuals tend to be significantly lower than rates of indicted individuals, although they follow similar trajectories which could have diverse explanations.

[165] Dataset finishes in 2008 since Mexican criminal judicial system was deeply reformed and, in consequence, the crimes' classification criteria and the way of register them is not comparable with precedent data (Piccato et al., 2018).
[166] Figures corresponding to all the offenses considered in the dataset and the comparison between National and Jalisco rates patterns are available in Appendix 1.

First, it is plausible to argue that the judiciary system, following penal code, is more demanding when classifying a deviant act as a crime, while police could be more flexible (Lajous and Piccato, 2018). Another explanation could be related to the dynamic of the law enforcement system as indicted individuals are subject to a long-term judicial process of many years, before a verdict is granted. It is also possible that a person sentenced can be benefitted by a revision and subsequent annulation of such sentence (Beltrán and Piccato, 2004)[167]

Graph 1.1 Individuals sentenced and indicted for robbery in Jalisco, 1926-2008

(Rate per 100,000 inhabitants)



Source: Elaborated by the author based on the data collected by Piccato, et. al. (2018) as part of the project "Estadísticas del crímen en México: Series Históricas 1926-2008". Rates come from the original. Figures represents the number of persons sentenced or indicted for robbery registered in Jalisco. White spaces correspond to unavailable data in the primary sources used by the authors - Annual Statistical Digest from the General Statistical Directorate attached to the federal Ministry of Economy; the Ministry of Industry and Commerce; the Office of Program and Budget and INEGI (since 1980).

[167] The dataset methodological note does not specify if the category "sentenced" included only people found guilty or also those who received a favourable judgment. That is important because -since the category is not "convicted"- it is possible to assume that "sentenced" includes indicted either found guilty or not guilty. Being the case, a not guilty verdict might result from many different possibilities, such as: a) the indicted is probably responsible but, as his right to fair trial was not guarantee, he is released. Although the possibility was unlikely (almost impossible) on the inquisitorial or mixt criminal system model, after the reform towards an accusatory model (decreed in 2008) the respect to due process is highly privileged; b) someone else is responsible for the offense, not the indicted; c) the judge concluded there is no crime to prosecute. Despite being unusual, it is a possible scenario. Under the assumptions a) and b), there is an offense that occurred, so figures still say something about criminality patterns, however it is clearly not the case on scenario c).

A comparative reading of these figures must consider different nuances, especially when it comes to the gap between both patterns. It could be argued that the difference between sentence and indictment rates illustrates the diminished capacity of law enforcement and the judicial system to punish deviant behavior, or in other words, patterns of impunity (Lajous and Piccato, 2018). Even if an indicted person's sentence could be impeded due to impunity, it is also feasible that a lengthy judicial process could lead to an indictment in a given year, and a sentence many years later. So, it is crucial to not interpret a sentence in a specific year as a subset of an indictment in the same year.

Aside from methodological limitations[168], the graph suggests that data on robbery could be displayed in three periods. The first contemplates the early 1930s to the 1950s when indictment rates fluctuated from 30 to 40 persons per 100,000 inhabitants. The second considers the early 1950s to 1970s when sentences and indictments decreased significantly to 10 to 20 persons per 100,000 inhabitants. This phenomenon is concurrent with the so-called "Mexican miracle", a period of sustained economic growth based on the Import Substitution Industrialization model (Ortiz Mena, 1998). Finally, the 1980s brought on recurrent economic crises as well as rising numbers of people indicted and sentenced for robbery. The economic environment as a backdrop clearly seems to lend to the understanding of property crime trends.

The 1970s, on the other hand, is a period with significant information loopholes. The lack of precise information may be another characteristic sign of the previously mentioned *Guerra Sucia*. A regime marked by illegal detentions, disappearances and acts of torture holds high incentives to hide police and judicial system records, if in existence. This is true even if indicted robbers or those suspected of robbery could be uninvolved in *guerrilla* movements or counterinsurgency acts. Moreover, the obscurity of the period could also influence these statistics. The former is only one hypothesis that would be worth testing in detail, confronting these figures with those of other offenses, other states and with those coming from different sources.

Despite the inherent value of the dataset, this tool has an additional limitation if the purpose is to explore the property crime context. The figures are measuring numbers (or rates) of

[168] Beltrán and Piccato (2004) based on Bottomley (1986) suggest exerting a reasonable scepticism regarding the historical data series on criminality. It means to mobilize the figures critically, recognizing its limits, using them cautiously rather than completely neglecting their qualities.

individuals who have committed felonies versus crime occurrence. In other words, to be part of the figures, law enforcement agencies might attach an accused person, or even many people to the concerned crime. Thus, offenses in which law enforcement agencies do not even have a suspect, fall outside this register, although the offense occurred[169]. On the other hand, an indicted or sentenced person may have committed many offenses and only receive one verdict, in that case, the figures with reference to people would also be underestimating the number of offenses committed.

To the best of my knowledge, on this period, the first figures on property crime officially registered in Jalisco were from 1984, which could explain why studies based on empirical evidence from the 1980s are scarce[170]. Moreover, it is not possible to explore to what extent property crime rates spiked, compared with the 1970s. However, the lack of data on that period is significant enough to raise doubts regarding government agency conditions, their agenda, and at least marginally, the features of crime dynamics. In this case, the historical perspective offers valuable insights into the social and institutional context, as well as the way diverse actors perceived and signified crime (*trama de significados)* (Beltrán and Piccato, 2004: 13).

By way of illustration, considering the annual reports presented by each Governor regarding their activities (*Informe de Gobierno)*[171]*,* it could be established that the disaggregation of property crime figures dates back to Alberto Cárdenas' administration (1995-2001)[172]. Prior to that time, the state of public security was described in a narrative fashion and data appeared only sporadically. In contrast, statistics contained in former governor Flavio Romero de Velasco's reports (1977-1983) were presented under the title "activities undertaken by the

[169] Mexican law included the possibility to open a preliminary investigation without an arrested person (*consignación sin detenido*), considering the cases where an offense occurred but there is not an allegedly responsible (Art. 142. Código Federal de Procedimientos Penales, 1934). For a detailed discussion on related data and its implications see Zepeda Lecuona (2004). Although the figure *consignación sin detenido* disappeared in 2008 after the Criminal System Reform there still are investigations without an allegedly responsible. The author acknowledges Tania Luna her helpful explanation about the Criminal System Reform to clarify this last point.

[170] Regalado Santillán (2012), based on his PhD dissertation and Marcos Pablo Moloeznik's work are the rare pearls on this regard. Without wishing to underestimate the effort made by those authors, the statistical treatment shows some inaccuracies and non-existent discussion on the scope and limits of data.

[171] The Governor of Jalisco is constitutionally required to present, before the local Congress, an annual report regarding the state of his administration (Art. 50, Fracción III. Constitución Política del Estado de Jalisco, 1917).

[172] The review included the annual reports (*Informe de Gobierno)* presented by the former Governors Flavio Romero de Velasco (1977-1983), Enrique Álvarez del Castillo (1983-1988), Guillermo Cosío Vidaurri (1989-1992), Carlos Rivera Aceves (1992-1995) and Alberto Cárdenas Jiménez (1995-2001).

state public security department". There, the number of people arrested for committing "serious administrative offenses and crimes" was reported on the same table with metrics such as "police school's graduates" or "health services provided by police bodies (injections, vaccinations, consultations and dressings)". Thus, crime figures were a general category (including any kind of offense) expressed not as crime patterns but as municipal and state police activities. Once again, that does not consider the number of offenses registered but the number of people arrested. Additionally, in the annual reports of Romero de Velasco, the only explicit offenses included in the statistics were "people arrested for bearing fire arms" and "number of seized fire arms". This might be related to the anti-violence policy launched by Romero de Velasco during his administration, which included a campaign of confiscation and collecting weapons held by the public (especially after the political violence experienced during the 1970s)[173]. So, these statistics could be interpreted as indicators of the Governor's policy interests (implemented and communicated), rather than as an expression of crime patterns.

The lack of crime figures might be explained, as the preceding example, on the basis of the hypothesis that before the 1990s, public security (and crime patterns) were not part of the public agenda, hence keeping track of its trends was not a priority for political elites and constituent interests.

Another explanation, not necessarily exclusive, could be that, back then, discussing policy in the Mexican public realm relied on resources other than statistics, which is an aspect that changed notably after the arrival of public servants with technocratic profiles[174].

By way of illustration, it is pertinent to evoke a press release published in May, 1980[175] where the head of the Police Department in Mexico City, General Arturo Durazo Moreno (*El Negro*) who was famous for being corrupt[176] stated that, during his administration, the cleansing

[173] The former Governor stated that his strong-arm policy was what Jalisco needed after the violence provoked by FEG *guerrilla* members and corrupted officials. That is why, along with the weapons confiscation campaign, he also drove the Federal Judicial Police and DFS agents out of Guadalajara ("Memoria viva: Flavio Romero de Velasco". (March 26th, 2012), *Mural*). However, Fernando González (1996) argues that Federal Judicial Police had been retired from Guadalajara due to a conflict between the Governor Romero de Velasco and the then President José López Portillo, forcing the former to implement the weapons confiscation campaign to reduce violence risks.

[174] For an analysis of the technocratic profile in Mexican bureaucrats see Babb (1998).

[175] "Solamente cambió caras". (May 24th, 1980). *Proceso*, (186).

[176] The whole career of Arturo Durazo Moreno is a demonstration of the spread of corruption of the period as several sources reveal, see (González, 1983; Piccato, 2003; "Su encumbramiento, su caída: los peores crímenes de Durazo no figuran en la consignación". (January 21th, 1984). *Proceso,* 377).

efforts of the police force would result in an 80% reduction of crime figures citywide. Certainly, the percentage seems unreasonable and fake. In fact, the journalist in charge of the piece confronted Durazo's numbers with data taken from the local Attorney's Office, according to which crimes had reach a record high level (120,000 offenses) that year, although the article omitted a point of reference to support the claim.

Besides the accuracy of the data, what the example vividly shows is the extent to which a clearly corrupted police officer, such as *El Negro* Durazo was able to launch notoriously unreliable percentages as part of his speech with no consequence or obligation to publish his records. At the present time, such kind of pronouncement, although possible, would likely produce, at least, a media scandal. Nowadays, we are witnessing what Fernando Escalante (2015:157) calls "statistical fetishism", an obsession with turning everything into numbers and explaining all phenomena through statistics, even if inaccurate or weak.

According to Regalado Santillán (2012), public insecurity played a role in the *Tapatía* political elite's agenda until early 1980. The author identifies a particular electoral campaign speech pronounced by the former governor Enrique Álvarez del Castillo (1983-1988)[177]. The *Priísta* would insist on the topic during his administration inaugural speech, stating that it was vital to improve the "vulnerable security services" and to do so, he had committed to undertake the "moral and technical renovation of public security bodies" (Regalado Santillán, 2012: 64). This framing coincides with the "Moral Renovation" project launched by the President Miguel de la Madrid (1982-1988) as an antidote for the levels of corruption shown during the prior administration[178].

Regalado Santillán (2012) argues that insecurity arrived to the public agenda only when property crime directly affected the economic elite. Although available statistic data could not confirm such a claim, the *Gaceta Mercantil* shows that property crimes had become a frequent topic within the business sector since 1983[179].

[177] A complete and systematic analysis of Governors (and candidates) pronounced speeches since the 1970 would represent a solid empirical support for future research.
[178] Different corruption scandals were disclosed after José López Protillo (1976-1982) stepped aside. The most remarkable were "The dog's hill", a luxurious building complex built by the President López Portillo and his family in unclear conditions, and "The Parthenon of Durazo", a mansion property of *El Negro* Durazo (Martínez Trujillo, 2017).
[179] Gazette Bank of Images 1970-2016.

During the mid-1980s, three different strategies were frequently implemented by commerce tenants within the Chamber: 1) arranging meetings with law enforcement agents to present their problem and ask for solutions. In this case, the head of the Department of Public Security in Guadalajara was a regular speaker at the Chamber meetings; 2) organizing conferences and notifications for the chamber's associates to prevent becoming crime victims. For instance, minimum standards of crime prevention and protection were usually described in the Gazette; 3) training their employees to be able to protect their stores. In order to illustrate, it was then when the Chamber of Commerce made available to the associates, for the first time, a training workshop[180] for night watchmen, under the name *"Veladores y Vigilantes: funciones y responsabilidades"*[181]. According to Máximo Ballesteros, owner of a private security firm, back in the 1970s, night watchmen used to be company employees who reached a certain age and, being close to retirement, they were converted into night watchmen. So, no training or specific background seemed to be necessary to get the job[182]. If that is the case, this occupation might have originated by an effort on the part of older employees to avoid being unemployed rather than having been created due to fear or any other perception of insecurity. Thus, the effort to professionalize these employees suggests that, during the 1980s, the night watchmen's profile went from "waiting for retirement" towards "protection professionals"[183].

Former initiatives demonstrated that business owners, since then, had not only been impacted by insecurity as a sector, but also decided to be part of the solution, asking for responses from the authorities but also taking action.

Back then, proprietors used to associate the rise in property crimes with drug addiction, gangs and informal markets (what they called the "underground economy"). In fact, in the early 1990s, the Chamber of Commerce promoted a campaign entitled "Triple vaccination against pornography, violence and drug addiction"[184]. This way of explaining crime matches with the conservative orientation of the sector. While trying to improve Jalisco's situation

[180] The Chamber of Commerce, among its benefits, offers to its associates a set of training workshops useful for their employees. Thus, secretaries, assistants, clerks and accounting assistants, among others, could attend a course to get new skills or to improve them.
[181] Gazette Bank of Images 1970-2016.
[182] Interview conducted with M. Ballesteros, Private Security Company owner. (January 19th, 2017). Zapopan, Jal.
[183] Part II is consecrated to protection market, so the professional attribute will be discussed later.
[184] Gazette Bank of Images 1970-2016, various dates.

regarding security, for instance, the agenda for 1992 Directive Council of the Chamber included the establishment of a commission to prevent delinquency, through the "adequate investment in media publicity, broadcasting educational programs which are not schools of violence and sex"[185].

Moreover, in some cases businesses assumed that those patterns of crime arrived with people from other states or municipalities that had migrated to Guadalajara, after the economic crisis of 1982[186]. This lays the foundation of a narrative that will become extremely relevant later in this analysis. It seems that for business owners, on the one hand, crime perpetrators were outsiders, people foreign to the peaceful city they inhabited. On the other hand, their propensity to commit criminal acts were related to their marginalized social and economic position.

As can be seen in Graph 1.2, from 1984 to the early 1990s, the property crime rates seem relatively steady, however, a further increase occurred in 1995, when rates registered by authorities went from 426.05 up to 610.63 crimes per 100,000 inhabitants[187].

Once again, the spike of property crimes concurs with an economic shock, popularly known as "the December mistake" of 1994[188]. This time it also coincides with the end of the uninterrupted PRI administrations in Jalisco and the arrival of the first Governor coming from the opposition, the National Action Party (PAN). In fact, some scholars consider that public insecurity and violent episodes occurred during Guillermo Cosío (1989-1992) and Carlos Rivera (1992-1995) administrations were determinant for the PRI's defeat, in the elections of 1995 (Arellano Ríos, 2004). However, data cannot confirm, since the effect of crime growth and a correlation with the electoral behaviour is not clear[189].

[185] Gazette Bank of Images 1970-2016, (January 20th, 1992).
[186] Gazette Bank of Images 1970-2016.
[187] Although the original source (Regalado Santillán, 2012) presents number of offenses registered, I prefer to use rates per 100,000 inhabitants to ensure comparability of data in a long period, especially considering the effect of population growth. Thus, it is possible to argue that crime rising showed is not an effect of population growth.
[188] Although this context economic has been mentioned in the Introduction, it is going to be retrieved elsewhere in the text.
[189] For a study about the relation about crime and electoral behaviour in the current Mexican context see Bravo Regidor and Maldonado Hernández, (2012).

Graph 1.2 Property crimes registered in Jalisco, 1984-2000

(Rate per 100,000 inhabitants)



Source: Elaborated by the author based on statistics quoted by Regalado Santillán, 2012. According to the text, data comes from the Alberto Cárdenas Jiménez's III and IV Government Report and the Public Security Secretariat Report. Property crimes in this graph include vehicle robbery, home robbery, robbery committed in a commercial establishment, bank-robbery and mugging. Cargo vehicle robbery is included only from 1994 to 1997 and kidnapping only from 1994 to 1999. Regalado Santillán does not discuss the assurance of the comparability of the data from both sources. For 2000 data, the number of offenses is calculated based on another chart provided by the author in the same text. It includes vehicle robbery, home robbery, robbery committed in a commercial establishment, bank robbery and kidnapping. The rates per 100,000 inhabitants are calculated based on INEGI Population Census and Counts, interpolated with annual average growth rates. In Regalado Santillán's graph, the *y-axis represents "number of offenses committed"*. However, it is not clear if it is the number of offenses committed or those registered by the authority. Considering the low level of trust citizens have for law enforcement agencies, both numbers tend to be very different. Since official sources are used (probably preliminary inquiries [*averiguaciones previas*]), I assumed data on the graph represents registered offenses rather than committed offenses. *Francisco Rodríguez Gómez (PRI) replaced Governor Álvarez del Castillo four months before the end of his administration, because he was appointed as National Attorney General.

Although the bar graph clearly shows that during the first half of Alberto Cárdenas' term, crime rates remain high and then fall in 1998, the data has important methodological constraints that jeopardize the robustness of the conclusion obtained from them. That does not mean they should be seen as useless, but it does require a more careful reading.

First of all, crimes determined to be in the category referred to as "property crimes" change from one period to another. At certain time intervals, this term covers offenses that involve either damage or theft of material goods, but where personal integrity is not necessarily

compromised. Thus, burglary, vandalism or alternate types of robberies are part of this category. In other periods (1994-1997 and 1994-1999), data includes other crimes such as kidnapping which even if it could undermine a victim's patrimony, it is mostly a crime against the person's integrity.

The above consideration is important because the asymmetric availability of data reveals something interesting about crime trends in themselves. It is possible that a specific offense started being registered by authorities later than others because the crime had just begun to take place on a large scale or the behavior had recently appeared as an offense in the penal code, so law enforcement agencies started its registration.

The case of the Mexican *Huachicoleros* could clearly illustrate this point since the practice of stealing and illegally selling fuel (oil and diesel) became relevant after the release of oil prices that took place during President Peña Nieto's administration (2012-2018)[190] and due to trends in oil prices. As an answer, since 2016, a set of reforms to Federal Criminal Code and other Acts were enacted to enforce the prevention and sanction of this practice at the Federal level[191]. Thus, although the practice was already considered an offense and old data exist, it was only recently measured and reported in a more systematic way[192].

In the case at hand, it should also be noted that from 1995 to 1998 a wave of kidnappings-for-ransom were registered not only in Guadalajara, but in the rest of the country. I will come back to discuss the details of this conjuncture later, in Part III. Meanwhile, I feel impelled to state that the high levels contained in Graph 1.2 could reflect a kidnapping-for-ransom effect and not an exclusive increase in property crimes.

[190] "Grupo antiordeña". (February 27th, 2016). *Reforma*.
[191] Decreto por el que se expide la Ley Federal para Prevenir y Sancionar los Delitos Cometidos en Materia de Hidrocarburos, y se reforman, adicionan y derogan diversas disposiciones del Código Federal de Procedimientos Penales del Código Penal Federal, de la Ley Federal contra la Delincuencia Organizada; la Ley Federal de Extinción de Dominio, reglamentaria del Artículo 22 de la Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos; del Código Fiscal de la Federación y del Código Nacional de Procedimientos Penales, 2016; Decreto por el que se reforman varios artículos de la Ley para Prevenir y Sancionar los Delitos Cometidos en Materia de Hidrocarburos, 2018; Decreto por el que se reforman, adicionan y derogan diversas disposiciones del Código Fiscal de la Federación, de la Ley Aduanera, del Código Penal Federal y de la Ley Federal para Prevenir y Sancionar los Delitos Cometidos en Materia de Hidrocarburos, 2018.
[192] Another illustrative case is the protection of honour, deeply analysed by Piccato (2010). According to the author, defence of honour became significant in Mexico toward the end of the XIX Century. Offenses such as insults or defamation, compelled state action and, consequently the register and report of such cases.

Since my interest is to explore property crimes, untangling how they have become a threat for business owners, Graph 1.3 isolates three kinds of robberies: vehicle, home and those that taking place within a commercial establishment.

The graph has two purposes: 1) to explore to what extent the peak around 1995 is also visible in the figures in order to determine whether the growth previously discussed is exclusively due to a wave of kidnapping-for-ransom or rather a general escalation in crime rates; 2) to consider vehicle and home robberies as crimes that could affect anyone, not only the business sector; whereas, robbery in a commercial establishment could work as a *proxy* to focus on business sector vulnerability and offer the corresponding insight.

Graph 1.3 Rate of theft registered in Jalisco, 1984-2000

(Rate per 100,000 inhabitants)



Source: Elaborated by the author based on statistics quoted by Regalado Santillán, 2012. Data comes from Alberto Cárdenas Jiménez's III and IV Government Report and the Public Security Secretariat Report. I calculated the rates per 100,000 inhabitants based on INEGI Population Census and Counts, interpolated with annual average growth rates to control for the effect of population.

The figures related to these three classes of theft are consistent with the general trend discussed before, reinforcing the idea that 1995 represents a breaking point in crime patterns registered in Jalisco, which reached its highest level at 320.43 vehicle robberies per 100,000 inhabitants.

The available data does not determine how many of the robberies registered occurred specifically in the Guadalajara Metropolitan Area, since the figures consider the state numbers as a whole. Nevertheless, in a meeting celebrated between Chamber of Commerce associates and the then Director of Public Security of Guadalajara, the Lieutenant Colonel Alejandro Flores Balderas[193], it was confirmed that in 1995, vehicle robberies ranked as the most frequent crime registered in the municipality, with 23,575 cases (144.41 per 10,000 inhabitants), followed at a distance by pedestrian mugging with 1,788 cases (10.95 per 10,000 inhabitants)[194].

Although some authors consider that vehicle robbery clearly indicates how trends in insecurity started "harming high class or political elite members" (Regalado Santillán, 2012: 77), the boom in car theft might have affected not only the business sector, but citizens in general[195]. Since data does not differentiate between car model, year or price, it is risky to assume that cars, as a general category, are an elite privilege[196].

However not exclusive to the business sector, two specific elements of the Gazette support the idea that vehicle robbery became a problem for Chamber associates: 1) car alarm publicity invaded the magazine pages and; 2) a long article, entitled "Vehicle robbery, an evil of our times" warned business owners not only about the risk of losing their own cars, but also about being duped by the illegal commerce of stolen cars[197].

The marked difference between the figures of car theft and other robberies could have many explanations. Assuming that the figures represent crime patterns, this kind of crime may require fewer logistic efforts on the part of perpetrators, compared to those required to break into a house or a commercial establishment. It could be especially true if the data

[193] To appoint Army members (active or in retreat) to lead local police bodies became usual those days in different states see Ibarrola (2003).
[194] Gazette Bank of Images 1970-2016, (July 1st, 1996).
[195] Based on vehicles robbed brands, Regalado Santillán (2012) argues that thieves prefer luxury cars over low-prize vehicles thus that might represent a threat especially for economic elites. However, data he reports consider some brands that sell expensive cars as well as austere alternatives (Datsun-Nissan or Volkswagen). There are no strong reasons to assume that thieves, for instance, prefer to steal the luxury car produced by Volkswagen instead of the classic and cheaper Sedan.
[196] To interpret figures under the evoked framing, it might be necessary to consider the likely effects of urban fleet renewal policies and the increase of credit alternatives to purchasing new cars, that took place during the mid-1990s (especially after the NAFTA was signed).
[197] Gazette Bank of Images 1970-2016, (July 1st, 1997).

discriminated between partial[198] and full vehicle robbery, although the original data does not specify.

Moreover, since the data is from an official source, the graph shows the growth in reported offenses rather than an increase in committed robberies. Thus, the gap between types of robbery could be explained by the fact that vehicle robbery claims are more likely since insurance policies require them to reimburse victims. There are also strong incentives to report offenses to avoid being associated with illegal acts, eventually committed with the stolen car. Furthermore, considering the effect of population growth is mitigated since figures are rates per 100,000 inhabitants, conversely the rise in motor vehicles could also mean more cars are likely to be stolen.

It is also suggested in Graph 1.3 that before 1989, the owner of a business was just as vulnerable to theft as the owner of a house. That pattern gradually changed until in 1995 the frequency of robberies registered in commercial establishments was higher than those in homes. The gap, however, disappeared in 1998. Some actions undertaken by the business sector could partially justify this result. The discussion of the aforesaid initiatives, nevertheless, will be the subject of succeeding chapters.

The coincidence in the growth of property crime rates with the economic crisis Mexico withstood from 1982 to 1994 led to the ease of relating both phenomena. As already recalled, an increment in crime was seen as a result of the economic crisis. This perception is certainly in accordance with dominant criminological approaches that either from an economic or sociological perspective, tend to associate economic hardship with crime patterns. Therefore, unemployment, genuinely low wages, unfulfilled ambitions and the weak rule of law could be behind heightened property crimes[199].

Following this line of thinking, business owners could be thought of as "natural targets" for criminals, as the owners of the material goods offenders seek. Nonetheless, adhering to this

[198] Accessories or car parts could be relatively easy to steal in some specific contexts.

[199] From the economic perspective, see Becker (1968) and Ehrilch (1973); from the sociologic approach see Cohen and Felson (1979), Blau and Blau (1982). For an integrated model of both perspectives see Engelen et al., (2016). For the Mexican case, following Becker's guideline, Chertorivski Woldenberg (1999) offers an analysis of Mexico City case, arguing that economic crises explains increasing crime levels in adverse institutional contexts. From an historical perspective, and also analysing Mexico City, Beltrán and Piccato (2004) similarly conclude that neither unplanned urbanization process nor poverty rates are enough to explain crime rates growth. Whereas, crime increasing is the outcome of a complex interaction of different decisions coming from diverse people and institutions.

prevailing interpretation of crime patterns (also within the business sector) poses the risk of simplifying the phenomena through the "determinism of misery" (Lagrange, 2001: 58), criminalizing poverty and misinforming the possible bidirectional causality between the variables (economic crisis and increasing crime) or even neglecting the effect of other significant variables. Accordingly, we must carry out cautious interpretations.

Nevertheless, the business sector's perception about crime sheds light on their sense of being more vulnerable than other groups in society. Thus, as it is viable to confirm in the Gazette, the concerns and measures adopted by the sector relied on their identity as economic power holders and on the assumption that such an identity makes them particularly vulnerable to crime[200].

The third turning point concerning crime figures in Jalisco occurred near 2010. At that moment, property crime did not reach unprecedented levels. In fact, as Graph 1.4 depicts, after the progressive decline of property crimes registered since 1997, rates did not surpass 150 robberies per 100,000 inhabitants after 2003 (for car theft). The robberies registered in commercial establishments significantly decreased and the gap between car theft and other kinds of robberies started closing[201]. In contrast, 2009-2010 is considered a breaking point due to the upsurge in other crimes affecting *Tapatios* (and the whole country), such as homicides, kidnapping-for-ransom or extortion.

Here, the familiar story does not link insecurity levels with the economic context, despite the global economic crash registered in 2008. On the contrary, almost all resolutions point towards *Narcos* and the so-called "War on drugs". Business owners, on their side, are not unconnected to the narrative, as it was not only present in some of their accounts but was indeed what they identified as being problematic during Calderon's administration[202]. From this angle, increasing rates of homicide tend to be qualified as drug-related whereas the rest of the crimes (extortion, kidnapping-for-ransom or robbery) are seen as the diversification of DTOs criminal activities, mostly due to government harassment. Since the *Narco* and the *Narcos* are such important actors, a detailed discussion of the threat they pose is worthwhile and will be covered in chapters 2 and 5.

[200] Gazette Bank of Images 1970-2016.
[201] Complementary figures are available at Appendix 1.1.
[202] "El Sexenio de Felipe Calderón Hinojosa". (December, 2014), Gazette Bank of Images, 1970-2016.

Beyond DTO-related violence and crime, it seems that a new kind of crime started concerning businesses in the last decade, namely, those related to technology and information security. Cybercrimes such as electronic fraud, information theft or cloning, is currently sharing the space with traditional security concerns on the front page of the newspaper, mainly to offer some advice on how to profit from technological advances without risking key company data[203].

Graph 1.4 Rate of theft registered in Jalisco, 1997-2017

(Reported offenses, rate per 100,000 inhabitants)



Source: Elaborated by the author with information from the Executive Secretariat of the National Public Security System (Secretariado Ejecutivo del Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública, SE-SNSP). Data includes preliminary investigations (averiguación previa) or investigative files (carpetas de investigación). Rates were calculated based on INEGI Population Census and Counts, interpolated with annual average growth rate. For 2016 and 2017 the projection assumes the average growth rate (2010-2015) remains the same.

So far, data coming from official sources backs the claim that businesses fell victim to crime in the early 1980s and experimented the worst moment during the mid-1990s. Despite recent efforts made by the Federal Government and civil society organizations to improve the quality of data collected by local law enforcement agencies[204], the figures in question still have significant limitations that might prompt a shortsighted examination of this phenomena.

[203] Gazette Bank of Images 1970-2016.
[204] For the evolution of crime registers as well as the implementation of new technical standards and registration criteria, see Vélez Salas et al., (2018).

Although these figures are used extensively as indicators of an offense, by definition they "describe crime through the 'activity' of law enforcement agencies" (Didier, 2015:110), implying that their accurate depiction depends on official agencies' resources, dynamics, capacities, incentives and interests. As Piccato (2010) claims "judicial records are not transparent: they involve the mediation of judicial authorities through the interpretation of behavior, the law and the participation of multiple actors" (p. 191). In other words, official statistics are more the mirror of law enforcement agencies than the operationalization of criminality, as such.

Given the above, it comes as no surprise that in general, crime statistics are "inaccurate, unclear and quite precarious" (Escalante Gonzalbo, 2015: 156). Mexico is no exception to this pattern. Nevertheless, instead of being completely rejected, official figures could be used in conjunction with other sources, and the limits of this data taken into account. Given the purpose of this chapter, two of these data constraints will be discussed below.

First, although the graphs depict the number of preliminary inquiries related to an offense, this is not indicative of the number of crimes committed. We must consider that victims report crimes depending on factors such as, the amount lost, the fear of criminal reprisal, a lack of trust regarding the rule of law, and a high cost of opportunity initiating the official procedure, as the following quote vividly illustrates.

> *"We were in the office before we had… a situation… a robbery… a couple of robberies…outside the office.* ***We caught the thief****… and we went all the way to report the offense… to get the thief arrested, right? Eh… it was something very…* ***burdensome, a terrible bureaucracy****. We went once… 'no, we can't take the report today, come back tomorrow', we just wasted our time… and in the end… the thief, for example, didn't have any ID with him, I mean… he said his name was so-and-so but me, and* ***I had to identify myself****, give them [the authority] my ID, to make the report… with my name, my address… then* ***he [the thief] knew who I was****, who set him up, while I didn't really know who this guy was!"*
>
> Gustavo Moreno, Service Sector
> Guadalajara, September 19th, 2015
> *(Q 1-2)*

This anecdote emphasizes that pressing charges could be an arduous procedure, not only due to the bureaucracy implied and the related inefficiency, which implies an important time investment, but also because there is fear involved. Here, we can note fear of the thief, who is able to identify their accuser. Although the account is not explicit enough, allusions to "catching the thief", or the belief that his personal data were not properly managed once in

agents' hands, suggest that this businessperson is not only afraid of thieves, but probably of officers as well. At least, he does not show trust towards the authorities[205].

The lack of crime reports and the incentives to file them result in statistics which may be significantly affected by "dark figures" which refer to offenses that remain off law enforcement agencies records. In Mexico, through a victimization survey[206], it has been estimated that 93.6% of the crimes committed during 2016 were not reported or did not lead to a preliminary inquiry (ENVIPE[207], 2017).

The unlikelihood to distinguish the proportion of victims that are part of the business sector presents another data constraint. So, if we make reference to "car theft", it is impossible to deduce whether this offense affects the business sector in a greater proportion, in other words, businessmen cannot be recognized as a particular category of analysis. Although "robbery in a commercial establishment" could be considered a proxy, it is not so accurate since it ignores industry or service sector victimization. In addition, with respect to "dark figures", we could assume that businessmen might be more likely than other citizens to report a crime since their material losses could be higher or the stolen goods would be more likely to be insured. However, that might be true only for high-level losses and it is difficult to determine what is considered to be a "high level loss" for some of the victims.

> *"[…]it happened… well, it happened two years ago, when foolishly you could say 'no, nothing is going to happen to me' and then pum! They [criminals] arrive and tap the table, saying 'you are not that far [from being targeted]', right? But* ***it was something very… simple****, eh…* ***It went really well!*** *[laughs] really, really! I mean, it was really… fine! [Criminals took]* ***just some computers, some TVs and some wine bottles, I mean… nothing!*** *Nothing…* ***compared with other situations*** *where they empty your pockets! It was nothing… 80 thousand, 100 thousand* pesos[208] *…then you say… it happened during the night and we were normally operating at 1 pm, I mean…* ***it did not really stop us****".*
>
> Sergio Hernández, Service sector
> Zapopan, Jal., September 1st, 2015
> *(Q 1-3)*

[205] A discussion about trust on law enforcement agencies is provided in Chapter 3.
[206] A discussion about victimization surveys is offered later in this section.
[207] Stands for National Survey of Victimization and Perception of Public Security, annually conducted at a national level by the INEGI, since 2011. This survey has been recently updated and the wave 2018 is already available on line. Being aware of that, however, I keep the analysis based on the previous version as it was conducted close to the rest of the fieldwork.
[208] 80 thousand pesos: 4,767 USD; 100 thousand pesos: 5,959 USD, considering that the exchange rate the day of the interview was 16,78 Mexican pesos per dollar. (Mexico Tax Administration Service [SAT], 2016).

> *"Nothing has happened to us, fortunately,* ***except for some thefts****... merchandise in transport was stolen. Not many [vehicles]... only some... When you send... let's say 400 trailers each month, and one or two get stolen, then you say...* ***or if you get one stolen every two months, I mean… over 800…*** *[Me:* is it marginal?], no, not [marginal] either, but ***nothing to be worried about****!"*
>
> José Gerardo Zapata, Industry sector
> Zapopan, Jal., September 1st, 2015
> *(Q 1-4)*

As expressed in the quote above, what could be considered a high-level crime (to the extent of filing a report with the authorities) is a relative calculation based on a dynamic point of reference. Thereby, the benchmark could be the experiences of others or previous episodes of victimization which could have been even more dramatic. It must be considered to what extent the situation broke the daily operation or the size of the loss versus the size of the operation. In other words, a "high-level loss" is always a relative parameter.

By contrast, the incentives to report a crime could decrease if victims estimate they have an alternative route to deal with it, an informal (even illegal) path towards justice. Privileged access to law enforcement could serve as a shortcut to set in motion state action informally and thus skip the reporting process. Businessmen with direct access to law enforcement agents have been association leaders, are well-known or have been close to political elites[209].

Table 1.1 sheds light on the "dark figures" concerning businessmen in Jalisco (ENVE, 2016)[210], showing that large companies are the most likely to declare having reported a crime, while offenses committed against the industrial sector would most likely remain unreported.

Since the 1970s, designing and conducting victimization surveys (Walklate, 2008)[211] to explore and measure crime and the role of fear (Didier, 2015) has been a way to overcome the analytical challenges related to studying official crime. This kind of tool offers an alternative to police records (Navarro Martínez and Cortez-Yactayo, 2015), which is especially appreciated where there are low levels of institutional trust, such as in Mexico. These polls attempt to unravel crime dynamics from the victim's point of view, which implies technical strengths, as well as challenges (Didier, 2015). For instance, to operationalize "fear" through a questionnaire, like any other emotion, is complicated. Therefore, most

[209] This point will be retaken in Chapter 3.
[210] National Survey on Crime against Business (INEGI, 2016).
[211] For an analytical review of Victimization Surveys conducted around the globe, including Mexico, see Mugellini, (2014).

surveys measure the perception of risk instead of fear (Roché, 1988). On the other hand, crimes not including a victim, such as bearing arms would remain out of the study.

Table 1.1 Proportion of unreported crimes within the business sector in Jalisco, 2016

Dark figures	
90,1% of the offenses committed remain **unreported**	
by main sector…	**by business size***
Commerce 88,8%	Small 84,5%
Industry 97,0%	Medium-sized 84,1%
Service 89,2%	Large 43,6%
	**I excluded micro-sized economic units.*

Source: National Survey on Crime against Business, 2016, INEGI (ENVE, 2016). Dark figures (*Cifra negra*) account for non-reported offenses, plus those reported without a related preliminary inquiry (*averiguación previa*) and those where a report is not specified. According to the survey, hidden crime is then the ratio between unreported crimes and total offenses,. (n=219,514).

Despite their limitations, nationwide surveys offer significant benefits for analytical purposes. For instance, the proportion of crimes that have not been reported to law enforcement agencies (dark figures) can be estimated and the main reasons victims chose to not report offenses can be explored. In addition, carrying out such an exercise can provide a great deal of information not only about the occurrence (the crime an individual claims to have been a victim of) but also regarding variables such as the image of law enforcement agencies and the effects criminal episodes had, if any, on their daily operation.

However, some critics consider that the quality of victimization surveys depends on "the memory, cognitive capacity and forthrightness of respondents" (Lynch, 2006: 233), but also in the extent to which they are aware about being victim of a crime (recalling the extortion allegedly committed by FEG members discussed earlier in this chapter). In addition, as any

other opinion poll, the accuracy of the results depends on the methodological rigor, the design of the questionnaire and sample as well as the conduction, data usage and interpretation.

In Mexico, some questions about insecurity have been included in public opinion polls since the late 1980, although not as part of a victimization survey. For instance, a national survey conducted in March 1989 by the Office of the President, Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994)[212] showed that 36.5% of the Mexicans considered that delinquency had grown in the previous year. This proportion did not necessarily reflect a generalized negativity of the citizens, since the perception regarding the increase in poverty was less pessimistic, to be specific, 24.2% considered poverty has grown in the year prior[213].

National household victimization surveys have been carried out since 2002, under the name ENSI[214]. Since 2011, INEGI has conducted the National Survey of Victimization and Perception of Public Security (ENVIPE) annually. Despite the quality of these tools[215], it is worthy to underline two main limitations: 1) considering that it is difficult to accept having been a victim of certain crimes in front of a stranger, especially in environments constantly under threat, some did not respond when asked a direct question. For instance, if someone pays a monthly racket and is worried about their safety or feels social pressure about this sensitive topic, he or she will not likely admit it when asked. Being the case, the survey might tend to underestimate this crime; 2) surveys are reported as citizen samples, making it impossible to distinguish between business sector risks and those that every citizen face.

To surpass the first limit mentioned, scholars have implemented several techniques to strengthen a regular survey and correct its weaknesses. By way of illustration, the study conducted by Díaz-Cayeros et al. used the list experiment technique[216] embedded in a

[212] Coming from President's Office, the survey could imply some bias, specially related with the propagandistic purposes of polls. However, this survey was not public until many years after Carlos Salinas de Gortari left the Office. Thus, it is possible to dismiss a possible attempt of manipulating the figures. Alejandro Moreno (2018) warns that even not being public, the polls carried out as part of a political strategy could have a public impact, since they shape policy programmes. Regarding the political use of surveys during Carlos Salinas administration see Moreno (1997).

[213] National representative survey conducted face-to-face to 5,053 Mexican adults. Although the survey includes 215 cases in Jalisco (enough to make some descriptive estimations), the available methodological notes do not specify if it is representative at the state-level, so to isolate the cases could imply important bias and to provide erratic interpretations. The survey is available at Laboratorio Nacional de Políticas Públicas, CIDE.

[214] Stands for National Survey of Insecurity. From 2002 to 2008 the survey was conducted by the non-profit organization Institute for Studies of Insecurity (ICESI). In 2010, the survey was conducted by INEGI.

[215] The ENVIPE has been internationally recognized by the quality of its methodology, see Vélez Salas et al., 2018.

[216] "A list experiment creates two groups of individuals, a control and a treatment group, assigned randomly from the overall sample, such that the two groups are equivalent. Individuals in the control group are shown a

probabilistic survey to measure extortion and assistance by DTOs in Mexico (Díaz Cayeros et al., 2015).

Regarding the second constraint of victimization studies, some surveys have been conducted focusing on specific groups. The study "Elites and organized violence in Mexico" conducted in 2014 by Andreas Schedler could be an example. The author is able to distinguish opinions and perceptions of six groups which can be distinguished from the general population: government employees, politicians, scholars, media, businessmen and civil society members.

The set of questions raised are not only concerning previous experiences of crime, but also perception of organized violence, punitive predispositions, as well as state and non-state actors' reactions to crime. Despite the ambitious nature of the study, the questionnaire has significant technical issues. For instance, exploring the opinion respondents have about what state actors should be able to do regarding organized violence, "police" and "army" are included in the same item as if they were the same. In other cases, a question is contaminated by the previous one or biased due to its framing.

A more accurate instrument is the National Survey on Crime against Business (ENVE)[217] as it focuses exclusively on economic unit[218] victimization. Another advantage of this survey is related to its ability to be representative at the national and state-level, thus, it is possible to analyze Jalisco (yet not isolate Guadalajara as an analytic dimension)[219].

According to ENVE-2016, 37.1% of the economic units in Jalisco were victims of at least one crime during 2015. As Table 1.2 shows, the most frequent offense reported by the

---

list of *n* items, they are then asked how many of the items they have/do/know of/agree with. It is important to ask them to not specify which items, only their count. The treatment group receives the same list with the *n* items plus an additional "sensitive" item that we seek to measure. Interviewees in the treated group are also asked to specify a number of items they have/do/know of/agree with, but, again, to not mention which specific items. The difference of the mean item responses between the control and treatment groups provides an adequate estimate of the aggregate proportion of the population that has/does/knows of/agrees with the sensitive item" (Díaz Cayeros et al., 2015: 16).

[217] Conducted by INEGI every two years since 2012. This survey has been recently updated and the wave 2018 is already available on line. Being aware of that, however, I keep the analysis based on the previous version as it was conducted close to the rest of the fieldwork.

[218] According to INEGI, economic units are entities producing goods and services. The survey considers the economic units that carry out some economic activity in the country having fixed installations, to exception of activities related to agriculture and those of the public sector and government. The ENVE-2016 includes a sample of 4'503,271 economic units established in the whole country of which 332,758 are situated in Jalisco. Since data-mining is not available, analytical disaggregation is not always possible.

[219] Since 2016 INEGI carries on the Urban Public Security National Survey (ENSU), a trimestral poll which considers the main urban centers, including Guadalajara. However, it is let aside from the present analysis as the municipalities sampled as part of the Guadalajara Metropolitan Area seems to change across the time, jeopardizing the comparability scope.

interviewee is shoplifting, followed by theft of money or merchandise. The nature of the crime could vary depending on the sector as well as the size of the economic unit[220]. Thus, while fraud is a problem for the industry and service sectors, it seems not to be a priority for members of the commercial sector.

That said, the category referred to as "fraud" could imply multiple practices, from receiving a 50 *peso* counterfeit bill to tax evasion. Moreover, the survey did not offer a detailed description of this offense, making it risky to draw any conclusions based on these numbers.

Table 1.2 Most frequent crimes against businesses in Jalisco, 2016

The three most frequent crimes	
Shoplifting	22,9%
Theft of money or merchandise	21,0%
Full or partial vehicle robbery	14,7%
per sector…	
Commerce	
Shoplifting	30,4%
Theft of money or merchandise	23,4%
Full or partial vehicle robbery	13,3%
Industry	
Fraud	21,7%
Full or partial vehicle robbery	18,9%
Shoplifting	14,3%
Service	
Theft of money or merchandise	20,1%
Fraud	15,9%
Corruption	13,9%
per business size*…	
Small	
Corruption	29,2%
Fraud	17,9%
Shoplifting	15,7%
Medium-sized	
Theft of goods in transit	34,4%
Theft of money or merchandise	15,8%
Full or partial vehicle robbery	13,3%
Large	
Theft of goods in transit	20,4%
Shoplifting	23,2%
Full or partial vehicle robbery	20,0%
**I excluded micro-sized economic units*	

Source: National Survey on Crime against Business, 2016, INEGI (Encuesta Nacional de Victimización de Empresas, ENVE, 2016). Percentages are calculated based on the total amount of crimes committed in Jalisco (n=219,514).

[220] Complementary figures are available in Appendix 1.1.

Several examples from fieldwork point out a challenge that some businessmen face and that could be considered fraud, depending on the individual's criteria:

> *"Well, we have had everything [happen]… such as* ***people that owe us an important amount of money and suddenly disappear****… and then you have to go looking for them, trying to find them… send someone to get them, go to their home or office, send… e-mails, call by phone, because they are hiding [avoiding to pay you back] finally, try to find them… sometimes,* ***you just accept the loss and that's it!****"*
>
> Alberto Hernández, Industry Sector,
> Zapopan, September 22th, 2015
> *(Q 1-5)*

> *"Well… emmm… look… we have been through robbery, burglary, emmm [silence]… extortion attempts… also fraud…* ***lately much more fraud****, that affect us…I am talking about some people that send you part of the payment upfront then* ***you send the merchandise and… you never hear about them again!*** *Or suppliers!"*
>
> Alfredo Palomino, Industry Sector,
> Zapopan, October 7th, 2015
> *(Q 1-6)*

Both cases describe similar situations related to debts, however, the first account does not refer to the act as fraud or even an offense, while the second respondent assumes it is, in fact, a fraud. In the case of Alberto Hernández, he shared this experience as part of the challenges he faces having a relatively new company. However, when we were talking about security, he said nothing has really happened to him or his partner, except for a couple of minor robberies and some shoplifting. This indicates that such a case would not be considered on the victimization survey since Alberto did not conceptualize his experience as a fraud. Alfredo Palomino, on the other hand, evokes this experience while listing the crimes his company has faced and explicitly calls it fraud.

The diverse threats each sector and enterprise face could explain various protection mechanisms adopted. However, the experience of crime victimization should not be interpreted from only one angle; thus, not every robbery leads to the purchase of an alarm nor every armed assault to hiring guards. In fact, the way the victim interprets the episode could also define the kind of protection that is considered necessary. For instance, Eduardo Hernández, the owner of a chain of stores narrates:

> *"We normally… for the last 15 years, our stores don't have metal doors[…] you know… those rolling iron grilles… because most [of the stores] are open 24 hours… only the previous* sexenio[221]*,* ***there were a lot of shootings on the streets****… so we had to install some grilles to protect the employees… the customers… but never because*

[221] He refers the six-year period of a President or Governor administration.

> *we could be attacked… **there were some confrontations in front of the store, there were deaths at one store's door… but…it was something between them [shooters], not against the Company**. Against the company, there are ordinary… or normal… there are thieves that stole… some money**, but it is part of the environment**… but drug trafficking related… or something stronger… we have not… we have never changed anything [of their daily practices]".*
>
> Eduardo Hernández, Commerce,
> Guadalajara, September 26th, 2015
> *(Q 1-7)*

As it is possible to see in Hernández's account, violent episodes were taking place in front of their stores, but since he assumed shootings were due to something between criminals (probably drug traffickers or gangs), he adopted minimal protection mechanism only to guarantee that this sort of external problem did not affect them directly. By contrast, if he would have considered the shootings could become a threat for his company, he would have probably taken other actions to feel protected. It must be noticed the notion of shootings as an issue between "others" far enough from him or his company is an idea that will be discussed later on in chapter 2.

At this time, it is important to consider that the criminal experiences lived (directly or nearly) is a factor to consider when it comes to understanding what determines certain needs for protection. However, not all crime victims choose the same protection measures and, among those getting security gadgets or staff, not all of them have been crime victims. Although a previous crime experience could be necessary, it might be not sufficient to explain why someone decide to invest his resources (time, money, effort) on taking precautions against crime and violence. Thus, other factors might be explored.

1.3 The fear factor: the gap between crime experience and insecurity perception

In the previous section has been settled that, considering official figures or victimization surveys, in Guadalajara, businesses faced a hostile environment in terms of crime. Thus, some measures to minimize crime effects or to inhibit them could be predicted. However, a previous crime experienced seems to not be enough to explain beliefs and attitudes towards crime.

Seemingly, neither in Mexico nor in other contexts is there a significant correlation between growth in the reports of the fear of being a crime victim and crime rates themselves (Roché, 1988; Escalante Gonzalbo, 2015). In Mexico, crimes as extortions or kidnapping occurrence

rates are considerably lower than the fear citizens recognize they have of being victims of it (Magaloni et al., 2012). For instance, Graph 1.5 shows that crime and insecurity is the most important concern for 64.8% of the economic units in Jalisco, according to the ENVE-2016, while as mentioned before, the proportion of crime victims registered in that same survey was 37.1%. Besides, this proportion surpasses other concerns as significant for an enterprise as the purchasing power of their potential customers, the fiscal policy or government procedures[222].

The gap between the perceived risk of being a crime victim based on the context and such concern could lead to an overestimated fear (Magaloni et al., 2012)[223].

Graph 1.5 Distribution of the main concerns for businessmen in Jalisco, 2016

(Percentage)



Source: Crime Against Business National Survey, 2016, INEGI (Encuesta Nacional de Victimización de Empresas, ENVE, 2016). Percentages are calculated over the total amount of economic unites considered in the survey in Jalisco (N=332,758). The original question was: "From the set of issues I will show you, which are the three that affect your establishment the most?" *(De los temas que le voy a mostrar, ¿cuáles son los tres que más afectan al establecimiento?*) The set of issues had 12 alternatives "crime and insecurity" being the fifth one. The list of possible answers was presented to the interviewee using a card. That could minimize a possible effect due to "bad memory" issues.

[222] The results could be biased by the fact that just before formulating the question, this part of the survey was presented to the interviewees as "Now I'm going to make some questions about your perception regarding the factors that affects your establishment and *the risks of delinquency* at the area it operates" (The italics are mine). With this framing, the interviewer put "delinquency" on the top of interviewee head –if it was not already there, contaminating the question. So, if the precedent introductory phrase had some effect on the response, it will probably lead to overestimate "crime and insecurity" as a main concern of the interviewee.

[223] It is also possible that people underestimate their risk of being crime victim (Magaloni et al., 2012)

Not being necessarily negative, fear drives us to certain preventive or reactionary behaviors, for instance, to look for different forms of protection, from installing cameras, alarms or any other devise to promoting repressive mechanisms that bring under certain control what we consider to be out of control, especially in a context of generalized helplessness (Rotker, 2002). In fact, Susan Rotker (2002) and her colleagues explore a new sort of citizenship in large cities, the one emerged from fear, the one in which a citizen is, above all, a potential victim. Thus, another protection mechanism could be emigration: to leave the place you perceived as dangerous (Yang and Holzer, 2006).

The precedent evidence shows two significant elements: 1) there is no clear and undeniable link between a prior experience of crime and the fear of crime; 2) notions as "fear", "worry" or "perceived risk" are commonly used as exchangeable labels, which merits a brief discussion.

An important corpus of literature has been concentrated on the so-called "fear of crime" as a key variable in understanding how crime affects society. Since "fear" is an emotion[224], it is hardly surprising that there is no consensus surrounding the notion. On the contrary, this has been source of confusion (Hale, 1996).

Certainly, to build empirical instruments based on a subjective concept has not been any easier than agreeing upon a definition of the concept itself. Following an advanced effort to define what an emotion is and how it could be measured, Scherer (2005) proposes a component process definition: "an episode of interrelated, synchronized changes in the states of all or most of the five organismic subsystems in response to the evaluation of an external or internal stimulus event as relevant to major concerns on the organism" (p. 3). If the notion "fear of crime" might be disjointed in as many dimensions (what causes the emotion, what does enforce a reaction, how it is felt and expressed) it is not surprising that some scholars, while trying to operationalize "fear of crime" are considering "worry" or "anxiety" while others are, in fact, measuring "public sensibilities towards crime" or "perceptions of risk and feelings of vulnerability" (Gray et al., 2011). In this sense, Sebastian Roché (1988) suggests the term "a feeling of insecurity", defined as "a personal and social worry regarding persons, as well as public power" (p. 17). Thus, beyond the ensemble of emotions it could imply (fear,

[224] According to Cambridge Dictionary (2017), fear is "an unpleasant emotion or thought that you have when you are frightened or worried by something dangerous, painful, or bad that is happening or might happen".

hate, distress, jealousy), Roché claims that it also relies on the perception of authority (whether the familial or state).

Having a catch-all label (Gray et al., 2011) is already complicated enough, but it is even more so considering the limits of the tools commonly used to measure this notion: victimization surveys. Among the significant constraints these kinds of instruments have, some of which we have already settled, a key element to consider is how the question which operationalizes "fear" has been formulated. In some cases, the pollsters ask "how afraid do you feel…" while others chose "how worried are you about…", in both cases, the measurement relies on two elements: 1) whatever the interviewee considers as fear or worry and; 2) on what the common use of the words could evoke (folk concept)(Scherer, 2005).

Aware of how difficult it is to measure emotions, in some cases what victimization surveys include is the perceived likelihood of victimization (Ferraro and LaGrange, 1987). Thus, the question is phrased as "how (un)safe do you consider…" or "how liable are you to become a crime victim". This is the case of an ENVE questionnaire, since the queries are mostly formulated trying to measure a perception rather than an emotion which is the way the criminal environment is seen and interpreted by someone, either regarding himself or his community. As any other perception, the estimated risk of becoming a crime victim is also the result of a set of subjective variables. Probably, a good way to summarize such wide discussion[225] could be following John Zaller (1992), one of the seminal authors on public opinion studies.

Trying to understand the way a person answers a survey, Zaller (1992) concludes that people constructs a position from the balance of different considerations they have on the top of their head. Then, he argues that "every opinion is a marriage of information and predispositions: information to form a mental picture of the given issue, and predisposition to motivate some conclusions about it" (1992:6). Notwithstanding, whether a person was a crime victim or not, the information his context provides and his predispositions to interpret it could explain his concern of becoming another crime statistic.

[225] For a more extensive discussion of this literature see Ferraro and Lagrange, (1987); Roché, (1988); Roché, (1998); Philippe et al., (1999); Magaloni et al., (2012); Sullivan and McGloin, (2014); Didier, (2015).

Regarding information, the literature stresses what we could encompass under the term "intermediation process" variables[226], which could be defined as the flow of information coming from contacts inside personal networks, through membership in secondary associations or from mass media (Gunther et al., 2007).

By way of illustration, the account of Máximo Ballesteros, the owner of a private security firm shows us how the context is one determinant of fear but the information to which they are exposed seems to be the trigger to decisions regarding protection.

> *Suddenly we had a great ally… this great ally is called fear. When businessmen started having problems such as kidnappings, extortions, armed robberies… the fear factor made those businessmen say 'let me ask professionals to help me with this problem'[…] This subject [insecurity] is* ***very dynamic*** *[…] there are times when****… there was a period where the problem was kidnapping, so they [businessmen] were afraid of it****, then at another moment the problem was more related to shootings and killings… on the streets,* ***that was another stage… and another fear****… then, in other moments, there were a lot of muggings and robberies… but now… it is a very funny period, because in the whole country, there are more problems…* ***the internal problem****: frauds, shoplifting, premise and machinery theft…internal problems in companies[…].*
>
> Máximo Ballesteros, Private Security Company
> Zapopan, October 16th, 2015
> *(Q 1-8)*

While explaining what happened at the beginning of his company, back in 1997, and how difficult it was to make the sector aware about the insecure environment, he considers that the real boost for his company's success was fear. Once businessmen started feeling it, his customer base expanded. Even if the threat changed considerably, from kidnapping to shoplifting, the risk perception of his clients did not seem to be adjusted to the new dimension of the threat. The next extract of his account shows a disproportional reaction motivated by a friend's advice rather than the actual situation.

> *"Yes, yes… [insecurity] it has been changing. Although people create… a lack of knowledge about security and prevention…* ***our customers tend to ask… first of all… 'I need you to send me… ten armed guards****, because I have a lot of shoplifting in my company and I need ten armed guards!'. So, we go 'hey!, why don't we start making a diagnosis of your enterprise, a risk analysis and then you will know what the problem is', -'No, no, no…* ***my friend told me I should hire ten guards****!'"*
>
> Máximo Ballesteros, Private Security Company
> Zapopan, October 16th, 2015
> *(Q 1-9)*

[226] I borrow the notion from Gunther et al. (2007), according to whom the political intermediation are the different channels and processes through which voters receive information during electoral campaigns.

Other sources of information available for businessmen are through their memberships to diverse associations or the network formed by suppliers and customers. The interpersonal communication about a perceived threat could generate measures to get protection, notably in tight knit groups. If its members share a common identity, they will probably think that once one of its members has been a victim, the rest of the members could become one. Of course, the overestimation (or underestimation) of the threat could be also shared within the network. On the other hand, it is possible that someone deeply involved in his community, especially with a high ranked position within the network, tend to develop less fear regarding crime, since he could have more information about what happens in his environment (Walklate, 1998).

> *"Here **in the factory you don't hear about it** [insecurity and crime conditions]… no… you know about it when you go to **the chamber of the association, but there…among your group of friends**, talking 'that happened to me, that happened to the other friend, or it happened to my niece or…', within that environment, you get it [the information], of course! **And it affects you**… you start thinking about your daughters, your grandchildren, right?… in any minute…you can get bad news".*
>
> José Gerardo Zapata, Industry
> Zapopan, September 1st, 2015
> *(Q 1-10)*

The description made by José Gerardo Zapata underlines three significant elements of intermediation as determinant to the perception of risk: 1) the fact that his employees and co-workers are not really a source of information for him, probably because what they are afraid of does not represent a threat for my interlocutor. In other words, the threats perceived by this businessman are not the same that those perceived by his employees; 2) chambers and associations are common spaces to get information about the security context, among many other topics, but; 3) the privileged source of information are their peers, those that resemble them to the extent to which one's niece evokes the image of other's daughters.

The fact that close friends within the sector are the source of fear (awareness, at least) shows that the size of social capital rather than the flow of information affects risk perception (Magaloni et al., 2012), and is likely related to their closeness.

In that sense, the business sector could have a set of threats they consider inherent to their group and deploy, in consequence, collective measures to combat it. However, since the *tapatio* business sector is diverse and heterogeneous, as already explained, it seems that within the sector there are different groups and, consequently, different threats perceived.

From that, is possible to expect selective protection mechanisms that cover certain groups more than the whole sector. That will be explored in further chapters.

On the other hand, mass media has played a significant role in citizens overestimating risks, particularly when they tend to overexpose criminal events. Based on a case study in Arizona, Mary Holland Baker and her colleges (1983) show through what they broadcast that media is able to create a wave of criminality, notwithstanding the crime rates, that affect crime risk perception. In fact, some scholars argue that "media lives on fear" (Martín Barbero, 2002: 29)[227] so they have strong incentives to broadcast "bloodiness" that attracts large audiences while generating a collective feeling of helplessness. A person more exposed to news related to crime or violence could be more likely to develop fear of being victim. It would be especially true among individuals with less formal education, because they could be more sensitive to the information on the media (Magaloni, et al. 2012). At the same time, the media could reinforce or even create a narrative about insecurity and crime dynamics that would be retaken and mobilized for anyone later: an "unvaried account" (*relato monocorde*) that (in)form the current public conversation (Escalante Gonzalbo, 2015: 10).

Regarding businessmen, a constant result of fieldwork was the effort they make to find a balance between being up-to-date with national and local events while keeping some distance from what one of them called "the excessive depiction of violence"[228].

> *"It has been a long time… I think 5 or 6 years,* ***I haven't watched TV… I haven't seen the news…*** *I mean, I do watch TV, but not the news. I don't read the news****… just maybe something from the BBC****, more like… but local****, related with blood… I turned myself off****… I don't want contamination, then… I prefer not to know"*
>
> Raymundo Chávez, Agroindustry
> Zapopan, August 29th, 2015
> *(Q 1-11)*

The quote evoked above shows that traditional mass media has its limits on the production of fear, since people such as Raymundo Chávez resist to be "contaminated", as he said. That is consistent with some quantitative studies that argue there is no evidence of the effect of violent content displayed in the media and the overestimation of fear among audiences (Magaloni et al., 2012). However, this young industrial interviewee is especially exposed to

[227] Martín-Barbero's essay (2002) is focused in Colombian case, where he explores the transformation of Bogotá, its loss of collective roots and the growing anxiety and distrust of its inhabitants. Matín-Barbero argues that "media living on fear" happens in Colombia as "in no other Latin America country" (p. 29), however, in that text, he does not offer any evidence to sustain such claim.
[228] Interview conducted with Susana Piña, Industrial Sector. (October 9th, 2015). Zapopan, Jalisco

social media. He remembered that *Twitter* was his main tool to get details during the *narcobloqueos*, checking where the burning buses were or to estimate if leaving home in that moment was pertinent or not. Of course, the comprehensiveness and diversity of information of this kind of platform has opened a new path to find the effects of information coming from media and the subsequent fear of being a crime victim.

Returning to Zaller, besides the information, the other set of variables defining public opinion might be biased: "a variety of interests, values, and experiences that might greatly affect [citizens'] willingness to accept or alternatively, their resolve to resist- persuasive influences" (Zaller, 1992: 22). Thus, evaluating a neighborhood as being risky based on attributes such as public service availability (lighting, lack of pavement), the presence of what we consider signs of damage (graffiti, vandalism, drinking in the street) (Tudor, 2003; Gray et al., 2011) or due to the 'kind' of people living there (considering race, color of the skin or a certain phenotype), more than a fear based on the criminal environment, reveals a certain perception of disorder or the way our predispositions drive us to read the landscape.

In that sense, fear could come, again, from otherness: "the criminal as the foreigner is placed out of social and political realms" (Roché, 1988: 18). Graph 1.6, for instance, illustrates that businessmen tend to feel safer in the neighborhood where they operate than in their municipality or state. It seems that the more the geographical area is expanded, the more threatening it is for them. Those who inhabit a neighborhood different that mine could be consider a greater threat that my own neighbors. Probably, because in their own neighborhood, they think everyone knows each other and higher levels of trust between neighbors mitigates fear (Gainey et al., 2011).

Another factor that could explain the finding is to consider which contextual elements are taken into account to configure the perception of risk. Recalling previous sections, the variety of crimes that potentially jeopardize businessmen (extortion, kidnapping, property crimes, violence) implies that different combinations of them could be part of the opinion building process. In that respect, it has been documented that exposure to high levels of DTOs violence have a higher weight on the way people evaluate the national context than in defining their personal fear, as DTOs related crimes are "less tied to the social conditions in the immediate surroundings" than ordinary crimes (Villarreal and Wei Hsin, 2017: 780)[229].

[229] A detailed discussion on the patterns of Drug Trafficking related violence is provided in chapter 2.

Graph 1.6 Percentage of economic units expressing insecurity, Jalisco 2016



Source: National Survey on Crime against Business, 2016, INEGI (ENVE, 2016). Percentages are calculated over the total amount of economic unites considered in the survey in Jalisco (N=332,758 , of which Industry= 40904; Commerce= 163,290; Services= 128,564). The original question was: "Regarding crime and insecurity, would you say that operating this establishment in [geographic area] is safe or unsafe?" (*En términos de delincuencia, ¿considera que operar este establecimiento en [ámbito geográfico] es seguro o inseguro?*)

So far, information and predisposition variables that could explain feelings of fear, more precisely risk perception and in consequence, the belief that someone needs to be protected, could be not exclusive to the business sector[230]. If anything, the difference could be the weight of a variable since some groups could be more sensitive than others to such stimulants (news, information from social networks, group identity). That said, since the population of interest in this research is the business sector, it is still necessary to explore what makes them different as potential crime victims. At least, according their perceptions.

During the semi-structured interviews, I noticed how vulnerable to crime businessmen feel, not only as inhabitants of Jalisco, but specifically as a part of the business sector.

[230] Complementary figures are available in Appendix 1.2.

A minority of respondents[231] consider that they are not at more risk than other citizens. Susana Piña[232], for instance, compares herself with the employees of her company. Then, she concludes that, according to the information all share in day to day conversations, she feels they are all equally vulnerable. Of course, this description could be considered inconsistent with José Gerardo Zapata's account, earlier discussed, when I stated that employees are not part of businessmen's information networks, since they are not seen as peers. However, the contradiction is not such. Susana, a young entrepreneur runs her company with a "more horizontal perspective", as she explained. Thus, she does not see her employees (mostly women) as being so different. This intuition is supported by other similar cases of younger businessmen with medium-sized companies, especially those who work in the Information Technology Sector (IT)[233], which has recently grown in Guadalajara[234].

Although there is certain diversity in the rest of the answers, the dominant perception relates to the way the business sector understands crime. As discussed earlier, for businessmen, deprivation is seen as the main engine for crime. From this approach, they assume their sector is more vulnerable than others due to their material advantages, whether this wealth is real or only a perception.

> *"Well, among businessmen… it is very palpable, very tangible… when it [business] is going well, you can see that! I mean,* ***I can tell you that a lot of people think I'm rich… I'm not!*** *… but the firm gives that appearance… it is a window, even more because I have stores… you see the stores and you say 'this guy has… [money]'. And people many times do not know that a lot of times… stores chain works with scale economies, you have debts and… so* ***we are more exposed, we will have to adopt a lower profile****"*
>
> Daniel Campos, Industry
> Guadalajara, September 8th, 2015
> *(Q 1-12)*

[231] I intentionally omit the exact amount of respondents who meet this criterion in order to avoid the wrong interpretation of data as a representative proportion of the interviews or, even further, of business sector. Being qualitative data, respondent' election method (snowball) –detailed earlier on the Introduction- implies a bias that nullifies all expectation of statistical representativeness. However, it should be recalled that the aim of a qualitative research is not statistical representativeness or the accounts, but their diversity and depth.
[232] Interview conducted with Susana Piña, Industrial Sector. (October 9th, 2015). Zapopan, Jalisco.
[233] Interview conducted with Sergio Hernández, Service Sector. (September 1st, 2105). Guadalajara, Jalisco; Interview conducted with Raúl Velázquez, Commerce. (October 29th, 2015), *Skype*; Interview conducted with José Julio Huerta, Industry Sector. (October 17th, 2015). Zapopan, Jalisco.
[234] Guadalajara Metropolitan Area has been called "the Mexican Silicon Valley" ("El Silicon Valley mexicano está en Jalisco". (March 13th, 2017). *El País*; "Guadalajara, Ciudad Inteligente", (August, 2014); *Gazette Bank of Images 1970-2016)*.

Among those who shared Daniel Campos' perspective, an effort to state the limits of the economic advantage commonly related to their sector is visible. For instance, one of them told me "I probably have a little more economic capacity [than others]"[235], while other interlocutor outlines that showing-off sparks envy from the others: "you can be projecting an inappropriate image"[236]. On the one hand, that is tightly related to choosing a low profile as a protection strategy. However, it also revels part of the set of values of the *Tapatio* business sector. Someone showing off his money is considered to be improper. I will return to this element later in the next chapter.

The vulnerability of businessmen to crime is a linear function for some of the interviewees, "the bigger you are, the higher the risk you face"[237]. Then, a smart strategy to stay safe is not grow too much[238]. The ambition of any business should be to grow permanently, in contrast, it seems that the risk of being a crime victim sets the limit of aspiration to grow. It could be counterintuitive from a strictly capitalistic understanding of the business sector, but very rational in a violent and criminal context. A more elaborate explanation considers business vulnerability "depending on everyone's level"[239]. In this respect, the elucidation suggested by Manuel Gómez is very illustrative:

> *"Then… …the* ***medium-sized*** *businessman****, I think, is the most affected*** *because… well, to whom would you rather rob? Or to whom would you rather extort or steal from? Of course,* ***to the one who has the*** **lana**[240]***! But you are not going to go against the super businessman, unless you are a super thief!*** *You know? I mean, you are not going to try to kidnap the head of one of those big families, unless you are a goddamn organized crime command! The biggest bastard! … Otherwise, you would take a lot of risks. Those guys, I mean,* ***the biggest businessmen… they are not fools, they have their security team****, then… you will go with the medium-sized [businessmen], right?* ***The smallest, no… they are*** **jodidos**[241]*, you will go against the medium-sized!"*
>
> Manuel Gómez, Services
> Guadalajara, October 15th, 2015
> *(Q 1-13)*

[235] Interview conducted with Marco Antonio Zepeda, Service Sector. (September 2nd, 2015). Zapopan, Jalisco.
[236] Interview conducted with Nicolás Bermudez, Commerce Sector. (September 17th, 2015). Guadalajara, Jalisco.
[237] Interview conducted with Alberto Hernández, Industrial Sector. (September 22nd, 2015). Zapopan, Jalisco.
[238] A discussion of an ensemble of self-policing measures adopted by businessmen is offered in Chapter 4.
[239] Interview conducted with Fidel Torres, Construction Sector. (October 13th, 2015) Zapopan, Jal.
[240] According to the Mexican Academy Dictionary (2016) "*lana"* is the colloquial term used in Mexico for "money".
[241] According to the Mexican Academy Dictionary (2016) "*jodido"* is bad language that refers being broken or poor. *Diccionario de Mexicanismos.*

Referring to his own position as a medium-sized businessman, Manuel Gómez displays a perception of criminals as rent seekers and additionally as rational individuals who weigh the possibility to make significant profit and also the feasibility of criminal impact.

Gómez's argument relies on the assumption of a certain correspondence between the size of the company and criminal sophistication. In fact, the idea of organized crime jeopardizing big business is present in other businessmen's perception, such as Carlos Solano[242], who considers that the highest rollers must always keep an eye crimes related to drug trafficking.

Other accounts did not emphasize the level of organization of the criminal group as much as the diversification of crimes. For instance, Arnulfo Arellano[243], the owner of a medium-sized service company, considers that the wealthiest businessmen could be more susceptible to kidnapping-for-ransom, while theft could be more oriented against medium-sized commerce. In a similar direction, he mentions that the same offense could have different modalities, thus, extortion by phone could affect anyone, not only businessmen, while violent racketing could particularly threaten small commerce, since they are the most visible and the most fragmented within the business sector.

From the perceptions evoked it is possible to set two leads to follow: 1) The nature of the perceived threat would be different for every business, depending either on the sophistication of the criminal or on the features of sector; 2) The kind of perceived threat would explain the adoption of distinct protection mechanisms.

Exploring the perception of vulnerability among businessmen, another result was that for some of them, regular criminals are not the only ones jeopardizing their patrimony, complicating their operations and, in the end, representing a threat.

> *"I think, in the end, businessmen **always feel threaten not due to illegal, but due to legal factors**! I mean, you never know when a bomb is going to explode… right? An **unfair labor complaint**, **a labor union bothering you… extorting you**, because that is what they do! Anyhow, so many situations"*
>
> Víctor Manuel González, Commerce Sector
> Guadalajara, September 15th, 2015
> *(Q 1-14)*

[242] Interview conducted with Carlos Solano, Industrial Sector. (October 8th, 2015). Zapopan, Jal. It should be made clear that the interlocutor uses *narcotráfico* and *organized crime* as if they were synonyms.
[243] Interview conducted with Arnulfo Arellano, Service Sector. (September 29th, 2015). Zapopan, Jal.

The previous account places emphasis on labor unions as a threat, since they are commonly seen as racketeers. Making such an emphasis points out that the boundaries in terms of legality are weak concerning threats to businessmen. In the end, burglars, racketeers, kidnappers or union leaders fit under a file labelled "threats to businessmen", all which merit protection[244].

Over the course of this chapter, I have demonstrated that businessmen have faced the threat of various crimes in the last fifty years including the inherent side effects of political violence namely the *guerrilla* and the counterinsurgency during the *Guerra Sucia,* as well as cybercrimes they are learning to prevent nowadays. It has been also established that besides being surrounded by crime, the fact that this becomes a threat for businessmen is dependent on the perception of the environment and their own role on the allegedly dangerous scenario.

Additionally, one actor has appeared many times in businessmen's accounts: Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTO), or the variations that this notion adopts in the much extended narrative, such as organized crime, cartels or the *Narco.* So far, it seems they have likely affected the most important businessmen (if we follow Manuel Gómez and Carlos Solano's argument) or they have altered the atmosphere as Eduardo Hernández suggested. Even María Emma, whose words open this portion, imply that *narcos* (or the struggle against them) is a watershed in Guadalajara's life. But, to what extent does the *Narco* represent a threat for *Tapatio* businessmen? Even before, what are we referring to when we say the *Narco* and the *narcos* within the Guadalajara context? These questions will be the guiding light of the next chapter.

[244] Under the label "Taliban lawyer's case", an illustrative example of disguised extortions carried out by trade unions or within labour conflicts will be discussed later in Chapter 4.

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Chapter 2. From "Startling Familiarity" to "Graves on Wheels": Guadalajara and the *Narco*

> *"Let me tell you a story that happened to me. This is an anecdote that could illustrate how the narcos got the startled inhabitants of the city to 'adapt'. Back in Guadalajara, in June of 1983, after being absent for some 13 years, a good friend of mine, an engineer, gave me some advice that I acknowledged, although it surprised me. He told me: '... when you see a pick-up truck with tinted windows, stand aside, because they are* narcos *and, if you get in their way, you'll get hurt –and with a bit of sarcasm he added-: generally, they only kill each other'. I mention the word 'startled', (to refer to the inhabitants) but it is necessary to add the word 'familiar', to be able to get a better picture of the prevailing atmosphere in the city which was characterized by startling familiarity with the* narcos*".*
>
> Fernando M. González[245]

On May 24th, 1993, the daily routine of the Guadalajara International Airport was shaken after shooting erupted in the parking lot. Amidst confusion and panic, the silence following the outburst of gunfire was even more stunning: the Cardinal Juan Jesús Posadas Ocampo was among the seven assassinated. The assassination of this member of the Catholic Church shocked not only *Tapatios* but, every citizen in the country[246].

The General Attorney Office's (PGR) first inquiry concluded the Cardinal was caught in a shootout between two rival Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTO's), being mistakenly identified as a drug lord. Indeed, he had been mistaken to be Joaquín "El Chapo" Guzmán, head of the *Sinaloa Cartel*. According to the PGR version, the Arellano Félix brothers (who controlled *Tijuana* drug routes) confused the Cardinal's Grand Marquis with their real target since *El Chapo* had the same car model. The 14 bullets that hit the Cardinal were alleged collateral damage of the confrontation between both cartels.

The suspicious nature of the official version became even greater some months later, when a note published in the newspaper *El Diario de Chihuahua*[247] quoted a professed *narco* who raised the hypothesis that Cardinal Posadas could have been related to the Arellano Félix

[245] González, F.M. (1996). *Una historia sencilla: la muerte accidental de un Cardenal,* México: UNAM-Plaza y Valdés., p. 14. Emphasis in the original; Translation is mine.
[246] A collection of first reactions and accounts about that day is available in "El Narcotráfico: El gobierno no puede". (May 29th, 1993). *Proceso,* (865).
[247] Founded in 1985, the daily has an average circulation of 78,566 copies. Its scope is circumscribed to Northern Chihuahua State. (Padrón Nacional de Medios Impresos, 2018).

Organization (AFO), especially since he had been Tijuana's bishop, a city controlled by those brothers (González, 1996).

The theory of a bond between Cardinal Posadas and the AFO was strengthened at the beginning of 1994, when the press revealed that the Arellano Félix brothers had held several meetings with the Apostolic Nuncio at the time, Girolamo Prigione[248]. Apparently, Tijuana drug lords had tried to reinforce their image as good Catholics before the Vatican's Delegate, as a strategy for counteracting the incrimination of the PGR[249].

In 1995, the recently appointed Mexican Attorney General, Antonio Lozano Gracia[250], eased the doubts concerning the alleged link between Cardinal Posadas and the *Narco*, reinforcing the hypothesis of the regrettable confusion, built by Jorge Carpizo McGregor, his predecessor.

Although urban violence was not a novelty in Guadalajara, as discussed in Chapter 1, the assassination of Cardinal Posadas represented a sinister combination of factors: assault-weapons, the *narcos* murdering and spreading rumours, representatives of the Catholic Church, a hardly credible official version, as well as either incompetent or colluded law enforcement agents and politicians.

In fact, the previous episode is considered a turning point regarding the "startling familiarity" (*sobresaltada familiaridad*) with which *narcos* and *Tapatio* society had allegedly coexisted for years (González, 1996:14). This expression, coined by Fernando González, is meaningful suggesting there is daily contact among people who know each other, and from time to time, are forced to face the violent disruption of routine order.

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[248] About the alleged meeting between the Arellano Félix and the Catholic hierarchy see: "Ellos no fueron: la esposa de Benjamín". (July 26th, 1994). *Excélsior,*; "Yo no estuve allí el día del crimen, señala en carta a Prigone", (July 27th, 1994). *Excélsior,*; "Que el Nuncio diga si habló con ellos en confesión: Sandoval I.". (July 27th, 1994). *Excélsior*; "No tengo que conocer a todo el que viene a confesarse", (July 27th, 1994). *Excélsior,*; "La Iglesia nos escuchó: el gobierno no". (July 28th, 1994). *Excélsior*; "Debe ser llamado a declarar a la PGR el Nuncio Apostólico, dice A. Montalvo". (July 28th, 1994). *Excélsior*; "No hubo absolución". (July 28th, 1994). *Excélsior,*

[249] Interview conducted with J.J. Doñán, Journalist. October 3rd, 2015. Guadalajara, Jal.

[250] Former President Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000) appointed Lozano Gracia as General Attorney once he took office. Member of National Action Party (PAN), Lozano would become the first General Attorney coming from the ranks of an opposition party. He stayed in office until 1996, when he was relieved of duty after notorious failings and scandals. In 2016 he reappeared in the public scene as head defense lawyer of the former Governor of Sonora state, Guillermo Padrés, accused of diversion of public resources and illicit enrichment. For more details about Lozano Gracia trajectory see "Perfil, Antonio Lozano, de procurador a abogado de Padrés". (November 10th, 2016). *El Universal*.

If “startling familiarity” is an adequate formula to sketch out Guadalajara and the *Narco* image, how can such familiarity be explained? What kind of episodes are able to upset everyday life and why? Ultimately, how can the presence of the *Narco* in the country’s second most important city be characterized? This chapter explores possible answers to these and other questions, with the purpose of disentangling the historical presence of *Narcos* in Guadalajara, laying the groundwork to eventually explore to what extent they represent a threat, especially to the business sector.

For this endeavour, the chapter is divided into three sections. The first two parts are mainly a general review of *Narco* history in Guadalajara. Without the pretension of providing a historiographical approach, it analyses a collection of biographies and actor profiles (by no means exhaustive) to inquire how the so-called “startling familiarity” developed over time. The account starts with the arrival of the *narcos* to the city, in the late-1970s, explaining why Guadalajara would become the cradle of the first Mexican drug cartel. The second section focuses on how *narcos* from Sinaloa began to populate the city. I argue that despite the foreign character that accompanied its leaders since their first days in Guadalajara, it is in this period when the image of the *narco* shifts from a stigmatic to an emblematic figure. Finally, the third section focuses on violence which is their characteristic feature. This aspect is explored *through* and *in contrast to* the dominant narrative that assumes *narcos* became suddenly violent since the late-1990s, and even more around 2010.

Before starting the historical account, it seems pertinent to pose a key question. What exactly do we mean when we use the term *Narco* (with capital letters) and the *narcos* as its members?

The category *narcotráfico* (drug-trafficking) sparsely appeared in Mexican newspapers back in the 1950s (Morín, 2015; Astorga, 2007). At that time, the expression was far from the notion of an “exotic and brutal industry” (Wainwright, 2016: 12), to which it is related nowadays. It made reference to drug trafficking groups, in general and in plural (*grupos de narcotraficantes*). Although the press used the title more frequently during the 1960s, it wouldn’t become popular until the 1970s, first mentioned the officially, later in the media and, eventually, everywhere else (Morín, 2015; Astorga, 2007).

On the other hand, *Narco* (short for *narcotráfico*) became widely used since the late 1980s. Paradoxically, in the mid-1980s, the word *narco* was used to refer to the American narcotics officials, commonly named “narcs” (Ramírez-Pimienta, 2011). Either created by government

agencies, journalists or criminal organizations (Pressacco de la Luz, 2019), nowadays, *narco* is a multi-purpose prefix used to describe something (mostly arbitrarily) associated to drug trafficking[251]. According to the linguistic approach of Pressacco de la Luz (2019), *Narco,* more than a prefix is a notion in and of itself. It grants meaning to an autonomous word (*narco* + *manta* [banner]= *narcomanta*) and it is autonomous itself.

Even though there are few documented exceptions of the social and hierarchical differences among *narcos* in specific regions[252], the term *Narco* generally refers to every step in the drug trafficking chain: from the poppy farmer, to the drug lord (Astorga, 1995; Astorga, 2007). It might be expected that such a name would contain every attribute related to those actors and, ultimately, every stigma associated with them. Since almost anything can be referred to as narco-related, such over usage implies a risk of losing its semantic value.

The word *cartel* also came along with the word narco, borrowed from Economics jargon and attributed to drug trafficking groups by Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents; first in Colombia and later in Mexico. Even though the term *grupos de narcotraficantes* was not compatible with the definition of a cartel, this became the regular way to make reference to them[253]. According to Félix Gallardo, a member of the Guadalajara Cartel (the first group qualified as such) "in 1989, cartels didn't exist… there started to be talk about 'cartels' from the authorities assigned to combat them" (Grillo, 2011: 65). Although the DEA has used the name Guadalajara Cartel since 1984 (Boullosa and Wallace, 2015), an expression that was soon incorporated by the press, more than the accuracy of timing, we can understand the

[251] For instance, from the 175 words enlisted in Grayson's Glossary of terms (2010) one third (59) are made up of the prefix *narco* and other word coming from Spanish language. Thus, it is possible to find terms such as *narcoabogados* (lawyers who defend drug dealers), *narcoasesinatos* (drug-related killings), *narcoaficionado* (drug baron who is a sports fan), *narcobautismo* (baptism of the child of a cartel leader), *narcoconcursos de misses* (beauty contest sponsored by capos) and *narcomonjas* (religious sister involved in drug trade), among others (Grayson, 2010: 310-315).

[252] By way of illustration, in a very complete Anthropological study about the village *Altar* in the northern state of Sonora, Natalia Mendoza (2008) explores the different hierarchies and social positions able to noticed among *narcos*: from the *burreros* (drug mules) to the mythical *patrones* (lords). For a discussion on the attributes associated with each profile see Mendoza (2008).

[253] According to the Oxford Dictionary of Economics (2018), a cartel is defined as "a formal or informal agreement among a number of firms in an industry to restrict competition. Cartel agreements may provide for setting minimum prices, setting limits on output or capacity, restrictions on non-price competition, division of markets between firms either geographically or in terms of type of product, or agreed measures to restrict entry to the industry (…)"According to Mendoza (2008) a process of "cartelization" might be observed among Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations between 2005 and 2011. The term refers the transition between a mainly local control schema towards a regional one. Hence, formal and informal local agencies lose control of their resources and the "independent traffickers" are not able to operate, since the drug trafficking organization, with its regional power, concentrates and seeks to monopolize legal and illegal rents.

seminal role that law enforcement officials and agencies played in defining the concept. This issue will be discussed at length in this chapter.

In the last ten years, rising levels of violence expressed mostly by homicides rates have brought the *Narco* to the forefront of public discussion as there are no other comparable topic in the press headlines (Escalante Gonzalbo, 2015). With some nuances, either in journalistic or academic work, notions such as "Organized Crime", "Drug Trafficking Organizations", "cartels", "*narcotráfico"* or "*Narco*" are generally used as interchangeable titles. For instance, the systematic examination of the weekly investigative news magazine *Proceso* (probably the most influential publication on the subject since the 1990s[254]) shows that within its articles from 2004 to 2010, words as *narcotráfico* and organized crime are used as synonyms, demonstrating that the *narco*-world representation (the symbol) weighs more in the magazine's editorial policy than the phenomena itself (Rodríguez Castro, 2012).

Despite being the main character in a considerable number of stories told in Mexico recently, the *Narco* seems like a catch-all black box. As a frequently cited expert has stated: "rhetorical fireworks matter much more than conceptual accuracy" (Astorga, 2007, 276). In this context, along with the aforementioned objectives, the chapter will look into what the *Narco* is and who the *narcos* are according to the narratives found in the literature, journals, as well as in official and *Tapatio* accounts.

2.1 "When the *narcos* arrived": the beginning of the story?

The compiled information about the history of *Narcotráfico* in Mexico commonly refers to the beginning of the 20th Century (Boullosa and Wallace, 2015; Morín, 2015; Valdés Castellanos, 2013; Grillo, 2011; Astorga, 2004a [2002]). The origin can be traced to the creation of the network between the Chinese expelled from the US who settled in the North of Mexico since the 1880s and their relatives that stayed in cities such as Los Angeles. Since the end of 19th Century and mostly due to climatic advantages, the cultivation of opium poppy introduced by Chinese immigrants had been expanded especially in the so-called *Triángulo*

[254] According to Standish and Bell (2004), since its foundation in 1976, *Proceso* "has occupied a prominent position in Mexican journalism as a watchdog specializing in investigative reporting" (p. 94). In addition, Astorga (1995) recognizes that back in the 1980s, while the rest of the media commonly reproduced the versions of the General Attorney's Office on the subject, *Proceso* was the only one that sent a reporter to the field. For a preliminary review of *Proceso* editorial policy concerning drug trafficking organizations since 2004, see Rodríguez Castro, 2012. To the best of my knowledge, a deeper analysis on the role of *Proceso* in the production and reproduction of the narrative about the Mexican *narcotráfico* is still missing.

Dorado (Golden Triangle), where the Northern states of Sinaloa, Durango and Chihuahua intersect. Back then, after harvesting the poppy and extracting the paste, *gomeros*[255] the opium reached the hands of Chinese traffickers located in the US (Boullosa and Wallace, 2015). As the Mexican Revolution had left devastation and poverty, it was not surprising that many peasants joined this network. In addition, the porous nature of the US-Mexico border and the precarious law enforcement structure offered enough incentives to some city merchants to be part of the business (Boullosa and Wallace, 2015; Astorga, 2004a [2002]).

From 1920 to the end of the 1970s, history might be told following the prohibitionist drug policies were progressively adopted and the extent to which, along with other factors, they changed the landscape. In particular, three aspects can be highlighted: *1*) the criminalization of addictions and the consolidation of an illegal market; *2*) the emergence of a network of collusion where drug traffickers and some local and national law enforcement officials, politicians and bureaucrats took part; *3*) the link between American drug policies and Mexican responses (Boullosa and Wallace, 2015; Valdés Castellanos, 2013; Astorga, 2004a[2002]). Law enforcement action could be tracked particularly since the mid-1940s, when policies to confront drug trafficking started appearing systematically in the *Informe de Gobierno del Presidente* (President Government Report) (Valdés Castellanos, 2013).

In fact, between the 1950s and the late 1970s, the information about *grupos de narcotraficantes* is significantly limited. At most, two main patterns are suggested. On the one hand, that they were managed by powerful local figures, such as former governors or *caciques*[256] (often both). While managing their relationship with the central power (within the context of a hegemonic party), regional elites were able to control the drug trafficking rent extraction (Duncan, 2014; Valdés Castellanos, 2013). That might explain why *narcos'* domain was local and belonged to politicians or local leaders. On the other hand, local groups were gradually becoming a larger scale organization, managed from Sinaloa, the so-called *Narco* cradle[257] (Valdés Castellanos, 2013).

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[255] People who converted opium poppies into paste (*goma*). For the origin of the term *gomero* see Astorga (1995:69).

[256] The *cacique* is a very significant figure in the Mexican political landscape. It has been described as "form of political boss, mediator or broker" [while *caciquismo* is a] distinctive form of patrimonial and clientelist authority" (Knight, 2005:10). According to Knight (2005), the leadership of the *cacique* might be national, state, regional, municipal or local. For a deep discussion on *caciquismo* see Knight and Pansterns, (2005).

[257] Along with Sinaloa, the other region considered as *Narco's* cradle is the North Eastern state of Tamaulipas. Thus, according to the chronicles, Mexican *narcos* descend either from the *Sinaloense* or from *Tamaulipeco*

In this panoramic view, Guadalajara is rarely mentioned. For this western city, the story starts only in the late 1970s, "when the *narcos* arrived". To recall the evolution of drug trafficking in the city, this phrase is often used as a starting point not only in the literature but also by journalists, some businessmen and others I spoke to while conducting my fieldwork. It seems the story about the *Narco* in Guadalajara, like any other tale starts with "once upon a time", in this case, "when the *narcos* arrived". Doña Rosy[258], the owner of a tiny *fonda*[259] where I used to have lunch during my fieldwork[260] recalls "when the *narcos* arrived, in the early 1980s, they started building their *casotas*[261] and being here and there. We used to say 'that is so-and-so's house', it was *clarito*[262]". Her account nearly represents a consensus among the *Tapatios*: the *narcos* arrived and everybody noticed. If this was the beginning of everything, we must wonder who arrived and where they came from. Why did they migrate and why was their particular destination Guadalajara?

Although in the *Tapatios* account, the trigger behind the *narcos* arrival is not clear, according to the literature, the explanation can be found within the so-called *Operación Condor,* the largest official anti-drug campaign implemented until then, which was conducted mainly by the Army (Morín, 2015).

In the fall of 1975, Mexican anti-drug policy experienced a significant transformation through the implementation of *Operación CANADOR*[263], which was considered an unprecedented effort to eradicate opium and marijuana crops using herbicides, mostly in states such as Sinaloa and Guerrero (Craig, 1980). In January 1976, the campaign's head[264],

lineage (Grayson, 2010). Since Guadalajara Cartel origin is attributed to Sinaloa, the present review leaves aside the history of Tamaulipas and the Gulf Cartel, except when it contributes to better explain the *Narco* in Guadalajara. For a revision of drug trafficking history focusing on Tamaulipas see Flores Pérez (2019; 2012) and Correa-Cabrera (2018).

[258] Fieldwork carnet notes, August 28th, 2015. I commonly had casual conversations with Doña Rosy (pseudonym) about many different topics. In fact, she was very open and able to socialize with the eaters. That is not necessarily astonishing when it comes to small shopkeepers in Mexico, although a more systematic observation might help to establish if the fluid conversation about any topic (including the *Narco*) is verifiable within other profiles and after some waves of violence allegedly related with *narcos*.

[259] "*Fonda"* is a modest restaurant. (DEM, 2018)

[260] Fieldwork carnet notes, September 19th, 2015.

[261] Big houses.

[262] Very clear.

[263] Stands for *Combate Contra el Narcotráfico,* Fight against drug trafficking. The name eventually changes to "*Operación Condor".*

[264] General José Hernández Toledo was in charge of the soldiers deployed on the Operation while the civil leading was on the PGR Senior Officer, Alejandro Gertz Manero (Morín, 2015).

Alejandro Gertz Manero[265], declared the government prevision to completely destroy the cultivation of narcotic drugs that same year[266]. Although it was unrealistic to achieve such ambitious goals, diverse resources and strategies to coordinate this effort were employed (Figure 2.1), making it the most important official action to combat drugs heretofore, recognized as such even by US agents (Craig, 1980).

Figure 2.1 Operation CANADOR's features: an unprecedented anti-drug measure

- Making the campaign **permanent**
- Investing a higher **budget** in the effort
- Vertical and horizontal **coordination** between the agencies (notably national and local authorities as well as the Army and PGR)
- More effective **International cooperation**, especially with the US
- Special attention to drug-related **corruption**
- Using **modern technology** and herbicides to destroy plants

Source: Prepared by the author based on Craig (1980: 347).

The measure must be interpreted not only as a part of Mexican Government drug policy, but also within the framework of the War on Drugs undertaken by their Northern neighbour (Boullosa and Wallace, 2015; Valdés Castellanos, 2013).

In January 1977, the recently elected President José López Portillo (1976-1982) reinforced the campaign, this time under the name of *Operación Cóndor*[267]. To the evoked features of

[265] Being part of the Public Administration since the late-1950s, Alejandro Gertz Manero has hold many designations on education, culture and security public offices. From 1998 to 2000 he was Mexico City Secretary of Public Security under the administration of Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas (1997-1999) and Rosario Robles (1999-2000), both from PRD. In 2000, the President Vicente Fox (2000-2006) appointed him to be part of the first *panista* federal administration as Secretary of Public Security, charge that he held until 2004. He also was Congressman in 2009. In 2019 the President's López Obrador appointed him as Federal General Attorney. For more details on his profile see *Sistema de Información Legislativa, SIL*. Available at: http://sil.gobernacion.gob.mx.

[266] "Sí, estamos usando herbicidas y vamos a acabar con la siembra de estupefacientes". (January 8th, 1976). *Excélsior*.

[267] *Operación Cóndor* must not be confused with the one implemented by military dictatorships in South America during the mid-1970s. Although *Plan Cóndor* was a codename for a secret exchange of information agreed between South American intelligence agencies and US officials, it was well beyond that. Under the context of the Marxist subversion combat, the South American regimes used this operation to eliminate the opposition in what has been considered as a way of transnational, counterrevolutionary, coordinated state terrorism (López, 2016; Gaudichaud, 2003). For an analytical description of the *Plan Cóndor* see Gaudichaud, 2003. For a literature review see the Introduction of López (2016). The Mexican's government decision of naming its policy against drug-trafficking similarly than the South American plan would be read as a coincidence. However, it must be considered that the operations were both undergoing at the same time.

the anti-drug action, the new administration would add three more characteristics: 1) an unparalleled deployment of federal forces into the field, namely the Army and Federal Police agents (Astorga, 2004a [2002]). In fact, it was the first anti-drug trafficking strategies led by the military on the whole continent (Astorga, 2007); 2) a focus on the Golden Triangle, more precisely on Sinaloa which was considered to be "a hub for one of the greatest productions of opium-heroin in the world" (Craig, 1980: 351), as well as a state embroiled in violence and corruption (Astorga, 2004a [2002]); 3) the eradication of illicit fields in order to pacify the countryside (Craig, 1980).

Promptly, the General Attorney, the Secretary of Defense and the Governor of Sinaloa laid claim to the achievements of the operation, based on a catalogue of statistics of opium plots and fields of marijuana destroyed, kilograms of cocaine seized and individuals arrested for drug charges (Craig, 1980). Furthermore, US agents did not hesitate to deem the Mexican anti-drug campaign as a success, mostly based on what they acknowledged as being a drug market transformation (Shannon, 2015 [1988]; Craig, 1980). It seemed that, for the first time, both countries were aligned regarding drug policy.

The effects of the campaign, however, would go far beyond. The presence of Federal Forces in the effort to detect and destroy drug cultures would soon produce grievances due to alleged violent procedures, consistent with counterinsurgent measures the Army had been putting in place since the late 1960s [268]. Another disapproval of the anti-drug operation was that it served to fill jail cells with peasants who allegedly cultivated marijuana or poppy, while no leaders were captured[269]. Thus, the operation provoked a large-scale emigration of peasants from the North Western *Sierra Madre* towards the cities (Astorga, 2004a [2002]). Supposedly harassed by the permanent *Operación Cóndor*, *narcos* left their rural hometowns in an exodus (mostly located in Sinaloa) to settle in Guadalajara, a growing city more than 750 kilometres away.

One element is clear regarding what could be called "the arrival narrative". The *narcos* are not from Jalisco, they were born and grew up elsewhere, in Sinaloa, Durango or Coahuila; anywhere but Jalisco. They do not share a birthplace with the *Tapatios*, which is a feature that emerges whenever someone tells the story of "when the *narcos* arrived". Perhaps, we

[268] "Sinaloa: un transplante de Sudamérica". (October 7th, 1978). *Proceso*, (101).
[269] "Alternaba públicamente con políticos y funcionarios". (April 15th, 1989). *Proceso,* (650).

should inquire if it is pertinent to conjugate the verb in past tense? To what extent does this dominant narrative cleanse present day *narcos* of the foreign origin of their predecessors? These questions are leads to be followed across the chapter.

At the beginning of the 1980s, the literature and *Tapatio* accounts coincide that the *narcos* not only arrived in the city but also that their illegal business was flourishing. In 1978, for instance, while describing the degree of the challenge the government was facing, Sinaloa's Governor pointed out that "a large portion of the buildings and hotels in Guadalajara may have been financed by drug money" (Craig, 1980:356). So, "Guadalajara has become the resting and recreation spot for traffickers from Sinaloa and Durango. They were all over Guadalajara, buying bars and hotels, spreading money around the police forces, acquiring fleets of airplanes" (Shannon [1988], 2015: 194).

Even if the dominant narrative does not dig deeply into why *narcos* chose Guadalajara rather than other cities, some general ideas have been suggested. On the one hand, the arrival to Guadalajara has been associated with its possibilities as a city since it "offered international communications and banking facilities and was a more luxurious place to live than Culiacán, Sinaloa's bleak capital" (Shannon, 2015 [1988]: 197). Certainly, Guadalajara was experiencing development and urbanization, including commercial expansion and a growing supply of schools and Universities, attractive to the middle class from different parts of the country[270].

From this explanation, it is possible to emphasize two elements that have shaped the way *Narco* and *narcos* are generally seen (perhaps the bias behind this version): 1) their illegal activity was aimed at becoming an international business since then; 2) the *narcos* enjoyed an extravagant lifestyle, in contrast with their humble origin. Although this version could be accurate, it does not necessarily explain why the *narcos* chose Guadalajara rather than another growing city.

[270] For instance, during the interview, the industrialist José Gerardo Zapata, who was born in the North of the country explained that he emigrated towards Guadalajara because his parents wanted to offer him a better college education. For his family, to send their elder son to Mexico City was logistically complicated and hardly affordable. Guadalajara, then, seemed as a better alternative for the future engineer who got married and settled there. (Interview conducted with J.G. Zapata, Industrial Sector. September 1st, 2015. Zapopan, Jal.)

From another angle, there are explanations that focus on the conditions that the Dirty War had left behind which would transform Guadalajara into the perfect terrain for the *Narco* to proliferate (Valdés Castellanos, 2013; Aguayo Quezada, 2001).

As evoked in Chapter 1, during the 1970s, the city was the stage for the political violence associated to *guerrilleros* and counterinsurgent activity (both legal and illegal) deployed by the Government. For some authors, the defeat of violent groups (gangs and *guerrilla*) "left an empty *plaza*[271] and it was gradually filled by those devoted to one of the most lucrative illegal businesses" (Aguayo Quezada, 2001: 216). Although the image of an empty seat to be filled by *narcos* coming from Sinaloa is quite illustrative and therefore easy to understand, it could distract attention from some elements remaining in the city that could better explain why Guadalajara became the *narcos*' chosen land.

The first of these elements is the significant presence of the DFS in the field and the possibilities it opened for drug trafficking. According to Valdés Castellanos (2013) "the decision to move to Guadalajara clearly had to do with the close connection they [the *Narco* main leaders] had with the DFS" (p. 175). As explained in Chapter 1, DFS agents had been deployed all over the city as part of their counterinsurgent activities, but their presence was clearly associated with corruption, crime and illegal violence. According to American agencies, one of their informants, who had allegedly been part of the DFS in those days, asserted that in the mid-1970s two "DFS officials convinced the Sinaloa drug traffickers to relocate in Guadalajara. He [the informant] said that the DFS created a bona fide narco-industrial complex where DFS officers […] introduced the traffickers to people of influence in Guadalajara, found them houses and assigned them DFS bodyguards" (Shannon, 2015 [1988]: 314)[272].

According to this version, rather than arriving on their own, *narcos* had been invited to move to Guadalajara. In addition, DFS agents had been described as a connecting point between *narcos* and influential *Tapatios* as is illustrated by the profile of the then DFS head Javier

[271] According to Grayson's Glossary of terms (2010), *plazas* refers to "strategic areas for the production, storing and shipping of drugs" (p. 314).
[272] The book *Desperados* by Elaine Shannon (2015) [1988] -originally published in 1988- is a seminal reference evoked for most of the authors on the topic. Her main sources are DEA agents and US officers. Some of the text bias, as well as different implications regarding her sources, are discussed later in the chapter. The book became a bestseller and inspired a TV miniseries, broadcasted by the NBC. See also "El asesinato del agente, en telenovela". (December 16th, 1989). *Proceso,* (685).

García Paniagua. He was a member of a renowned local family[273] and leader of an important network within the political, economic and public security local arenas (Valdés Castellanos, 2013). From this perspective, the bond between DFS officials and *narco* leaders would be reciprocal: "the traffickers provided *muscle* and blood (…) the DFS leaders contributed *brains, coordination*, insulations from government agencies, and firepower" (Shannon, 2015 [1988]: 314)[274]. The informant quoted by Shannon, by and large, argues that the DFS furnished the *Narco* with two precious resources: protection and order ("they organized them"). On this basis, Guadalajara, despite not being the cradle of the *narcos*, has been considered a sort of "organized drug trafficking cradle" (Osorio Méndez, 2009: 97).

Following the description above, it seems that *narcos* were contributing to DFS officer power by means of a very lucrative business which, up until then, had been managed in a disorganized manner. The intelligence officers thus offered them the structure that upgraded the business. The manner *narcos* were allegedly running the business before arriving to Guadalajara reveals their uneducated, almost wild, profile commonly attributed to them. This aspect will be discussed throughout this chapter.

Additionally, it must be noted that, despite the mention of "Guadalajara's influential people" and the assumption that *narcos'* money was behind buildings, hotels and bars city-wide, no role is attributed to the business sector when referring to the *narcos*' arrival. The scope of the narrative is reserved to *narcotraficantes* and alleged corrupted state agents. This does not imply that businessmen were not involved in the supposed deal (either in a colluded form or as victims of such agreements). Instead, it suggests that the chroniclers did not pay enough attention to this sector while building the narrative.

The second element that the Dirty War had left in Guadalajara was an intricate network established between the violent actors of those times (*Guerrilla* groups, gangs such as *Los*

[273] Javier García Paniagua was born in Jalisco. His father, Marcelino García Barragán was Governor of Jalisco (1943-1946) and National Defense Secretary (1964-1970) during the 1968 Movement and the October 2nd bloodshed in Tlatelolco (Scherer and Monsivais, 1999). Javier was Senator (1970-1976), DFS head (1976-1978), Interior Deputy Secretary (1978-1980), Agrarian Reform Secretary (1980-1981), PRI's national leader (1981), Labor and Social Welfare Secretary (1981-1982) and PRI's Presidential pre-candidate -when Miguel De la Madrid was designed as the ruling party candidate-. His son, Javier García Morales, *priista* politician and businessman was murdered in 2011 in a Coffee shop in Guadalajara. Rumors about Gacía Morales links with drug trafficking organizations surrounded his career for a long time and his assassination reinforced the version (For more details see "El tercer García: Amigo de bandas y capos…"; "…y protegido por los militares"; "'Javiercillo' ya preparaba a su propio cachorro". (September 10th, 2011). *Proceso*, (1819).

[274] Emphasis is mine.

Vikingos, FEG members and state actors, namely the Army, the MFJP[275] and DFS members). As described in the previous chapter, during the Dirty War, an ensemble of violent state and non-state actors maintained fairly undefined alliances using legal and illegal methods of violence to combat their opponents. Broadly speaking, the literature considers that *narcos* fit into that picture, although a deeper analysis on this matter is required. In that respect, one main feature can be distinguished[276]. Specifically, the role *narcos* played in the fight against *guerrilla* activity and drug related activities which was unified.

Such a merge was embodied in the redeployment of violent actors, formerly involved in counterinsurgency activities, who would join the *Narco* ranks, either as gunmen or bodyguards (Aguayo Quezada, 2001). Multiple armed players, significantly well trained after a decade long violent struggle, seemed ideal raw material for the *Narco.*

A very enlightening case would be that of Carlos Morales García "El Pelacuas", an outstanding member of FEG strikers and eventually part of the secret group organized by the Army General Federico Amaya Rodríguez to extort businessmen (Aguayo Quezada, 2001). "El Pelacuas" added drug trafficking to his criminal record, already bulging with bank assaults, robberies and homicides. Despite the amount of crimes he had committed, he only spent ten years in prison where he apparently studied law. Once out of jail, he founded a law firm, although he did not possess an official law degree[277] and defended important drug lords such as Rafael Caro Quintero (González, 1996) and Félix Gallardo (Astorga, 2004a [2002])[278]. Finally, the assassination of "El Pelacuas" in September 1989, was attributed to the violent confrontation between two cartels (Astorga, 2004a [2002]; González, 1996).

Therefore, granting DFS agents a protagonist role or considering them to be one of the diverse violent agents seemed to be the route for the *Narco* towards Guadalajara. In fact, it could be said that the city might have been chosen due to the vestiges of its condition as a "cathedral of political violence"[279]. Although some authors assume that *narcos* were passed the baton of violence inherent to the long-standing rivalry between student groups (González, 1996; Regalado Santillán, 2012), it is also likely that the new players were amalgamated to a highly functional configuration that state and non-state actors had set up in Guadalajara

[275] Stands for Mexican Federal Judicial Police.
[276] And probably consider it as a starting point to better document this period in ulterior researches.
[277] "¿Quién mató al Pelacuas?". (April 19th, 2012). *El Diario de Coahuila*.
[278] The profile of both drug lords will be discussed at length in the next section
[279] Regaining the description proposed by Aguayo Quezada (2001: 145) and evoked earlier, in Chapter 1.

during the 1970s. Nevertheless, instead of a process of replacement, it might be considered complementary.

Thus far, it seems clear that Guadalajara was not an empty space but one full of possibilities[280] for the *narcos* who arrived, particularly those from Sinaloa. However, considering the strategic geographic location of Jalisco, it is only logical to expect that there were signs of drug trafficking in the city before chroniclers began to document them. In stark contrast, if *Operación Condor* were behind the *narco* presence in Guadalajara, this simplistic explanation would be ignoring that before the anti-drug campaign, some groups had already been on the playing field.

A superficial review of the local press reveals that the history of the *Narco* in Guadalajara begins earlier than the late 1970s. By way of illustration, there is a series of news articles that the traditional newspaper *El Informador*[281] published spotlighting the alleged drug trafficking group known as *Los Dones,* between 1972 and 1974.

Throughout nearly twenty articles, the newspaper reported the case of a *banda de narcotraficantes*, which fell on the public eye after a shipment of cocaine and heroin was seized by the Jalisco State Judicial Police and the 15th Military Region Soldiers. According to the press, it was considered the biggest confiscation registered until then, although it is not clear if the reference point is the city, the state or the country. During the police operation, Pedro Federico Carrasco Gómez, the supposed group leader, and other members of the group were captured[282].

Days later, while the judicial process against the alleged *narcotraficantes* was carried out, *El Informador* added more details about the group, including its name and area of operation[283]. The case took precedence in the press after the supposed group leader escaped from prison

[280] Not meaning that, in those days, *narcos* from the Golden Triangle migrated exclusively to Guadalajara. Instead, it is only helpful to explain why they especially chose that city to settle, likely among others.
[281] Founded in 1917 and managed since then by the Álvarez del Castillo family, *El Informador* has a circulation of 46,434 copies (Padrón Nacional de Medios Impresos, 2018).
[282] "El más grande contrabando de Cocaína y Heroína fue descubierto en esta Ciudad". (September 21st, 1972). *El Informador,*.
[283] "Son también peligrosos asesinos los Narcotraficantes capturados". (September 22nd, 1972). *El Informador*; "Murió uno de los Narcotraficantes pues se ahorcó dentro de su celda". (September 23rd, 1972). *El Informador*; "Fueron ayer consignados a un Juez Federal los Traficantes de Drogas". (September 24th, 1972). *El Informador*; "Hoy se resolverá si los dejan formalmente presos". (September 26th, 1972). *El Informador*; "Formal prisión de nueve de la Banda de 'Los Dones'". (September 21th, 1972). *El Informador.*

two months later[284], yet it progressively lost the interest of law enforcement agencies in the following months[285]. Carrasco Gómez apparently continued his career as a *narcotraficante* for a couple of years until he was captured in Texas[286]. He returned to *El Informador* pages when he was shot down while trying to escape from a US prison[287]. At that point, the newspaper considered the story to be finished. Once their leader had died, the steps of the rest of *Los Dones* were not followed as if the group had vanished.

To my knowledge, the case of *Los Dones* has been neglected by the literature and other journalistic compilations which have featured the *Narco.* In addition, none of my interlocutors mentioned it during my fieldwork. Put simply, although the group is part of the archive at *El Informador*, it is not part of *Tapatio* memory. A possible explanation is that the dominant narrative regarding the *Narco* is seen from national studies perspective, which neglects local specificity. Most of the seminal texts cover Guadalajara by following the tracks of *narcos Sinaloenses*[288], and do not attempt to understand Jalisco as a whole.

Notwithstanding media coverage of *Los Dones* story shows that *bandas de narcotraficantes*, as named by the local press, were operating in Guadalajara well before *Operación Cóndor* was launched in the Golden Triangle. In fact, considering that the group only appeared in the public eye when an important drug shipment got seized, it is challenging to determine when drug related activities began in the city. This is relevant because it forces us to relocate the beginning of the account and to pose diverse questions about the media as a legitimate source of information. It opens an avenue of inquiry on how the events that are covered by the press are merely the tip of the iceberg of any given phenomena. Additionally, what this kind of case reveals about mass media dynamics[289] as well as public actors and their arena can be better understood.

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[284] "Se fugó de la Penitenciaría el Jefe de la Banda de Narcotraficantes Los Dones". (November 11th, 1972). *El Informador;* "Hay indicios de que el narcotraficante evadido huyó hacia el extranjero". (November 12th, 1972). *El Informador*; "Nada se sabe del evadido ni a quién le dio dinero". (November 14th, 1972). *El Informador*; "Surgen otros sospechosos de propiciar la evasión". (November 15th, 1972). *El Informador*; "Va para largo todavía la investigación de la fuga". (November 17th, 1972). *El Informador*.

[285] "Pierde ya todo interés la fuga de F. Carrasco". (November 28th, 1972). *El Informador*; "En el olvido el caso del Narcotraficante evadido". (January 4th, 1973). *El Informador*.

[286] "Golpe al tráfico de Drogas entre México y EU". (March 24th, 1974). *El Informador*.

[287] "Federico Carrasco Gómez, muerto al tratar de fugarse en EEUU". (August 4th, 1974). *El Informador.*

[288] Sinaloa inhabitant's demonym (DRAE, 2018).

[289] That line has been explored, for instance, by the literature on corruption scandals (Zamora and Marín, 2010; De Blic and Lemieux, 2005; Bouissou, 2002; Thompson, 2000; Arroyo Martínez, 1997; Markovits and Silverstein, 1988). Concerning Mexican *Narco,* however, research is still needed on how media makes visible certain elements of the phenomena and its implications.

After all, it is possible that the *narcos* did not arrive to Guadalajara, at least not when the dominant narrative states. That prospect is not completely ignored by the literature, although not explored in-depth. According to Guillermo Valdés Castellanos (2013), some drug leaders from Sinaloa had been present in Guadalajara since the early 1970s, but what *Operación Cóndor* triggered was the relocation of the "whole organization's leadership" (p. 121) to the city, better known as the "Sinaloa leadership, based in Guadalajara" (Valdés Castellanos, 2013: 198). Actually, this is consistent with the fact that the arrival narrative normally pays attention to the deployment of those who have been considered the leaders of the *Guadalajara Cártel*: Miguel Ángel Félix Gallardo, Ernesto Fonseca Carrillo "Don Neto" and Rafael Caro Quintero.

The history of the *Narco* keeps record of former leader's names[290] such as Pedro Avilés Pérez[291] and Alberto Sicilia Falcón who is considered one of the first leaders that settled in Guadalajara, who allegedly ended up having "half of the City on his payroll"[292]. Nevertheless, Félix Gallardo, Fonseca Carrillo "Don Neto" and Caro Quintero would become the most significant figures leading the *Narco* during the early 1980s. In fact, there is a certain consensus which considers them to be the founders of the Guadalajara Cartel, yet they went well beyond that. Indeed, they have been considered to be the origin of the *narco* myth and archetype (Astorga, 1995), one that has very likely lasted until the present.

The trajectories and profiles of the members of this triad are available in virtually all chronologies regarding the history of the Mexican *Narco.* In what follows, however, some of their attributes and anecdotes will be analytically evoked to discuss how "those who arrived", despite their foreign and illegal profile, achieved a "startling familiarity" within the

[290] Astorga (2004b) claims that an ensemble of drug traffickers active since the 1940s in different parts of the country became legends, mostly due to their permanence in the business or the importance that official sources granted them.

[291] Pedro Avilés took part in drug trafficking through heroine, marijuana and cocaine. He is considered part of the first generation of drug traffickers, who became bosses and mentors of the second generation, the one holding the leadership during the 1980s (Shannon, 2015).

[292] The assumption comes from a CIA's murder-for-hire which, according to an article in *Proceso*, was quoted by the US journalist James Mills in his book *The underground empire, where crime and governments embrace* published in 1987. ["Hasta banco propio tuvo en la capital tapatía". (April 15th, 1989). *Proceso,* (650)]. The version has been restored multiple times, although neglecting a critical discussion on its validity, even leaving behind the original source and, certainly, its implications. (Aguilar Camín, H. (May, 2007). Narco historias extraordinarias. *Nexos*). The Cuban Alberto Sicilia Falcón has been called the first *narcostar* (Enciso, 2009) and the bisexual *narcostar* (Enciso, 2015), based on his reputation as eccentric and wasteful. Elaine Shannon refers to him as "a flamboyant, bisexual Cuban" (Shannon 2015 [1988]: 114), attaching to his description three stigmatizing attributes, namely "Cuban, trafficker and bisexual" (Astorga, 1995: 84).

Tapatia society. In the next section, I will explore how the *Narco* inhabited Guadalajara after its arrival. Doing so, rather than focusing on the city streets, the observation focuses on the dominant narrative about who a *narco* was and how they were imagined by individuals. In addition to going into more depth on emblematic *narcos*, several aspects related to the *Narco* operation are also explored to complete the analytical review.

2.2 The *narcos* inhabit Guadalajara: building the "startling familiarity"

José, an *Uber* driver in his sixties was polite to start a conversation as soon as I said "good afternoon". He asked me where I was from since my accent did not sound *Tapatio.* Once he found out that I was not born in Guadalajara nor did I live there, he immediately became a tourist guide, giving me advice about food and good *tequila.* When we passed in front of a luxury housing complex he said: "this is one of the most exclusive *cotos*[293] of the city, only the richest live here… the richest and the *narcos*", he laughed. Beyond the fact that José made a clear distinction between rich people and *narcos*, his unintentional joke gave me the opportunity to start talking about the subject. "Are there a lot of *narcos* living here?" I asked, not specifying if, by "here", I meant the complex or the city. "Yes! *un montón*[294], and you see them everywhere" he answered, "[they have been here] for a while. I remember since Caro [Quintero] and 'Don Neto' [period], a long time ago".

Now, the door was open, so I asked: "Do you remember Caro and…?", then he started his fluent account: "Yes, of course, I never met him, but his people… in those years, I had a used car dealership, I was doing fine. But always… every time I received a Grand Marquis, Caro's people showed up immediately to buy it. They arrived with the *fajos*[295], chaz! (he made the sound of money tapping the table) 'Here you have it'. Every time. Rumor had it that Caro liked them a lot! *Grand Narquis*, we used to call them[296]". Trying to see me through the rear-view mirror he continued: "it was said he gave one [a Grand Marquis] to a Governor's *pariente*[297], as a gift, I don't know. Once I asked his people who were paying for [the cars]

[293] *Coto* is the name *Tapatios* use to call housing complexes, not necessarily luxurious but always well-delimited and commonly closed with gates and watched by private security agents (Camus, 2015). A discussion on the *cotos* as spaces shared between businessmen and *narcos* will be provided in Chapter 5.
[294] A large number.
[295] Bricks of cash.
[296] The play on words mixing the car model *Grand Marquis* and *Narco* is also evoked by González (1996: 14).
[297] Relative.

or…[who was] the boss, and they just said 'the boss, that's it', as if they didn't want to say more, I didn't ask more, but yes… they used to come a lot [to the car dealership]"[298].

Whether the story is true or not, since it could be his own version of a *narco* urban legend[299], José's account speaks to several features that are commonly associated with Caro Quintero's image. Furthermore, his contribution to the *narco* archetype included his inclination for the Grand Marquis (which became the *narco* car), the image of his power embodied by "his people", stacks of cash, the title of "the boss" which did not allow to dig deeper into his identity. Moreover, the willingness of ordinary people, such as José to frequently sell him cars, considered him a curious feature of the landscape. José never mentioned fear or an associated risk of being Caro Quintero's Grand Marquis supplier. For him, it seems, this was an anecdote worthy of sharing with an unknown passenger on a typical short trip.

Although Jose claimed to have never met Caro Quintero, the previously mentioned characteristics were sufficient for Jose to assume it was him buying the cars. Quintero was not the only *narco* who liked Grand Marquis nor was he the only *Tapatio* that could pay for a car with cash, thus, José's assumption shed light on the weight of Caro Quintero's figure. If someone sends his people to buy a Grand Marquis with cash, it must be no other than Caro Quintero. His account, indeed, is consistent with a *Proceso* journalist, Juan José Doñán's:

> *"It was known that… Caro Quintero,* ***he used to give to his father in law*** *and to… who knows how many… of his friends… [he gave them] cars that became a sort of brand… almost his personal brand… the Grand Marquis or the* ***Grand Narquis*** *as it was called"*
>
> Juan José Doñán, Journalist
> Zapopan, Jal., October 3rd, 2015.
> *(Q2-1)*

[298] Fieldwork Carnet notes. (September 22nd, 2015).

[299] "Urban legend" is used here to mean a persistent short tale spread by word-of-mouth (or by similar means). They are commonly non-verifiable rumours or news (Donovan, 2004; Noymer, 2001). Regarding the Mexican *Narco,* two common stories could be considered "urban legends": *i)* The one narrated by someone in a restaurant that suddenly sees entering a group of heavily-armed men who start collecting everyone's mobile phones and prepare the arrival of a drug lord to the place. The *capo* peacefully eats there and once he left, his guards return the mobile phones and pay everyone's check, as a compensation for any inconvenience caused; *ii)* The one of a driver that stops in front of a red light, when it turns green, the lead car –normally, a pickup truck- does not move forward, staying there for some seconds. The teller, unusually patient, does not honk the horn nor put pressure on the neighbouring driver. Suddenly, the latter gets out of the car, visibly armed, approaches the narrator and says "I made a bet with my pal, if you would have honked the horn, I would have shot you, but since you didn't, I lost the bet and I'll give you 100 dollars". Whether being partly true or complete fantasy, these "urban legends" are possible means to inquire about certain social strains, the significance of violence, fears, distrust and, in the *narcos* specific case, some elements of how they inhabit people's imagination and accounts. A deeper analysis of "urban legends" around the *narcos* seems a remaining challenge. For a general review of sociological research about "urban legends" see Donovan, 2004.

Three elements of both accounts manifestly match: 1) the Grand Marquis as a brand clearly related to Caro Quintero; 2) the wordplay between the car model and the *narco* affiliation; 3) the rumour which says the Grand Marquis was a sort of classic gift that Caro Quintero offered his friends who belonged to high society and certain political circles, in other words, the trademark in their circle of reciprocity[300]. The convergence between the two versions (journalist and *Uber* driver) demonstrates that the image of Caro Quintero is widely present in the imagination of Guadalajara's inhabitants. Yet, we must ask who this popular *narco* is. How did his figure become the spearhead of the *narco* archetype?

According to his own account, Rafael Caro Quintero was born in 1954[301] in *Rancho La Noria*, located in *Badiraguato*, Sinaloa. He got as far as the first grade of elementary school[302]. It is assumed that he became involved in the drug trafficking business when he was around 12 or 13 years old, working for Pedro Avilés (Astorga, 1995), although it has also been stated that he began in Culiacán, Sinaloa, hand-in-hand with his aunt Manuela Caro, a "legendary trafficker of the region" (Ramírez-Pimienta, 2011: 122) She was described as "an unusual woman (…) the first *cacica*[303] of the *narco*" (Gómez O., 1991 in Morín, 2015: 40). Either way, Rafael Caro started in the business at a young age. He even showed off handling a weapon when he was 12 years old (Enciso, 2009).

Years later, the eldest of 14 children who had lost their father in a presumably drug-related fight (Ramírez-Pimienta, 2011), was considered by Elaine Shannon as "a natural entrepreneur who specialized in a different commodity. He transformed Mexican marijuana from common weed to what experts preferred to smoke (…) Caro Quintero realized cheap Mexican labour could be used to grow *sin semilla*[304] on a grand scale. By 1985, (…) the

[300] When José makes reference to "a Governor's *pariente*" as the one who received the Grand Marquis, and Doñán talks about Caro Quintero's "father in law", it must be noticed that they are both are speaking about the same person, César Octavio Cosío, brother of Jalisco former Governor Guillermo Cosío Vidaurri (1989-1992) and Sara Cosío's father, allegedly romantically related to Rafael Caro Quintero. This point will be developed later on the section.

[301] Other sources state he was born in 1952 (Caro Quintero sale libre tras 28 años. (August 10th, 2013). *Primero noticias* [T.V. Broadcast]. Mexico: Televisa). Beyond the likely not significant gap between both dates, the inaccuracy in one or both sources could be showing something about the available information concerning Caro Quintero. To my knowledge, no study had restored his birth certificate, so the information passes from one source to another, likely reproducing mistakes or uncertainties that, after being constantly repeated, tend to look like clear truth.

[302] "Caro Quintero según Caro Quintero". (April 23rd, 1988). *Proceso*, (599).

[303] Female *cacique*

[304] The US journalist refers to powerful and more expensive marijuana called *sin semilla* (without seeds).

precocious Rafael had created an efficient integrated industry" (Shannon, 2015 [1988]: 29). The aspirational image of a poor *serrano* that transformed a domestic business into an industry displays an element worth keeping in mind. Based on her official sources (mostly US agencies), the journalist also paints a picture of the *Narco* being not only powerful, but also a structured and vibrant industry.

The aforementioned idea is engaging considering that, as discussed in the Introduction, the mid-1980s were terrible times for businessmen and industries in Mexico, not only due to the economic crisis but also because the changing economic and productive model required businesses to adapt. Thus, it seems that the *Narco* were pioneers in transitioning from domestic to industrial production. But it is also possible that intelligence agencies overstated the capacity of the Guadalajara Cartel, justifying their own operation.

Even though Shannon (2015) [1988] grants Caro Quintero the image of "the most audacious" (p. 29) of the three Guadalajara Cartel leaders, she constantly reiterates that he is an illiterate entrepreneur. The innovative trafficker is also an insolent punk[305], "dressed like an Acapulco gigolo" (p. 55); "a Mexican version of a rhinestone cowboy" (p. 198). What such a description emphasizes is the image of an individual from a humble background unable to transform his money into good taste. For instance, he liked to wear visible gold jewellery and diamonds (Astorga, 1995). In fact, Caro Quintero himself even stated once "if I had a vice… it would be women and gold"[306]. His luxurious lifestyle was made visible by just looking at him or his properties.

Although Caro Quintero claimed that only two of the "seven or eight" houses he owned, came from drug trafficking. Yet official sources affirmed that he had accumulated 36 houses solely in Guadalajara, not taking into account other properties in Zacatecas, Sinaloa and Sonora[307]. One of them was "the size of a small college" (Shannon, 2015 [1988]: 57), exemplifying the ostentatious presence of Caro Quintero in Guadalajara as well as in other cities.

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[305] Astorga (1995) considers that the journalist uses the term punk "in a pejorative and police-oriented (*policiaco*) way" (p. 74). Even if he does not discuss enough his interpretation, the guiding line of Shannon's book (2015) made it highly feasible.

[306] Caro Quintero, R. (May 1st, 1985). *Interview conducted in a press pool with Rafael Caro Quintero at Mexico City Reclusorio Norte prison* [T.V. Broadcast]. From Televisa Film Archive.

[307] "Caro Quintero, mandón de la droga y prominente empresario de Guadalajara". (March 16th, 1985). *Proceso*, (437).

Nowadays, it is relatively easy to find references referring to *narcos* as illiterate or poorly educated, of peasant origin, finally unable to transform their ill-gotten gains into cultural capital (Morín, 2015). They are also conceived as cynical, sneaky and corrupt (Grayson, 2010). In terms of the archetype, Caro Quintero also seems to be a pioneer. The *narco* image in general and his in particular were constructed mostly by law enforcement agency descriptions.

In the early 1970s when Caro Quintero allegedly arrived in Guadalajara, his drug trafficking career was already consolidated. However, the "cowboy gunslinger" (Grillo, 2011: 67) did not appear in press reports until 1984, after the Mexican Army and the Federal Judicial Police discovered a large marijuana processing complex located in Chihuahua by the name *Rancho El Búfalo* (Astorga, 2004a[2002]). When the authorities reported the achievements of the *Operación Chihuahua* on *El Búfalo*, Caro Quintero's name started being mentioned in the press (Ramírez-Pimienta, 2011). For instance, the commander in charge of the operation claimed that *El Búfalo*, where eleven thousand tons of marijuana was destroyed, was related to "a nationwide organized mafia", adding that the head of the group was "the *Sinaloense* Rafael Caro Quintero, whom they had been trying to find for years"[308]. The commander's statement points to how the term *Sinaloense* had already been a meaningful one when referring to the *Narco.* But, aside Caro Quintero's image, the commander's words also revealed how, back then, the *Narco* was defined by law enforcement agencies before reaching the public's eye. First of all, they conceived groups related to marijuana processing as being a "mafia", although the commander did not explain the reasons underpinning such a conclusion. Second, drug trafficking was seen as a nation-wide problem, not constraint to the Golden Triangle any longer.

Despite the importance of the *Chihuahua Operation*, Caro Quintero's figure became tabloid news some months later, when the *El Búfalo* incident became the well-known "Camarena Affair" (Text Box 2.1). The poorly educated, daring cowboy became the *narco de narcos* after he was accused of being one of the perpetrators who kidnapped and murdered Enrique "Kiki" Camarena, DEA special agent settled in Mexico at that time.

[308] "Escepticimo en Chihuahua; cayó infantería, ningún jefe". (November 17th, 1984). *Proceso,* (420).

The Camarena affair drove Caro Quintero and the so-called Guadalajara Cartel to the headlines. It was then when the information about the *narcos*, the local and national officers and the US role in anti-drug policy occupied a privileged space in the Mexican press.

Text Box 2.1 Camarena affair: the beginning of the end?

On February 12th, 1985, the US Ambassador in Mexico, John Gavin and DEA's head Francis Muller offered a press conference to make public the kidnapping of the DEA agent Enrique "Kiki" Camarena. He was one of about thirty US agents deployed in Mexico in the fight against drugs. According to US officials, Operación Chihuahua was made possible due to information collected by DEA agents and transmitted to Mexican authorities.

Enrique Camarena had received word about *El Búfalo* from the Mexican pilot Alfredo Zavala, who was connected to the Agriculture and Hydraulic Resources Secretariat (SARH). Zavala's many flights over the region made him aware of the existence of the marijuana complex, however, his contacts within the Mexican Government advised him to stop reporting such findings, or to do it in the right way, via DEA agents located in Mexico.

Mexican authorities were able to destroy the marijuana crops in *El Búfalo* due to DEA agent collaboration and, more precisely, due to the information collected by Camarena.

Since the destruction of *El Búfalo* represented a significant lost for the *Guadalajara Cártel*, according to official sources, Caro Quintero ordered the kidnapping of both, Camarena and Zavala, in revenge. They were retained and tortured in a house in Guadalajara and assassinated days later.

The weeks after Gavin and Muller's press conference, an exchange of official statements from both Mexican and US governments, revealed a deep tension between the agencies responsible for the anti-drug policy. For DEA agents, the Camarena case proved the lawless nature of Mexican authorities (especially the DFS and the Judicial Police) and *narcotraficantes.* Meanwhile, Mexican government efforts were focused on making the "bad apple" allegation credible by repeating that the corrupt police officers and DFS agents had jointly fomented an increase in drug trafficking operations, and in addition, the Camarena and Zavala kidnapping. The bet seemed to direct attention towards a weakness within the police body rather than corruption in the political realm.

Despite the fact that Caro Quintero was assisted by some Mexican officers in order to leave the country once his persecution began, he was captured in Costa Rica in April 1985 due to his alleged involvement with the kidnapping and murder of Camarena and Zavala.

In March, 1986, under the same charges, Ernesto Fonseca Carrillo "Don Neto" was captured and four years later, in 1989, Félix Gallardo would meet the same fate.

Their detention brought to the public eye not only the collusive pattern with which the *Sinaloenses* and state agents had been operating for years, but also criticism regarding US agents operating widely in Mexican territory.

The Camarena affair has been deeply analysed through diverse approaches with a particular emphasis placed on its political consequences on bilateral US-Mexico relations. However, the common thread asks whether it should be considered to have triggered the *Guadalajara Cartel* debacle. If anything, it clearly enabled the emergence of *narcos* within the public debate and daily discussion. Actually, it has been considered the starting point of Caro Quintero's mythology.

Sources: Enciso, 2015; Valdés Castellanos, 2013; Grillo, 2011; Ramírez-Pimienta, 2011; Astorga, 2004a [2002], 1995; "Alfredo Zavala, informador espontáneo, dice su hermano". (March 16th, 1985). *Proceso*, (437); "El Caso Camarena destapó el gran problema: la cantidad de policías al servicio del narcotráfico". (April 13th, 1985). *Proceso*, (441).

Once Caro Quintero was captured, the *narco* became a public figure. The first to enable the attention of the newspapers were, perhaps involuntarily, law enforcement agencies. Although before his detention, local authorities avoided talking about Caro Quintero and his profile[309], this changed remarkably after the *narco* got arrested and was interviewed by a pool of journalists[310].

After local and federal agents were related to both the Guadalajara Cartel operation and the protection of three alleged drug leaders, the reputation of Mexican law enforcement agencies was severely tainted. Thus, placing the imprisoned Caro Quintero in the spotlight could lead journalists to overlook the other fugitives, "Don Neto" and Félix Gallardo. The outcome of the strategy was the emergence of a popular character (Enciso, 2015)[311]. Once in prison Rafael Caro Quintero became so well-known, the audience was prone to develop a bit of empathy towards a poor peasant who became a wisecracking billionaire.

In the above-mentioned interview with a press pool[312], conducted one month after his detention, he showed himself to be a witty fellow that was able to answer journalists' questions with humour, without any degree of solemnity. During the conversation, he led journalists to reformulate their questions many times to make them simpler to understand, playing the card of the almost illiterate peasant. He repeatedly answered with an evasive "I don't know" every time the questions were clear enough but directly related with his illegal activities, sneaking jokes or smiles. Perhaps, the moment that best illustrates this easy-going aspect of Caro Quintero's personality was when a journalist asked him why he wanted to go to Costa Rica, where he got arrested. With a clear smile he answered: "I was told that it was a very tranquil country… but, from what I was able to see… it isn't!" He was then surrounded by the laughter of the journalists that understood the sarcasm in his words and his smile. At the end of the interview, the group of journalists acknowledged him for the interview "thank

[309] Before Caro Quintero was in jail, the reporters explicitly asked to the Jalisco State General Attorney about Caro Quintero, he answered "Excuse me, who is he?" ["Caro Quintero, mandón de la droga y prominente empresario de Guadalajara. (March 16th, 1985). *Proceso,* (437)].
[310] *Interview conducted in a press pool with Rafael Caro Quintero at Mexico City Reclusorio Norte prison,* (May 1st, 1985). [T.V. Broadcast]. Mexico: Televisa Film Archive.
[311] It is possible to argue that, if Caro Quintero became a sort of TV star, it was despite prison authorities and not due to them. For instance, the original video (without editing) of the interview conducted with the alleged drug leader in prison suggests that the ensemble of reporters would have been invited by Caro Quintero's defense attorney, as a manner to put pressure over the *Reclusorio* authorities to achieve a better treatment to his defendant (*Interview conducted in a press pool with Rafael Caro Quintero at Mexico City Reclusorio Norte prison.* (May 1st, 1985). [T.V. Broadcast]. Mexico: Televisa Film Archive).
[312] *Idem*

you Rafael, really thank you very much" one of them remarked. Then, they asked Caro Quintero to take some photos together as a souvenir, as you would when meeting a celebrity.

Actually, a myth also exists in which Caro Quintero offers to pay the country's entire foreign debt if the government allows him to develop his drug trafficking business. However, this myth takes origin in a parody in which the comedian José Natera impersonated Caro Quintero[313]. The sketch was full of strong criticism against the PRI-ruled government and the TV chain monopoly *Televisa* containing multiple jokes and satiric statements surrounding the economic crisis and the subsequent effects. The main difficulties citizens were facing were sarcastically presented in the voice of an audacious character, someone who also mocked the years he made money with the complicity of a government officer, until their "non-aggression pacts" ended due to US government pressure. Homemade records of the parody were passed from hand to hand among the public (Enciso, 2015). Within a society facing a deep economic crisis, Natera's humour became part of Caro Quintero's legend: "it is not important if he [Caro Quintero] said so or not, [that he would pay the debt], what matters is that a significant part of the population thought it was possible and, even further, desirable" (Ramírez-Pimienta, 2011: 121). During Natera's sketch, an old resentment towards the *gringos*[314] was also exploited. The figure of Caro Quintero, instead of being disowned, seemed to be perceived as desirable by part of the population, since he did what Mexicans were not able to do: he harmed the *gringos*.

This last interpretation has been thoroughly developed by Ramírez Pimienta (2011), in a detailed study based on a corpus of ballads known as *corridos*[315]. Throughout his analysis, the author argues that Caro Quintero marked the difference between "*corridos del narcotráfico"* (from the late 1970s) and *narcocorridos* (from the 1980s). The former looks down on the drug trafficker, while the latter does almost the contrary. Ramírez-Pimienta not only calls into question the common belief that *corridos "*often extol the virtues of drug lords" (Grayson, 2010: 308), but also proposes that *narcos* were not always applauded in

[313] [7xJxBx7]. (21st May, 2010). *Entrevista a Caro Quintero Parte 1 de 2* [Video Archive]. Available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DdmkZcnm-l8; [7xJxBx7]. (May21st, 2010). Entrevista a Caro *Quintero Parte 2 de 2* [Video Archive]. Available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X97C20Vc_Kc. During the sketch, the Caro Quintero impersonator said: "I sell my marijuana to the *gringos*, the *gringos* pay me with dollars, dollars that generate foreign exchange and with those currencies we could pay the foreign debt (…)".

[314] "Colloquial term that refers someone or something who came from the United States" (DEM*,* 2018).

[315] "*Cantadas y contadas* (sung and told) versions of the violence and unease that dominates the country" (Ramírez- Pimienta, 2011: 21)

corridos. This change came when one of them defied the *Gringos*: "challenging the United States, Caro Quintero refuted the abuses and injustices that many Mexicans had suffered at the hands of US authorities" (Ramírez-Pimienta, 2011: 142). Accordingly, in the context of a *corrido,* drug lords were seen as national heroes while Camarena and the DEA agents, far from being victims, were seen as intruders.

It might be pertinent to discuss if Caro Quintero actually represented a (willing) challenge for the United States or not. Either way, we shall refer the DEA in particular, rather than US agencies in general. Meanwhile DEA agents were placing pressure on Mexican officers to undermine *narcotraficante* power, the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was supporting *Narco* operations in Mexico as a way of providing the fire arms to the *Contras* located in Nicaragua[316] (Boullosa and Wallace, 2015). Regardless, the *narcocorrido* as an expression of a prevalent sentiment showed that the overexposure of Caro Quintero's figure encountered a public which was able to see his bright side.

Caro Quintero as a mythical figure vividly embodied the still employed image of the "good *narco*" whose criminal activity went hand in hand with sharing gains with family friends, and the community (Ramírez-Pimienta, 2011), in other words, a kind of *narco* Robin Hood. Despite being cruel, the good *narco* provides some benefits to his community, such as the construction of sidewalks, paved roads and church repairs. It is said that by giving money to the poor, they receive in return protection from law enforcement action (Grayson, 2010). This idea of popularizing Hobsbawm's social bandits (Mendoza, 2018)[317] is appealing to the

[316] After the *Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional* (FSLN) defeated the dictatorship of Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua, the *Contras* opposed the new Sandinista regime settling a new civil war. The *Contras* was a composite body (formed by *Sandinismo*'s opponents, old Somoza's supporters and the indigenous organization Costa Caribe) (Bataillon, 2014; Pardo-Maurer, 1990). The *Contras*' scope could not be understood without US intervention as a key supporter and funder of the right-oriented armed rebels. For a discussion on the *Contras* from the US intervention approach and the political scandal that resulted in that country see Thompson, 2011. Although the presumed link between the Contras and Caro Quintero also arrived to the press and the *corridos* (Ramírez-Pimienta, 2011), it has not been deeply studied yet.

[317] The social bandits (Hobsbawm, 2008 [1969]: 16) are "peasant outlaws whom the lord and state regard as criminals, but who remain within peasant society, and are considered by their people as heroes, as champions, avengers, fighters for justice, perhaps even leaders of liberation, and in any case as men to be admired, helped and supported". Social bandits are distinguished from criminals due to their peasant status and context and they would have a moral code, which discourages excessive use of violence. According to the historian "the crucial fact about the bandit's social situation is its ambiguity" (p.76) since, remaining close to his origin, he is also close to the poor and, consequently, opposed to the hierarchy of power, however, the bandit "acquires wealth and exerts power" and, doing so, is not only different from other peasants, but also associated with the power-structure. For an analysis of Mexican *narcotraficantes* as social bandits see Edberg (2001). The notion of social bandits associated with drug lords is not exclusive to Mexican studies. Certainly, different studies had explored such dimension regarding the famous Colombian drug lord, Pablo Escobar. For a deep analysis on the creation of his figure as a social bandit, but also as a villain see Bowley (2013).

extent to which it is reproduced by the public and repeatedly related. In this case, Caro Quintero's image has been only superficially analysed.

The following extract of the interview granted by Caro Quintero to a group of journalists is, in this regard, meaningful. When the reporter of one of the most important national TV newscasts, *24 horas,* asked Rafael Caro Quintero his opinion about Mexican peasants, he answered:

> *"[They are] only noble people, as well as I am… and my* compañeros[318] *and… Mr. Ernesto [Fonseca Carrillo] and all his people, we are only people that* ***help Mexico****… and… I mean… we build schools, we set up [medical] clinics, we bring electricity to the ranchos, potable water…* ***what the government doesn't do, we do it****… but… I mean, we don't do that with the aim of getting something… you get me? Or to be considered…it is only to feel good about ourselves, you get me? (…)".*
>
> Rafael Caro Quintero
> Interview conducted by a press pool
> in Mexico City *Reclusorio Norte* prison,
> (May 1st, 1985), Television Newscast *24 horas*,
> *Televisa* Film Archive.
> *(Q2-2)*

Later in the conversation, he added that he had brought electric power to different "villages in Sinaloa, Chihuahua, Sonora… and Jalisco"[319] because he liked to help poor people since he suffered a lot when he was a child "I do a lot of charity that must be done… just to feel … good about myself".

The "good *narco*" narrative, from what can be grasped in Caro Quintero's words, is bolstered by three pillars. First, the *narco* highlights his peasant origin not only since he considered he belonged to this group of "noble people", but also to explain that his longstanding suffering had motivated such charitable action. In that regard, as in Hobsbawn's social bandit figure (2008) [1969], the "good *narco*" differs from other criminals and even from other *narcos*, due to a peasant origin.

Second, he lists a set of basic services that are related to supporting the progress of marginalized communities including schools, medical clinics, electricity and drinkable water. Although this could be understood to be akin to charity or even social consciousness, does it explain satisfactorily that such lawless profiles could also be community benefactors? Few clues have been discovered when it comes to Mexican *narcos*. Luis Astorga (2007), for

[318] Partners
[319] Caro Quintero, R. (May 1st, 1985). *Interview conducted in a press pool with Rafael Caro Quintero in a Mexico City Reclusorio Norte prison* [T.V. Broadcast]. From Televisa Film Archive.

instance, considers that more than bringing benefits to their community, they are investing in infrastructure to support their illegal business. He also suggests that, since they come from little towns or *ranchos* where most of the inhabitants are (blood) related, while improving the community they are upgrading their families' way of life[320]. That becomes more meaningful considering that, according to his own words, Caro Quintero's social projects were carried out in the states were his business allegedly operated or his family lived.

Finally, Caro Quintero argues that *narcos* primarily perform governmental duties, filling a void left by state authorities. Although Mexican *narcotraficantes* are normally conceived only as criminals lacking political aspiration, this does not mean they do not have a political dimension (Sullivan, 2012). Bearing in mind they might not be after a specific and explicit social or political agenda, the literature assumes that, aiming to gain territorial control, *narcos* tend to displace the state. The provision of goods and public services reinforce this process (Sullivan, 2012; Sullivan and Rosales, 2011; Sullivan and Elkus, 2010). The *Narco* approach of replacing the state has been set in motion especially due to the increase in violence since mid-2000, building on the idea that drug trafficking organizations challenge the state monopoly of violence and, in consequence, are able to exert quasi-governmental functions (Guerrero, 2009). The argument has been stretched to the point of employing the "failed state" notion to analyse cartel operations (Grayson, 2010) which clearly incurs in the over-simplification of both the Mexican state and the failed state theory (Morton, 2012).

In this specific case, it must be noted that although Caro Quintero seemed critical towards the government which might seem he reflects how bandits express social views or even evolve into political figures, he avoided to express any political opinion, even when reporters asked him about the economic crisis, the PRI-ruled government, US-Mexico relationships, the *Gringos*, and even the Revolutionary Movements in Nicaragua or El Salvador occurring then. His resolve to be perceived as non-political could have multiple interpretations and merits further research.

Caro Quintero's appearance as a "good *narco*" stands in contradiction with the significant number of peasants found working in deplorable conditions when the *Rancho El Búfalo* was raided[321]. It is of interest, however, that such a finding did not stain his image.

[320] Interview conducted with Luis Astorga in Mexico City on March 10th, 2014, as part of my masters' degree research fieldwork. (Martínez Trujillo, 2014)
[321] "Escepticismo en Chihuahua; cayó infantería, ningún jefe". (November 17th, 1984). *Proceso,* (420).

His detention called attention to the fact that law enforcement agents, from the local and federal levels, were on his payroll. At least according to Quintero's version, officers from the Federal and State Judicial Police, DFS agents and military authorities had been bribed by the *Sinaloenses* to guarantee protection for his business and properties[322]. Although the collaboration between drug lords and state officers is a relevant dimension to discuss, when it comes to Caro Quintero, there is another link between *narcos* and the so-called "upper-world" which is worthy to explore. The story filling newspaper headlines describes how the day Interpol captured him, he was accompanied by a woman. The importance did not lie in Caro Quintero's personal life, namely his mistress, but because the "woman" in question was seventeen-year old Sara Cosío, member of a well-known *Tapatía* family.

Sara's father, César Octavio Cosío Vidaurri had been Jalisco Minister of Education while her uncle, Guillermo Cosío Vidaurri had held different positions at the local and national levels, as well as within the PRI. When the relationship of Caro Quintero and Sara Cosío went public, Guillermo Cosío was the General Secretary of the Mexico City Government (1982-1988). Soon after, he became the Governor of Jalisco (1989-1992). It seemed that the illiterate entrepreneur not only achieved becoming billionaire, but also attained proximity to the conservative and tight knit *Tapatio* high society. Thus, when José, the Uber driver talked about "the Governors *pariente*" receiving the Grand Marquis, he was making reference precisely to that bond.

The romance between Caro Quintero and Sara Cosío was read by the public as a sort of "social revenge" (Ramírez-Pimienta, 2011:141), since the cowboy was humiliating the rich family. Yet, rumor has it the *narco* achieved a dominant position regarding Cosío's family insomuch that Sara's father used to be Caro Quintero's *chalán*[323]*,* always willing to serve the drug lord[324].

Another way to analyse this is to consider the link as a way for the drug trafficker to climb the social ladder. As stated, the financial gains were not necessarily a means for social mobility and marring a member of high society was probably more effective.

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[322] Preliminary Investigation 2428-85 from April 9th, 1985 quoted in "El Caso Camarena destapó el gran problema: la cantidad de policías al servicio del narcotráfico". (April 13th, 1985). *Proceso*, (441).
[323] In in Mexico, *Chalán* means bricks layer or painting helper (DRAE, 2018). The term is not necessarily derogatory, at least not as clearly as other terms such as "achichincle" (DME, 2017). However, it stands clearly the existence of a hierarchy between one figure (the boss) and the other (the helper).
[324] Interview conducted with J.J. Doñán, Journalist. October 3rd, 2015. Zapopan, Jal.

Sara Cosío was only the tip of the iceberg since an even more significant element of the *Narco* had been in Guadalajara discretely blending into to daily life and taking social roots:

> *"(…) with Caro's detention**, other names emerged, the Zuno!** (…). That showed **how rooted they [the* narcos*] had been** here, and for a long time, also doing business with the* jaliscience *business community (…). I mean, it was until the Camarena Affair was uncovered that something that was happening here for a while… something that… let's say**… did not cause police problems**… since then, we spoke about the Guadalajara Cartel".*
>
> Juan José Doñán, Journalist
> Zapopan, October 3rd, 2015.
> *(Q2-3)*

As Doñán notes, the Cosío family was not the only *Tapatía* family in the middle of the scandal[325]. The investigation of the Camarena Affair concluded that Rubén Zuno was the owner of the house where Camarena and Zavala were retained and tortured. On the one hand, this member of the prominent Zuno family[326] explained that he rented the house without the knowledge of who the owner was[327]. On the other hand, Martín Curiel, Sara Cosío's official boyfriend and member of another well-known family, was mentioned as Caro Quintero's lieutenant[328]. Venturing beyond the names or how prominent a "prominent family" in Guadalajara is, this part of the story emphasizes, as Juan José Doñán underlines, that the *Narco* was strongly embedded in *Tapatio* society. If the *narcos* had arrived to Guadalajara in the past, the Camarena case made it evident that in the mid-1980s they had been inhabiting the city.

According to the analysis up until now, to what extent has the Caro Quintero archetype resonated among *Tapatios* in general and businessmen in particular? Is this narrative still present nowadays? José, the Uber driver, suggests that Caro Quintero, who spent more than 28 years in prison, is still a character who is present in the *Tapatio* version of the story. However, the opinion of Lorenzo Mendoza, a businessman on his thirties, is even blunter:

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[325] After the Chihuahua Operation and the emergence of the name Caro Quintero, the Cosío family disseminated the version according to which Caro Quintero kidnapped Sara ["Caro Quintero, mandón de la droga y prominente empresario de Guadalajara", (March, 16th, 1985) *Proceso,* (437)]. Doing that, they anticipated that, when the *narco* was captured, Sara was seen as his partner rather than a victim. The story does not seem to be embraced by the public. According to Ramírez-Pimienta (2011), Sara was seen as a "traitor", probably since Interpol found the couple tracking a phone call that the young lady made to her family. The alleged kidnapping remained an unbelievable version (Interview conducted with J. J. Doñán, Journalist, October 3rd, 2015, Zapopan, Jal.).

[326] For the importance of the Zuno family in the local landscape, see footnote 134 in Chapter 1.

[327] Interview conducted with J.J. Doñán, Journalist. (October 3rd, 2015). Zapopan, Jal.

[328] "Caro Quintero, mandón de la droga y prominente empresario de Guadalajara. (March 16th, 1985). *Proceso,* (437).

*Look, for instance, Rafael Caro Quintero. Rafael Caro Quintero, him… **people used to love him very much**. Here, in Guadalajara, in general… well, of course, the rich people didn't love him, because he was a* cabrón[329] *that made much more money that they did… in one year, right? In five years. He got arrested when he was 30 years old, I think… or less, I mean, he wasn't someone who made a trajectory towards richness, **he made money, and more money than anyone else**. Like this… and those of* abolengo[330]*, more [money] than them… He was the first one that said to the government **'I'll pay the foreign debt'**. Thousands and thousands of billions of pesos in cash, right?... that's… unique… that's calls our attention. But I mean, mostly… the guy was probably a hit man, and a drug addict, whatever he was… an alcoholic, I don't know, a womanizer, we could see thousands of his flaws, but what I'm saying is that… in his production line, where they cultivated [marihuana], **he paid the growers very well**, to those who had… he arrived and said 'I'll pay you that, grow that for me', and people were excited, he **activated the economy** for the poor people in a village, right? And the whole village worked there [with him]… here… [in Guadalajara] he arrived with a lot of money to open auto dealerships, because he opened a lot of dealerships, and hotels**, he did a lot of… business… legally**, right? Back then money laundering did not exist, thus he brought the [car] brand he wanted, the franchise he wanted… well, through frontmen, maybe, or anyway, what for? To be always behind the power, right? His way [of being] is the way [of being] of many, many, many* narcotraficantes*, they are not in bad terms with the people, only a few are in bad terms with the people.*

Lorenzo Mendoza, Service Sector
Zapopan, September 13th, 2015
(Q2-4)

As can be clearly observed, almost every element discussed regarding Caro Quintero as the *narco* archetype is present in Mendoza's account. Yet, when Lorenzo was born, Caro Quintero was already in prison and the young businessman must have been a child (perhaps even a baby) when the *narco de narcos* was front and centre in the newspapers pages and on TV news broadcasts. Thus, it seems that Caro Quintero's image was handed down over time and is still relevant in the narrative of younger *Tapatio* businessmen.

Certainly, Lorenzo Mendoza's words also makes the *Tapatio* business sector central respecting two aspects. On the one hand, he states that Caro Quintero established several businesses in the city, contributing to the local economy. On the other, he warns that the beloved image of Caro Quintero is not the appreciation among the richest. It has been documented that the *narcos* as alleged social bandits are perceived differently in rural and urban areas (Edberg, 2001). In addition, what Lorenzo Mendoza suggests is that the lack of approval of Caro Quintero's wealth within the more affluent *Tapatio* community does not

[329] Bastard
[330] Lineage

owe more to jealousy than to a moral code. In any respect, both elements will be discussed later on the Chapter 5.

Albeit situating Caro Quintero as one of the most transcendent characters in order to understand the *narco* figure, there are two others that must not be neglected, namely, Ernesto Fonseca Carrillo "Don Neto", and Félix Gallardo.

Ernesto Fonseca "Don Neto" was born in Badiraguato, Sinaloa in 1931, and was the eldest of the cartel leaders. Assorted compilations about the Mexican *Narco* granted less attention to his figure, probably because his name lies in the shadow of Rafael Caro Quintero's. Thus, Fonseca is commonly reduced to Caro Quintero's "primitive fellow" (Shannon, 2015 [1988]: 486). The journalist Elaine Shannon (2015) [1988] describes him as "the old *bandido*" (p. 28), the one who "looked like a country *bandido*" (p. 198). In her description, she emphasizes his messy personal life as "he had gone through several wives, numerous mistresses and had fathered many children" (p. 198). Even though the previous remarks contribute to building an image of this character, it could be the average description of a rural man. The depiction would not be complete unless it is explained how, being so poorly educated and unsophisticated, he became one of the *Guadalajara Cartel* leaders.

"Don Neto"'s career in drug trafficking started long before he appeared in the newspapers. There are references which related he had been part of the business since 1955 (Enciso, 2009; Astorga, 1995). In 1963, a press release had formerly reported his detention, although in an undetailed fashion (Astorga, 2004b [2015]), suggesting he had been in and out of jail more than once. He was to become Pedro Avilés' treasurer (Astorga, 1995), although it is not completely clear what the description of the position might be. In other words, we can imagine he managed Avilés' illegal rents, kept the books or was an early version of what the current *Narco* jargon refers to as a financial operator. If anything, this notion points out some traits which hint at structure and order within the operation. The challenge is that, knowing so little, there exist a significant risk of over-interpreting such features, especially considering the tendency of using *Narco* and "organized crime" as synonyms, as is stated before in this chapter[331].

[331] The sketch of the *narco* as an archetypical character also includes their *apodos* or nicknames as "a factor that constitutes identity and provides meaning" (Morín, 2015: 51). In that regard, "Don Neto" offers an interesting discussion opportunity. When Elaine Shannon (2015)[1988] refers Ernesto Fonseca, she suggests that the nickname "Don Neto" shall be translated into English as "Sir Goodprice" (p. 198). To my knowledge,

According to the chronicles, after his last detention, "Don Neto" was a rallying point between the *Guadalajara Cartel* and its successors. He was the uncle of Amado Carrillo Fuentes "*El Señor de los Cielos*" (The lord of the Skies)[332], leader of the *Juárez Cartel*, which was one of the drug trafficking organizations that, allegedly, replaced the *Guadalajara Cartel* after the downfall of its leaders (Valdés Castellanos, 2013).

In fact, taking a closer look at "Don Neto", it is possible to raise questions that the literature has omitted. For instance, knowing that he was *compadre* of Caro Quintero[333] and Juan José Esparragoza Moreno "El Azul"[334], probably among other *narcos*, his biography is useful to inquire regarding the weight of kinship and *compadrazgo*[335] in the performance of an organization. This kind of tie would also be useful to observe, for instance, if *compadrazgo* has been utilized by drug traffickers to achieve social mobility or a system of reciprocity among them and other actors, such as officials, politicians, community members and, certainly, businessmen[336]. Put differently, rather than anecdotal facts, the social relationships of these figures could provide valuable information about the way the business is run.

Regarding the association between *Guadalajara Cartel* members and public officials, Fonseca Carrillo's case is also appealing to explore. His detention in Puerto Vallarta Jalisco,

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the term *"goodprice"* does not exist either in English dictionaries or in popular language. Thus, the combination between "price" and the adjective "good" could be interpreted in many different ways. For instance, it might be related with the illegal market Fonseca was part of, or it probably has to do with his audacity and his business skills. However, someone who knows Mexico better might know that, in fact, "Neto" is the short version of the name Ernesto. That is to say that Mexicans might use this nickname to refer to anyone with the same name, regardless of his profession. Although the nickname translation proposed by Shannon does not seem very well known among foreign scholars and journalists, it calls to ponder to what extent chronicles and interpretations are made from the researcher's preconceptions or lack of knowledge. In fact, almost every publicly- known drug trafficker has an alias and it is easy to assume that it, somehow, reveals his role in the *narco* world, as the precedent example illustrates. Wainwright (2016), for instance, considers that drug trafficking industry runners "may have a sinister glamour with their monstrous nicknames" (p. 13). Although "monstrous nicknames" would be useful to support the evil temper attributed to *narcos*, it is also possible that such narrative drives us to deliver inadequate interpretations of this feature.

[332] *El Señor de los cielos* was recognized as such due to his fleet of jets through which he transported cocaine. He was eventually considered "the most important Mexican drug trafficker", according to FBI and DEA. "Don Neto", his uncle, allegedly introduced him to the business ["Amado Carrillo, 'hombre inteligente, respetado y querido', según la DEA y el FBI, es ahora el principal narcotraficante de México". (January 20th, 1996). *Proceso*, (1003)]. Armando had two brothers, also in the drug trafficking business, Vicente and Rodolfo.

[333] Caro Quintero, R. (May 1st, 1985). *Interview conducted in a press pool with Rafael Caro Quintero at Mexico City Reclusorio Norte prison* [T.V. Broadcast]. From Televisa Film Archive.

[334] "Capturó la Judicial Federal a un buscado narcotraficante". (March, 13th, 1986). *El Informador*.

[335] Connection or affinity that the godparent settles with the parents of a child through an act of baptism or another sacrament (DRAE, 2019).

[336] Mintz and Wolf (1950) analysed co-parenthood from its functions in furthering social solidarity. They associated *compadrazgo* to the adjective "horizontal" when the mechanism links together members of the same class, while "vertical" is attached to the cases in which it ties together members of different classes.

disclosed his proximity to law enforcement officers. "Don Neto" was arrested while hiding in a house that belonged to a municipal public security department head (*Jefe de Seguridad Pública*). His security staff, some of them also arrested in the same operation, was integrated by former and active members of the Federal Judicial Police, the Jalisco State Judicial Police and DFS agents[337]. This illustrates two dynamics: first, the circulation between police officers at the federal, state and municipal levels and the *narco*'s bodyguards; secondly, regarding "Don Neto", it seems that his link with state-actors are mainly established through policing agencies, rather than politicians. That contrasts with Félix Gallardo's profile, to be discussed later in the section.

The protection through armed agents was not the only mechanism that state agencies mobilized to safeguard Fonseca Carrillo. As shown in Figure 2.2, "Don Neto" held an identity card issued by the Ministry of the Interior that entitled him as an investigator affiliated to the DIPS[338] (together with DFS, CISEN's predecessor). The badge, colloquially known as a *charola*[339], enabled Fonseca Carrillo to bear firearms (not specifying what kind) and ensured civil and military authorities, as well as citizens, provide their collaboration to let this investigator "do his job".

When the journal *El Informador* published the document, it stated that the badge might have been obtained through "bribes worth millions". Yet, the information available cannot confirm that was the case. On the other hand, if the ID had been delivered by state-officials as a reciprocal resource, this was likely established in conjunction with cartel members. The DEA Office located in Mexico claimed that Fonseca Carrillo held a *charola*, as well as Caro Quintero and Félix Gallardo; moreover, that they had been signed by no other than the head of the DIPS[340]. This took on meaning especially since the DFS had a long record of furnishing, not only *narcos,* but counterinsurgency non-state actors (such as FEG strikers), with this powerful badge, a sort of granted *laissez-passer*[341].

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[337] "Gran triunfo policiaco de Jalisco: Fonseca fue detenido en Vallarta". (April 10th, 1985). *El Informador.*
[338] Stands for Direction of Political and Social Investigations (*Dirección de Investigaciones Políticas y Sociales*).
[339] *Charola* is, literally, a platter. In Mexico, it is also a popular term used to refer a police badge, since it is metallic and shiny, like the evoked utensil (DEM, 2018). The term also has a derivative verb "*charolear*" used to refer someone who uses his *charola* (or influence and power) to gain privileges.
[340] "El excandidato era distribuidor de dinero a altos niveles". (June 1st, 1985). *Proceso*, (448).
[341] As a symbolic act that tried to prove the deep transformation the intelligence agency would face, in 1985, the first head of the National Security and Investigation Direction (DISEN) collected all DFS' agents badges (*charolas*) and transformed them into a President Benito Juárez' statue (Aguayo Quezada, 2001) and into the

Figure 2.2 Fonseca Carrillo's *charola*: the Federal Intelligence Agency entitled "Don Neto" as one of its members



Como una muestra de lo que lograban los narcotraficantes con sus millonarios sobornos a funcionarios y agentes de corporaciones policiacas federales, a Ernesto Fonseca se le encontró una credencial expedida por la Secretaría de Gobernación, a su nombre, en donde se señala que es investigador de la Dirección de Investigaciones Políticas y Sociales.

Source: "Gran triunfo policiaco de Jalisco: Fonseca fue detenido en Vallarta" (Mexico. April 10th, 1985). *El Informador*.

When the US journalist Elaine Shannon (2015) [1988] refers to Caro Quintero and "Don Neto", there are no prejudiced comments about being or dressing like a Mexican. It is even more visible if compared to her description of DEA agents who resided in Mexican territory back in those days. What is seen as determination in the "good guys", is described as violence when referring to the "bad guys". While "Kiki" Camarena is a natural leader with a cowboy façade, *narcos* are considered *bandidos*[342]. As can be seen in Shannon's account, the epitome of the *narco* also must include appearance, for instance, the clothing worn should be that of a *narco* (Astorga, 1995).

In the mid-1980s, when both Caro Quintero and "Don Neto" were arrested, their image as relaxed fellows, even easy-going, circulated widely in the press (Figure 2.3). That reinforced the figure of the *narcos* as the daring *ranchero.*

big sculpture of a flame (known as "the flame of hope") that stands nowadays in the middle of the building lobby (Informal conversation hold with a former CISEN official. January 10th, 2019).

[342] The unspoiled image of US enforcement agents is later nuanced in Shannon's work. (See, Coulson and Shannon, 1999).

However, the profile of the third *Guadalajara Cártel* leader by the name of Miguel Ángel Félix Gallardo[343] differs from the *narco* archetype.

Figure 2.3 "Don Neto" and Caro Quintero in prison: the end of an era?



Source: "La vida en la cárcel". (August 21st, 2011). *Proceso,* (1816), p. 11. The digital retouch that apparently overlaps two photos comes from the original. The image dates from 1985, when Ernesto Fonseca "Don Neto" (left) and Caro Quintero (right) were brought before the court (*juzgados*).

Born in Culiacán, Sinaloa in 1946, Félix Gallardo was initially described as "slim and quiet, masking his lower-class origin behind a slick veneer. He was, by all accounts, a merciless killer, but he could put on a tailored suit and look the part of a fast-track entrepreneur, which in fact, he was" (Shannon, 2015 [1988]: 199). Although general, the prior description outlines some features which contribute towards the *narco* archetype being built at that time: 1) his willingness to disguise his humble origin; 2) his cleverness regarding business; 3) his façade of a decent man in coexistence with his cruelty. His discreet profile challenges the strident image of his partners. However, this does not seem to be the only difference. The three main attributes that set Félix Gallardo apart might help to get a broader picture.

[343] Some sources attached the nickname *El Padrino* (The Godfather) (Shannon, 2015 [1988]), but the alias is not always evoked when the drug leader is referred. Other sources, in contrast, attributed such nickname to Ernesto Fonseca Carrillo (Ramírez-Pimienta, 2011). In addition, Ioan Grillo (2011) suggests that the famous song *"El Jefe de Jefes"* (Boss of Bosses) by *Los Tigres del Norte* could refer to Félix Gallardo, although he does not move forward on his intuition.

Firstly, among the three founders of the so-called *Guadalajara Cartel*, Félix Gallardo was the only one who had a more significant educational background since he finished secondary education and continued on to the Webster commerce school[344]. This element differentiates him from his partners who were, as described above, scarcely educated. It should be noted that, in her text, Shannon (2015) [1988] ignores this fact, as she states that none of the three cartel leaders "had more than a secondary level education" (p. 28). While other inaccuracies committed by the journalist have been pointed out elsewhere[345], this last imprecision is highlighted since it suggests something about the available information relative to the *Narco*. Shannon's portrayal, based on official US sources, dated from a time when Félix Gallardo had just started receiving greater public attention. It seems that information gaps are not signaled but filled through generalizations and biases.

After his detention, significant information was added to his profile[346], enriching his description and gaining the reputation of a smart man. Indeed, the Mexican deputy attorney Javier Coello Trejo in charge of the fight against drugs at that time stated "he is a very smart man, you can't imagine how naturally smart he is. He just went to secondary school, but during the twenty years he devoted to drug trafficking, he managed to control all the *bandas de narcos*" (Enciso, 2009: 217). When he was captured, four years after his partners "Don Neto" and Caro Quintero, Félix Gallardo had accumulated more than a dozen warrants for his arrest, two decades of free operation and visibility owing to his remarkable friendships[347]. Seen from that perspective, it sounds feasible that officials, while referring to him, highlighted the attributes which challenged an earlier capture. Doing so, the deputy attorney was triumphant regarding at least three aspects: 1) he discreetly exempted law enforcement agencies for letting the drug leader operate freely for such a long time. Félix Gallardo was as smart as he was difficult to capture which could be explained by incompetence, negligence or complicity; 2) he indirectly emphasized law enforcement agency capacity by referring to those who managed the detention of the elusive figure and stating that Félix Gallardo

[344] "Alternaba públicamente con políticos y funcionarios". (April 15th, 1989). *Proceso,* (650).
[345] Astorga (1995) warns that Shannon's bestseller presents different mistakes and misinterpretations that someone who has studied Sinaloa deeper, could easily identify. See also footnote 331 in Chapter 1.
[346] In April 1989, *Proceso* devotes five articles to Félix Gallardo. Since then, *Proceso* issue has been largely used by scholars and journalists, but that did not result in the revision of Shannon's text (which remains as a seminal reference) or in a discussion around the kind of information the newsweekly obtained.
[347] "De catorce órdenes de aprehensión contra Félix, tres, no cumplidas, se libraron en el sexenio de Álvarez del Castillo". (April 15th, 1989). *Proceso,* (650); "Alternaba públicamente con políticos y funcionarios". (April 15th, 1989). *Proceso,* (650).

controlled all the *bandas de narcotraficantes;* 3) the deputy attorney launched the idea that, after his capture, the drug trafficking realm had received a lethal blow which is consistent with the disclosure of achievements via *Operación Cóndor*, discussed earlier. In sum, when it comes to *narcos,* it seems that the available information depends highly on what information official sources want to transmit.

Secondly, while the *Serranos* "Don Neto" and Caro Quintero were born within families largely associated with marijuana and poppy cultivation (Ramírez-Pimienta, 2011), which represented a sort of inherited *savoir-faire*[348]*,* Félix Gallardo had a different background. He started out young working as an itinerant vendor, but when he turned 20, he joined the Sinaloa State Judicial Police. His adscription to a law enforcement agency is remarkable in itself but it is even more significant since it is what drove him to be part of the security staff of the Sinaloa Governor Leopoldo Sánchez Celis (1963-1968). He later became the close bodyguard for the Governor's children and, eventually, he got involved into drug trafficking[349]. The passage from bodyguard to *narco* remains as one of the poorly analysed elements of his profile. It is generally assumed that he built one of the most powerful drug trafficking organizations due to his connections with public officers (Enciso, 2009), but the details of such configuration are omitted.

On the other hand, his closeness with the Sinaloa Governor and his family became undeniable once Félix Gallardo became Sánchez Celis' *compadre*. Six years before Félix Gallardo was captured, the alleged drug lord was best man for the former Governor's son's wedding[350]. In those days, the local journal *El Sol de Sinaloa*[351] published a chronicle of the social event, including a photo of the best man (Figure 2.4). The social page shows that neither Félix Gallardo, nor his relationship with the politician, were clandestine.

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[348] Know-how.

[349] "Alternaba públicamente con políticos y funcionarios". (April 15th, 1989). *Proceso,* (650).

[350] According to a childhood friend of one of Sanchez Celis' children, Rodolfo Sánchez Duarte –the groom- was killed years later. In such account it also called my attention the fact that Sinaloa's Governors children used to live in Mexico City while his father was running the Northern state. Although the explanation could be multifactorial, it might be related with protection purposes. It remains, however, as a lead to follow in further research [Informal conversation hold with a childhood friend of Sánchez Duarte siblings. (December 26th, 2018)].

[351] Founded in 1956, El Sol de Sinaloa has an average circulation of 12,332 copies distributed mainly across 9 of the 18 municipalities of Sinaloa. Unfortunately, the newspaper circulation pattern during the mid-1980s is not available, so it is not possible to build on the size or profile of such an audience. (Padrón de Medios Impresos, 2018).

Figure 2.4 The wedding's best man: the drug lord and the former Governor became *compadres*



Source: "Elegante matrimonio López Urrutia Torres-Sánchez Duarte, en la Sagrada Familia". (May 30th, 1983). *El Sol de Sinaloa.* Photographic archive. The original image has been digitally modified in order to zoom-in on the photos the author considers pertinent to emphasize.

Thirdly, the previous anecdote also shows that Félix Gallardo entered the *Narco* through the "upper-world", first approaching the political elites as part of a local police body, and later since this relationship likely provided him more contacts within the local political elites. In fact, scholars highlight it was he who contacted *Guadalajara Cartel* members via the political arena (Valdés Castellanos, 2013; Astorga, 2004a [2002]).

Caro Quintero may have attempted to move up the social ladder through his relationship with Sara Cosío, remaining true to his *ranchero* origin; whereas, Félix Gallardo seemed to look for resemblance with politicians. In other words, the link between the *Narco* and the political elite relied on a figure that not only had former governors among his friends, but who also qualified as a respectable gentleman. In an interview conducted by *Proceso*[352]*,* Félix Gallardo's sister expressed her indignation on what was being said about his brother since

[352] "Alternaba públicamente con políticos y funcionarios". (April 15th, 1989). *Proceso,* (650).

they came from "a decent family" and, she added, "we are not *huarachudos*[353]". In the same article, the *Proceso* reporter describes Félix Gallardo's house and astonished, stressing that it was a proper and modest house, with little decoration taking particular notice of a Don Quixote figurine.

The statement of Félix Gallardo's sister, as well as the reporter's description of his environment, not only reveal the extent to which drug trafficking activities were (and still are) associated with rural and poorly educated individuals, but also the weakness of such an association. Furthermore, his profile sheds light on how thin the line is between the upper and underworld. In fact, the conception that these two worlds are clearly delimited and different from one another relies on the assumption that its members are certainly distinguishable, since they fit into a clear profile. Félix Gallardo strongly challenges such a scenario.

Although the *Guadalajara Cartel* leaders are attractive figures whose track records revealed significant details regarding the *narco* archetype, some questions remain unanswered, especially concerning the operation of the group. For instance, if the literature mentions three leaders, how did a three-headed organization work? In addition, if the Condor Operation forced all of the cartel leaders to move to Guadalajara beforehand, why did the Federal operation (and US pressure) suddenly weaken allowing the Cartel to establish a successful drug industry almost without obstacles? Briefly, how did the *Guadalajara Cartel* supposedly operate and to what extent did this performance contribute to the "startling familiarity" in the city?

A review of the narrative concerning the organization's operation was construed mostly by law enforcement agencies and was widely reproduced by the press. This shows that a series of speculations, as well as variable and unverified information have gradually taken the place of undiscussed versions which constitute what we still know about the *Guadalajara Cartel.*

The hierarchy attributed to the three main leaders of the *Guadalajara Cartel* was not always consistent. According to Astorga, (2004) DEA's initial reports considered Ernesto Fonseca to be the head of the cartel, followed by Félix Gallardo and then by Caro Quintero. Ramírez-Pimienta (2011) confirms that, according to some police sources both the national and US

[353] *Huarachudos* are the people wearing *huaraches,* the traditional sandals of Mexican indigenous or rural population. (DEM, 2018). Although the term is not always pejorative, in this context seems to be used with that intention.

viewpoint considered that to be the order within the cartel. However, after "Don Neto" and Caro Quintero were arrested (1985), the DEA attributed the leadership to Félix Gallardo (Astorga, 2004). These distinct versions suggest that if the DEA granted Caro Quintero and "Don Neto" the level of *Narco* leaders, their presence in the Mexican arena which was already controversial would become unsustainable.

On the other hand, the local press, while reporting his detention, named Ernesto Fonseca "the main drug trafficker of the country". Then, the newspaper storyline became a sort of recognition for the local police that had arrested him[354]. Remembering that the Camarena Affair led to significant criticism towards federal and local law enforcement agencies (Text Box 2.1), qualifying "Don Neto" as the most important *narco* is likely an effort to vindicate the image of local authorities which could be done through the local press.

Twenty-five years later, *Proceso* would attribute the cartel's leadership to Caro Quintero while considering "Don Neto" only a member of the organization[355]. The journalist Ioan Grillo (2011) claims that "many in Sinaloa consider Félix Gallardo to be Mexico's greatest capo[356] ever, the unchallenged king of the Mexican underworld in his era" (p. 64).

Even further, in April 1985, the DEA considered that neither Caro Quintero nor Ernesto Fonseca being nearly illiterate, were capable of leading a drug trafficking business. Admitting both figures participated in kidnapping and assassination of Camarena and Zavala, the US agency stated that they were, nevertheless, just "obeying their bosses". According to the agency, the bosses, might be found within the political sphere[357]. Therefore, the *Narco* leadership should not be searched for in the under-world but in the political realm.

The lack of consensus about the hierarchical order points out, at least, two significant issues: 1) this order, as well as the functions, attributed to drug organization members normally proceeds from the agencies in charge of pursuing them. A bias could be implied since, as the case of *Guadalajara Cartel* shows, the permanence on the field could be conditioned to attaching a title to a specific figure. Thus, such an assignment depends on a state agency's incentive to continue or to deter a certain operation. In addition, it is possible that the evoked

[354] "Gran triunfo policiaco de Jalisco: Fonseca fue detenido en Vallarta". (April 10th, 1985). *El Informador.*
[355] "Don Neto: la vida en la cárcel". (August 21st, 2011). *Proceso,* (1816).
[356] Term coming from Sicilian mafiosi groups -*famiglias*- to refer the boss, generally these coalitions holds local level domain (Blok, 2002).
[357] "Caro y Fonseca no tienen la capacidad para dirigir el narcotráfico". (April 13th, 1985). *Proceso*, (441).

tension among law enforcement agencies (even between the DEA and the CIA, for instance) could have a role in the way the drug organization is conceived. In other words, it is possible that, while describing the structure of drug cartels, what is really being revealed are the dynamics, incentives, relationships and tensions among national and international law enforcement agencies; 2) a bias towards drug organizations as being well-structured and hierarchically ordered could foster assigning the leading role to someone, despite how limited the information on drug trafficking is. The use of terms such as the leader (or the *tesorero,* the *lugarteniente* or any other position within the organization) by law enforcement agencies and the reproduction by journalists and later by scholars might reflect a more top-down structure. On the one hand, the dominant image of the *Narco* as "a monolithic enemy, hierarchically organized and owning a bureaucratic and economic rationality" is, as Astorga (2007:276) claims, a simplistic perception of the phenomena produced by the authority. On the other hand, that short-sighted view is transferred and disseminated by journalists and the media (Astorga, 2007).

Moreover, if asserting a specific hierarchical order seemed complex and even inadequate, uncertainty emerged yet again when newspapers affirmed that cartel leadership had arrived after the Condor Operation in Guadalajara. It is possible that for years, the analyses about the *Narco* in Guadalajara has not only been constrained by these three figures somehow qualified as cartel leaders, but they may also have been ignoring other important individuals that had not yet reached law enforcement agency reports and, in consequence, newspaper pages.

This order of the visible personalities of the *Narco* is not the only aspect that exposes the loopholes on the topic which remain albeit current research. The cartel's performance is also a meaningful area to explore in that regard.

Regarding their operation, DEA agents used to call the cartel "the family", to describe how they divided the work into "departments" according to the kind of drug, namely heroin was Fonseca's responsibility, cocaine was led by Félix Gallardo and marijuana was Caro Quintero's domain (Ramírez-Pimienta, 2011). This business distribution seems very harmonious, as if it was a well-oiled machine: each leader controlling his market without disturbing other businesses. However, from this perspective, the US agency neglects the potential tensions associated with, for instance, the diverse cost of each drug as well as the different actors potentially involved in each production-distribution chain. Back then, official sources related the Guadalajara Cartel with some Colombian *narcotraficantes*, especially

regarding cocaine trafficking, assuming that Fonseca was the contact point between the Colombian and the Mexican organizations. However, to my knowledge, an analysis of the possible effect that such connection might have had within the Mexican organization is still missing.

Based on several texts, Valdés Castellanos (2013) speaks about how the *Guadalajara Cartel* operated by "dividing family clans into *plazas*[358]" (p.210). According to the legend, Valdés Castellanos adds that Miguel Ángel Félix Gallardo organized such splitting as "a sort of holding, without conflicts and wars between the families and leaders". After Félix Gallardo's detention, and despite the efforts of his subordinates to sustain the pacific distribution on the market, this agreement ended giving rise to a scenario of a "family business" in conflict (p. 212).

Both versions build on the idea of a harmonious division of the market not only between the three main leaders, but with the minor leaders and their families. Said balance would expire once the *Guadalajara Cartel* lost its three-heads. In this narrative, what is less clear is how to explain that the momentum that pushed the *Narco* to Guadalajara (Condor Operation) became an impasse that allowed the *narcos* to establish an industry operating with clockwork precision. How did US pressure that once forced Mexican agencies to launch anti-drug policies suddenly disappeared from the chronicles?

Craig (1980) argues that, because of the inertia that characterized the end of President López Portillo's administration, the anti-drug policy was practically abandoned in the early-1980s, enabling the arrival of an ensemble of *narcoburócratas* (narco-bureaucrats) who colluded with traffickers. Meanwhile, he claims the US Government took the continuity of the implementation and success of Mexican anti-drug policy for granted.

The limitation of Craig's explanation is that the passivity of US drug agents while the *narcos* arrived and settled in Guadalajara stands in contradiction with the presence of DEA agents in the Mexican city. It is likely that the above-mentioned DEA-CIA rivalry and the transformation of US-Mexico relations could be better explained. Despite the fact that anti-drug agents had been operating in Guadalajara for some time, their capacity to influence (and put pressure) on Mexican authorities diminished until after the Camarena Affair.

[358] See footnote 271 in Chapter 1.

Furthermore, if the *Narco* had come across an intricate configuration of violent actors that had already been in Guadalajara for some time (Chapter 1), how can we explain that these forces allowed the *Narco* to settle in the City? Why did those violent entrepreneurs not represent an obstacle for *Narco* leaders? According to Boullosa and Wallace (2015) the *Guadalajara Cartel* was a "centralized criminal regime, regulated and supported by the *Priista* state" (p. 85) which explains the alignment of other violent actors. The main elements of that paradigm are widely present in the literature that builds the understanding of drug trafficking in Mexico on the existence of an arrangement where, side by side with the *narcos*, local and federal state actors played a main role: the so-called *Pax Priista* or *pax narcotica.* Present in mostly every study about drug trafficking in Mexico, the main elements of this paradigm are available in a quote, based on a literature review, and shown in Figure 2.5.

Figure 2.5 The *Pax Priista* paradigm or the perfect piece of machinery

> "The generic story found in many scholarly interpretations argues that during the 1980s, Mexico's authoritarian, single-party political system enabled corrupt Mexican government officials to play a mediating and regulatory role with drug-trafficking organizations and to explicitly discourage violence. Mexican authorities implicitly agreed on allowing traffickers to continue their business as long as a quota of bribes was paid and no major episodes of violence occurred. When state and local electoral victories brought politicians from opposing parties into power starting in the 1990s, previously established bargains with the drug-trafficking organizations were rejected or renegotiated by new, independent political actors who lacked the connections or ability to enforce previously established agreements of corruption. In this context of political diversity and uncertainty, the state no longer served as an effective mediator, and criminal organizations began to splinter and battle each other for turf".

Source: Ríos, 2013: 141.

The *Pax Priista* paradigm is supported by three pillars. First, it is based on the assumption that there was an agreement between criminal organizations and state agents, as part of a corporatist state ruled by a hegemonic political party (the PRI). For some authors, drug trafficking organizations were the clandestine version of the confederations of workers and peasants (Boullosa and Wallace, 2015) that, through corporatist relationships, contributed to perpetuate the rule of the PRI. Not surprisingly, *clientelismo, caciquismo*, corruption and other mainstream explanations around the construction of the post-revolutionary Mexican state have been also applied to describe (more than analyse) such arrangement (*vgr.* Duncan, 2014). In this paradigm, the hegemonic party is seen as a monolithic, disciplined and highly hierarchic system.

Despite its prevalence in the literature, the previous assumptions neglect two significant aspects: 1) the complexity of the post-revolutionary political system: cleavages and tensions among party members, negotiations, alliances and other dynamics within the local elites as well as the role of non-partisan actors (Escalante Gonzalbo, 2015; Gillingham and Smith, 2014); 2) the possible territorialisation of criminal organizations, since they did not act above a local context but within it. Thus, beyond the link between drug trafficking organizations and state agencies, the bonds between such organizations and local communities must also be more profoundly observed (LeCour Grandmaison, 2019a; Gillingham and Smith, 2014; Maldonado Aranda, 2010; Malkin, 2001).

The foundation of a necessary reformulation of the *Pax Priista* paradigm has been constructed by diverse studies that have sought to "decentre" the Mexican political regime by arguing that the PRI, is neither equally present in some local realities (Rubin, 1997) nor monolithic when existent (Knight and Pansters, 2005). In addition, in-depth accounts at the local level have contributed to a finer understanding of drug trafficking organizations, embracing their dynamic character and particularities (Mendoza, 2018; Maldonado, 2010).

The second pillar is related to the parasitic character of state-crime relationships (Lupsha, 1996). Within the *Pax Priista,* state agents allegedly provided limitless protection to drug trafficking organizations obtaining financial benefits in exchange. From that perspective, the rapport between drug trafficking and state agents was established through bribes (and threats) from drug traffickers towards law enforcement agents, in one word, following the "silver or lead" formula, applicable not only in Mexico (Duncan, 2015; Kelly, 1999).

Thus, the so-called under-world was connected to the upper-world by means of infiltration. This version, as shown earlier in the chapter, is normally supported by state agencies and reproduced by media coverage. An alternative to this explanation, ingrained in the mighty PRI-ruled regime, has been developed by Luis Astorga (2007), who asserts the subordinate actors in the Mexican case were the DTOs since the political sphere held the dominant position of the agreement. The progressive dismantling of the hegemonic party system entailed a relative autonomy of the drug trafficking field regarding political power. Although Astorga's contribution incorporates some of the nuances that former assumptions neglected, it maintains a vision in which political and drug trafficking realms are separate worlds, coalescing only through the domination-subordination pattern. The symbiosis between both worlds might be the consequence of the infiltration of criminal actors into the political field

(Lupsha, 1996), either as dominant or subordinated actors (Figure 2.6). That considers a transition from a regular situation (I) in which the border between the upper and underworld was clear and respected, to a symbiotic scenario (II) where criminals infiltrated the legal field, jeopardizing the frontier between both worlds.

Figure 2.6 Political-criminal collusive rapport based on the infiltration principle



Source: Elaborated by the author based on literature review.

The narrative still puts aside a more complex configuration where the concepts of "upper and under-world" are surpassed producing unclear boundaries within a field of complex intersections. In this case, the link between these two worlds is conceived simply as collusive and stable. However, this supposition neglects other kinds of political-criminal configurations (Briquet and Favarel-Garrigues, 2008), for instance, a less symmetrical arrangement where criminal organizations subordinate to one state agent but not to another. Furthermore, it is possible that with some agents the link is based on collusion while with others the feature is cooperation, subordination even resistance (Sciarrone, 2008). The relationship could be also change dynamically over time.

The third pillar that is held up by the *Pax Priista* paradigm is related to the administration of violence which is currently and frequently recalled (although barely challenged) in several studies due to the rising homicides rates registered in the country in the last ten years.

Following the *Pax Priista* approach, the agreement between drug trafficking organisations and a centralised regime (ruled by a hegemonic party) gained control of the levels of violence associated to such an illegal market. From this perspective, the regional caciques, enabled by

the PRI and the reproduction of authoritarian schemas at the local level, exerted control over violent actors, including drug traffickers (Duncan, 2014). Thus, state agents or local caciques mediated and regulated the drug market while also controlling violence threats. A former Governor stated that the alleged pact included rules to avoid killings on the streets or affecting communities (Guerrero, 2009).

As might be expected, this version claims that the democratic transition undermined the capacity of political elites to sustain the agreement, leading to the explosion of violence. Thus, process of democratization diversified the political elite (different parties and different trajectories), making it more difficult for criminal organizations to (re)establish a pact with them (Valdés Castellanos, 2013). It has also been stated that bureaucracies coming from opposition parties did not have the experience, capacity or interest in transforming law enforcement agencies in order to hinder cartels (Benítez Manaut, 2009; Arellano Ríos, 2004). Fragmentation, nevertheless, was not exclusive to the political realm. Criminal organizations were also splintered, due to anti-drug policies and changes in the international market led to rising levels of violence (Duncan, 2014; Valdés Castellanos, 2013; Guerrero, 2009).

Certainly, this narrative does not envision the democratic transition as a progressive process that unfolded in different rhythms across the country, but as a sudden one. This logic also neglects the role of multiple violent actors in the maintenance of a certain social order (Arias, 2006) and even, in the construction of democracy (Grajales, 2016; Arias and Goldstein, 2010; Arias, 2006). In other words, there is a poor understanding of both, the process of democratization and increasing (drug-related) violence.

Despite criticism towards the *Pax Priista* argument, the levels of violence registered in Mexico since 2007 are certainly higher or, at least, more visible. Unprecedented homicides rates, terrifying scenes of *encobijados*[359], *colgados*[360], *narcofosas*[361] or *narcomensajes*[362] flooded newspapers and TV news broadcasts during the last decade.

[359] According to Grayson's Glossary of terms (2010), it refers to an "assassinated person wrapped in a blanket" *(cobija)* (p.308).
[360] It refers to bodies hanging in public places.
[361] According to Grayson's Glossary of terms (2010), it refers to "a grave where cartels bury their victims" (p. 312). For Grillo (2016) refers to drug trafficking graves.
[362] According to Grayson's Glossary of terms (2010), it refers to "brutal acts through which cartels send messages to their foes" (p.312).

While the violent acts of the old *narcos* were considered sporadic and framed by certain codes of decency, the new generation have been perceived as indiscriminately violent and evil to no limit. Therefore, respondents recognize nostalgically a time when *narcos* did not hurt those who were not related to their business. Robert, a former New Yorker drug dealer interviewed by the journalist Ioan Grillo (2016), said: "Back in the old days, it was nothing like this (…). They were just smugglers. Now they prey on their communities. They have become too powerful. And many of the young guys working for them are crazy fucking killers who are high on crystal meth. You can't mess with these people" (p. 14). In the same line, Baltazar Rodríguez[363], journalist of the conservative daily *El Informador* argued:

> *Emmm… **since [Vicente] Fox times**… they… left… **those loose ends to be tied**…then [the* narcos*] they started… before they were considerate people… I mean, a* Narco*, for instance, the boss… not the leader, those who were here [in Jalisco], they were thoughtful people that said: 'ey, **don't bother the society**… don't go against them' **keeping their** **sicarios**[364] **under control**. But now that they [law enforcement agents] **start arresting mid-level** [*narcos*] the ones rising to the position are the* sicario*… and* sicarios *do not think the same way. Then, armed vehicle robberies started to occur … kidnappings, because what those guys wanted was just money and then they started affecting society.*
>
> Baltazar Rodríguez, Journalist
> Zapopan, Jal., October 15th, 2015.
> *(Q2-5)*

This quote is significant for three reasons. First, the description of the 'good *narcos'* and a certain melancholy for those times are clear in his account. Before, drug traffickers were 'thoughtful people' who controlled over their hit men, protecting, somehow, "society". Now, the heirs of the arrested leaders are greedy and boundless, putting society at risk. Although during the 1980s and 1990s there were significant violent episodes, the journalist seems to minimize these events, by assuming *narcos* were able to control the amount of violence.

Beyond the vagueness of the title 'society', the interlocutor tied the division between the two *narco* profiles not in terms of the violence itself, but in its external repercussion. Illicit activities coupled with professed good actions that do not directly harm society enjoys relative acceptance.

[363] Different from other journalists quoted, the name of this interlocutor has been anonymized, to guarantee his safety, due to another episode he shared in the interview which is going to be shown later in Chapter 5.
[364] According to Grayson's Glossary of terms (2010), it refers to "Thugs or hit-men" (p.314). According to Fontes (2016), the term comes from the Turkish, although has been borrowed from Colombian narco-culture.

In addition, the quote directs our attention to what the journalist considers the turning point: the administration of Vicente Fox (2000-2006), the first President elected representing the National Action Party (PAN). Accordingly, democratic transition and hegemonic party defeat represents for him, the beginning of uncontrolled violence. It is a clear seal of the reproduction of the Pax Priista paradigm. Alternate political power, in his opinion, resulted in going from "*capos sueltos*"[365] to "*cabos sueltos*"[366].

Recalling nostalgically the time when drug-related violence was (or at least perceived to be) under control is also clear in the account of the young businessman Raymundo Chávez. He emphasizes how *narcos* used to respect a code and understood they were not allowed to cross some boundaries. That border became blurry, suddenly, when "they became violent". Then the presumed respect for society vanished.

> ***There was a lot of respect****, I mean… my mother [he laughs] I even remember she told me that she used to attend cooking classes and… there was… the mother of… this mister [Caro Quintero] and…* ***she was her classmate****. There were restaurants, for instance, where [when they] went… 'ey, you can't come in here' and then 'OK, fine', and they [the* narcos*] used to leave…today, you say that to anyone and…* ***they destroy the place!*** *I mean, there was like… a kind of…* ***respect for society****. I think* ***crime has changed … and then they became violent!*** *... and I think it [crime] has become a part of society, and… they [*narcos*] had blended quite well… for instance…* ***the sons of the bad guys had got married with the daughters of the good guys*** *(…).*
>
> Raymundo Chávez, Agro-Industrial Sector Businessman
> Zapopan, Jal., August 29th, 2015
> *(Q2-6)*

The aforementioned claim, however, relies on the *narco* archetype, widely discussed, and mainly inspired by a dominant narrative. Another tempting perspective is through this account. He evokes the scene of two mothers sharing a cooking class (Caro Quintero's and the interviewed businessman's), or the idea of "bad guys" and "good guys" celebrating their children's marriages together. According to this version, "those who arrived" did more than business in Guadalajara which is illustrated by the track records of Caro Quintero, "Don Neto" and Félix Gallardo. The "startling familiarity" seemed to be established to the point to which the mother of a drug-lord is sharing spaces with my interlocutor's mother. That rapport will be deeply analysed in Chapter 5, however, in order to characterize *narcos* and how they accomplished such "familiarity", the role of violence must be discussed.

[365] Unarrested drug leaders.
[366] Loose ends.

The next section inquiries how the once respectful *narcos* crossed the limits, becoming a "new generation of *narcos*" or, more precisely, the amendment of the *narco* archetype, characterized by outrageous patterns of violence (Grillo, 2016; Grayson, 2010)[367].

2.3 "…and then they became violent": the new generation of *narcos* or updating the archetype

"Dead bodies wandering around Guadalajara in two tractor-trailers", seems to be a scene from a terror-movie. Yet, it was on the front page of the newspaper *Reforma* on September 18th, 2018[368]. The revolting smell of nearly 270 unidentified bodies stacked into two refrigerated trailers called the attention of the inhabitants of a neighbourhood in Tlaquepaque. Looking for a parking spot, the trailers were moved from one municipality to another during a two-week period, since Jalisco state authority did not have enough space to store them. The number of bodies in the same conditions rose later to more than 400. The scene, as expected, was just the tip of the iceberg.

From a biological viewpoint, the unbearable smell came from the decomposition of human remains, from a broader perspective, its origins were other decaying instances. The Jalisco Forensic Sciences Institute stated they were not able to manage the volume of bodies they were receiving daily[369], showing how, beyond statistics, local authorities were overwhelmed by the amount of assassinations attributed to drug-related confrontations being committed. The lack of resources that hampered the application of a proper procedure, shifted the attention to the misguided decision-making process, in terms of the public budget and local public security policy on a whole. The sheer sum of unidentified murder victims shed light on the increasing number of missing persons in the state of Jalisco alone and the tragedies within their families[370]. As previously mentioned, Caro Quintero's times are recollected like those of the "good *narcos*". Even in the 1990s, Guadalajara was considered a sort of sanctuary where violence was occasional (González, 1996), mostly because *narcos* and their families lived there. How did the sanctuary become the stage for graves on wheels? More

[367] It should be noticed that the "new generation of *narcos*" was also used to explain the transformation of *narcos'* profile from *gomeros* (those who convert opium poppies into paste) and smugglers to cartel members. That could be observed in Shannon (2015) [1988].
[368] "Deambulan cadáveres en dos tráileres por Jalisco". (September 18th, 2018). *Reforma*.
[369] "Lo que se sabe del tráiler con cuerpos en Jalisco". (September 21st, 2018). *El Informador*.
[370] Vélez Salas, D. (September 26th, 2018). ¿Qué hay más allá del tráiler que deambuló por las calles de Jalisco?. *El Universal*.

than offering an answer, the present section analytically reinstates the explanations offered by multiple sources, aiming to ponder drug-related violence as a threat.

The first lead to follow brings us back to the *Guadalajara Cartel* where the image of non-violence dominated in reference to its leaders, yet, "good *narcos*" also exerted violence. By way of illustration, people coming from Oaxaca, Guerrero, Chiapas and Sinaloa to work at *Rancho El Búfalo* were not only exposed to precarious conditions but were also held captive. A peasant released by the police when *El Búfalo* was raided revealed that "deserters were killed with machine-gun fire (…) there were a lot of people killed, even when we left, they [the *narcos*] were still killing a lot of *raza*[371], the gunmen watching us, used to beat us for no reason, besides, there were other people that treated us like animals"[372].

The episode narrated above has been interpreted as a sign that people working for Caro Quintero were treated almost as slaves (Ramírez-Pimienta-2011). Beyond that, it also revealed that the *Guadalajara Cartel*, or at least, Rafael Caro Quintero had armed men able to exert violence if needed as well as to protect cartel operations.

In addition, although even Caro Quintero said that he only had one gun for his protection[373], the cartel members had wide accessed to weapons. For instance, according to the local press, when "Don Neto" Fonseca was arrested, the police also seized "seventeen AK-47 rifles (*cuernos de chivo*), R-15 rifles, handguns, fragmentation grenades, rocket-propelled grenades, some cocaine and many other things"[374]. In other words, they had quite an arsenal considering these were times when the PRI controlled violence.

Taking into account Caro Quintero's armed staff and the weapons carried by Ernesto Fonseca, it is possible to claim that both resources were there to provide them with protection. Usually, illegal groups seek to protect themselves from state law enforcement policies or other cartels[375]. That said, if the PRI-ruled centralized regime controlled drug trafficking activities (as the *Pax Priista* claims), protecting cartels against state action and guaranteeing

[371] Colloquial word to refer an ensemble of people, family or friends (DEM, 2018).
[372] "Los enganchados para procesar la mariguana en Chihuahua huían del hambre; ahora también tienen miedo". (November 17th, 1984). *Proceso*, (420).
[373] Caro Quintero, R. (May 1st, 1985). *Interview conducted in a press pool with Rafael Caro Quintero at Mexico City Reclusorio Norte prison* [T.V. Broadcast]. From Televisa Film Archive.
[374] "Gran triunfo policiaco de Jalisco: Fonseca fue detenido en Vallarta". (April 10th, 1985). *El Informador.*
[375] For a theoretical discussion regarding protection provision see the Introduction. An analysis of the Guadalajara case will be developed in Part II.

the non-confrontation of drug trafficking groups, who were they protecting themselves from? Who threatened the "good *narcos*"?

Nevertheless, *Tapatios* claim that the *narcos* of those years were not as violent their contemporaries are. Businessmen, in particular, did not ignore the *narco* presence, but they underlined their pacific character. In that regard, Ernesto González, owner of an important company in the industrial sector, former public servant and current militant of a political party, constitutes a vivid example:

> ***The economic crisis of 1984-1985***[376]***… we didn't feel it in Jalisco!*** *[Due to]* ***those groups' [narco] investments…*** *[laughs discreetly] it was astonishing!* ***But they did not kill anyone****… nothing happened… they used to build huge houses, they did everything… to invest… to establish companies, warehouses, everything… ah, because… they started using the money to… do things… but* ***they did not kill anyone****…* ***then, well, we all knew****… They were* ***another kind of group****, but then…* ***nowadays…now there are other groups****… they ask someone…****before they used to do it themselves****, but now they* ***ask someone to invest on their behalf****… and if he [the front man] makes a mistake****… they kill him!***
>
> Ernesto González, Industrial Sector,
> Zapopan, Jal., October 16th, 2015.
> *(Q2-7)*

If the general narrative evokes paved streets and parochial assistance as charitable measures of a "good *narco*", for this businessman, the distinguished actions were city infrastructure investments which were a key element for economic development and the mitigation of the effect of the economic crisis. In fact, this version which suggests that Guadalajara did not suffer from the 1980s crisis as much as the rest of the country due to *narco* investment was also mentioned by the scholar Gustavo Monterrubio[377] who emphasizes the importance of *narco* money circulating in the local economy. The emergence of the front man in González's account should also raise our attention. In both periods, *narcos* were involved in the money laundering business. However, this would not merit attention from the owner of a big industry. For him, what is relevant is the fact that *narcos*, nowadays, could assassinate someone for making a mistake. To what extent do businessmen consider those working as frontmen to actually be *narcos*? Are they conceived as people involved with the *narco* rather than part of the *Narco* industry?

[376] He is making reference to the debt crises that started in 1982. The inaccurate reference could be read as a simple distraction of the interviewed that had a hard time even to remember the title "economic crisis" or as a sign of how vague such period rests in his memory. In any case, these are only speculations.
[377] Interview conducted with G. Monterrubio, Scholar. (October 5th, 2015). Guadalajara, Jal.

The apparent inconsistency between the *Guadalajara Cartel* as a source of violence and the perception of the group as being mostly non-violent is worth our attention. First, there is a possibility that their acts of violence were less frequent that those occurring nowadays. As Astorga (2004b) claims regarding the 1940s and 1950s, the extreme violence of drug traffickers occurred although it was not the rule[378]. Secondly, the violence exerted by the *Guadalajara Cartel* was less visible then.

The visibility of violent acts might depend on the profile of the actors as well as the extent to which violence is considered as a resource for the organization. It has been documented, for instance, that current Mexican organized groups publicize themselves, showing their presence and domain of certain territories. Thus, *narcomantas* or threatening billboards allegedly placed by criminal groups are part of their noise (Ríos, 2013), in this sense, murders could be another way to send messages to their enemies. From this approach, the *narcos* of the 1980s may have made violence less visible since they had no incentives to be noisy. However, little is known about the significance that violence in general and homicides in particular had within the *Guadalajara Cartel* because perhaps the dominance of the *Pax Priista* paradigm drives us to take for granted their non-violent condition.

The lack of visibility of the Cartel's violent acts could also be explained by the available means to unveil and disseminate such deviant acts. Returning to *Pax Priista* assumptions, if it is granted that the PRI-ruled regime used to have limitless control over the context, this might include local and national press. Thus, it is possible that the hegemonic party was able to control the exposure of violent acts, especially since the independent press was almost non-existent. Even further, if the state made forced disappearances a regular practice during the Dirty War (Vicente Ovalle, 2018), it is possible to consider that the obscurity that surrounded such crimes could also be applied to those committed in the context of drug trafficking operations[379]. Being the case, the democratic transition could ease the control that

[378] That opened three leads for future research: 1) under what conditions extreme violence were exerted back-then? ; 2) in those circumstances, how the allegedly perfect piece of machinery of the *pax priista* worked to avoid extreme violence as a rule?; 3) to what extent non-extreme violence, although discreet and unobtrusive, was present in *tapatios'* daily life? In order to answer such questions, it might be necessary to collect information mostly through innovative sources and methods.

[379] For an analysis of political violence coexisting with drug trafficking landscape until the intersection of both in Sinaloa, see Vicente Ovalle (2018).

the PRI had over drug related violence, but it could also enable the emergence of diversity within the press that was progressively able to shed light on drug-related violence.

Assuming the limits of the available information, who is the "new generation of *narcos*" in Guadalajara?

After Félix Gallardo was arrested in 1989, the different *plazas* (production fields and traffic routes) were distributed in a friendly manner among the local low-ranking leaders, most of them already related by blood, friendship or business (Boullosa and Wallace, 2015; Valdés Castellanos, 2013). Thus, figures such as Amado Carrillo Fuentes "The Lord of the Skies", Joaquín "El Chapo" Guzmán, Ismael "El Mayo" Zambada, Héctor "El Güero" Palma or the Arellano Félix brothers gained importance. All of them shared a peasant origin except the brothers, who were born into a middle class family in Culiacán and therefore had more education (Astorga, 2004). The presumed agreement between the new leaders did not last long, yielding the fragmentation of the group which became family businesses and, later, disputes and violent confrontations framed by an illegal "free market" landscape (Boullosa and Wallace, 2015; Valdés Castellanos, 2013).

In the context of an increase of property crimes, as discussed in Chapter 1, and a national landscape coloured by a significant currency crisis, the occurrence of significant political assassinations, the continuing *Zapatista* uprising, electoral conflicts, and fractures within the PRI, the confrontation between cartels finally reached Guadalajara.

Three specific episodes merit our attention: 1) on November 8th, 1992, a shooting took place at the nightclub *Christine* located in Puerto Vallarta, Jalisco. According to the local police of Jalisco and Guadalajara, it was provoked by Héctor "El Güero" Palma, who was close to "El Chapo" Guzmán, in an attempt to kill the Arellano Félix Brothers[380]; 2) six months later, on May 24th, 1993, the Cardinal Posadas was murdered, as explained in the opening of this chapter; 3) in June 1994, a Grand Marquis exploded in close proximity to the luxury *Camino Real* hotel, where a *quinceañera* party was being celebrated which some drug cartels members were attending[381].

[380] "La matanza de Vallarta con precisión militar; se salvaron dos sobrinos de Félix Gallardo". (November 14th, 1992). *Proceso*, (837).
[381] "Tal como deseaba, Karime Fernández nunca olvidará su fiesta de 15 años". (June 18th, 1994). *Proceso*, (920).

Following the above discussed *Pax Priista* paradigm, Duncan (2014) claims that the weakening of PRI central power due to the democratization process, also implied the erosion of local elite control over drug trafficking organizations and, in consequence, their capacity to regulate the use of violence. For the first time, the political elite required the financial support of drug traffickers to be competitive in future electoral process. This changed the balance of power among them, thus, drug traffickers began to affect public decisions. However, since this explanation relied on a nationwide perspective, Guadalajara did not fully fit this pattern.

If the analysis of the democratic transition is reduced to an alternation of the Executive as is common, it must be recalled that, in Jalisco, the first Governor emerged from the opposition party (PAN), who won the election in 1995. Scholars interpreted Alberto Cárdenas victory as a result of a property and violence crisis that the incumbent government was not able to manage anymore (Arellano Ríos, 2004; Arellano Ríos, 2014).

On the other hand, if a larger scope is considered, Jalisco's democratic transition and, ultimately the PAN candidate's success could be understood. Alberto Cárdenas' triumph can be traced back to 1988, where the PAN started gaining crucial positions in the local elections, consistently increasing its presence at the municipal level and, in consequence, its chances to win in 1995 (Morones Servín and Sandoval Izarrarás, 1995). From that perspective, the progressive democratization would have coincided with the twilight of the Guadalajara Cartel, the realignment of the new drug-leaders, their attempts to settled on a pacific distribution of plazas and, finally, with the violent confrontation among the different fractions, in other words, periods of relative peace and violent crisis. Thus, the relationship between the democratic transition at the local level and the growth of drug-related violence is not crystal-clear. The likelihood is that both phenomena might be affecting one another.

According to most printed news sources, the Mexican *Narco* in the late 1990s was characterized by the fruitless effort of Sinaloa leaders to establish a united group under the name of *La Federación* (the Federation). Moreover, there was an upsurge of struggles between various groups, for instance, former Sinaloa allies and old enemies, namely, the Gulf Cartel members (Boullosa and Wallace, 2015; Valdés Castellanos, 2013; Grillo, 2011; Astorga, 2004).

The narrative, however, minimizes Jalisco as a region, and only considers two main aspects of the city: 1) it reinforces its role as the hometown of the *narcos* and an ideal space to do business; 2) the leadership of Ignacio "Nacho" Coronel, whose domain relied on trafficking methamphetamines and other synthetic drugs (Text Box 2.3).

Text Box 2.3 Ignacio "Nacho" Coronel, "The King of Ice"

Ignacio "Nacho" Coronel was born in Canelas, Durango. He started his career in drug trafficking under the mentorship of Amado Carrillo Fuentes "The Lord of the Skies", one of the leaders of Juárez Cartel. During the early 1990s, Coronel became a branch of Carrillo Fuentes settling in Guadalajara. Together with his brother Magdaleno Coronel (head of the *plaza*) and his nephew, "Nacho" Coronel re-established drug trafficking operations, partially interrupted after the Guadalajara Cartel was dismantled.

In 1993, within the context of Cardinal Posadas assassination and other episodes of drug related violence, "Nacho" Coronel was arrested and therefore lost his mentor's backing.

Once released, he jointed Ismael "Mayo" Zambada and Joaquín "El Chapo" Guzmán from the Sinaloa Cartel, both of whom had already broken their alliance with Carrillo Fuentes and the other members of the so-called "Federation".

Around 2001, after Guzmán escaped from prison for the first time, "Nacho" Coronel became the Sinaloa Cartel's *lugarteniente* and was responsible for enhancing their presence in the western region of the country (Jalisco, Colima, Nayarit and Michoacán), specifically through the production and trafficking of methamphetamines (also called *ice*), earning the nickname of "the king of the ice".

According to accounts in the press, "Nacho" Coronel lived in Guadalajara under a low profile, regularly appearing in public places, not having excessive protection. He lived in an upper-class *coto*, in Zapopan.

During five local administrations, Coronel expanded his power allegedly without any law enforcement agency threats, most likely since he avoided confrontation and did not tolerate extortion or kidnapping within his organization.

The harmony attributed to his negotiating capacity ended around 2007, once the conflict between the Sinaloa Cartel and the Beltrán Leyva brothers affected his *plaza*. As part of this conflict, Coronel's son was *levantado* pushing him to take part in the violent confrontation between cartels.

On July 29th, 2010, in an operation conducted by the Mexican Army in the *coto* where he had lived previously, Ignacio Coronel was shot down, after he tried to avoid arrest.

That same day, President Felipe Calderón, in a meeting with businessmen in Guadalajara, endorsed his commitment to restore the rule of law and the struggle against crime.

"Nacho" Coronel's downfall was interpreted by National and International official sources as a severe blow to Chapo's cartel. Some specialists on the topic, in their own right, anticipated that his absence, as other *capo* arrests or killings, would provoke a spiral of violence in the region. If anything, it represented another key moment in the history of Guadalajara and the *Narco*: a new generation of *narcos* was about to emerge in Guadalajara.

Sources: Beith, 2012: 250; Martínez Sánchez, 2016; Flores Pérez, 2016; De Mauleón, 2015; 'Un ejecutivo con poder, ese es Nacho Coronel'. (July 30th, 2010). *Reforma*; "Pierde Chapo Conexión con EU. (July 30th, 2010). *Reforma;* SEDENA, 2010; "Muere Nacho Coronel". (July 30th, 2010). *Reforma*; Presidencia Felipe Calderón Hinojosa, 2010; Abatido por las balas del Ejército. (July 30th, 2010). *Reforma*.

Besides his success regarding the introduction of synthetic drugs to the Sinaloa Cartel, "Nacho" Coronel is also recalled when it comes to explaining the relatively peaceful coexistence of distinct drug trafficking cells in his *plaza* during the year 2000, since levels of violence within the Jalisco (at least represented by intentional homicides rates) were then lower than those at the national level.

As illustrated in Graph 2.1, between 1997 and 2009, Jalisco had a yearly rate of 5 to 10 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, while at the national level 8 to 14 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants were registered per year in accordance with either preliminary investigations or death certificates. In fact, a slight decrease can be observed at the beginning of 2001, when "Nacho" Coronel allegedly returned to Jalisco, this time to become the head of the *plaza*, representing the Sinaloa Cartel (Text Box 2.3).

Graph 2.1 Intentional homicides 1997-2017
(Rates per 100,000 inhabitants)



Source: Elaborated by the author. The figures of preliminary investigations (*averiguación previa*) or investigative files (*carpetas de investigación*) come from Executive Secretariat of the National Public Security System (SE-SNSP) and could be considered police and local attorney reports. The tabulates from death certificates are qualified as intentional homicides by the medical examiner and reported by the National Institute for Statistics, Geography and Informatics (INEGI). Rates were calculated based on INEGI Population Census and Counts, interpolated with annual average growth rate. For 2016 and 2017, since population data is not still available, the projection assumes the average growth rate (2010-2015) remains the same.

At first glance, it is possible to assume that "Nacho" Coronel was effective in achieving a relatively peaceful situation while in other states the conflict between former members of the so-called *Federation* broke out. The situation was further exacerbated by the confrontation with the Gulf Cartel headed first by Juan García Ábrego and later by Osiel Cárdenas.

Although Coronel had distanced himself from Amado Carrillo Fuentes and shared the antagonism that "El Chapo" Guzmán had regarding the Beltrán Leyva brothers, Jalisco did not reproduce the trend of increasing homicide rates that other states followed. That was the case even after 2007, when the national homicide rate (based on death certificates) jumped from 8 to 23 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in 2010.

When "Nacho" Coronel was shot down in his house located in a fancy *coto* in Zapopan Jalisco, as part of an operation implemented by the Mexican Army in 2010, the violence in Jalisco had been apparently increasing. However, as seen in Text Box 2.3, the breaking point seems to have been in 2009, likely concurrent with the abduction of the Coronel's son. In fact, the case contributed to a debate about the possible effects that targeting drug leaders had on violence rates as well as how the Federal government operation affected the rise in homicides rates. On the one hand, those who criticized government strategy claimed that the removal of a cartel leader would cause violent confrontation among a number of potential successors, fragmentation of criminal organizations and the geographical dispersion of violence. In addition, they considered that joint operations would contribute to increasing violence (Escalante, 2011; Merino, 2011; Guerrero, 2011). Others added nuances or replicated the argument, including government spokespersons that took part in the discussion with experts and scholars (Rosas, 2012; Sota and Messmacher, 2012; Poiré and Martínez Trujillo, 2011). More sophisticated analyses were added later which considered a wider set of explicative variables as well as the differences between short-term and long-term public policy effects (Signoret, 2011; Calderón et. al., 2015).

In Mexico, there are currently two official homicide registers, both included in the previous graph. One is based on preliminary investigations (*averiguaciones previas*) collected by each state and concentrated and published by the Executive Secretariat of the National Public Security System (SE-SNSP) and the other is based on the information found in death certificates reported by INEGI.

Both approaches above, similar to any seeking to count deaths occurring within violent contexts, entail a number of flaws regarding, at least, "comprehensiveness, representativeness and reliability" (Freedman, 2017:128). This aligns with the discussion widely developed in Chapter 1 regarding official figures when referring to intentional homicide records. Rather than an accurate measure of violence, such statistics could be more related to agency capacity, dynamics and incentives.

According to the Institute for Economics Peace[382], local law enforcement agencies underestimated homicides by approximately 20%, using medical reports as a reference point in 2016. Actually, in some states considered to be the most peaceful, the gap between medical examiner (médico legista) reports and police registers was greater. The think tank speculates that this reflects the lack of police investigation concerning the homicides committed. Resource constraints, incompetence or a deliberate manipulation of data should be added to their interpretation. Although this is not considered in the referred report, the same limitations could be present among forensic professionals. Even if forensic medical doctors possess a degree, in comparison with policemen, the quality of protocols to distinguish between intentional and criminal negligent homicides cannot be guaranteed. In addition, taking into account a set of attributes[383], the report evaluates the statistics presented by every state, based on a 10 point scale. Jalisco obtained 4.425 points, ranking 16 out of the 32 states which indicating low quality data.

While the evoked issues are significant, perhaps the greatest limitation in the data is related to reading them within the drug-related violence framework. Since the so-called "War on drugs" has eclipsed the public debate in the last ten years, the figures frequently support arguments around drug-related homicides patterns. Yet, the available information is not determinant whether a homicide is related to *Narco* violence or not.

Contemplating that homicides figures are not necessarily linked to drug-related violence and, above all, due to the lack of official data, multiple efforts have been made by the press and

[382] The Institute for Economics & Peace (2018) defines itself as an independent, non-partisan and non-profit think tank engaged in changing the global approach around peace to make it a positive, feasible and tangible measure of wealth and human progress.
[383] The evaluation criteria are built on the Bogota Protocol. The pertinence of *adopting*, rather than *adapting*, such protocol for the Mexican case should also be called into question.

consultants to offer alternative figures. In January 2011, the Federal Government published a dataset of alleged drug-related homicides, becoming the first official figures of their kind (Text Box 2.4)[384].

Both, the official version and private efforts to tabulate drug-related homicides, due to scanty and mostly unreliable evidence, shared limitations resulting from the fact that, as Freedman warns regarding retrospective data on war deaths, "calculation draws on whatever information comes to hand, whether field reports from fighting units, newspaper stories, benefits claims, or medical records, but these are often incomplete and ambiguous" (Freedman, 2017:128). It is even more complicated if we take into account the clandestine nature of the *Narco*. The more disorganized the armies involved, the more difficult it is to keep intentional homicide records (Freedman, 2017).

As compared to counting deaths within a conventional non-international armed conflict, estimating drug-related homicides represents another significant challenge: to be able to classify a sum of intentional homicides as drug-related, the criteria to delimit signs of *Narco* violence must be established. For instance, a class of weapon or bullet diameter, signs of torture, symbolic amputations (as the tongue chopped to alleged whistle-blowers) the presence of the so-called *narcomantas* or crime scenes with series of human remains or bodies. However, it must be emphasized that such criteria is based on an archetypical and almost caricaturized image about what the *Narco* is and how *narcos* wield violence. That preconditioned perception, although possibly based on some historic records or deeply inspired by other phenomena (such as mafia performance), contributes to the inaccuracy of the figures, since it is mostly based on guesswork.

[384] Concerning the information contained in the Text Box 2.4 a possible conflict of interest disclaimer must be presented. In January 12th, 2011 I was part of the staff responsible of the data publication (Security Strategy Spokesperson Office), being directly involved with the dataset publication project, but not with the database construction. The information provided in this text: 1) comes exclusively from public documents, in respecting the confidentiality clauses associated to the position I occupied then; 2) the tone of the Text Box is emphatically descriptive to avoid expressing my personal opinion or to deliver a biased analyse by presenting a professional experience (and personal perception) as an academic discussion.

Text Box 2.4 Government dataset on drug-related violence: a continuing challenge

In August 2010, within the framework of the so-called "*Diálogos por la Seguridad"*, President Felipe Calderón committed to make the dataset of drug-related homicides public. This information was being held by the Federal Government and the numbers had been occasionally mentioned by Security Cabinet members. The dataset and its methodology became public in January 2011, under the name "Dataset of Homicides allegedly related to Organized Crime" (Base de datos de homicidios presuntamente relacionados con la delincuencia organizada").

The dataset included drug-related homicides, as defined in the database, perpetrated between December 2006 and 2010. The data was broken down by month and by the municipality where authorities had found the victim.

A group integrated by members of the Secretariat of Defense, Secretariat of the Navy, Public Security Secretariat, General Attorney Office, Federal Police and CISEN, collected, registered and classified the data based on their territorial deployment. It involved a validation process that could include and exclude cases progressively, if more information around the case were available overtime.

The group determined if the case was allegedly drug-related based on their assessment of the crime scene, the traces of violence in the victim and the way the person was killed.

This database classified cases into three categories: executions (targeted murders within the drug market), confrontations (casualties generated by struggles between DTOs) and aggressions (casualties generated by encounters between authorities and traffickers, mostly as part of law enforcement operations).

In April 2011, the Federal Government announced that the dataset would be denominated "Dataset of Deaths due to alleged criminal rivalry" (*Base de fallecimientos ocurridos por presunta rivalidad delincuencial)*. The Government argued that the aim was to avoid any confusion since the dataset was not a judicial but an analytical tool. In other words, including a case on the register was not an attempt to criminalize victims or formulate judicial charges.

Data concerning the period January-September 2011 was added recently and was the last update to be published.

The figures derived from the official dataset were higher than those published in diverse independent sources which measured drug related violence and were used by some analysts and scholars. The statistical tool received diverse critiques mostly related to the way the administration treated violence victims and not in regards to methodological, conceptual or accuracy issues.

Under the administration of President Peña Nieto, the database was relegated and, eventually, online access was disabled. No other tool was offered to improve or replace the calculation of drug-related deaths. Currently, the dataset is only available for those who managed to download it while it was public or through an informal exchange among those who have it.

Sources: Presidencia de la República. (April 1st, 2011). *Informa Vocería de Seguridad Cambio en Nombre de Base de Datos Publicada* [Press Release] ; Presidencia de la República. (January 12th, 2011). Presentación del Vocero de Seguridad de Base de Datos de Homicidios presuntamente relacionados con la Delincuencia Organizada en los Diálogos por la Seguridad [Press Release]; Presidencia de la República. (August 2nd, 2010). Diálogos por la Seguridad con Organizaciones Civiles; Presidencia de la República. (2011). Base de Datos de Homicidios Presuntamente Relacionados con la Delincuencia Organizada", Methodological Framework. The document used to be available together with the dataset. Both sources were disabled during the administration of President Peña Nieto.All the pieces used to be available at: http://calderon.presidencia.gob.mx/, however, during the administration of Andrés Manuel López Obrador the web page concerning Calderón administration was disabled.

One of the most recurring aspects of the *narco* image likely has to do with the high-calibre weapons they bear, especially recently. Revisiting the archetype, the classic arm of the *narco* is likely the so-called *Cuerno de chivo* (goat horn), also known as an AK-47 rifle, what Grillo (2010) calls "their (*narco*'s) beloved Kalashnikovs". The British journalist also assumes that the way they name weapons, at least in the case of a group from Michoacán he analyses, is attributable to their rural origin. He claims that the farmyard references fit to the fertile agricultural state they inhabit[385]. Albeit the possible logic, it is another untested conjecture. It could be true, but it could also sound logical due to the enormous bias of the *narco* rural origin (which is clearly taken for granted in Grillos' reading of the phenomena). Thus, it has become an interpretation mainly based on the trend of taking that background as a strong explanation of what *narcos* do or, even further, what they are.

Under the name "*Narco cultura*", the last room of the Psychotropic Substances Museum (*Museo de los Enervantes*)[386] at the Secretariat of National Defense (SEDENA) exhibits a collection of objects that were seized from supposed drug traffickers. Among all the accessories, the weapons are outstanding: a Colt 38-caliber with images of the Mexican war of Independence, belonging to Osiel Cárdenas Guillen (Gulf Cartel); the grenade-launcher with which a SEDENA helicopter was shot down; a Colt 38-caliber, with a gold handle with the initials ACF[387] engraved next to an eagle, both adorned with emeralds and diamonds. Joaquín "El Chapo" Guzmán (Sinaloa Cartel) was carrying it during his first arrest in 1993. SEDENA presumes the pistol was a gift offered by Amado Carrillo Fuentes "The Lord of

[385] He also evokes the example of the grenades named as *papas* (potatos) and the circular clips with hundreds of bullets as *huevos* (eggs).

[386] Hosted in the Section 7 (Operations against Drug Trafficking) offices, the Museum was founded to sensitize and to support the training of military personnel. Throughout seven rooms, visitors could admire the history of Psychotropic substances, its effects in Mexico, the different methods SEDENA uses to confront DTOs (on the ground, by air, even at the sea and oceans) and a collection of objects seized during its operations (Fieldwork carnet, January 26th, 2017). Although the Museum is not open to public, it is possible to visit after delivering a formal petition. In my case, I knew about the Museum by reading a magazine article, so I started seeking the possibility to make a visit. A person I know offered me to put me in touch with some members of the Army, friends of him form a Masonic lodge. One of those officers gave me an e-mail address to send a formal petition to visit the Museum. I sent the letter and the day after I had a positive answer. It is hard to say if the path I followed was the only one to get access to the Museum (knowing someone who knows someone). A way to test it might be trying to enter knocking SEDENA's door through the Citizens' Attention Office (Fieldwork carnet, January, 2017). Different authors have referred the Museum before (Zavala, 2018; Grillo, 2016; Fernández Menéndez, 2001). All of them, however, had paid attention almost exclusively to the last room, namely "Narcocultura". Despite being probably the most attractive, to neglect the rest of the Museum limits the discussion around the exhibition and its implications. On the other hand, it is not clear if the authors visited themselves the Museum or they are only reproducing someone else's description, mostly because no one describes the process through which they got accessed there, which is meaningful in itself.

[387] Presumably stands for Amado Carrillo Fuentes.

the Skies" (Juárez Cartel); a 9-millimeter submachine gun which was property of the Beltran Leyva Cartel; the assault rifle with a palm tree engraved in the handle, belonging to Héctor "El Güero" Palma (Sinaloa Cartel).

Diverse cartels and a whole new generation of *narcos* had a common denominator. They all invested in arms which skyrocketed since 2004, when the United States Federal Assault Weapons Ban expired (Poiré, 2012; Williams, 2010). Weapons have been seen as a sign of power. The Army major who guided me during the museum visit, while looking at the "Güero" Palma assault rifle, told me: "once we took them to an exhibition and I carried [this one] to relocate it…and… yes, that is what power feels like!"[388].

Since the so-called "War against the *Narco"* and its effects are extremely present in the public debate, it is possible that rising homicide figures are also reflecting a growing tendency to classify every murder as drug-related, either due to inner-conflict and/or to state-agency weaknesses (Zepeda Gil, 2018). The study "Elites and Organized Violence in Mexico", evoked earlier in Chapter 1, constitutes a good example in this regard. In the fourth question raised in the survey, while trying to measure to what extent the respondents are worried about "organized violence", they framed the question in the following manner: "During the interview we will talk a lot about organized violence, also known as 'narco-violence'[389]. We are thinking mostly about missing persons and homicides committed by organized crime. Personally, how worried are you about organized violence?" (Schedler, 2014: 95). In this case, the pollsters are not only conditioning the answer since "missing persons" or "homicide" are crimes that a respondent would likely consider serious, being forced to answer he is very worried, just to avoid being perceived as indolent or cynical. The question also implies three assumptions which are difficult to sustain: 1) Violence coming from DTOs is always organized, neglecting more random violent behaviours; 2) Organized violence occurring in the country has origin in the *Narco*, ignoring any other possible (state or non-state) violent actor; 3) They reduce the expression of violence to homicide and missing persons, neglecting other manifestations of violence (from *narcos* or any other agent).

Regarding the Jalisco case, Graph 2.2 illustrates a comparison of the growing rate of intentional homicides reported by local police bodies or the state attorney in Jalisco and the

[388] Fieldwork carnet, January 26th, 2017.
[389] Quotation marks from the original.

so-called drug related violence allegedly committed in the state and reported by federal law enforcement instances.

Graph 2.2 Number of international homicides and drug-related homicides in Jalisco (2007-2010)



Source: Elaborated by the author. Figures of preliminary investigations (*averiguación previa*) or investigative files (carpetas de investigación) from the Executive Secretariat of the National Public Security System (SE-SNSP) based on police reports and reports filed before state-level attorney general offices. The numbers on drug-related homicides come from the dataset "Fallecimientos por Presunta Rivalidad Delincuencial" (deaths occurring as a consequence of alleged rivalry between criminal groups) made public by Mexico's federal government in 2011, but that was not updated after June 2011. The dataset is no longer publicly available, after President Enrique Peña Nieto took office.

While it is true that it is inapplicable to interpret one kind of homicides as a subset of another, what is noticeable is that those classified as drug-related homicides grew faster than intentional homicides in general. It could be explained by two non-exclusive insights: 1) Actually, drug-related violence grew faster than the capacity of law enforcement agencies to start a criminal investigation, having more cases registered as related to *narco* without a preliminary investigation associated; 2) there is a trending practice of classifying homicides as drug related, especially considering the methodological limits of the figures, as discussed above. Anyhow, available information does not allow a firm conclusion to be established.

In this sense, two examples may be sufficient to illustrate how the predilection about what is considered drug-related could affect data collection as well as interpretation. First, in 2012,

the newspaper *Reforma* included in its *Ejecutómetro* 167 skeletal remains found in a cave in Chiapas. Within a context where some clandestine graves (where cartels allegedly bury their victims - *narcofosas*) have been found, it seems that the first reaction of the newspaper staff was to consider the finding as drug-related. However, the bones dated from at least 50 years prior, which means that such human remains could not have been a drug-related outcome[390]. The example shows how the data collected was mistakenly classified which was likely due to the momentum of a public debate rather than being based on specific information. Second, in an interesting effort to explain the increasing levels of violence in Mexico, there are some explanations based on an innovative and unique dataset of recorded communications between drug traffickers and violent drug-related figures (Phillips and Ríos, 2019). The disadvantage of that study is that the conclusions hinge on the assumption that "communications between drug traffickers" (*narcomensajes* or *narcomantas*) are genuine and that the signature is actually theirs. In other words, it is not called into question if a *narcomensaje* signed by the *X* or *Y* Cartel is in reality coming from a member of the drug cartel or if it likely comes from another actor that has the incentive to sign as *X* or *Y*.

The vagueness of the idea of "being related to the *narco*" entails numerous risks, among them, to criminalize the victim of violence. The case of the real-estate businessman Rafael Magaña is meaningful in that regard:

> *Security is the main topic to me… It [his interest on the topic] comes from…* ***my son's assassination, in 2008… here… in a soccer field****, he was playing soccer with a group of alumni of…* ***he was alumni of University X*** *[he mentioned a private well-known University]… then… my son got killed… and… as always, when it is* ***organized crime related****,* ***narco…*** *they [criminals] poisoned the… everything, everything! The place… the crime scene… the day after* ***they planted some assault weapons****, they tried to trigger explosives… to simulate it has been a vendetta, then… of course****, the authority is colluded****, then, people say "ah look,* ***it was a settling of scores!****", then… based on that…* **dan carpetazo[391]** ***and water under the bridge!***
>
> Rafael Magaña, Real-estate sector businessman
> Zapopan, Jal., January 23rd, 2017.
> *(Q2-8)*

Rafael Magaña is a wealthy businessman[392] who practically abandoned his firm to devote his time to clarify his son's murder. The scene he narrates includes some elements that would be

[390] Hope, A. (March 10th, 2012). "Las trampas de los números". *Animal Político*.
[391] *Dar carpetazo* (to shelve) refers to tacitly and arbitrarily leaving a file without course or resolution; close the case or desist from pursuing it (DRAE, 2018).
[392] Although the private University in which his son studied could be a signal of his social standing, is not enough, considering the availability of certain financial supports for middle class students. Since the interview

a part of an organized crime episode nowadays: the assault weapons and the explosives, contrasting with the soccer court where, some hours before, a regular every day and irrelevant game had been played.

The archetype is used to drive public opinion, according to Magaña, to think his son's death is yet another related to organized crime. That triggers two reasons to justify the *carpetazo:* 1) in a context where growing homicides rates are mostly attributed to drug trafficking, this case only fattens the *narco homicide* file. Thus, the authority is cleared if agents send the case to a very long waiting list or even if they desist to pursue it. Somehow, public opinion is a type of fast-track sentence which assures *narcos* are "the guilty"; 2) on the other hand, the propensity to criminalize the victim is also implicit. If someone is killed, there must be a rationale, namely, the "settling of scores". Again, the stereotype dictates that a *narcos'* motivation is discipline and punishment, as in the case of *levantones.* That idea is reinforced by the limited media coverage devoted to the case. It could be interpreted, again, as an effect of the large amount of cases that outweighs a particular one (not only within law enforcement agencies but within newsrooms). But yet, this could explain Magana's deliberate effort to avoid publicity in order to keep his son's image far from that of a *narco*. For a father who has converted the investigation of the case into his main endeavour, media coverage would seem a natural ally to place pressure on the allegedly colluded law enforcement agencies. However, Magaña told me that, after following the advice of a journalist and close friend of his, he decided not to play that card. The journalist would have argued: "when things are not clear enough… then everything… gets… distorted!"[393]

The other use of the *narco* archetype is one that Magaña, himself employs. By describing his son as athlete and alumni of an exclusive private University, he basically disclaims him from the *narco* world. *Narcos* neither play soccer with friends any given day on a public court, nor are they among the students enrolled in a prestigious higher education institution. Or, are they?

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was in a restaurant and not in his office or house, I was not able to raise some intuitions based on his entourage. However, the "Society reporting" media were helpful on this regard. Magaña and his family featured at the "society pages" due to one of his son's wedding. Sharing the photos with the big names of the city, they seem being part of the privileged social group, target of this journalism. (Fieldwork carnet, July 24th, 2017; Society pages of *El Informador*, non-explicit due to the anonymization strategy).

[393] Interview conducted with R. Magaña, Real estate sector businessman. (January 23rd, 2017). Zapopan, Jalisco.

María Emma Santillán, the person who put me in contact with Rafael Magaña, confided in me explaining that Magaña's son was allegedly dating a *narco's* ex-girlfriend. She said that essentially became his death sentence[394]. Magaña, off the record and before saying farewell, told me: "what happen with my son was a stupid thing… jealousy!"[395]. Magaña's statement, although framed in a very generic way, along with the version told by María Emma, showed how broad and vague the category "drug-related violence" is and, ultimately, having anything to do with the *Narco.*

The preceding discussion does not mean that the endeavour of measuring drug-related violence should be abandoned, or that available homicide figures are useless. By contrast, it seems imperative to identify and assume that figures are imprecise, thus the analysis and conclusions obtained from available data might be interpreted underlining its limits. In addition, the task of producing better data concerning drug-related violence might be undertaken by inquire regarding conditions (incentives and dynamics) of official data registration, collection, validation and diffusion. Considering that such a task could be seen as an expression of how the government and the public perceive the *Narco*, the consequence could constitute a starting point for a public policy. Moreover, creating statistics on crime might be analysed as another public action in itself.

Beyond the above drug-related homicide figures, and the related limitations, other violent expressions have been observed in Jalisco nowadays, such as *narcobloqueos*[396]*,* kidnapping, the murder of three film students[397] and the attempted murder of the former state Attorney, Luis Carlos Nájera while he was leaving an exclusive restaurant in Guadalajara[398]. The cartel that currently holds the title of being the most powerful and dangerous group in the country is allegedly responsible for this new wave of violence in Guadalajara. It was even considered the *cártel del sexenio*, since it grew rapidly during President Enrique Peña Nieto's administration period (2012-2018): the *Cártel Jalisco Nueva Generación* (CJNG)[399].

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[394] Fieldwork carnet notes, January 29th, 2017.
[395] Fieldwork carnet notes, January 23rd, 2017.
[396] See footnote 124 in the Introduction.
[397] "Así secuestraron y mataron a tres estudiantes de cine en Guadalajara". (May 1st, 2018). *El País.*
[398] "El exfiscal de Jalisco sobrevive a un atentado en pleno centro de Guadalajara". (May 22nd, 2018). *El País.*
[399] The following review is based on La Rosa and Shirk, 2018; Flores Pérez, 2016; Martínez Sánchez, 2016; De Mauleón, 2015; "El Nuevo grupo criminal en México que enfrenta al CJNG en su bastión". (October 2nd, 2018). *Insight Crime*; "Cártel Jalisco Nueva Generación, 'el cartel del sexenio'". (May 29th, 2018). *Es la hora de Opinar* [T.V. Broadcast]. Mexico: Televisa; "Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG). (February 27th,

The Jalisco New Generation Cartel only appeared in official records during the first decade of the 2000s, and in some journalistic pieces, its emergence is related to "Nacho" Coronel's disappearance. However, its origin might be traced even further back in time. For analytical purposes, the trajectory of this relatively recent criminal organization could be divided in two stages: the background (1970s-1990s) and the group's emergence (2000s-2011).

The first traces of the organization take us to Michoacán, during the 1970s, when the Valencia family, natives of the municipality of Aguililla[400], were initiated in the cultivation of marijuana and poppy. Back in those times, the Valencia family established contact with the Guadalajara Cartel to sell their production. Indeed, from the 1970s to the 1990s, the family made fruitful alliances with drug trafficking organizations that operated outside Michoacán (Figure 2.7).

In the 1980, the agreement was with the cartel led by Amado Carrillo, "The Lord of the Skies", and with the Arellano Félix brothers, with the intermediation of a Colombian trafficker. It is said that, during the 1990s, they started collaborating with the Amezcua brothers who controlled Colima and the Manzanillo Ports. Both spots were cardinal for synthetic drug production, since they were the gateway for chemical precursors coming from Asia. The 1990s are also the years when the Valencia family named their organization *Cartel del Milenio*.

With the advent of the new century, the Valencia family established a vibrant business in the *Tierra Caliente* region. Yet, that would change just a few years later (Figure 2.8). Around 2001, *Los Zetas,* the armed branch of the Gulf Cartel, launched a strike against the Cartels operating in the Pacific region seeking to gain *la plaza*. It represented a blow for the Sinaloa Cartel as well as an obstacle for the Colima Cartel. To the *Milenio Cartel*, it represented the displacement towards Jalisco of most of its members. A splinter group, however, remained in Michoacán using the name *La Empresa*, allegedly trying to recover *la plaza*. Eventually, they became *La Familia Michoacana* Cartel.

2017). *Insight Crime*; "El cartel más peligroso de México". (May 12th, 2015). *El País*. Considering the possible bias of this kind of sources, largely discussed across the Chapter, the version has to be taken as a narrative useful to contextualize the contemporary period. Further research may revisit the following chronicle.

[400] Located in the *Tierra* Caliente region of Michoacán, in 1970, Aguililla was a rural municipality with around 21,596 inhabitants, according to INEGI last census. According to INEGI in 2015, the population estimated inhabiting the municipality was around 15,241.

Once relocated in Guadalajara, the *Milenio Cartel* worked supposedly under the protection of Ignacio Coronel. Journalists and analysts often use the apparent alliance between the Valencia families to support the idea that "Nacho" Coronel privileged productive agreements over monopolizing the area where he operated. That piece of evidence was contested later.

Figure 2.7 Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG): the background



Source: Elaborated by the author based on La Rosa and Shirk, 2018; Flores Pérez, 2016; Martínez Sánchez, 2016; De Mauleón, 2015; "El Nuevo grupo criminal en México que enfrenta al CJNG en su bastión". (October 2nd, 2018). *Insight Crime*; "Cártel Jalisco Nueva Generación, 'el cartel del sexenio'". (May 29th, 2018). *Es la hora de Opinar* [T.V. Broadcast]. Mexico: Televisa; "Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG). (February 27th, 2017). *Insight Crime*; "El cartel más peligroso de México". (May 12th, 2015). *El País*.

In October 2009, Oscar Nava Valencia "*El Lobo"* alleged leader of the Milenio Cartel was arrested by the Mexican Army[401] and eventually extradited to the United States[402]. His detention meant a new cleavage for the group. On the one side, the so-called *Resistencia* sought an alliance with the *Michoacán Family*, while Erick Valencia "*El 85*" and Nemesio Oseguera, "*El Mencho",* looked for Sinaloa Cartel support. According to some accounts,

[401] SEDENA. (October 30th, 2009). *Detención de Óscar Orlando Nava Valencia (a) 'El Lobo', líder de la Organización delictiva 'Los Valencia'* [Press release]. Available at: https://www.gob.mx/sedena/prensa/detencion-de-oscar-orlando-nava-valencia-a-el-lobo-lider-de-la-organizacion-delictiva-los-valencia.

[402] "Extraditan a Estados Unidos a líder del Cártel del Milenio". (January 30th, 2011). *Excélsior*.

"Nacho" Coronel would fuel *"El Mencho"* to betray Nava Valencia, "*El Lobo"*. In those times, "*El Mencho*" was Nava Valencia's bodyguard, although he was also part of the Valencia family since he married Rosalinda González Valencia.

Figure 2.8 Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG): the emergence



Source: Elaborated by the author based on La Rosa and Shirk, 2018; Flores Pérez, 2016; De Mauleón, 2015; "Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG). (February 27th, 2017). *Insight Crime*; "El Nuevo grupo criminal en México que enfrenta al CJNG en su bastión". (October 2nd, 2018). *Insight Crime*.

Due to that supposed betrayal, the group led by "*El 85"* and "*El Mencho"*, would be known as *Los Torcidos* (The Twisted). In 2010, after "Nacho" Coronel's death, his allegedly successor was Margarito Soto *"El Tigre"* who was arrested by Federal Police on September 26th, 2010[403]. Thus, the remainder of his organization joined the group led by Valencia Salazar and Oseguera, becoming the Jalisco New Generation Cartel. Trying to confront the Zetas in Veracruz, a branch known as Zeta Killers appeared in September 2011, which was the arrival of the CJNG to the public eye[404].

[403] "Policía Federal captura al presunto succesor the 'Nacho Coronel'". (September 26th, 2010). *El Informador*.
[404] "Los Mata Zetas se 'disculpan' por los asesinatos en Veracruz". (September 26th, 2011). *Animal Político*.

Nowadays, the CJNG supposedly operates in 22 states and has connections in different countries. In fact, it is estimated that one of its biggest markets is in Australia. The leaders of the CJNG work closely with the so-called "Cuinis" González Valencia and 18 siblings, including "*El Mencho*"'s wife, the financial arm of the CJNG.

The account of the cartel's emergence is clearly a story of diverse unstable alliances and enemies which multiplied constantly which includes the proliferation of much violence. Lately, reference has been made to another possible split in which a new group confronted the CJNG[405]. However, it is still early to support this theory (the presence of a new cartels and the fact that they confront the Valencia family) and the urgency to complete the account could drive us to inaccurate statements that are hardly verifiable in the future[406].

Plenty of information is still missing regarding this case, and therefore it must be called into question and discussed; however, being a relatively new organization, it will take a few years. At this early stage, it would be pertinent to avoid the mistakes committed before, building on better evidence before incorporating this case to the "unvaried account" (*relato monocorde"*) (Escalante Gonzalbo, 2015: 10). As foreseeable, the thoughtless reproduction of a uniform perspective deteriorates the quality of the comprehension of the phenomena, since pertinent nuances and complexity are lost due to mythologized knowledge (Astorga, 1995; Escalante Gonzalbo, 2015). The perspective that drug trafficking is a public problem and that *narcos* and their criminal activities are a complete fabrication of the political elite, full of evil intentions, as a recent text suggests[407] cannot be taken at face value. It would be like "throwing the baby out with the bathwater", disregarding the image perceived instead of changing the lenses. Hence, the phenomena is worthy of further analysis as well as a greater level of creativity.

From the *Cártel de Guadalajara* to the *Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación,* the archetype of the *narco* became more violent and, for the first time, is directly contesting law enforcement

[405] "El Nuevo grupo criminal en México que enfrenta al CJNG en su bastión". (July 24th, 2008). *Insight Crime*.
[406] "Rectificación del artículo de Insight Crime sobre el CJNG publicado el 28 de marzo". (April 4th, 2018). *Insight Crime*.
[407] See Zavala, 2018. Although his argument about the precarious rigour of narrative about the *narco* has merit, the journalist concludes that it has been a premeditated action from state agents and international actors to justify their appetite of war and power only based on the examination of some novels and other cultural expressions. The essential elements of his discussion about the vulnerabilities of this narrative come from his reading of Astorga (1995) and Escalante Gonzalbo (2015), consequently in my own discussion I rather evoke the original references.

agencies. This new generation of *narcos*, according to the dominant narrative, are more violent. However, they still fit into the *Narco* epitome, indeed, it has only been updated.

The *Narco* as a business is conceived as the real enemy, able to navigate across economic and political fields (Fernández Menéndez, 2001). A global business which is highly organized (Wainwright, 2016), it is described as "able to mobilize inexhaustible sources of illicit resources" (Cruz Jiménez, 2010: 12). Since the organization has achieved a well-coordinated vertical integration, they are in the position to challenge state agencies (Fernández Menéndez, 2001). Always conceived as groups, even further, as stable and well-organized groups, the scenario of independent actors in an unstructured, dynamic network is hardly considered.

The main producer of this narrative (official and state-agencies) grants them this image of mighty criminals, powerful enemies who might be confronted. Paradoxically, in the official rhetoric, those strong criminal groups are never strong enough to be able to defeat law enforcement agencies. The Psychotropic Substances Museum is also meaningful in this regard. In every room, they exhibit the strategies that sneaky offenders use to plant, pack, transport and traffic drugs. But they also show the resources the Army deploys on a daily basis to intercept *Narco* operations.

Besides representing a criminal world, *Narcotráfico* is also seen as a cultural form, with its icons, symbols, style and proper expressions (Fernández Menéndez, 2001). They even have their own criminal activities, exclusive and characteristic. By way of example it is possible to evoke the *levantón*[408], a sort of abduction attributed to drug trafficking organizations. Although it could be considered a kidnapping (*secuestro*) or an illegal deprivation of freedom, scholars, journalists and public opinion agrees on assigning a particular term to this illegal practice. Even when a police officer participates in a *levantón*, he does it as a *narco* accomplice or employee.

According to the anthropologist Natalia Mendoza (2017), they are called *levantones* because they always involve getting the victim into a car and taking him outside his hometown. They normally imply two crimes, specifically, the abduction and the homicide of the victim. The researcher argues that, since *levantones* are discipline and punishment mechanisms within

[408] From the verb *levantar,* to pick up. The term *levantón* entered the media lexicon possibly around 2005 (Mendoza, 2018).

Drug Trafficking Organizations, the victims are somehow linked with *narco* activities[409]. As earlier discussed, to have a bond with *narcos* is a fuzzy notion since someone related to a *narco* could be another drug trafficker as much as the one who dates an ex-girlfriend of a narco, as Magaña's son's case illustrated before.

Furthermore, being a "thing" between *narcos*, the *levantón* notion reinforces two archetypical symbols: 1) following a certain code that inhibits random acts of violence or exerted against whomever such that *narco* violence is always for a *narco* reason; 2) seeing them as a different, separate and distinguishable group.

Described as an industry or as social phenomena, the otherness is the axis that crosses the whole narrative of the archetype, especially since none of them, from the old or the new generation, was born in Jalisco. They are a category apart from the regular society, yet they are seen as seeking to be part of us, "laundering" their deviation from social normality. To do so, they have to appear in the same photo, and they have the resources to achieve it, although they will remain like "the others" among us. Astorga (1995) claims that it is a sort of a social alchemy to convert economic capital into social and symbolic capital[410], "the transmutation from the stigma to the symbol (*del estigma al emblema)"* (p.79). Otherness and normalization seeking is the perfect complement to the sketch of "*the narco".*

The figure is quite well drawn in the placard that introduces the last room of Psychotropic Substances Museum (Text Box 2.5). Each previous room refers to their business, what they do, whereas the last one outlines to who they are.

Text Box 2.5 The *Narco* in the official discourse: placard exhibited at the Psychotropic Substances Museum, SEDENA

The Narco *Sub-culture*

Narcotráfico is not just organized crime anymore, it has given place to a subculture with its own literature, fashion, icons, music and even saints. The ramifications of this alternative culture, warps the political and economic system. It distorts the social and cultural sector where *narco* and society further intertwine and coexist with each other. Mainstream movies and the *narcocorridos* or *narco* folk songs, are the main media outlets used to spread and enhance the philosophy of the *narco*, which creates an unmistakably stereotypical image. *Narcotráfico* and its associated fake culture are permeating the collective subconscious. Disturbingly, its traits are more accepted, and even approximated by society more and more each day; those who subscribe to it do not seem to realize the severity of the issue.

[409] For a detailed discussion about *levantones* and its effects in communitarian relationships, reactions and meaning-making, see Mendoza, 2018.
[410] In this point, the author is borrowing Bourdieu notions of cultural and symbolic capital.

Way of life and Social Coexistence

Most *narcotraficantes*, originally from the countryside and poorly educated, have a stained obsession for access into the upper milieu of society. Co-ordinately, they launder their ill-gotten wealth, hoping for their social laundering, while encrusting among high society, investing limitless amount of money in order to do so. The mechanisms used to reach this end vary greatly, from sumptuous residences in exclusive real estate developments, acquisition of luxury cars, squandering on parties, donating to distinguished foundations, spreading money in their home town to seeking nexus with respectable families through marriage among their descendants.

Source: SEDENA. (2017). Mexico City Psychotropic Substances Museum.

The social laundering, however, is not fully achieved. Albeit the dominant narrative considers that *narcos* try to insert themselves in the upper-world, it is also stressed that they remain as a separate group, mostly due to their peasant origin. That could be vividly illustrated through the relatively new use of the term *buchón*[411], a sort of derivative of the *narco* look. Probably, the best explanation about this title is the one I gathered from Raymundo Chávez, a young agro-industrial who said:

> *A buchón is someone* ***that dresses like this****: with a Loius Vuitton belt, his shoes… like… Loius Vuitton, his Dolce & Gabbana shirt… but…* ***very… abusive!*** *I mean, it is visible… they carry their* mariconera[412]*, they carry… they obviously have* ***people protecting them****, eh… they* ***are surrounded by women****… and the women around… are* ***very… exotic****, I mean, not even those [who work] in the table [dance clubs] are like this, I mean… big boobs, big butts, big lips*[413]*… very [surgically] treated… ¡Corrientes!*[414] *[…] Do you know why they are called* buchones*? Is because of the whiskey Buchanan's, [he exaggerates the English accent],* ***they can't pronounce it correctly****… 'may I have a Buchanan's please' [he exaggerates the 'ch' sounds as if it were Spanish while he is mocking them], so they started being known as buchones.*
>
> Raymundo Chávez, Agro-Industrial Sector Businessman
> Zapopan, Jal., August 29th, 2015
> *(Q2-9)*

Chávez account recovers a lot of emblems of the *narco* archetype, but now under the name *buchón.* Whether the origin of the term that he explained is accurate or not, what it reveals is

[411] The title *buchón* is more and more used in the *narco's* argon, however, there is no yet an available meaning in the dictionaries (Spanish, Mexican use of Spanish or scholars Glossary of terms) to define it. In the article "Deslumbra narcomoda" (October 31st, 2010), *Reforma* newspaper, however, has defined it as a term originated in the Northern state of Sinaloa that used to make reference to the *Narcos* from the sierra, distinguished by their overloaded dressing style, with brand clothing and prominent jewellery. Now, according to the newspaper, has become a fashion style to which younger people aspire. Another version is that the term was coined to refer the Culiacán (Sinaloa) peasant who had big *buches* (mouths, even double chin). Thus, a *buchón* would be someone with a big mouth or double chin. Being the case, the bridge between a specific physical attribute and the *narco* title might be the stigmatization of Northern peasants (Fieldwork carnet, September 11th, 2015).

[412] It refers to men clutch bags (DRAE, 2018).

[413] As can be seen in the Appendix Q, in the original he uses "súper chichis, súper nalgas, súper labios".

[414] *Corriente* refers to a trashy or tacky (*vulgar*) person (DEM, 2018).

significant. The *Buchones* have enough money to drink an expensive drink in a fancy bar in Zapopan[415], but their limited education deprives them to name it properly. That merits the mocking tone with which this young businessman mimics them. According to Chávez, they are riches with no-style, since their branded clothing are worn in an inappropriate way. He himself dresses with brand names but certainly in a discreet way; a barely visible icon appears in his *Ralph Lauren* shirt[416].

In the description, it also stands out how people are considered as part of the accessories a *buchon* displays. That is shown while he is evoking bodyguards and women around this new version of *narco*.

The figure of bodyguards drives us straight to the notion of protection. Among the *buchones,* it fits with the image of a lack of style, since they are described in a flashy way as part of their courtiers, as in medieval times (Raphael, 2014). The same criticism is often formulated against the *mirreyes* or "new riches"[417].

There are two other ways in which protection appears within the *Narco* archetype: 1) The kind offered to avoid being robbed, kidnapped or killed, in other words, extortion and racketeering, which will be discussed in Chapter 4 and; 2) The image of armed peasants in charge of watching over the illegal plantations. In the Psychotropic Substances Museum, for instance, this scene is recreated using dummies. A peasant holding a rifle, modestly dressed, wearing *huaraches,* the traditional sandals of Mexican indigenous people (DEM, 2018) living in precarious conditions. In addition, a collection of messages, gathered by the Army on the field was written with bad spelling and even worse handwriting, request as "Please, sir, soldiers… if you let me to seed and grow [poppies or cannabis] I share"[418]. The countryside origin and the poor-education, once again, reinforces the stereotype, however, these *narcos* do not seem to enjoy the massive profits of "the most exotic and brutal industry on earth" as Wainwright (2016: 12) described the *Narco.* In the end, some diversity could fit into the *narco* category.

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[415] A bottle of whiskey Buchanan's in a bar is ranked as medium level drink regarding its price. Fieldwork carnet, January 15th, 2017.
[416] Fieldwork carnet, August 30th, 2015.
[417] The *mirreynato* is, according to Raphael (2014) a moral regime dominated by ostentation, arrogance, impunity, corruption, discrimination, inequality, disregard for hard work culture and the privileged inherent to the familial networks, in a context of a broken-down "social lift".
[418] Fieldwork carnet, January 26th, 2017.

Regarding women, Chávez goes from "exotic" to "trashy" depicting them. His language register markedly drops down, compared not only with the preceding minutes of our conversation, but also with the rest of the interviews I conducted. In other words, by saying *chichis*[419] to refer women breasts in the middle of a formal interview, he abandoned his sober tone to become tacky himself. Indeed, it is also possible to argue that he is showing a *machista* attitude, especially since he does not waste the opportunity to refer to the dancers of a nightclub as the extreme of vulgarism. In fact, he was even condescending towards me. For instance, during the interview, he asked me questions like a teacher applying an exam: "Where is *Yurécuaro*[420]? Do you know it?, -No, I answered, - Geography! he replied, stressing what I should learn[421].

Since I did not see his interaction with other men, I could not affirm he is *machista* rather than arrogant or pretentious. However, other elements that I will develop later in Chapter 5 might confirm that intuition. Chávez's account, besides significantly describing the *buchones,* suggests an appealing lead to follow, which has appeared several times throughout the chapter: the *narcos* (or the *buchones*) are there, sharing spaces with businessmen, becoming part of their landscape. Nevertheless, the way businessmen characterized *narco*s and the way they relate to them is the main theme of Chapter 5.

Thus far, the chapter has shown that *narcos* have been widely present in the *Tapatio* landscape, whether in the form of an archetype or due to increasing violence attributed to them. Yet, several leads suggest that the *Narco* could represent a threat to businessmen, not only as perpetrators of different crimes, but also because they accessed their social circles.

The previous chapter established property crimes, extortion, and racketeering as threats affecting the business sector. Such a scenario, accompanied with a long-lasting and significant presence of the *Narco* in the city, opens an avenue to explore how businessmen dealt with such challenges. That will be the main topic of the next part.

[419] It is a popular term used to refer women breasts (DEM, 2018).
[420] It is a municipality of Michoacán state with around 31,000 inhabitants (INEGI, 2017).
[421] Interview conducted with R. Chávez, Agro-Industrial Sector Businessman. (August 29th, 2015). Zapopan, Jal.

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Part II. Demanding Protection from Regular and Alternative Suppliers

> *"(W)e are in a far better position to realize the consequences for human existence when both, the public and the private spheres are gone, the public because it has become a function of the private, and the private because it has become the only common concern left"*
>
> Hannan Arendt[422]

There is no doubt that insecurity and violence patterns somehow shape the daily lives of citizens. Even though cities have been transformed into fortresses, entire communities are still forced to leave their hometowns and, ultimately, their countries (Raderstorf et al., 2017; Caldeira, 2000). The way an individual inhabits a city goes hand in hand with the kinds of threats they face or perceive and the resources they have to manage them.

Historically, businessmen in Guadalajara have struggled with diverse security challenges. As discussed in depth in Part I, an evaluation from the 1970s to our times has revealed that crime in a variety of modalities (property crime, racketeering and kidnapping) is a real or potential threat to those building and operating enterprises in the city. It seems fear of being a crime victim is a common feeling among the sector. Therefore, within a (potentially) violent social order set in place by criminal groups, the economic elite "codify and signify the logics of insecurity and violence" (Padilla Reyes and Arteaga Botello, 2019: 31), developing routine or strategic behaviours to remain safe. Thus, they avoid what they consider high-risk areas of town returning home early or maintaining a low profile in their community as daily measures of protection (Padilla Reyes and Arteaga Botello, 2019). While perhaps useful, these strategies are likely insufficient to manage risks which is why businessmen search for protection from other instances. Their demand for protection from an entanglement of entities is precisely the focal point of the next chapters.

Part II of this research aims to explore the conditions under which businessmen in a city such as Guadalajara establish rapport with governmental and nongovernmental actors to demand protection while facing what they perceive as a threat. Then, we will examine the manner in

[422] Arendt, H. (1958). *The Human Condition.* Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, p. 69.

which such a complex pattern of protection scenarios proposed in the Introduction takes shape in the case at hand.

More than considering the ensemble of actors separately, the provider-receiver relationship established between them will be the guiding concept. This will allow us to better understand what can be considered a local protection market since our observation will be delimited to an area where protection suppliers are able to directly contact demanders (Tajima, 2018); thus, a higher level of attention can be devoted to businessmen in our analysis.

The following three chapters are highly complementary in order to encompass the conditions under which businessmen are protected considering the context of multilateralization of policing as well as how that scheme has transformed collective life.

Chapter 3 is devoted to exploring the link between businessmen and the regular protection provider, in other words, the law enforcement system (quadrant I in Figure *i* in the Introduction). The main objective is to call into question the unsubtle yet dominant explanation of the proliferation of private security as well as the context of insecurity and violence in general, which up until now has been a corrupted police system incapable of delivering sufficient protection. Dismantling such a preconception allows for a more nuanced reading regarding the regular provider. As a discernable polycentric system, rather than the extinction of public agencies, the progressive devolution of some of its prerogatives is observable. This arrangement yields a personalized relationship between public agents and the "local notables". In the end, it will be clear that aligned with Hibou's (2004) observation, delegation does not necessarily imply a loss of power on the part of the government.

The alternative protection providers are at the centre of Chapter 4 (quadrants II-IV in Figure *i* in the Introduction). The overarching theme is the relationship between businessmen and the main protection suppliers, namely *i)* government agents under private contracts; *ii)* private security firms and; *iii)* criminal protectors. I will argue that purchasing protection occurs within a complex entanglement of violent entrepreneurs hardly fitting the preconceived notions of private-public or legal-illegal. In addition, contributing to the complexity of the landscape, the figure of law enforcers is quite present throughout the chapter. The intimate articulation among those actors based on coalition, collision or collusion, is rounded off by a business sector for which protection is not only a security issue but also one of the assets amidst a circle of reciprocity that grants other benefits.

The entanglement of government and non-government protection suppliers by no means represents of a retreat of the state but instead a reconfiguration, as will be clarified by integrating Chapters 3 and 4. Thus, the lack of clarity between private-public and legal-illegal boundaries serves as a mirror which reflects the way businessmen and their protection suppliers have historically managed protection and social control.

The previous section, besides revealing how significant property crimes, kidnapping and extortion are for businessmen, also provides evidence concerning how *Narco* related violence does not seem a threat for the local notables. If businessmen consider this to be "*narco's* business", it would be logical to conclude they might not develop protection mechanisms regarding that group, yet they do. Chapter 4 ends by offering clues as to how "*narcos* business" becomes at certain point, "businessmen's business".

Building on this initial insight, Chapter 5 goes further in exploring the relationship settled between *narcos* and the *Tapatio* business sector by challenging the dominant idea that the former are nothing but a violent threat for the patrimony and lives of the latter. Instead, based on businessmen's narratives, I discuss how these two characters have shared key socialization spaces historically and woven networks as business people, social actors and relatives. Hence both concepts of threat and protection acquire distinct features.

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Chapter 3. The Regular Provider of Protection and the Local Notables

> *"(...) what underlies is the malaise and lack of trust that policemen produce. As stated by a professional interviewed for my research: 'the police officer's image varies according to the level of cynicism of the one expressing an opinion: pigs, bastards, profiteers, thieves, gangsters, hitmen, illiterates, people under subjugation, drug addicts'. (...) [Once], while sharing lunch together, an architect graduated with honours ask me about my research subject. I tried to offer an 'interesting' synthesis of my project. After a long silence, my interlocutor said: 'Oh, you mean… you research the garbage'"*
>
> María Eugenia Suárez-De Garay[423]

Targeting the official nationalist rhetoric with ironic and sharp criticism, the Mexican novelist, playwright and journalist, Jorge Ibargüengoitia (1988) [1972] once stated that the social status of a policeman is that of the so-called *cácaro*[424]: the audience only remembers this figure during crises and in order to insult them. The context of crime and violence discussed in Part I could and has been taken as disastrous enough to trigger multiple analyses regarding the performance of Mexican police force in particular, and law enforcement agencies and agents in general.

Research on policing agencies significantly increased, especially in the context of the democratic transitions taking place during the 1980s and 1990s, initially to understand social control mechanisms following military dictatorships, but eventually to focus on police corps as research subjects separate from the armed forces (Aparicio, 2016). Two approaches stand out among this considerable body of literature, Mexico does not seem to be an exception. One approximation focuses on the scope and limitations of the reforms implemented in the context of political democratization and the adoption of a market-oriented economic model (López Alvarado, 2017; Sabet, 2012; Cruz, 2011; Uildriks, 2010; Uildriks, 2009; Bailey and Dammert, 2006; Dammert, 2005; Davis, 2012). The second focuses on the effects that police agency performance has on the establishment, support or reinforcement of democracy (Cruz, 2015; Alvarado and Davis, 2001).

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[423] Suárez- De Garay, M.E. (2006). *Los policías: una averiguación antropológica*. Guadalajara: ITESO. Translation is mine.

[424] Colloquial word to refer the projectionist at the movie theatre (DEM, 2019).

Both approaches share the idea that law enforcement institutions, especially police, perform deplorably. Corruption, incompetence and unlawful acts are commonly connected to these institutions (Shirk, 2010), which hinder the establishment of a trust based relationship with the local population, and ultimately, the achievement of government legitimacy (Alba Vega and Kruijt, 2007).

Starting from the idea that one of the main purposes of the modern police is the protection of constituencies' lives and properties (Clift, 1964 in Suárez de Garay, 2006), the deficient performance of law enforcement agencies and agents is commonly interpreted by policy makers as the source of poor protection patterns, opening avenues for the militarization of public security (Medeiros Passos, 2018). For scholars, the ultimate result is the proliferation of alternative protection providers which, either legally or illegally, tend to fill the void that public institutions leave behind (Alba Vega and Kruijt, 2007; Moloeznik, 2006; Arroyo, 2003; Skaperdas, 2001).

However, the performance of public police forces is far from black and white, ranging from deplorable to upstanding. For that reason, taking a look at law enforcement agencies and agents as protection providers remains pertinent.

This chapter aims to examine the rapport that businessmen in Guadalajara have established with professionals who individually or collectively employ certain knowledge and expertise as representatives of public organizations who produce protection. In other words, reference is made to the regular providers of this public service (Steen and Tuurnas, 2018; Parks et al., 1981). Across three sections, I argue that despite the poor reputation law enforcement agencies possess, businessmen have approached them in order to be protected under specific circumstances, interacting with the law enforcement structure through multiple and diverse channels, by what can be defined as a personalized, as opposed to institutional contact. Thus, instead of waiving the regular provider, businessmen have used them selectively.

In the first section, within the context of democratization, I describe empirically how local level law enforcement agencies became highly fragmented and developed a polycentric system where distinct levels of financial resources, expertise, integrity and, ultimately, capacities to provide protection were found.

The second section shows that, in conjunction with fragmentation, public agencies favoured the delegation of protection prerogatives to the business sector which, eventually, opened the door to a hybrid scheme of provision established to protect an ensemble of "local notables".

The reader will notice that, in addition to archival research, these two sections rely particularly on the interview I conducted with the former Governor Alberto Cárdenas. I acknowledge that building on one interview might bring about significant bias in my account due to the lack of confirmation or contradictory sources. Nevertheless, Cárdenas' account is unique as he was the first governor of Jalisco to have come from a political party other than the PRI. Thus, his memories come from a privileged stand point that no one else has had or will have. Furthermore, contrary to other politicians and bureaucrats, accustomed (even trained) to offer a few details during these kind of interactions (Chamboredon et al., 1994), the former Governor was generous and spoke openly about his administration. Still, any possible bias will be minimized by not taking his word as the incontrovertible truth regarding his administration, but as his version of those times.

Once the period of democratic transition as a turning point has been explored, the more contemporary rapport held between the business sector and the regular protection provider is discussed in the third section. Analysing the features of the relationship between businessmen and public security officers, I argue that twenty years after the arrival of partisan alternation, it is possible to observe a personalized interaction between businessmen as "local notables" and a polycentric law enforcement system.

Before going into detail, it is pertinent to outline that, as Uildriks (2010) states "'a Mexican police force does not exist per se, yet we find a kaleidoscope of different police forces" (p. 61). Only to begin to understand the complexity, it is possible to observe that police agencies multiplied during the revolutionary period in terms of their competences, (preventive and investigative) specific aspects of governance (highway and migration, etc.) and the related government level (Piccato, 2017) [425].

As a Federal republic, three different orders of government must be considered. At the state and municipal level, multiple bodies constitute the first line of public policing, albeit not the only one. At the National level, for instance, agencies such as the Ministry of Defence

[425] On the political factors that contribute to explain the configuration of the kaleidoscope since the emergence of the post-revolutionary Mexican state, see Davis, 2012.

(SEDENA), the Ministry of the Navy (SEMAR), the Federal Police (PF) or National Institute of Migration (INM) take part, somehow, in policing. Even the Federal Attorney's Office (PGR) is able to carry out detentions or to apply other coercive measures through the credible threat of using public force. Although, this last measure could be considered a limited incursion, it could be still considered policing[426]. It should be regarded that, at the national level, policing will likely be concentrated into one corps soon, as the new president Andrés Manuel López Obrador (2018-2024) passed a constitutional reform to create the so-called National Guard. The agency will be integrated by officers coming from SEDENA, SEMAR and PF, and thereafter the latter will be dissolved[427].

At this time, in view of the before mentioned complexity, I will address not only the police but also the law enforcement system. Therefore, by using the term law enforcement agents or officials, I am referring to all security forces able to use public force while exercising a modality of policing, such as patrolling, arrest or detention, among others.

3.1 Law enforcement fragmentation or the establishment of a polycentric system

"And now, what do we do?", according to the local journalist Eugenia Barajas[428], that was the first phrase pronounced by Alberto Cárdenas after discovering he had won the race for Governor, on February 12th, 1995. For the first time in more than 60 years, the PAN would rule Jalisco state, displacing the hegemonic PRI and its elite. In Barajas' words, Cárdenas was not expecting to win. As stated elsewhere in the text, although PAN's victory was multifactorial, the rising crime rates that Jalisco had been facing at the time, might have played an important role.

The former Governor Alberto Cárdenas (1995-2001) recalls having three main challenges at the beginning of his administration: 1) to boost the depressed local economy, amidst the

[426] The author acknowledges the generous contribution of Paola Cicero and Ximena Suárez in order to clarify this point.
[427] Decreto por el que se reforman, adicionan y derogan diversas disposiciones de la Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicano, en materia de Guardia Nacional. Diario Oficial de la Federación, Mexico City, March 26th , 2019.
[428] Interview conducted with Eugenia Barajas, Journalist. (October 16th, 2015). Zapopan, Jal.

context of the economic crisis of 1994; 2) to promote the reformulation of the Federal pact[429] and; 3) to improve the local state capacity to face the wave of insecurity and violence[430].

To address such goals, the first *Panista* administration launched and implemented numerous reforms. According to Cárdenas, behind those major changes was a team that was "providentially comprised of (…) decent and honourable people. There were no *pillos*[431], no *truhanes*[432], [it was] an extraordinary team that perfectly matched [among themselves]". Certainly, recognizing this providential aspect after reaffirming his belief in God reinforces the proximity of PAN members to the Catholic Church. Moreover, in his description of his staff, integrity stands out representing "the distinction from PRI administrations", as he said.

The Governor's staff recruitment process, he emphasized, opened the door for "the best men and women" to be part of the public office, since rather than PAN members, he hired experts and professionals[433]: "I think it was the first plural cabinet… in the country (…) for instance, for the economic cabinet, only businessmen were appointed", the former governor argued. Through that door, businessmen entered the public arena. For some authors, Alberto Cárdenas' cabinet, and the two subsequent PAN administrations, might be described as the business sector's seizure of public power (Regalado Santillán, 2012). However, as discussed in the Introduction, businessmen in Jalisco had more lengthy careers formally participating in public offices. If anything, in Cardenas' administration businessmen adapted to the post PRI-era way of governing (Gómez Valle, 2011), especially considering that support from the business sector had not always been granted to the former Governor Alberto Cárdenas, at least, not while he was a candidate. During the interview, he recalls that some businessmen

[429] See the Introduction.
[430] Interview conducted with the Jalisco's former Governor Alberto Cárdenas. (April 22nd, 2018). Mexico City. Hereafter, the quotations attributed to the former Governor come from the same interview. Otherwise specified.
[431] Colloquial term to name a person that cleverly and unashamedly takes advantage from others, generally in order to steal (DEM, 2019).
[432] Someone who lives from tricks and frauds, a rascal (DRAE, 2019).
[433] The kind of recruitment Cárdenas described during the interview is similar to the one announced by the former president Vicente Fox after winning in 2000. His promise to recruit public officers through head-hunters was quickly read as an effect of his trajectory as businessman, since Fox was the chief executive of Coca-Cola in the mid-1970s ("Fox contrata a cinco 'cazatalentos' para seleccionar a sus ministros". (July 12th, 2000). *El País*). In that sense, Alberto Cárdenas' account could be influenced by Vicente Fox's image, since he recognized Fox as a powerful character, even before being presidential candidate (while he was Guanajuato state governor). However, the recruitment process aside political parties or bureaucracy ranks must be analysed from a wider perspective. For instance, more than the effect of Fox, Cárdenas and the rest of *Panistas* governors' styles, that could be reflecting the dominant arrival of technocrats at the public administration combined with the lack of a career system of civil service in Mexico.

did not even agree to speak with him out of fear or because they had an allegiance to a PRI candidate. "A few businessmen agreed to talk to me publicly, some others preferred to meet me in someone's house, at night where 'nobody knows that we have met you, and if you tell someone, I'll deny it'", Cárdenas accounted.

During the PRI era, besides the limited presence of the business sector, the cabinet and public officers were characterized by two main attributes according to Alberto Cárdenas' remembrance: 1) a reputation linked with adjectives such as *pillos* or *truhanes* and; 2) their partisan profile which led to politicised policing and, ultimately, the perpetration of arbitrary acts, such as those linked to the so-called Dirty War.

The democratic transition was supposed to fix such flaws. In fact, in Latin America, democratization is commonly considered a turning point not only in regards to building institutions which guarantee transparent and fair electoral processes, but also in terms of (re)constructing the institutions responsible for promoting the rule of law (Diamond, 2008). Since democracy would render the relationship between law enforcement agents and citizens more accountable, repression and abusive behaviours would no longer be the main policing modality (Light et al., 2015).

However, regarding public security policy, both attributes are still present in scholars' diagnosis of the democratic era. Even further, corruption and "political policing" (Uildriks, 2009: 202) are identified among the factors behind the persistence of crime, despite the efforts of reform undertaken (Sabet, 2012; Uildriks, 2009). In this case, more than pointing out institutional reform, it is pertinent to focus on the extent to which such reforms have assisted in "escaping an authoritarian past" (Cruz, 2011: 8) in order to better understand the provision of government protection before and after democratic transitions.

In Jalisco, even if the Governor Alberto Cárdenas has been described as a popular although not a particularly charismatic politician (Modoux, 2006), the reality is that an apparently naïve and inexperienced political elite implemented reforms to combat insecurity, having at their disposal corrupt and poorly trained elements (Santillán and Moloeznik, 1998). Yet, some scholars claim that *Panista* governments in Jalisco were not much different than previous PRI administrations as they did not replace the elites (Arellano Ríos, 2008; Hurtado and López Cortés, 2004). We must ask whether this is only politics as usual or perhaps a try at teaching an old dog new tricks.

In what follows in this section, my intention is neither to determine to what extent policing in Jalisco and Guadalajara has been carried out by incompetent or corrupt officers, nor to explore the level of corruption that could be associated with Cardenas' staff and cabinet. This is partly due to the fact that studying police corps and their performance is not the main objective of this research, not to mention the methodological challenge that this kind of endeavour would imply[434]. Instead, what I am after is to show that, during the first *panista* administration in Jalisco, a major shift occurred within the law enforcement system that continued during the three subsequent administrations, namely, the multiplication and fragmentation of the state agencies in charge of the public security agenda. As far as this research is concerned, such a transformation allows us to make two assumptions: 1) that state agencies and officers involved in policing have diversified in terms of operative processes, results, access to the public budget and other resources, as well as exposure to the public eye, among others and; 2) that such diversity concurs with businessmen's demand for protection (which tend to be heterogeneous) engendering interactions among those who demand and supply protection.

It has been largely explained in Chapter 1 that since the 1970s and in the context of the Dirty War, the state responded to the violence generated in Guadalajara by *guerrilla* groups and armed student organizations with a strong presence of Federal agents on the ground via the Army, Judicial Police, or DFS agents. It was also stated that these government and nongovernment violent actors represented a threat for businessmen through extortion and kidnapping.

At that point in time, the President had supposed strict control over the Governors' space to manoeuvre. In Jalisco, the Governors' image had long been associated with someone who had not group up or lived in Jalisco, as they were (s)elected by the incumbent President rather than the *Tapatios*[435]. Thus, a discrepancy between the President and a Governor would result in the decision of the former to relocate federal agents outside the state, jeopardizing the chances of the Governor to manage social order which is precisely what occurred in Jalisco, as previously discussed.

[434] For an interesting discussion on the methodological challenge on studying corruption within an organization, emphasizing how anthropology has and would contribute on this regard see Arellano Gault and Trejo Alonso, 2017.
[435] Interview conducted with J.J. Doñán, Journalist. (October 3rd, 2015). Guadalajara, Jal.

Although at that historic moment, National level agencies exerted strong control over local agencies aligned to the counter-insurgency agenda, the remarkable presence of federal forces in the local field was not exempt from tension and conflict between the three government orders.

As an illustration, a chronicle published in the *Gaceta Mercantil* in August 1977 (Figure 3.1), reports how a DFS agent assaulted a woman in a hotel, after which the owner called the municipal police. Despite the committed offenses, the Tlaquepaque police released the woman's aggressor after learning he was a Federal officer "as a consideration towards the agency he was part of", said the chief of the municipal police department. However, the DFS agent returned to the hotel, this time to kill the owner and to abduct three of the employees. The Tlaquepaque police tried to intervene, however, an armed group, arguably also members of the DFS intercepted them, kidnapping the officers and disappearing the patrol car. The incident triggered a vigorous debate among the three levels of government. The municipal authorities stated that DFS agents frequently violated municipal sovereignty, appealing the Governor's intervention to guarantee Jalisco's autonomy. Federal authorities, on their part, suggested that local public forces were trying to damage DFS agent reputation, notwithstanding the support the latter had offered to face the *guerrilla* groups in Jalisco. Regarding the then Governor Romero de Velasco (1977-1983), he made attempts to mediate between the municipal and the federal security agencies.

The episode shows not only the abusive behaviour of DFS agents operating in the area, but also the tensions that their presence entailed vis-à-vis local forces. It also suggests that the alignment of municipal agents to the control of the Army and DFS, if existent, was solely partial.

Two other factors shall be outlined before moving forward: 1) the local press covered the case, demonstrating that during the so-called Dirty War, not every abuse committed by federal law enforcers remained clandestine and; 2) the event called the attention of the business sector, since the detailed chronicle was featured on the *Gaceta Mercantil* pages. Such interest was likely because the hotel owner, a sector member, was shot dead. If anything, the incident might have had some effects on the way businessmen related to the federal, state and municipal levels in seeking protection, as the members of the Chamber of Commerce addressed an open letter to the Governor expressing their concern regarding the

violence and compromised position of security agencies[436]. This kind of public claim has appeared on the *Gaceta Mercantil* mostly when shocking events reach the business sector[437], for instance, when one of its celebre members was kidnapped, as will be detailed later in Part III.

Figure 3.1 Tension and conflict between security agencies in the field during the 1970s: an illustrative episode



5

HISTORIA DE UNA VIOLACION

Julio 23, 1977

En la madrugada, un joven no sobrio molestaba a una dama en el hotel El Tapatío. El personal de seguridad del negocio le llamó la atención, y al notar que estaba armado lo entregó a la Policía Municipal de Tlaquepaque. En la comandancia de Policía el detenido se identificó como Guillermo Orozco Loreto, y exhibió credencial que lo acreditaba como agente de la Dirección Federal de Seguridad.

Las autoridades municipales afirman que no se le dejó en inmediata libertad por falta de **capacidad decisoria** de la guardia, pero que al presentarse el jefe de la Policía lo dejó libre sin sanción alguna, no obstante las faltas cometidas, en atención al cuerpo de seguridad de que forma parte. Para ese momento ya se había presentado el regidor del Ayuntamiento de Guadalajara, Ing. Ismael Orozco Loreto, delante de quien se dieron excusas por la breve detención sufrida por Guillermo mientras se esclarecía su identidad.

El mismo 23 de julio, por la noche, un grupo armado irrumpió en el hotel El Tapatío, asesinó a balazos al empleado señor J. Jesús Camacho y secuestró a otros tres empleados. Al solicitarse garantías a la Policía Municipal de Tlaquepaque, ésta envió una patrulla con un chofer y tres agentes, misma que fue interceptada a mano armada por personas que se identificaron como elementos de la Dirección Federal de Seguridad. No se hizo resistencia, pues la policía ignoraba lo acontecido y no tenía razón para oponerse. Policías, chofer y patrulla fueron secuestrados por los elementos que los interceptaron.

Julio 27

La patrulla desaparecida apareció en las calles de Tlaquepaque, sin daño alguno. Poco después fueron apareciendo todos los secuestrados, que hasta la fecha se niegan a hacer declaración alguna.

Sin la menor atención al Ayuntamiento, el secretario de la Defensa Nacional, Gral. Félix Galván López, llamó a su despacho en la ciudad de México al jefe de la Policía Municipal, capitán retirado del H. Ejército Nacional, y le reclamó **la falta de respeto a la credencial** del joven Guillermo Orozco Loreto. Se le dieron respetuosamente las explicaciones del caso, aun sin ser necesario por tratarse de un hecho del fuero común y de indudable competencia municipal.

Julio 31

Dos periódicos locales, El Occidental y El Diario, publican un desplegado ordenado por el Ayuntamiento de Tlaquepaque. Firman el alcalde Marcos Montero Ruiz y ocho regidores, pero no lo hace el secretario y síndico, Lic. Fernando A. Gallo Lozano.

En ese documento se afirma que ningún integrante o colaborador del Ayuntamiento anda armado, fuera del cuerpo de seguridad pública, y que no tienen guardias personales porque no los necesitan ni tienen querellas con nadie. Y que por ese motivo es mayor la indignación con la que denuncian **la violación a la autonomía municipal, a las garantías**

Source: Gazette Bank of Images 1970-2016. (August 15th, 1977: 5). (Illustrative extract. The entire chronicle is available at Appendix 3.1).

Despite potential tension among the three levels, the significant dependence of state governments on federal agencies contributes to the explanation that during PRI

[436] The open letter is also available at the Appendix 3.1.
[437] Gazette Bank of Images 1970-2016.

administrations, state level agencies in charge of policing were few and closely controlled by the Governor. Back then, the Government Secretary-General (from now on referred to as the Secretary-General) and the Jalisco State Attorney General were two players. The first was the Governors' right-hand, responsible for propelling state domestic policy[438]. He was in charge of the Department of Public Security and Social Prevention and consequently, the State Preventive Police. The Attorney General's "primary job was to conduct patrols, maintain public order, prevent crimes and administrative violations, and be the first responder to crime scene" (Sabet, 2012: 11).

Under the Secretary's control was also the Secret Service Office, which was abolished in 1981, the Office for Missing and Detained Persons and a Specialized Group to support Public Security (or Specialized Squad). Although specific details on prerogatives and performance are not part of the present research, it is indeed possible to argue that they must have been part of the key mechanisms of control that the government employed during the fight against the *guerrilla* and the Communist threat, not only in Guadalajara but in Latin America, the so-called state "parallel services" (Alba Vega and Kruijt, 2007: 485). These so-called "specialized forces" should be an interesting lead to follow, notably considering that, as stated in the literature review that introduces Part II, such groups became death squads quite often (Huggins, 2000a; Huggins, 2000b; Huggins, 1997; Huggins, 1991).

The second most important person on the local political landscape also headed the Inter-municipal Directorate of Public Security of the Metropolitan Region, supposedly coordinating the state and municipal level policing agencies and heading the Inter-municipal Police which was dismantled by the Governor Guillermo Cossío Vidaurri (1989-1992), in spite of the fact that he had made the commitment of enforcing and improving police capacity (Regalado Santillán, 2012). Through the Department of Public Security and Social Prevention, the Secretary-General of the Government also was in charge of the Auxiliary Police, a sort of hybrid (public-private) force created to transport valuables that eventually became a source of selective protection for businessmen[439].

[438] A schema with the evolution of law enforcement scaffolding will be provided later in the section, in order to illustrate all the changes I will be progressively discussing (Figure 3.2)
[439] A comprehensive discussion about Auxiliary Police and the schema of selective protection provision will be developed later in Chapter 4.

On the other hand, the State Attorney who was not autonomous from the Governor, was in charge of the State Judicial Police (or ministerial police) and the public prosecutors (*ministerios públicos*). The former were responsible for "investigating crimes and carrying out warrants" (Sabet, 2012: 11).

Although the list of agencies involved in policing during the PRI era seems vast, some factors allow us to presume that they operated in a centralized, vertical way, aligned with the Governors' wishes. For instance, since the Secretary-General, the State Attorney General and even the head of the Public Security Department, appointed by the Governor, were usually rose from the ranks of the PRI, their designation was more a political than a technical oriented decision. For public officers, that represented significant incentives to show loyalty towards the Governor, especially considering their long-term odds for achieving a promising political career.

Certainly, that should not be read from the usual PRI's image as a "homogeneous, vertical, centralized organism, with a unique commander [the President] who achieved imposing his willingness without any contestation from party's members" (Hernández Rodriguez, 2016: 13). On the contrary, tensions and disputes within the PRI were highly possible, especially at the local level, as the hegemonic party was composed by "diverse groups which imposed diverse practices and, sometimes, they provoked confrontations that, however, did not jeopardize party's permanence" (Hernández Rodríguez, 2016: 13). In that case, the incentive to comply with governor's project relied on "the most appreciated mechanism of control and discipline among the [*priista*] elite" (Hernández Rodríguez, 2016: 243), namely, the Executive's power to eventually nominate his successor. Then, loyalty, might be worthwhile.

Since the onset of Alberto Cardenas' administration, the above described configuration greatly changed. If the transformation were explained in one phrase, it would be "the significant fragmentation of the local law enforcement system and the realignment of the agenda of politicization". How that occurred and the implications for providing protection for the business sector will be explored in this chapter.

Concerning public security, the first half of Cardenas' administration has been described as a period when an important public discussion regarding the rise of property crimes and other offenses took place around (Arellano Ríos, 2008). Businessmen, in that regard, played a major part. Although that will be developed later in the chapter and in even greater depth in

Part III, it is important to consider that their demands to improve policing and to guarantee protection at that time were clear and explicit. Partially articulating the business sector's demands, Cardenas' cabinet launched a project in December of 1997, entitled Jalisco's Public Security and Justice Administration Programme (*Programa Jalisco de Seguridad Pública y Procuración de Justicia*). It was described by the government at the time as being "one of the most ambitious and comprehensive institutional and public policy plans in Jalisco's history"[440]. The programme's main objectives and strategies are evoked in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1 Jalisco's Public Security and Justice Administration Programme (1998-2001)

General Objectives	Strategies
• Reduce crime rates • Effective abolition of impunity, avoiding advantageous scenarios for organized crime • Recover public opinion, trust and credibility in law enforcement institutions	• Modernization of legal framework • Administrative and technologic modernization • Professionalization of public servants • Modernization of facilities, equipment and special tactics • Organization and participation of the community • Specific operative projects

Source: Prepared by the author based on Cárdenas Jiménez, A. (February, 1999). *Cuarto Informe de Gobierno*. Jalisco, México.

What the government announced actually became an important piece of institutional re-engineering, based on a design commissioned to a private consultancy firm, as the former Governor explained:

> *So, we saw that the security issue was red hot. And when we started [to run the state] it got even hotter! So, it was important that the Government Secretary be completely aware of the need for political reform and to* ***create an entity focused exclusively on public security*** *[issues]… we hired a firm, here in Mexico and I think we did it right,* ***it was a consultancy… kind of expensive****, but the institutional design was 100% appropriate. Because, I think it was during the second year [of the administration]… that we started seeing that* ***they [criminals] were affecting important businessmen*** *[…]. Then, within these reforms we created* ***an exemplary and extraordinary anti-kidnapping entity****.*
>
> Alberto Cárdenas Jiménez
> Former Governor of Jalisco (1995-2001)
> Mexico City, April 22nd, 2018
> *(Q3-1)*

[440] Cárdenas Jiménez, A. (February, 1999). *Cuarto Informe de Gobierno.* Jalisco, México.

Commissioning the institutional design to a private firm, besides a feature of a new wave of public management, was not exempt from criticism and debate. The former Governor himself recognized that he received disapproval in that regard, especially coming from opposition parties and the local Congress[441]. Years after, he still considers it was worth investing a significant amount of money on such acute institutional design, especially since "everyone from his own trench was willing to do something [regarding crime figures]", as he asserted. In fact, this consultancy project seems to have been a collaborative endeavour carried out by both Jalisco's government and businessmen, since presumably the public budget was accompanied by the financial contribution of the private sector. Impersonating business sector voices and alluding to this collaboration, the former governor mentioned that "for this study, as it is very expensive, we can throw in half of the money[442]".

So far, two leads direct our attention to the business sector. First, the government decision to implement the process of institutional re-engineering that was triggered by the fact that "important businessmen" had been affected by crime patterns, especially kidnapping[443] and; second, that members of the business sector would co-fund such an expensive project design. It would not be surprising, then, that businessmen were able to have privileged access to law enforcement agencies compared to the rest of the citizens. In addition, it is possible to claim that, during Cardenas' administration, the relationship between the business sector and the *panista* government was primarily collaborative regarding the security agenda. The former supported the governor's decisions and the latter paid special attention to the sector. Yet, what did the institutional reform carried out during Cárdenas administration entail? How did it affect the rapport between the business sector and the law enforcement system?

As part of the *Programa Jalisco*, more than twenty bills and laws were either created, amended or, at least, presented before the local Congress[444]. Regarding policing agencies, as can be seen in Figure 3.2, those times marked the beginning of the continual creation of

[441] More details on the debate surrounding the anti-kidnapping specialized unit will be provided in Part III.
[442] In Spanish, the former governor used the expression "*le metemos la mitad [del dinero]".*
[443] Certainly, the "exemplary and extraordinary anti-kidnapping entity" mentioned by the former Governor should not be overlooked by the reader, especially since, back-then, kidnapping was an offence particularly addressed against businessmen and because of the prominent role that the sector played during the creation of such agency. However, this subject will be the guiding line of Part III and, in order to avoid unnecessary redundancies, I do not take the discussion any further now.
[444] Cárdenas Jiménez, A. (February 1999). *Cuarto Informe de Gobierno.* Jalisco, México; Cárdenas Jiménez, A. (February, 2000). *Quinto Informe de Gobierno*. Jalisco*,* México; Cárdenas Jiménez, A. (February, 2001). *Sexto Informe de Gobierno, Alberto Cárdenas Jiménez*. Jalisco, México.

numerous agencies, each of which would hold partial responsibility (and power) in terms of the policing process, likely overlapping in more than one case.

In 1998, Governor Cárdenas decreed the creation of the Secretariat of Public Security, Civil Protection, Prevention and Social Rehabilitation. The new local ministry absorbed the policing responsibilities that had historically been carried out by the Secretary- General. According to Cárdenas, as a government in transition much attention was devoted to the imminent political transformation which entailed developing and implementing reforms related to new federalism, municipal reinforcement and democratic instances, yet at the same time, public security could not been neglected. He pointed out[445] "they decided to divide public security from the political agenda". However, distancing public security from the political agenda did not imply de-politicizing it. An eloquent demonstration would be the frequent disputes that the former Governor recalls between the Secretary-General and the State Attorney[446]:

> *Then, they [the Secretary and the Attorney]* ***engaged in frequent confrontations****… from the beginning, they just* chocaron[447]*, and sometimes in the ordinary-law operatives… the… the confrontations were… [Impersonating the Secretary-General's voice] 'Don't interfere, man'… and I had to reprimand my Secretary… 'Hey, man, what do you mean, don´t interfere… he is the Attorney… I mean, this is about justice procuration…', then, I used to see the* ***Secretary- General very close to his military*** *[the Secretary of Public Security] and…* ***the Attorney… resisting*** *[…] until we achieved a good way out for him (…).*
>
> Alberto Cárdenas Jiménez
> Former Governor of Jalisco (1995-2001)
> Mexico City, April 22nd, 2018
> *(Q3-2)*

At a first glance, the image of the "providential cabinet" sketched earlier by the former governor becomes blurry. Beyond that, the quote shows that, despite the institutional transformation carried out by Alberto Cárdenas, the public security agenda was not necessarily depoliticized. Focusing specifically on three axes found in Cárdenas' words makes this more visible.

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[445] E-mails exchange with former governor of Jalisco, Alberto Cárdenas, (January 17th - 22nd, 2017).

[446] During Alberto Cárdenas administration, the replacement of security cabinet members was frequent, while the economic cabinet was very steady. Cardenas, himself, did not mention the names of his collaborators during the interview and, although it is possible to trace them, I intentionally avoid to explicitly mention their names and periods of the public servants alluded in the former Governor's account to keep the attention on their profiles rather than on themselves.

[447] *Chocar* (lit. to crash). He uses the crashing metaphor to express the opposite temper of both members of his cabinet.

First, his account clarifies that despite creating a Secretary of Public Security to disentangle that agenda from the political reforms being carried out by the Secretary- General, both cabinet members were very close and the latter appeared to maintain a certain level of control over the responsibilities of the former. In addition, while referring to the Secretary of Public Security as "his military", Cárdenas outlines the appropriation that the Secretary-General had over this member of his own cabinet, as well as the distance that the former Governor took himself from his subordinate.

Second, the involvement of the Secretary-General in the public security agenda was not necessarily separated from his political ambitions. Going deeper into the confrontations between his right-hand and the State Attorney, the former Governor recalls other episodes in which the Secretary-General, his "number two", as he called him, exceeded boundaries gaining prominence over security policy. For Cárdenas, the main explanation was the intention of his collaborator to become the next Governor. Contemplating, he shared a lesson he took from that experience: as a leader, keep a watch on your right-hand's expectations and ambitions.

> *I also saw this at the Federal level (…) I think… when* ***they,*** *the 'number two',* ***are possible candidates*** *[to succeed the President] … that's no good…* ***it's not a good idea*** *that the 'number two' [has such a will]… mostly if he had not responded [optimally] to the most important challenges. When I had this 'number two'… yes! I saw him as a successor!* ***Certainly, for me, the leading one****… the 'number one'* ***has to visualize****, almost from the beginning,* ***how many horses he has*** *to… how many horses are able to start [the race]*[448]*, right?*
>
> Alberto Cárdenas Jiménez
> Former Governor of Jalisco (1995-2001)
> Mexico City, April 22nd, 2018
> *(Q3-3)*

Third, besides the fact that the institutional reform did not depoliticize the security agenda, the anecdote of the Secretary-General also shows that, at least at the local level, policing retained some features associated with authoritarian rule. This suggests that the first PAN government, despite the expensive reform implemented, was not able to detach law enforcement agencies from such a past.

For instance, coming from the ranks of the Army, the Secretary of Public Security's profile illustrates that PAN's victory had not changed certain features of policing. On the one hand,

[448] He is clearly evoking the well-known "horse race" metaphor to refer the electoral competition.

it has been documented that the presence of military officers heading civilian security forces was common practice in the early 1990s, nationwide (Arzt, 2003). In Jalisco, the military command of civil security body would become commonplace during Cosío Vidaurry's administration (1989-1992) (Regalado Santillán, 2012). On the other hand, the persistence of such profiles at the head of policing has had important implications on the militarization of public security policy (Medeiros Passos, 2018). Shaping the new regimes' (in)ability to control violence produced by its own agents (Cruz, 2011) and rendering social control expectations more punitive, even criminal, (Rodrigues Fernandes, 1991) by both protection auspices and providers should be contemplated (Müller, 2016).

Accurately illustrating the former point, the following episode started when Alberto Cárdenas attempted to fire the military officer in charge of the Secretary of Public Security. However, to better understand the anecdote, it must be clarified that the alluded Secretary was not only a member of the military, but a blood relative of Jesús Gutiérrez Rebollo, a prominent Army General[449].

In 1996, President Zedillo appointed General Gutiérrez Rebollo as commissioner of the PGR's National Institute to Combat Drugs (INDC), an entity created in 1993 and reformed later "to undertake the specialized work in the broader fight against organized crime (…)[whose creation] seemed more of a political gesture in response to US pressure than an effective project to professionalize forces in the fight against drug trafficking" (Arzt, 2000: 116). Shockingly, in February 1997, General Gutiérrez Rebollo was arrested and prosecuted for having protecting the drug lord Amado Carrillo Fuentes and his organization before heading the INDC (Astorga, 2000). Allegedly, being Mexico's drug Czar, the General used his position to continue protecting Carrillo Fuentes' activities, while pursuing the drug trafficker's main rival, namely, the Arellano Félix Organization (AFO) (Pimentel, 2000)[450]. Although the Zedillo administration faced diverse allegations of "narco-politics" (Curzio, 2000: 89), General Gutiérrez Rebollo's case was remarkable due to his position within the

[449] Although throughout the text, the anonymity of the sources and alluded figures has been consistent, in the following anecdote the real names of those involved will be displayed based on two criteria: 1) as it will be seen, General Gutiérrez's profile is unique and relevant to support the argument and; 2) the case is publicly known, therefore, in what follows there is not a disclosure, nor a risk for someone's security.
[450] Gutiérrez Rebollo died in 2013 while serving a forty-year sentence ("Muere el general Gutiérrez Rebollo". (December 19th, 2013). *Milenio*). For more details on Gutiérrez Rebollo's case see Fazio, 1998.

highest decision-making circles, but also since it showed the links between drug trafficking organizations, the General Attorney's Office and the Army.

According to the former Governor Alberto Cárdenas, while he still had a good reputation, General Gutiérrez Rebollo had recommended his son-in-law to be appointed as Jalisco's Secretary of Public Security. Considering that Gutiérrez Rebollo was head of the 5th and 15th Military Region[451] in the late 1980s (Fazio, 1998), it is possible to assume that he held long-standing connections with local authorities, whether *priista* or *panista*[452] Thus, Ihis recommendation was likely to have had significant weight among local elites. Yet some rumours began to spread regarding the Secretary's integrity (and his father-in-law's) following certain operations and the inability to carry out arrests. Finally, this uncomfortable situation led the governor to consider making some decisions regarding this member of his cabinet:

> *(…) then, you start to connect the dots… […] in that moment, I took the phone and I told the Secretary-General 'he [the Secretary of Public Security] is done, he leaves now!'.* ***I also received a call from the Army*** *[saying] 'don't you dare remove him, don't move him, don't move him!', [I went] 'He is out… this is my structure, I'm in charge here and he is out!'. [They went] 'Look, this is…' 'He is out!' [governors' answered]… later, at night, he wanted a meeting… many…* ***the man was harsh!*** *The day after… I realized that… someone had said that I was in the Chamber of Commerce.* ***Around 800 security officers were there****, entering the Chamber… there was a ceremony happening..., and they [the officers] entered breaking doors and windows,* ***they were coming after me!*** *They realized I was not there, that I was at the official Government residence… so they went… a whole contingency with dozens of patrol cars… screaming not to remove the Capitan. They arrived to the official Government residence, they arrived and… the doors were closed… but someone opened them from inside … someone opened them and* ***nobody was able to stop them****. They went directly to my office and yes… then,* ***I thought they were going to kill me right there!*** *That was when* ***I called President Zedillo****, I told him 'Mr. President, this is happening… for these and those reasons, and I think* ***the only one able to stop them is the… [Secretary's] father-in-law!'****. And like this, a few minutes went by… [minutes] that seemed endless! … right? You feel the minutes are… that you will no longer [resist] … out of the sudden… the officers are gone, right? It was like that!... this is it, when you decide there will be no more… you take the risk with all its consequences, right?*
>
> Alberto Cárdenas Jiménez
> Former Governor of Jalisco (1995-2001)
> Mexico City, April 22nd, 2018
> *(Q3-4)*

[451] Both with headquarters in Guadalajara (Fazio, 1998).
[452] To go further on this intuition, see General Amaya Rodríguez's case, discussed on Chapter 1.

Alongside the persistence of Military influence on local law enforcement agencies, the episode also sheds light on the limited influence the Governor had on the public security agenda. It is possible to expect that having been the first to be democratically elected could have granted him more space to manoeuvre. Based on his legitimacy and the support of the population; nevertheless, Cárdenas' account suggests something closer to limited power. Such a constraint can be recalled from memories shared during the interview, for instance, when he made an effort to mediate between both collaborators and, at the end, he prepared a "good way out" for the state attorney, overlooking how far his Secretary-General was jeopardizing the principle of institutional reform Cárdenas had proposed. When he called the Secretary-General in order to fire the Secretary of Public Security (his own subordinate); and more plainly, when he called the President to trigger the instruction from the Secretary's father-in-law to dismantle the threat he was facing.

Therefore, controlling security governance had once been entirely in the Governor's hands, which ceased to be the case. This scenario could be explained in two ways which are not necessarily exclusive. On the one hand, democratic transition at the local level implied fragmentation not only of the institutional scaffolding, but also of the power exerted by multiple officers. On the other hand, the delegation of power, more than a loss on the part of the Governor, power could have been deliberately granted, not only to cabinet members and other officers, but also to members of the business sector. In other words, rather than lack of power, this may signify a devolution. However, that lead will be followed in the next section.

Alongside the creation of the new Public Security Secretariat, many other agencies were born (Figure 3.2), such as the Institute for Forensic Sciences, an unparalleled tool to support the process of crime investigation, and ultimately, the pursuit of justice. The creation of an ensemble of six units specialized in dealing with specific crimes: bank robbery and transport of valuables; robbery against trailers and cargo vehicles, sexual offence, homicide and kidnapping is also worth mention (Suárez de Garay, 2006). Furthermore, it is pertinent to look into Government criteria in terms of which crimes received particular attention. It is possible to argue that those were the crimes most committed according to official figures. If so, such procedure would be questionable as sources could be considered inaccurate, as widely discussed on Chapter 1. Some authors would claim that, in fact, the government handled only those crimes affecting powerful elites, primarily the business sector (Arellano,

2008; Moloeznik and Regalado Santillán, 1999). As previously mentioned, businessmen had a strong presence during Cardenas' administration, especially related to the public security project.

The fragmentation of the local law enforcement system did not stop at the end of Cárdenas' administration in 2001, instead, it was deepened (Figure 3.2). The subsequent PAN administrations continued creating diverse and sometimes highly specialized security agencies, such as the Cybernetic Police Unit or the State Public Security Commissariat. Although some of them were reintegrated to the State Attorney's Office during the Aristóteles Sandoval (*priista)* administration (2013-2018), under the project named *Fuerza Única Jalisco*[453], the institutional law enforcement scaffolding has remained widely fragmented at the state level.

Transformations in the law enforcement structure observed since the mid-1990s in Jalisco shall be read not as exceptional but mostly as part of a pattern visible in other parts of the country, or even the region. Indeed, in Latin America, such period was also characterized by the proliferation of police forces due to a decentralization process, either in the form of devolution from national to provincial and municipal forces, the creation of specialized units or the multiplication of units and offices within the forces (Ungar, 2007).

The complex kaleidoscope would not be complete without referring to the municipal police (*Policía Municipal Preventiva*), which is the face citizens supposedly have more contact with when accessing policing services.

A comprehensive study carried out in 2010 among the police corps in the six municipalities which comprise the Guadalajara metropolitan area[454], demonstrates persistent as well as significant differences between those agencies, regarding available resources, level of training, profiles, recruitment procedures, salaries, and even perception about police inner-circle corruption, crime and society (Suárez de Garay et al., 2010). For instance, while in El Salto precariousness of the police stations and a significant lack of resources (uniforms,

[453] Jalisco's Joint Force was a project to unify all police corps into one state level police corps. Jalisco's initiative must be situated within a larger debate that was taking place in the country regarding the integration of a national force, able to unify the above described kaleidoscope, the *Mando Único Policial* (Police Joint Command) (Sánchez Orozco, 2015).

[454] As early evoked the Guadalajara Metropolitan area refers to the municipalities of Guadalajara, Zapopan, Tlaquepaque, Tonalá, Tlajomulco and El Salto.

equipment, weapons) is characteristic (Haro Reyes, 2010), in Tonalá, the main challenge is policing in a highly marginalized area (Mercado Casillas, 2010). In contrast, Jalisco's best paid police are in Zapopan, yet high rotation and ageing of its members, as well as the large size of this police force constitute its most significant aspects to defy (Zepeda Lecuona, 2010).

To the intrinsic deficiencies of the six municipal police bodies, we must add the joint responsibilities of the six municipal level police corps, the state level agencies and the federal level officers. In that sense, this polycentric system might not be exclusionary for the Guadalajara case. In fact, some authors have made reference to the proliferation of inter-organizational conflicts, resulting from police reforms in regions such as Mexico City (Davis, 2006), some of them highly associated with the politicized security agenda, in which many social actors, such as businessmen, take part (Pansters and Castillo Berthier, 2007). Thus, to the concurrent prerogatives and the complexity of the three levels of government, such tension produced by politicians from different political parties settling agreements on the security agenda (Pansters and Castillo Berthier, 2007) has to be considered as well.

In Jalisco, police leadership seemed disperse at the state level since cabinet members whose incentives to be aligned with the head of government was likely no longer tied to the succession ritual. Among state level agencies which had taken part in supplying protection, as well as municipal police, it is possible to assume the presence of diverse inter-organizational tensions.

Moreover, democratization and the end of the *Dirty War* did not represent the retreat of Federal forces from Jalisco. It might be illustrated by the so-called *volantas*[455], back-then defined by the incumbent political party as "security mobile devises"[456]. Not immune from controversy, they were operations aiming to track and seize fire arms and explosives deployed by the Army, Judicial Federal Police, State Police and municipal forces[457].

[455] Term used in Mexico to refer the vehicle that custom officers use to oversee roadways (DRAE, 2019). Seemingly, during the *Porfiriato* the so-called *volantas* were a sort of patrol on horseback who used to supervise roadways and to protect landowners.
[456] "Logra Alberto Cárdenas frente común contra la delincuencia". (August 15th, 1997). *La Nación: Órgano Oficial del Partido Acción Nacional,* p. 11.
[457] *Idem*

Figure 3.2 Establishing a polycentric system: the evolution of the law enforcement landscape in Jalisco 1977-2018



Source: Elaborated by the author based on annual reports of Government (Informes de Gobierno) of every Governor of Jalisco from Flavio Romero de Velasco (1977-1983) to José Aristóteles Sandoval (2013-2018), (see references for details); Periódico Oficial del Estado de Jalisco 9543, Mexico, January 4th, 1977; Periódico Oficial del Estado de Jalisco 9579, Mexico, July 9th,1977; Periódico Oficial del Estado de Jalisco 11550, Mexico, February 25th, 1984; Ley de Seguridad Pública del Estado de Jalisco 1993. Periódico Oficial del Estado de Jalisco, México, December 28th, 1993; Periódico Oficial del Estado de Jalisco 15424, Mexico, June 13th, 1994; Periódico Oficial del Estado de Jalisco 17161, Mexico, December 5th, 1998; Periódico Oficial del Estado de Jalisco 17086, Mexico, January 10th,1998; Ley de Seguridad Pública del Estado de Jalisco 1998. Periódico Oficial del Estado de Jalisco, Mexico, January 15th, 1998; Periódico Oficial del Estado de Jalisco 17113, Mexico, January 20th, 1998; Periódico Oficial del Estado de Jalisco 1415, Mexico, February 7th, 1998; Periódico Oficial del Estado de Jalisco 22687, Mexico, August 26th, 2009; Periódico Oficial del Estado de Jalisco 24036, July 21st, 2012; Periódico Oficial del Estado de Jalisco 24467, Mexico, October 15th, 2013; Periódico Oficial del Estado de Jalisco 24998, Mexico, September 27th,2014; Moloeznik and Regalado Santillán, 1999; Moloeznik and Andrade Romo, 2002; Suárez de Garay, 2006; Regalado Santillán, 2012.

The polycentric law enforcement system detailed previously allows us to assume that, when citizens and, especially businessmen, make contact with governmental protection providers, the interaction must vary to a great extent depending on the budget, expertise, integrity, political incentives and, ultimately, the capacity to provide protection. In addition, it is possible that, since the distinct fragments of the law enforcement system provide protection in different ways and to different potential clients, the administration of social control is highly conditioned by the tension among diverse agencies and the relative weight of the clients on the panorama.

In the next section, we will take a look at how the business sector, more explicitly a group of local notables, participated in this fragmented (although neither depoliticized, nor entirely democratized) terrain, occupying a leading role. This included counselling, sponsoring projects, taking part in the decision making process, as well as designing the communication strategy towards the public. That grants them a personalized public protection pattern, not necessarily available for those outside their selective group.

3.2 Progressive devolution: taking part in shaping public policing

While describing the public security reform carried out by the first *panista* administration in Jalisco, the account shared by Alberto Cárdenas, evoked in the precedent section, offered two interesting leads to follow regarding the contribution of the business sector towards institutional transformation and shaping policing.

On the one hand, Cárdenas recalled the financial sector's contribution in order to cover the expensive consultancy project that his government ordered to address the reform. In that sense, businessmen are sketched out as individuals with money, able to invest their financial resources on being protected by government agencies. Such a vision, as previously established, aligns with numerous studies which associates the business sector with their financial capacity. However, those with monetary power might have been seen from a broader perspective. In fact, Cárdenas' memories also suggest that the sector could have played a more leading role while developing public security policy and such participation could have owed to delegation, rather than businessmen taking over state prerogatives.

Alberto Cárdenas was (and still is) perceived as a Governor who is especially close to the business sector. In those days, for instance, he was criticized for granting more attention to

businessmen than to any other sector or key actor, such as peasants or workers, civil society delegates, even other members of powerful groups and Mayors[458]. In fact, an economic cabinet nurtured by businessmen, already described in previous section, could be additional and compelling evidence (Arellano Ríos, 2004). Nowadays, among businessmen, he is still remembered as someone who created collaborative relationships with the sector. That is observable through the account of some businessmen interviewed, whether they were appointed to Cárdenas' economic cabinet or not. This last attribute on an interviewees' profile shall be stressed as a businessman perception might be conditioned by a certain bias related to "loyalty to a former boss".

> *(…) there have been governments much more open to having a… proactive relationship…constructive… teamwork, between the government and businessmen… government and society… thus, for example**, Alberto Cárdenas (…) he was very open to that**. And businessmen themselves, nowadays, they say 'yes, yes, **Alberto put us on the table… some hybrid agencies were created**, where we were businessmen and Government', (…) the Economic Promotion Council, the State Information System, the State Science and Technology Council, and… etcetera, the Information Technology Institute… and in all these agencies… businessmen were there… and **a lot of these agencies were chaired… are chaired by business sector**.*
>
> Víctor Manuel Olvera,
> Service Sector
> Zapopan, Jal., October 15th, 2015.
> *(Q3-5)*

Public policy implemented during Cárdenas' administration to improve local economy conditions, and notably its institutional legacy, are still directly associated with the former Governor's figure, as someone who stands out from his peers. In addition, it is seen as the foundation of a pattern of collaborative action between government and business on economic issues. "Hybrid agencies" were, then, the trademark of a time in which the public sector was under downsizing while private agents were absorbing some of the former public tasks.

The former Governor recalled numerous national and international tours he along with other businessmen achieved on behalf of the sector to attract investors, meetings, projects which he evokes in detail using the first-person plural, "we". Such collaborative connections might be regarded as the expected outcome of the economic sector and government sharing

[458] "Empresarios, interlocutores favoritos del gobernador". (February 18th, 1999). *Público*.

incentives to reactivate the damaged economy, working hand-in-hand and bolstering ties. In other words, economic elites were ensuring their economic interests.

The incursion of the business sector on public security issues, in contrast, is less likely to be foreseen as providing security which was the government's ultimate prerogative. If "collaboration" is the proper adjective to characterize the government-business sector regarding the local economy agenda during Cárdenas administration, "twofold devolution" might be the way of featuring the interaction, when it comes to policing.

In the former section, it was discussed that focusing on economic recovery and the reconfiguration of the Federal Pact, former Governor Alberto Cárdenas tended to delegate the public security agenda to his cabinet members, notably the Government Secretary, as well as to diverse local agencies of different size and weight in the kaleidoscope reflected the first display of decline. At the same time, this act of delegating also reached businessmen fomenting a close relationship between policing agencies and the business sector, or at least, with some of its members.

Although extensive, the following quote is a strong starting point in developing such claim:

> *I: (…) I remember we asked them [businessmen] to intervene… to take part in the discussion, listening how we were forging this… in the private sector. And… I remember they… nominated a leader… [to represent] the private sector. And… on behalf of… we granted faculties to the Council… to the Security Council…**we granted them faculty to intervene**… **to review all the crime figures**… and we achieved an agreement: 'from hereafter, the government is not going to report crime statistics, you are going to do so… and **it will be the voice of the private sector who will publicly announce if crime figures rise or fall**', right? Then, we even told them 'you will have a significant amount of influence… if you, the private sector, notify the Attorney's Office or the Secretary of Public Security that there is a bad officer, if that… jail custody … if prisons are being poorly managed, we will fire them… **if you tell me something is wrong here and there, with evidence, we will change it! I mean, you can remove them, the officers who are failing in their duties**'. So this brought great momentum… and as Governor, **I stopped talking about security**. It was them [businessmen] who every month in their press conference, stated 'this was created or the cost of… the new weapons, the bulletproof vests, uniforms, patrol cars… the [contracts] will be defined in tendering…'*
>
> *Me: Why did you give… let's say, the voice, the topic to the business sector instead of taking it yourself?*
>
> *I: Well, first, it was **because people didn't… they did not want to hear the official word**, **they did not trust us much, however, for such a difficult topic… 'keep an eye on me citizen!** You look after… you will watch over… we already agreed on what we want, what kind of Secretary we want, we already agreed what proportion of the budget we are going to invest in it' … as never before in the history… for Public Security…*

we invested… we took from the budget of other areas and we threw the money there [into public security].

Alberto Cárdenas Jiménez
Former Governor of Jalisco (1995-2001)
Mexico City, April 22nd, 2018
(Q3-6)

According to former Governor Alberto Cárdenas, the intervention of the private sector in the public security agenda was mostly due to an invitation extended by politicians. He portrays an image of himself granting certain prerogatives to businessmen, for instance, evaluating officer and law enforcer performance and functioning as spokespeople concerning crime figure trends and public policy decisions, specially related to public expenditure.

A general review of local newspapers shows that businessmen, indeed, carried out some press conferences to inform the public about insecurity. The photograph in Figure 3.3, shows a group of businessmen, gathered at COPARMEX[459], presenting the alarming trends of property crime and expressing their concerns about the procuration of justice. Next to that press release, *Mural*[460] published a smaller article on the State Attorney's Office recognizing those figures as being correct and derived from their own records. Thus, in this case, the business sector acted mainly as official spokespersons on statistics.

Although the previous example shows that businessmen and law enforcement agencies were collaborative to a certain degree, the agreement between these actors seems to have been more complex than a polite invitation from the Governor to interact with his spokespeople. In this scenario, businessmen were enabled access to official data in order to present it publicly.

[459] For an explanation on COPARMEX see Introduction.
[460] *Mural* is a local paper founded in 1998. Currently, they report an average of 41,979 issues of daily circulation and it is distributed in Jalisco, Aguascalientes, Colima, Michoacán and Nayarit. (SEGOB, 2019). Albeit *Mural* is a local media, it belongs to the media consortium *Grupo Reforma*, which also publishes *El Norte* (in Monterrey, Nuevo León) and *Reforma* (in México City). That results in a perspective that mixes local and national approaches.

Figure 3.3 "Numbers speak": business sector offering a press conference on property crime figures (May 6th, 1999)



Source: "'Ahoga' la corrupción a la justicia estatal.- IP". (May 6th, 1999). *Mural*.

In order to better observe how businessmen became influential in defining security policy, two elements regarding delegation, must be discussed more carefully: 1) it was not only based on an allocation determined by the Governor, but also due to the request of the business sector; 2) it was a progressive process that did not start with the first *Panista* government, but before.

First, since increasing crime figures were affecting commerce, industrial and service sectors, businessmen constantly urged the government to act. It is especially clear in the case where economic elites were specifically targeted as kidnapping victims by criminal groups[461]. Yet, businessmen went beyond demanding government action achieving privileged access to official data and the communication of such information, and more importantly acquiring power.

Calling for government action could be, in fact, the tip of the iceberg of a more complex pattern in which businessmen begin to take part by coproducing public security. In this regard, Part III offers an in-depth discussion. By now, suffice to say that, in the late 1990s, hundreds of kidnappings affecting businessmen in Guadalajara triggered the coproduction of the sector's actions that shall be understood within the context of devolution.

[461] "Exigen empresarios: Alto a los secuestros". (December 4th, 1998). *Mural*.

As much as businessmen and the government collaborated to communicate official crime figures, confrontation dominated other fronts. Press archives demonstrated tension between Governor Cárdenas and businessmen, the latter demanded better policies but also pushing to achieve the dismissal of Security Cabinet members, while the former called to dialogue and conciliation[462].

It must be emphasized that such conflicts were not separate from the political struggles between the two main parties, namely PAN and PRI. Hence, *priista* congressmen were explicitly joining (perhaps instigating) the demands of the business sector's against Cárdenas Cabinet[463]. It is worth mentioning that some businessmen were also partisan militants, so their political agendas could easily overlap their demand for security. In that sense, the delegation of a certain amount of power seems not to be only based on an allocation decided by the Governor, but also gained by a sector that disposed of both economic and political resources.

Businessmen appeared to have privileged access to the outline of the public security agenda, albeit the space to participate more actively did not include the diverse business sector at large, but a group of what could be called "local notables".

The "local notables" were a privileged group that reached a dominant position in political, economic and social arenas (Tudesq, 1993). Members of this group often shared prerogatives due to many factors including their reputation, affluence as private property owners, territorial embeddedness, and capacity to organize themselves. Belonging to recognized families, they also develop affiliations and alliances that reinforced their local roots. Economic power placed them in proximity to political power, on occasion, both spheres overlapped, allowing them to influence policy. Although the title of "local notable" does not contemplate all businessmen, a wide and diverse sector was represented, such as business association members, and a less defined business sector, as a whole (Briquet, 2012; Hoffmann, 1994; Tudesq, 1993). The last feature is particularly relevant regarding the highly heterogeneous sector comprising businessmen in Guadalajara.

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[462] "Exigen la renuncia de Ituarte y Ledesma". (May 7th, 1999). *Mural.* Guadalajara; "Cárdenas ofrece diálogo, pero la IP exige resultados". (May 12th, 1999). *Mural*; "Presentan hoy plan de justicia". (August 5th, 1999). *Mural*.

[463] *Idem*

From the local notable perspective, it is worth rereading Alberto Cárdenas' account on the prerogatives granted to businessmen. According to his own words, the former governor entitled the business sector to examine and validate crime statistics, to communicate government acts and results, but likely more importantly, to play a role in officer nomination or dismissal. Such privileges were not restricted to the intersection characterized by rising crime numbers and the democratic transition.

If it is true that the first PAN government must have been seen as a turning point, it must also be considered that the devolution process did not start with *panista* administrations. Instead, it shall be described as a progressive process that precedes Cárdenas' period. The Consultative Council that the former Governor evoked (*Q3-6*) represents an illustrative case on how local notables have been holding/weilding a certain portion of power related to public security.

These councils are spaces integrated by government authorities and citizen delegates and are an old formula to promote citizen participation; nevertheless, businessmen had always been represented on these boards.

Since the early 1940s, the business sector participated in the *Consejo de Colaboración Municipal* (Municipal Collaborative Council) where city problems were brought forward and discussed. During these council sessions some collaborative policy projects were conceived[464]. In fact, the President and the Treasurer of this collegiate group were nominated by businessmen while the local authorities selected the Council's Secretary[465], thus making business sector participation crucial.

In the late 1970s, businessmen promoted the reorganization of urban programs through the *Juntas de Mejoramiento Moral, Cívico y Material* (Moral, Civic and Material Improvement Boards) of Guadalajara, Zapopan and Tlaquepaque municipalities. There, they established the necessity of recovering social order in the city that, according to them, impoverished migrants had disrupted. Vandalism, street vending and informality were seen as major

[464] Gazette Bank of Images 1970-2016.
[465] Gazette Bank of Images 1970-2016; Informal Conversation with Celia M., Chamber of Commerce staff for more than 30 years; Fieldwork carnet, January 17th, 2017.

problems to address[466]. Certainly, the moral dimension plays a significant role in defining the threat and its source.

Regarding the public security agenda, Jalisco was a pioneer in the creation of a collegiate consultative body. The first feature of a group where businessmen and local authorities collaborate dates back to 1977, when the governor Flavio Romero de Velasco (1977-1983) decreed the creation of state and regional level technical councils[467]. The main purpose of such body was to propose measures and programs related to the policies of security and maintaining order. Businessmen collaborated indirectly as members of the *Juntas de Mejoramiento Moral, Cívico y Material* which, at the same time had a chair on the councils.

Businessmen's participation on public security councils gained more significance in 1984, when the Governor Enrique Álvarez del Castillo decreed the creation of the *Consejo Consultivo Estatal de Seguridad Pública,* as a "technical and normative organism for planning, organizing, operating and controlling the public security program of Jalisco state"[468]. In this initial space for citizen participation, the business sector had three delegates: one from the industrial sector, one from the Chamber of Commerce and a third from the Guadalajara Banking Centre.

As seen in Table 3.2, the name of consultative council was modified over the course of time, for instance from "public security" to "citizen protection" and from "social re-adaptation" to "social reinsertion". Although nominal, these changes reflect the different views that, through time, governments have had on both, public security and citizens participation. Since 1977, the council was attached to the Public Security Department. In 1991, however, the council detached from the department, gaining certain autonomy.

To learn about the importance of the role of businessmen in influencing public security policy through citizen councils, a glance at the board composition is useful (Table 3.3).

[466] Gazette Bank of Images 1970-2016.
[467] Decree No. 9579. Periódico Oficial del Estado de Jalisco, Mexico, July 9th, 1977.
[468] Decree No. 11676. Periódico Oficial del Estado de Jalisco, Mexico, November 13th, 1984.

Two main groups can be identified within the council: 1) government officials and state level cabinet members and; 2) non-government actors, in other words, civil society representatives, scholars, experts and, clearly, businessmen[469].

The composition of the council may be analysed from a variety of angles; nevertheless, for the purpose of this research, there are four main leads to follow.

Firstly, the most evident aspect is that the business sector was always represented within the council. While some government officials (their positions, more precisely) could come and go from boards, representatives of commercial and service sectors have been part of the council since its foundation. Bankers, nonetheless, seem to have been a whole different category. They were represented until 1991 through a commissary from the Guadalajara Banking Centre demonstrating that bankers could have been seen as a sector with special security requirements. As will be discussed later in Chapter 4, bank branch surveillance and the transport of valuables has been handled by the Auxiliary Police for decades.

Secondly, that the local notables are far removed from other social groups (Hoffmann, 1994) which is illustrated by the composition of council boards. The financial sector has been seen as a separate entity from the rest of civil society. Over the course of time, the non-government members of the council consisted in individuals from the business sector and the so-called social sector[470] was replaced in 1993 with the title "civil society".

Thirdly, once again consistent with the local notable notion, businessmen seated on the council board represent *Tapatio* businessmen, although they are only one segment within a wide and diverse sector. In other words, not every entrepreneurs' interests and concerns reach the Council table. Such privilege is reserved to those members of the most important associations (the Chamber of Commerce and an Industrial Sector Chamber). As mentioned by Basañez (2011), business associations, led by a limited group, had significant importance on the political-economic landscape during the 20th Century. These notables were the voice of an entire sector.

[469] This suggests that it shall be pertinent to revisit (and likely to reformulate) the dominant idea according to which the organized civil society in Mexico emerged only after the 1985 earthquake. In this approach see Isunza Vera, 2001.

[470] Different from the public and the private sector, the social sector is constituted by productive entities such as ejidos, worker's organizations, agrarian communities, cooperatives or companies that, mostly or exclusively, belong to workers. (Art. 25, Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, 2016)

Table 3.2 Evolution of the Public Security Councils in Jalisco (1984-2016)

Governor	**Enrique Álvarez del Castillo** *PRI*	**Guillermo Cosío Vidaurri** *PRI*	**Carlos Rivera Aceves** *PRI*	**Alberto Cárdenas Jiménez** *PAN*	**Emilio González Márquez** *PAN*	**Aristóteles Sandoval Díaz** *PRI*
Date of issuance	November 13th, 1984	January 5th, 1991	December 28th, 1993	January 15th, 1998	July 21st, 2012	May 24th, 2016
Legislative process creating the Council	Amendment to the Regulatory Law of Article 35, section XII of the Constitution of the State of Jalisco	Amendment to the Regulatory Law of Article 35, section XII of the Constitution of the State of Jalisco	Public Security Law of the State of Jalisco	Amendments to the Public Security Law of the State of Jalisco	Law of the Public Security System of the State of Jalisco	Amendments to the Law of the Public Security System of the State of Jalisco and to the Organic Law of the Prosecutor´s Office
Name of the Council	**State Advisory Council on Public Security**	**State Advisory Council for Citizen Protection**	**State Level Citizen Protection Council**	**Citizen Council for Public Security, Prevention and Social Re-adaptation**	**Citizen Council for Public Security, Prevention and Social Re-insertion**	**Citizen Council for Security and Justice Procuration**
Definition	Technical and advisory council for the planning, organization, operation and oversight of public security programs in Jalisco	Technical, consultative, collaborative and citizen participation collegiate body aiming to set the basis for the coordination and execution of state level action regarding citizen protection	Consultancy body for analysis and opinion regarding public security		Consultancy, analysis and opinion collegiate body regarding public security	Consultancy, analysis and opinion body constituted as a public entity of citizen participation with technical and managerial autonomy and administratively assigned to the State Attorney's Office

Source: Prepared by the author based on Decree 11676. Periódico Oficial del Estado de Jalisco, Mexico, November 13th, 1984; Decree 14160. Periódico Oficial del Estado de Jalisco, Mexico, January 5th,1991; Decree 15310. Periódico Oficial del Estado de Jalisco, Mexico, December 28th,1993; Decree 17087. Periódico Oficial del Estado de Jalisco, Mexico, January 15th, 1998; Decree 24036/LIX/12. Periódico Oficial del Estado de Jalisco, Mexico, July 21th, 2012; Decree 25832/LXI/2016. Periódico Oficial del Estado de Jalisco, Mexico, May 5th, 2016.

Table 3.3 Public Security Council member evolution

Council Members	State Advisory Council on Public Security	State Advisory Council for Citizen Protection	State Level Citizen Protection Council	Citizen Council for Public Security, Prevention and Social Re-adaptation	Citizen Council Public for Security, Prevention and Social Re-insertion	Citizen Council for Security and Justice Procuration
	1984	1991	1993	1998	2012	2016
Government members	- 1 President (appointed by the Governor) - 3 Representatives of the Governor - The municipal official in charge of public security in each municipality of the Metropolitan Area, Puerto Vallarta and other municipalities that are also electoral districts of the State	- 1 President (appointed by the Governor) - 3 Counselors (appointed by the executive power) - The Mayor (or the alderman commissioned to represent the municipality) of every municipality of Guadalajara Metropolitan Area, Puerto Vallarta and those head of Judicial party	- 1 President (the Governor or designee) - 3 Counselors (appointed by the state executive power) - Congressmen and members of the Permanent Commission on Public Security, Prevention and Social Re-adaptation within the state level Congress. - The first aldermen of the Guadalajara Metropolitan Area municipalities or the person who represents them	- 1 President (the Governor or designee) - 3 Counselors (appointed by the state executive power) - Congressmen and members of the Permanent Commission on Public Security, Prevention and Social Re-adaptation within the state level Congress - The first aldermen of the Guadalajara Metropolitan Area municipalities or the person who represents them - The Public Security, Prevention and Social Re-adaptation Secretary, to be the Executive Secretary of the Council	- 1 President (the Governor or designee) - Counselors appointed by the state executive power from the following agencies: a) Roadway and Transport Secretary b) Public Security, Prevention and Social Reinsertion Secretary c) State Attorney's Office d) Executive Secretary of the Public Security State level Council - Congressmen head of the following Commissions: a) Public Security and Emergency Preparedness b) Social Re-adaptation c) Justice d) Roadway, Transport and Communication - The Mayor of each municipality from the Guadalajara metropolitan area or their representative	- 1 President (the Governor or designee) - The head of the following agencies (or a designated representative): a) State Attorney's Office b) Secretary of Mobility - The Technical Secretary of the State Public Security Council - The Congressman (president of the Public Security and Emergency Preparedness Commission) - A technical Secretary, with rights as a spokesman, designated by the Governor - 1 Mayor from the Guadalajara metropolitan area, elected by the members of the Metropolitan Coordination Board. The elected mayor invited by the Governor.

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Council Members	State Advisory Council on Public Security	State Advisory Council on Citizen Protection	State Level Citizen Protection Council	Citizen Council for Public Security, Prevention and Social Re-adaptation	Citizen Council for Public Security, Prevention and Social Reinsertion	Citizen Council for Security and Justice Procuration
	1984	1991	1993	1998	2012	2016
Non-government members	- 4 Representatives of the Social Sector - 1 Representative of the State Chamber of Commerce - 1 Representative of the National Chamber of Commerce - 1 Representative of the Guadalajara Banking Centre	- 4 Representatives of the Social Sector - 1 Representative of the Industrial Chamber - 1 Representative of the Chamber of Commerce - 1 Representative of the Guadalajara Banking Center - 1 Representative of the University of Guadalajara	- 4 Representatives of the Civil Society invited by the same Council - 1 Representative of Jalisco Industrial Chamber - 1 Representative of the Guadalajara Chamber of Commerce - 1 Representative of each public or private University in Jalisco	- 4 Representatives of the Civil Society invited by the same Council - 1 Representative of Jalisco Industrial Chambers - 1 Representative of the Guadalajara Chamber of Commerce - 1 Representative of every public or private University in Jalisco	- 4 Representatives of the Civil Society invited by the Governor - 1 Representative of the Jalisco Industrial Chambers - 1 Representative of the Guadalajara National Chamber of Commerce and Services - 1 Representative of COPARMEX Jalisco - 1 Representative of the University of Guadalajara - 1 Representative of the Jalisco Private Universities, invited by the Council - Any other institution the Council approves to invite	- 5 Representatives of Civil Society, invited by the Council - 1 Representative of each of the following entities: a) Guadalajara's Chamber of Commerce, Services and Tourism (Civil Association) b) Jalisco Entrepreneurial Center (Employer Association) c) West-Mexican Council of Foreign Commerce (Civil Association) d) Jalisco Council of Industrial Chambers (Civil Association) e) Jalisco Agrarian Council (Civil Association) - 5 experts adjoined to the same number of universities in Jalisco, proposed by the Council and invited by the Governor

Source: Prepared by the author based on Decree 11676. Periódico Oficial del Estado de Jalisco, Mexico, November 11th, 1984; Decree 14160. Periódico Oficial del Estado de Jalisco, Mexico, January 5th, 1991; Decree 15310. Periódico Oficial del Estado de Jalisco, Mexico, December 28th, 1993; Decree 17087. Periódico Oficial del Estado de Jalisco, Mexico, January 15th, 1998; Decree 24036/LIX/12. Periódico Oficial del Estado de Jalisco, Mexico, July 21st, 2012; Decree 25832/LXI/2016. Periódico Oficial del Estado de Jalisco, Mexico, May 24th, 2016.

Finally, in the early 1990s, the *Gaceta Mercantil* reported the chamber members were experiencing uneasiness since the *Consejo Consultivo* had become a useless figure which barely held a minimum of work sessions[471]. Even if the weight of citizen voices in the decision-making process and the effectiveness of the councils is highly variable (Olvera, et al. 2012), being part of these groups gives the business sector the opportunity to deliver their peers' concerns to the government, and to establish direct and personal contact with local government officers. As can be seen in Table 3.3, government members of the councils changed progressively from more administrative to operation-oriented profiles. Therefore, councils have been a space to initiate and nurture personalized requests and responses concerning protection needs implying a degree of reciprocity which will be explored in the following pages.

Due to the large volume of information contained in the legal framework, council tasks have been classified in eight categories for analytical purposes. Thus, council members (businessmen in particular) might have some influence on: 1) public policy design; 2) police organization, management or action; 3) legislative-related tasks; 4) conduction of studies, analyses and public debates; 5) public communication and policy diffusion; 6) crime records and statistics; 7) citizen attention and participation and; 8) other duties.

A general reading of the councils' set of tasks reveals that those that the first Council (1984) had established drastically reduced towards the 2000s, to yield boards which carried out studies and analyses, endorsed law reforms and constituted a point of contact with citizens, although effectiveness on the latter aspect is beyond the boundaries of this research. Despite the complexity implied in each category, and prioritizing protection as the backbone of the research, it worthwhile to pay special attention to the category on police corps (Table 3.4). The rest of categories are available in detail in Appendix 3.2.

Tasks related to police bodies can be grouped into four sub-categories. To begin, businessmen and other board members were able to suggest techniques and forms of operation. Although "suggest" is a vague verb which speaks little to the weight that council advice had on public policy, it stands out that since 2012, the possibility to discuss police protocol or techniques fell out of the reach of the citizen council. Relative to businessmen,

[471] Gazette Bank of Images 1970-2016.

that may have had two implications. Either businessmen did not take part in policing design or they exerted influence through informal means. Concerning the local notables, the second scenario seems more likely.

Endorsing professionalization and modernization of the police constitutes a second sub-category. Following this clue, it is possible to observe how the police career system, back in the 1980s, was barely a project and in the late 1998 seemed still unfinished. Regardless of the shape taken nowadays, it must be noticed that council members might play a role in the processes of admission, promotion and vetting protocols of local police bodies.

The former category is closely related to the third sub-category, namely, the prerogative to grant awards to outstanding police officers. Considering that rewards system somehow constrain the careers of police officers, businessmen as part of the councils, have the possibility to define who is promoted within the corporation. On the other hand, awards might constitute a space for exchange, where businessmen grant improvement of agents' labour status and police officers could reciprocate with personalized protection. As in other devolution schemas, this might also entail loyalty dilemmas for public agents (Huggins, 2000). This point will be widely discussed in Part III, where it will be demonstrated that the *Premio al Policía del Mes* (Police Officer-of-the-month Award) became a mean through which an ensemble of businessmen reached specialized and loyal police protection[472].

[472] On the Chamber of Commerce members' narrative concerning the award, see Appendix 3.4

Table 3.4 Public Security Council task evolution: police corps category

Council Task Typology	State Advisory Council on Public Security	State Advisory Council on Citizen Protection	State Level Citizen Protection Council	Citizen Council for Public Security, Prevention and Social Re-adaptation	Citizen Council for Public Security, Prevention and Social Reinsertion	Citizen Council for Security and Justice Procuration
	1984	1991	1993	1998	2012	2016
Police Corps Organization, Management or Actions *Part I*	- Suggest system and operation techniques for police corps, as well as formal mechanisms of coordination to enhance scientific and technological development - Promote the moralization of the Public Security forces to avoid abuse of authority and police corruption, to procure action within the constitutional framework - Support the modernization of police corps via organic, technical and administrative restructuring	- Propose system and operation techniques for various police corps, as well as the coordination mechanisms, aiming to enhance improvement - Promote the moralization and professionalization of the Public Security forces to procure action within the framework of constitutional norms' and strict observance of individual rights	- Propose system and operation techniques for various police corps, as well as the coordination mechanisms, aiming to enhance improvement - Promote the moralization and professionalization of the Public Security forces to a procure action within the framework of constitutional norms' and strict observance of individual rights	- Propose system and operation techniques for various police corps, as well as the coordination mechanisms, aiming to enhance improvement - Promote the moralization and professionalization of the Public Security forces to a procure action within the framework of constitutional norms' and strict observance of individual rights	- Grant awards to any public security institution or to one of its members if their performance is considered outstanding by the Council. When an award is granted to a member of a group of members of public security entities, this will be effective to obtain a promotion within the civil service career, hence it must be registered in the officer's file	- Grant awards to any public security institution or to one of its members if their performance is considered outstanding by the Council. The award will be effective to obtain a promotion within the civil service career, hence it must be registered in the officer's file

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Year	1984	1991	1993	1998	2012	2016
Police Corps Organization, Management or Actions *Part II*	- Promote the creation of a police career system to guarantee the formation of professional policemen with a sense of integration and social participation, through the establishment of technical and scientific selection systems, comprehensive education, incentives and adequate civil service and social protection regimes - Strive to improve the police corps through technical training and development programs - Promote respect towards the law and the population.	- Promote respect towards the law and the population within police corps. - Promote the creation of a police career system to guarantee the formation of professional policemen with a sense of integration and social participation, through the establishment of technical and scientific selection systems, comprehensive education, incentives and adequate civil service and social protection regimes - Strive to improve the police corps through technical training and development programs	- Promote and maintain an up-to-date police career system to guarantee the formation of professional policemen with a sense of integration and social participation, through the establishment of technical and scientific selection systems, comprehensive education, incentives and adequate civil service and social protection regimes - Promote respect towards the law and the population.	- Promote and maintain an up-to-date police career system to guarantee the formation of professional policemen with a sense of integration and social participation, through the establishment of technical and scientific selection systems, comprehensive education, incentives and adequate civil service and social protection regimes - Promote respect towards the law and the population.		- Implement and manage the Rewards Program for the officers of the Public Security System, according to Internal Regulation

Source: Prepared by the author based on Decree 11676. Periódico Oficial del Estado de Jalisco, Mexico, November 13th, 1984; Decree 14160. Periódico Oficial del Estado de Jalisco, Mexico, January 5th, 1991; Decree 15310. Periódico Oficial del Estado de Jalisco, Mexico, December 28th, 1993; Decree 17087. Periódico Oficial del Estado de Jalisco, Mexico, January 15th, 1998; Decree 24036/LIX/12. Periódico Oficial del Estado de Jalisco, Mexico, July 21st, 2012; Decree 25832/LXI/2016. Periódico Oficial del Estado de Jalisco, Mexico, May 5th, 2016.

The fourth category is related to the moralization of the police. Jorge Ibargüengoitia (1988) [1972] wrote that "Mexicans are born and raised in a climate of mistrust towards the police" (p. 68). Thus, to offer an incentive police officers to respect the law arises as a fundamental task. Such endeavour has been a long standing (com)promise of the members of the political elite without regard to political parties and has become a sort of workhorse during electoral campaigns or officers' public statements[473]. In fact, the notion that "we are (or will be) cleaning up the police force" has reached a point of irony or perhaps absurdity. This was epitomized in a statement made by General Arturo Durazo, in the 1980s, (the Mexico City police department chief at the time), who despite his reputation of founding the police led extortion system[474], he dared to declare he had "made a commitment with the President López Portillo, to leaving a more decent and honest police, [agents] more aware of their duties as public servants (…) when I arrived [as head of the police department] it was a den of thieves, but we are cleaning it up little by little"[475]. Hence, besides the prevalent image of the hopeless effort to cleanse the police corps, it would seem that any relationship businessmen established with police agents was characterized by mistrust and suspicion. However, these relationships will be discussed in the next section. Businessmen have a distinct opinions in terms of the level of trust that diverse police forces have earned which is related to how they set up bonds of varied nature.

One last element concerning council tasks, reasonably associated to the police corps category, must be outlined. Besides the opportunity to oversee law enforcement agency performance to deter abusive behaviours, lately oriented by a humans rights oriented framework, it shall be noticed that in 1984 one of the councils' tasks was to achieve the extinction of parapolice group within any public agency (Table 3.4 (IV) on Appendix 3.2). The generic notion of "strive" was amended in 1991 and replaced with the word "denounce". Therefore, it can be assumed that parapolice groups were likely identified as existent and problematic. However, a former senior official, who currently runs a private security company, has a different explanation:

> *What provoked such mention was… in those years,* ***Colombia was facing a very difficult period of insecurity*** *… there, yes, it was provoked by drug trafficking and*

[473] See, for instance, *Por un México Seguro: Elecciones de gobernadores por entidad federativa*. (2018). Available at: http://onc.org.mx/mexico-seguro/entidades_federativas.php.
[474] On Arturo Durazo profile see Chapter 1 (footnote 176).
[475] "Expolicías los delincuentes más buscados". (April 12th, 1980). *Proceso*, (180).

> *drug cartels… there, in Colombia… and one of the alternatives that citizens in Colombia opted for was the creation of self-defence groups, and… the well-known paramilitary groups, that… at the beginning they thought they would be very useful regarding security issues, but they only made things more complicated … because then* ***there were three powers… struggling… fighting for [controlling] the provision of order and governability****, namely… the Colombian government, drug trafficking cartels… and the self-defence groups (paramilitary)… and that's why* ***it was mentioned… people saying 'we don't want that happening here'****. Surprisingly, 20 years later…or more than 25 years later… here in Mexico…the problem of the… self-defence groups in certain states… is emerging where* ***you can see that…in these states there were no opportunities for citizen participation, then citizens said 'ok, if you don't let me participate, I will create my own self-defence group'****, in these states… Michoacán, Guerrero… these states, and… they have been a problem, they still are.*
>
> Máximo Ballesteros,
> Private Security Company owner
> Zapopan, Jal., January 19th, 2017.
> *(Q3-7)*

Aside from the interviewee's narrative about the context of Colombian violence, which could be an object of analyses in itself, there are two elements that are significant in Ballesteros' account. The former official considered this stipulation to be preventive rather than corrective, denying the possibility that parapolice groups were present in Guadalajara's landscape. However, as will be seen in the next chapter, this is unlikely. Additionally, Ballesteros argues that self-defence groups are not only a problem, but also the result of a lack of spaces for citizen participation. While the emergence of self-defence groups have a limited explanation, this phenomena has led to an informal, even illegal, alternative to influence how policing is shaped.

Whether effective or not, citizen councils are a formal channel which allow for the participation in public security policy design. However, informal mechanisms might also be used to affect, and ultimately shape public policing, especially for those who are excluded from privileges which are granted through formal mechanisms. For instance, amidst the tense atmosphere generated by businessmen and cabinet members during Alberto Cárdenas' administration, a group of entrepreneurs, joined by PRI congressmen, launched a *Plan de Justicia* (Plan for Justice). Businessmen then proposed funding an information system to improve the efficacy of the Attorney's Office, in particular regarding cases of kidnapping[476]. Another group of businessmen, meanwhile, published a manual against insecurity including an ensemble of measures addressed to sector members aiming to prevent crimes, especially

[476] "Presentan hoy plan de justicia", (August 5th, 1999), *Mural,* Guadalajara.

robbery and kidnapping. According to the press, it was equivalent to "their own guidelines for action"[477].

However, these informal mechanisms are not exclusively for those who are excluded from council boards. Having access to information, a precious asset for defining public (security) policies, reveals how the local notables benefit not only from the position of power that the Council represents, but also from other points of contact that are not considered within the legal framework.

As stated previously, Public Security Council members were in charge of elaborating studies on the topic suggesting that, through the Council, the business sector became the government's spokespeople. As Alberto Cardenas recalled, the sector was also a source of data, as can be observed in an account by Jerónimo Cervantes, an industrial sector member and the right-hand of the president of an important business association:

> *What we do [as part of the Council] is* ***to closely follow the information granted by the government****, the National Security System and the state Attorney's Office, analysing the… figures of every crime. We elaborate a report, depending on the availability of official data, generally it is updated every month, or every two or three months, depending on how much the figures have changed.* ***We present the report at the Council****, to the different chambers and associations' presidents, explaining how Jalisco ranks regarding some crimes or what kind of patterns might be a source of concern. In parallel,* ***we hold meetings with the Federal Police and other security agencies****… the Marines****… for them to show us their data****, what they are working on, their initiatives, and their results.* *In such meetings, we also aim that the businessmen, the chambers' presidents, address their concerns [the security agents] 'Do you know what? In my sector we consider this crime a high risk,* ***because sometimes they are not considered in the figures, because… well, sometimes there are no… complaints of crime. So, this is also feedback for them*** *[the security agents]. In these meetings,* ***either Federal Police state delegates, or military regional commanders could attend*** *… rather* ***to give us an immediate answer right there, or to follow up on a subject, in each sector****.*
>
> Jerónimo Cervantes
> Industrial Sector Businessman
> Zapopan, Jal., October 28th, 2015
> *(Q3-8)*

First of all, Cervantes' explanation outlines how businessmen make official data accessible to public opinion, adding the final touches to favour a level of trust that the voice of public officers is missing. In addition, they use this information to examine closely the government and make their peers aware of specific risks through a sort of inner-sector diffusion of regular

[477] "Los empresarios lanzan su 'manual' anti-inseguridad". (August 23rd, 1999). *Público*, Guadalajara.

reports. Access to official data is not necessarily a privilege for the local notables, since numerous other groups and organizations throughout country are able to access and analyse official data. In fact, in the last decade, plenty of reports have been elaborated, on the crime figures collected and published by the Executive Secretariat of the National System of Public Security (SESNSP) either by think tanks, organizations for victims or for academic purposes[478].

That said, it must be noticed that Cervantes' words also point to some channels that might be considered a privileged way the business sector contacted public security entities. For instance, meetings with high level officials, which are celebrated aside Council activities are spaces for information exchange, out of the reach of citizens or other groups. On the one hand, public servants pinpointed information regarding their diagnosis and action plans that otherwise would have been absent from public platforms allowing businessmen to develop preventive behaviour. On the other hand, businessmen offered their own experiences and concerns as first-hand knowledge, which may perhaps have been excluded from the official data due to the fact that they opt not to file lawsuits. This last point not only reinforces the discussion developed in Chapter 1 regarding the accuracy of official crime figures, but also indicates that through this via businessmen are able to endorse their definition of what constitutes a threat and how it can be best faced.

Following Cervantes' account, once this insight is shared with public officials, it seems that businessmen generally obtain solutions, or at least, specific actions to deal with their problems. Hence, the information exchange within these meetings privileged business sector concerns. Certainly, the efficacy perceived regarding government entities contrasts with the prevalent negative image of police forces, especially considering that institutional trust often depends on their performance (Catterberg and Moreno, 2016). How to explain such a contradiction? Do businessmen trust government institutions, particularly police, more than the rest of the population? To what extent do the patterns of trust regarding police condition the rapport between businessmen and the regular provider of protection?

[478] See, for instance, "Semáforo delictivo nacional". (2019). Available at: http://www.semaforo.mx/; Observatorio Nacional Ciudadano. (2019). "Reporte sobre delitos de alto impacto". Available at: http://onc.org.mx/; Asociación Alto al Secuestro. (2019). "Reporte estadísticas de secuestro". Available at: http://altoalsecuestro.com.mx/; Valle, D. (2016). "Crimen en México: Reporte mensual sobre delincuencia en México". Available at: https://elcri.men/.

In the next section, we will explore the manner in which fragmentation and devolution endorsed personalized relationships involving businessmen, which attenuated the effect of institutional distrust associated with police enabling the selective use of public protection.

3.3 Privileged and personalized bonds: a path towards selective protection

Distrust regarding institutions has been a prevalent sentiment within Mexican public opinion. Most of the institutions evaluated through diverse surveys are not trustworthy, according to the majority of citizens (Layton and Moreno, 2010). Some institutions, such as the Church or the Army, reach higher levels of trust; whereas, law enforcement agencies are generally ranked as less trusted (Moreno, 2010; Rubli and Vargas, 2010). Does the business sector express more or less trust regarding law enforcement agencies compared to the public opinion? Are the attitudes of *Tapatio* businessmen different from the national sector? If so, how does this aspect shape the relationship built between the local notables and the local enforcers? In order to explore some possible answers, the victimization surveys conducted by INEGI, deeply discussed in Chapter 1, constitute a prime tool[479].

The surveys carried out by INEGI, namely ENVIPE-2017 and ENVE-2016, estimate the level of trust that respondents claim to have regarding the law enforcement agencies they are familiar with. It shall be recalled that ENVIPE-2017 is based on a sample of Mexican adults, while ENVE-2016 focuses on economic units nationwide. This distinction allows for the division of the sample isolating cases in Jalisco, although not Guadalajara specifically and compares them to the national sample, without losing statistical representativeness. Hence, the figures from the four groups can be contrasted: 1) Mexican citizens (public opinion from the national sample); 2) Jalisco inhabitants (public opinion from Jalisco); 3) Business sector at the national level (economic units from all over the country) and; 4) Jalisco business sector (economic units located in Jalisco). The comparison is also possible as both surveys formulate the same question. In both, the level of institutional trust is measured through an ordinal variable which ranks from "a lot of trust" to "no trust at all"[480]. The respondents who state that a public agency inspires them "a lot" or "quite a lot" of trust may be grouped under the label "trust", while the categories "not very much" and "not at all" as "distrust". The

[479] For a discussion on methodological details regarding both polls, ENVIPE-2017 and ENVE-2016, as well as the scope and limits of victimization surveys, see Chapter 1.
[480] For a discussion on the accuracy of measuring institutional trust through public opinion polls, see González and Smith (2017).

percentage of respondents from each group who say law enforcement agencies inspire trust is shown in Table 3.5.

Table 3.5 Institutional Trust: law enforcement agencies

Percentage of respondents that trust "a lot" or "quite a lot" per institution

Level	Government agency	Public Opinion		Business Sector	
		National	***Jalisco***	***National***	***Jalisco***
National	Navy	88.01	92.44	**83.15**	79.67
	Army	84.79	87.32	**79.48**	77.95
	Federal Police	66.50	69.97	**52.23**	48.24
	National Level Attorney's Office	58.60	62.34	**42.90**	39.60
Local	State Level Attorney's Office	53.37	62.52	39.11	**42.21**
	State Level Police	56.36	62.22	39.89	**42.14**
	Ministerial Police	52.89	56.31	36.37	**41.71**
	Traffic Police	43.07	48.50	31.90	**40.76**
	Municipal Police	51.19	53.29	34.92	**38.19**

Source: Prepared by the author based on the "National Survey of Victimization and Perception of Public Security" (ENVIPE-INEGI, 2017) for public opinion and the "National Survey on Crimes against Business" (ENVE-2016) for business sector. Both surveys were conducted by INEGI. The original question was "How much trust does [the institution] inspires you" *(¿Cuánta confianza le inspira [la autoridad]?)* The possible answers were an ordinal scale "A lot, quite a lot, not very much, not at all". The percentage considers the respondents who identify the public agency. For National Public Opinion N=83'888,403; for Jalisco Public Opinion N=5'519,573; for National Business Sector N=4'503,271; for Jalisco Business Sector N=332, 758. The percentage differences are significant according to the residual analysis.

Data from victimization surveys, either conducted among citizens or businessmen, confirms some of the observations outlined in the literature: higher levels of trust are granted to federal level institutions. Between 78% and 93% of the respondents from different groups considered that military institutions inspire "a lot" or "quite a lot" of trust, 32% and around 60% correspond to municipal and state level police corps respectively. In fact, municipal forces, along with traffic police, rank at the bottom of the table.

Many vantage points could be discussed regarding the trust inspired by each government agency, yet, there are two main results that shall be outlined for the purpose of this research. First, the survey suggests that the business sector tends to trust law enforcement agencies less than the public does, both in Jalisco and nationwide. This trend is illustrated in Graphic 3.1 where a solid line represents businessmen who trust "quit a lot" or "a lot" in law enforcement agencies, while dotted line public represents the public opinion. Thus, the closer the line is to the center, the less trustworthy each institution evaluated by the respondents is.

Graphic 3.1 Trust in law enforcement agencies: contrasting businessmen and public opinion

Percentage of respondents that trust each institution "a lot" or "quite a lot".



Source: Prepared by the author based on the "National Survey of Victimization and Perception of Public Security" (ENVIPE-INEGI, 2017) for the public opinion and the "National Survey on Crime against Businesses" (ENVE-2016) for business sector. Both surveys were conducted by INEGI. The original question was "How much trust does [the institution] inspires you" *(¿Cuánta confianza le inspira [la autoridad]?)* The possible answers were an ordinal scale "A lot, quite a lot, not very much, not at all". The graphic considers the respondents who identify the public agency. For National Public Opinion N=83'888,403; for Jalisco Public Opinion N=5'519,573; for National Business Sector N=4'503,271; for Jalisco Business Sector N=332, 758. The percentage differences are significant according to the residual analysis.

Although the distance between public opinion and the business sector is slight regarding the Marine or the Army, it is possible to state in advance that the apparent contradiction noted previously, in section 3.2, is reinforced. Businessmen tend to grant less trust to law enforcement institutions than citizens, whether in Jalisco or at the national level. However, they still host the expectation that law enforcement agencies will deal with threats and, eventually, provide protection.

Since both studies are statistically comparable, it is possible to argue that the difference observed between public opinion and business sector perceptions is not due to a bias implied in the design of a survey[481]. In addition, the data already excludes those who ignore the existence of such agencies. Hence, random answers seem less likely. It is also important to recall that the survey includes not only individuals who have been crime victims, but also those who have not had such an experience previously. That tempers possible flaws related to having (or not) an experience when evaluating law enforcers, since both profiles are included in the figures.

The second relevant result shown in Table 3.5 is related to the business sector. Graphic 3.2 compares the business sector from both national and state (Jalisco) perspectives. The graph illustrates that businessmen in Jalisco tend to trust federal agencies less than the national business sector. Yet, the pattern is reversed in terms of trusting local level policing agencies, in that regard, Jalisco businessmen express more trust than the national sector does, albeit the poor reputation of local authorities.

Nonetheless, this does not convey that Jalisco businessmen grant an outstanding level of trust to local police bodies. In fact, merely 38% to 43% of respondents considered that these agencies inspire “a lot” or “quite a lot” of trust. In contrast, it is remarkable that, in relative terms, the rapport between local notables and local law enforcers seems different in Jalisco than that defining the national landscape.

Certainly, this kind of tool frequently leads to inquire what exactly constitutes the concept of “trust”. What aspects contribute towards the perception interviewees have regarding law enforcers? Further statistical research might help to model the variables that significantly explain the levels of trust expressed by the respondents in both, the ENVIPE-2017 and the

[481] On the victimization surveys and possible bias, see Chapter 1.

ENVE-2016[482]. Excluding micro-sized economic units, for instance, might improve the analyses and refine the results. For the time being, the before mentioned data requires ascertaining the particularities of the bonds set up between local notables and the enforcers in Jalisco. The systematic analysis of the qualitative interviews conducted among businessmen, provides some clues that might be useful to achieve such an aim.

Graphic 3.2 Businessmen and trust in law enforcement agencies

Percentage of respondents that trust each institution "a lot" or "quite a lot".



Source: Prepared by the author based on the "Crime Against Business National Survey" (ENVE-2016) for business sector, conducted by INEGI. The original question was "How much trust does [the institution] inspires you" *(¿Cuánta confianza le inspira [la autoridad]?)* The possible answers were an ordinal scale "A lot, quite a lot, not very much, not at all". The graphic considers the respondents who identify the public agency. For National Business Sector N=4'503,271; for Jalisco Business Sector N=332,758. The percentage differences are significant according to the residual analysis.

The data collected in Guadalajara reinforces the image that law enforcement agencies are entities unworthy of trust. Among other reasons, businessmen (interviewees) allude to flaws

[482] Access to the database has been recently obtained through the *Dirección de Acceso a Microdatos* which will be consulted *in situ*. Forthcoming analyses would update this part of the analysis.

such as police officers' poor level of education, low salaries, lack of social prestige or inadequate training. The final outcome: "policemen ignore the rules, the correct protocol… for detention and prosecution. So, generally, no one goes to jail"[483].

The precedent attributes, from the account of the industrialist Ernesto González, are related with officers' profiles, outlining precarious job conditions to explain the high levels of impunity existing in the country[484]. Police are qualified as incompetent providers of protection and therefore unable to offer security. It shall also be noted that "impunity" from González's perspective is not necessarily the lack of justice but the fact that most individuals who are indicted are released due to a deficient process. In addition, when he evokes police capacity to detain and prosecute, the skills of inquiry are omitted reflecting a punitive orientation in dealing with crime. A focus on merely putting people in prison concurs with the opinion of some other members of his sector[485].

According to some of the elder businessmen, the local government placed importance on reinforcing police corps fairly recently, precisely during Alberto Cardenas' arrival to Jalisco's government:

> *It was said that in Bebeto's times*[486]*… the famous Bebeto Cárdenas, the heads of the Guadalajara Police Departments* ***were sent to Israel and to France for training****… [it was said] that they followed training courses and that* ***police here were better than anywhere else in Mexico. I don't really know*** *if it was true or if it was only a Cardenas' Government publicity tactic! Maybe…I don't know!*
>
> Leonel Novak,
> Financial Sector Businessman,
> Guadalajara Jal., August 26th, 2015
> *(Q3-9)*

> *Around… twenty years ago or so… the government became aware that [police]* ***must be well paid… or better paid… they realised they must be people with a good level of education, because did not have those conditions****. And they… realised that it was necessary to* ***vetting… [police officers] through the polygraph*** *and some other things that used to be neglected…so I'm talking about 20 years ago, that* ***we started doing that****… what we have now…* ***it took us a lot of time for them… to understand what is basic****… so basic to understand.*

[483] Interview conducted with Ernesto González, Industrial Sector, (October 16th, 2015), Guadalajara, Jal.
[484] As evoked in the Chapter 1, around 95.4% of the crimes committed in Mexico remain unpunished, considering that only 25% of the offenses is reported and, from them, only 18.25% reach a final sentence in either way (Zepeda Lecuona, 2011).
[485] Interviews conducted with Héctor L. Orta, Industrial Sector. (September 3rd and 18th, 2015; January 18th, 2017). Zapopan, Jal.
[486] Along with "Beto", "Bebeto" is the short for the name Alberto.

Héctor L. Orta,
Industrial Sector Businessman
Zapopan, Jal., January 18th, 2017
(Q3-10)

Both accounts describe Alberto Cárdenas' administration as being a turning point in terms of reinforcing government agencies since the political elite became aware of the problem and they (re)acted. A certain link is indicated by the profound reforms addressed by the first *panista* government, which have been detailed earlier in this chapter. However, the prior accounts also suggest a discrepancy between the two businessmen interviewed. While the first recalls only having heard something related, the second narrates the changes implemented as a protagonist, as someone at the head of the decision-making process. Although both are contemporaries, there is a main difference between them, namely, Leonel Novak describes himself as being "not very active" within business associations, whereas Héctor L. Orta, as will be demonstrated especially in Part III, is an active and very high-profile member of the organized sector. That lead, however, will be followed in much greater detail further along.

Combined with an inadequate profile of the police officers, businessmen have identified organizational factors that have contributed, according to them, to the failure of law enforcement agencies. In a highly fragmented landscape, the necessary coordination among various agencies seems difficult to achieve. For instance, Rafael Magaña, while trying to obtain justice after his son's killing, bears witness to constant confrontations between government agencies, which have diverse competences and levels of power that have made his struggle even more complex[487].

Furthermore, partisan tensions are also considered a source of conflict within the fractured institutional structure. Manuel Gómez, a young businessman in the service sector argues that, after a highly competitive electoral processes, to expect coordination between a governor from one political party and the municipal presidents from others, is almost naïve[488]. Besides this perception being quite similar to the current electoral landscape in Guadalajara, the fact that Gómez does not expect such coordination to be feasible is relevant. In that regard, once again, Héctor L. Orta's account allows us to go further, shedding light on how the mediation between diverse and opposed public servants has been one of the issues that organized businessmen

[487] Interview conducted with Rafael Magaña, real estate company owner and activist. (January 23rd, 2017). Guadalajara, Jal. Some details on Magaña's case will be discussed in the following pages.
[488] Interview conducted with Manuel Gómez, Service Sector. (October 15th, 2015). Zapopan, Jal.

have been dealing with over the last twenty years. In other words, in their opinion, if any degree of coordination has been achieved in such fragmented institutional landscape, it has been enabled to some extent at least by the business sector.

Incompetence is not the only concept businessmen associate with the police force. For some of them, police are mostly colluded with criminals, including the *Narco*:

> *Extortion?* ***Extortion… is demanded by no other than the police****… the traffic police… there is not a morning that they don't say 'well,* ***do you want to pass safely? I'll charge you!*** *(…) and there are a lot of risks to face… talking about the Narco… I think the Narco is not really a huge risk… they are not a threat for me… I mean,* ***the real risk is the one who allows the Narco to operate****… right?*
>
> Lorenzo Mendoza,
> Service Sector Businessman
> Zapopan, Jal., September 13th, 2015
> *(Q3-11)*

> *There are so many things that could be done in terms of insecurity,* ***but the authorities, they are not surpassed…they are colluded!*** *At each government level they send the message that 'there is nothing to be done!*
>
> Rafael Magaña,
> Real estate Sector Businessman and Activist
> Guadalajara, Jal., January 23rd, 2017
> *(Q3-12)*

The idea that police officers are a part of crime, instead of providing protection, was confirmed by a former chief of police working within a *panista* municipal government who stated: "[when we arrived] a lot of authorities were engaged with *narcos*, protecting them… why didn't I complain? To whom would I complain? If the highest levels were colluded, to whom was I supposed to address such a complaint?"[489].

Both interlocutors, businessmen and public servants, describe a pattern of government protection which, on the one hand, employs illegal means to "protect" a legal transaction, for instance to transport merchandise on a particular highway. On the other hand, they also use legal means to protect illegal transactions such as drug trafficking. Thus, by way of anecdote, they begin to map out distinct scenarios of protection patterns, deeply discussed in the introductory pages of Part II. However, in both cases, they assume to be "actors with their hands tied" who go with the flow, having few other alternatives. Therefore, Lorenzo Mendoza pays some type of bribe to traffic police officers because it is the only way to operate on daily

[489] Interview conducted with Macedonio Tamez, Politician and Public Servant. (February 23th, 2017). Mexico City.

basis. Macedonio Tamez recalls that, unable to fire or prosecute the majority of the colluded officers, as a police chief department, he developed alternative actions such as "sending them [colluded police officers] to keep watch over nothing else but a door or to exert pressure on them forcing them to quit"[490]. Although the politician did not go into much detail on which measures he employed to force the officers to resign, Tamez's tactics do not necessarily imply illegal methods[491].

Furthermore, collusion is not only taken as police officers protecting criminals or extorting citizens, including businessmen. A flow between both categories, "police officers" and "criminals" is also perceived. From his experience of working hand-in-hand with police officers, Francisco Herrera, owner of a private security company and kidnapping-and-ransom consultant, dares to state that "while fighting crime, they [police officers] learn how to commit offences"[492].

Along with incompetence and collusion, a third attribute that emerged from businessmen's accounts, while qualifying law enforcers, is "indifference" or "lack of interest" in doing what they are supposed to do. In other words, although they could have the conditions to deliver protection, their apathetic manner deters any action.

> *Distrust! They don't trust [the governmen]t… and a lack of interest, on the Government's side [drove businessmen to protect themselves], because there were* ***two aspects…****.that we did not trust the government, because* ***we thought they were corrupt*** *or linked to the wave of crimes that were occurring. On the other hand,* ***they didn't grant any attention from the Government****… to [businessmen's] organizations… they ignored us, they didn't listen… then, society said 'ah, then we will organize ourselves and* ***start working on those issues on our own! We will take over!***
>
> Máximo Ballesteros
> Private Security Company owner
> Zapopan, Jal., January 19th, 2017
> *(Q3-13)*

As far as incompetence is concerned, businessmen believe they are able to do something to reverse inappropriate public action; whereas, the lack of interest seems to be the issue to be

---

[490] *Idem.*

[491] For instance, within Mexican public administration, practices known as "*la aburridora"* (to bore) or "*la congeladora"* (the freezer) are usual to neutralize some bureaucrats who are impossible to fire (unionized, notably). In some cases, through legal tactics, such bureaucrat position becomes more precarious or even disappear, then the public servant is forced to either accept the lack of benefits or to quit. [The author acknowledges the kind contribution of Pablo Cervantes, Rebeca Rodríguez and Juan Martínez C. who, from their large number of years as public servants, feed this point].

[492] Interview conducted with Francisco Herrera, Private Security Company owner and kidnapping-and-ransom consultant. (February 1st, 2017). Mexico City.

undertaken. The possible meanings of "take over" alluded to in the narrative above is what will guide the next chapters. Thus far, what is important to keep in mind is that whether businessmen consider law enforcers to be incompetent, colluded and apathetic, they still consider them worthy as providers.

A possible explanation is that, contrary to other citizens who may share the opinion regarding law enforcers, businessmen are able to receive at least something from the regular provider. To explore this potential interpretation, it will be useful to focus on their experiences in dealing law enforcement agencies. What particularities are visible in this rapport?

Numerous extracts could be replicated which explore the experiences that some businessmen recall as crime victims in an attempt to obtain government agency protection. However, I will focus on those that have particularly rich details.

Concerning his own kidnapping, that took place in 1997, Juan Zenón, a prominent businessman from the industrial sector, remembered:

> *Me: Did you ever find out who was responsible for… [the kidnapping]?*
>
> *I: No, I never did! Back-then,* ***the State Attorney told me 'don't try to find out anything****…* ***you are free now****, the ransom has been paid, let it go', then I went 'but, what about…', and he went 'Stop worrying about it and try to live a normal life'. So, I tried!* ***The attorney, he was my friend… he is still my friend***
>
> Juan Zenón,
> Industrial Sector Businessman
> Zapopan, Jal., August 27th, 2015
> *(Q3-14)*

This is consistent with the story shared by Antonio Alcántara and his father[493], despite being a more recent memory (15 years later) than the one Zenón evoked. The Alcantaras refer their experience when someone stole one of their trailers that was full of merchandise. Not being the first time that this had happened, they contacted the state deputy attorney to obtain a solution, as they were afraid of becoming endless victims of such crimes. The answer was another polite invitation to avoid opening an investigation to trigger state action.

> *[Alberto A.: Tell her about the deputy attorney!] Yes, we went… we went to see him – again, talking about the government as an ally or not, supportive or not-* ***we went to see the deputy attorney*** *and we told him 'that is what happened', and he answered* ***'do you want me to arrest them? Because I know them… you are talking about so-and-so,***

[493] As explained elsewhere in the text, this interview was conducted simultaneously with Alberto A., founder of the company, and his two sons -Alberto Jr. and Antonio-, both in charge of the firm nowadays. For the methodological implications, see the Introduction.

> ***but… do you have insurance? – yes, we do-, in that case, use the insurance, it is better, because we can go catch them and send four guys to jail, but there are not only four [guys], there are many more, and they are going after you, because you interfere with their business, right?'*** *[Alberto A., impersonating the deputy attorney: You already got the insurance!] yes, 'you got the insurance, but you tell me… if you want me to go arrest them, I'll do it now… ready, set, go!' [Alberto A.: The deputy attorney!][laughs] Of course, after that we just left!*
>
> Antonio Alcántara,
> Commerce Sector Businessman
> Zapopan, Jal., September 9th, 2015
> *(Q3-15)*

Two elements might be recovered from the precedent accounts since they give us interesting leads to follow. First, both Juan Zenón and the Alcántaras, have direct and personalized access to local law enforcement agencies, to the highest levels, the attorney and the deputy attorney, respectively. The possibility of discussing the case in person with the authority responsible for procuring justice is not necessarily within the reach of every *Tapatio.* One way to read this is to consider that such a bond whether considered a friendship or not is the outcome of common interests between political and economic elites. Nevertheless, Antonio Alcantara himself presents evidence that the personalized nature of the relationship with government agencies and agents is not constrained to the highest levels, but includes a diversity of actors within a landscape of policing multilateralization filled with individuals holding power:

> *My father is* ***the company's face to the public*** *and* ***he has contacts at all levels… politics, businessmen… all kinds, local, regional… you name it!*** *And no… [Alberto A.:* ***it is friendship****] it is not the same… when we have had an episode, for instance, merchandise stolen, immediately my father goes 'ey, what's up? Do I reach so-and-so? Do you want me to tell him? Do you want me to…?'. In the end we said "well… it is not such a good idea to contact them…* ***we already filed the insurance claim and were reimbursed****… we already solved it, we don't need to go…' and you are always afraid of contacting them and ask them for a favour…* ***because you are…*** *[Alberto A., Jr.:* ***vulnerable!] vulnerable and in debt!*** *You owe them a favour!*
>
> Antonio Alcántara,
> Commerce Sector Businessman
> Zapopan, Jal., September 9th, 2015
> *(Q3-16)*

It must be noticed that government action eventually triggered through such connections is seen as a favour granted. In addition, these ties involve certain reciprocity or, at least, the disposition to enter in an exchange where favours are (or must be) payed-back. Hence, it seems that businessmen carefully consider whether it is worth it to be part of a long-term reciprocation. "That is why I don't ask for favours, cause then you have to do others", said

Raymundo Chávez[494], young agro-industrial businessman who, nonetheless, maintains close relationships "with public servants at many different levels". Therefore, having connections is only the first step in benefitting from that sort of social capital, so, one must be willing to exchange.

The second element to bear in mind from previous accounts is that, showing a certain amount of apathy while doing their job, law enforcement agents involved in the anecdotes try to dissuade the victims from reporting the crime, discouraging a report by activating either a fear of retaliation or point out what, in their opinion, really matters: "being free" or "receiving insurance compensation". This mechanism is apparently effective, at least in these examples in which victims did not follow through with their cases via the institutional route. Once again, this opens the door to dealing with threats by using alternative mechanisms[495]. In that sense, while deterring the filing of a complaint, government agents are indirectly delegating protection to others, those who businessmen consider appropriate. Devolution, then, is also materialized on regular basis and not only as the outcome of historical reforms.

Still, to discourage businessmen from pressing charges does not seem particularly difficult since "filing a complaint requires courage and civil awareness"[496].

> *Sometimes, there is no trust regarding the authorities, I mean 'eh, if the one to* ***whom I go to…to press charges is also… perhaps a friend,*** **compadre**[497] ***or he is [colluded] with this other person and what do I get? I just put myself to the spotlight and I did not achieve anything'****, that happens a lot, for instance, as landowners, sometimes people occupy part of our ranch to grow cannabis there. Then, you are in a very serious dilemma, 'do I press charges?' do I take my chances?' me or my people [are at risk], the muleteer or the one in charge… and what if nothing happens?* ***Because they [the offenders] enter [to jail] and they are [immediately] out*** *and me… I just put myself in a very compromising situation*
>
> Jesús Salas,
> Agro-industrial Sector Businessman
> Zapopan, Jal., October 8th, 2015
> *(Q3-17)*

[494] Interview conducted with Raymundo Chávez, Agro-industrial Sector, (August, 29th, 2015), Zapopan, Jal.
[495] Two other possible effects could be mentioned. First, it has an impact on public policy since unreported crimes are not part of the official statistics, the one in which diagnosis and policy designs are based on. Then, programs could be affected by a blind angle position. Second, it hampers state agency actions. Even kidnapping or robbery implies an investigation *ex officio*, the authority has to have elements of suspicion or indications of the offense. The informal conversations with the officials should be enough to trigger state action. However, as both examples show, they were driving the case not to present a complaint but in the opposite way.
[496] Interview conducted with Víctor José Prieto, Commerce Sector Businessman and Public Servant, (October 21st, 2015), Guadalajara, Jal.
[497] See footnotes 335 and 336 in Chapter 2.

To report a crime entails a risk for businessmen in, at least, two respects: on the one hand, potential collusion between offenders and law enforcers could transform a complaint into retaliation, as Jesús Salas argues. Along the same lines, Gustavo Moreno calls attention to the fact that, while reporting a crime, all your personal information is granted to untrustworthy institutions whereas the offender remains unidentified[498]. Finally, an asymmetric rapport is established between victims and offenders where the former are in clear disadvantage.

On the other hand, filing a complaint also might imply that the businessperson fall under scrutiny. For instance, Paula Gudiño, owner of a chain stores said that once, in one of her stores, she identified some apocryphal pieces that had been sale along with the rest of the merchandise. She asked to her lawyer to report it and to go after the employee that allegedly used her store to commercialize "pirate merchandise". Her lawyer gave her a precious piece of advice: if she reported it, she would set off a process requiring the inspection of all her stores, then, some other irregularities might emerge, such as the way her father had obtained, some years ago, a license to operate 24/7. Then, she abandoned the idea of reporting the offense and reached an agreement with the person allegedly responsible[499]. Then, besides how challenging the bureaucratic procedure of filling a complaint might be, in some cases businessmen's estimation on reporting (or not) a crime lies on how much it exposes their own skin.

Taking into account that conventional access to law enforcement is conditioned by the image of authorities being apathetic, incompetent and colluded with criminals, what kind of options do businessmen have to face threats? Is there a zero-sum game between the regular protection provider and alternative protectors? Still, for businessmen, is there a way to receive the little that is good left over in such rotten system?

Figure 3.4 illustrates the possibilities of protection that businessmen alluded to during the interviews, given the fact that the regular provider is not always an optimal choice. These options could be classified in two groups: 1) actions that seek to induce government agency

[498] Interview conducted with Gustavo Moreno, Service Sector Businessman. (September 19th, 2015). Zapopan, Jal.
[499] Interview conducted with Paula Gudiño, Commerce Sector Businesswoman. (October 22nd, 2015). Guadalajara, Jal.

(re)action and; 2) those that rather consider non-government actors to face a threat. It must be noticed, however, that both groups are not necessarily mutually exclusive.

In the first group, a recurrent alternative mentioned by businessmen is to foment association or chamber intervention to achieve a proper and effective government reaction that, otherwise, would not be possible. The intermediation on behalf of the association is equivalent to "direct and permanent"[500] contact with the government, a space that represents "an open dialogue with the agencies"[501], and also the possibility to obtain an immediate and effective response from the concerned authority[502]. This leads to the question of which factors explain that business associations are seen as a valuable alternative to access the regular provider of protection, despite its unfavourable reputation.

Figure 3.4 Protection alternatives assuming law enforcement agencies to be incompetent, apathetic or colluded



Source: Elaborated by the author based on the ensemble of interviews conducted, between August 2015 and January 16th, 2017, with 57 businessmen settled in Guadalajara Metropolitan Area, Mexico.

[500] Interview conducted with Jerónimo Cervantes, Industrial Sector Businessmen. (October 28th, 2015). Zapopan, Jal.
[501] Interview conducted with Alfredo Palomino, Industrial Sector Businessmen. (October 7th, 2015). Guadalajara, Jal.
[502] Interview conducted with Camilo Hernández, Industrial Sector Businessmen, (October 1st, 2015), Zapopan, Jal.; Interview conducted with Fidel Torres. (October 13th, 2015). Construction and real estate Sector Businessmen, Zapopan.

The short answer would be that organized agents act as pressure groups, lobbying for certain policy orientation or action. However, that neglects all the nuances of the business associations' scopes and limits. If they have enough weight to influence policy design, the elements on which this power relies must be explored.

Numerous chamber and business associations have a department of public security, namely, vice-presidency (section or direction) through which businessmen are able to contact government agencies[503]. It must be noted that these counters are not only devoted to public security concerns, but to any other issue that interests the sector. Thus, fiscal support or some advice regarding tendering procedures for selling to the government are also included in what the chamber calls "services granted to associates"[504]. Yet, the presence of these entities confirms the importance that businessmen grant to (in) security issues. In addition, it reflects that the dialogue between the business sector and law enforcement agencies has an institutional basis. However, such rapport also takes place under less formal conditions.

While referring to the measures he takes when perceiving a threat, José Julio Huerta, owner of an industrial sector company, states:

> *I think, first, you have to know what to do… for instance, [you should] contact… to say* ***'I will call my chamber's president'****, because the chamber's president is able to call the… the… Council of Chambers' president and* ***he, in his turn, might call the state Attorney… directly… to have an answer****.*
>
> José Julio Huerta
> Industrial Sector Businessman
> Zapopan, Jal., October 17th, 2015
> *(Q3-18)*

Then, it seems like the most effective path to follow in order to get efficient government intervention is to contact the heads of business associations who have direct communication with the highest local level law enforcers (notably the state Attorney). Thus, the association's counter is set aside, and a more informal method is put into motion, one in which the head of every sphere takes part. This is consistent with the version expressed by Fidel Torres, real estate and construction sector businessman who also chairs an important business association. According to him, his organization has an "excellent link and direct communication with the

[503] Interview conducted with Raúl Velázquez [Skype communication], Commerce Sector Businessman, (October 29th, 2015). On the possible effects of the interview format, see the methodology section at the Introduction.
[504] Gazette Bank of Images 1970-2016.

state attorney's office, thus, when we have an event… we get an immediate response (…) [we get] efficiency and results"[505].

Although different kinds of bonds might be possible between local notables and high-level local enforcers, to illustrate, kinship, friendship, similar political orientation or common business, there is a type of contact that has emerged in numerous accounts: the meetings celebrated amongst them.

Earlier in the chapter, it was argued that meetings held between business sector members and law enforcement authorities are a space for information exchange. During these reunions, businessmen also receive "courses conducted by generals from the Army or the Navy"[506] who give them advice and training on "security tactics, what or what not to do, what routes to avoid, how to react in case of… or to avoid a kidnapping or a robbery while transporting merchandise"[507]. That confirms that businessmen assume themselves to be more vulnerable than other profiles regarding certain crimes (as discussed in Chapter 1) but it also illustrates that authorities agree on the extent to which they advise them in such a focalized way, whereas the rest of the citizens must learn these measures on their own.

The specialized attention businessmen receive from law enforcers is neither necessarily new, nor comes from the democratic transition period. By way of illustration, it is pertinent to evoke the offer that, in the 1980s, the state Attorney made of establishing a Public Prosecutor's Office at the Chamber of Commerce (*Módulo del Ministerio Público)*, to simplify the report of property-related offences for businessmen[508]. That could be read as an indicator of the Governor responding to the sector's specific demands, but also as a sign of the discriminatory character of his policy. Business sector or more precisely, those affiliated to the Chamber of Commerce, would be beneficiaries of a privileged service counter, while the rest of the citizens would have to pass through a long and bureaucratic process to have access to the authority.

The reunions with public servants are also an opportunity for businessmen to exert certain pressure on their interlocutors and call for solutions to specific problems. Within the meetings,

[505] Interview conducted with Fidel Torres, real estate and construction sector businessman. (October 13th, 2015). Guadalajara Jal.
[506] Interview conducted with Manuel Gómez, Service Sector Businessman. (October 15th, 2015). Zapopan, Jal.
[507] Interview conducted with Alfonso Magadán, Industrial Sector Businessman. (September 23rd, 2015). Zapopan, Jal.
[508] Gazette Bank of Images 1970-2016.

businessmen, for instance, point out the performance of public servants or officers they judge as being inappropriate. Due to their intervention, a police department commander or a deputy secretary could be removed from office[509]. As has been discussed in another section of the text, this might imply a loyalty-related dilemma for public servants or, at least, the incentive of having a remarkable performance on protecting businessmen, even if that implies not attending other sectors.

It has to be considered that the benefits the business sector gains from such privileged contact with law enforcement agents are not necessarily limitless. For instance, Víctor Manuel Olvera, service sector businessman, recognizes that the chambers' demands have real effects on government decisions, however "problems are not treated from their root cause"[510], which yields an ensemble of temporary remedies, rather than permanent solutions; even if, businessmen's demands reach the highest levels of the law enforcement system.

The dominant belief among the interviewees is that they receive this direct, permanent and specialized attention from the most important profiles; albeit, the idea deserves a more meticulous exploration.

The interview with Alfonso Magadán, a young industrial sector businessman was conducted on location in the lobby of a large business association. While we were talking over a cup of coffee, a notorious security apparatus crossed the lobby to leave the building. Five black *Suburban* vans waited at the end of the stairs situated after the gate. The figure in the middle of such showy departure was barely visible. Magadán explained:

> *Look! Talking about security, here…* ***there is the state Attorney… Look at him! How many guards around him!*** *[silence] [laugh] You see? When we were talking about security! He was the key speaker today… today it [insecurity] was the subject…* ***he was the special guest… no matter how protected he is… he is here****, to talk to us.*
>
> Alfonso Magadán
> Industrial Sector Businessman
> Zapopan, Jal., September 23rd, 2015
> *(Q3-19)*

As this quote shows, when it comes to local authorities, businessmen are effectively able to hold meetings with the highest-level public servants, the state Attorney or the Secretary of

[509] Interview conducted with Eduardo Hernández, Commerce Sector Businessman, (September 26th, 2015), Guadalajara, Jal.
[510] Interview conducted with Victor Manuel Olvera, Service Sector Businessman, (October 15th, 2015), Zapopan, Jal.

Public Security. Even if the security apparatus deployed by the Attorney guards could be read as a sign of status and importance (as Magadán does) he is there, on the businessmen's turf, talking to them. Furthermore, businessmen could also meet medium level and more operative profiles, for instance, the chief of municipal police or the commander responsible for protecting a specific area. That has been the case during the *priista* hegemony (before the mid-1990s), as well as during *panista* administrations (since 1995) [511]. Yet, the "special guests" have a different profile when the meetings are celebrated with federal authorities.

> *For instance,* ***we have a good relationship*** *with* ***the Fifth Military Region, the former commander had a very… very straightforward relationship with businessmen, as well as the current*** *[commander]. He just changed like… less than a month ago, he had been in the position for about one year. Any problem, with the federal forces, either Federal Police, Navy, Army…* ***they are available [for us]****.*
>
> Jerónimo Cervantes
> Industrial Sector Businessmen
> Zapopan, Jal., October 28th, 2015
> *(Q3-20)*

Whereas a diversity of local authorities, ranking from the highest level to operative profiles, attends meetings within chambers, the contact with federal government lies mostly in the local or regional delegation. In the precedent case, for example, they received the Regional Commander of the Military Zone, but not the Ministry of Defence. That implies that the possibility that those reunions could have to influence national public policy is limited, since their interlocutors within the Military may have wide prerogatives in operative terms at the regional level but scare possibilities of affecting the redistribution of the budget or reorientation of the national public security strategy.

Probably, this also explains the diverse patterns of trust the sector in Jalisco grants to local and federal authorities, exhibited at the beginning of this section: businessmen display greater trust in agencies that are close enough to (re)act to their petitions in a way that is convenient for them.

Whether high or medium level authorities, contact with business associations seems to be personalized and to transcend changes in public administration, thereby, the replacement of one regional commander for another did not seem to disrupt contact with the Military Region. Perhaps, that was the outcome of personalized rapport, in which businessmen and law

[511] Gazette Bank of Images 1970-2016.

enforcers have been able to build long-term relationships. By way of example, it is possible to recall that the former state Attorney in charge of the case of Juan Zenón's kidnapping is still his personal friend, almost twenty years later.

In addition, personalized communication, besides being a fertile ground for future friendships, is also a guarantee of effective attention for businessmen and social prestige for the law enforcers:

> *We had a case in which we made a petition… more attention on Guadalajara municipality, in a specific area… **I was put in direct contact with the region commander**, [he gave me] his personal mobile phone number, then, in case of any other event**, we can call him directly** (…) and they follow-up the subject in a timely manner. In the next meeting, **I was thinking of… thanking them for… the support**, but it was not necessary to bring it up, because they, brought it up themselves… first, they asked 'what happened? the problem, is still keep going? Did we act right? What are you missing?*
>
> Jerónimo Cervantes
> Industrial Sector Businessmen
> Zapopan, Jal., October 28th, 2015
> *(Q3-21)*

The otherwise apathetic, colluded, incompetent authorities may become collaborative, effective and considerably attentive to business sector's necessities. However, although businessmen refer that the reunions are always celebrated in cordial terms, some tensions arise, especially, when it comes to addressing issues such as the alleged collusion between police officers and criminals or deliberate negligence in law enforcer performance:

> *I think it's impunity… more than insecurity, it's impunity [what disturbs businessmen]. For instance, specifically… the other day, **two businessmen told him [the State Attorney]** [lowing the voice] **'Come on, don't play the fool!** We have been telling you about the robbery of the van and the kidnapping for four or five weeks now… about the kidnapping of someone we know… dude, **four weeks and the Attorney's Office is doing nothing!** And then, you send us the State Police Chief… but nothing happens… **and then you went mad and called us to complain after we called the Navy**, who fixed the problem in a couple of days! So… this is the corruption of your police, nothing but corruption', they told him, clearly… because it is unbelievable that there is no way to [fix it].*
>
> Alfonso Magadán
> Industrial Sector Businessman
> Zapopan, Jal., September 23rd, 2015
> *(Q3-22)*

Besides the confrontation described by Alfonso Magadán, the way businessmen diversify their contact with either local or federal level agencies is also relevant. As explained in the Introduction, the Federal Pact hinders the coordination between the three levels of government

and several law enforcement agencies might have incentives to hold more power vis-à-vis other public agencies. In that sense, businessmen could take advantage of the cracks in the complex law enforcement kaleidoscope, discussed in Section 3.1. However, if businessmen are not confronting but instead collaborating with local government, they could also represent a tool for the authorities gaining more attention and resources from the Federal Government. "If you cannot handle it, tell us, and we can go all together to ask for Federal intervention and support. If we go together and ask for Federal Government support, we are stronger and we can get better results"[512] said Eduardo Hernández, while recreating one of his conversations with local authorities. Hence, the link between the Federal Government and the business sector could represent a spur to local authorities or an opportunity to increase the public budget coming from Federal contributions. Either way, this depends on the terms of the relationship between the business sector and local law enforcers: coalition or collision.

Following Eduardo Hernández's words', it seems that being a group grants greater weight and a better position to bargain with the business sector. That is even clearer in comparison to the path that Rafael Magaña has been following since his son was shot and killed. His goal is to make sure everyone responsible for the killing is in prison: "People ask me if I want justice or revenge? Which is the difference? I want to have them punished, period!"[513] said Rafael off-the-record.

As his son's murder has been portrayed as being an execution somehow related to the *Narco* (as explained in Chapter 2), Rafael Magaña was not able to count on the business associations; he would have to take this on himself. Hence, to achieve his objective, he practically abandoned his profession and his company in the pursuit of practically becoming a lawyer.

Proud of his achievements, he explained that he had obtained the extradition of one of the killers, who already lived in the US, a procedure which Mexican authorities gave him no hope of obtaining. He paid for the investigation to strengthen the case file with evidence such as DNA and ballistics tests. He added "You have to do it! For sure! You have to get the evidence and grant it to the attorney's office (*ministerio público*), because they won´t do it, that's

[512] Interview conducted with Eduardo Hernández, Commerce Sector Businessmen. (September 26th, 2015). Guadalajara, Jal.
[513] Fieldwork carnet, January 23rd, 2017.

clear,"[514], while showing a large amount of papers that constitute his son's case file that he masterfully put together.

In contrast with business associations, Magaña did not have direct, permanent and effective communication with authorities to get what he was striving for. His contact with specific government figures was periodic, diffuse and indirect. For instance, he has a cousin who used to work with a former Mexican Ambassador in the US who put him in touch with the US Government. He also created a non-profit organization to play, when necessary, the "civil society card", as he called it. Clearly, whatever Rafael Magaña accomplishes is an individual endeavour, with his own resources, and not as part of the local notables.

Magaña's account, coupled with the previous discussion, allows us to claim that being part of business associations is a way to pursue the protection that, otherwise, law enforcement agencies would not necessarily deliver, at least, not with the same efficiency and efficacy. Nevertheless, some alternatives remain for those who do not belong to an association or participate much within the chambers.

According to this profile, it is still possible to induce government action, although to do so, it is necessary to pay for it. Víctor Manuel González, the owner of a medium-sized commercial enterprise complained saying that "if you want the public prosecutor to follow your case up, you have to keep giving him money. Otherwise, your file goes to the last in line"[515]. Hence, bribes are one way to obtain protection from government agencies. For businessmen, however, it is possible to pay for protection investing in lawyers that represent you[516]. Of course, what businessmen consider as "greasing the wheels" is mostly corruption, as it is clearly illustrated by the anecdote contained in Text Box 3.1.

Text Box 3.1 "You know, sometimes we have to grease the wheels

Since I arrived to this company, everything looked different from the other factories I had visited thus far. It was a large piece of property in the middle of a popular neighbourhood located in the municipality of Tlajomulco. In contrast, the waiting room corresponding to his office was minuscule to the point that his assistant struggled organizing files and documents.

While waiting for him, I found it impossible to set my sights anywhere else but on the walls, crowded with photographs in which my interviewee posed with personages coming from

[514] Interview conducted with Rafael Magaña, Real estate company owner and activist. (January 23rd, 2017). Guadalajara, Jal.
[515] Interview conducted with Víctor Manuel González, Commerce Sector Businessmen. (September 15th, 2015). Guadalajara, Jal.
[516] Interview conducted with Paula Gudiño, Commerce Sector Businesswoman. (October 22nd, 2015). Guadalajara, Jal.

all political parties, either former Mexican Presidents or local leaders. Mostly all of them were smiling, mostly all of them were hugging Edmundo Saavedra in a friendly way. From the waiting room, the statement was clear: Saveedra, the businessman I was about to interview, was someone important in the political world.

Wearing brand-named clothing, an eye-catching diamond ring, a gold bracelet and a *Rolex* watch, he appeared. He invited me to have the interview in his office, a large space that outlines the narrowness of the room we left behind. We sat down in the living room, surrounded by TV screens and other electronic devices.

I had conducted fifty interviews before this one and in no other had I seen this much opulence. But what was revealed in this interview although luxurious was not the one of a kind experience that would come later, in the middle of the meeting.

The conversation was developing normally, I dare to say it was even anecdotal, a businessman is used to talking about his company, repeating the script he knows by heart: his grandmother had an idea, his grandfather made it happen, his father transformed it into an emporium and he and his siblings are now fighting each other to gain its control. Suddenly, one of his two mobile phones rang, he asked me to stop the recorder machine to take the call and then, the course of the interview completely changed.

His daughter was on the other end of the phone, asking him for an update on a situation that, at the beginning, I could not follow. He started reading a list of names from a piece of paper he took from his shirt-pocket. All these names did not mean anything to me. Then he explained: *"Yes, my godson is in charge of that, he already has an agreement with [he mentioned two names], they are willing to receive the money. The problem is this other guy [he says the name], because he is acting like the innocent one and he is rejecting the compensation. My godson is in charge, he is close friends with a friend of this guy, and we will offer the money using that route".*

He was focused on his conversation, as if I had disappeared, he kept going, spelling out the explicit details of the arrangement.

"This other guy [again, one name] he already accepted, but I just warned my godson to keep him to his word, because last time he agreed to help us, he received the money and later he insisted, what a fag!", he launched insults using a series of derogatory words to refer to this person as a coward, someone without honour or homosexual.

His second mobile phone rang, he asked his daughter to hold on because his godson was calling: *"Hey bastard, what's up? [laughs], I'm fine… so? Yes, I have my daughter on the other line, she is worried. How is it going? Did you fix it?"* the answer took a while. He just nodded his head, confirming what he was hearing for himself.

As for me, I tried to memorize the names he was throwing out, acting neutral, as if nothing shocked me, as someone who without a clue about what was happening. I did not have to do anything to make myself invisible, it seemed that I already was.

"Ok, let me know how everything goes", he ended that call and returned to speak to his daughter: *"Hey, apparently this other guy will accept. At least they made an appointment. They will go to a restaurant or something, I hope it works".* That call also ended.

He turned to acknowledge me, I was hesitant whether to pick the conversation up where we left off or to stay silent. I chose the latter, and few seconds after hanging the phone up, he said:

"There is a problem [pointing his mobile out] we have a problem with someone who wants to steal the brand from us, so we are in the middle of a lawsuit and we are trying to get the judges on our side"

It was not necessary to remember the names he had mentioned as he just granted me the pieces of information missing in the picture of my mind, they were judges and he was bribing them to get a favourable judgement.

"We have to do what it takes, I mean, you know, sometimes we have to grease the wheels, although everything inside the law", and the conversation continued, as if nothing had happened.

Source: Fieldwork carnet (October 23rd, 2015) Notes from the interview conducted with Edmundo Saavedra, Industrial Sector Businessman, (October 23rd, 2015), Tlajomulco, Jal.

The preceding episode is not only an example of a businessman paying for gaining a specific reaction from the government agencies. It also shows many other aspects of the way they proceed to get the protection of the government over their properties and interests. From the account it is possible to remark that it is a common practice, since one of the magistrates already received money from him some other time. Indeed, that element, besides his homophobic language, reveals that these agreements may not be observed. Therefore, some measures may be taken minimizing the risk retraction. How does Saavedra's godson will "tie up" the magistrate who did not respect the agreement before?

Certainly, the porosity of the borders between the legal and illegal are manifested again. For him, "to grease the wheels" is not outside the law. Probably, that is why he did not ask me to leave the office during the call and did not spare a single detail either on the phone or after, to explain to me what this was all about. Another possibility behind this normalized way to settle an act of corruption in front of a stranger is that he wanted to reinforce the idea that he is someone who get what he wants. Perhaps, it is simply that he is not accustomed to discretion, as exemplified with not only his jewellery, but also by his actions.

Saavedra's bonds with political elites should not be overlooked. First, such relationships are part of his presentation and he continuously recalls them during the conversation. In addition, that underlines that, even having high-profile friends or actively participating in chambers and associations, which is the case, businessmen may use individual strategies, such as corrupt agreements to obtain public action on their behalf. In other words, within their repertory of threads to pull, they are not mutually exclusive.

In fact, there are alternatives in which, to governmental (insufficient and poor) action, businessmen add other sources of protection, namely, appealing to experts, hiring private security or even, to take the situation into their own hands. These paths will be explored in the remaining chapters.

Thus far, it has been shown that, through formal and unformal means, a progressive delegation of security duties has been endowed to a selective group of businesses, which has been able to shape its own provision of protection. As much as the democratic transition did not necessarily represent the origin of the process of devolution, the fragmentation of law enforcement agencies that began with Cárdenas' administration laid the foundation for a polycentric system, which has entailed diverse positions of power and networks. Despite the

perceived flaws regarding law enforcement agencies, or perhaps because of such conditions, businessmen set up a dynamic relationship with the regular protection provider based on personalized and privileged contacts as local notables. In the next chapter, the alternative protection providers and their rapport with businessmen will be located at the centre. Certainly, government agencies will remain present pointing out that devolution is not equivalent to fading state functions.

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Chapter 4. Purchasing Protection: The Entanglement of Alternative Suppliers

> *Allowing a pacific and productive citizen to bear arms grants him the opportunity to protect himself. And they [the government] can't say that it would drive us to the law of the jungle, because we have been living there for a while, but in a very uneven way.*
>
> Javier Magaña, head of a rural owners' union in Jalisco[517]

Cattle rustling is an offense that breeders face frequently in Mexico. The problem was famously exposed in an assembly of Jalisco's rural landowners in 1998, in which they demanded that Governor Alberto Cárdenas authorize their use of firearms to guarantee their own protection. Arguing that "the State has to accept its limitations and to recognize that it is seriously failing in its mandate [to protect its citizens]"[518], the leader of one of the unions advocated for cattle ranchers and *ejidatarios*[519] to use their own protection mechanisms.

Rural owners were also facing rising kidnapping rates. Therefore, along with seeking authorization to carry firearms, they also asked for other protection measures[520], such as the restoration of the *Policía Pecuaria* (Livestock Police), whose efforts they were willing to support by providing it with vehicles and equipment to needed operate[521].

The *Policía Pecuaria* was a police force founded in 1994 that, according to the regulation, was created to protect the livestock sector from theft and other offenses[522]. However, it was also a reflection of a context in which numerous murders were registered in Jalisco's rural region[523]. In fact, the press reported the presence of possible "death squads"[524] that would kill alleged kidnappers, presumably financed by a group composed of people that either had been kidnapped in the past or was afraid of suffering the same fate, and who ultimately did not trust in the protection measures provided by the government[525]. The *policía pecuaria*

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[517]"Propietarios Rurales piden permiso para portar armas." (September 18th, 1998). *Siglo XXI*.
[518] *Idem*
[519] Communal owners. Ejidos were the plots of land that were allocated to communal owners by the land reform program of 1910 (Larreguy et al., 2019).
[520]"Abigeato y secuestros, problemas de los ganaderos sin resolver". (December 1st, 1997). El Informador.
[521] "Definirán aumentos en carne, leche y huevos". (January 11th, 1995). El Informador.
[522]Acuerdo del C. Gobernador del estado por el cual se crea la unidad operativa de la policia pecuaria del estado, dependiente de la dirección de seguridad pública, May 28th, 1994.
[523]"El Estado investiga los asesinatos múltiples". (July 9th, 1994). El Informador.
[524] Quotation marks come originally from the press release. For a discussion on conceptualizing death squads, see the Introduction.
[525] "Investigan 'escuadrones de la muerte' en Jalisco". (July 10th, 1994). *Reforma*.

would be the response that Governor Carlos Rivera Aceves (1992-1995) approved of as a means of deterring both crimes committed against rural owners and illegal measures of self-protection. Nevertheless, the police body did not succeed in deterring these crimes and eventually disappeared. Indeed, cattle ranchers considered it a failure, despite the publicity it received through the government. Their authorization to carry weapons was eventually renewed,[526] extending to the *panista* administration of Alberto Cárdenas (1995-2000), as previously described in this work.

In the late-1990s, the Secretary-General of the Government stated that the government would not yield in authorizing rural owners to carry arms, although he added an important detail to the problem: the recurrent petition around bearing weapons and other protection measures did not only come from rural owners, but from urban businessmen dissatisfied with Jalisco's security conditions as well[527]. It seems, then, that the desire to be armed as a means of self-protection was not just an issue concerning *rancheros*[528]; it was also a measure contemplated by the urban economic elite.

Beyond its anecdotal character, the previous narrative provides three important insights: (a) Facing offenses that (rural or urban) owners perceived as threats against their sector, they sought targeted solutions in which they were able to contribute with their own financial resources; (b) Besides their interaction with the regular protection provider, owners are willing to implement self-protection measures and to resort to non-government instances; and (c) The alternative protection supplier could deploy illegal practices (such as killing alleged offenders).

The analysis of these components sits at the center of the present chapter, and the main objective is to explore the rapport between businessmen and their "hired" protection providers, to characterize this relationship and to consider its implications. The *privatization of public security*, framed by the minimum state principle, shall be used as a suitable and comprehensive term to denominate the object of the study. However, across the chapter, it will be demonstrated that, to characterize the complex contemporary protection patterns in a multilateralization context, a more accurate term might be the *commodification of policing*

[526] "Demandan productores mayor participación política". (October 3rd, 1994). *El Informador*; "Ganaderos se quejan de la administración de justicia". (October 8th, 1994). *El Informador*.
[527] "Descarta Guzmán avalar uso de armas". (May 11th, 1999). *Mural*.
[528] See Footnote 53 in the Introduction.

and a "new combination of the public and private [realms]" (Hibou, 2004: 46) that entails the relocation of the state, the blurring of the public-private divide (Hibou, 2004) and even policing performed through practices that are "neither public, nor private, but something 'twilight'"[529] (Diphoorn, 2016: 314).

In Latin America – and Mexico is not an exception – the economic crisis of the 1980s-1990s, the open market-oriented policies implemented since then, the rise of mass private property, the rising crime rates and the expansion of fear among the population, was accompanied by the expansion of the private security sector. This resulted in the increasing presence of national and multinational companies which would offer protection alternatives to an ensemble of clients able (and willing) to pay for it.

Those who analyze the proliferation of private security agents as a direct consequence of the contraction of bureaucracy, assume that, to a certain extent, private security agents are filling the vacuum left behind by the state reduction or the lack of trust in its institutions, prompting the privatization of public security. Eventually, the latter would contribute to the endangerment of the state's capacity to deliver security to the rest of the population (Arias, 2009, Ungar, 2007, Benítez Manaut, 2004). According to this perspective, the plurality of agents providing protection would be doing surpassing the state. However, this dichotomized perspective, in which private agents would be supplanting rather than supplementing state's offer of protection, neglects the abundant evidence indicating that the level of state devolution towards the alternative protection agents and agencies could vary widely. Overlooking this, the perspective "misses the complexities and ambivalences inherent in contemporary patterns of security provision" (Müller, 2010: 133) and, more importantly, neglects that "privatization never meant loss of influence by state power" (Hibou, 2004: 27).

Challenging the assumption of the "state crisis," Lorenc Valcarce (2011) conversely explores the possibility that the proliferation of non-government protection providers is rather "an informal emanation from the state" (p. 20). Thus, it is not a process happening outside the state, but hand in hand with it. Indeed, the varying level of control that the state keeps over those alternative providers, as well as the mission each of these entities embraces, shape a broad spectrum of non-government security provision (Lorenc Valcarce, 2011; Ungar, 2007),

[529] Quotation marks from the original.

among which might be mentioned different commodified forms of private protection: gated communities or "fortified enclaves" (Caldeira, 2000: 258), elite guards, community policing units (Ungar, 2007), the proliferation of alarms, gates and other devices, but also many other "more informal bottom-up practices, such as lynching and vigilante justice" (Müller, 2016: 119). In all those cases, the government delegates certain parts of the task of protection, but not necessarily its control. Thus, while analyzing alternative protection providers, more than a privatized market, we expect to observe its hybridization, as the government is not necessarily replaced or eroded but relocated.

Although market-oriented economic reforms effectively brought about increasing numbers of private security companies, a more historical standing point will be highly informative to the extent in which it illustrates that non-government protection providers have been present in Mexico ever since it was a Spanish colony.

Certainly, tracking protection mechanisms set up by Mexican economic elites or land owners over time, it might be necessary to go back as far as the country's colonial era and the measures adopted or inherited from the Castile Kingdom (now Spain), such as the *Hermandades* (brotherhoods) (Vanderwood, 2014 [1982]). The *Hermandades* were both like fraternities and armed confederations. They propagated in Castile between the 13th and 15th centuries, created to defend the ancient customary laws (*fueros*) and privileges in times of deep turmoil and instability, to expand Christendom, and to enforce order and protect roads and fields from pillage. They were even able to exert summary justice against road blockers and other criminals (Sánchez Benito, 2006; Asenjo González, 1997; Suárez Fernández in Higounet, 1953)[530]. According to Vanderwood (2014) [1982], the *Santa Hermandad* was established in New Spain in 1553 by the Viceroy Luis de Velasco, who granted them far-reaching power to pursue and punish robbers and other offenders.

Although an exhaustive discussion of the protection suppliers established in Mexico since those times would be a compelling endeavor, it falls far from the aim of this research. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that ever since those early times, government and non-government protection suppliers have been sketching a scenario of blurry boundaries

[530] For an interesting discussion on how the armed groups who used to perform theft and kidnapping in Castile were not oblivious to the political tensions of the period and their violence were often managed from power struggle, see Sánchez Benito (2016).

between private and government spheres, between security-oriented and political aims, and between mass and elite protection services that should be given careful attention.

In that regard, the *Guardias Rurales* (*rural guards*) provide an informative illustration of armed groups that land owners originally set up against cattle rustling, the *Guardias Rurales* were later promoted by the Porfirian political regime and eventually used, after the Mexican Revolution, to ensure internal security. However, they were also used to enforce specific political interests within a context of struggles between multiple revolutionary leaders (Vanderwood, 2014 [1982]). In those times, they also took the form of *guardias blancas* (white guards), private police forces usually organized by hacienda owners (Piccato, 2017). Besides serving as private guards for *caciques* (strongmen), the *rurales* would operate as repression instruments when the post-revolutionary state needed them, i.e., during the land distribution reform (Larreguy et al., 2019).

In what is today Jalisco, a Horsemen Armed Force for road and population security was established in 1849, becoming the *Policía Rural* (Rural Police) in 1856. In 1911, a decree enabled the executive power to organize a *Cuerpo de Rurales* (*Rural Defense Corps*). In 1912 the *Guardias Mutuas* were created with the aim of protecting "social interests" such as population security, farms, and roads. An Organic Law that regulated the Rural Police was not published until 1954 and subsequently derogated in 1977[531].

Attached to Mexican Army, the *Guardias Rurales* still exist on the field and, without claiming full representativeness, fieldwork suggests that they would also be close to illegal groups such as drug cartels: "when you are patrolling, you see these guys driving a truck and holding AK-47, total *narcos*! You reach them and they say 'we're [*guardias*] *rurales*', and they are… the Army is behind them, but they are carrying AK-47s… you know them, they

[531] According to the state of Jalisco's Congressional Archive, the following laws and decrees would be the legal framework of the Guardias Rurales: Reglamento y creación de Cuerpos de Fuerza Armada de Caballería para la Seguridad de los Caminos y Poblaciones, C.D.T. 11. December 10th, 1849; Decreto que reglamenta la organización de la fuerza de Policía Rural y del Estado, C.D.T. 14. August 11th, 1856; Decreto 1386 que Faculta al Ejecutivo para que organice un Cuerpo de Rurales. March 20th, 1911; Decreto 1429 que Autoriza la formación de cuerpos de seguridad o Guardias Mutuas para proteger los intereses sociales bajo condiciones que se determinan, May 6th, 1912; Ley Orgánica 5928 de la Policía Rural del Estado de Jalisco, March 30th, 1954; Decreto 9543 que deroga el Decreto 5928. January 4th, 1977. However, the decree published in 1954 is the only piece I could access.

are also *narcos*, but you cannot do anything", accounted a former chief of police in a rural municipality of Jalisco[532] off the record.

The *Rurales*, including all its variances, illustrate that a "resurgence of private protection" (Forst, 1999: 14) ought to be considered while discussing the alternative protection providers that neoliberalism brought onstage. Even more relevant, it underlines the complexity of protection patterns and calls for a more careful review of the differences in the way *Tapatio* economic elites demand protection today.

Exploring the rapport established between businessmen and the variety of alternative protection providers, it will be possible to demonstrate that the latter conform a complex entanglement of actors and groups which do not supplant, but supplement law enforcement protection provision. Indeed, under certain conditions, it is difficult to set borders between "public and private" or "legal and illegal", when it comes to characterizing protection modalities and suppliers.

The following analyses will also be informative in exploring how paying policing agents is a measure adopted to protect not only goods and proprieties, but also multiple private interests that lie far from concerns about social order (Huggins, 2000).

The chapter is organized in three sections: the first one discusses the selective policing that law enforcement agencies have historically implemented to protect businessmen, who become clients paying for a service. In other words, the discussion is built around the private service granted by the public agencies. The second section focuses on both self-policing measures and private security companies to analyze them as contemporary traces of a neoliberal encouragement of self-preservation. The last section, on the other hand, focuses on the illegal means of protection in which businessmen could (un)willingly "hire" *Narcos* or other criminal organizations to ensure the protection of their lives and properties as well as their interests.

[532] Fieldwork carnet, February 22nd, 2017.

4.1 Commodifying public policing: the "armed protection of private interests"

In their analysis of police forces' highly-developed corrupt practices in Mexico City[533] under the leadership of the infamous General Durazo[534], Pansters and Castillo Berthier (2007) mention the existence of a group known as *La Hermandad* (the brotherhood), "a secret network of police officials involved in illegal activities" (p. 45). The group was evidence of the longstanding connections that Durazo instated between the police force and multiple illegal businesses (Piccato, 2003). Beyond its role in putting a network of corruption into motion within the police, *La Hermandad* also played a part in providing protection in exchange for a payment, either to guarantee impunity to certain officers or to safeguard "most formal business (such as restaurants, bars, bakeries and cinemas)" (Pansters and Castillo Berthier, 2007: 45).

In the former example, the protection that rent seeking officers provided to businessmen represented a sort of private service granted by public forces to a specific group. It seems to rely on corruption, collusion and illegal practices: "the bad cops", acting as criminals, extorting local owners. Although businessmen's (re)actions vis-à-vis *La Hermandad* remain unexplored, it is possible to imagine them as victims of Durazo's network. However, other forms of "armed protection of private interests by a public institution in exchange of cash payment" (Pansters and Castillo Berthier, 2007: 45) could be settled.

Focusing on Guadalajara, the main purpose of this section is to demonstrate that police bodies supply a form of private protection within a more complex pattern than the "victimizer-victim" relationship previously described. In this understanding, businessmen's role should not be considered as trivial or simple. To reach the objective, two cases would be discussed, namely, the so-called Auxiliary Police forces (*Policía Auxiliar)* and the VIP (in)formal protection schema.

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[533] Mexico City became the official name of Mexico's capital in 2016, known before as Federal District. In the late 1920s the Federal District was established as an Administrative Department (DDF), dependent of the central government and whose regent was appointed by the President (*Regente del Departamento del Distrito Federal)*. In 1996, after a political reform, the ruling figure was changed to Mayor of Federal District (*Jefe de Gobierno del Distrito Federal)*, who would be elected for the first time in 1997. For more on Mexico City's political reforms see Cervantes Méndez, 2019. For more on the political (and notably partisan) evolution enveloping the reforms see Combes, 2011.

[534] For more on General Arturo Durazo (1976-1982), former chief of Police in Mexico City, see footnote 176 in Chapter 1.

Drawing attention on the property crimes rising during the 1980s and 1990s, Máximo Ballesteros, former public servant and owner of a private security company settled in Guadalajara, stated:

> *The curious thing was… during the [property crime] spikes in 1985… and then in the 1990s, the way, at least in Jalisco, the way private security was handled… was that a part of the government security apparatus, named* **Policía Auxiliar***, **was taken over by private individuals**, and that's the origin of the well-known* Policías Auxiliares bancaria, industrial[535]… ***which used to be bodies… I mean, government organizations or institutions, but which were delegated to private individuals to be managed, and they operated as private security, but they really belonged to the Government**, right? And that was… during the late 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s… (…) there were rising property crimes and this scheme* [policía auxiliar] *was reinforced.* ***But... once they realized that this framework was not enough to solve the problems, more and more private security companies began to be integrated, with private, civil staff…*** *right? Not… not from the Government.*
>
> Máximo Ballesteros,
> Private Security Company owner
> Zapopan Jal., January 19th, 2017
> *(Q4-1)*

The prior account might be confusing since Ballesteros describes *Policía Auxiliar* as a branch of the police department but, *managed* by non-government actors. Indeed, some scholars and experts, as Ballesteros himself, describe these police corps as part of a trend towards privatization (Regalado Santillán and Moloeznik Graer, 1998) as it "is a service that the state charges to private individuals"[536]. But, to what extent are Auxiliary Police bodies *private* bodies?

Attempting to find an answer, it is pertinent to explore the Auxiliary Police by unpacking the label "privatization", paying special attention to five attributes in the management of these forces: (a) recruitment and selection of the agents (who recruits?); (b) payroll (who pays the wages?); (c) equipment and weaponry (who provides the equipment and weapons?); (d) objectives and main tasks (who defines the objectives and tasks?); (e) performance evaluation or reward-punishment policy (who evaluates?).

Following these threads, the reader will realize how all these questions have ambiguous answers, making it impossible to limit them as "private" or "public" instances. Instead, a

[535]In the Auxiliary Police, *bancaria* is the police responsible for protecting bank branches and *industrial* is the one monitoring factories and industrial parks.

[536] E-mail exchange with researcher and expert Dr. Marcos Pablo Moloeznik, February 19th, 2018. The author thanks Dr. Moloeznik's kind availability to clarify some questions on Guadalajara case and to put some of his unavailable publications within my reach.

dynamic combination between government and non-government actors would be involved in setting the protection supplier in motion.

Studying the *Policía Auxiliar,* although the focus is still on Guadalajara, will briefly take this research further in time and space, towards post-revolution Mexico City.

In the early 1920s, amidst the aftermath of the Mexican Revolution and an important urbanization period of Mexico City, *Las Lomas de Chapultepec (Chapultepec Heights)* was founded. It was a neighborhood in which diplomats, politicians, bankers and industrialists built their luxurious manors[537]. As it was located between the end of the main avenue *Paseo de la Reforma* and the entrance to the old Mexico-Toluca road, the wealthy *barrio* became the forced route of merchants, transporters and multiple travelers that sought either to enter or leave the capital city. In order to protect the neighborhood from the masses in daily crossing and considering that the Police Department lacked officers needed to monitor the areas along the city borders, inhabitants considered the presence of a small group to provide them with security "necessary, almost forceful."[538] This group was eventually named *Policía Privada* (Private Police)[539]. Such a name was appealing since, at a first glance, it alluded to policing devoted to (or conducted by) private entities.

Thus far, security agents were recruited by the real estate agencies that sold the manors, and their protection services were paid for by *Las Lomas* neighbors[540]. Regarding equipment provision (as well as its disposal), its objectives and its control mechanism (evaluation) remain a blind spot. However, all else considered, it seems to be a "private" force.

Progressively, following the neighbors of *Las Lomas*, non-government actors in other parts of the city started paying other groups or individuals for this kind of protection, addressed either to their *barrios* or to their factories and businesses[541].

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[537] 5to. Batallón. (July-August, 1957). Fundación de los primeros grupos de la Policía Auxiliar. *Boletín Informativo Policía Auxiliar del D.F.* The english term "hights" (sic) comes from the original.
[538] 5to. Batallón. (July-August, 1957). Fundación de los primeros grupos de la Policía Auxiliar. *Boletín Informativo Policía Auxiliar del D.F.*, p. 12.
[539] 5to. Batallón. (October, 1956). Historia de la Policía Auxiliar. *Boletín Informativo Policía Auxiliar del D.F., 5to. Batallón*; 5to. Batallón. (July-August, 1957). Policía Privada de las Lomas de Chapultepec Hights. In Fundación de los primeros grupos de la Policía Auxiliar. *Boletín Informativo Policía Auxiliar del D.F.*
[540] 5to. Batallón. (July-August, 1957). Fundación de los primeros grupos de la Policía Auxiliar. *Boletín Informativo Policía Auxiliar del D.F*
[541] 5to. Batallón. (August, 1956). Introducción. *Boletín Informativo Policía Auxiliar del D.F*.

In the 1930s, the multiplicity of comparable groups deployed in different parts of the city entailed some trouble, to the point that some of them even confronted one another. Other profiles such as private detectives or law enforcers hired by private citizens joined the landscape, bringing the porosity of the borders between private and public fields into clearer view (Piccato, 2017). The Mexican Army's Lieutenant Colonel Leandro Castillo Venegas and the Mexico City Regency attempted to integrate all (or most of) the different bodies into the *Policía Auxiliar*[542] which in 1941, through a presidential decree, was formally constituted as a police body attached to the Preventive Police, under the leadership of the chief of police department, but responsible for providing service to "particular residences and commercial, industrial and banker establishments, located in the Federal District, to prevent crimes and offenses"[543].

In the mid-1950 it was reported that *Policía Auxiliar* was financed by factories, business, stores, companies and bank branches in exchange of "surveillance services and the protection of their interests"[544]. That said, it must be added that the profits coming from the protection services granted by the police body went to the public purse[545], as the agency was attached to the law enforcement system. Thus, regarding the police body funding, it is fair to say that its resources came from private actors, but they were managed by public entities, implying that the wage policies and operative expenditures were planned and performed by public instances. Certainly, in contrast with collected taxes (which come from private individuals and constitute part of the public budget), in this case, the state was collecting profits associated with a service sold to private citizens.

The dimension involving equipment and weaponry reinforces the image of this police body as a compelling expression of highly entangled public and private realms. Although customers financed them, the city government made its own contributions to arms and equipment (Figure 4.1), although the conditions under which this happened are not clear.

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[542] 5to. Batallón. (October, 1956). Historia de la Policía Auxiliar". *Boletín Informativo Policía Auxiliar del D.F.*
[543] Reglamento del Cuerpo de Veladores Auxiliares de la Policía Preventiva del Distrito Federal, Art. 1. Diario Oficial de la Federación, Mexico City, March 13th, 1941.
[544] 5to. Batallón. (August, 1956). Cómo se sostiene el 5to. Batallón de la Policía Auxiliar. *Boletín Informativo Policía Auxiliar del D.F*, p. 2.
[545] 5to. Batallón. (March-April, 1957). Historia de la Policía Auxiliar, Parte III. *Boletín Informativo Policía Auxiliar del D.F.*

Figure 4.1 Equipment and weaponry donated by the local Government to the Auxiliary Police, (Mexico City, 1957)



Source: 5to. Batallón. (July-August, 1957). Colaboración del DDF para la Policía Auxiliar. *Boletín Informativo Policía Auxiliar del D.F,* p. 3-5.

Beyond the occasional governmental contributions, the Auxiliary Police was (and still is) allowed to bear arms, authorized by the collective permission granted to the Preventive Police given that the former is a branch of the latter. In addition, the Auxiliary officers have access to police patrols and to the police department VHF radio network, and they are dressed in uniforms similar to those worn by the police (Juárez Guerrero and Mendoza Vidal, 2001). According to Puck (2017), through uniforms and other features that replicate the police's image, private security companies seek to express "symbolic stateness" (p. 75) which grants them some legitimacy as protection providers. Aside from the complexity that this condition brings to the rapport between public and private security suppliers (Puck, 2017), the "stateness" of the Auxiliary police seems to be far more than symbolic. It makes this group an advantaged protection supplier for private individuals, as it is better equipped, close enough to the police department to trigger its action, but distinguishable from it and its bad reputation. In fact, for several years, the Auxiliary Police held the monopoly of protection

supply to public buildings and facilities (Juárez Guerrero and Mendoza Vidal, 2001) and substituted the preventive police in tollgates and roads when it was required[546].

The complex interweaving between public and private spheres is observable in multiple features throughout the history of the Auxiliary Police, and its recruitment and agents' profiles sample that. Since its origin, the group was composed of people coming from the Army ranks and by other civilians, who were paid by private individuals through real estate agencies[547]. In fact, under the presidential decree mentioned above, not only groups but diverse agents who delivered a protection service – like night guards or watchmen who monitored cars in the streets – were integrated into the ranks of the new police body (Juárez Guerrero and Mendoza Vidal, 2001). That draws an institution that, on the one hand, is managed under a strong military inspiration but, on the other hand, is formed by profiles ranking from professional militaries to improvised street watchmen. Bearing in mind that the Mexican Revolution had left behind several armed people, it is not difficult to perceive the complexity of this police corp.

The Auxiliary Police had a very significant militarized tune since its official foundation[548]. Thus, its leading figures were military personnel[549], the force was structured using battalions and some military rituals were adopted towards the auxiliary officers. For instance, an internal bulletin of the 5th Battalion[550] describes the degradation ceremony to which one of its members was subjected, due to disciplinary flaws. Replicating the military codes, the officer's badges were ripped out and his cap was destroyed. Witnessed by fellow members,

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[546] 5to. Batallón. (March-April, 1957). Historia de la Policía Auxiliar, Parte III. *Boletín Informativo Policía Auxiliar del D.F.,*

[547] *"Salidos del Ejército y el pueblo (...) retribuídos por la compañía vendedora y fraccionadora"* says originally the Bulletin (5to. Batallón, July-August, 1957). Fundación de los primeros grupos de la Policía Auxiliar. *Boletín Informativo Policía Auxiliar del D.F.,* p. 12).

[548] 5to. Batallón. (October, 1956). Historia de la Policía Auxiliar. *Boletín Informativo Policía Auxiliar del D.F*.

[549] 5to. Batallón.(December, 1956). Historia de la Policía Auxiliar, Parte II. *Boletín Informativo Policía Auxiliar del D.F.*; 5to. Batallón. (July-August, 1957). Fundación de los primeros grupos de la Policía Auxiliar. *Boletín Informativo Policía Auxiliar del D.F.*

[550] The reader will have noticed that a significant part of the restitution of the Auxiliary Police's history relies on an ensemble of issues of the bulletin concerning the 5th Battalion. The source might entail, at least, two biases that must be considered: a) since it is a medium for internal communications, it could be seeking to build a certain (favourable) image of the police body. For that reason, the facts are evoked from an analytical perspective; and b) it is possible that different battalions operated in diverse and even contrasting ways. Thus, using 5th battalion as a source, neglecting other battalions, and ignoring its weight within the Auxiliary Police structure, increases the risk of misinterpreting what could be mostly particular aspects of one of its battalions to be general features of the Auxiliary Police. Trying to avoid this, the references made here are mostly those made on the Auxiliary Police body (not only the battalion), otherwise, it is explicitly specified.

the official seniors expel the officer from the police ranks. The shaming ritual goes beyond the ceremony, as the ceremony is reported in the internal publication in which the name and photograph of the downgraded officer remain for history[551]. It was probably its militarized character, and especially the leadership of Lieutenant Colonel Castillo Venegas, that made the Auxiliary Police a body too close to political power. In fact, in the mid-1930 it was known that this security body was "extremely loyal to [President Lázaro] Cárdenas and his political ideals" (Davis, 2012:77). But his bond with political power was not circumscribed to their loyalty towards Cárdenas.

Proudly, the 5th Battalion reported how, beyond the services provided to private individuals, the Auxiliary Police, for several years, closely collaborated either at the request of the authority or based on their free will, with some politicians' protection (notably, Presidential candidates), safeguarding ballot boxes during elections, surveilling the incumbent political party offices and events, or suffocating uprising attempts, sometimes wearing their uniforms, while others operating in plain clothing[552]. Certainly, every evoked activity[553] would be worth a discussion in itself, particularly considering that this police body could have had a role during the hegemonic party system consolidation, which has been neglected by literature. Instead, remaining attached to the purpose of this research, the hybrid character of the Auxiliary Police would concern not only administrative but also operational aspects: it seems that the same staff was providing security to bank branches and factories, while serving as a tool for social order and control for political power, pursuing objectives partially defined by the customers, partially decided by public officers, politicians, and party members.

Thus far, the image of the Auxiliary Police shows several intricacies in the inner circle of the public arena, namely, the political elite, the military and the police. Certainly, the coexistence with the last two forces was not free from tensions (Davis, 2012). Thus, Auxiliary Police

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[551] 5to. Batallón. (January-February, 1958). Por indisciplina fue degradado el Policía Miguel Elías Rodríguez. *Boletín Informativo Policía Auxiliar del D.F.,* p. 27.

[552] 5to. Batallón. (October, 1956). Historia de la Policía Auxiliar. *Boletín Informativo Policía Auxiliar del D.F.*; 5to. Batallón. (December, 1956). Historia de la Policía Auxiliar II. *Boletín Informativo Policía Auxiliar del D.F.*; 5to. Batallón. (March-April, 1957). Historia de la Policía Auxiliar III. *Boletín Informativo Policía Auxiliar del D.F.*; 5to. Batallón. (May-June, 1957). Historia de la Policía Auxiliar IV. *Boletín Informativo Policía Auxiliar del D.F.*; 5to. Batallón. (July-August, 1957). Fundación de los primeros grupos de la Policía Auxiliar. *Boletín Informativo Policía Auxiliar del D.F.*; 5to. Batallón. (September-October, 1957). Historia de la Policía Auxiliar VII. *Boletín Informativo Policía Auxiliar del D.F.*

[553] Appendix 4.1 shows a list of "other services" that the 5th Battalion reported as their contribution to "avoid social order to be disturbed".

activities bordered on public security and political control. One must not forget, however, its origin and its links to private sector protection. If this police body was more complex than organized watchmen attached to the government while serving private individuals, what repercussion would that complexity have on the private protection supply? A review of the protection services that Auxiliary Police used to offer would provide a useful guideline to answer this question.

In the late 1950s, the 5th Battalion introduced its "investigators body" which offered to businessmen an ensemble of services that allows to better understand their notion of "surveillance and protection of their interests". Figure 4.2 shows the list of activities that this Auxiliary Police division can do since its staff, according to themselves, is well prepared to provide such services.

Despite the fact that the archival piece is rich in elements to analyze, it is pertinent to focus on the kind of services offered and demanded. In other words, what the body of investigators offered to businessmen has to be read as mirroring what the sector likely demanded and the police body was able to grant. In that vein, it is possible to classify the list of services into three groups, discussed below.

The first group would be the activities concerning surveillance and guard of establishments, cash transactions or transit. In this case, for businessmen, the threat are thieves, more generally, the risk of being victims of property crimes. In that sense, it is possible to consider it as the basic service nowadays provided by private security companies.

Second, the investigators body offered services to inquire on client records before granting them credits, minimizing risks of debtors, what nowadays the business world calls "due diligence". In the next chapter, this kind of demand and some of its implications are developed concerning *Tapatio* businessmen. By now, it suffices to say that property crimes are not the only threat businessmen sought to inhibit through a private police service, but also the barely trustworthy customer portfolio.

Figure 4.2 Services offered by the Auxiliary Police to protect business' interests
(Mexico City, 1957)



CUERPO DE INVESTIGADORES DEL 5o. BATALLON DE LA "POLICIA AUXILIAR"

El 5o. Batallón de la Policía Auxiliar, siempre atento a las necesidades de garan izar y vigilar los intereses que están bajo su cuidado ha formado un cuerpo de investigadores, compuesto de personal perfectamente capacitado para desarrollar este trabajo, en cualquier industria o lugar que se precise; los elementos de este cuerpo pueden desarrollar su trabajo, de acuerdo con las circunstancias del caso, en el lugar que se les asigne y sea necesario. Concretamente la jefatura de este cuerpo investigador cuenta con elementos que pueden prestar su servicio en la siguiente forma:

A).—Como simple obrero en una factoría.

B).—Como obrero especializado, con conocimientos elementales para cualquier caso.

C).—Empleo de bodega o almacén.

D).—Empleado del departamento de contabilidad o caja.

E).—Empleado oficinista.

F).—Office boy.

Igualmente, el personal de nuestro c.erpo ejecuta investigaciones de solvencia de clientes de negociaciones para el fin del otorgamiento de créditos.

En la misma forma, los elementos de este Cuerpo, hacen investigaciones de personal, tanto de confianza, como de obreros de negociaciones; lo mismo que podemos hacer toda clase de encuestas sociales, de personal existente o que esté por ingresar a cualquier factoría; estas encuestas consisten en investigar la conducta moral de un individuo, parten desde los primeros antecedentes que éste haya tenido en el plantel escolar en el cual haya cursado, hasta el último empleo desempeñado antes de solicitar u ocupar empleo en la negociación que solicite dicha encuesta, asimismo comprende nuestro trabajo la investigación de antecedentes de parientes más cercanos a dicha persona.

Asimismo nuestro cuerpo de agentes está capacitado para acompañar y custodiar al cajero o personas de confianza empleadas en negociaciones, que estén encargadas de hacer remesas o recabar fondos ya sea a bancos o a cualquier otra parte donde se acostumbre llevar o traer éstos; este mismo personal puede prestar sus servicios vigilando al público que se presente a cobrar o efectuar pagos en el departamento de caja de cualquier negociación.

Nuestros agentes se encuentran dotados, por la jefatura del 5o. Batallón de la "Policía Auxiliar", del arma que sea necesaria para el desarrollo de su trabajo y se presentan con la indumentaria que el caso requiera.

EL COMANDANTE DEL 5o. BATALLON
DE LA POLICIA AUXILIAR
MAYOR LEANDRO CASTILLO SANCHEZ

Source: 5to. Batallón. (July-August, 1957). *Boletín Informativo Policía Auxiliar del D.F.,* p. 58.

The third group concerns the recruitment vetting process and staff monitoring. To avoid hiring untrustworthy employees, the Auxiliary Police offers to conduct deep investigations on candidates' records, paths and even family bonds, a sort of due diligence, but addressed towards the business staff. The service is not limited to the recruitment stage, as the police body also offers profiles of people able to act as employees: specialized workers, storage staff, bookkeepers, cash-point responsible staff, office workers and even office boys. Although such service seems to be an infiltration within the business' staff, the available information does not allow this research go further on that inference. For instance, we ignore whether this sort of inner-control measures could eventually become industrial espionage tools, if the hired auxiliary police officers were sent to a rival company. Additionally, spying on employees would also make them vulnerable to racketeering and other offenses conducted by the spies, as they collect detailed information on them. Indeed, within the context of an Italian-American slum during the 1920s, it has been documented how little and poorly organized groups of crooks who started spying workers, "would eventually find those who had cumulate some savings, extorting them for such money under threat" (Foote Whyte, 2002 [1943]: 153).

Moreover, this piece retrieved from the archive is deeply informative as it grants more meaning to the isolated account of one of the *Tapatio* businessmen interviewees during fieldwork in 2015:

> *They are setting up all kinds of* ***security locks****, from internal policemen… in fact,* ***the Navy are using people in order to transform your human resources into an internal police… because thieves are entering*** *[to the companies]. Kidnappers… they are your own… [staff]… it is well documented that 90% of kidnappings are perpetrated by someone from inside, and… regarding security issues, we are really concerned*
>
> Alfonso Magadán, Industrial Sector
> Zapopan, Jal., September 23rd, 2015
> *(Q4-2)*

Law enforcers (notably military) infiltrating companies' staff could be a highly specialized service to prevent kidnapping, but it is also a fertile space to collect information on staff and their networks, especially those settled in dangerous areas. If anything, what is possible to clearly visualize is how employees were, and still are, seen as businessmen's potential threat.

Certainly, it is noteworthy that the Auxiliary Police specified that, depending on each situation, they were able to bear whatever weapon, or to wear whatever outfit, needed to deliver the hired service. Even if this versatility could remain within the borders of legal

transactions, hybrid police bodies are not exempt of being used with criminal purposes. In that sense, it is pertinent to evoke the infamous case of the *Batallón de Radiopatrullas del Estado de México* (BARAPEM)[554], a police elite group created in the 1970s in the State of Mexico[555] to provide specialized security services to bank branches and industrialists[556] although, eventually, became a cradle of criminals (Monsiváis, 2016 [1994]).

The *BARAPEM*, created under the administration of Carlos Hank González (1969-1975) and consolidated with the support of the governor Jorge Jiménez Cantú (1975-1981), was supposed to be a model to be followed by other states. It was integrated by a select group of around 600 agents, trained in different martial arts and equipped with the best available weapons[557]. Conversely, it is widely remembered because some of its members[558] became perpetrators of several bank robberies, quotidian extortions and muggings against factories' employees, bus burglaries and kidnappings of various rich people. In fact, it was its high training, equipment and deep knowledge of business, industry, banks and police dynamics which turned them into a threat for their erstwhile protected (Monsiváis, 2016 [1994]).

Some of the former members of the Battalion considered that it was the government that created the monster[559]. Effectively, alongside with the protection services that BARAPEM granted to business and financial sectors, the group widely served the government on repressing urban social movements (Moctezuma Barragán, 1999), within the Dirty War context, in which different paramilitary groups were used by the regime to suppress uprising attempts and guerrilla[560], as explained in Chapter 1.

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[554] The author thanks Monte Alejandro Rubido, former official, for his punctual advice to pay attention on this example as well as his kind availability to discuss other aspects of this research.

[555] The most populated of the 32 federal entities that integrate Mexico, which surrounds a significant proportion of Mexico City. In fact, 59 of its 125 municipalities are considered as part of the Greater Mexico City or Valley of Mexico Metropolitan Area.

[556] "Oficialmente muerto, el Barapem continua vivo y amenazador". (December 26th, 1981). *Proceso*, (269).

[557] *Idem*

[558] The most notable character that emerged from the group was Alfredo Ríos Galeana, who had been thrown out of the Army but nonetheless recruited to be part of the BARAPEM. For more on his trajectory see Monsiváis, 2016 [1994].

[559] "El Estado creó a Ríos Galeana y 560 como él, advierten sus compañeros". (November 29th, 1986). *Proceso,*(526).

[560] Notably, "*Los Halcones*" (the hawks), a group also trained in martial arts and fully equipped and armed, is infamous due to the so-called "hawk strike" or Corpus Christi Massacre against student protesters that took place in 1971. For more on *Los Halcones* see "Crimen y ¿castigo?". (July, 26th 2004). *Proceso,* (1447).

As in other federal entities, the Auxiliary Police was also set in Jalisco, although the available information is less vast[561]. In the legal framework, the first registry dates back to 1981[562]. This police body appeared as a sub-directory of the Public Security Department (DSP), in charge of "protecting business, banks, industries, neighborhoods and institutions, which cover the salary and employee benefits to the agents, in exchange for the service they received"[563]. This regulation, however, does not provide more details on the modalities and conditions in which such service was granted then, nor on what kind of staff was recruited or what process was used in recruitment. Conversely, as in the Mexico City case, the profits collected by granting these services are incorporated to the public budget.

In 1989, a press release gave note of the endeavor led by Servando Sepúlveda[564], then Head of DSP, to consolidate a unique Auxiliary Police fully managed by the state. According to the public official, at the beginning of the administration of Governor Cossío Vidaurry (1989-1992), under such figure, 36 groups were operating with different quality standards and were managed by "people not driven for a service mystic but for making profits"[565]. Nevertheless, it is not clear if those profit-driven people were public servants, private actors or both. In addition, within a meeting held with Chamber of Commerce that same year, Sepúlveda stated that around 25% of Auxiliary Police belonged to different companies[566]. That contributed to the confusion as the term "belonging" could yield different interpretations. For instance, it is possible that some groups are consecrated to provide protection to some specific industries. But it is also possible that, beyond hiring those groups, certain businessmen managed them. One of the few researches focusing on this police body in Jalisco describes them as "subrogated groups (…) managed by private individuals under state authorization" (Morquecho Güitrón and Vizcarra Guerrero, 2007: 261), which reinforces the idea suggested by Máximo Ballesteros mentioned earlier. However, "managing" remains as a very vague notion, allowing diverse readings and providing no clear answers to the five questions we

[561] Although I requested some information on the number of Auxiliary Police agents settled in Jalisco and Guadalajara, the State Attorney Office did not provide an answer. The available data, coming from the *Censo Nacional de Gobierno, Seguridad Pública y Sistema Penitenciario Estatales* carried out by INEGI (2011-2016) is shown in the Appendix 4.2.
[562] Official document No. FG/UT/1958/2018 from the State Attorney of Jalisco in response to the right-to-information request LTAIPJ/FG/586/2018, March 2nd, 2018.
[563] Reglamento Interior de trabajo del Departamento de Seguridad Pública del Estado de Jalisco, Art. 24. Periódico Oficial del Estado de Jalisco, December 24th, 1981.
[564] More details on Servando Sepúlveda's profile will be discussed later in this chapter.
[565] "El director de la DPS se reunió con profesionistas". (September 29th, 1989). *El Informador*, p. 11-A.
[566] Gazette Bank of Images 1970-2016. (November 3rd, 1989).

started with: who recruits them? who pays them? who provides the equipment? who defines the objectives? who evaluates?

Additionally, according to a Guadalajara municipal alderman, in Jalisco the Auxiliary Police is constituted by private security companies but supervised by the government[567]. In this case, the difference between the Auxiliary Police and the private security sector is not clear. Are there some services exclusively granted by the former in which the later are not allowed to be suppliers? If so, what kind of services are they and why are they exclusive? Is a sector protected by the Auxiliary Police while others by private security companies? Under which framework? Or, otherwise, are Auxiliary Police and Private Security Companies competing for the same potential clients? Those elements show the extent to which, in Jalisco's case, it is even more difficult to draw a line that circumscribes both the public and the private ingredients conforming this hybrid protection supplier. At the limit, over and above the act of paying for a service granted to a group of public servants, businessmen could have control over a segment of the law enforcement system to protect their interests, whether related with insecurity or not.

As head of DPS, Sepulveda used to promote the auxiliary services as an optimal alternative to reach businessmen's demand for security[568]. However, and as in the case of the *BARAPEM*, some wrongdoing was publicly associated to this police body. In 1995, several irregularities were revealed "creating the image that it [the Auxiliary Police] was mostly an optimal space for the private business of retreat and on-duty police officers, who taking advantage of their positions and their connections, offered private security services" (Regalado Santillán and Moloeznik Grare, 1998: 118).

The position of these complementary bodies became even less clear within the public security regulation. Neither the *Ley de Seguridad Pública del Estado de Jalisco* (published in 1993 and reformed twice[569]), nor the *Ley del Sistema de Seguridad Pública para el Estado de*

[567] "Guadalajara crea Policía para los eventos privados". (December 21st, 2010). *El Informador*.
[568] Gazette Bank of Images 1970-2016.
[569] Ley de Seguridad Pública para el Estado de Jalisco. Periódico Oficial del Estado de Jalisco, December 28th, 1993; Decree 15310. Periódico Oficial del Estado de Jalisco, January 27th, 1994; Decree 21838. Periódico Oficial del Estado de Jalisco, February 24th, 2007. According to Suárez de Garay (2016), "the Auxiliary Police is considered in the Eight Title of this law, concerning the private security services" (p. 130). However, I was not able to find the version referred by the scholar.

Jalisco (published in 2012[570]) explicitly referred to the Auxiliary Police as a government police body. However, an organization manual of the Public Security Secretariat, dating from 2008, mentions the Auxiliary Police Groups as attached to the Special Services Direction and regulated along with Private Security Services[571]. It seems that, more than the actual predecessor of Private Security Companies, the Auxiliary Police framework was equated to them, integrated in the same regulations, but not necessarily subsumed to them.

The complementary police bodies contribute to the further embroilment of Mexican law enforcement structures, particularly because this sort of corps could be created by both the state and the municipal levels of government.

Recently, in the municipality of Guadalajara, the government was about to create what they called *Empresa paramunicipal de seguridad privada* (Private Security Paramunicipal Company) (Text Box 4.1). Although this project was never achieved, its discussion within the local Congress reveals that this kind of protection provider is still present in the policing landscape.

Text Box 4.1 Guadalajara's Private Security Paramunicipal Company: the miscarried attempt of sharing the protection business

In august 2010, the Guadalajara municipal council (*cabildo*) opened a discussion on the project of creating a brand-new police body responsible for providing protection service to private entities. In those days, massive spectacles producers and sports businessmen used to pay the Municipal Preventive Police to deploy their officers during concerts or soccer matches. The main purpose of the *Private Security Paramunicipal Company* was to meet these and other protection requisitions without distracting the municipal police officers from their duties. In addition, the company revenues would be addressed to improve police officers' access to health services and housing loans.

Some months later, the municipal council approved the creation of this police body. However, the recruitment of new agents was not preview. Instead, the project planned to employ the same municipal officers, who would supply the private service when they were off-duty (*estar francos*), a sort of "legalized moonlighting". Then, officers could receive an extra-revenue and the number of agents deployed in the municipality would not be affected. Certainly, the plan did not consider that surcharging officers' schedules, leaving aside the potential work rights' violation, would entail a risk for them and for the society they shall protect.

[570] Ley del Sistema de Seguridad Pública para el Estado de Jalisco. Periódico Oficial del Estado de Jalisco, July 21st, 2012.
[571] Secretaría de Seguridad Pública, Prevención y readaptación Social. (April, 2008). *Manual de Organización: Secretaría de Seguridad Pública del Estado*.
Available at: http://www.ordenjuridico.gob.mx/Documentos/Estatal/Jalisco/wo48062.pdf.

Even more intricacies could be observed in the business plan. The body was conceived as "paramunicipal" entity, because it would rely on the partnership between the municipal government and the private security sector. Then, the police body would be integrated as a private company in which 51% of its capital would come from the government while 49% from private security companies interested to be shareholders.

The close link between some public officials and the private security sector represented a challenge. For instance, Servando Sepúlveda, Municipal Public Security Secretary in those times, owns a private security company. Although it was managed by his relatives, it would not be allowed to be part of the project. At the same time, other companies' odds to get the business could be affected by Sepulvedas' position, if he considered his concurrence.

The paramunicipal company would have a privileged position on the market, regarding the private security sector, as its agents would be better equipped, trained and certified by the federal vetting process. Under what conditions a private company could be interested in an investment scenario which enforces the asymmetry between the regular protection provider and their own sector? Likely, if such investment could bring them significant utilities.

Although the project seems to have full support from the Mayor Aristóteles Sandoval (PRI) and some companies showed their interest to become partners with the government, in august 2012 the project was permanently cancelled. The aldermen said that such decision had to do with the interim Mayor, Francisco Ayón (PRI), but they did not offer more details. The partisan tensions do not seem as an explication for the project miscarrying, since the aldermen behind the project, the mayor and his interim were all PRI members. If anything, it could be due to inner-partisan confrontations. It is also possible to exclude the version of the lack of budget: the municipal government planned to allocate 40 million pesos (around 3'367,000 dollars), which only represents 1% of the public income of that year. In fact, according to the Public Budget report (*Cuenta Pública),* that year the municipal government spent 19% less of the available public budget and collected 5% more taxes than their programmed budget. Anyhow, the paramunicipal company never saw the light

Sources: "Duplican costo de los servicios privados que ofrecen policías". (August 21st, 2010). *El Informador*; "Crea Ayuntamiento a 'cuicos' privados". (December 21st, 2010). *Mural*; "Guadalajara crea Policía para lo eventos privados". (December 21st, 2010). *El Informador*; "Policía privada tapatía requiere 40 MDP para su creación". (June 25th, 2011). *El Informador*; "Guadalajara instala módulos para denunciar delitos". (June 29th, 2011). *El Informador*; "En tres meses opera la policía privada del Ayuntamiento tapatío". (July 7th, 2011). *El Informador*; "Cancelan el proyecto para una empresa paramunicipal de seguridad". (August 7th, 2012). El Informador; "Decreto que aprueba la creación de una empresa de participación municipal mayoritaria de seguridad privada". (January 28th, 2011). *Gaceta Municipal*, *1*(7); Municipio de Guadalajara. (2011). *Cuenta Pública.*

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As can be inferred from the previous discussion, this sort of complementary police creates confusion not only while trying to understand the composition of Mexican Police Forces (Reames, 2007) but in the daily operation, since it would be competing with, complementing, or replacing both public police bodies and private security companies. However, the rapport between those different protection providers stays widely unexplored.

During the administration of Aristóteles Sandoval (2013-2018) the status of the Auxiliary Police in Jalisco became even blurrier. As has been explained in the previous chapter, the *priista* governor included the Secretariat of Public Security within the State Attorney Office duties, creating the State Public Security General Commissariat. According to the local Congressman Augusto Valencia (MC), the complementary police bodies disappeared during Sandoval's administration, after the integration of the so-called *Fuerza Única Jalisco*[572]. Nonetheless, the complementary protection services are considered in the Commissariat's internal regulation.

As part of the Preventive Commissariat, there is a General Inspectorate of Proximity and Complementary polices. Such office is integrated by the Crisis Attention Police Unit (UPAC), the Private Security Companies Supervision Area, the Guards Area (*Escoltas)* and others that the State Attorney considers as necessary[573]. From there, it is possible to observe that rather than an Auxiliary Police, complementary protection is embodied by a guards' area, which transforms the image from police body to a group of agents. In fact, as part of his prerogatives, the Preventive Commissariat is able to "grant security to those persons who need it, due to their investiture's nature or importance, based on a previous contract and aligned to State Attorney dispositions"[574]. Thus, private protection services supplied by the government take the form of "close protection", in which personal agents protect specific (outstanding) figures rather than a sector.

[572] Interview conducted online via *Skype* with the local Congressman Augusto Valencia López (*Movimiento Ciudadano*), March 1st, 2018.
[573] Art. 25- 27, Acuerdo del ciudadano Gobernador Constitucional del Estado de Jalisco, mediante el cual se expide el reglamento interno del Comisionado de Seguridad Pública. Periódico Oficial del Estado de Jalisco, December 27th, 2014. About the Preventive Commissariat see Section 5th.
[574] Art. 29, Section 4th, Acuerdo del ciudadano Gobernador Constitucional del Estado de Jalisco, mediante el cual se expide el reglamento interno del Comisionado de Seguridad Pública. Periódico Oficial del Estado de Jalisco, December 27th, 2014.

Close protection is, according to Cox (2001), the military euphemism used to refer to Very Important People (VIP) protection. Its objective is to guarantee the safety of an ensemble of people who are "considered too important to lose" (O'Connor, 1996: 17). The selected group is typically integrated by the political or economic elite, although some other celebrities could fit into the figure (Cox, 2001).

Throughout history, government heads and state leaders around the globe have been protected by a special guard which either deter or confront diverse sources of danger. Economic elites and other outstanding profiles, for their part, have also appealed to close protection foreseeing threat, especially after some famous episodes made them feel vulnerable, despite (or due to) their VIP condition. For instance, the narrative around the assassination of the US President John F. Kennedy unleashed a bodyguard's boom in the country. Both businessmen and film stars hired several personal guards believing that if someone could kill the president, anyone else could be killed (O'Connor, 1996).

Effectively, albeit this protection modality also includes safety transporting VIPs or securing their physical environment, the bottom line of this service is guarding them and their relatives. Thus, bodyguards or bouncers are the most incisive incarnation of close protection (Cox, 2001; O'Connor, 1996).

Precisely, bodyguards are nowadays a notorious part of the landscape where the wealthiest in Guadalajara used to gather. An exclusive mall located in Zapopan, for instance, is a runway of the richest *Tapatios* and their armed companions.

> *I mean, you can see it on the street.* ***You can go to a mall…*** **Andares,** ***in the afternoon, and you will see the amount of*** **escoltas**[575] ***outside the restaurants****. Most businessmen now have… a driver, or an* escolta*… or a follow car. I mean, yes, the* ***businessman is getting his own security****. But I mean… this is another subject, then you're talking about kidnapping… mugging, when they leave their facilities…* ***this is another branch of security.***
>
> Rosa María Cortés
> Private Security Company
> Guadalajara, Jal., August 28th, 2015
> *(Q4-3)*

[575] Guards. In Mexico, different words are used to refer bodyguards, some are more formal while others are clearly derogatory. Consequently, when it comes to interviews extracts, I will respect the term used in Spanish, explaining its general connotation, aside of such of bodyguard.

As described by Rosa María Cortés, *Andares'* restaurants and boutiques are usually surrounded by burly men in dark suits, waiting next to black vans. Radio communication earpieces are part of their outfit, as well as a (more or less discreet) gun under their jackets[576]. While the idea of the majority of businessmen having hired bodyguards could sound excessive[577], on Cortés words is also significant that VIP protection is considered another branch of security, a specific service that her private security company, despite the rising demand, does not provide: "most of the clients ask for armed agents. Yet, it is a branch which… for more than 18 years, we don't want to meet"[578]. Among the reasons behind such decisions, she mentions two: (a) managing armed staff is a major challenge for her company, "a huge responsibility", she said, which is best to avoid; and (b) because it is not worth it to compete against the biggest close protection supplier in Jalisco: local police forces.

> ***Most of the people that have*** **escoltas** ***do not hire them from private security****, they are commissioned by the state [government].* ***Because they [businessmen] have relationships****, then… I can tell…to the Attorney, 'you know what? Give me 4* escoltas*', then* ***he sends me [the guards] from the police… I don't know if they pay for it or not, I don't know if they are favors****… but… they are commissioned.*
>
> Rosa María Cortés
> Private Security Company
> Guadalajara, Jal., August 28th, 2015
> *(Q4-4)*

Since government heads are the main subject of close protection, states regularly create specialized police units responsible for guarding the VIPs. In addition, these units and the Army used to have tight relationships, either because the later was behind the creation of the former (in the structure or training) or because the guards are (or used to be) militaries (Cox, 2001; O'Connor, 1996). From this perspective, the image of local government supplying

[576] Fieldwork carnet notes, September 22nd, 2015 and October 29th, 2015; January 15th, 2017. Observing attentively the dynamics in the previously mentioned mall *Andares* during three different visits, it specially caught my attention that some bodyguards are quite discreet regarding the gun they carry, while others were much more explicit. A more extended, systematic and longer lasting observation exercise could delve into an inquiry regarding whether or not it is possible to identify a guard profile with higher predisposition to show the weapons off. By now, it is pertinent to point out that in a *Tapatio* bodyguard situation, the gun's place (and visibility) should not be taken for granted.

[577] This claim will be discussed later in the section, particularly because having bodyguards is more the exception than the rule among the businessmen interviewed during the fieldwork. Thus, some intuitions on this shall be presented.

[578] Interview conducted with Rosa María Cortés, Private Security Company owner. (August 28th, 2015). Guadalajara, Jal.

close protection, drawn in both the internal regulation of Jalisco's Commissariat and Rosa María Cortés account, would fit in a global pattern[579].

Until very recently, in Mexico, close protection was offered at a Federal Level trough an Army branch, namely the *Estado Mayor Presidencial* (EMP) (Presidential Guard), and the *Servicio de Protección Federal* (Federal Protection Service), attached to the Security National Commissariat[580]. The EMP was responsible of safeguarding the president and his family, as well as former presidents, foreign heads of government or diplomats visiting Mexico, and people to whom the President expressly ordered to protect, due to their rank or situation[581]. The Federal Protection Service, for its part, is responsible for providing "protection, custody, surveillance and security to people, properties and facilities"[582] of the three state powers and other public institutions which demand the service. Furthermore, it can protect individuals or legal entities in order to preserve national goods or if they contribute to national development[583].

In both cases, as in the internal regulation of Jalisco's Commissariat, the protection service granted by these bodies is mainly addressed to the public arena. However, the three regulations create a space in which the protection of private entities or individuals is possible. Although in all the cases the criteria to allocate law enforcers to private protection duties remains vague, it has to be noted that the (local and Federal) executive power holder could exert such prerogative, precisely building on such vagueness[584].

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[579] While the American Secret Service or the British Scotland Yard are widely known, there are similar institutions across the globe (O'Connor, 1996). In Latin America, for instance, it is possible to mention the Bolivian National Police's Battalion of Private Physical Security (*Batallón de Seguridad Física Privada)* (Ungar, 2007) or the Important People Protection Group (*Grupo de Protección a Personas Importantes)* at El Salvador (Martínez d'Aubuisson, 2015), among others.

[580] There are other cases in which public police forces granted protection to an ensemble of individuals, for instance, the *Mecanismo de Protección para Personas Defensoras de Derechos Humanos y Periodistas* (Human Rights protectors and Journalist Protection Mechanism). However, since they are addressed to a specific population (other than businessmen), they are set aside this research.

[581] Reglamento del Estado Mayor Presidencia, DOF, March 8th, 2010.

[582] Reglamento del Servicio de Protección Federal, DOF, January 16th, 2015, Art. 3.

[583] The EMP was disbanded by the current President Andrés Manuel López Obrador ("Desaparece el Estado Mayor Presidencial, *Boletín Senado de la República,* May 2nd, 2019). On the other side, the Federal Protection Service still exists, although the transformations implemented by the new administration could also reach this institution soon.

[584] During an informal conversation, an EMP member explained to me that, according to his 30 years of experience, presidents do not tend to order them to protect businessmen, despite being their prerogative. However, he also explained that if it was the case, an explicit verbal instruction would be enough for them to comply. Thus, the lack of documentary record would make difficult -even impossible- to track if Presidents exert or not such prerogative and under which basis (Fieldwork carnet notes, November 3rd, 2017).

Discretionary power to provide protection, through public means, to private-selective individuals is possible, according to the legal framework. Not only does it seem that it actually happens in Jalisco, on the basis of Rosa María Cortés' account, but also in pursuance of the narrative of two public officials and a local congressman.

> *We [the congressman and his staff] arrive to the issue… by chance, because what we were analyzing was the* ***State Attorney's Office*** *performance (…). Reviewing the caseload and the number of people hired, with public budget, to deal with these duties [investigation and policing] we realized that there was overwork but not necessarily lack of staff. (…) I mean****, there were people hired but not dealing with complaints*** *(…). Thus, we realized that* ***there was a discretionary allocation of [public] security agents to protect either public servants or private sectors, in which there were… still are businessmen, labour union leaders, religious leaders****… who have personalized guardianship.*
>
> Augusto Valencia López
> Local Congressman, MC (2015-2018)
> Via *Skype*, March 1st, 2018
> *(Q4-5)*

> *I can tell you… and I could, later, pinpoint the number*[585]*, in the municipality of Guadalajara,* ***how many police officers were commissioned as bodyguards****, as security providers… - here they have a very derogatory term, that I don't like to use… they call them* guaruras[586]*, -… commissioned bodyguards or guards****. There were hundreds of police officers, [serving] different level… businessmen****, some media companies or…* ***someone with an outstanding position****… within sports world or… whatever makes them an outstanding public figure.*
>
> Enrique Ibarra Pedroza
> Guadalajara Municipality Government Secretary, MC (2015-2017)
> Guadalajara, Jal., January 20th, 2017
> *(Q4-6)*

> *Because,* ***within the exchange of favours made between politicians and businessmen****, there is security as an issue. For instance, I've always been very critical… whether when was mayor or when I was chief of police*[587]*, for three years, of [****what is an embezzlement form]… using police officers as personal bodyguards****. That is an atrocity! Eh… when I became chief of the police department, the first thing I did was to relocate the* ***bodyguards [commissioned] to an ensemble of businessmen that had received them as a favour from the former administration****. And that still happens, still*

[585] Despite his offer, the public servant did not pinpoint the exact number of police officers commissioned to private security tasks. He even offered to give me some documents to analyze via his chief of staff, but after some weeks of calling him and unfruitfully insisting, I backed off.

[586] Colloquial term that refers a strong, pushy and to be reckoned men, in charge of protecting a person, especially a politician or a powerful businessman (*DEM, 2017).*

[587] Macedonio Tamez was Zapopan Mayor (2001-2003) and Chief of Guadalajara Police Department (2007-2009), both as PAN member. While the interview was conducted, he was Federal Congressman (2015-2018) elected under MC emblem. He is currently part Jalisco Governor Enrique Alfaro (MC) cabinet as head of the Security General Coordination (Coordinación General Estratégica de Seguridad).

> *happens…* ***there are many businessmen that have, as guards, on-duty police officers from the state Attorney's Office or from municipal governments****.*
>
> Macedonio Tamez
> Federal Congressman, MC (2015-2018)
> Mexico City, February 23rd, 2017
> *(Q4-7)*

As can be traced to the four interviewees who refer this dynamic[588], the mechanism upon which this sort of discretional allocation of a public service relies is the so-called "commission". Thus, police officers are "commissioned" to protect private entities, including businessmen, which implies a semi-formal redefinition of their duties.

"Commission" is a usual -almost traditional- figure within the Mexican public administration. A public servant, whose charge profile is defined as *A,* could actually carry out his duties in an office different from the one noticeable in organizational chart, or even perform completely different activities, fitting in a *B* profile. Such practice is not completely informal as it normally meets two features: (a) the commission is communicated -and recorded- through an official document (*Oficio de Comisión*) in which the hierarchical superior orders the reallocation of his subordinate under certain reasons; and (b) the hierarchical superior, among his prerogatives, is able to redefine his subordinates' duties according to "service necessities", as is normally mentioned within the respective regulation[589].

Even registered, the "commissioned" figure keeps a sense on informality, even illegality, in the extent to which a hierarchical superior could widely redefine "service necessities", and, from there, yielding practices as *aviadores*[590] or ghost workers, as well as using subordinates as bargaining chips in the relations settled among middle and high-level bureaucrats. Certainly, some anti-corruption institutions attempt to detect and sanction the misuse of this

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[588] Interview conducted with Rosa María Cortés, Private Security Company. August 28th, 2015. Guadalajara, Jal.; Interview conducted with Enrique Ibarra Pedroza, Guadalajara Municipality Government Secretary, MC (2015-2017). January 20th, 2017. Guadalajara, Jal.; Interview conducted with Macedonio Tamez, Federal Congressman, MC (2015-2018), February 23rd, 2017. Mexico City; Interview conducted with Augusto Valencia López, Local Congressman, MC (2015-2018). March 1st, 2018. Via *Skype*. Henceforth, references on Cortés, Ibarra, Tamez and Valencia accounts come from the same interviews, otherwise specified.

[589] An iconic example that illustrates this practice lies in labor union representatives who, despite being part of the bureaucracy, instead serve within the union. The author acknowledges Pablo Cervantes Méndez for suggesting this example, based in his long experience as public servant.

[590] Lit. Aviator, pilot. In Mexico is the colloquial term to refer the ghost workers. Along with the positions' selling, *aviadores* are considered the most significant forms of employment-related corruption practices (Morris, 1992).

figure[591]. Regarding police officers, however, the nature of their tasks entails an additional challenge for probity watchers: since mobility is essential to meet their duties, not being compelled to be in a specific office makes it more difficult to track them and to evaluate whether the commission is pertinent.

Regarding the case that concerns us, it was not possible to get official documents to better analyse the commissions through which police officers perform as close protection agents devoted to businessmen[592], meaning the likely absence of records on these decisions and, in consequence, the lack of means to track and review them.

> *They are* de facto *situations, not always registered. I inquired and…* ***I rarely saw*** **Oficios de Comisión** ***delivered to protect businessmen.*** *Actually, I don't remember one. They are* de facto *situations.* ***The police officer… just receives the order*** *'watch this place out!' 'Keep an eye on this house!' 'Protect this person!' and* ***he receives an official document enabling him to work plain-clothed and bear arms****, but [without specifying] the purpose.*
>
> Macedonio Tamez
> Federal Congressman, MC (2015-2018)
> Mexico City, February 23rd, 2017
> *(Q4-8)*

Two roles, at least, are required to implement this form of close protection: the one who allocates police officers to private protection duties and the one who is protected. Regarding the first one, although an official document states that the allocation of guards is a prerogative of the state Attorney[593], interviewees refer to four positions that are able to grant such a service, namely, governors, mayors, state attorneys and chiefs of police departments. In other words, the political and operational heads of local public policing instances.

In the matter of selective protection beneficiaries, respondents evoke local politicians – ranking from former governors to minority party representatives "*diputadillos*"[594] (Tamez,

[591] For instance, the Federal or state level Supreme Audit institutions (*Auditoría Superior)* or the Secretariat of the Civil Service.
[592] The local Congressmen Augusto Valencia (MC) who prepared a legal amendment concerning guards allocation mentioned that accessing the official information was impossible. To overcome this barrier, he interviewed some agents and public officials. As for me, the data collected through the right-of-information omitted this information (Request No. UT/0546-03/2018, Unidad de Transparencia de la Secretaría General de Gobierno y del despacho del Gobernador).
[593] "Acuerdo del Ciudadano Gobernador Constitucional del Estado por el que se determina que el Fiscal General del Estado será el funcionario competente para autorizar el servicio de escoltas", January 1st, 2016. Accessed through the right-to-information request No. UT/0546-03/2018, Unidad de Transparencia de la Secretaría General de Gobierno y del despacho del Gobernador.
[594] A derogatory way to refer congressmen (*diputados*)

2016: 93), religious and labour union leaders, famous athletes and businessmen[595]. Which is the pattern covering them all? "The profile is power. People with political or economic power", stated Tamez, who personally dealt with the situation when he was mayor and municipal chief of police department.

"People with power" interacting is a worthwhile notion to dig into. Focusing on businessmen, despite the interest that other beneficiaries' profile could arouse, it is fair to say that local government officials provide them close protection in exchange for a pecuniary payment, either under a formal contract or a more informal agreement. At a first glance, it is not very different from the pattern discussed earlier in this chapter: underfunded police bodies seeking to get supplementary profits through (off)duty officers' private close protection services. In addition, Jalisco does not seem to be an exceptional case in this regard. In Russia, as earlier evoked, this practice is known as red-roof (*krasnaya krysha*)[596] (Cox, 2001).

From that perspective, this case of VIP protection would be nothing but an illustration of the commodification of protection. Thus, as alleged by Tamez and Valencia, it could be qualified as a sort of embezzlement as police officers are allocated to serve a private purpose leaving aside their primary duties. This interpretation would be reinforced if the monetary reward associated to the service delivered were not contained in the public purse but in the public officer's pockets: "they (businessmen and public officers) are close and they do business together, which usually leads to *moches*[597] or that kind of frequent practice", explained Tamez.

That said, it shall be noted that public servants' narratives, as well as that of Rosa María Cortés, imply that, for local officials, the reward attached to this sort of privatized policing is not exclusively financial, as they also alluded to an "exchange of favours". That being the case, the pattern analysed could be, rather than merely a commercial transaction, a reciprocity circle in which local officers received non-monetary benefits, setting protection as more than a commodity.

[595] Results are consistent with the experience accounted by Macedonio Tamez in his memoire (2016).
[596] For the use of the word "roof" to refer to "protection", see Introduction and Chapter I. It must be pointed out that Russia has been considered "the world's number one operating center for bodyguards" (O'Connor, 1996: 9). On close protection after USSR dissolution, either in Russia and non-Russian republics see Cox, 2001.
[597] Mexican colloquial term that comes from *mochar*, to cut or rip a piece out of something (DEM, 2019). *Moche* became a popular term to refer systematic bribes received by political elites.

As former Zapopan chief of police, Macedonio Tamez recalls that one of the businessmen benefited by the protection of a couple of on-duty police officers owned by a media company: "a big private company… able to hire its own private security guards", he claimed. When he reallocated the police officers to their original duties, the businessman reacted by calling the mayor to complain about the chief of police's move. But the mayor's possible response as not really what concerned Tamez. Instead, he knew that his decision meant risking that media company's backlash in the form of ceaseless criticisms of his performance, driving public opinion against him. Therefore, officers could grant protection while seeking, for instance, public support or favourable press coverage.

In addition, Congressman Augusto Valencia intuits another kind of benefit that a figure such as the state Attorney could receive through this agreement:

> *The way the state Attorney is appointed in Jalisco… the Governor nominates him before the local Congress and congressmen ratify it [the nomination]. And, this logic has emerged where* ***the candidate's validation depends on his links with different interest groups.*** *So, those who have been appointed to lead the Attorney General's Office have certain relationships or agreements within the political arena. And, well, within politics,* ***there are actors linked to the private sector and one hypothesis is that… well, there are businessmen vetting the nomination*** *through this mechanism,* ***as long as they get…uh… in return, the benefit of protection****.*
>
> Augusto Valencia López
> Local Congressman, MC (2015-2018)
> Via *Skype*, March 1st, 2018
> *(Q4-9)*

The quotation speaks by it-self. If anything, it is pertinent to outline that law enforcers' nominations could be settled within the exchange dynamics between political and economic elites and, in such cases, close protection is granted in exchange of political support. Yet, Cox (2001) claimed that guards easily become a source of information on their protegees' dynamics and private lives, which could be useful for politicians.

Seen from businessmen's perspective, guards watching their backs might be not the only benefit received from such an exchange.

In contrast with Private Security Company owners' accounts[598], guards do not seem to be an esteemed means of protection among most businessmen. Only a few of the interviewees

[598] Not only Rosa María Cortés, but Máximo Ballesteros explains that their customers' first petition is armed guards, which they have to discourage in order to offer a more appropriate service (Interview conducted with Máximo Ballesteros, Private Security Company owner. October 16th, 2015. Guadalajara, Jal.). The quote is available in Chapter 1 *(Q1-9)*.

stated that they, or someone in their family, have guards, although they do not specify if they are police officers or private agents.

In a couple of cases, they own big industrial companies. One of them, at a certain moment, was local congressman within PAN ranks[599].

> *Yes, I mean, in Jalisco, as in other… same-size cities, with these problems, you see a lot of* escoltas *and armoured cars,* escoltas… *cause it is more and more difficult, because, today, to kidnap someone, they deploy six cars, high-powered weapons, weapons coming… even from other countries. And, what do you do? I mean,* ***what do you need? Your 10 vans, with twenty guards, we're not going to finish, ever!*** *There won't be enough money!*
>
> Ernesto González
> Industrial Sector
> Guadalajara, Jal., October 16th, 2015
> *(Q4-10)*

Beside the force and weapons racing pictured in Ernesto González narrative, the businessman, who happens to have guards at his service, incisivelyr describes one of the attributes associated with this form of protection: high visibility. Bodyguards are the opposite to the low-profile protection strategy that many businessmen said they adopt[600]. Thereupon, it is possible that, having guards, they preferred no to share it during the interview, attempting to settle their profile as "a normal guy" before the stranger they were talking to. Nevertheless, it is also possible that close guards are constrained to the more visible and powerful group of businessmen.

In addition, Rafael Magaña, real-estate company owner and activist, notes that hiring guards is nonsensical, as they themselves eventually become the threat businessmen have to face: "those who have *guaruras*, they are the first to get killed, because their [guards] place them [to be killed]"[601]. Due to their closeness and their knowledge of daily routines, bodyguards harming their protegees is not an unlikely scenario (Gayer, 2019; Cox, 2001; O'Connor, 1996). Thus, why a businessman would agree on establishing the described close protection schema if his safeguard is not necessarily guaranteed? Probably, because close protection granted by law enforcers would be more than a security issue.

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[599] Interview conducted with José Gerardo Zapata, Industrial Sector. September 1st, 2015. Zapopan, Jal.; Interview conducted with Ernesto González, Industrial Sector. October 16th, 2015. Guadalajara, Jal.
[600] Interview conducted with Marco Antonio Zepeda, Service Sector. September 2nd, 2015. Zapopan, Jal.
[601] Interview conducted with Rafael Magaña, Real estate Sector and Activist. January 23rd, 2017. Guadalajara, Jal.

Certainly, the idea of the guards spread all over the *Tapatio* landscape is shared by some businessmen, however, it is to refer to "some high-level businessman" or "heavy profiles" as the ones accompanied by bodyguards[602]. From this point of view, rather than security, bodyguards' deployment provides exposure, thus protection would be a source of social status: being the *crème de la crème* among businessmen. Indeed, Congressman Valencia agrees with such claim:

> *I'd say that this [having bodyguards] is becoming something aspirational, because* ***it grants status****, right? I mean, someone who has guards, probably also* ***attempts to expose himself as someone more relevant*** *(…) it is like…* ***they have their slaves****, cause sometimes guards, at the end, are carrying shopping bags or become children's nannies, right?*
>
> Augusto Valencia López
> Local Congressman, MC (2015-2018)
> Via *Skype*, March 1st, 2018
> *(Q4-11)*

That is probably why, according to Congressman Valencia, rather than his training or skills, what determines whether a police officer is allocated as guard is his physical appearance "they assigned as guards those who are… not ugly! [laughs]", he said.

Although social status could be one of the benefits businessmen obtained from close protection, this remark shall be nuanced, as guards could also be related to less appreciated profiles. For some businessmen, for instance, *guaruras* are associated to "the arrogance and excesses of politicians"[603] or to *narcos'* force deployment, attempting to impress and caught high-society eyes[604]. Indeed, Congressman Valencia points out what other people in Guadalajara informally said: "When someone is around, in a street or a mall, bearing a weapon, we don't really know if he is a police officer carrying out private protection services, a private security company agent or a criminal!".

Bodyguards closely accompanying businessmen also represent an ensemble of violent entrepreneurs at the disposal of local notables. While private security companies have to go through different regulations and vetting process to be able to bear weapons[605], police officers

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[602] Interview conducted with Benito Alvarado, Industrial Sector. September 2nd, 2015. Zapopan, Jal.; Interview conducted with Lorenzo Mendoza, Service Sector. September 13th, 2015. Zapopan, Jal.; Juan Galicia, Real estate company owner. September 25th, 2015. Zapopan, Jal.

[603] Interview conducted with Benito Alvarado, Industrial Sector. September 2nd, 2015. Zapopan, Jal.

[604] Interview conducted with Susana Piña, Industrial Sector. October 9th, 2015. Zapopan, Jal.

[605] Regulation concerning private security services changes from one state to another. However, weapons possession licenses are regulated at the Federal level, since it is granted by Secretariat of National Defense. Thus, a private security company has to be active in at least two federate states and continuously certificate

-either as auxiliary force members or commissioned to VIP protection- are equipped with authorized weapons, ammunitions and other devices that they are able to use (sometimes while plain-clothed), draped by certain legitimacy as law enforcers, as already explained. On the bright side, that means well trained staff to protect those especially vulnerable to victimization -or those who perceived themselves as such, as shown in Chapter 1. Nevertheless, on the edge, there is a shady side: due to their proximity with those they protect and the development of certain dependence, close guards are likely to become private armies (Cox, 2001). Especially considering that guards might be prone to developpe a certain bond of loyalty towards the VIP they protect (Manning, 1999). In other words, it could be the emergence of a new generation of *pistoleros* or gunmen, whose job used to be "the extension of the duties of the *guarura* or *guardaespaldas* (bodyguard), who offered physical protection to his employer but was also his strong arm" (Piccato, 2017: 170).

Effectively, one of the *caciquismo's*[606] spawns – and one of his pillars - were *pistoleros*, who used violence (notably murder) to serve, certainly, *caciques*, but also public officials, landowners and businessmen (Piccato, 2017; Smith, 2009).

Similar to the *narco* - discussed in depth in Chapter 2 – and other emblematic violent actors, there is a consolidated stereotype of a *pistolero* that has to do with his dress, his behaviour, his woman, his *charola*[607] but, most importantly, "his gun, usually big and barely hidden from sight" (Piccato, 2017: 162), thus either coming from the police offices ranks or not, violence is his essential business tool.

*Pistolero*s' figure shall be compulsorily attached to his bosses, those who ensure him impunity and, sometimes, illegal rent means, in exchange for protection and loyalty. Political elites count on *pistoleros* to rigging elections, getting rid of their opponents and repressing social revolts, which could explain their importance in the shaping and maintenance of the *caciquismo* (Smith, 2009) and the post-revolutionary political system (Piccato, 2017).

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their staff before the Secretariat of Interior, in order to be able to offer armed guards services [Interview conducted with José Manuel Sánchez, Federal Government Official attached to the General Directorate of Private Security, Security National Commission. (February 22nd, 2017). Mexico City,; Ley Federal de Seguridad Privada, Diario Oficial de la Federación, Mexico City, July 6th, 2006 (last amendment, *DOF,* October 17th, 2011); Ley Federal de Armas de Fuego y Explosivos, Diario Oficial de la Federación*,* January 11th, 1972 (last amendment, *DOF,* May 22nd, 2015)].

606 On *caciquismo* see footnote 256 in Chapter 2.

607 On *charola* or official badge granted to non-sate violent actors as immunity guarantee, see footnote 339 in Chapter 2.

Regarding landowners (*hacendados*) and businessmen, *pistoleros* were used -as a group or separately-, to "spread fear and death" (Piccato, 2017: 178) within agrarian controversies and even to perform murders against political opponents or labor union leaders. They were also main characters when it comes to illegal rent-seeking, performing racketeering, bank robberies or controlling illegal activities such as prostitution. Thus, *pistoleros'* world is one of relations established between violent entrepreneurs and politic-economic actors, a bond that sometimes became symbiotic (Piccato, 2017).

Although such figures come from the Mexican post-revolution, they became more common from the late 1930s. Within the mid-20th-century, *pistoleros* were key characters to understand the interweaving between political, economic and criminal arenas (Piccato, 2017; Smith, 2009). It shall be clear at this point that, beyond being contemporaries, *pistoleros* have some resemblance to the Auxiliary Police bodies previously discussed and, as those hybrid bodies, their trace might be still present nowadays.

The close protection scheme instated in Jalisco demonstrates that, given the entanglement between economic and political realms, protection enters circulation not only as a commodity (pecuniary profit-seeking-oriented), materialized in a one-time transaction, but more as a strategic investment for both, public officers and businessmen. Thus, rather than a payment, the exchange relies on a diversity of reciprocal rewards that could be progressively recovered in a long-lasting play. More precisely, while providing selective protection to businessmen, law enforcers also grant them social status and armed agents which may be used discretionally to achieve workers' discipline or to pursue a variety of their interests. Rather than paying for this protection, businessmen could be rewarding public officers through political support or good press.

Once observed that VIP protection settles within the politico-economic sectors exchange, it shall be noticed that the three public servants who condemned this practice, providing also the base material for this part of the analysis, are members of the political party *Movimiento Ciudadano* (MC). Although being a minority party in the rest of the country, in Jalisco, MC progressively gained importance in the last years, to the extent to which its candidates won several positions during the last election, including the governorship, occupied by Enrique

Alfaro Ramírez (2018-2024)[608]. Thus, the new incumbents are denouncing a mechanism of protection provision that previous administrations -and their opposite parties- managed. Indeed, according to Congressman Valencia López, *priista* government set this schema into motion, in a more discreet way, protecting mostly PRI members. By contrast, when *panista* administrations arrived, rather than dismantling the schema, it would extend it towards "the businessmen that supported them during their campaigns and towards the clergy and religious leaders", the Congressman claimed.

Although testing the accuracy of Valencia's account would imply deeper research, what is observable so far is that his words strongly rely on his partisan bias. Obviously because PRI and PAN are his opposite parties, but mostly because his perception about *panista* governments is clearly oriented by the common sense around that political party: a right-wing organization, conservative and close to business sector and the church. By no means Congressman Valencia inquiries on the likely effect that some episodes could have into close protection growing demand, for instance, the previously described assassination of Cardinal Posadas Ocampo in 1993, or a kidnappings wave occurred in the late 1990s, whose main target were businessmen[609]. Not to mention that, as shown in the previous chapter, the proximity between the *Tapatio* business sector and *panistas'* local government should not be taken for granted.

In addition, the partisan framework is observable in a journalist's account who, referring the case, outlines that despite some businessmen, feeling extremely insecure, had asked the former government for protection, the new governor "[Enrique] Alfaro (MC) realised that a lot of [Guadalajara municipality] police officers were acting as bodyguards and he claimed them back"[610].

It could be argued that Macedonio Tamez's case challenges the idea of partisan tensions as triggering those narratives, since he was PAN member while serving as Mayor and municipal chief of police[611]. Certainly, being a young party, MC has members coming from other parties' ranks, as Tamez or Ibarra -who comes from PRI and PRD-, but this did not

[608] "Movimiento Ciudadano le arrebata Jalisco al PRI: se lleva la gubernatura, congreso y alcaldías". (July 3rd, 2018). *Animal Político*. Available at: https://www.animalpolitico.com/2018/07/movimiento-ciudadano-jalisco-pri/.
[609] The late-1990s kidnapping wave will be detailed later on Part III.
[610] Interview conducted with Eugenia Barajas, journalist. October 16th, 2015. Zapopan, Jal.
[611] See footnote 587 on this Chapter.

necessarily temper the critics that incumbents address against former administration -and former fellow party members-. By way of illustration, it could be evoked that Tamez himself argues that he left the PAN after feeling he was ignored by the party local leaders, not considered to become candidate and because eventually, the party looked like the PRI, as its members attempted to sell him a candidacy. Thus, inner-partisan tensions could also be behind pointing out privatized VIP protection schema, rather than preserve it.

Partisan or inner-partisan tension as an incentive to challenge what seems to be an old practice suggest that close protection is deeply situated in the political realm, showing that close protection is certainly a security issue but it could also be a political one.

Public protection commodification, or the hybrid forms of policing, points out four main lessons when it comes to businessmen hiring protection: (a) they are able to purchase law enforcement's protection especially designed according to what are considered their special necessities. That widens the gap observed between the local notable and the rest of the citizens; (b) Yet, among the already privileged businessmen, there is a supplementary segregation, since close protection supplied by police officers seems reserved to the *crème de la crème*, reinforcing, on the one hand, the observation that the *Tapatio* business sector is not homogeneous and, on the other hand, the weight of personalized relations between economic and political (and policing) elites, two claims presented previously; (c) Selective protection illustrates rather than commercial transactions, a reciprocity dynamic settled between political and economic elites that locates protection beyond security concerns; and (d) Devolution of certain task protection does not mean security privatization nor, by any means, State disappearance among the protection suppliers. Hybrid schemas also demonstrate that there might be a permanent tension between law enforcers and private security companies, as they contend within the protection market.

Competition is not the only observable rapport between hybrid bodies and private companies as businessmen's protection suppliers. In the course of this section readers may have noticed that drawing sharp boundaries between private and public suppliers (as much as formal and unformal protection provision) proves being not only a challenge, but probably a blunder. Bearing that in mind, the next section inquires on the protection purchased before private security companies which, along with an ensemble of other practices, major market changes -occurred since the late-1980s- made reachable for the *Tapatio* business sector.

4.2 Beyond the "injured Leviathan": self-policing and private security firms as neoliberalism traces

In her influential text devoted to private security sector in Latin America, Patricia Arias, includes a text-box with the thoughts of a Brazilian Military Police Reserve Colonel who opens his text by saying: "There remains no state institution that could be considered free from privatization, as there are not public services that remain strangers to the hypothesis of being sacrificed on the free market altar. Privatization does not stop, not even before the State's central core: the monopoly of force" (Ferreira Melo in Arias, 2009: 39). Reviewing the rising private security industry, the Reserve Colonel warns that, although it could be easily inferred that the state abdicates part of its prerogatives, what really perturbs him is that "the State is losing control and its capacity to keep social order" (p. 40), what he encompasses within the appealing label of "the injured Leviathan".

Associated to Neoliberal reforms, from Arias and her collaborators' approach, private security industry mirrors two unpleasant trajectories: on the one side, the state is "losing the control" on security provision, on the other side, it surrenders its prerogatives towards an ensemble of nothing but profit-oriented entities (Arias, 2009) and, in consequence, puts force and security on the guardians hands, who could transform into mercenaries and even criminals.

The discussion offered so far in the text may provide enough elements to call into a question the idea that the state once had "a control to lose" or "a social order to keep". Nevertheless, it is still pertinent to explore the contemporary protection mechanism that *Tapatio* businessmen purchase from security companies, especially considering that, as has been already shown, under certain conditions, law enforcers are able to provide them (privileged) protection.

This section focuses on private security firms and their rapport with *Tapatio* businessmen, building on the idea that, rather than being in front of the "injured Leviathan" portrait, what the contemporary configuration mirrors is "the very logic of neoliberal democracy that requires individual responsibility for self-preservation, without reliance on the sate" (Arias and Goldstein, 2010: 22), from which economic elites are certainly not excluded. In other words, what the late-1980s and 1990s had witnessed was, rather than "private", a "merchant form" of security and protection, embodied in the relations settled by producers, consumers

and regulators (Lorenc Valcarce, 2011), but hosted in a wider pattern of daily actions that individuals take to reach it, "neoliberal forms of self-help" (Müller, 2016: 119). The traces that market-oriented policies actually left behind when it comes to protection, reveal a more complex configuration that such of "the state in crisis" (Puck, 2017; Müller, 2016; Lorenc Valcarce, 2011; Müller, 2010).

To address this analysis, it is worth keeping in mind that, although businessmen are the main consumers of private security companies, whether referring the global scale (Müller, 2016; Lorenc Valcarce, 2011) or closing the scope to Guadalajara[612], it must be noted that security products and services are accessible to a wider population nowadays. In contrast with selective protection modalities earlier discussed, a significant variety of products and services oriented to "self-preservation" purposes might be observable in different social layers. Then, although this analysis will focus on businessmen, at times they would be put into perspective with other potential consumers. In addition, the heterogeneity of business sector expressed by means of its inner-segregation dynamics would be represented (or reinforced) through the so-called "self-preservation measures".

As stated earlier, the security market must be read as part of a "self-preservation" ensemble of measures. Thus, before exploring the merchant form of protection provision, other behaviours must be discussed that, not involving the purchase of security, do represent the trend of the times framing this market, that is to say the so-called self-policing mechanisms: "the regulation and limitation of one's own conduct and activities in public and private spaces due to security concerns" (Müller, 2016: 120).

Everyone is, in some extent, responsible for preventing becoming victim of a crime (or to react in such case), adapting their behavior and/or adopting certain measures to minimize the risk, enabling a sort of "self-coercion", to recall the definition of *policing* discussed in the Introduction.

The adaptation of day-to-day activities and the adoption of (more or less) informal self-policing measures could affect the ways people interact and stablish social bonds (Müller,

[612] Interview conducted with Rosa María Cortés, Private Security Company owner. (August 28th, 2015). Guadalajara, Jal.; Interview conducted with Máximo Ballesteros and Máximo Ballesteros Jr., Co-owners of a Private Security Company. (October 16th, 2015). Zapopan, Jal.; Interview conducted with José Manuel Sánchez, Federal Government Official attached to the General Directorate of Private Security, Security National Commission. (February 22nd, 2017). Mexico City.

2016). Self-policing could also be the top of the iceberg of self-segregation and social gap reinforcement (Müller, 2016; Camus, 2015; Caldeira, 2000). Regarding businessmen, the adoption of certain self-policing measures could avert their fears, transform their business model and strengthen their place as local notables.

Graphic 4.1 shows an ensemble of self-policing measures that inhabitants of Jalisco and Guadalajara Metropolitan Area, as part of a survey, declared they had adopted out of fear of being crime victims.

Graphic 4.1 Day-to-day activities Jalisco and Guadalajara inhabitants quit doing out of fear of being crime victim

(Percentage)



Source: Prepared by the author based on National Survey of Victimization and Perception of Public Security (ENVIPE, 2017) conducted by INEGI. Percentages are calculated considering the proportion of respondents that, doing frequently each activity, changed such habit out of fear of fall victim of crime. Thus, N sizes changes for every item, from 5'386, 979 inhabitants of Jalisco that frequently carry cash, to 1'804, 064 who go often to the stadium. The original question was: "During 2016, out of fall victim of a crime (robbery, burglary, kidnapping, etc.), did you stop on…(read items)? [Durante 2016, por temor a ser víctima de algún delito (robo, asalto, secuestro, etc.), ¿dejó de…(leer)?].

Some of the limits regarding the methodology of victimization surveys have been discussed earlier un Chapter 1. In addition, it must be noted that the precedent graphic becomes from a closed and previously defined ensemble of items to which every interviewee answered with "yes" or "no", whether they adopted or not, out of fear of fall victims of crime. Certainly, other self-policing measures adopted by citizens could be neglected and remain unobserved

and unregistered and, in consequence, its implications will not be analyzed. In addition, some interviewees could consider as desirable to perform one of the enlisted behaviors and be likely to say they do while is not the case[613].

Despite the precedent potential source of bias, the list presents significant variations worthy of exploration. While 73% of the respondents of Guadalajara Metropolitan Area stated they do not allow their children to go out anymore, activities as going out for lunch, to the stadium, to visit friends and family or for a walk seem not to be a widespread behavior (ranking between 20% and 33%). Going out late is avoided by almost half of the survey participants, showing they feel more vulnerable during certain hours and children are seen under more risk. The survey does not let us dig deeper into specific fears or the implications of such decisions, notably regarding *Tapatio* social life. However, it sets some precedents on how some self-policing practices, observable among businessmen, could be like any other citizen's performance, while others could distinguish them[614].

Available victimization surveys regarding businessmen are even more limited, as they focus on the consequences that being victims of crime brought to the company, showing reactive rather than preventive measures, as shown in Graphic 4.2.

Although measures such as cancelling growing investment plans or delivery and merchandising routes, ceasing transactions with other companies, reducing cash availability or the rare presence of business owners could entail a significative transformation of the *Tapatio* business model, the percentage of economic units that answered "yes" on having such a consequence from a victimization experience is low (between 2,6% and 10,6%), especially considering the National reference (which ranks between 5,6% and 21,1%).

In addition, these measures could be either preventive or reactive since they could be triggered after a direct crime victimization experience or only due to fear or insecurity perception, as argued in Chapter 1. However, the survey only registered the self-policing measures as consequence of being crime victim. The qualitative approach grants a more detailed ensemble of self-policing measures that *Tapatio* businessmen adopt whether they have been crime victims or not. It is worth noting that these behaviors were spontaneously

[613] On the Social Desirability Bias (SDB) see footnote 101 in Introduction.
[614] Certainly, should not be ignored that when citizens adopt measures such as not carrying cash (51%) or credit and debit cards (37%), that could have an impact on commerce sector dynamics that worth an ulterior research.

mentioned by the interviewees, while talking about how they manage the different threats they have to face, thus it is possible to assume that what they evoked was not conditioned by a preconceived list of possible measures.

Graphic 4.2 Crime victimization consequences over the company

(Percentage of economic units)



Source: Elaborated by de author based on the Crime Against Business National Survey, 2016 (ENVE, 2016), conducted by INEGI. Percentages are calculated considering the number of economic units which has been crime victims. For Jalisco sample, N=123,613, for the National sample, N=1'597,983 economic units. The original question was: "Due to one of the situations or offenses that you previously evoked, during 2015…(read items)?" [Como consecuencia de alguna de las situaciones o delitos que reporté anteriormente, ¿durante 2015…(leer)?]

As seen in Table 4.1, the semi-structured interviews conducted and analyzed provide two wide groups of self-policing behaviors, namely, the one related to businessmen and the one referring to the company. This first classification already suggests that businessmen differentiate the ensemble of measures that grants protection for them and their families directly, and others which focus on their business, a difference that proved to be significant earlier, while discussing close protection.

Table 4.1 Self-policing measures adopted by *Tapatio* businessmen

Businessman	Company
Active preventive performance • Constantly changing routines • Collecting information from media and social networks • Attending courses and training sessions to prevent crime within business associations • Partially living or sending the family abroad ***Discretion*** • Adopting a low profile, avoiding exposure (through society pages) • Not to spread being the company owner • Acting as not presumptuous or simple people, not to waste significant amounts of money or bear luxuries ***Social capital selectivity*** • Being "hermetic", avoiding have contact with strangers or circles where bad reputed people could be part of • Considering the kind of friends and acquaintances they spend time with	***Human Resources*** • Reinforcing the vetting process while recruiting employees • Treating employees well to avoid frustration and bitterness ***Operation*** • Avoiding cash transactions • Changing delivery routes and routines • Giving up contracts, closing branches or avoiding expand business scope when that implies dangerous environments (*vgr*. some violent states) • Making business only with known people -the advantage of the *pueblo chico* (small village)- ***Exposure*** • Avoiding publicity and advertising • Growing modestly to avoid calling attention ***Setting community*** • Cultivating certain esteem and affiliation regarding your brand • Granting benefits (*vgr.* materials to improve the church or public parks) to gain the entourage sympathy

Source: Elaborated by the author based on the ensemble of interviews conducted, between August 2015 and January 16th, 2017, with 53 businessmen settled in Guadalajara Metropolitan Area, Mexico.

Within the measures regarding businessmen protection, three sub-groups could be identified: active preventive performance, discretion, and social capital selectivity. The first and second sub-groups allude to activities that could protect them from property crimes and other risks such as kidnapping or extortion. Although some of those mechanisms can be adopted by any other citizen -such as changing routines-, there are certain measures that seem exclusive to local notables. For instance, when the industrialist Ernesto González mentions "having a house in the US for a quick exit"[615] as a way to be prepared in case of being extorted or facing a kidnapping threat, he points out an alternative not reachable for anyone other than elites. What for the wealthiest is "a quick exit", for others might represent displacement and dangerous migration experiences[616].

Regarding the last sub-group, the potential threat is less sharp. Hermetism and being cautious about the social relations they establish do not show businessmen's fear regarding theft or kidnappers. Whom are they protecting themselves against through these measures? It is worth considering then, that "discretion" is not only a self-policing measure to be out of kidnappers' scope, but also a way to establish a difference between local notables, the "new rich" and other "trashy millionaires", such as *narcos*. Although this point will be deeply developed in the next chapter, it must be noted here.

Four sub-groups protect their companies: human resources, operation, exposure and setting community.

The category of human resources calls to attention how the included measures suggest that their employees could be the potential threat. Some businessmen adopt vetting processes within the recruitment to guarantee that they will not hire dishonest or dangerous profiles. Héctor L. Orta, an industrialist in his eighties, considered that businessmen should not hire anyone, either to work at their company or at their houses. Thus, regarding both secretaries and housemaids he stated: "you need to pass her through a sieve, to know where she comes from, where she lives, how is… who are her parents, her siblings, to inhibit anyone who could do something against you"[617]. In the same vein, other businessmen consider that

[615] Interview conducted with Ernesto González, Industrial Sector Businessman. (October 16th, 2015). Guadalajara, Jal.
[616] A broad literature deals with forced displacements in Latin America. On Mexican case, see Durin, 2018 and Salazar Cruz, 2014.
[617] Interview conducted with Héctor L. Orta, Industrial Sector. (September 18th, 2015). Zapopan, Jal.

treating their employees well could avoid frustration that could be turn against the employer. The human resources category points out how businessmen grant credit to the idea that poverty, eventually, entails crime, as it provokes frustration and retaliation against the wealthiest.

The sub-groups' "operation" and "exposure" are probably the ones which illustrate most clearly how a business model could be transformed due to self-policing measures. Although some of these measures would be retaken in the next chapter within a broader perspective, it must be noted that even the growing path of the company could be conditioned by perception of insecurity or fear or, more precisely, by the assumed need for protection.

When it comes to the category "setting community", that refers to actions that businessmen carry out to transform a likely dangerous community into their own protectors. For instance, Eduardo Hernández, owner of an old chain of stores, considers that by sowing esteem to the brand, they can count on the community to protect it: "It is their *tiendita*[618]*,* they go there every day, if they harm it, they harm the whole community and themselves"[619]. According to the businessman, thus, community members – potential thefts included- would protect the store, putting aside that it is part of an important chain, since they are somehow attached to this branch.

In addition, Juan Zenón, whose company is located in a popular neighborhood known as cradle of petty criminals, shares that he often contributes to improve the community's conditions, for instance, to remodel the church or the school. He also accepts to be the godfather of some neighbors' children or provides some wheelchairs and hospital beds to some aged slum inhabitants. With actions that represent a progress not only to the community but to some of his employees' lives, as some of them live there, Zenón claims: "we are seen as part of the clan, we are part of the family, they [the neighbors] know us, they take care of us (…) thus the rascals don't harm us, they go out to harm the outsiders (…). This is part of our security". The mechanism, Zenón esteems, is effective to the point that he does not have guards or other forms of protection in the factory, even after having suffered a kidnapping years ago[620].

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618 Lit. little store.
619 Interview conducted with Eduardo Hernández Commerce Sector. (September 26th, 2015). Guadalajara, Jal.
620 More details on Juan Zenón's kidnapping in the late 1990s will be developed later in Part III.

Certainly, the idea of granting benefits to the community in exchange for certain protection or support recalls the discussion developed in Chapter 2 on *narcos* and bandits building their social support by playing the Robinhood role. Furthermore, the possible intersection of clientelist networks of local politicians, *good-narcos*' actions, and businessmen seeking their communities' protection seems to be a compelling thread to follow for future research.

It is important to mention that self-policing measures developed by the business sector have also been encouraged by the local and federal government since the late 1980s. Since then, the *Gaceta Mercantil* reported different meetings between law enforcers and businessmen whose main objective was for the former to present an ensemble of self-policing measures that business could adopt to prevent certain crimes. Additionally, since the magazine started including publicity among its pages in 1989, several insertions of advertisements on self-policing measures were signed either by the state or municipal governments.

The precedent review on self-policing measures yields leads that will enrich the rest of the analysis. Along with self-policing, allocating part of the budget to commodified forms of protection is a path that businessmen often follow and, as stated before, such practices will be deeply discussed in what follows.

Security products and services result from market makers' interactions; suppliers, consumers and regulators define both protection necessities and the means to fulfill them (Lorenc Valcarce, 2011). According to Rosa María Cortés, young owner of a Private Security Company settled in Guadalajara, "everything is defined by the cost"[621]; businessmen attempt to meet their security requirements at the lowest possible fee. In that sense, security shall be understood as any other market. However, as it could somehow affect the way in which social control and public security issues are addressed toward citizens, it shall be observed as a *sui generis* market (Lorenc Valcarce, 2011).

Fieldwork reveals that, at least three interlinked dynamics influence the definition of a security necessity and, in consequence, the commodities developed to reach it: (in)direct experience, *rachas* (streaks) and market escalation or that could be called "the spiral pattern".

[621] Interview conducted with Rosa María Cortés, Private Security Company owner. (August 28th, 2015). Guadalajara, Jal.

Chapter 1 has explored the relation between a crime victimization experience and fear and perception of insecurity which, eventually, engender a demand for protection. Whether as a direct or indirect victim, when business or businessmen adopt measures to prevent the repetition of crime or to prevent other offenses, they contribute to the enhancement of what would be the private security industry, as illustrated by the businessmen narrative offered in the first chapter[622].

Along with previous experiences, owners of private security companies identified streaks as an explanation of what businessmen demand of them:

> *[The ensemble of products and services they offered] has changed a lot. I mean, it has changed a lot… to the point that,* ***the demand on my company now is very different from the demand 10 years ago.*** *Now it is a 'must do', that is, all companies must hire security… period! And I think that the situation that the state is going through has a lot to do with it… what I mean is, two or three years ago, with all the stuff happening with the* narcobloqueos*… the private guard boom grew and grew. The demand of CCTV's also increased, and we did not need a market analysis to find it out! Clients give you that! Later****, there was a period in which clients wanted to substitute all human labour with technology. Then that started a boom of surveillance cameras, alarms… and instead of 5 guards, they had 20 cameras and 1 guard, and this one was also a*** **racha*****!***
>
> Rosa María Cortés
> Private Security Company
> Guadalajara, Jal., August 28th, 2015
> *(Q4-12)*

In Cortés's narrative it is important to notice that *rachas* could emerge not only as a result of certain crime waves or of shocking episodes, but also in response to tendencies barely related to security issues. Technological progress, for instance, is pointing to the transformations inside the business world. In that sense, the security market also moves in relation to multiple economic, politic and social conditions.

Once businessmen, as costumers, establish a relation with a private security company, the supply-demand of products and services progress as a spiral trajectory: clients demand more commodities, providers offer them along with additional commodities, clients purchase those commodities and demand others, at the end, the market escalates not only with regards to the amount of providers and consumers, but the variety of the available merchandise as well.

> *First, we started a consulting company in… prevention and security measures for business and families. Then,* ***coming from the same path, the clients told me 'if you***

[622] See for instance narrative on Q1-8.

> ***suggest that I should have surveillance cameras, alarms, GPS, then you… I trust you, you handle it!****', and I went 'no, no, I don't manage that', 'You handle it' - then I said 'let's grow and create more companies related to that.*
>
> Máximo Ballesteros,
> Private Security Company owner
> Zapopan Jal., October 16th, 2015
> *(Q4-13)*

> *Security has become* ***an integral system****. I mean, costumers not only ask for guards… to keep watch****… if they feel comfortable with this company, then they ask for more services****: cameras, alarms, a risk analysis, I mean… integral!*
>
> Rosa María Cortés
> Private Security Company
> Guadalajara, Jal., August 28th, 2015
> *(Q4-14)*

What Cortés calls "an integral system", is more a spiral path. However, as fieldwork suggests, it might illustrate an endless protection purchasing spiral that barely relieves the feeling of insecurity and fear among businessmen. Even those who confirm that alarms and surveillance cameras have helped them, keep several self-policing measures and are able to acquire other systems and devices "to reinforce the locks", as pictured by Paula Gudiño, businesswoman on the commerce sector[623]. This pattern, that could be called a "persisting fear paradox", emphasizes how economic elites, being able to purchase different means to gain security, in fact, are mostly wrapped by "the endogenous production of uncertainty" (Gayer, 2019: 4) observable among the self-protection measures. Actually, that trend has been widely identified in studies concerning gated communities in Guadalajara, arguing that a larger deployment of security commodities set a difference between social classes, rather than between those who feel safer or not (Camus, 2015).

Probably, the persisting fear has to do with the fact that security commodities attempt to deter, rather to confront, crimes. The aim is, in providers and regulators' words, "to minimize risks"[624]. That could explain, for instance, that a door-to-door company of home products offers Mexican consumers a fake surveillance camera for around 10 dollars, with no capacity other that deter minor robberies[625].

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[623] Interview conducted with Paula Gudiño, Commerce Sector. October 22nd, 2015. Guadalajara, Jal.

[624] Interview conducted with Rosa María Cortés, Private Security Company owner, August 28th, 2015; Interviews conducted with Máximo Ballesteros and Máximo Ballesteros Jr., Zapopan, Jal., October 16th, 2015 and January 19th, 2017; Interview conducted with José Manuel Sánchez, Federal Government Official attached to the General Directorate of Private Security, Security National Commission, Mexico City, February 22nd, 2017.

[625] *Betterware* brochure, October, 2017. A photography is available on Appendix 4.3.

The preventive nature that formally characterises the market also sets the limits on the kind of threats that they can handle as protection suppliers. For instance, Rosa María Cortés explains that, when some clients ask their intervention in *cobro de piso*[626] cases, the security she provides would be useless, hence, they shall "resort to other means". Despite the vagueness of Cortés phrase, these other means could be less formal, even illegal. This point will be retaken in the next section.

So far, some of the products and services frequently offered by private security companies have been mentioned. Furthermore, a systematic analysis of the interviews conducted with *Tapatio* businessmen and the notes collected from my observations associated to each interview, reveal an extensive and varied ensemble of products and services mentioned therein, whether as providers or consumers of security commodities. The catalogue of commodities can be nested in six main groups, as shown in Figure 4.3.

Desk research and consultancy services seem to be frequently proposed by the companies to readdress customers' first impetus to hire armed guards in order to deal with petty robberies inside their facilities. They also contribute significantly to the aforementioned spiral pattern of consumption, as these analyses used to end with a list of security measures to adopt and products and services to purchase.

In Mexico, the insurance industry grew in the mid-1990s, partly as a result of the effects of the market-oriented policies on the financial sector (Loyola Lescale and Pérez Barnés, 2002). In that context, robbery and automobile insurances became common for business sector, especially towards the rise in property crime described in Chapter 1[627]. In the fieldwork, those businessmen who deliver merchandise or transport products mentioned insurance as indispensable among their crime prevention strategies. Certainly, that has a relation with the number of offenses registered and reported before the authority, as stated previously in the first chapter: businessmen accept that their first -and sometimes only- incentive to denounce is to make the insurance effective, minimizing their loss. In addition, for some businessmen, insurance agencies are privileged sources of information concerning crime patterns and,

[626] Racketeering. See footnotes 15-17 in the Introduction.
[627] Actually, according to the *Gaceta Mercantil*, under the name *Alta Seguridad* (High-security) an insurance company's advertisements started appearing in 1989, offering "life and damage insurance plans". It is worth to mention that the Gazette started including publicity that same year, before then, no advertisement was included in the inner-communication mean (Gazette Bank of Images 1970-2016, November 18th, 1989).

consequently, additional protection necessities. According to the industrialist Carlos Solano, for instance, his insurance agent would offer him advice on delivery routes and on the (re)definition of the insurance coverage[628].

Figure 4.3 Security Commodities: products and services purchased by *Tapatio* businessmen



Source: Elaborated by the author based on the ensemble of interviews conducted with businessmen settled in GMA and fieldwork carnet notes corresponding systematic observations, August-October, 2015 and January-February, 2017.

In contrast, patrimonial crisis insurance, also known as "anti-kidnapping" insurance, is one of the recent demands that businessmen make to the private security industry. Firms' heads

[628] Interview conducted with Carlos Solano, Industrial Sector Businessman. October 8th, 2015. Zapopan, Jal.

esteem that demand has been raised after kidnappings reached a wider victims' profile, including not only politic and economic elites. Indeed, a businesswoman[629] mentioned that they also seek for this kind of service to manage a very specific kidnapping modality: the one addressed against the employees, who are not protected the way company owners are, and asking the enterprise for the ransom to set him free. Businessmen also recognize that anti-kidnapping insurance is not affordable to anyone but elites, who could also manage the crisis hand-by-hand with specialists, such as *negociadores* (kidnapping-and-ransom consultants) or an anti-kidnaping group created *by* and *for* businessmen, both to be discussed in the following pages of this Chapter and Part III, respectively.

E-security is a category recently demanded by businessmen, although it has gained visibility in the *Gaceta Mercantil*, which lately includes several pieces explaining the risks that companies face in the technology era as well as some of the measures, either basic or more complex, that they could adopt[630]. It seems that that, around cybercrime, the industry spiral trend would be observable again, as businessmen become progressively more aware of the potential threats and, in consequence, begin to demand more protection measures, which would be soon outdated and replaced by others.

Itinerant monitoring, for its part, is a type of security commodity notably associated with transport sector, illustrating that specific necessities of specific consumers partially shape the market (Lorenc Valcarce, 2011).

Devices and indoor surveillance are the most ancient, varied and expanded security commodities. Indeed, the history of this industry might be tracked following the emergence and evolution of these two categories. A systematic review of the *Gaceta Mercantil*[631] shows, as previously mentioned in Chapter 1, that in the mid-1980 businessmen started paying attention on *veladores* (watchmen)'s professionalisation, since they used to be company staff who, reaching a certain age, had become unable to work in the production area. It was not until 1986 that their training was included among the workshops that the Chamber of Commerce offered to its associates and their employees.

[629] Interview conducted with Susana Piña, Industrial Sector. (October 9th, 2015). Zapopan, Jal.
[630] Gazette Bank of Images 1970-2016.
[631] Gazette Bank of Images 1970-2016.

On the other hand, the Gazette started publishing different advertisements for alarms and card locks in 1991, under the slogan *¡Instale alta seguridad! (Install High Security!),* becoming progressively more common and including more suppliers. In 1999, the industry was large enough that "Security and custody" joined the list of the sector "specialized sections" within the Chamber of Commerce[632]. It could mean either that the amount of this kind of supplier increased, gaining importance in the Chamber, or that they managed to be organized as an industry in itself.

Furthermore, devices and indoor surveillance measures vividly illustrate important gaps within the business sector. For instance, while some of the biggest industries have high-technology access control - including badges with visitors' photography, barcodes and scanners to open only the authorized doors, even metal detectors - in other factories, private security guards are there mostly to watch over employees, rather than controlling access to the facilities. Thus, visitors only register their hand-writing names in a poorly ordered list, while workers wait in a large line for the guard who checks their bags, jackets, pockets and other belongings as a ritual to finish their work journey[633]. Although alarms and surveillances cameras are spontaneously mentioned for almost every interviewee, in some cases these are discreet, almost imperceptible, while in others they are more visible or announced with stickers on the companies' doors and windows[634].

Paying attention to the variety of security commodities businessmen purchase already provides a picture of the private security industry, as well as some aspects of their rapport with the business sector as its main costumer. However, this image must be accompanied by a general review of those who conform the private security industry and how this composition could condition their relationship with businessmen and, ultimately, the (purchased) protection landscape.

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[632] The Chamber of Commerce is divided in different "specialized sections" (*secciones especializadas*) grouping associates belonging to the same industry. Thus, some meetings, events and services are devoted to all the Chamber's associates, while others are addressed to a certain section's members.

[633] Fieldwork carnet notes corresponding systematic observations, August-October, 2015 and January-February, 2017. Notes come from the author observations accessing different enterprises and factories, during various dates intentionally omitted to preserve the anonymity of the interviewees.

[634] A pattern of the type of enterprise in relation with the different security devices deployed should be explored preferably through a statistically representative sample and a systematic register of protection measures adopted and mention by the respondents. That way, a model could point out some factors able to explain why business adopt certain devices, broadening the hypothesis beyond insecurity perception and fear.

It is two sources that feed most of the "pool of talents" of private security companies: (a) a so-called "revolving door" mechanism, established between law enforcers and private agents, and (b) the unemployment figures and limited labor opportunities that the Mexican economy has produced in the last two decades[635], which drive young men to become private security agents as the least bad alternative.

The revolving door is defined as a "rite of passage for those who retire from the public security apparatus to move into the field of private security" (Puck, 2017: 88). Different studies have shown that former law enforcers and retired military in Latin America transferred their "know how" to the private arena, either founding their security companies or as part of its ranks (Lorenc Valcarce, 2011; Arias, 2009; Müller, 2010). As in other cases seen throughout history, the detectives' figure and the police officers' passage from the public to the private field represent a permanent connection between both sides as agents that bring with them "experience, social capital and arcane knowledge about crime" (Piccato, 2017: 111).

According to José Manuel Sánchez, Federal Government Official attached to the General Directorate of Private Security, in Mexico it is not very different: upper level former police officers and military personnel are commonly behind the emergence of private security companies and, even if they show a significant lack of skills needed to run an enterprise, they use their knowledge, contacts and reputation to conform a customer portfolio[636]. Considering that in a country where career Civil Service is rare and mid and high-level bureaucracies are displaced and replaced with every new leader in office, their passage from public service to business sector is habitual. Yet, in this case, what former law enforcers transfer from place to place is their violent entrepreneurship and their policing skills: in sum, their protection supplier resources.

In Guadalajara, that is clearly illustrated by the interviewees' profile. First, Máximo Ballesteros, who founded his firm in the late 1990s, used to be a public servant. Although he was not a police officer, he served in the local Government General Secretariat at the time it

[635] Unemployment rates reported by ENOE-INEGI since the mid-1990s (considering unemployment, partial unemployment and underemployment) shows that the economy has not produced jobs at the rhythm that labour force increases. For a general analysis see Ruiz Nápoles and Ordaz Díaz (2011).

[636] Interview conducted with José Manuel Sánchez, Federal Government Official attached to the General Directorate of Private Security, Security National Commission. (February 22nd, 2017). Mexico City.

led the entirety of the security police. According to his account and that of his son (and firm's co-director), Ballesteros' professional trajectory grants him reputation and expertise, especially when it comes to better understanding (and anticipating) law enforcement agency insights[637].

Rosa María Cortés, for her part, runs the company founded in the mid-1990s by her father, a former law enforcer mostly active during the *priista* administrations. Both cases, then, show that, as much as the market-oriented policies are significant in explaining the emergence of the private security industry, it could not be separated from what seems to be another trend: the partisan alternation (from PRI to PAN in Jalisco) also resulted in the passage of (mostly mid and high level) law enforcers to the private field because they were excluded from the *panistas'* cabinets.

Another well-known case reinforces the previous intuition: Servando Sepúlveda, a former chief of police and municipal Public Security Secretary in the 1980s and 1990s, was mentioned earlier in the chapter. The arrival of the first *panista* governor in 1995 resulted in Sepúlvedas' passage from public servant to businessman, as he created a private security firm that he consolidated while the PRI was the opposition party. However, appointed by the *priista* mayor Aristóteles Sandoval, in 2010 Sepúlveda came back to government ranks as Guadalajara's Public Security Secretariat, (Puck, 2017). Later, when Sandoval became Jalisco's Governor, Servando Sepúlveda was appointed as Mobility Secretariat. Meanwhile, he left the firm in his relatives' hands. Sepúlveda's case illustrates how revolving doors could result in a 360° tour, as the character passes back-and-forth from one field to another, setting connected vessels between them. Certainly, Sepulveda's case caused some reactions among the local political elite, who pointed out some of his actions as public servant as potentially profitable for the private security industry and, indirectly, to his own firm: such as the agreement that banks should hire private companies to protect their branches, or the Private Security Paramunicipal Company project, mentioned above[638]. Disregarding the (in)accuracy of those allegations, the case suggests that revolving doors could entail form of multi-located

[637] Interviews conducted with Máximo Ballesteros and Máximo Ballesteros Jr., Private Security Company owners. October 16th, 2015 and January 19th, 2017. Zapopan, Jal.
[638] "Pugnan por exigir seguridad privada en bancos de la ciudad". (May 11th, 2011). *El Informador*; "En tres meses opera la policía privada del Ayuntamiento Tapatio". (July 7th, 2011). *El Informador*.

agent who formally exerts his protection tasks in one arena, while informally (or indirectly) also act it in the other one.

Furthermore, the notion of revolving doors -either one or two-way passage- contributes to the democratic transition narrative with a significant nuance. Even if it has to be considered a turning point when it comes to policing, when a political party is displaced from office, it does not necessarily mean the end of their agents' prerogatives or scopes, which could be transferred from field to field. In that sense, the case of Rosa María Cortés' father is informative[639].

El licenciado[640], as she calls him during the entire interview, cemented his company through his persistent links with the public field. According to his daughter's narrative, their first clients were people he met as public servant, and he also brought former public officers to his staff and stayed in close communication with others who remained within the law enforcement offices: "people that respect him", stated the businesswoman. Such connections would bring him information and a privileged communication channel with public agencies, which costumers would appreciate, especially bearing in mind the importance of personalized bonds with law enforcers, previously discussed in Chapter 3. Although *el licenciado* is retired now, and Rosa María wants to lead the firm to a whole different era, she considers that her father's figure is still determinant for some clients, interlocutors within public agencies and former police officers working for her.

Another modality of the revolving door could be observed within the low-level agents. It has been documented that some auxiliary police agents entered to these bodies as a previous (and easier) step to be part of the police bodies (Suárez de Garay, 2016; Morquecho Güitrón and Vizcarra Guerrero, 2007). It has been also argued that, although some private companies are explicitly reluctant to receive retired or dismissed police officers, others are able to do so (Puck, 2017). It has even seen that some profiles, fully trained at the police academy are finally hired by private companies, as those guarantee a faster recruitment process and, sometimes, better labor conditions[641]. These scenarios picture a revolving door linking public

[639] Interview conducted with Rosa María Cortés, Private Security Company owner. (August 28th, 2015). Guadalajara, Jal.
[640] In Mexico, *licenciado* is the term to refer someone who completed a Bachelors' degree (*licenciatura*) (DEM, 2019).
[641] Interview conducted online via *Skype* with the local Congressman Augusto Valencia López (*Movimiento Ciudadano*), March 1st, 2018.

and private protection agencies through which agents could pass every day if, for instance, some police officers were moonlighting.

Among different implications, protection agents' passage from one body to other might represent the intricate relation between preventive and reactive protection measures. Considering that police officers are trained to react before some offences and the private agents shall only deter them, the former's displacement to private field could entail operative challenges. For instance, in 1995 the *Gaceta Mercantil* released an extensive article in which the author discusses private agents being charged in court as they triggered their weapon or exerted violence while attempting to protect their clients. According to the piece, private protection suppliers should have the right to be treated as police officers and allowed to use their firearm under certain conditions[642], although these bodies do not share the protocols for the use of weapons and their duties are different. The article's consideration is illustrating the inherent tensions of having personnel trained to be reactive protector, but constrained to preventive tasks, despite the kind of threat they face.

If preventive versus reactive protection activities illustrate a complex side of entangling private and public realms, crime investigations and management provide another vivid example. Seeking the administration of justice is a kind of protection since it means sanctioning the responsible and deterring recidivism. Since the early 1920s, these activities relied on private detectives who were closely connected with police bodies. In addition, detectives could also offer "the basic ability to navigate the underworld and the willingness to produce keep secrets, whether they worked for the government or private customers" (Piccato, 2017: 107). Ultimately, detectives were experts who represented an "additional protection for those who could afford it" (Piccato, 2017: 110). In that sense, a similar analysis could be built around other experts present in the contemporary entanglement of alternative protection suppliers. That applies, for instance, to the *negociadores* (kidnapping-and-ransom consultants), a socio-professional category situated in the grey zone drawn between public and private crime management, and that remains poorly analysed.

Regarding the kidnapping suffered by the son of one of his providers in Mexico City, Orestes Ruiz, commerce sector businessman recalls "he [the businessman], first called a friend,

642 "Los Vigilantes y la Autoridad". (November 1st, 1995). Gazette Bank of Images 1970-2016,

businessman *X*, who sent him his own *negociador*, a group of people that took the case, they were in charge, then the police intervened, but through the *negociadores*"[643]. The episode suggests that, for some businessmen, kidnapping-and-ransom consultants might be part of their regular suppliers. Being the case, it is possible that this kind of experts are not that rare within the sector. On the other hand, Ruiz' account also shows that private consultants would be the first interlocutors a businessman could appeal to within an emergency and police intervention depends on *negociadores* intermediation. Thus, rather than private or public actors, these experts might be considered as hybrid. Although not necessarily representative, the trajectory and narrative of Francisco Herrera could be illustrative on these *sui generis* protection suppliers.

Francisco Herrera[644] owns a private security firm located in Mexico City, although he has clients all over the country. Although the building façade has a billboard reading "private security services", the main commodity he offers is that of kidnapping consulting. The job, as he describes it, lies in establishing contact with the kidnappers, to advocate for the victim's maximum well-being despite the circumstances, and to achieve the release agreement based on the ransom payment. At a first glance, it seems that his services are well demarcated and clearly differentiated from the police agents' tasks: he negotiates the ransom, but he does not confront the kidnappers nor catch them as both are judicial police duties. Digging deeper, however, it is noticeable that this boundary is mostly blurry. Three faces of his profile are especially telling in such regard: his professional trajectory, his perception regarding police bodies and the alternative services he offers to businessmen.

Herrera is a lawyer whose father was a military and DFS agent in the 1960s. However, his primary connection with policing and protection market come from his uncle, a high-level General Attorney Office agent who, among other things, trained him in the use and handling of firearms:

> *When I grew up, rather than an image of my father, the image I had [as a referent] was* ***my uncle's****, because he allowed me to do different things… for instance, I was never allowed to touch my father's gun… he argued safety issues, who knows! But my uncle…* ***since I was five years old, he arrived saying 'take it, put it there', and I brush it up!***

[643] Interview conducted with Orestes Ruiz, Commerce Sector. (August 31st, 2015). Zapopan, Jal.
[644] The following lines are built on the interview conducted with Francisco Herrera, kidnapping-and-ransom consultant. (February 1st, 2017). Mexico City. Or from the associated fieldwork notes, otherwise specified.

Francisco Herrera
Kidnapping-and-ransom consultant
Mexico City, February 1st, 2017
(Q4-15)

His labour as a kidnapping consultant started randomly around the 1980s, as one of his friends was kidnapped and the victim's relatives asked him for help to figure out how to manage the case. According to his narrative, he got involved with no more than guts, curiosity to ask key questions and what he knew about law enforcement agencies and crime. From that stand point, Herrera's memories on his path towards his current job are consistent with Piccato's observation regarding the detectives during the early decades of 20th Century: "before the business could be regulated, it seemed to be an open field which anyone with method and initiative could enter" (Piccato, 2017: 109). Certainly, that outlines the poorly trained profile of those experts. Did Herrera learn how to deal with kidnappers using only intuition? Yet, there is the possibility that he decided, during the interview, not to share some details on his way to become a consultant. Anyhow, this last scenario drives us to the relation of these experts with the secrecy-visibility dimension.

Herrera is not a clandestine character, nor a very publicly exposed one. I heard about him following other leads provided by businessmen (which will be detailed in Part III), but I reached him easily through a journalist who I met long ago[645]. In other words, some businessmen openly named him in recorded interviews, he holds links with journalists and those who know him are able to share his contact (at least with someone they know). Nevertheless, his services as kidnapping-and-ransom consultant are not public in his webpage and the firm's facilities are significantly discreet, suggesting that his relationship with secrecy is complex and deserves deeper research.

By now, it shall be said that Herrera's bonds with journalists, especially those who report crimes, is also appealing, given they could be mutual sources of information. Herrera's desk is flooded with cut press releases enveloped in little plastic bags, classified in several groups. At certain a point, he said that media, even the less significant pieces, were essential for him "to know the kidnappers and deal with them".

[645] The journalist, an old friend of mine, gave me Herrera's mobile phone number. I contacted him through *Whatsapp* and he immediately answered and accepted to grant me the interview. The trajectory to reach him is not very different from the majority of the interviewees. On the interview contact pattern see Methodological Appendix *SB*.

Concerning his perception of police bodies, Herrera describes having a twofold link with them: on the one hand, he considers no agent is neither trained nor interested in facing and solving kidnapping cases as they are corrupt and able to make profits from such crimes. He even recalls cases in which he "tracked and dismantled kidnapping gangs", as police bodies are supposed to do. When he restores these memories, he uses the first person singular, claiming well-known detentions as his own victories. Thus, he draws the image of an expert who offers to his customers not only a ransom agreement, but protection from the regrettable performance of police bodies as well. On the other hand, the *negociador* recognizes that he acts as an intermediary between the victim's family and law enforcers, as he leads when and how appeal to them. This feature could entail a complementary dynamic between both protectors, everyone doing what is attached to their well-delimited duties and prerogatives. Yet, it also might be mirroring confrontation and overlap between the providers, or instrumental contact with a regular protection supplier. A kidnapping case passes through the official instances only if the private expert decides such a pattern.

The *negociador* is also a VIP's bodyguard, as reveal several photographs hanging in his office walls. He proudly explains that some of his experiences close protecting politicians and important businessmen, arguing that "thanks to God" he got such chance. In the late 1990s, Herrera also advised a group of *Tapatio* businessmen to deal with a kidnapping wave they were then facing. Although such consultancy will be detailed in Part III, at this time the multi-positioned figure that Herrera fulfils must be emphasized, which enabled a long-term bond with business sector, either in critical conjunctures (as a kidnapping) or within in more quotidian basis as a close protection supplier.

Exploring Fracisco Herrera's case is nothing but the initial steps of a research that observes this (and likely other) socio-professional roles that emerged not only from crime patterns but, from the grey zone in which they are managed.

Alongside the former law enforcers and experts, young men without better options are a targeted source for public security companies' recruitment efforts. That partially explains why the sector faces high levels of personnel rotation, as these agents barely last at these

jobs. It also allows us to emphasize the proliferation of *patito*[646] companies, as some interviewees call the low-quality enterprises that have flooded the private security market.

According to Máximo Ballesteros, some of these businesses recruit its staff "going to the bus station, showing a banner reading 'who wants to be a private security agent?', people say 'I do, I want to…', and it's done, they got a uniform and that's it"[647]. Even if the image described by Ballesteros could caricaturize the recruitment process, a more extended perception among the interviewees is the lack of regulation needed to set a minimum standard for the private security companies' performance. Indeed, the different government levels (municipal, state and Federal) hold diverse regulations for security enterprises and various public officers' capacities to enforce such rules.

Regarding the federal level register, a mentioned in the previous section, for these firms, an incentive to be part of this list is the right to obtain a license for guns and weapons. This is only the case under two assumptions: (a) the company is seeking to offer armed guards' services, which implies a challenge that not all the entrepreneurs are able to confront, as clearly stated by Rosa María Cortés in precedent pages; or (b) the legal pattern is the only one to obtain arms (or at least, the one chosen by businessmen).

At the local level, companies' regulation changes between municipalities and states. Although many dimensions could be explored in that regard, there are two that could be particularly significant when it comes to provide protection to businessmen:

First, the lack of solid registers that catalogue the existing companies. In Mexico, not all the municipalities or states have an updated register of private security companies. That makes it more difficult to establish minimal quality standards for this type of business, to inspect them once functioning and to sanction them when needed. Thus, the selection filters for the companies competing in the market mostly depend on the potential clients and the attributes they decide to prioritize: "if clients do not demand the providers to be aligned with regulation,

[646] Colloquialism used in Mexico to refer apocryphal or low-quality products, although they imitate the original brand (DEM, 2017).
[647] Interview conducted with Máximo Ballesteros and Máximo Ballesteros Jr., Private Security Company owners. (October 16th, 2015). Zapopan, Jal.

choosing instead a lower price over a high-quality service, that's when *patito* enterprises raise", argues Rosa María Cortés[648].

Secondly, the current regulation does not seem to consider the significant differences between security commodities offered in the market and, in consequence, the different regulations needed.

> ***What I informally know, for instance, from the armouring sector****, is that they are very worried about* ***the regulation that requires them to use uniforms to identify them as private security agents****, especially in specific regions where some criminal groups and organized crime groups are deployed. Why? Because they have a logo reading 'Armours X',* ***criminal groups identify them, knowing they have certain knowledge of this work.*** *The armouring companies' employees don't want to be identified as such,* ***fearing being*** **levantados** ***and forced into bulletproof organized crime vehicles****. Then… eh… I think that it [the pertinence of the rule] must be mainly oriented to every kind of commodity and the knowledge that implies, rather than the service delivery.*
>
> José Manuel Sánchez
> Federal Government Official attached to
> the General Directorate of Private Security,
> Security National Commission,
> Mexico City, February 22nd, 2017
> *(Q4-16)*

The anecdote that Sánchez informally collected outlines the importance of taking distance from an extremely normative position. Sometimes, the use of uniforms and other identifiers, rather than formalizing the sector, jeopardize agents' safety. In this case, for instance, to bend the registration rules becomes a sort of self-protection strategy for the armors.

Another factor to notice within Sánchez's account is how, once again, a certain "know-how" sets up a revolving door, this time between the legal and illegal fields. Regarding the armors, transferring their knowledge to serve criminal clients seems to be against their will. However, it is possible that some private security agents are eager to offer their protection skills to criminal purposes. Despite the fact she does not offer more details, Patricia Arias (2009) argues that in Mexico such cases have occurred.

Actually, either based on their experience or not, *tapatio* businessmen are aware that private security agents could eventually become a threat themselves, notably as they may have a significant access to their companies, staff and quotidian lives: "that's quite hard because, the one you hired to protect you became the one kidnapping you!", said Gerardo Nava, real-

[648] Interview conducted with Rosa María Cortés, Private Security Company owner. (August 28th, 2015). Guadalajara, Jal.

estate businessman[649]; "when you find out, as I did, that the watchman… the one you hired to keep an eye on your storeroom is stealing the merchandise, the supplies, well… it is the ultimate letdown!", shared Arnulfo Arellano, head of a service sector firm[650].

The veil of distrust that takes over the relationship between businessmen and law enforcers seems to be replicated in the realm of private security agents, reinforcing the paradox of the persistent fear: the need to watch over those you hired to protect you.

This "anxious relation" (Gayer, 2019: 4), which evolved between protegees and their protectors, observed in the precedent accounts, as well as in other latitudes[651], brings an important nuance to one of the findings offered in the precedent section: while it is true that privileged businessmen who have commissioned police officers to protect them also have an ensemble of armed and well-trained agents to satisfy any other interest (workers discipline, for instance), it is equally true that the majority of businessmen hiring guards to watch their firms likely acquires the services from a staff who could eventually become an insecurity source. It seems that the level of incertitude or anxiety associated to that relation depends on the kind of businessmen, whether if they are part of the *crème de la crème* or average businessmen.

In the precedent examples, the link between private protection firms (or agents) and criminality are based on violent actors forcing firms to provide them with a service (armoring) or based on some agent's transgression (a sort of rotten-apples principle). However, the private security industry and criminal protection racket could be linked in a more comprehensive way. For instance, Máximo Ballesteros recalled the case of a *patito* enterprise which turned out to be the front for *sicarios*' recruitment. "The [drug] cartel published classifieds in the local papers looking for agents, but they were seeking and hiring young guys to act as *sicarios*"[652]. Regarding Morelia, another Mexican city located in the state of Michoacán, it has been shown that shopkeepers pay protection fees to a private security firm while suspecting that those agents are actually sent by the drug cartel (Martínez-

[649] Interview conducted with Gerardo Nava, Real-estate company owner. (September 24th, 2015). Zapopan, Jal.
[650] Interview conducted with Arnulfo Arellano, Service Sector. (September 29th, 2015). Guadalajara, Jal.
[651] Analyzing the case of industrials in Karachi, Pakistan, L. Gayer (2019) documented what he called "the uncertainty production" emerged from the relationship established between economical elites and the poorly-trained and demotivated private security agents.
[652] Interview conducted with Máximo Ballesteros, Private Security Company owner. January 19th, 2017. Zapopan, Jal.

Trujillo, 2014). Unable to close the private protection analysis, it opens the criminal protection patterns discussion, pointing out how between the so-called upper and underworlds another blurry boundary will be observable.

The next section is dedicated to examining the (un)willing protection that businessmen receive either by illegal actors, namely the *narcos,* or through illegal means, both encompassed within the term "criminal protection".

4.3 The (un)willing criminal protection: when the "trouble-maker" is the "trouble-solver" and vice-versa

Among the increasing amount of studies around violence and drug-related homicides in Mexico, only a few focus -at least partially- on the protection-racketing practices settled by criminal organizations, despite the fact that most of them evoke "extortion" and *cobro de piso* (racketeering)[653] as one of the effects of the Federal Government policy against DTOs and their subsequent fragmentation. One of the early efforts was made by Eduardo Guerrero (2012) who explores its illegal protection recognizing the importance of this variable, although his operationalization is unfortunate as "in order to assess the evolution of illegal protection organization (mafias) in Mexico" he uses two datasets: the official DTO-related homicides register[654] and the one containing "messages from criminal organization placed next to corpses" (p. 37) or *narcomensajes*. As discussed across this research, protection is a more complex configuration and illegal suppliers would not have to be an exception. In addition, the author's national approach, seasoned with anecdotical cases reported by the press, neglects the diversity of violent entrepreneurs able to take part in the protection market, whether around legal or illegal transactions.

More recently, other studies have paid attention to how protection-racketeering dynamics settle in certain regions. In studies about cities such as Tijuana in Baja California (Medeiros Passos, 2018), Altar in Sonora (Mendoza, 2008), Monterrey (Signoret, 2015), Ciudad Juárez in Chihuahua and La Ruana in Michoacán (Moncada, n.d), Tierra Caliente, Michoacán (LeCour Grandmaison, 2019) or associated to inter-cartel turf wars in different regions of the country (Lessing, 2018) the importance of racketeering in the criminal groups' dynamics has

[653] Sometimes the term is shortened as *piso.* See footnote 15 in the Introduction.
[654] See Text-Box 2.4 in Chapter 2.

been documented, as well as the weight of the economic elites' reactions to shaping those extractive schemas.

Perhaps the most emblematic and best analysed case is Michoacán, and more precisely the *Tierra Caliente* region, where successive drug cartels (first *La Familia Michoacana,* and later*, Los Caballeros Templarios*) had settled on an extortion system that eventually became an unprecedented "extractive regime" (LeCour Grandmaison, 2019: 156). The *Templarios* regime later reached the public budget, the billionaire agro-industrial sector[655], where they controlled the retailing prices, the harvesting, packing and transportation of agricultural export corps, but also labor unions and workers (LeCour Grandmaison, 2019; LeCour Grandmaison, Forthcoming).

The system of protection in Michoacán illustrates how "the trouble maker" -the racketeer- could also be "the trouble solver" within some communities, as the *Templarios* used to make some loans to the people or to disciplined rebellious teenagers in their parents favor (LeCour Grandmaison, Forthcoming). In other words, illegal protection could take different shapes and that could entail different reactions from those who became (un)willing consumers.

From the political-economic approach, Moncada (Forthcoming *a*) argues that the victims are able to exert some agency in the protection-racket relation and, in consequence, that they are able to re-negotiate the racketeering conditions. Thus, different ways of resistance are observable, depending on victims' access to economic and political resources autonomous from criminal power (Moncada, n.d.). However, a more detailed review focusing on racket victims (or illegal protection consumers) is still missing.

At the first glance, in Guadalajara, racketeering is not a widespread problem among the business sector, at least, according to their accounts. Some of them evoke the situation experienced by their peers in other states of the country, recognizing the privilege of not confronting that kind of threat. Aguascalientes, Zacatecas, Tabasco, Hidalgo, Estado de México, Guerrero and, certainly, Michoacán appear in businessmen narratives as places in which their peers, suppliers or friends are experiencing racketeering[656]. Even some of them

[655] In Michoacán, mostly due to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) signed in 1994, production of avocado, lemon and woods became billionaire industries.

[656] Interviews conducted with Leonel Novak and Leonel Novak Jr., Financial Sector. August 26th, 2015. Guadalajara, Jal.; Raymundo Chávez, Agro-industrial Sector. (August 29th, 2015. Zapopan), Jal.; Víctor Manuel

had closed (or avoided to open) branches settled on these states where "the situation is really very serious"[657]. Such references play an important role on their awareness regarding how such offenses could happen anytime in their city[658].

That said, those accounts shall not enable an incontestable statement such as "in Guadalajara there is no extortion or racketeering against businessman", as significant nuances must still be explored.

First, a scene in which an ensemble of gunmen arrives to the firm, violently requesting for a "protection fee", despite how present is in other cities around the country, it might not be what *Tapatio* businessmen experience nowadays. Yet, it does not mean that: a) businessmen do not confront other modalities of extortion or; b) they did not deal with this threat once in the past. In other words, extortion and racketeering must be analyzed as a dynamic threat and, in consequence, it is fair to expect varying mechanism through which businessmen manage it.

> *Fortunately*, **cobro de piso *is not something happening in an uncontrolled way in… Guadalajara.*** *I mean, probably, someone had… this experience… yes! But it is not something to say 'Wow!', Now it's like in other places, right? What happened, instead, is that* ***we had a whole season of extortion attempts by phone****, but they were not… I mean, they were random calls, people calling from prison, seeking victims… testing if someone could fall [in accepting to pay them].*
>
> Manuel Gómez, Service Sector
> Zapopan, Jal., October 15th, 2015
> *(Q4-17)*

Manuel refers to the proliferation of phone calls made from penitentiaries in which convicts have illegal access to mobile phones. Sometimes, they dial random numbers pretending they know their interlocutors' identity and launching a threat. Sometimes it works and the victim deposits an amount of money either to a bank account or by money order. In some cases,

González, Commerce Sector. (September 15th, 2015). Guadalajara, Jal.; Carlos Solano, Industrial Sector. (October 8th, 2015). Zapopan, Jal.; Susana Piña, Industrial Sector. (October 9th, 2015). Zapopan, Jal.

[657] Interview conducted with Susana Piña, Industrial Sector. (October 9th, 2015). Zapopan, Jal.

[658] Within and ensemble of 33 interviews conducted by the author with medium and large-size business owners settled in the city of Querétaro between November 11th and December 16th, 2015, a distinctive feature of those who come from states highly touched by criminal violence (such as Michoacán and Jalisco) is the perception that what they witness in Querétaro nowadays -a growing city where businessmen and *narcos'* families are progressively arriving- seems just like what they saw in their own hometowns years ago. In other words, they anticipate "the coming storm". The interviews, however, have not been systematically analyzed yet, so that must be taken more as an observation than as a finding. If anything, it is an interesting lead to follow for future research.

prisoners have even settled a sort of call-centre, transforming this practice into a successful criminal rent seeking[659].

Certainly, the success of fake threats relies on the credibility that such situations could exist among the population: in an environment where different criminal actors are racketeering the population and that is known, the probability that a person believes the threating call is genuine tend to increase.

In addition, phone extortions managed from prison are not always fake. In Central America, for instance, it has been shown that gangs' extortion system relies on the close bonds between convicts - planning the extortion and making the calls- and their families and friends out of prison collecting "the rent" (Fontes, 2016).

Clearly, fake or genuine, in Mexico, convicts are able to perform this kind of extortion due to the conditions inside the prison system in which corruption, self-government, overpopulation and the perpetration of several crimes are dominant (Palma-Rangel, January 8th, 2018).

In 2011, the Federal Government launched the campaign "*Escucha, cuelga y llama al 088"* (listen, hang up and call-088) encouraging the population to, in case of receiving this kind of call, hang the phone up and call the Federal Police to report the threat and to verify its authenticity[660]. That might contribute in raising people's awareness regarding how to react when met with extortion phone calls. However, in contrast to other groups, businessmen also had their direct and personalized contact with law enforcers to deal with those threats: "businessmen were worried during those times, cause phone extortion increased… so the business associations organized workshops with the Attorney Office staff. They installed a *Ministerio Público* office (Public Prosecution Office) to address their cases", explained the journalist Oscar Garza[661].

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[659] "A sí funciona el negocio de la extorsión telefónica". (October 8th, 2018). *Excelsior,*

[660] [Presidencia Felipe Calderón Hinojosa]. (n.d.). SPOT. Extorsión- Escuchar, Colgar y Llamar al 088 [Video Archive]. Available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_ihlWDSDa8A; Poiré, A. (2011), Ante la extorsión telefónica, escucha, cuelga y llama al 088 [*Blog de la Presidencia*]. Retrieved on January 7th, 2017 at: http://www.presidencia.gob.mx/el-blog/ante-la-extorsion-telefonica-escucha-cuelga-y-llama-al-088/.

[661] Interview conducted with Oscar Garza, Journalist. (October 20th, 2015). Zapopan, Jal.

Indeed, the businessmen that recall having received one of these calls lately followed the pattern recommended by the authorities, avoiding falling victim to extortion[662]. As has been shown, for *Tapatio* businessmen, two mechanisms were key to deal with this threat: (a) available information, either coming from a public campaign or from their personalized close contact with law enforcers; and (b) selective attention provided by law enforcers to address their complaints.

Besides phone extortion, according to some accounts, racketeering against the business sector was about to emerge in the region. However, it was not spread in Jalisco, in stark contrast to other states:

> ***It was pretty rough for a while****. Look, my friend… my friend [he gives the name… around three or six years ago, I think,* ***they… ask him*** **piso** ***and he complained*** *before the government, the business associations, the press… on this* cobro de piso *and… [lower voice]* ***they burned his business!*** *They burned it! … but then, everything just calmed down.*
>
> Ernesto González, Industrial Sector
> Guadalajara, Jal., October 16th, 2015
> *(Q4-18)*

Among those who recall that, some years ago[663], businesses started confronting racketeers' threats, there is a consistent version pointing out that "everything calmed down" later. Some explanations on how that might had happened are trackable within the businessmen's narratives and, at the same time, some insights on how they dealt with unwilling protection offers.

The versions on how racketeering was managed in Guadalajara, to the point that it does not seem to represent a challenge for the business sector, could be summarized in four interrelated categories. The first one relies on law enforcers performance, while the other three have to do with the perception around the region's dominant drug cartel.

> *Well, when he* ***[the state Attorney] came to the business association****, we used to tell him what was happening and he went 'No, it [racket] is not happening here', but then someone said 'yes, in my business, they came and ask me* piso*', so he went 'ok, you tell me where and how… and I immediately will send someone there', I mean,* ***it was on us to bring the issue on the table, but he used to be willing to support us!***

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662 Interviews conducted with Orestes Ruiz, Commerce Sector. (August 31st, 2015). Zapopan, Jal.; Daniel Campos, Industrial Sector. (September 8th, 2015). Guadalajara, Jal.; Alfredo Palomino, Industrial Sector. (October, 7th, 2015). Guadalajara, Jal.; Susana Piña, Industrial Sector. (October 9th, 2015). Zapopan, Jal.

663 The vagueness on the time period comes from the accounts. Since interviewees use expression such as "a time ago", "around 2007-2008 or so", "three or six years ago", it is impossible to frame the period more accurately.

Josefa Domínguez, Industrial Sector
Guadalajara, Jal., October 14th, 2015
(Q4-19)

> *Yes, yes…* ***we used to have an extraordinary state Attorney****…he was very attentive to what was going on… because, of course, in some areas of the city they started to request* piso *and* ***like this [she snaps her fingers] in a minute, they stop it and that's it!*** *[…] the state Attorney was very alert,* ***Luis Carlos, the former Attorney… he often went to business associations****, he had a lot of meetings with us and he told us: 'if someone asks you for* piso*, call me, directly! You don't have to pay'.* ***He protected us a lot!***

Susana Piña, Industrial Sector
Zapopan, Jal., October 9th, 2015
(Q4-20)

Following the businesswoman's words, it is clear that close (and selective) attention coming directly from the state Attorney is read as the key to deter racketeers. The public servant is seen as someone working hand-in-hand with the sector. Using his first name to refer to him, Susana Piña even shows a certain familiarity with him[664]. However, it is important to remember that the accounts lack details regarding how the State Attorney Office deals with the subject. Thus, for local notables, law enforcers keep racketeers off their backs and that is protection.

On the other hand, the other three versions focus on the dominant drug trafficking organization to explain how the racketeering attempts did not transform into a permanent challenge for businessmen. However, the business narratives are not necessarily clear about the criminal group to which they refer. As discussed in Chapter 2, today the *Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación* appears as the dominant group on the region. Nevertheless, the long tradition of *narcos'* presence in Guadalajara could entail that their vague references mirrors their uncertainty on who attempted to perform the *cobro de piso.*

First, there is the idea that racketeering is not among the activities that interests drug cartels in Guadalajara when it comes to get profits: "It is not the cartel style! There are criminal organizations that say 'I don't extort, I don't kidnap, I don't bother the good people' while others say 'let's do whatever we want', but here, they have this profile of not venture in those

[664] Susana Piña refers Luis Carlos Nájera, Jalisco state Attorney (2013-2015). Despite the good image that the businesswoman keeps about Nájera, it must be outlined that the public officer left the charge surrounded by several rumors on the links he allegedly settled with the dominant drug cartel *Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG)* ("Narcotráfico empaña la imagen del fiscal". (April 14th, 2014). *Excélsior*. For a chronology on Nájera's administration see "Cronología: Luis Carlos Nájera, su paso por la Fiscalía". (July 7th, 2015). *El Informador,*; "El Final del ciclo en Fiscalía". (July 6th, 2015). *Reporte Índigo*; "Fiscalía de Jalisco se deslinda de Sergio Adame, acusado de lavado de millones de dólares en EU". (June 18th, 2016). *Proceso*).

crimes"[665], explained Máximo Ballesteros. It is relevant to consider Ballesteros' profile since he is a multi-located protection supplier: owner of a private security firm and former public officer, as said somewhere else in the text. That illustrates not only his perspective as businessmen, but also as security provision expert.

The second version, advanced by some of the less active members of business associations and self-defined as outsiders regarding the *crème de la crème* in Guadalajara, posits that dominant criminal organizations do not perform racketeering due to the close and long-living social bonds established between them and the local notables. In other words, *narcos* would not perform racketeering against businessmen as they are friends, family or associates. In addition, *narcos* would also deter any other criminal group from *cobrar piso*[666], granting a sort of indirect protection towards the business sector. Beyond the accuracy of the version or how close to the truth it could be, what is significant is how businessmen perceived that the *Narco* is not necessarily a stranger (and antagonist) group vis-à-vis the business sector. That lead will be widely followed in the next chapter, by now, it must be borne in mind that threads relating *Narcos* and businessmen might contribute to shaping the occurrence (or absence) of racketeering and, doing so, the protection market.

The previous intuition is directly related to the third version on why Narco does not perform extortions in Guadalajara, oriented towards the racketeering choices. Businessmen who are closely linked with retailers or big food market vendors (*locatarios en mercados de abastos*) argue that *cobro de piso* is a frequent problem not for local notables but for those shopkeepers and informal merchants: "People who perform those kind of things [racketeering] look for the easiest niches, people working in the *Mercado de abastos,* for instance"[667], stated Sergio Hernández, whose raw material sources are these merchants. What makes *Mercado de abastos* an easier niche to illegal rent seeking?

In the view of the young industrialist Gilberto Fuentes[668], two elements might explain why shopkeepers are more vulnerable than medium and large-size business: (a) the former do not

[665] Interview conducted with Máximo Ballesteros and Máximo Ballesteros Jr., Private Security Company owners. (October 16th, 2015). Zapopan, Jal.
[666] Interviews conducted with Benito Alvarado, Industrial Sector. (September 2nd, 2015). Zapopan, Jal.; Lorenzo Mendoza, Service Sector. (September 13th, 2015). Zapopan, Jal.; Alberto Hernández, Industrial Sector. (September 22nd, 2015). Zapopan, Jal.
[667] Interview conducted with Sergio Hernández, Service Sector. (September 1st, 2015). Guadalajara, Jal.
[668] Interview conducted with Gilberto Fuentes, Industrial Sector. (January 16th, 2017). Tlajomulco, Jal.

count on the selective protection that law enforces and private agents grant to local notables and; (b) the degree of informality that characterizes such environments facilitates illegal activity. Thus, significant amounts of money that hardly passes through the financial system (prevalence of cash transactions) and the corruption of law enforcers who are "their first extorters" lay the foundations for an illegal protection market. In the same vein, other businesses appeared on the interviewees' narrative as "easier niches" for racketeering: bars and casinos, both located at the margins of legality[669].

This version offers main elements to enhance the illegal protection market understanding. The successful pattern that protects some businessmen from such threats does not mean the end of the practice but its displacement towards other arenas in which the relationship with law enforcers and commodified protection is different. Thus, it is imperative to emphasize the diversity amidst the business sector and, from there, better appreciate the weight of local notables not only reaching out to provide protection for them but shaping retailers or merchants' racketeering landscape. In addition, the fact that they are not part of the local notables does not necessarily exclude them from law enforcers' (in)formal protection, which is worth more attention in further research. It therefore follows that different protection configurations could be observed among distinct kinds of owners (either merchants or self-employees). By way of illustration, the words of Gilberto Fuentes may be considered again:

> *Well, yes, they [*comerciantes del mercado de abastos] *are united, there is a lot of union among them around security issues… **they act as a group!** If something happens… forget it! I mean, **there are a lot of powerful people as well**. If something happens, a half an hour later, there are helicopters flying around, police cars everywhere […] **they have a lot of connections, among the good guys and the bad guys**. I mean, I've personally seen that they have a lot of influential contacts among both, the political sector and the… crime… sector, right? Those, **if they don't fix it in one way, they do it in the other way!** That simple!*
>
> Gilberto Fuentes, Industrial Sector
> Tlajomulco, Jal., January 16th, 2017
> *(Q4-21)*

Although racketeering might be the quintessential expression of illegal protection suppliers, it is also difficult to set the borders between illegal actors seeking rent and other forms of extortion.

[669] Interview conducted with Eugenia Barajas, Journalist. (October 16th, 2015). Zapopan, Jal.

Andrés González, a middle-aged businessman in the service sector, argues that the worst extortion *Tapatio* businessmen have to face is the one performed by labor unions: "there is no chance to negotiate with them, nothing, they come to extort you!"[670], he stated while showing me a payment receipt issued by a trade union to which González had paid fifty thousand pesos[671] some days ago. The makeshift paper was on his desk to remind him how he spent such an amount of money to prevent the union from blocking the firm's facilities, organizing a strike, although none of González's employees are members of that union "they don't protect or represent anyone", he added.

The perception that Andrés González shared about the syndicates is consistent with the opinion of most of the businessmen interviewed: "they are legal extorters", said the industrialist Alberto Hernández[672], "they are disguised delinquents!" blurted out the businesswoman Josefa Domínguez[673]. Even those who do not express animosity towards these organizations, neither move them away from their racketeer's image: "I have a great relationship with the labor Union leader, great! We pay them every month and we have no problem with them!", explained the industrialist José Gerardo Zapata[674].

For businessmen, the rapport with trade unions might be qualified as an extortion or racketeering since these organizations present themselves as the source of protection towards a threat they also provoked: "they [labor unions] do not help us! They create the problem and they come to offer to fix it! I didn't have a trouble before, they made it up!", explained Gerardo Nava, owner of a real-estate firm who deals with different syndicates.

The main threat launched by the labor unions is to organize a strike, blocking the business facilities and obstructing the daily operation. Yet, syndicates' purchased protection is useful to neutralize such threats as well as to deter other unions' attempts to operate within the firm. As stated by the industrialist Daniel Campos: "the only benefit I get [from paying to the labor union leader] is that no other union comes to bother me, that's it! That's a mafia, we know that"[675]. Certainly, it might imply that workers might not count on unions to represent their

[670] Interview conducted with Andrés González, Service Sector. (October 30th, 2015). Guadalajara, Jal.
[671] Around 3000 USD considering the exchange rate of 16.45 pesos per dollar, registered the date of the interview (Fieldwork carnet, October 30th, 2015).
[672] Interview conducted with Alberto Hernández, Industrial Sector. (September 22nd, 2015). Zapopan, Jal.
[673] Interview conducted with Josefa Domínguez, Industrial Sector. (October 14th, 2015). Guadalajara, Jal.
[674] Interview conducted with José Gerardo Zapata, Industrial Sector. (September 1st, 2015). Zapopan, Jal.
[675] Interview conducted with Daniel Campos, Industrial Sector. (September 8th, 2015). Guadalajara, Jal.

interests and foster their labor rights, notably if the businessman, once paying the "licit extortion", also purchases the guarantee of permanent workers' appeasement. That is a likely scenario due to the Mexican long tradition of *sindicatos blancos* (white labor unions) or organizations aligned to businessmen interests and unable to protect workers[676].

In Guadalajara, the labor disputes field offers another telling example of an extortion performed by those who were supposed to be "trouble solvers": the so-called Taliban lawyers' case[677], legal actors who threaten businessmen, not through firearms but with the tricky use of legal framework.

According to an ensemble of businessmen and key actors accounts[678], the "Taliban lawyers" operate by systematically triggering legal procedures against a firm on behalf of a fired employee. The "*abogangsters*"[679] first step is to meet the former employee and persuade him on appealing the labor instances to present an employment related complaint against the former employer. Then, the *Talibanes* contact the businessman searching for an unlikely agreement in which they offer to drop the case in exchange for a certain amount of money. Businessmen normally refuse to pay as they consider that the dismissal was legal and, in such case, the former employee has no chance to succeed within the Labor Court. Nevertheless, the next step of the *Talibanes* complicates businessmen odds as, using their collusive relations with officers and judges within the Labor Tribunal, they present allegedly fake evidence of unpaid overtime and other labor abuses. The next contact between the *Talibanes* and the firm is closer to an extortion scenario as the former threatens the latter on going further through the colluded institutions, unless they accept an economical agreement.

To that point, the threated businessman has to choose between two paths: either he continues the legal cause, although it is expensive and requires the service of inner-levers as powerful

676 On Mexican syndicalism and its transformation after the market-oriented economic reforms, see Murillo (2005).
677 The name of the group will be discussed later.
678 Interviews conducted with Victor Manuel González, Commerce Sector. (September 15th, 2015). Guadalajara, Jal.; Alfonso Magadán, Industrial Sector. (September 23rd, 2015). Zapopan, Jal.; Juan Galicia, Construction and Real-estate Sector. (September 25th, 2015). Zapopan, Jal.; Alfredo Palomino, Industrial Sector. (October 7th, 2015). Guadalajara, Jal.; Oscar Garza, Journalist. (October 20th, 2015). Zapopan, Jal.
679 To refer the *Taliban* lawyers, Alfonso Magadán uses the expression *abogangsters*, built from mixing the words *abogado* (lawyer) and gangster. According to Piccato (2017) the term was coined by the common language "to name those who combined the credentials of the lawyers and the attributes of the *pistoleros*" (p. 172).

as those mobilized by the Taliban, or he accepts the agreement and pay the "*abogangsters*" to disarm the case they built.

The *Taliban* lawyers' case emphasizes that selling protection while being the source of the threat is not drug cartel or gangs' members monopoly. The lawyers who were supposed to be "trouble solvers" became "troublemakers", using legal trickery to build a credible threat towards businessmen and subsequently reach an economic agreement to dissolve it. In addition, it should be noted that the extortion experience takes place in the upper world, although it relies on corruption practices, illustrating, once again, the porous lines dividing legal and illegal fields.

It should be pointed out that the nickname "Taliban", which has nothing to do with any religious dimension but instead evokes roughness and radical action, is a vernacular term not only used by businessmen but also by government offices[680] and journalists[681] in Guadalajara. This reveals how the case has transcended the business chambers and associations, arriving to public discourse.

A general review of the press coverage shows that some of the *Taliban Lawyers* have been sued under fraud charges. However, they are still on the field, driving significant profits targeting not only businessmen but municipal governments as well, as they represent dismissed public officers in their labor complaints against the municipal government[682].

To this case, it is possible to add others that, not being as well organized as the *Taliban*, are routinely confronted by the real-estate businessmen and other industrialists: lawyers denouncing that they represent the rightful owner of the land in which the firm is building on, "they submitted papers… from the viceroyalty period, around the 1500s", explained Juan Galicia, real-estate firm owner. Certainly, the case is discarded as soon as the businessman accepts a financial agreement. Lawyers also mobilize environmental or indigenous groups to obstruct the construction, putting pressure on the firm to pay them in order to demobilize the protesters[683].

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680 Jalisco Governement. (December 16th, 2013). *Giran orden de aprehensión contra dos abogados conocidos como "Talibanes"* [Comunicado de Prensa].
681 "Capturan otra vez al líder talibán". (July 28th, 2016). *Mural*.
682 "Acusa Alberto Uribe a Tribunal". (September 28th, 2016). *Mural*.
683 Interview conducted with Juan Galicia, Real-estate Sector. (September 25th, 2015). Zapopan, Jal.; Interview conducted with Alfredo Palomino, Industrial Sector. (October 7th, 2015). Guadalajara, Jal.

So far, the protection offered either by criminal actors (*narcos*) or by *abogangsters* (legal actors manipulating the law) set businessmen as victims unwillingly paying for criminal protection. However, it is also possible that they voluntarily hire illegal actors to protect some of their interest.

The introduction evoked examples of death squads or other militias performing social cleansing on behalf of *hacendados*. Probably due to the research design bias, this kind of cases did not emerge from fieldwork. Conversely, one of the findings reveals how businessmen appeal to *narcos* to collect debts.

The archives regarding the Auxiliary Police, discussed earlier, as well as the *Gaceta Mercantil* show that debt collection is a challenge that businessmen often confront. Thus, both, the hybrid police body and the Commerce Chamber offered the service of debt collection, "a necessary job", as described by one of those in charge of the duty within the business association: "business patrimony and success could be seriously jeopardized if debtors get away with it"[684]. From this perspective, debt collection services become a protection modality. Along with private agents, fieldwork revealed that violent entrepreneurs had made inroads into this part of the market, as will be shown in the following episode.

Coming from a wealthy family, Armida Romero was a key figure in my entry to the field. Ana Bernal, a mutual friend, introduced us via *Whatsapp*: "Armida knows every rich family in Guadalajara", explained Ana, confident that she could help me meet potential interviewees. After several messages in which she sent me businessmen's contacts, Armida and I agreed to have lunch together to finally meet[685]. We met at a chain restaurant in Zapopan, neither pretentious, nor extraordinary. The main theme of our conversation was Guadalajara's general environment and how difficult it was to run a firm in the city. Criminality and violence did not appear in her account as one of the challenges businesspersons have to face. Instead, she talked about the lack of financial opportunities and state's support to launch a start-up. To illustrate her point, she evoked an anecdote in which she embarked on a business, trying her own luck. Although the endeavor resulted in meagre

[684] "Cobrar no siempre es tarea ingrata, dice Pablo Ramírez: efectiva labor de cobranzas y reclamaciones realiza la Cámara. (May 3rd, 1971). Gazette Bank of Images 1970-2016

[685] The following paragraphs concerning the informal conversation with Armida Romero are based on the Fieldwork carnet notes, (September 2nd, 2015). Her account is paraphrased as the conversation was not recorded. As early explained, quotations taken from fieldwork notes might not be literal. However, the systematic review of the notes at the end of each workday reduces the risk of bias or inaccuracies.

earnings for her, what is really worth noting is the story Armida shared regarding an associate who decided not to pay her part of the profits, going against their precedent agreement.

"He didn't pay me back!", told me Armida still frustrated, "It was unfair and there is nothing you can do on these situations. Actually, Rosa María [Cortés] offered me to talk to her brother-in-law to collect the debt. You know, Rosa is my best friend, so she told me 'If you want, we could reach the debtor, *levantarlo* [to abduct him] and get your money back', but I thought he would realize that it was me behind that… even Rosa told me 'don't worry, we could tell him that we bought you the debt and now he owes us the money', but… I hesitated! At the end it was not that much money… I mean, it was my money but, I gave that up as lost!".

At this point, the reader may anticipate some of the pieces missing to complete the puzzle Armida is picturing. However, it worth making them explicit: (a) Rosa María, Armida's best friend, is none other than the head of the private security firm who gave me an interview and whose narrative was widely retrieved in the precedent pages; (b) As explained in Chapter 2, *levantón* is a sort of abduction performed by the *narcos* either seeking money or as a means of retaliation or discipline towards the cartel members. That leads us to Rosa María's brother-in-law, the one to turn to if you need that kind of service; (c) Earlier in the conversation, Armida had told me that, for many years, Rosa María's sister dated the son of the well-known drug leader *Y*. The next chapter will discuss how the business world and the *Narcos* might be connected through kinship relations. For now, it will suffice to note that businessmen could use this bond, and more precisely, *narcos,* when it comes to collect a debt. In this case, the owner of a private security firm, daughter of a former law enforcer, *el licenciado,* appealed to the *Narcos* and their methods to protect her friends' interests. Afterwards, "it was her money".

It must be noticed that the *Narcos* could take action, using illegal means, to reinforce the agreement that two businesspersons settled in legal and formal bases, -i.e., one not related to gambling or illicit business. The erstwhile "troublemaker" becomes a sort of "trouble solver", regardless of Armida's hesitation and final decision.

Armida shared the anecdote in a quite ordinary context. The description of our meeting aims to settle how the account emerged as any other subject in our regular conversation, during the first time we met. Probably, the fact that we have a mutual friend and the messages

exchanged the days before, or the similarity in our age, yielded a trustworthy environment that encouraged her to talk me about the experience. Anyhow, she did not change her tone, nor paid attention to how crowded the restaurant was. She went on with the story, even answering some of my follow-up questions, suggesting that it is not a subject about which she is discreet or secretive[686].

Armida's paraphrased words also illustrate the dynamic through which *narcos* collect legally agreed-upon debts: they buy them from the original creditor. Juan Galicia, owner of a construction and real-estate firm describes a similar experience, except that he does it from the debtor's standing point:

> *I: One of my… suppliers… he had… I think, dirty money… then, once,* ***I owed him some money and… and… he left, but a Mafia came to get the money back.*** *So, I get the money, I paid them back and they left, but it was an unpleasant episode… Yes… and I went to the business association and I explained my case: 'this and that just happened', 'well, let us know if they call you again', but… I had the chance they were very kind criminals! [laughs] and once I paid them, that's it! A year later, they call me, but I did not pick the phone up, and… that's it.*
>
> *Me: So, they told you: 'we are collecting the money on behalf of this other guy?'*
>
> *I: Yes,* ***'now, you owe us the money'****, 'hold on, I didn't do business with you', 'I couldn't care less!', 'let's call this guy [the original creditor]'. We called him and I went 'hey, what's up? I did not make the deal with these guys!' and he went 'I don't care, deal with it!'* ***And here, in front of me, there were two gunmen****… 'hey, give me your house deed, your car, the other… your wife's car', so* ***we started bargaining*** *because they want me to pay them a million pesos and the debt was around 300 or 400 thousand* ***[…] I paid with a check payable to the guy I owed the money to originally*** *[…] The people of the* ***Business Association told me that they could send the militaries****, to be around, patrolling for a week, to watch out, and if they [the debt collectors] came, the militaries could tell them* ***'hey, keep on going, don't mess around with this guy, keep moving!'*** *That's why being part of the business association gives you… this support".*
>
> Juan Galicia, Construction and real estate sector
> Zapopan, Jal., September 25th, 2015
> *(Q4-22)*

Galicia's words show that, as in Armida's episode, businessmen could delegate their role of creditor to the *narcos* (or "a Mafia" in this case), standing aside from the matter. Three other elements are appealing on the debtor account. First, the gunmen in charge of retrieving the money did not exert any violent act, instead, they negotiate with Galicia to set the amount he finally paid. The threat, however, is perceived as credible enough to force him to get the

[686] As for me, I made a conscious effort to keep listening, pretending I was not surprised by the account, wanting to avoid causing her inhibition.

money and pay back and with long-term effects, as both the businessman and the association considered the gunmen could eventually return. Second, the debt was successfully collected through a legal means (by check), which shows that even if the "problem solvers" are violent entrepreneurs, the transaction stays within the formal financial system. Thus, upper-world and under-world are displayed as entirely entangled. Third, as the check could be easily tracked and, at the same time, the collectors, such a feature suggests that regarding "debt collection services" performed by criminal actors, the secrecy is not a priority for any of those involved. That is consistent with the role that businessmen expected from the militaries patrolling around, as the aim is not to capture the gunmen, but to deter further requests or threats towards Galicia.

Although neither of the examples of debt collection clarify the incentives violent entrepreneurs have to collect a debt or if they keep the entirety of the profits, they vividly illustrate that even if businessmen have been victimized by *narcos* or other racketeers, they are also able to mobilize those groups and their violent resources to protect their interests.

The landscape of alternative protection suppliers, as shown in this Chapter, is a complex interweaving in which setting boundaries between private-public, formal-unformal, legal-illegal is unattainable. Several revolving doors enable the passage of agents from one realm to another or constitute a link between them. It should be noted that those protection services could compete among themselves, and hence provoke tensions between suppliers, including government agencies (Gambetta, 1993), but they could also be complementary. Even if law enforcers could gain some operational advantages (state structure, equipment, trained personal, legal access to police files and weapons), non-state actors could always offer other legal or illegal services. Since all of them are able to use some sort of force, competition could unleash violent contexts (Varese, 2001).

Throughout the chapter, although the core of the discussion was the ensemble of purchased or non-government protection providers, law enforcement agencies or agents remain strongly present in the analyses. In the contemporary ensemble of alternative protectors, government officers play the role of change agents (Lorenc Valcarce, 2011), inducing self-policing measures, selling their services (either formally or through moonlighting), sharing certain parcels of the protection market with private firms, (semi)regulating the latter and even participating in the ways criminal protection is performed for *Tapatio* businessmen.

Criminal (un)willing protection patterns anticipated that the link between businessmen and *narcos* in Guadalajara was also an intricate configuration. The next chapter digs deep into the rapport that *Tapatio* businessmen had established with *narcos*, illustrating another protection modality. This time, the threat is not directed towards businessmen's lives or properties, but against their social status.

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Chapter 5. The Elephant in the Room: Sharing Spaces with *Narcos*

The Paseo de los Parques *house*[687]
was transferred from one narco *to another […]*
As they saying goes, the best hiding spot is the most obvious place,
the one where nobody thinks someone would hide.
Or perhaps, simply, in the Paseo de los Parques *house,*
narcos *are invisible.*

Diego Petersen Farah[688]

The "startling familiarity" established between *Tapatios* and the *Narco* in Guadalajara, deeply discussed in Chapter 2, was shaken when, in August 2017, the US Department of Treasury, through the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) made public a list of people and companies that were allegedly "providing support for the drug trafficking activities of Raúl Flores Hernández" and his organization, by the North American agency as "significant foreign narcotics traffickers pursuant to the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (Kingpin Act)", presumably linked with the Sinaloa Cartel and Jalisco New Generation Cartel[689]. Every year a similar listing is released where businesses and figures from Guadalajara, such as Raúl Flores, appear. However, the publication drew a lot of attention from the media due to a different reason. As part of the presumed network, Rafael Márquez, renowned soccer player and Mexican national team captain, and the well-known Mexican singer Julión Álvarez had been included[690].

Although the so-called North American "black-list" does not imply a formal judicial process[691], North American agencies, once again, orient who they consider the *Narco* is*,* their links to illicit activity and how it had expanded on the *Tapatio* landscape. This time, placing emphasis on connections with the business sector.

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[687] *Paseo de los Parques* is a street located in one of the many exclusive gated residential developments located in Guadalajara. There, the drug lord "Nacho" Coronel was brought down in 2010. For further details on Coronel's case, see Text Box 2.2.
[688] "La Casa de Paseo de los Parques". (August 4th, 2010). *El Informador*.
[689] US Department of the Treasury. (August 9th, 2017). *Treasury Sanctions Longtime Mexican Drug Kingpin Raul Flores Hernandez and his Vast Network*. Consulted October 7th, 2018 at: https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-release/sm0144
[690] "Estados Unidos señala a Rafael Márquez y a Julión Álvarez como presunto prestanombres de un narcotraficante". (August 9th, 2017). *Animal Político*.
[691] A more detailed discussion concerning "black lists" is developed later in the chapter.

Within that inference and through the local newspaper *La Crónica de Hoy*[692], the cartoonist Manuel Falcón delivered a meaningful image that summarizes not only the episode accounted, but also the presence of the *Narco* in Guadalajara and the role of businessmen in such a configuration.

Under the name "The Narco-elephant in the room" (Figure 5.1) Falcón represented the *Narco* as a giant elephant occupying the whole space, being impossible to ignore. The cartoonist added to the pachyderm the tag "Raúl Flores" and "opium" in parenthesis, playing on words with the last name of the indicted "Flores", which literally means flowers.

Figure 5.1 "The *Narco*-elephant in the room", press cartoon by Manuel Falcón



Source: Cartoon published by *La Crónica de Jalisco*. (August 10th, 2017). Image digitally retouched by Verónica Martínez.

As in the classic Indian tale, seven blind men surround the big animal, touching and embracing it. One of them is even on his knees, holding the elephant's trunk. Each man, guessing what this animal looks like, has a dialogue box that starts with the phrase "I though he [Raúl Flores] was a…" and then, everyone continues with his own version:

[692] The journal *La Crónica de Hoy* was founded in 1996 in Mexico City. According to the *Media Owner Monitor Mexico* (CENCOS-Reporters without borders, 2019), this tabloid-size newspaper, with a shared audience of about 76,000 daily issues, has been criticized for being aligned to PRI and quite critical with other political parties. Available at: https://mexico.mom-rsf.org/en/media/detail/outlet/la-cronica-de-hoy/. Retrieved: September 23rd, 2019.

"businessman", "celebrity manager", "soccer team owner", "restaurant owner", "Casino owner", "school owner", "Julión's backup singer". Except for the last statement, which is clearly the touch of humour that completes the cartoonist' message, Raúl Flores was embedded in the *Tapatio* business sector playing all these roles. Again, as in the Indian tale, the elephant is not only what one blind man perceives but, the ensemble of perceptions and, probably, other facets that remain untouched and unknown by the blind men[693]. Manuel Falcón's cartoon also suggests that this giant figure everyone pretends not to see represents the *Narco*, which everyone has contact with. Furthermore, the huge animal is sharing the room with the blind men who also appear to be businessmen.

To what extent does Falcón draw a mirror image of a *Tapatio* businessman and his rapport with the *narcos*? Considering the argument thus far, it is fair to say that *narcos* may have, at least, a twofold relationship vis-à-vis the business sector. On the one hand, violence associated with their illegal market might represent a threat for the economic elite, although not greatly feared within the sector, as previously detailed in Chapter 2. On the other hand, in the previous chapter it is described how the *Narco* has provided protection to businessmen through practices such as extortion, racket or debt collection whether they themselves are considered to be the danger or not. In both cases, the characters seem to be distinguished from one another, businessmen being mostly victims with their hands tied. However, the cartoon that inspires the title of this chapter suggests that the role of local notables is to establish bonds with *narcos* which could be more intricate than the binomial "victim-victimizer". Indeed, the case of Armida Romero and Rosa María Cortés, analysed in Chapter 4, already advances such intuition as it shows that illegal protection delivered by *narcos* could be set into motion as one of the businessmen strategies to ensure others' adherence to agreements. Therefore, Guadalajara is likely a space inhabited by "blind men" sharing rooms with the big narco-elephant. Being the case, to what extent does that pose a threat to the economic sector and how do they deal with it?

The space, or the rooms that the pachyderm and the apparently blind people might share on a daily basis, is a fundamental variable to consider here. Although it is an aspect commonly relegated as a second-place element in analytical efforts, "the social world is inexorably

[693] For a version on the Indian tale "The blind men and the Elephant" see Tales from the Panchatantra (vgr. Forest, 1996).

spatial and the spatial is always political" (Cerón-Anaya, 2018: 7). Actually, spatial distribution may determine and reinforce behaviours, social hierarchies and differences (Cerón-Anaya, 2018; Mendoza, 2018). In that sense, space is never neutral, since everyone is associated to "moral connotations and social meanings" (Mendoza, 2018: 169). Beyond the notion of a physical place or geographical area, in what follows, the variable "space" will be understood as a social product, the result of the interdependence among material, social and symbolic dimensions, beings and goods in a relational disposition (Löw, 2015; Löw, 2013). Thus, space is the relational entanglement of goods and people that contribute to structure certain actions. From that perspective, two elements have to be preserved: 1) space might be dynamically constituted and transformed (Löw, 2015) and; 2) inclusion and exclusion of those who constitute such entanglement become significant defining the *Ego* (members of the space) in relation to *Others* (the excluded from the space) (Landa, 2002) and, eventually, the space itself.

Based on an observation in Altar, Sonora, Natalia Mendoza states that "there are spaces where *narcotráfico* is deployed more naturally. There are spaces they own, spaces they share and spaces where they are excluded" (Mendoza, 2018: 169). The anthropologist argues that drug trafficking has a clear affinity with the spaces associated to risks and vices, such as gambling and alcohol, while it tends to be discreet within "the church, the school or the domestic space" (Mendoza, 2018: 169). Such a perception relies on two assumptions: 1) that the image of the *narcos* is clear-cut, so they are identifiable and distinguishable from other profiles and; 2) that there are (spatial or symbolic) borders that *narcos* do not dare to cross, thus, they dominate the under-world and remain discreet in the spaces where "normal people" live their "normal lives". While the author recognizes that some spaces are shared by *narcotraficantes* and society, it is not clear how, with whom and under what conditions that occurs. Yet, exploring the Colombian case, Duncan (2011) outlines that *narcos* from their humble origins show a constant interest in gaining access and belonging to the richest social circles. If that is the case, the exclusive sphere of the wealthiest might be an attractive space to conquer "in hopes of carrying out social laundering, while blending in with the high society", as Mexican official sources claim[694].

[694] Fieldwork carnet, (January 26th, 2017). Author's visit to the Psychotropic Substances Museum, Mexico City. The quotation comes from the placard that introduces the room *Narcocultura.* The whole text is available at Text Box 2.5.

Being businessmen, the local notables, who naturally inhabit these privileged social spaces, the intention of *narcos* to be part of them might represent a concern. Thus, if such pretention is read as a threat by the economic elite, they would tend to develop protection mechanisms to temper such risk which is the hypothesis explored in this chapter. It is noteworthy, however, that the incentives and interests driving *narcos* to be part of businessmen's social circles are outside the scope of this research. Since the business sector is the focal point, what is going to be carefully observed is the way these local notables perceive the alleged incursion of the *narco* in their own spaces and how it might or might not unleash protection strategies.

The availability of the information on the matter is a foremost consideration. Reviewing official documents and files such as the mentioned "black lists" might be a way to explore the position of the *Narco* in the business world. However, the difficulty of prosecuting ties between businessmen and *narcos*, along with weakness of Mexican law enforcement to achieve such investigations[695] makes this kind of sources suboptimal. On the other hand, judiciary files may reflect a strictly legalistic perspective that, despite being interesting, would overlook social dynamics worthy of exploring since they characterize shared spaces. Which is why, the chapter is based on businessmen's testimonies collected during fieldwork, under the assumption that beyond the "legal truth", what businessmen's perception reveals is the way they observe, represent, understand and retrieve, through their accounts, the (likely) presence of the narco-elephant in their rooms.

In addition, while sharing their opinions, anecdotes and stories about the *narcos* as part of their daily landscape, businessmen reveal not only the way they see the *Narco* but also the way they perceived their own world.

Certainly, it is possible to argue that, motivated to go unnoticed, *narcos* might keep a low profile, making it difficult for businessmen to observe them within their restrained social circles. Regarding the Sinaloa case, Astorga (1995) argues that even the less informed people of the state have heard about who the *narcos* are and even where they live. The most informed, Astorga considers, have even attended one of their parties. However, not all of them are open to speaking about the subject. In his essay, this influential author does not break up the information such as key variables, neither the conditions that explain the

[695] On this point, see Chapter 3.

decision to remain silent: what kind of information is he making reference to? How is it obtained, selected, restated and transferred to others? How does the available information shape the perception about *narcos* and the possibility to share spaces with them?

Although the questions remain unanswered, what Astorga proposes is useful in this discussion, in at least, two respects: i) the information about *narcos* and their presence is not equally distributed among the diverse social actors and; ii) having similar levels of information, perhaps they did not have the same disposition to share it during the interviews. Since the accounts supporting the following discussion could contain a certain social bias related to desirability [696], they might be restored keeping in mind not only the literal words, but also what such phrases say about the information holder and his willingness to share it.

By systematically exploring businessmen accounts, this chapter demonstrates that the border between the *narco-world* and the upper-world (the businessmen's) is not well defined. Thus, businessmen assume that, despite sharing key social spaces, they are able to protect themselves from the *narco* invasion through informal means such as "keeping distance" from them, retaining the belief that *narcos* are easily distinguishable belonging to another well-defined and remote world. Certainly, such an assumption will be critically analyzed. Moreover, the chapter reveals that *narcos* seem more threatening due to their lack of capacity to transform money with good taste, than their illegal activities or potentially violent behavior.

Three dimensions of businessmen's social relations are reviewed throughout the sections which make up the present chapter. The first one focuses on the potential link that businessmen could establish with *narcos* as part of their professional activity, since *narcos* could become one of their clients, providers or associates. Section two deals with the ties businessmen and *narcos* establish not only due to their professional activity but also because of their social interactions as neighbours, sport club members, classmates, or even friends which potentially solidify these relationships. The last section attempts to explore a more intimate social sphere, namely, family structures, where businessmen and *narcos* could be bound by marriage, melting the apparent demarcation between the *Ego* and the *Other*.

[696] For Social Desirability Bias see the Introduction Footnote 101 in the Introduction.

5.1 *Narcos* as clients, providers or associates

If *narcos* and their families have inhabited Guadalajara since the 1970s, the first interaction between businessmen and *narcos* could have been through the domestic market. As any other citizen, *narcos* might be consumers of products and services provided by local businessmen. Despite being a possibility for almost all of my interlocutors, only two of them made an explicit reference to this relationship, expressing it as a risk and, in consequence, developing an account about how they have dealt with it.

First, Raymundo Chávez, the young agro-industrial businessman who explained the term *buchones* (Chapter 2), said that one of the challenges in launching an enterprise in Guadalajara is that, at a certain point, "everything is mixed", referring to, legal and illegal activities:

> *You can't avoid it! I mean, I can't guarantee… but I have the strong suspicion that* ***some of our clients… plant marijuana*** *or plant… I mean…poppy… I don't know… but marijuana, yes [they do it]. There was a time when some clients used to arrive… with… I don't know,* ***50 thousand, 100 thousand dollars… in cash!*** *… and then… 'I'll take this and that, and that, that, that and that'… and they paid… here, you can take dollars, in cash, directly to the bank. Now that is not possible anymore… which is good! But… then if you ask 'hey, what do you sow? I mean, I'm asking to give you a better recommendation [about products]', and they would answer 'corn', and… so you know that the product [in question] is not for corn, neither this one, nor that other one […] so…* ***first, they are lying****. Second, it is like…* ***they don't really want to talk*** *or say that much and* ***third, they arrive with a wad of bills****… twenty pesos bills… what do you do? Do you sell to them or not? I mean, you don't know how they are going to use [the product], maybe it is really for corn! [laughs] but, I mean… my… little antennas… like those of the* Chapulín Colorado[697]*,* ***my little antennas say that… they are buying that for something different*** *[than corn] and… I can't prohibit it so…* ***what can I do?*** *What am I suppose say?* ***'No, I'm not going to sell anything to you!'… Later they kill my people!*** *And… on the other hand… I'm not sure [they are* narcos*] and, it is the same if they go to an OXXO*[698] *or to restaurants or to WalMart,* ***they are buying everywhere… they are paying…you don't know if they are good or bad people****. Perhaps****, if they enter to a Ferragamo or Hugo Boos*** *[stores]* ***and they pay 100 thousand pesos***[699]*, you wonder 'what do you do for living?',* ***'don't ask!'****, you can suspect, because* ***they are pretty obvious****.*

[697] He is making reference to the very popular TV character "*Chapulín Colorado*" (The Red Cricket), a sort of comical, awkward super-hero (or mostly anti-hero). Among his powers, and as part of his costume, he has a couple of *antenitas de vinil* (little antennas made of plastic) used to detect possible danger and villains. Although created in the early 1970s, the character (as well as others from the same author, Roberto Gómez Bolaños, *Chespirito*) is still very well known in Mexico and the rest of Latin America. For a discussion on the anti-hero figure of "*El Chapulín Colorado"* as a Latin American myth, see Quiceno Vélez, 2010.

[698] OXXO is the largest chain of convenience stores in Mexico. Belonging to world largest Coca-Cola bottling group, FEMSA. OXXO also operates in Colombia, Chile, Peru and USA.

[699] 100 thousand pesos: 5,922 USD, considering that the exchange rate the day of the interview was 16,89 Mexican pesos per dollar (SAT, 2015).

Raymundo Chávez, Agro-Industrial Sector Businessman
Zapopan, Jal., August 29th, 2015
(Q5-1)

Useful as a complement, but also as contrast medium, it is pertinent to evoke the account of Alejandro González, the owner of a medium-size jewellery company, specializing in the design of exclusive pieces and in the management of precious stones, such as diamonds.

> ***I don't have clients who are* mafiosos*!*** *When I started working… in a small workshop, I was in an atelier that* ***I'm sure that use to make… [jewels] for the* mafiosos***. *And yes,* ***it is true that there is a lot of money there****, but it never has a happy ending [laughs], because…* ***I don't think you can trust those kinds of people****, honestly. And no… we are not interested… and there is… money in other kind of jewellery… and you don't have to satisfy a* Mafioso*. At least, this is not the [business] schema that we want to follow. And we have had some opportunities, what do we do to turn them away? … with a lot of…* ***you can't give them a very expensive price, because obviously money is not a problem for them!*** *[I: Right!] So, you have to* hacerle al loco[700] *and then you go 'I can't do that,* ***I'm specialized in other things you wouldn´t like, fine jewels, of good taste,*** *I only know how to do that!', 'No, this is too simple!' 'Well my friend, you can go to a place where they actually do* ***those kind of things…* nacas!***'*[701] *I mean, you don't say it like that, but… and they leave… […] and all of us dealing with clients, we have a lot of tact…* ***to deal with… these kinds of people.*** *And they arrive… and* ***we can't guarantee that they are… [*mafiosos*] or not… but there is a stereotype of people****, which is* ***currently very trendy****, … we are not interested in them. Other jewellery stores yes… they love those kinds of clients, because they arrive with this idea of* ***paying in cash****, etcetera… Cash is not useful for me…[…] then, 'hey, may I pay you by cash… in dollars?' 'Of course not!' 'May I pay by cash… in pesos', 'Of course, if it is more than 32,000 pesos*[702]*, I need your ID and a proof of address' 'why?' 'Because, there is an anti-money laundering measure!', 'Then… no [I won´t buy here]' 'OK, bye! I didn't say 'no'… [you decided by] yourself'… so, it is complicated, but…* ***once you like this kind of money… ya valió madres!***[703]
>
> Alejandro González, Commerce Sector Businessman
> Guadalajara, Jal., August 28th, 2015
> *(Q5-2)*

In both cases, *narcos* are identified as potential clients, but while Raymundo Chávez considers there is nothing to be done about it, Alejandro González categorically states that he does not accept having *narcos* as his clients. Both assume that a frontier exists yet a key difference between these accounts is the way they visualize the border that allegedly separates the upper and under-world. González claims that this border is significant and if

[700] To pretend to be distracted or to pretend to not understand what is happening (DEM, 2017).
[701] *Naco* is a colloquial and offensive adjective that refers something indigenous, or someone with poor education, taste or style (DEM, 2017).
[702] 32 thousand pesos: 1,870 USD, considering that the exchange rate the day of the interview was 17,10 Mexican pesos per dollar (SAT, 2017).
[703] Although it could be interpreted as not caring about something or have little or any value (valer madre) (DEM, 2017). In this context, he is using the expression as "Everything is over, there's no turning back".

there is a gate that can be opened, it must be managed from the businessman's side. Chávez, on the other hand, indirectly evoked violence as the key forcing businessmen to accept them as clients[704].

Reading these accounts jointly, it is clearly possible to consider that the marijuana farmer as much as the drug lord could be called a *narco* (Astorga, 1995; Astorga, 2007). Chávez builds his account using the image of someone he believes could be a marijuana or poppy grower, while González mainly infers his conception of a drug lord. Both, however, assume that they are likely dealing with *narcos.* Chávez exalts the term throughout his narrative assigning the *narco* affiliation to buyers (farmers) as well as *buchones* or the well-known *capos*, as stated before.

Even if different actors in the drug trafficking chain may be labelled as being *narcos,* it is important to point out that according to these businessmen, there are explicit signals suggesting that a (potential) client is also a *narco*, although both admit that it is not possible to be certain. Enlisting these features, they are indirectly drawing their own image of a *narco*. That figure is close to the archetype largely discussed before, in other words, a peasant like appearance, exorbitant amounts of cash to spend, wearing jewellery and expensive clothes, yet showing no good manners or class.

In fact, *narcos* are commonly seen as *nacos*. The description that Elaine Shannon (2015) [1988] made regarding Rafael Caro Quintero and Ernesto Fonseca or the epitome sketched at the *Museo de los Enervantes,* both evoked in Chapter 2*,* remain valid in light of Alejandro González words[705]. Although *narcos* seems to have a particular fondness for expensive jewellery, their money to spare is attached to their bad taste. González does not hesitate to use a derogatory term such as *naco*, outlining *narco* propensity to purchase such jewellery. For Chávez, on the other hand, the same picture is represented by these characters spending significant amounts of money on luxury brands. Why do both businessmen point out the tasteless profile of *narcos* as consumers? This viewpoint stands in contrast with the minimal attention they concede to the potential use of violence that these characters are able to exert. Raymundo Chávez barely mentioned it while he proceeded to refer to the vulgar manners

[704] Such difference might explain that the agro-industrialist went far beyond explaining about the *narco* presence in his entourage, probably because he accepted that his margin to maneuver was reduced.
[705] Even if in the previous quote Raymundo Chávez does not explicitly use the adjective *naco* to refer *narcos,* he does it at certain point of the interview, as will be shown later in the Chapter.

which they behave. It seems that the *naco* rather than the *narco* aspect of their potential clients is what mostly disturbs businessmen, the disengagement between money and proper manners.

In this matter, a clue to follow is the fact that, among businessmen, the criticism of ostentatious manners is not exclusively addressed towards *narcos*. For instance, referring to the so-called new rich within the business sector, the industrialist Héctor L. Orta said:

> *There are other kinds of businessmen, I can give you some names and* ***I hope you don't interview them!*** *[laughs] If you see them****, they are wearing huge diamond rings… and a lot of gold bracelets and a gold watch****… and you say 'let's see, what he is trying to show me! Power? Strength?'* ***But this is not normal!*** *Thus, they don't need to say a word. If I see a businessman who arrives in a convertible Rolls Royce, I think like* ***'it is fine to come by car, he doesn´t have to come by foot, but he came to show off his Rolls Royce****, he wants to be seen because he has a lot of money, because he feels he is very important […] or you go to a restaurant with friends and you hear them [the new rich]saying 'bring me the most expensive wine!',* ***the most expensive wine is not always the best wine****, there are many good wines that are not that expensive! I don't need to ask… he is a businessman with power and money, but* ***one who is twisting the sense of having power and money.***
>
> Héctor L. Orta, Industrial Sector
> Zapopan, Jal., September 3rd, 2015
> *(Q5-3)*

As it may be grasped from the prior quote, the lack of taste attributed to both newly rich businessmen and *narcos* is belittled by someone who has the means to acquire luxury goods but also the knowledge to select good wine based on something other than its price. Rather than being able to acquire the same brands and products that local notables do, what results regrettable is the way they go about it.

In this sense, it must be pointed out that identifying consumption patterns has long served to differentiate social class. In his classic *Theory of the Leisure Class*, Veblen (2014) [1899] argues that the non-productive (leisure) class reinforces its status or recognition by others through conspicuous consumption[706]. Thus, privileged classes purchase goods and show them off to make a statement about their social position. Actually, Veblen considers the way individuals dress to be one of the clearest and most visible ways to make explicit one's

[706] The reader must notice that, according to Veblen (2014) [1899] those who worked doing physical labour to transform and produce goods were part of the lower classes. To the upper classes were reserved, in contrast, the non-productive (more contemplative) activities, such as the army, church, government and sports and that is why the name this privileged group as 'leisure class'.

capacity to possess goods (pecuniary emulation). The transformation of the production model towards mass-production, still dominant nowadays, and the emergence of the middle-class entails that "conspicuous consumption is no longer confined to the echelons of the elite". (Currid-Halkett, 2017: 10) Therefore, as more goods are produced, more people are able to acquire them (either authentic or apocryphal versions). Despite this sort of democratization of conspicuous consumption, consumer patterns are still signifiers of class position.

According to Elizabeth Currid-Halkett (2017) Velben's leisure class has been substituted by the so-called "aspirational class". The elite aspect of this class, which fosters the values of work and effort, does not manifest its privileged position through owning material goods but by granting a cultural signifier to their acquisitions[707]. Thereby, to purchase certain goods rather than others conveys the message that in contrast to the new rich, the elite have knowledge, information and a system of value (ecological concerns, for instance) that inspire their (likely expensive) acquisitions.

From the precedent approach, businessmen's judgmental opinion regarding *narcos-nacos* has an air of class division.

Regardless, as potential clients, *narcos* are seen as a threat only to the extent to which they must be identified and kept away from business affairs. Although most businessmen agree on the idea that *narcos* have an obviously distinguishable profile, the image of a *narco* is still associated with a certain clandestine or discreet side. For instance, when Raymundo Chávez mentions that farmers who might also be *narcos* do not seem able to talk about their job (or, in this case, their plantations), he considers this a possibility[708]. Perhaps, that is why Chávez evokes the image of the "little plastic antennas" of the popular character *Chapulín Colorado*[709], to refer a sort of sixth sense that is needed to detect who is who in a society where, as he said, "everything is mixed". Yet once they are aware that a *narco* could become one of their clients, how do they deal with it?

[707] Certainly, Currid-Halkett is building on the notion of "cultural capital" coined by Pierre Bourdieu (2000) which refers to inherited or gained skills, knowledge or education that a person (agent) is able to accumulate granting him social status. Cultural capital can exist in three forms: *i*) Embodied (*habitus*); *ii*) objectified (cultural goods) and; *iii*) institutionalized (educational qualifications).
[708] It must be noticed that this feature coincides with the Uber driver's (José) account on Caro Quintero's people buying a Grand Marquis from him in the 1980s, evoked in Chapter 2.
[709] See footnote 697 in this Chapter.

In his narrative, Alejandro González was clearly pointing out that all doors must be closed to *mafiosos*, as he called them. Besides pretending he is not trained to manufacture the pieces of jewellery the *narcos-nacos* prefer, he also shared two other methods to protect his business from "those kinds of clients": 1) he only works for people he knows, stating that "not everyone can be your client". He describes how his mother's friends contact him through their social circles and then put him in contact with their friends, and so on, illustrating how he gets most of his customers; 2) he keeps track of every client by using a sort of "family tree", as he names it, where he and his staff trace who recommended or put them in contact[710].

Such handcrafted methods of protection seem only imaginable in a small-scale company where every element relies on the notion of exclusivity. His diamonds are, by definition, not accessible to everyone, so his business model works, somehow, as a protection mechanism. Furthermore, in Alejandro's case, it is possible to argue that social capital is the scaffolding of his customer portfolio as much as the filter he needs to avoid *narcos* among his clients.

Considering social capital as a resource "inheres in the structure of relations between persons and among persons" which enables certain actions of those within the structure (Coleman, 1990: 302), Alejandro González illustrates how social capital is a useful resource not only to allure potential clients to his enterprise, but also to allegedly keep *narcos* far from his exclusive group of consumers. Thus, trusting his mother's friend he is, somehow, trusting the members of her social circle. Indeed, interpersonal trust is one of the main dimensions commonly attributed to social capital as well as the expectation of correct behaviour by other members of a specific social group (Putnam, 2000; Coleman, 1990)[711]. In other words, social capital acts as a sort of shortcut to filter potential clients.

Paradoxically, two of Gonzalez's assumptions could jeopardize his explicit decision to avoid *narcos*. First, *narcos* are stereotyped in such a way that he excludes the possibility of having white-collar *narcos* with exquisite taste buying gemstones from him. The questionable nature of the *narco* archetypical image discussed in Chapter 2 make this a likely scenario. This is directly related to the second assumption which is his perception that a clear division exists between *narcos* and his network not allowing him to consider that *narcos* could be included

[710] Interview conducted with Alejandro González, Commerce Sector Businessman. (August 28th, 2015). Guadalajara, Jal.
[711] For a general review on the notion of *Trust* within Social Capital theory and theorists see Bagnasco, 2004.

among his acquaintances. Put simply, he neglects that the "tree" he proudly evoked as a protection tool, could have some "rotten apples", or branches. He could be even doing business in the "rotten woods"[712].

Raymundo Chávez reiterates that having *narcos* as clients is a high risk in Guadalajara since they are there, paying for goods and services as any other consumer. To avoid them, it seems that visiting only the most exclusive boutiques could be an alternative; however, ironically, those shops could be the most interested in having them as costumers. Gilberto Fuentes, a young industrial entrepreneur[713] comments: "I have personally seen it, you go to very recognized brands [stores] and they close the boutique to please those kinds of people! And they go there and spend 500 thousand pesos[714] in *Gucci* or *Louis Vuitton* at *Andares*[715]… it is depressing!"

Another bond that could be established between *narcos* and businessmen is becoming partners in the same business, either deliberately or forcefully. Whether being shareholders of the same company or businessmen acting as frontmen of the *Narco*, these characters could be associated.

This type of rapport has been visible on the media, at least, for as long as the *Guadalajara Cartel* has appeared in the press. Returning to the detention of Rafael Caro Quintero, Ernesto Fonseca "Don Neto" and Félix Gallardo, widely discussed in Chapter 2, that case also sheds light on the importance of businessmen to the entrenchment of *narcos Sinaloenses* in Guadalajara.

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[712] I avail myself the opportunity that the "family tree" metaphor offers to anticipate, ironically, the image of the "rotten apples" as part of the tree. The "rotten apples" perspective is an individual level-explanation for deviance, commonly used to explain crime occurrence or police corruption. This approach considers the misconduct as isolated incidents, resulting from an individual decision (the rotten apples in a basket infect others). Although it was a very popular interpretation for police corruption in the early 20th Century, in the 1960s and 1970s a more complex explanation was granted. Police deviant behavior as encouraged by systematic factors more than as an individual decision was considered (the rotten barrel) (Cooper, 2015; Sabet, 2012). For that reason, beyond the "rotten apples", I evoke the potential "rotten branches" and "rotten wood" that could be behind Alejandro González clients' "family tree".

[713] Interview conducted with Gilberto Fuentes, Industrial sector. (January 16th, 2017). Tlajomulco, Jal.

[714] 500 thousand pesos: 23,020 USD, considering that the exchange rate the day of the interview was 21,72 Mexican pesos per dollar (SAT, 2015).

[715] *Andares* is the most exclusive mall in Guadalajara. It is known because upper-class young people, *narcos* and both bodyguards fill the place every weekend. (Interview conducted with Rosa María Cortés, Private Security Company owner. [August 28th, 2015]. Guadalajara, Jal.; Interview conducted with Macedonio Tamez, Public Servant. [February 23th, 2017]. Mexico City; Fieldwork carnet notes. October 9th, 2015).

When Caro Quintero was finally arrested, the judiciary investigation revealed that he had run away with the support of the Federal Judicial Police Commander and a DFS agent, leaving Guadalajara by plane. Following that lead, the investigation found that the jet Caro Quintero had used belonged to the brothers Eduardo and Javier Cordero Stauffer, prominent *Tapatio* businessmen and alleged partners of Caro Quintero in different companies. The Cordero Stauffer siblings were apprehended in April 1985 for being Caro Quintero's accomplices in investing ill-gotten money in different business[716]. Their judicial declarations would disclose more details about such partnership.

The Cordero Stauffer brothers were considered among those holding the greatest fortunes in the city during the early 1980s. They founded a diversity of enterprises, such as real estate agencies, a fixed-wing aircraft company (import, sale and operation), tourism development agencies, hotels, and a car dealership (*Ford Motor Co.*) among others. According to their own declarations, the approximate value of the companies where the Cordero Stauffer brothers and Caro Quintero were associated in 1985 was around 10,000 million pesos[717]. To put it into perspective, that amount represents 66% of the Federal Expenditure Budget programmed for the whole Judicial Power that year[718].

Yet Carlos Lozano, former Jalisco Secretary of Tourism (1993) and head of a business association, stated that his friends, the Cordero Stauffer brothers, had acquired their wealth many years prior in the shoemaking industry[719]. According to the weekly *Proceso* inquiry, six of their main companies had been founded between July 1980 and December 1981[720]. Not only does this imply an unusual speed in establishing an enterprise, but also it coincides with the time frame that, according to the chronologies, the *Guadalajara Cartel* was establishing itself in the city.

Whereas no members of the Cordero Stauffer family were actively participating within the local business associations or chambers, they were certainly part of the *Tapatio* upper-class,

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716 "Su captura, golpe al centro del narcotráfico". (April 5th, 1985). *Proceso*, (440).
717 "Demanda Guadalajara: que la pesquisa llegue a los capos de cuello blanco". (April 13th, 1985). *Proceso,* (441); "Puso a Banpacífico al servicio de Félix Gallardo". (January 30th, 1993). *Proceso,* (848).
718 The Federal Expenditure Budget for the Judicial Power in 1985 was 15,168,687,000 pesos (Presupuesto de Egresos de la Federación para el Ejercicio Fiscal de 1985. (December 31st, 1984). *Diario Oficial de la Federación*.
719 "Los hermanos Cordero, socios de Valenzuela, ya están fuera". (January 30th, 1993). *Proceso,* (848).
720 "El expresidente de los banqueros, Arcadio Valenzuela, socio en cuatro de las presuntas 'lavadoras' de Caro". (April 13th, 1985). *Proceso*, (441).

appearing in photographs within the "society pages", as well as with Ministers and high-level public officials[721].

The reaction of the business sector regarding the Cordero Stauffer brothers' detention and subsequent scandal was not consistent. Well-known businessmen and friends of the siblings stated that it was necessary to wait the judicial process before judging them, while some business associations rush into making it clear that "generic and irresponsible" assumptions that the whole business sector should be avoided[722]. Other businessmen leaders and chambers remained silent around the case[723].

The brothers were released almost 18 months later and continued running their enterprises. However, at the beginning of President Carlos Salinas de Gortari's administration (1988-1994) they were arrested again, this time under tax-evasion charges. After paying a financial penalty, they recovered their freedom[724].

Despite the fact that the Cordero Stauffer brothers were the most recalled during the Caro Quintero-Camarena scandal, they were not the only businessmen involved with the alleged *Guadalajara Cartel* leaders. Another figure mentioned was Arcadio Valenzuela, former president of the Bankers Association (1980-1982), son of a wealthy industrialist in Sonora and approved as a PRI pre-candidate for the Sonora gubernatorial election in 1985. As leader of the bankers, he had a good relationship with the then-President José López Portillo (1976-1982) and the Jalisco Governor Flavio Romero de Velasco (1977-1983)[725]. With the latter, the relationship with the banker was not circumscribed to the public arena, as they had been partners on the tennis court[726].

Arcadio Valenzuela was never called to testify and his name remained virtually unnoticed during Caro Quintero and Ernesto Fonseca's legal proceedings[727], but in fact, he had shares

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721 "Demanda Guadalajara: que la pesquisa llegue a los capos de cuello blanco". (April 13th, 1985). *Proceso,* (441). A point on photography as a space to share will be developed later in the chapter.
722 *Idem.*
723 Gazette Bank of Images 1970-2016; "Demanda Guadalajara: que la pesquisa llegue a los capos de cuello blanco". (April 13th, 1985). *Proceso,* (441).
724 "Los hermanos Cordero, socios de Valenzuela, ya están fuera". (January 30th, 1993). *Proceso,* (848).
725 The former Governor Romero de Velasco was arrested in 1998 for allegedly having collusive ties with the *narcotráfico*. He was released in 2001, after President Ernesto Zedillo completed his administration period. His detention has also been read as a sample of PRI inner-tensions. ("Flavio Romero de Velasco: Pros y contras". (July 16th, 2016). *Proceso*, (2072).
726 "Puso a Banpacífico al servicio de Félix Gallardo y Caro Quintero". (January 30th, 1993). *Proceso,* (848).
727 *Idem.*

in four of the companies that Caro Quintero allegedly used to laundry the illegitimate money[728] and was a business partner of the Cordero Stauffer siblings[729].

The DEA also claimed that Valenzuela's secular membership to the religious order *Opus Dei* enabled him to invest drug trafficking money in different companies owned by his fellow believers[730]. It must be considered that, in Mexico, *Opus Dei's* strongest links with society rely on the private sector. Thus, businessmen who belong to the order have had a strong impact on the whole sector and in the government, which coincides with the order's objective of placing its members in important positions. In Guadalajara, particularly, the influential Cardinal José Garibi Rivera[731] supported the order (Camp, 1997). Thus, Arcadio Valenzuela's ties within the religious order also might incorporate some important local figures into the *narcotráfico* money flow.

Valenzuela also represented a sample of the alleged presence of Guadalajara Cartel leaders in the banking sector, as he was the owner of the extinct bank *Banpacífico.* In 1981, he sold his bank shares, although he kept his chair on the Bank Council, even after the sector's nationalization in 1982[732]. One of the share buyers was Miguel Ángel Félix Gallardo[733]. The allegedly leader of the Guadalajara Cartel was also a member of the *Banco Mexicano Somex* board at the state level and distinguished account holder at the National level[734]. Thus, owning a regional bank and as bank board members, the *narco* was able to make convenient financial operations with a lot of room to manoeuvre.

Recapitulating the case of the Cordero Stauffer brothers and Arcadio Valenzuela who were private sector members allegedly involved with Caro Quintero and Félix Gallardo, it is

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[728] "El Expresidente de los banqueros, Arcadio Valenzuela, socio en cuatro de las presuntas 'lavadoras' de Caro". (April 13th, 1985). *Proceso*, (441).
[729] The distribution of the shares in every company as well as the names of other partners are available at "El Expresidente de los banqueros, Arcadio Valenzuela, socio en cuatro de las presuntas 'lavadoras' de Caro". (April 13th, 1985). *Proceso*, (441).
[730] "Puso a Banpacífico al servicio de Félix Gallardo y Caro Quintero". (January 30th, 1993). *Proceso,* (848).
[731] José Garibi Rivera was the first Mexican to be appointed Cardinal. He was the Cardinal from 1958 to 1969, although his influence in Guadalajara was extended until his death in 1972. As explained in the Introduction, his ties with the *Tapatio* business sector seem strong according to the *Gaceta Mercantil,* which reflects how every year the Governing Board of the Chamber of Commerce used to visit the Jalisco State authorities, namely, the Governor, Guadalajara and Zapopan mayors and the Cardinal Garibi Rivera (Gazette Bank of Images 1970-2016).
[732] See footnote 34 in Introduction.
[733] "Puso a Banpacífico al servicio de Félix Gallardo y Caro Quintero". (January 30th, 1993). *Proceso,* (848). On Félix Gallardo's profile, see Chapter 2.
[734] "Eran accionistas y se les nombró por su solvencia moral". (March 30th, 1985). *Proceso,* (439).

possible to claim that this border between narcos and businessmen the clear frontier that the young businessmen interviewed, Alejandro González and Raymundo Chávez, assume as exceptionally jeopardized by collusion or violence is, and has historically been, significantly blurry.

Regarding such porosity, the relationship established between businessmen and *narcos* more than sporadic and based on one exercising power over the other (through violence or any other mechanism) could be of reciprocal and stable nature in the long term. National and local political elites may play an important role in such dynamic. Thus, the underworld penetrating the upper-world through bribes and threats (illustrated earlier in Figure 2.5) seems to be a very limited vision of a more intricate system of relationships.

Deeply analysing the "penetration into politics of violent underworld figures and greedy business tycoons and the inevitable subsequent social ills such as vote buying, political violence, insider trading, bid rigging and official (and unofficial) corruption" (Chin, 2003: 5) for the Taiwan case, Ko-lin Chin (2003) suggests that members of the business sector, politicians and gangsters have their own reasons to converge on daily bases with the other figures and, doing so, that penetration (also called *Heijn* politics or "black-gold politics"[735]) is developed and becomes an entity. Everyone collaborates in the alliance to enhance their competitive advantages in their own field. To schematize the co-mingling between the members of those three groups, Chin emphasized the pattern of exchange these characters establish (Figure 5.2).

The "Black-gold politics" schema left behind the idea of two clearly separate worlds to embrace a more regular and reciprocal exchange pattern. However, it has two potential limitations. First, it suggests that a certain hierarchical order among the actors is still present, in this case, politicians are at the top of the triangle but, as discussed in Chapter 2, it is not clear if *narcos* are subordinated or not to the other figures. Second, although Chin (2003) recognizes that a gang member could become a congressman or a company owner, the affiliations as politicians, businessmen or *narcos* remain exclusive titles, although they may not be clearly delimited and mutually exclusive, as has been discussed in Chapter 4. Taking Arcadio Valenzuela as an example, it is possible to argue that the banker, who also had

[735] According to Chin (2003) in Taiwan the word *hei* (literally "black") is used to name the underworld, while *jin* (literally "gold") is the way to evoke money or business.

political aspirations at a particular moment, would be considered a *narco*, since he accumulated profit via the drug trafficking industry.

Figure 5.2 "Black-gold politics": a representation of the nexus between gangsters, businessmen and politicians



Source: Chin, 2003: 17.

If anything, this challenges yet again the limits of the title *narco* (businessman or politician) and the whole archetype. In addition, it raises a central question: within the private sector in Guadalajara, does a businessman who has been linked to the *Narco* become a *narco* or is he considered one to be affiliated with them?

To explore a possible answer to the previous question, it is feasible to turn to the so-called blacklists, evoked earlier. These lists are a sort of targeted sanction "which bans from travel and freezes the assets of specific individuals or organizations on the basis of the suspicion that they are involved in the financing or facilitation of terrorism" or organized crime (de Goede, 2011: 499). Among others, the blacklists are one of the current strategies on the fight against terrorism that gained importance all over the world, especially after the 9/11 attacks in the United States (Amicelle and Favarel-Garrigues, 2009).

Many different implications regarding the blacklists could be, and have been, discussed. For instance, this kind of instrument shows the weight of the North American agenda and the practices to define (and conduct) actions to fight against terrorism, or any other threat, all

over the world, since the lists include foreign people or entities unilaterally considered to be related to terrorism or drug trafficking. It also shows how they are based on suspicion or are likely biased, since they might not be supported by conclusive evidence but rather by stereotypes associated to certain countries or profiles. These lists which lack transparency tend to point out individuals or institutions. What used to be a sanction against countries became a sanction against individuals and private entities. In that extent, the lists could be used as a political instrument rather than a tool against organized crime[736]. It is also important to consider that blacklisting might jeopardize sovereign legal frameworks and could violate individuals' fundamental rights, such as right to personal privacy or the right to a hearing (Amicelle and Favarel-Garrigues, 2009).

Since blacklists aim to prevent a potential wrongdoing (pre-crime logic), they rely on the naming and shaming principles to deter terrorism or organized crime support (de Goede, 2011; Amicelle and Favarel-Garrigues, 2009). When it comes to reintegration, community participation on shaming offenders has been considered a robust mechanism of informal social control, even more effective than formal punishment, but mostly under two conditions: 1) in contexts where offenders have something to lose in terms of social standing and respectability while being pointed out; 2) as long as shaming does not result in stigmatization (Braithwaite, 1989).

Based on its pre-emptive nature, blacklisting might have a "symbolic function of banishment and exclusion, which simultaneously redraws the boundaries around normal, valued, ways of life" (de Goede, 2011: 500). Since being listed implied being shamed but not protected by the rights of a formal trial, blacklisting has been described as "a modern practice of banishment" (de Goede, 2011: 502) that affects not only the person listed but also their relatives and associates. Although those pointed-out could be eventually delisted, to demonstrate no ties to terrorism or organized crime, this requires the mobilization of the resources that are normally frozen. At the limit, to be included on a blacklist could constitute a sort of "civilian death" (de Goede, 2011; Amicelle and Favarel-Garrigues, 2009) especially if the person named is not able to restore his reputation.

[736] Aristegui, C. [Aristegui Noticias]. (August 10th, 2017). *Escándalo Julión Álvarez y Rafael Márquez involucra a diputado de Morena*. *Interview with Jorge Lara Rivera, Federal Assistant Attorney* [Video Archive]. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SU2-niD42B4&feature=youtu.be.

Among the various lists that enumerate people and companies that are allegedly related to terrorism and drug trafficking, the most important is the one published by the OFAC, which served as the opening of this chapter.

The annual publication of the OFAC report normally sheds lights on Guadalajara, since the city has appeared several times. For instance, 156 out of 300 companies (52%) included on the list published in 2017 were settled in Jalisco, mostly in Zapopan and Guadalajara, but also in Puerto Vallarta and Tlajomulco[737]. Considering the proportion of cases that have steered attention towards Guadalajara, to what extent do businessmen employ OFAC lists as a mechanism to identify (and keep away) from *narcos* or money launders? Once being part of these blacklists, does it represent the shaming and civil death for *Tapatio* businessmen? Contrary to what has been documented in other contexts (de Goede, 2011), in Guadalajara the accusations formulated by the US Treasury Office seem to have little echo among businessmen.

According to the former Federal Assistant Attorney Jorge Lara Rivera, for many years the OFAC list was almost irrelevant in Mexico as it was elaborated unilaterally for US Government and it does not entail criminal prosecution. That pattern changed after the adoption of a legal framework on money laundering around 2008, where the OFAC list gained relevance[738]. As related with their sector and their main professional activity, it could be expected that *Tapatio* businessmen would have the OFAC accusations at the forefront of their minds. However, during the fieldwork, blacklists were only mentioned in eight of the 65 interviews, half of which were not conducted with businessmen, but with journalists. Put in other terms, while all the journalists interviewed mentioned the US Treasury Office accusations at one moment of the conversation, it was barely evoked among businessmen[739].

Considering the few times blacklists were mentioned, it must be highlighted that all of them emerged while speaking about the likely presence of people related to the *Narco* among their peers or in the private sector in general. However, there is not a clear profile of those who

[737] "Diversifican 'lavaderos': penetra narco en amplios sectores económicos". (August 15th, 2017). *Reforma.*
[738] Aristegui, C. [Aristegui Noticias]. (August 10th, 2017). *Escándalo Julión Álvarez y Rafael Márquez involucra a diputado de Morena*. *Interview with Jorge Lara Rivera, Federal Assistant Attorney* [Video Archive]. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SU2-niD42B4&feature=youtu.be.
[739] Since almost all the interviews were conducted before August 2017, it is possible to consider that having carried out a round of conversations while the media scandal of the soccer player and the popular singer was at its peak, could increase the mention around the lists. However, that assumption could be applied to any other citizens' profile (not exclusively businessmen).

evoked "the listed". It could have been the inheritor of a large-industry in his fifties, a 70 year old industrialist with a long-standing company founded by himself, one of the few women recognized as a successful industrialist or a young businessman running marketing and publicity companies. Their perception, not only of the OFAC lists but of what they revealed regarding their sector, is also diverse.

> *Somehow, I think, that kind of money [ill-gotten] is not* ***… not very visible****… right? They are hidden… so, to define who has this kind of… [financial] support is… the authority's role […]. Recently… here… many times you know, for instance,* ***because of the publications made by the American government****, right? 'DEA outlined or point out… some companies…dedicated to commerce or industry, dedicated to services, dedicated to hotel industry', right? And then you say 'well, look'…maybe****… you don't know… what is going on there****. But yes… it is surely a complex subject, complicated and difficult to detect*
>
> Carlos Solano, Industrial Sector Businessman
> Zapopan, Jal., October 8th, 2015
> *(Q5-4)*

> *I mean****, it's difficult to say that a well-known businessman in Guadalajara is involved in illicit activities****… very difficult…* ***all those who have appeared*** *at [blacklists]… that… [are allegedly involved in] money laundering…* ***nobody knows them!*** *[I: They aren't known] I don't know them.*
>
> José Gerardo Zapata, Industrial Sector Businessmen
> Zapopan, Jal., September 1st, 2015
> *(Q5-5)*

> ***It's like a taboo****, you see? The issue is never addressed [within business sector] and* ***if it*** **sale a flote**[740]*, people keep quiet, not saying anything! And we see it in the newspapers, the reports: 'so-and-so company that was into money laundering and so, but we keep quiet. [I: recently, for instance, it was published the US government list…][she interrupts] Yes! Nobody comments on that,* ***not one word about it!****, look how peculiar. It's like…* ***if we were afraid****, because* ***you don't immediately know****… if [the indicted] is [anyone's] relative, right?*
>
> Josefa Domínguez, Industrial Sector Businesswoman
> Zapopan, Jal., October 14th, 2015
> *(Q5-6)*

> *But, the sad truth is that… it* ***is not that simple*** *[to identify them]****!*** *Because they [narcos] are clever, they use frontmen, they are money launderers… then it* ***is not that easy to detect them****, or sometimes, there are people…* ***the lists, where they come up with stories 'he… [is involved in] money laundry, the*** **narco** ***is pumping money' … and they are not… or you don't know*** *[…] And then, you don't really know, you don't know if the businessman who is… first of all,* ***the businessman who wants to invest [in your business] or… if he is bringing dirty money****, he, directly or… if someone else is pumping [dirty money] and he didn't know and then you come to him, and you think he is good, but… I mean, it's quite complicated! Right?*

[740] The emergence of an emotion or attitude that use to be hidden or repressed (DEM, 2017).

For the interlocutors, the clandestine nature of these activities makes it difficult, almost impossible, for businessmen to distinguish, among their peers, who are possibly related to *Narco* activities. Thus, as a businessman, you are not able to have certainty and the cases must "salir a flote" or come to light, mostly through the media or the blacklists which can also lead to doubt among the sector.

Although Carlos Solano and José Gerardo Zapata recognize that the accusations exist, for them, the US Treasury Office lists are not irrefutable evidence of culpability. Even if that is accurate from the legal perspective, businessmen's arguments do not seem purely legalist. Being true, in order for Solano, to clarify if someone is involved in an illicit business must be determined by the criminal authority. Such claim has to be understood in the light that law enforcement agencies face a significant lack of trust, as has been discussed in Chapter 3. In other words, more than showing an unusual amount of trust in the authority, Solano seems to be justifying how difficult, and perhaps, inappropriate, it could be for businessmen to consider that someone is close to the *Narco* based on the blacklist.

Even further, Manuel Gómez suggests that an innocent individual could be accused which is referred to as a false positive, (Amicelle and Favarel-Garrigues, 2009) or, in some cases, businessmen involved in *Narco's* finances could be somehow ambushed, not having direct bonds with *narcos*, but being legally related to someone that is illegally linked to them. In the business world, the former Assistant Attorney Jorge Lara considers people can always be invited to be associated within a project or someone could pay them for a service or a debt through company shares[741]. In other words, a businessman could be related to the *Narco* due to negligent behaviour or through a connection with someone who is actually linked with ill-gotten money. That last schema, which has been described as "informal/illegal organizational structures" (Cano, 2016)[742], is useful to outline that, on the one hand, uncertainty relativizes

[741] Aristegui, C. [Aristegui Noticias]. (August 10th, 2017). *Escándalo Julión Álvarez y Rafael Márquez involucra a diputado de Morena*. *Interview with Jorge Lara Rivera, Federal Assistant Attorney* [Video Archive]. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SU2-niD42B4&feature=youtu.be.

[742] Regarding violence management and the construction of political markets associated to land-ownership issues in Colombia, Rodolfo Cano (2016) coins the notion of *informal/illegal organizational structures* (*complejos organizacionales informales/ilegales)* to refer the schemas in which one provider is illegally (or informally) related to violent actors on the one side, and legally (or informally) related with another market's

businessmen's responsibility in taking part in illicit operations and, on the other hand, might open different mechanisms, or strategies, to avoid being implicated in these kinds of activities.

José Gerardo Zapata, is emphatic in saying that businessmen enlisted as suspects by the OFAC are mostly unknown. That could be associated to the fact that some of the listed companies are relatively new (and unknown) on the market, especially if they are created only as illegitimate money washing machines. Furthermore, Zapata's account calls attention to how he indirectly states that the circle of businessmen to which he belongs has never been part of those lists, assuming that, if the US agencies' conclusions are correct, they are not making reference to his peers, but to another kind of businessmen, far from him and his circles. Such statement, however, contrasts with the perception of Josefa Domínguez. Although her reference to the blacklists is related to the interview previously mentioned, what is more significant in the businesswoman's account is the number of times she evokes silence as the common reaction of the sector. "A taboo", she said, a sort of open secret that is not subject of discussion, at least, not outspoken. For her, when media force the sector to face the likely presence of *narcos* among them, silence is mostly the result of clever behaviour, since you never know if one of your peers is, in fact, related to one who is being pointed out. In contrast to Zapata, who considers his own circle to have been cleansed, Domínguez anticipates that it is hard to establish where the the dirt collects.

The precedent examples suggest that the capacity of blacklisting to effectively banish or exclude someone from a social space such as a businessmen's circle is conditioned to, at least, three factors: 1) the extent to which the list is spread and known among the peers of those being pointed out. If the list remains within the journalistic debate but is not present within businessmen's discussion, it could be less effective as a shaming tool[743]; 2) the level of trust that peers grant to the blacklist, either due to the issuer's reputation or because

members on the other side. Then, the latest are indirectly related with the violent actors through a secondary figure.

[743] Mexico has its own list elaborated by the Finance Intelligence Unit (UIF) attached to the Ministry of Finances (SHCP). Nurtured by the information exchange agreements settled between Mexico and US governments, the list includes people and entities allegedly related with drug trafficking. However, the Mexican blacklist is only distributed among financial institutions rather than among public at large (Aristegui, C. [Aristegui Noticias]. (August 10th, 2017). *Escándalo Julión Álvarez y Rafael Márquez involucra a diputado de Morena*. *Interview with Jorge Lara Rivera, Federal Assistant Attorney* [Video Archive]. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SU2-niD42B4&feature=youtu.be). That might contribute to explain that within *Tapatio* business sector blacklists are not widely known.

businessmen do not necessarily recognize the named as part of their sector. In other words, how to exclude someone who is not actually seen as being part of the sector?; 3) how feasible is it, for peers, to explicitly participate in the process of shaming and eventually excluding the person included on the list.

Considering these factors, Guadalajara hardly seems a context where a businessman included on a blacklist might face a sort of "civil death . A very illustrative example of such statement might be the case of the businessman and politician Carlos Lomelí Bolaños[744] who, despite being included on the OFAC list in 2008, at the time of writing he was appointed by the President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (2018-2024) as Federal Government delegate in Jalisco (Text Box 5.1).

Text Box 5.1 The Lomelí Bolaños' case: from blacklisted to "superdelegate"

In October 3, 2008, the headline of the local newspaper *Mural* accounted that the US Government had pointed out the *Tapatio* pharmaceutical company *Grupo Collins* as being *narcos.* Infringing fair trial guarantees, the newspaper illustrated the article with names and pictures, contributing to the shaming process associated to blacklisting.

***Mural* newspaper illustrates US Treasury Department accusations**



Source: "Acusa EU de narco a laboratorio tapatío". (October 3rd, 2008). *Mural*. Carlos Lomelí Bolaños (Lomedic) in appears in the third picture from left-to-right.

Although the blacklists normally are built on uncertain information, suppositions and conjectures (de Goede, 2011; Amicelle and Favarel-Garrigues, 2009), this time the Department of the Treasury highlighted a clearer link between the business sector and drug trafficking: *Grupo Collins* and another three laboratories might be providing to a Cartel the commodities to produce methamphetamine. Among the companies pointed out in such report was *Lomedic*, whose owner was the businessman and local politician Carlos Lomelí Bolaños.

Owner of several pharmaceutical companies, Lomelí unsuccessfully attempted to be a PRD candidate for governor in 2006. The same year, for the same party, he ran for senator and lost. According to the press, Lomelí's (financial) support to López Obrador's political career could be traced from 2000, when the businessman only owned one company with around a dozen employees.

When the OFAC list named Lomelí in 2008, the businessman also owned *Lomedic,* holding significant contracts to provide medical supplies to diverse local governments (mostly run by PRD members). The businessman immediately reacted stating that the US Government version was false, asking publicly the intervention of the Mexican Government to reverse the alleged defamation and asking the General Attorney's Office (PGR) to investigate his finances and companies to demonstrate that there was no link with a drug cartel. After three years of investigation, the PGR decided not to start a

[744] I keep his real name since it is a public case.

criminal proceeding against Lomelí and he was delisted in 2012.

Although Lomelí's reputation might be harmed after being blacklisted, OFAC accusations did not mean his "civil death" neither as a businessman, nor as a politician.

While Lomelí was on the OFAC list, he kept his contracts as a local government provider and his company grew from 430 employees to around 5 thousand.

In 2015, as part of the political party *Movimiento Ciudadano*, he became Federal Deputy under the proportional representation principle (not elected but listed by his party).

A controversial character, since he openly declared among his goods a jet, a boat, art pieces, and a dozen properties (houses, flats, plots of land, warehouses, etc.), the politician was challenged once again in 2017, when the OFAC list pointed out the soccer player Rafael Marquez, who appeared as Lomelí's associate in a company that the Congressman did not declared in his financial disclosure. He justified the omission by saying that he did not remember being a company shareholder.

According to Lomelí Bolaños, his inclusion on the OFAC lists (directly in 2008 and indirectly in 2017) is the result of a strategy of "enterprise-terrorism" from his oligopolistic competitors and a sort of persecution from his political opponents. His version, although possible, is as difficult to prove as his alleged connection with drug trafficking organizations.

Despite being in the spotlight more than once, and even having a criminal record for illegally carrying a weapon (in 2002), Lomelí Bolaños was a MORENA candidate for the Jalisco Government in 2018, losing by almost 15 points, against Enrique Alfaro (*Movimiento Ciudadano*), the current governor.

Nowadays, Lomelí has been appointed by the Federal Government as a delegate in Jalisco, a figure commonly known as "superdelegates", since those officials concentrate the interlocution between the elected Governors and the President. The figure has been a matter of debate, since the so-called superdelegates could become a sort of "appointed governors", challenging the Federal pact.

López Obrador accompanies Lomelí during his electoral campaign closure



Source: Carlos Lomelí Bolaños Official Website. Available at: http://carloslomeli.com.mx/. Accessed: November 18th, 2018.

Recently, his name filled the newspapers again as he was pointed out for owning (as a shareholder or closely related to shareholders) of an ensemble of companies who signed a contract worth millions of pesos with the Federal Government.

Besides, the Lomelí case shows that blacklisting could have an effect on damaging people's reputation, unless political arrangements eventually neutralize such impact, at least, in the listed people's country.

Sources: "Acusa EU de narco a laboratorio tapatío". (October 3rd, 2008). *Mural*; "Solicitan a Calderón intervenir". (October 4th, 2008); *Mural* ; "Empresario polémico financia a López Obrador". (June 26th, 2012). *Excélsior*; "Carlos Lomelí: entre la gubernatura de Jalisco, la opulencia y el narco" (April 13th, 2018). *La Silla Rota*; "Red farmacéutica vinculada con superdelegado Lomelí obtuvo contratos millonarios con el gobiero". (May 20th, 2019). *Animal Político*; US Department of Treasury Press Center. (October 2nd, 2008). *Treasury Designates Corporate Network Tied to the Amezcua Contreras Organization* [Press Release]. Available at: https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp1171.aspx.; Aristegui, C. [Aristegui Noticias]. (August 10th, 2017). *Escándalo Julión Álvarez y Rafael Márquez involucra a diputado de Morena*. *Interview with Jorge Lara Rivera, Federal Assistant Attorney* [Video Archive]. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SU2-niD42B4&feature=youtu.be; Aristegui, C. [Aristegui Noticias]. (August 16th, 2017). *Documentos me desligan del cartel de los Amezcua: diputado de Morena*[Video Archive]. Available: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8TH9kxI17sw&feature=youtu.be.; Instituto Electoral y de Participación Ciudadana de Jalisco. (2017). Available at: http://www.iepcjalisco.org

Business sector reaction regarding Lomelí, his profile and US Government suspicion remains poorly explored. On the one hand, the journalist Eugenia Barajas stated that the sector chose silence as its position and nobody talked about the subject[745]. In fact, none of my interlocutors evoked the Lomelí Bolaños case, probably because the scandal was not forefront in their minds, since the interviews were conducted seven years after the firm *Lomedic* appeared on the OFAC list, and before the brand was mentioned again as being related to Raúl Flores and Rafael Márquez. It is also possible that *Tapatio* businessmen prefer not to discuss the subject, being consistent with Josefa Domínguez. Although I tried to conduct an interview with Lomelí Bolaños, especially to inquire about the extent to which being listed might lead to banishment and sector exclusion for him, the politician did not accept to have a conversation, arguing he had no time available for that[746].

Lomeli's case, in addition to shedding light on the rapport businessmen could have regarding blacklisting, outlines how the possible ties between businessmen and *narcos* could be based on a provider-client rapport. As explained in Text Box 5.1, the US Treasury Department considered that Lomelí's pharmaceutical company supplied the methamphetamine production chain.

Recapturing businessmen's accounts concerning blacklisting, it is possible to outline another possible link between *narcos* and businessmen while doing business, namely, association. For instance, the account of Manuel Gómez, quoted previously (Q5-7) highlights investors seeking a space where the *narcos'* presence might become a threat for businessmen. When the medium-size businessman indicates that *narcos* could be interested in investing their ill-gotten money in different legal enterprises, he directs attention to a constant challenge expressed mostly by the youngest enterprise owners: they regularly need more capital to take root in the market, until they become competitive. However, an environment where *narcos* are likely present might condition their openness to easily accept new investors: 1) either

[745] Interview conducted with Eugenia Barajas, journalist. October 16th, 2015. Zapopan, Jal.
[746] It is possible that establishing contact with him through his social network (Facebook) was not optimal to achieve the interview as it could be considered a very impersonal way of contact him. Therefore, it is fair to say that another path to contact (through a fellow partisan or a college) would increase the chances of being able to talk to him. However, I followed the same procedure with another elected local deputy who immediately accepted to be interviewed by *Skype*, suggesting that, rather than the means of contact, what conditions the odds to achieve an interview with a local politician is their incentive to address an issue. (Messages exchanged with Carlos Lomelí Bolaños. November 23rd, 2018. Fieldwork carnet; Interview conducted with Arturo Valencia López, Local Deputy. March 1st, 2018. *Skype*). On the

being more cautious when near potential partners or; 2) including such a risk in the decision-making process.

Some signs that businessmen are incorporating the risk of be associated to *narcos* might be distinguished in Armida Romero's accounts[747]. During one of many informal conversations we had together, she told me: "Once, my ex-boyfriend received a huge offer to inject money to his little company… he was starting with it, but suddenly someone… he didn't know… arrived... it was a guy that offered him… like thousands of pesos! His partner had contacted him, I think… and he was tempted, because, he was just starting. In the end, I don't know if he accepted the money, but it seemed really strange!"[748]. The anecdote evoked by Armida left many loose ends, but it is useful to show that, once again, uncertainty is present in the account, although this time, notions as "temptation" arise, showing that even if the situation is unusual, someone who just launched his enterprise might consider taking such a risk. Establishing an enterprise often involves different hazards, in Guadalajara, however, it seems that risk taking includes having *narcos* as potential investors and that businessmen would act accordingly.

That possibility is vividly illustrated by Nicolás Bermudez for example, founder of a medium-size trade and marketing company, devoted to wine and gourmet products. The account starts with Bermudez sharing his perception on launching his enterprise with some associates. In that part of the conversation, insecurity, violence or *narcos* were not on the table. As can be seen, while developing his argument, he arrived to the risk of not knowing your potential associates.

> *Well, everyone has their own style, but I think* ***associates are important for growth*** *[as an enterprise]… in certain stages, but only if you trust them… if you have the mind-set of working [collectively]… and if you have something in common with your partner, otherwise, don't even try it! […]it is much more enriching* ***to be sure he contributes not only with money but, even making public that he is associated to the company*** *[I: reputation, you mean?]Yes, that is indispensable, especially now, with the current situation,* ***you must be careful about whom you are associated to****, because it is not only to get someone who injects capital, but also [is about]* ***where such capital comes from!***
>
> Nicolás Bermudez, Commerce Sector Businessman
> Guadalajara, Jal., September 17th, 2015
> *(Q5-8)*

[747] For a profile on Armida Romero, see Chapter 4.
[748] Fieldwork carnet notes (October 29th, 2015).

Once Nicolás Bermudez took the subject, I asked him "and around that kind of situations, 'where does the capital come from', how do you take care of that? What mechanism…?" He interrupted to talk about the necessity of investigating and looking beyond the most evident features of potential partners, suppliers and clients. Since the answer stayed very generic, I insisted on what kind of investigation he conducted and under what circumstances:

> *"The truth is that we make… [laughs] even with the restaurants [to which they supply their products],* ***we investigate*** *about… the associates, so on and so forth, and it is a bias,* está cañón![749] *I mean, because… the other thing, money can't be hidden easily, [laughing] and here in Guadalajara, what happens is that 20 restaurants are opened for every 15 that close! And then,* ***you have to be careful****, because they can run away with your products! Or, they are people that you don't know if they are…* ***we have to carry out some investigations****. [I: What kind of sources do you use…?] Look, we… as I told you,* ***synergy*** *[with other businessmen],* ***we organized a group of importers****, and we met every month and then… well,* ***to exchange the gossip****! [laughs] 'that… so-and-so is not trustworthy' or if someone appeared on the blacklist, so we try to communicate within the group […] and* ***we made the group to notify ourselves****, I mean, to take care if us… [I: but these are initiatives settled by businessmen…?] yes, and we also are members of a business association. They also help us, they also have* ***their investigation methods*** *and they have consultants who they ask to investigate. I mean, us,* ***we also use consultancy offices to make the investigations****".*
>
> Nicolás Bermudez, Commerce Sector
> Guadalajara, Jal., September 17th, 2015
> *(Q5-9)*

As in prior cases, Nicolás Bemudez underlines uncertainty as the starting point for making associations within the business sector. Thus, he states that businessmen must be careful about potential investors. It is possible that in Guadalajara, which has been considered a place where *narcos* and their families live, that wariness is more developed than in other regions of the country where the presence of *narcos* is not that evident, at least in the public account. A comparative study could contribute to testing such alternative, controlling other variables as sector size or diversity. Alternatively, it is also possible that *narcos* are equivalent to other threats that, besides drug trafficking or the under-world, emphasizes weakness of institutional framework where agreement enforcement is not necessarily a guarantee. Thus, when Bermudez passed straight from *narcos* potentially investing in their companies to clients running away with their merchandise or debtors impossible to find, he enables to relocate the *Narco* threat in terms of the extent to which it jeopardizes private property guarantees instead

[749] Colloquial term to refer something that is strong, intense, hard or difficult (DEM, 2019).

of its illegal or violent aspects. In other words, what becomes threatening is a scenario where contracts or agreements are not fulfilled, whether a *narco* is involved or not.

Corresponding to that, the mechanism that his group implemented to protect themselves is not exclusive to *narcos* but regarding anyone who is able to cheat on them. Four characteristics of such mechanism are significant: 1) it is mostly an informal procedure among private agents; 2) it relies on the solidarity of the network's members of those who decided to exchange what they know about the others in the sector; 3) the information is a crucial ingredient to brace protection and it could be as frail as gossip or as robust as the results of an investigation conducted by private consultants; 4) the mechanism put into place by this wine salesperson and his network generates their own blacklist through which they track specific actors' reputation and are able to excluded them from their business, in the name of protection.

The mechanism described by Nicolás Bermudez is not far from the one deeply discussed by Avner Grief (1993) regarding the Maghribi Traders in the Eleven Century. According to Grief, within the pre-modern institutional framework, West Jewish merchants (Maghribi) who operated mainly in the western basin of the Mediterranean, faced a constant challenge since they needed to work with overseas agents while the latter had incentives to act opportunistically and cheat on the merchants, especially because no supporting institutional force drove them to respect the agreements. The so-called agent commitment problem was overcome through an institution that Grief called "coalition". It was a sort of convention that relied on expectations of future exchanges (the commitment between merchants and overseas agents were a long-term game, so future deals are conditioned on traders' past behaviour), and on a specific information-transmission mechanism. Both elements conditioned individual trader choice (merchants and agents) and, ultimately, such constrains supported a mechanism of reputation that motivated the traders to adhere to the agreements, since reputation could trigger community punishment or ostracized cheaters. Once more, similar to blacklisting, information and reputation supports agents naming, shaming and, eventually, sector expelling.

Certainly, the Maghribi Traders' Coalition dates back from medieval times and precedes to the formation of the modern state. This assumes that institutional framework might govern agents whose difficulties to honour their commitment led to the establishment of "coalitions"

or any other informal mechanisms. Yet, Bermudez' narrative suggests that currently, some *Tapatio* businessmen emulate these pre-modern agreement enforcers.

It is possible to argue that in the Mexican case, the contraction of the bureaucracy due to the arrival of neoliberalism around the late 1980s, enabled the establishment of informal mechanisms such as the one described by the wine salesman, where government agencies are not widely present. Nevertheless, some evidence indicates that during the 1970s, when the public administration was more extensive, businessmen in Guadalajara still inquired about reputation of their peers through the Chamber of Commerce, an organization that historically agglutinates businessmen and manages their main concerns. According to the *Gaceta Mercantil*, the list of Chamber services provided to the associates the so-called "Confidential reports about solvency and morality of business" (Figure 5.3).

Figure 5.3 Services provided by the Chamber of Commerce: sample of a monthly report corresponding to the 1970s



SERVICIOS PROPORCIONADOS A NUESTROS ASOCIADOS DURANTE
EL PRIMER BIMESTRE DEL AÑO DE 1970

En los meses de Enero y Febrero del presente año, tuvimos el gus
to de proporcionar a nuestros asociados, que lo solicitaron, los si---
guientes servicios:

PERMISOS DE IMPORTACION	2
INSCRIPCION EN EL PADRON DE PROVEEDORES DEL GOBIERNO FEDERAL	2
CERTIFICADOS DE ORIGEN	78
INFORMES COMERCIALES	58
CONSULTAS DE CARACTER ECONOMICO Y ESTADISTICO	95
INSCRIPCION EN EL REGISTRO NACIONAL DE IMPORTADORES Y EXPORTADORES	1
INFORMES CONFIDENCIALES SOBRE SOLVENCIA Y MORALIDAD DE NEGOCIOS	155
TRAMITES ANTE DIVERSAS AUTORIDADES	1 368
INFORMACION A TURISTAS	180
CONSULTAS DE CARACTER JURIDICO	240
CERTIFICADOS EXPEDIDOS POR MERCANCIA AVERIADA	237
RECLAMACIONES DE FLETES,RECUPERADOS PARA NUESTROS ASOCIADOS POR VALOR DE $ 6,649.70	
COBRANZAS REALIZADAS EN VARIAS PARTES DEL PAIS RESCATANDO PARA NUESTROS ASOCIADOS, LA SUMA DE $ 26,786.24.	
SE ENVIARON POR CORREO,ATENDIENDO DIVERSOS ASUNTOS DE LOS ASOCIADOS, COMUNICACIONES EN NUMERO DE	3 784
POR MENSAJERO LES ENTREGAMOS EN LA CIUDAD,UN TOTAL DE CARTAS DE	1 227

EN EL BIMESTRE TUVIMOS EL GUSTO DE ENTREGARLES O ENVIARLES EL CALENDA--
RIO FISCAL PARA EL PRESENTE AÑO Y TAMBIEN LES REMITIMOS DURANTE CINCO -
OCASIONES NUESTRO BOLETIN "GACETA MERCANTIL" CON UN TOTAL DE QUINCE --
MIL EJEMPLARES.

DENOS LA OPORTUNIDAD DE SERVIRLE acuda o llame a nuestras Oficinas para pro
porcionarle los servicios que tenemos a su disposición.

Marzo 9, no. 6, 1970

Source: Gazette Bank of Images 1970-2016. (March 9th, 1970). The square surrounding the confidential reports has been added by the author to point such category out.

Although the information about the structure of such reports (around 70 per month), its manufacturing process, the content included or the procedure businessmen followed to request them is not available. It is significantly confidential in character, and the fact that, besides creditworthiness, the morality of an enterprise was evaluated. Around mid-1970s, the confidential reports disappeared from the monthly inventories of Chamber activities, either because the service was not offered anymore or because this kind of service stopped being publicly reported although still supplied. It must be recalled that the Mexico City Auxiliary Police, discussed in the prior chapter, in the late-1950's also offered investigation services (See Figure 4.2) that could be (and have been) provided by an ensemble of protectors.

In addition, Chamber activities show that collecting unpaid debts was also one of the regular services offered to its associates. Besides the (il)legal dynamics of debt collection already discussed in Chapter 4, which reinforces the idea that *narcos* seem to be only one of the different partners with which businessmen had to deal with.

Currently, businessmen still ask for this kind of investigation, at least, Máximo Ballesteros Jr., co-owner of a private security company, revealed that some clients ask them to analyse if a potential investor is likely related to ill-gotten money[750]. According to him, businessmen that proceed that way are, ultimately, taking care of their families, conjuring the risk of being hand-in-hand with "bad little seeds", as he called them. In contrast, Máximo Jr., considers that, if the businessmen are ambitious or lack values, they accept the attractive investment opportunities, not even considering the associated risks of doing business with *narcos*.

It is worth mentioning that the co-owner of the private security company explained how the reports offered to businessmen are fed with information coming from their direct contact with law enforcement agencies (high-level and key operative agents) and their "own sources", although he did not go into more details. That reinforces the claim developed in the precedent chapter, the "market of specialists" is a precious space to observe the intricacy of the bonds between government and non-government protection providers.

[750] Interview conducted with Máximo Ballesteros Jr., Private Security Company. (October 16th, 2015). Zapopan, Jal.

Throughout this section, it has been clarified that some (in)formal mechanisms are implemented to keep doing business, despite the uncertainty related to the institutional framework for enforcing contracts and a significant lack of interpersonal trust. When the threat is represented by the *narcos* as potential clients or associates, the key element of the protection strategies is to recognize them, since their features are considered undeniable. To create and categorized mental representations about *Ego* and the *Others* shapes social interactions, since people's classification and labelling process conditions who are (or will be) playing the role of allies or opponents. Among traders, a way to reduce uncertainty has been to particularize exchange relations on the basis of the degree of social distance, which ranks from kinship (the closer to *Ego*) to strangers (the more *Others*). Thus, the shorter social distance, the higher incentives to honour agreements (Landa, 2002).

From that perspective, to operate in a local closed market should be a protection strategy to avoid interacting with *narcos.* Despite the fact that it seems difficult to implement it within a global economy, this plan has a significant flaw: although the dominant narrative surrounding the *Narco* coincides in classifying them from the otherness point of view (as demonstrated in Chapter 2) *narcos* might be entering into the businessmen's world not only through transactions, but also via social bonds. In such case, the *Other* would be closer to the *Ego*, while threat and protection would mean a whole different configuration.

5.2 Bowling with the bad guys: classmates, neighbours and friends

In 2000, Robert Putnam published the seminal book *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and revival of American Community*. There, Putnam offers a deep analysis on the declining value of social connections among individuals in North American society since the 1950s, and how it has direct effects on citizen engagement and, ultimately, on democracy. The name of the book is inspired by the anecdotal story of John Lambert and Andy Boschma, two individuals who knew each other only because they attended the same local bowling league. Coming from different paths, social origins, professions an even age groups, these two characters only had the bowling alley in common as a space to meet each other and share. Eventually, Boschma donated a kidney to Lambert, saving his life. Such an account alludes to the discussion on social capital developed by Putnam who has been an influential reference on the topic to the present day.

"Bowling" in Putnams' work is the allegorical representation of a socialization process, while the bowling league is the social space where that occurs. Thus, it is meaningful how everybody is bowling (or not) in the extent to which such interactions contribute to (re)shaping individuals, (re)building their beliefs, attitudes and behaviours (Camp, 2002) and, ultimately, (re)assigning their social role. On this basis, it is pertinent to explore in which way *Tapatios* businessmen are (and have been) "bowling" with *narcos,* since the latter have been present in the landscape for many years[751] and the Mexican elite is deeply linked through extensive network ties, which highly contribute to explain their level of interaction and integration within and among the dominant groups, beyond their origins and background (Camp, 2002).

If businessmen and *narcos* have been "bowling together" in Guadalajara, to what extent have these interactions modified the threatening image associated to the latter and, consequently, the protection mechanisms implemented by the former? Has the pairing of the "victim-victimizer" been rewritten?

According to Duncan (2011), who has observed the case of an ensemble of Colombian drug lords who are driven by the desire to be socially recognized, drug traffickers seek to dominate three kind of social spaces: *i*) a concrete community where they establish direct relationships with the population, either the low or the middle and upper classes, who celebrate their success since they depend on it to remain in the social structure; *ii*) popular sectors who appreciate what their benefactors seem to do for them; *iii*) the economic and political elite who need the drug lord either to increase their wealth or to win elections. Consequently, the social mobility of the *capos* does not mean a challenge to the domination of the social structure, but the adaptation to the needs and requirements of an "emerging criminal class" (Duncan, 2011: 171). From that perspective, it seems that *narcos,* have achieved a certain social laundering dominating either popular sectors or the elite, exchanging their money for social recognition. What is less clear is how these social groups adjust to *narcos'* intentions.

[751] As discussed in Chapter 2, a first wave of *narcos* and their families arrived in the 1980s after the *Operación Cóndor* was launched. A second wave, however, dates back to the mid-2000, due to the arrival of important drug lords as convicts to the high-security prison Puente Grande in Jalisco, who arrived with their families, friends and bodyguards, to inhabit the most exclusive gated neighbourhoods and to send their children to the most recognized private schools [Osorio Méndez, A. "Llegaron... con toda la banda". (January 23rd, 2005). *Proceso Jalisco*, (1473)].

Although exploring different sectors' (re)actions could be very informative, for the purpose of this research, the scope might be limited to the economic elite.

In Chapter 2, it has been argued that the notion of "good *narcos*", as those who benefit certain communities despite their illegal activities, is present in some businessmen's narratives, especially in contrast to the *narcos* seen as limitless and violent. Thus, social support from the popular classes can be likened to the "Robin Hood" legend. However, such assumption is not enough to explain the eventual support of the economic elite to *narco* upward mobility, since they are not beneficiaries.

Following Duncan (2011), it seems that the possibility of becoming wealthier could be an incentive for businessmen to make an exchange with *narcos*. Nevertheless, this perspective ignores two main elements: 1) while drug lords are seen as complex characters with meaningful social backgrounds and a desire to ascend, businessmen are seen only as "money makers", which is an extremely limited perspective; 2) driven by economic interests, businessmen are conceived as able to welcome *narcos* into their social circles, an assumption that must be revisited considering that the *narcos-nacos* might represent a threat to them, as advanced in the previous section. Thus, *narcos* potential presence within privileged social circles deserves a more detailed revision.

Although different aspects could be analysed in that regard, in what follows, *narco* presence in business social circles will be explored since this might constitute a threat for the latter and, in consequence, unleash protection mechanisms, as the forthcoming accounts advance:

> *... I think,* ***they*** **[narcos]** ***have been entering in the society much more than what we must let them****, yes!* ***They are in our sport clubs, in our schools, the go to the same bars with our children****… yes! And… that… illegitimate money… yes! And, unfortunately, nowadays values have changed so much and… so… twisted… the value of money is overrated*
>
> Susana Piña, Industrial Sector Businesswoman
> Zapopan, Jal., October 9th, 2015
> *(Q5-10)*

> *I mean, when you are… in a social… in a social lunch or… that is a reality that… if someone arrives that you know… is not [involved] in clean business… and, and, and…* ***you met them, in the same places, they are even in the same schools, and their children are friends with your children… it is an issue that bothers you… strongly*** *and yes, let's say… [long silence] most of people use a sort of 'cold shoulder approach, right? Let's say like that (…)*
>
> Alfredo Palomino, Industrial Sector Businessman

Both, Susana Piña and Alfredo Palomino, regret *narcos* having entered their social circles and suggest that granting attention to the social space of the economic elite is a pertinent strategy to understand these patterns. It makes possible, on the one hand, to focus on specific interactional spaces and, on the other hand, to differentiate local notables from any other social group who is likely interacting with the *Narco*.

To define which social arenas must be explored to reach this section's objective, an inductive path which builds on businessmen's accounts will be followed. This approach prioritises the differentiation described above and is based on two assumptions that are not mutually exclusive: the spaces that the interviewee mentions during the conversation are selected because they are the most significant for them (notably qualified by Susana Piña as "our") or they are where businessmen especially observe *narcos*' presence. Certainly, the analyses must be framed by literature findings on upper-class socialization. Thus, three main spaces will be discussed, particularly, schools, exclusive neighbourhoods known in Guadalajara as *cotos*[752] and social and sports clubs[753].

Through his work, in *Mexico's Mandarins,* Roderic Ai Camp (2002) argues that education (in the country and abroad) is one of the most significant sources of socialization of the power elite[754], comprised by notable politicians, military officers, clergy, intellectuals and, particularly important for this research, the so-called capitalists[755]. Although Camp focus his analysis on undergraduate and graduate studies (private and public most notable universities),

[752] According to Manuela Camus (2015) *coto,* from the Latin *cautus* meaning "defended", is a term coined in Guadalajara to refer closed residential spaces.
[753] It is noteworthy that some other social spaces associated to *narcos'* presence in coexistence with businessmen have emerged in interviewees narratives, such as bars or malls. However, they are going to be left aside in this analysis since they do not constitute long-term interactions but, mostly, occasional meetings. In that sense, they may not be considered as socialization spaces. In the possible case that those places have regulars, I assume that social links between those gathering there are build outside these places and, if anything, reproduced inside them.
[754] In Camp (2002) study, the three main domestic sources on constructing Mexican power elites' values and views are family, career and education.
[755] It must be outlined that Camp (2002) study considers, as part of his sample of *capitalists*, a tiny proportion of businessmen from Guadalajara, arguing that the majority of this sector is concentrated in Monterrey and Mexico City. In addition, the author notes that the control of Jalisco's leading companies are under five families' control (p. 70). That could contrast with my own findings because, as stated at the Introduction, what I observed is a more expanded and diversified sector. Anyhow, this gap might be bared in mind either to update some of Camp's findings or to nuance the way I use them to frame my own analysis.

he recognizes that education, in a broad sense, could moderate the influences of socialization coming from family, background or wealth.

Being true that universities could be a fertile ground for professional links based on specific skills and "know-how", Camp calls attention to the fact that education is especially significant in terms of setting up long-term informal networks, providing, like no other socialization source, an environment "favourable to cementing friendships among future leaders" (Camp, 2002: 93). That is important as power elites are understood to be embedded in influential networks in which professional rapport may not be separate from personal (long-standing friendship and trust) bonds. That is also the case regarding capitalists, educated mainly in a handful of Universities some which have been founded by notable businessmen, despite the fact of the importance given to technical-pragmatic formation.

It follows from the foregoing that, if *narcos* attend the same schools as businessmen, future professional ties and long-standing friendships among them are a possibility and, being the case, the notion that *narcos*' are a threat might be challenged. To explore such intuition, two accounts will be contrasted.

Jesús Salas is an agro-industrialist in his sixties and Rosa María Cortés who, in her thirties, runs the private security company founded by her father. The generation gap is intentionally emphasized as it allows to explore the narrative of someone who went to University before the "startling familiarity" came about in Guadalajara and someone who grew up in the middle of it.

> *Another way in which* ***they embedded these people, was through their children****, I mean, local universities […] because it was the destination point of the children of… the richest, from Sinaloa, Sonora, Baja California, and… well, later on, they sent the son, the daughter to study, then, they put a flat together, and then the brother, the sister… and later on, the mother came to stay with them, and then the father… and so on… and* ***we saw the classmates of your children or your nephews… 'who is this? Why does he drive this fancy car?****', so… and yes* **cuando acordamos**[756]***, they already were part of… our lives****… part of the state, of the city… of certain neighbourhoods, certain places (…)*
>
> Jesús Salas, Agro-industrial Businessman
> Zapopan, Jal., October 8th, 2015
> *(Q5-12)*

[756] It could be translated as "when we realised" (rather that "when we agreed"), as something you suddenly are aware that it has been happening progressively and for a while. Although it must be tested, I have the impression, from my own experience, that this is a phrase used in Mexico mostly by the elderly.

> *Yes, I think it has been something… **since seven or eight generations ago**. I mean, the issue… the* Narco*… was not even mentioned before, you know? I mean, among people, it was… you could stay really something on the sidelines.. **Last generations, what happened? His children… studied with businessmen's children! …at the best schools! … Then we, the new generations, we already grew up … with that… as something natural!** I mean, **you just said… 'ah yes, the drug lord Y's son' 'ah, yes, he is my friend, I don't get involved**… but he is my friend and he is there, in his house'…*
>
> Rosa María Cortés, Private Security Company
> Zapopan, Jal., August, 28th, 2015
> *(Q5-13)*

From Jesús Salas' account, at least, three elements must be noted. First, he describes a progressive process that took some years but businessmen only realised once *narcos* were already were part of their daily lives. Second, the attribute that allowed businessmen to recognize the *Others* was their consumption pattern (driving fancy cars). Third, the entrance of *narcos* to "our schools" (to come back to Susana Patiño's words) was through their families, more precisely, their children. In that matter, Salas' account is linked to Rosa María, the young businesswoman's narrative. They describe how school is the social arena where *narcos'* children socialize with businessmen's children. Taking the argument further, this socialization takes place with the children of the whole elite power, as they attend the same schools which are "the best", Rosa María states.

Certainly, it could be argued that a *narco'*s child is not necessarily a *narco* himself, as businessmen's children are not undoubtedly future members of the economic elite[757]. It is not my purpose here to elucidate the chances of one child to inherit his parents' metier. Instead, what is of interest to me is to discuss how, according to these accounts, sharing schools might blur the assumption of the binomial *Ego* (businessmen) and *Other* (*narcos)* that, as stated in the precedent section, is seminal to define the threat and the protection methods.

In that regard, it seems like Guadalajara has experienced a twofold generational replacement: first, from the *narcos-nacos* (or those with a peasant humble origin) to those educated in the best schools, if they decided to continue their parent's business and; second, from the

[757] Alongside to the arrival of an ensemble of drug lords to Puente Grande prison, the press reported different incidents in the city involving some boys speeding and bearing assault weapons, who would be kinship related to "Chapo" Guzmán and Caro Quintero. Thus, if they did not participate into drug trafficking business, they were easily qualified as narcojuniors (Osorio Méndez, A. "Llegaron... con toda la banda". (January 23rd, 2005). *Proceso Jalisco*, (1473).

businessmen that recognize the *narcos* as *Others* far from their social circles to those who, growing up with them (or their children, more precisely), see them as friends, although, they do not "get involved".

Although not completely replaced, the first group of businessmen is mostly made up of the older generations, who see their children and nephews are classmates with *narcos'* children and react trying to keep their distance: "my only daughter… ah, when she was young, she was dating a guy, he was supposedly the son of the businessman X, but he had this… profile…[*narco*] and we just forbid her to keep dating him, that simple!"[758], as was explained by Héctor L. Orta, as would any other father who considers his daughter's boyfriend is not good enough for her.

The second perspective, although not uniform, is represented by Rosa María Cortés who recognizes being friends with a drug lord's son and, indirectly, suggests that this friend is into something that she chooses not to be involved with. The last part of the premise is not supported by the fact that Rosa María is precisely who offered to help Armida Romero in collecting a debt through a *levantón* performed by his brother-in-law, Y's son, a case that has been described in depth in the prior Chapter. Thus, the friend she met at university, actually, became her sister's boyfriend[759] and part of her ensemble of solutions to collect a debt.

Armida also confirms the position of "getting used to *narcos'* presence at elite schools" not only through the anecdote with Rosa María, but also when, in an informal conversation, she said: "my brother, for instance, he knows that his child's classmates are *narcos*' children, but he stays in the same school because, on the other hand, many other important people send their children there and that is a big network opportunity for my nephew"[760]. Either this generation seems less threaten by sharing school spaces with *narcos* or are more interested in linking their children to the future elite social circles of power, even if that means co-existing with *narcos'* and their families. Yet, this thread will continue to be developed in the chapter.

Before, it is pertinent to point out a subtlety. If businessmen who have socialized with *narcos* (or their children) do not seem to be threaten by them, this is not necessarily the case for

[758] Interview conducted with Héctor L. Orta, Industrial Sector. (September 3rd, 2015). Zapopan, Jal.
[759] This point will be more widely developed in the next section.
[760] Informal conversation with Armida Romero. Fieldwork carnet, September 2nd, 2015.

those who own these exclusive schools. Máximo Ballesteros Jr., co-owner of a private security company explains how, among their services, they offer consultancy to schools in order to manage the possibility of having *narco*'s children in their ranks.

> *Well, for instance,* ***we have clients… schools that… ask us for some studies, or some coaching*** *as in… 'eh, we received Juan Pérez' daughter… and we know who Juan Pérez is, what can I do?' and then, they said* ***'I mean, [laughs] do I accept her or not? If I say no, there will be repercussions, then… what can we do?'****. And obviously,* ***our recommendation is not to accept her, why? In order to avoid further problems.*** *Because, we have also had other clients that… accepted those people and…* ***those people, with such… education they have, they threaten our teachers…at other levels****… then they ask 'what can I do? If I throw him out…* ***I mean, if he fails [the exams] all the teachers have been already threatened'*** *[I: It became unstoppable] Of course! It became unstoppable. So,* ***it is better to reject them… from the beginning, to say 'no, he did not pass the exams' or whatever…***
>
> Máximo Ballesteros Jr., Private Security Company
> Zapopan, Jal., October 16th, 2015
> *(Q5-14)*

The specialists, once again, are consulted to manage a certain threat, this time related to violent manners brought from the under-world to student-teacher rapport. While Ballesteros Jr. is clear on referring to *narcos*' children in the anecdote shared, such a challenge to authority figures is not limited to the *narcos'* children. The possibility that the children of other powerful elites, commonly referred to as juniors, could also be involved, especially considering the proliferation of *Mirreyes* or arrogant members of privileged families[761]. However, more data should be collected to explore such possibility. Nevertheless, it seems that for school owners, *narcos'* children could represent a long-term source of trouble.

Without neglecting the weight of private schools in the formation the powerful elite and as one of the spaces *narcos* may use for social lifting, it does only represent one frame of the whole picture, especially if we consider that: 1) due to scholarship programs, private universities could be more class diverse than is often thought and social relations could be reconfigured[762] and; 2) the possibility that *narcos*' children are a different (a less threatening) category than *Narco*. The picture, then, must be completed by paying attention to two social

[761] See footnote 417 in Chapter 2.
[762] An anthropological study, within a private university in Colombia, analyzed the interactions between the low and upper-class students. The former accessed to this privileged social circle due to a scholarship public program. The author observes a significant opportunity for those coming from popular sectors to interact and even settle long-lasting friendship bonds with the wealthiest. However, such interactions are also crossed by inequality experiences and symbolic limits that reinforce some class' differences and segregation (Álvarez Rivadulla, 2019).

spaces where the division between the wealthiest and the others is harder to overcome since there are not compensation programs (as scholarships) and where *narcos'* and their children are no longer separated categories, namely, the exclusive gated neighbourhoods or *cotos* as well as sport clubs.

Cotos are gated enclaves that became one of the icons for the elite in Guadalajara and could be considered "spaces with no place for precariousness" (Camus, 2015: 73). They first appeared on the *Tapatio* scene in the late 1960's, but their proliferation dates back to the 1990s. Concurring with the Neoliberal policies including housing programs, the government partially abandoned the role of housing provider to become the facilitator for private investment, which fulfilled the residential need at the time (Harner et al., 2009).

The idea of a *coto* is not far from that of gated communities observed in most parts of Latin America, which are closed due to the increasing perception of insecurity and fear of being crime victim, as described in Chapter 1[763]. However, the literature has also pointed to some of its effects on the urban landscape such as segregation, reinforcement of social division and even as part of a deep sociocultural transformation (Camus, 2015; Camus and de la O, 2014; Ickx, 2002; Cabrales Barajas and Canosa Zamora, 2001). For instance, even if closed enclaves could be located in popular neighbourhoods as much as in exclusive housing complexes, in the latter, housing occupies a significant proportion of land, yet they are not densely populated[764], contrasting with government subsidised or even informal housing enclaves (Harner, et al., 2009).

Marketing and selling under the promise or being exclusive and far from "congestion, stress and the pathology of everyday city life" (Harner et al., 2009: 484), the luxury private developments not only represent a sort of segregation from the others, but a symbol of social lifting, status and privilege. Based on a large study on upper-class *cotos* in Guadalajara, Manuela Camus (2015) points out that its inhabitants believe they are living among "gente como uno" (p. 70), coining even the acronym GCU[765]. However, names such as *Puerta de*

[763] On the "persisting fear paradox" while seeking security see Chapter 4.
[764] According to Harner et al., (2009), in 2000 only 6.5% of the total population in Guadalajara lived in higher-income housing. Ickx (2002), on the other hand, estimated that in 2002 there were around 150 private *cotos* in Guadalajara Metropolitan Area.
[765] People like us. In Guadalajara, the opposite category to GCU is "nobodies' cousins" (*primos de nadie*) (Camus, 2015).

Hierro[766], *Valle Real*[767], *Puerta Plata*[768], *Royal Country* or *Residencial Versalles*, besides the aspirational references of the *Tapatios*, hosted "members of the bourgeoisie, new rich, traditional oligarchs, political elites, transnational emerging classes or the so-called *wannabe*[769]" (Camus, 2015: 72). *Cotos* are also "drug traffickers, 'white collar' criminals, armed people and others' 'meeting places'"[770](Camus, 2019: 37).

> *Yes, sadly… sadly… I think, it is a lack of courage, sometimes you realised that* **narcos *or crime leaders are caught in the neighbourhood*** *… where the ladies [who live there] say 'Ay, I didn't know… he lives just next door, right?' or 'we had not realised' or later they said '**I thought it was suspicious**, because they used to change cars, and they had ten cars… **new cars… tinted windows** and they used to arrive late in the night' and then you say… I think, **it is lack of courage, although it is possible to understand**, because **these people are vindictive,** and they are… tough.*
>
> Susana Piña, Industrial Sector Businesswoman
> Zapopan, Jal., October 9th, 2015
> *(Q5-15)*

Neighbours' incentives to avoid complaining about the *narcos* presence within a *coto* lie on the same perception around reporting property crimes or extortion, which has been explored previously in Chapters 1 and 4, respectively. Instead, in Susana Piña's interview, her comment is more informative and referring to the fact that for her arrests, depletions or police (even Army) operations are the way businessmen confirm what they already suspected: *narcos* inhabit among *"gente como uno"*.

Is not uncommon to read in the newspapers that famous drug lords have been captured in luxurious gated residential areas. In fact, it is said that some *narcos* own small *cotos* located inside bigger ones (Camus, 2019). In that regard, the case of "Nacho" Coronel, "The King of Ice" is particularly illustrative[771].

As explained prior, the Mexican Army shot down the Coronel in July 2010 in a manor located in one of the most exclusive *Tapatio* neighbourhoods, *Colinas de San Javier* (Figure 5.4). The house of *Paseo de los Parques* street had been seized by the Mexican Government years before, corresponding to the Coronel's first arrested. While it was in Government possession, the house was a foster home for children, but neighbours put pressure on the government

[766] Iron Gate
[767] Royal Valley
[768] Silver Gate
[769] Someone who "wants to be" like another person. Italics from the original.
[770] Quotes from the original
[771] On "Nacho" Coronel trajectory see Text Box 2.3, in Chapter 2.

since they did not agree with having an orphanage next-door. Months later, Coronel recovered this house along with other properties seized, which had become education institutes or non-profit organizations[772].

Figure 5.4 Mexican Army conducts an operative in *Colinas de San Javier* to capture the drug lord "Nacho" Coronel



Source: "Muere Nacho Coronel". (July 30th, 2010). *Reforma*. Image digitally retouched by Juan Martínez.

In Guadalajara, people still recall "'Nacho Coronel's house, where he got killed, in *Colinas [de San Javier]*, just next to *Puerta de Hierro*"[773], perhaps, as much as they remember Caro Quintero's properties. Recently, the house on *Paseo de los Parques* street, which is approximately 1800 m^2 in size and estimated to be worth between 8 and 30 million pesos[774] was sold for 6 million pesos[775] as part of an ownership extinction process. Certainly, it was difficult for the Government to sell it[776] as it will likely forever be "'Nacho Coronel's house".

A glance at the manor gives the sense that any other wealthy *Tapatio* could live there, although ostentatious, its style is not very different from where some businesspeople actually live (Figure 5.5). For instance, the construction sector businesswoman and politician, Olivia Ciriaco, granted me the interview in her luxurious home situated in a very exclusive *coto*[777], which does not look much different than Coronel's house. That, in some way, challenges the

[772] Petersen Farah, D. "La Casa de Paseo de los Parques". (August 4th, 2010). *El Informador*.
[773]Informal conversation with Armida Romero. Fieldwork carnet, January 15th, 2017.
[774] Between 423,785 USD and 1'589193 USD, considering the exchange rate of 18,87 pesos per every dollar, registered on June 17th, 2018, date of the press release that reports the data (http://www.banxico.org.mx). The reader must notice the wide range of the house value estimation. It was calculated by *Milenio* considering different webpages of real estate agencies selling similar properties. Thus, the data shall be adjusted following a better method or reference point ("Venden en seis mdp la casa donde murió Nacho Coronel". (September 17th, 2018). *Milenio*.
[775] Around 317, 839 USD considering the exchange rate of 18,87 pesos per every dollar, registered on June 17th, 2018, date of the press release that reports the event. (http://www.banxico.org.mx).
[776] "Venden en seis mdp la casa donde murió Nacho Coronel". (September 17th, 2018). *Milenio*.
[777] Fieldwork carnet, September 15th, 2015.

narco epitome of the eccentric rich and, consequently, the idea of recognizing them as the first step to stay away. Sometimes, businessmen do not need police operatives to realise they are sharing these exclusive enclaves with *narcos.* Indeed, "there are plenty anecdotes about *narco* neighbours in all the *cotos*" (Camus, 2015: 145).

Figure 5.5 "Nacho" Coronel's manor: *Narco*'s meeting place or home?



Sources: "Subastan mansión en la que fue abatido de 'Nacho' Coronel" *(sic)*. (September 17th, 2018). *La Silla Rota*; "Venden en seis mdp la casa donde murió Nacho Coronel". (September 17th, 2018). *Milenio*. Images digitally retouched by Juan Martínez.

If businessmen are aware of the *narco* presence, it is fair to expect they implement some informal mechanisms to protect themselves from any risk associated to such neighbours, since reporting them to the law enforcement agencies seems to not be an option. In that sense, Fernando Huerta, industrialist and member of one of the most recognized families in Guadalajara, shared:

> *I got…* ***I lived in a*** **coto***…* ***where, in front of me, I realised, a hitman from the Federal Police was living … obviously, was involved in the mafia, and*** **Narco** *and… all that… and…* ***I accepted my reality!*** *I… the reality I had was just that… and… and* ***if I moved, it was probable that I will have another neighbour like this.*** *Then, it did not make sense to move! Instead, how to deal with reality? Then, what we decided to do at home [silence] eh… in the house is to sleep! Period! And… and…* ***we do not go out, to spend time with neighbours, everyone in his business****…*
>
> Fernando Huerta, Industrial Sector Businessmen
> Guadalajara, Jal., October 1st, 2015
> *(Q5-16)*

Two strategies which are congruent with "reality" emerge from Fernando Huerta's anecdote. On the one hand, "isolation" for him and his family, as they choose not to socialize with neighbours. On the other hand, to "escape" from their own house, by restricting its use as a place to sleep. Certainly, "isolation" and "escape" may entail many effects regarding social interactions and community (de)construction, since both, the space of residence and the

family in where the elite grow up, are highly formative (Camp, 2002). Thus, changing what living in a certain place means for an individual, not to mention the repercussions it might have on family dynamics, represents a major transformation of social dynamics as well.

Moving houses as an unfeasible option to Fernando Huerta should draw our attention. His calculation, in addition, omitted the monetary cost that this alternative could bring. Conversely, backing his decision is the certainty that, in any other place, it would be the same story. His deduction could come from a couple of not mutually exclusive premises: *i*) the idea that *narcos* are present in all of the *cotos* and; *ii)* the belief that a housing development different from luxury *cotos* are not for him. This scenario seems similar to parents taking their children to more exclusive schools to guarantee their future position within the elite, even if that implies to co-habiting with *narcos*.

Huerta's words also provide the opportunity to confirm the porosity of the *narco* concept. In this case, he mixes "being involved with the *Narco*" to another problematic profile: a Federal police hitman. I shall not reiterate what in previous chapters has been stated about businessmen's rapport with police bodies and other armed guards. However, it is useful to highlight this element to pin point that Fernando Huerta's narrative is similar to what Manuela Camus (2015) described about *coto* inhabitants who referred that, even if they lived there to feel safer, they were living with the enemy.

In Camus' analysis, "the internal enemy", who has penetrated such exclusive spaces, is a category comprising not only *narcos* but private security personal that commit robberies from time to time, arrogant neighbours bearing arms, those who fail to pay their monthly maintenance fees and, clearly, the *nacos* (Camus, 2015). Indeed, Emma, one of the women interviewed by Camus, a *coto* resident in Guadalajara said: "One of the owners here, everybody hates him, because he is a *naco*, he is horrible. I think he works at the Attorney's Office or he is police officer, something like that (…) he has a lot of force and power deployment, a lot of guaruras[778] outside, we panic!" (Camus, 2015: 119).

Few differences can be identified while comparing Emma and Fernando Huerta's descriptions of each unwelcomed neighbour in the *cotos*. If anything, it must be emphasized

[778] Mexican expression that refers to an arrogant, strong and reckless person in charge of protecting someone, especially a politician or an important businessman (DEM, 2019).

that what the former considers *naco*, the latter equates to *narco.* As in the previous section, it seems that *narcos-nacos* is a solid category to define what bothers *coto* inhabitants.

Despite their image of exclusiveness, *coto* inhabitants sometimes recognize that, rather than *gente como uno*, all kinds of people are living in these residential areas and "sometimes you don't know who you are relating to" (Camus, 2015: 97). That is probably why there are certain *cotos* in which purchasing power is not enough to be accepted. Thus, when someone intends to sell or rent his property, neighbours must vote to accept the new tenant (Camus, 2015). Closely observing this other mechanism of building walls to avoid unwanted neighbours might reveal how in order to be protected, social differences are accentuated by means of voting, as well as the belief that *Guadalajara* has two kinds of wealthy people, those coming from the families with historical roots and the new rich. This, however, is a lead to follow in ulterior research.

The *Narco* presence in *cotos* is, as demonstrated, extended and accepted by businessmen, with a certain dose of resignation. Yet, it is not as clear if the luxurious gated enclaves are *narcos'* meeting places or homes. In the first scenario, the *Ego* and *the Other* would remain distant as one is hiding and the other escaping. In the second image, they are both living together, so *the Other* is not that far from *Ego*.

Within the *cotos* there is a particular space of socialization that must be mentioned: social and sport clubs. Usually, gated neighbourhoods feature clubs or establishments where people practice recreational activities and interact with other club members. According to Camus (2015), in term of status, the difference between one *coto* and the other one can be marked by each one's club and the kind of leisure services they offer.

Whether lodged in a *coto* or not, exclusive social and sports clubs may be ideal socialization spaces for the upper-class as they attend them for entertainment and socialization, while reinforcing features of membership and exclusivity (Camus, 2015). For businessmen, in addition, they are fertile ground to do business (Cerón-Anaya, 2010). As can be expected, clubs are also key spaces that *narcos* might seek access to, in order to erase the borders between them and the elite (Duncan, 2011).

Surprisingly, only a few general mentions of *narcos* (intending to) penetrating social or sports clubs were found in the field. The lack of comments regarding sports clubs as shared spaces

with *narcos* could have, at least, two explanations, leaving aside the methodological dimension[779].

First, it could be possible that *narcos* are not interested in belonging to these exclusive social or sport clubs[780]. That seems counterintuitive considering that they have historically been both, a sign of status and a space to do business (Cerón-Anaya, 2010). In addition, other experiences show that controlling social clubs were seminal to drug lords' attempts to impact daily social life. In fact, regarding the Colombian case, it has been argued that: "it could be said that the upper-classes' conquest was made through seizing their social clubs" (Duncan, 2011: 166)[781].

Secondly, social and sports clubs are not at the forefront of businessmen minds, because they do not have a significant weight as social spaces[782]. That is probably since Mexico is not a very sports-oriented society[783], and the extended culture of effort, (prevalent among businessmen) which favoured work over leisure, at least discursively[784]. However, golf courses would be a significant exception regarding businessmen because, there, elite identity is reinforced[785] and entail long walks and conversations, turning it into a privileged

[779] Certainly, a methodological bias that overlooks this socialization space is possible. Since I did not purposefully make reference to specific social spaces, but I merely recovered those the interlocutors mentioned during the interviews, such bias would also have an impact on schools and *cotos* mentions and, as proven above, it is clearly not the case.

[780] It is pertinent to notice that, in Mexican fiction, sports (especially boxing) and crime has been represented as suggestively linked (Piccato, 2017). However, businessmen were not part of this image which mostly evokes popular classes. At the end, boxing is a popular sport, conversely to golf.

[781] Duncan (2011) also argues that some drug lords eventually bought some of the more exclusive social clubs. He even recalls the anecdote of a drug lord who built a social club identical to the one that had once rejected him.

[782] For instance, the *World Values Survey* (WVS) (2012) reports that only 18% of the Mexican adults actively belong to a sport or recreation organization.

[783] According to INEGI (MOPRADEF-2018), in urban localities, 41.7% of adults are physically active and, out of that proportion, only one third exerts this activity in private spaces, such as clubs (it means 13.7% of the adults), not to mention sports club members that, paying fees, do not attend them ("Crece inscripción a gimnasios pero casi nadie va". (March 10th, 2017). *El Financiero*). On the other hand, the proliferation of gyms where the emphasis is placed on the cult to the body and health culture, along with a diverse supply of activities and disciplines, could transform sports clubs as leisure spaces and, consequently, as socialization spheres (Martínez Guirao, 2004).

[784] According to the WVS (2010-2014), 59.2% of Mexican adults considers leisure time as very important in his life, contrasting to the 87% that has the same opinion regarding work. Useful as a reference point, the same survey shows that in USA, 38.9% considers leisure as very important while 35.6% thinks that way about work.

[785] It is pertinent to outline that golf is still considered one of the most elitist sports in Mexico. Among other factors, it is the case since it is only practiced in private, expensive, exclusive clubs; since their arrival to Mexico, in the late nineteenth-century, there were consecrated to foreign or to Mexicans belonging to the wealthiest families able to interact with the former; although they gain a significant importance for regional elites around the 1940s, they remain as an elite within the elite (Cerón-Anaya, 2018; Cerón-Anaya, 2010).

socialization space where business is commonly done (Cerón-Anaya, 2018; Cerón-Anaya, 2010). This scenario will be explored later.

Among the few references businessmen made on the possibility that *narcos* shared social or sport clubs, Héctor L. Orta and Manuel Gómez shared the most extensive accounts which are detailed below.

Referring to weddings and other parties celebrated among social club members, in which unwelcome profiles might attend (either *narcos* or the new rich) Héctor L. Orta explains:

> *When this group of businessmen* ***gathers at a wedding****, in which you go with your wife, right? […] Then* ***I like to go with… friends and businessmen with a profile similar to mine****. But if they invite me not telling me with whom I'll be seated… and the one I sit with is… part of the other group [of businessmen] because there are all kinds… the wives…* ***the wives sometimes reflects a bit of what kind of person … that businessman is****… and they are different, and they dress differently (…) and you don't agree with these kinds of gatherings,* ***the only thing you do is to check the situation****… what I do (…) I ask to my assistant 'who is going to attend?' Then I have two ways:* ***if people [invited] are quite acceptable then I go.*** *But if it turns that in that group of people there are some I don't like, I don't go, and the problem is over! And* ***if I met them there, I don't say hello, I don't take photos with them****.*
>
> Héctor L. Orta, Industrial Sector
> Zapopan, Jal., September 3rd, 2015
> *(Q5-17)*

Plenty of similarities could be outlined from Héctor L. Orta's account regarding many others presented and discussed in this chapter. Yet, it is noteworthy that, for the first time, wives appear among the signs to recognize "the other group of businessmen", those who are either *narcos* or *nacos* (or both). A deep discussion on the instrumental role women play and their likening to a businessman's accessory could be developed here, but it falls far from the purpose of this research. Conversely, strategies of protection and avoidance of hanging out with this profiles brings up two new leads to follow.

On the one hand, businessmen could choose not to attend gatherings where these unwelcome profiles may be present. Preventing who is going to attend to the wedding not only reveals how embedded the idea of the possible mixture of profiles is, but also how that defines the selection of social interactions. That aims, once again, to "isolation" as a protection strategy and, consequently, to the eventual transformation of socialization experiences. Considering the importance of festive rituals as integration and collective identity expression (Homobono, 1990), the likely transformation of these dynamics shall be carefully analysed in future research.

On the other hand, Héctor L. Orta, while explaining how to deal with the imminent encounter with these profiles, enables us to visualize another way of protection: to avoid appearing in pictures with them. Considering that photographs could be seen as long-lasting evidence that such a gathering happened and that they could contribute to building a certain imaginary, representation and perception on how society is (Villaroel, 2007), the industrialist is careful to avoid that, especially since even a random meeting could be interpreted as proving a strong bond.

Manuel Gómez refers to the most exclusive sports club in Guadalajara to support his perception on this regard.

> *What I've seen is…* ***in the highest spheres of the business world, they pay a lot of attention to that [ill-gotten capital holders entering the business sector]****. I mean, a very simple example, very simple…* ***the most*** **pipiris nice**[786] ***sports club in Guadalajara, the Country Club****, it is a place* ***where it is not allowed****… the… I mean...* ***to receive anyone, unless they come from a family that has been a member forever*** *or having the recommendation of a lot of people and if the committee, which has many members, accepts you. It means,* ***you can't arrive with lots of money saying 'I've got a lot of money, how much does the membership cost?****', so… I've heard that they try to block that…*
>
> Manuel Gómez, Service Sector Businessmen
> Zapopan, Jal., October 15th, 2015
> *(Q5-18)*

From his outsider perspective, as he is not a member of the Country Club, the young businessman restores the image of this luxurious club, especially appreciated by golfers, as a place where: 1) only members of the Guadalajara *familias de abolengo*[787] belong; 2) *narcos* and other new rich would be interested in gaining access to and; 3) businessmen succeed on keeping *narcos* distant favouring lineage over money.

According to this narrative, it is possible to deduce two other informal mechanisms of protection, namely, to be "the elite within the elite" and "linage".

[786] Mexican colloquial expression that makes reference to the *crème de la crème* of society. Apparently, *pipiris* is the corrupted version of *people is* (sic), so the whole phrase could derive from *people is nice* (although it should be "people *are* nice"). It probably became popular to point out foreigners or Mexicans who returned from the US with a certain arrogance (speaking English). The author acknowledges Germán Suárez, professional translator, and Laura García, lexicographer, for their kind contribution to clarify this point.
[787] Distinguished ancestry and lineage (DRAE, 2016).

José Gerardo Zapata's son, now in charge of the family business, claims his father does not play golf as he does, arguing that "you met a lot of people playing golf"[788]. However, the idea of "lot of people" must be nuanced, since practicing a sport as exclusive as golf set the long standing rich (the elite within the elite) apart from any other wealthy profile, such as the mass of businessmen, the new rich and, of course, the *narcos.*

When the entry barrier to a club membership is defined by family roots or linage, the *crème de la crème* guarantees guard their circle from *narcos* and *nacos.* Even having enough money, or counting on the generational replacement that their well-educated children could represent, *narcos* will never become one of them as "*siempre les sale el origen*"[789]:

> *I mean, [narcos] yes,* ***they have been polished****, now you see the daughters studying at [he mentions a private University] I mean… [lower voice] let me… I don't want to say it.. [I: go ahead, if you want off-the-record] no, no, it's OK.* ***They do not cease to be*** **nacos*****!*** *I'm sorry! And… I mean, [normal voice volume] ups! It's sounds pretty bad [laughs] but… they never stop having this style…* ***they drag their origin! Or their parents' [origin****]. **The origin always shines through!***
>
> Raymundo Chávez, Agro-Industrial Sector Businessman
> Zapopan, Jal., August 29th, 2015
> *(Q5-19)*

The dominant narrative regarding *narcos,* built on otherness, although anachronistic and constantly challenged by the way *Tapatios* describe their daily contact with them*,* is a useful alibi for businessmen to keep the elephant in the room as an strange, a well-defined creature that some good people touch, from time to time, mostly due to their blindness, yet not becoming one of the pachyderm's parts. Among the different informal mechanisms to keep them afar, linage seems to be the most efficient, unless, *narcos*' were to become part of the family.

5.3 Happily ever after? Linage preservation as protection mechanism

It was Paris, apparently, the fieldwork had finished months ago. For me, it was time to transcribe and to pick up the pieces to determine which stories I would be able to restore. A close friend was passing some days in the city, so we met at a dinner where a couple of her

[788] Interview conducted with José Gerardo Zapata, Industrial Sector Businessman. (September 1st, 2015). Zapopan, Jal.
[789] Their origin always shines through.

friends were also invited. Among with them, there was Camilo[790], a middle-age marketing professional who had been born in Guadalajara.

During dinner, Camilo talked a lot about himself. I learned that he grew up in Zapopan, that his family had a very recognized last name that "he has to honour", as his mother always reminds him, that their parents used to be *hippies* in the late 1960 and currently, his father is a businessman and his mother is a common face in the society pages. My interest in Guadalajara brought me to pay attention to what, under other circumstances, would have been only a conversation with a self-centred man.

It was not a formal interview or an observation in the field, but it certainly added to my data collection, especially when he talked about his experience as a student in a very exclusive private school. From time to time, I posed some questions to get more details in his narrative. All of a sudden, he recalled how the *narcos'* sons used to be his classmates at the University: "they were there, and everyone knew who they were", he stated in the same tone he used to describe any other passage of his life. "Did you usually spend time with them?" I asked, "Yes, I mean…" The other dining guests asked in a slightly judgmental tone of voice "how so…?", "I mean, you spend time with them, but you are cautious" he answered. Probably due to the confused expression on the faces of his interlocutors, he added "for instance, you attend their parties, but you are not their friends. You spend time with them, but you don't marry them"[791].

In accordance to the examples evoked in the last section, Camilo's explanation keeps the idea that *narcos* (more precisely, their children) might have access to exclusive social spaces where someone like him, with his honourable last name, coexist with them. Despite that, he considers he is able to establish a difference between "attending their parties" and "becoming their friends". It seems that the level of intimacy set the boundaries between one scenario and the other. The nuance Camilo concedes to "not being friends" saved the frontier that keeps him and *narcos* separate and distinguishable actors. Even more resounding is his final sentence: "you don't marry them", because coexistence is allowed unless it erases the difference from the *narcos* or the *Others*.

[790] His real name evokes a famous Communist leader.
[791] Fieldwork carnet, May 14th, 2017.

It seems that marriage is the ultimate stage conceivable for someone who, he assured, has coexisted with *narcos* his whole life, watching the line. Is Camilo right? Is marriage the unbreakable frontier for *Tapatios*?

Marriage has been historically seen as a mechanism to preserve the purity of linage, as well as a way of transferring property, social status, rights and privileges, through descendant, inheritance and succession (Portela and Pallares, 1987). In addition, it has been a means to settle strategic alliances between families, not limiting linage to blood purity. In Medieval Spain, for instance, the aristocracy or nobles with patrimony and titles, (but without royal blood) had access to the highest social circle by marring royal members who, despite their blood, did not always have enough financial resources and power. Yet, the alliances between royalty and aristocracy remained within the upper-class circle.

On the other hand, the importance that kinship alliances have within *mafia* structure has been widely documented. According to Anton Blok (2002), the Sicilian *mafia* mobilizes three types of kinship to achieve local territorial control and to foster loyalty and reciprocity: *i)* agnatic kinship (consanguinity)[792]; *ii)* ritual kinship (god-parenthood, co-parenthood) and; *iii)* ritual friendship (blood brotherhood).

Kinship through ritual and friendship would be rewarding to explore aiming to observe bonds settled between political spheres and the *Mafiosi* (Blok, 2002). Indeed, some insights have already been presented earlier in Chapter 2, while speaking about the co-parenthood between Leopoldo Sánchez Celis, Sinaloa's former governor, and the famous drug lord Miguel Ángel Félix Gallardo. Nevertheless, the following analyses is restricted to agnatic kinship, since what interests us is to test linage preservation attempts as a protection mechanism.

It is worth saying that consanguinity bonds are not limited to blood-relatives: sons, siblings, uncles and cousins, instead they comprise ties relying on marriage, it means, in-laws (Blok, 2002). This kinship, in addition, endows interaction with "diffuse, enduring solidarity" (Blok, 2002: 110). Certainly, agnatic ties could be established between inner-circle of the *Mafiosi* or between them and power elites. In that way, Duncan (2011) emphasizes how, in the Colombian case, the marriage between a drug lord and the daughter of a local aristocrat, as

[792] It is noteworthy that "agnatic" refers a person descendent from the same ancestor as another implied person, especially through the male line (Oxford Dictionary, 2017). The weight of the male line (kinsmen, in Blok words) will be recovered later in the section.

he calls them, sealed the entrance of the former to the elite circle and, besides, contributes to his acceptance and recognition as a village boss.

It must be kept in mind that, according to Raphael (2014), within the Mexican elite, the conditions related to the "marriage market[793]" are significant predictors of social lifting, rather than reducing the downward trend, they promote moving up.

In Chapter 2, when Raymundo Chávez recalled how his mother used to be Caro Quintero's mother's cooking classmate, he also suggested that crime was very much integrated into society adding that *narcos "*had mixed quite well… for instance, yet… the sons of the bad guys had gotten married to the daughters of the good guys", he said. Doing so, he not only suggested that marriage between these two groups is indeed possible, he also offered an example he has first-hand knowledge of:

> *for instance, yet… the sons of the bad guys had gotten married to the daughters of the good guys* ***… the daughter of* X *[he mentioned a very well-known drug lord] is married to one of my friends!*** *This… his father was released [from prison] recently, I think… this [he laughs] mister* X*… [he repeated his complete name], and* ***his daughter, a very beautiful girl eh!****, I mean… and* ***she married a chavo bien***[794] *from here, from Guadalajara. Eh,* ***he owns an enterprise****… [that produces] soda…, I don't know if you have seen it …* ***Soda Z*** *[I: Ah, yes, of course!] ah, well, he is the owner. Then, he is married to this man's daughter. And he [his friend] is a chavo… bien, I mean… then, there has been those kinds of [situations]… then, the grandchildren…* ***they are drug lord's grandchildren and grandchildren of… families… of formal, serious businessmen!*** *And like this, many other cases that* ***we don't know and we have not noticed****.*
>
> Raymundo Chávez, Agro-Industrial Sector Businessman
> Zapopan, Jal., August 29th, 2015
> *(Q5-20)*

Following Raymundo Chávez's narrative, the so-called "good people" not only coexist with the "bad guys", they actually establish kinship ties.

Explicitly labelling someone as the "bad guy" is an aspect that should call our attention in Chávez's account. To illustrate his point, he offered the name of the well-known drug lord (*X*, for the purposes of this analysis), while the interview was being recorded. He also

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[793] Certainly, Raphael (2014) borrows the notion coined by Gary Becker, according to whom marriage shall be analyzed from economic principles as any other market since persons marrying (or their parents) search to maximize their utilities while voluntarily choosing a mate among different people who compete (as they seek mates). "Each person tries to find the best mate, subject to the restrictions imposed by market conditions" (Becker, 1974 :300).

[794] "Chavo" refers a young guy. "Gente bien" or good people make reference to those who are distinguished by having a wealthy position, high education and other qualities which are appreciated socially. (DEM, 2017).

mentioned the drug lord's daughter and her husband. Although he did not mention their names, he provides the sector and name of the company that his friend, *X*'s son-in-law, owns[795]. Doing so, he took the case out of anonymity and offered clues to be followed, if I so desired. It is possible to assume that Chávez is generally able to speak openly about his friends and his in-laws, recognizing also that some likely unknown cases exist.

The obvious next step was to seek an interview with Chávez' friend and, to do so, ask for his help. As can be seen in the schema of the interview contact pattern[796], Raymundo Chávez enables another three interviews among his friends. However, none of them were Alejandro Pacheco, son-in-law of the dug-lord *X*, to whom I was eventually able to talk to. Despite the fact that he speaks frankly about the case, Chávez decided not to lead me to his friend. In other words, he can reveal one part of the open-secret but not the whole picture.

Another remarkable aspect of Chávez's narrative is the image of "bad" versus "good" guys he offers. On the one hand, his friend, who married a drug-lord's daughter, is a *chico bien*, someone who comes from a "good family". In his definition, such social origin could be labelled in sum as being "formal, and a serious businessman". The shortcut carries several assumptions, but it also lets us picture what "good" looks like in his mind. Furthermore, Pacheco, despite his in-laws, is still conceived as a businessman. Even further, in his narrative, he remains a friend, not just an acquaintance. Thus, from Chávez's point of view, Pacheco neither acquires the *narco* title, nor loses the friendship as a businessman. He just became a businessman that married one of "them".

Such statement is reinforced by the clarity with which the agro-industrialist recognizes the implication of the kinship ties. The second generation emerging from those alliances were then half good and half bad. Yet, in his description, the imaginary frontier between upper and under worlds remains present. Even if with the second generation such a barrier could disappear, Chávez rather assumes the two worlds are brought together, as if he was describing a fantastic creature born from two species that are not supposed to be mixed. As in other tales, such creature features could be identified as coming from one or the other parent. To the contrary, the images of *chico bien* and *narco* were conceived as being one in the same in

[795] The kind and name of company were changed in order to preserve the anonymity of the actors involved.
[796] Available at the Appendix *SB*.

their children. Therefore, both stereotypes must be challenged, a task that the interlocutor does not seem able to do.

On the other hand, Raymundo Chávez more clearly distinguishes what the "bad guys" look like. Combined with his description of the *buchones*, which has been evoked in Chapter 2, the previous extract provides yet another lead to follow. "Mister *X*" is his way to make reference to the drug lord, the one who was in prison while his daughter was marrying a *chico bien*. Yet the way he refers the capo's daughter is also significant: "a very beautiful girl, eh!", considering it necessary to stress this aspect was as if he was saying beauty and evil were not supposed to go together. There could also be something to say about Chávez's rapport with women, beyond the shadow of the *narco*.

Early on, in Chapter 2, certain signs of *machismo*[797] in Chávez's narrative became evident and were only reinforced by his comment about the relationship *chavos bien* established with *narcos'* children. In addition to Alejandro Pacheco's anecdote, later on in the conversation, Chávez recalled the case of another "*narco* junior", as he called him, who studied with him at university and who was usually surrounded by women:

> *[When I was at the University] you would hear about the [well-known drug lord]* **Y' son***, only that dude! And 'ay, he…', he was [seen] like… fancy. That bored me a lot, like '… let's go out with* Y*' son', I mean, it was something… glamorous or…* ***I don't know what the fuck he used to give to the*** **viejas**[798]*, I don't know if…* ***a hint of… danger, a hint of… or because he used to pay*** *or because… I don't know. To me,* ***that's so boring… and make me feel*** **hueva**[799]***… and sadness… and… rejection****, I don't know why...* ***I even saw him with my sister.*** *I mean, all of a sudden, some years ago… and I told her 'ey,* ***these friends of yours are weird, they are kind of suspicious*** *and…' then…* le cayó el 20[800]*, and she took distance [from these friends], but yes****, they are dangerous people.*** *Then, I don't know if there is* ***something sexy around… evil…that is attractive to… [Me: people] women! [Me: Women especially?] Yes!*** *Back in those days I just knew about him […] nowadays, it is more [common]… chatting with more people they know about…* ***people that are*** **naquita**[801]*,* ***they have an obscene amount of money*** *and it is not clear where it comes from.*
>
> Raymundo Chávez, Agro-Industrial Sector Businessman
> Zapopan, Jal., August 29th, 2015

[797] Attitude that considers male are naturally superior to female, manifesting it with arrogance, violence or even paternalism regarding women. (DEM, 2018). On *machismo* as a seminal feature of *Tapatios* see Doñán (2011).
[798] Although the word "viejas" could be literally translated as "old women", on this context it evokes the popular and offensive term to make reference to women. (DEM, 2018). Reader must notice that, as while referring the *buchonas*, Chávez language suddenly becomes tacky.
[799] Mexican term that refers lack of desire, laziness, sloth (DEM, 2018).
[800] "Caer el 20" is a Mexican colloquial expression that means to understand, realize or recall something suddenly (DEM, 2018).
[801] Diminutive of *naco.* See footnote 701 of the chapter.

(Q5-21)

As in the above mentioned case, *Y*'s son has no explicit name, but he is recognized as "the son of", like if this aspect was what mostly could identify him. In addition, he displays a more judgemental attitude regarding women's interactions with a drug lord's son, compared to his thought on a man marrying a capo's daughter[802]. While the *chavo bien* is pictured as a businessman, the women surrounding *Y*'s son were described using derogatory terms and reduced to being superficial and only after their money. It is possible to argue that his position changes due to a class versus gender bias since Alejandro Pacheco, somehow, looks like him. However, the women referred to use to study at the same private university and even his sister fit into that description of a *vieja* [803].

Contrasting the cases Chávez explicitly evoked, it is not only useful to observe how class and gender biases might condition the way businessmen deal with "bowling with the bad guys", it also offers clues to follow regarding how the business sector observes the possibility of creating agnatic ties with *narcos.*

The drug lord *Y*'s son appeared in another conversation during my fieldwork. Armida Romero put me in contact with Rosa María Cortés, her best friend and, as explained in the previous chapter, a businesswoman in charge of the private security company founded by her father who, indeed, happened to be a former high-level public security officer. Sharing a meal with Armida, talking in a very informal and friendly way for a first conversation, the *narco* presence in Guadalajara came up when suddenly she told me: "well, Rosa María's sister used to date *Y*' son. They were in a relationship for a while, they were about get married and so…"[804]. I pretended her words did not shocked me, aiming not to inhibit the flow of her story. Then, she got into some details: "Yes, and her father, you know, he was kind of troubled because, you know, the co-father-in-law… but they lasted a while". I asked if she, Armida, had met him: "Of course! I mean, Rosa María had been my best friend since we

[802] Probably, it also has to do with the fact that, in Mexico, women social status is widely determined by her husband status (Raphael, 2014). In that sense, the businessman (Alejandro Pacheco) grants his wife with certain social acceptability, despite being the daughter of the drug lord *X*, while the girls surrounding *Y*'s son, lose their "*niñas bien*" status to acquire such of opportunists.

[803] Reinforcing findings discussed in the precedent section it must be noticed that, aside from the likely *machismo* involved in Raymundo Chávez narrative, that also shows that the dangerous face attributed to *narcos'* relatives is subordinated to another feature: they are *naquitos*, provoking him a particular game of feelings, from disinterest to rejection.

[804] What follows on this anecdote comes from the same talking (Fieldwork carnet. September 2nd, 2015)

were children, her family is close to mine", "what was he like?" –I continued- "You know how the *Sinaloenses* are… with their trucks and their parties, with their loud music". Still pretending that I was just gossiping, I asked "and, why did they break up?" -"because he cheated on her!" she answered[805].

Armida –the daughter of a businessman-, Rosa María and her sister, daughters of a public servant who became a businessman and who is again back in the political arena, and drug lord *Y*'s son are all intertwined by ties as ordinary as friendship and romance. Nevertheless, what they are illustrating is how politics, the business world and the *Narco* are related in a more complex way that the *quid pro quo* exchange of benefits earlier discussed[806].

The law enforcer/businessman's daughter did not marry the drug lord's son because they were not of the same kind (kinship affiliation) but due to an infidelity. In other words, for an upper-class *Tapatio* girl, the fact that her fiancée was a *narco* could be tolerated, but not a cheater[807].

Returning to Alejandro Pacheco, drug lord *X*'s son-in law, he was not only brought spontaneously to the table by Raymundo Chávez but his story also emerged in the conversation with the Alcantara family.

Mr. Alberto Alcántara is an octogenarian founder of a trading company that, nowadays, is managed by his two sons, Alberto Jr. and Antonio. As specified in the Introduction, the interview was conducted simultaneously with the three businessmen[808]. While talking about sharing spaces with *narcos* or their families, they evoked the case of Alejandro Pacheco:

> *Alberto Jr.: For… for my generation, for our generation,* ***a lot of people in Guadalajara knew about****, right?* ***'so-and-so attended the marriage of X's son, and he got married with so-and-so'****, and a lot of people know that and… they have these kind of things very well-identified, like… they even tend to see them as normal. But it is… I think everyone… [chooses] what they want.* ***Me, for my family, I try to avoid those kinds of things, and I have more closed groups****.* ***People with whom I grew up, people… just like me, with the same education and degree****… I don't search of being*

[805] Other details of that truncated love story can be seen in Chapter 4.
[806] In addition, when Armida summarizes Y's profile as a *Sinaloense*, she reinforces the hypothesis proposed in Chapter 2 according to which *narco* dominant stereotype is rotten in the drug traffickers who were born in *Sinaloa.* Besides, agreeing with different examples evoked throughout the present chapter, Y's son consumption habits fill *narcos-nacos* epitome and his rapport with drugs, violence or illegality is completely omitted.
[807] As made explicit before, it is possible that *narcos'* children are not *narcos* themselves. However, in this case, it is fair to discard such scenario based on the evidence discussed in the precedent chapter, according to which Y'son is able to perform *levantones* as debt collection managing.
[808] For methodological implications on this collective interview see the Introduction.

*related to… I'm not interested! I don't seek them [*narcos *related people]… I even avoid it, probably.*

Me: There are a couple of quite interesting things about what you… explained… the first one, [you said] 'they tend to normalize it', how could you explain that, can it really be normalized?

Antonio: Well, because they have a normal life, I could say… ***maybe, they are not within my circle but in my [school] generation there was X' daughter****, and then… maybe, she belonged to a group of friends, and* ***we all knew what she was and who she was, but that was it****. I mean… and she was… pointed out only because of her last name [Alberto interrupted:* ***he married the guy who owns the*** **refresquera**[809]*, right?] Yes, yes.*

Alberto, Alberto Jr. and Antonio Alcántara,
Commerce Sector Businessmen
Zapopan, Jal., September 9th, 2015
(Q5-22)

This long quotation has many worthwhile leads to follow. First of all, the elder of the Alcantara siblings emphasizes that, despite clearly sharing spaces with *Tapatios,* establishing a relationship is a decision. To watch out for the members of your group and to limit social interaction to those who are on your same path, is enough to keep your social network spotless. This version concurs with some of the accounts evoked throughout the chapter.

As in the other cases, this relies on the certainty that: 1) they are able to distinguish who is and who is not related to *narcos*; 2) social attributes such as education or scholarly degrees are an effective shortcut to discern and pick with whom you relate to. Once again, both assumptions are sustainable only in the extent to which the dominant stereotype of the *narcos* is life-like. Elsewhere in the interview, however, Alberto called into question whether sharing childhood is a sufficient enough filter. Then he evoked the case of one of his sons' playground mates, who descending from a very well-known family of politicians and businessmen, was killed, and over time, his ties with drug traffickers became public. To that remark, Antonio Jr. reacted saying that, then, it is mostly education and values that protect you from getting involved with "those kinds of people".

The second element is directly related to Alejandro Pacheco, the owner of a medium-size soda factory and *X*'s son-in-law. To follow up on his brother's account, Antonio explains that, even sharing a social space such as school, it is possible to stay away from those related

[809] Soda factory.

to *narcos*. To illustrate the case, he brings up his own, since being *X*'s daughter's classmate, she was not included in his group of friends.

The abrupt interruption of the father was fortunate for this research purpose since, while confirming the version with his sons, he revealed part of the identity of their former classmate, the one who married *X*'s daughter. Describing him through his enterprise, Alberto confirms how the son-in-law of *X* drug lord is mainly seen as a businessman, not as a *narco* himself. Moreover, his candour on giving such a clue and the quick answer of his sons that drove the conversation to a more general narrative, helps us realise that the identity of the actors was intentionally omitted by Alberto Jr. and Antonio, in contrast to the patriarch. Even though it could be read as an over-interpretation of the Alcantaras' words, the following detail could reinforce the previous interpretation. At the end of the conversation (and already off the record), I asked Antonio for some other contacts to conduct more interviews, including Alejandro Pacheco. Meanwhile, Mr. Alberto whispered to Alberto Jr. "don't send her there. That's just [money] laundering!" Then, Alberto Jr., on the sly, mimics a sign of silence.

From the last-minute interaction with the Alcantaras, it might be inferred that, between two generations, there are differences not only in terms of managing shared spaces with *narcos*, as stated in the previous section, but also in accounting such an experience. Mr. Alcantara's inheritors are more sensitive to dealing with that information carefully, probably because they are more aware of the risks of talking about the subject with a stranger. Indeed, although Antonio gladly accepted to put me in contact with other businessmen, including Alejandro Pacheco, in the end, the Alcantaras did not lead me to another interview, despite my further insistence[810]. This intuition regarding the generational gap, however, deserves to be tested more broadly in ulterior research[811].

Eventually, I was able to conduct an interview with Alejandro Pacheco. I reached him not through Raymundo Chávez or the Alcantaras, who explicitly evoked his relationship with the drug lord *X*. Instead, Alfonso Magadán, the young leader of a business association, got

[810] E-mails exchange with Alberto Alcántara Jr. (September 9th - 11th, 2017).
[811] Certainly, since Armida Romero is Alcantaras brothers contemporary, her anecdote on her best friend and *Y*'son could seem contradictory with such claim. However, her words must be relocated within the framework of an informal conversation which may enables her to be explicit. Besides, even if she shared these memories the first time we met, a mutual friend introduces us. Conversely, one of the businessmen I interviewed drove me with the Alcantaras (see Appendix *SB*). Thus, informality and friendship could foster a more explicit discourse.

me in touch with the *refresquero*, as well as with another 19 interlocutors[812]. Such pathway implies a significant advantage: Pacheco's ties with *X* was not mentioned when his name was included on a long and heterogeneous list of businessmen Magadán introduced me to[813]. Thus, when I conducted the interview, I assumed that Pacheco did not know that I was aware of his wife's family background. In any case, almost a month after the interview with the Alcantaras, I met *X*'s son-in-law.

The meeting was in his office, in a not so pretentious meeting room where I waited for him for less than five minutes. He is a middle-age businessman, he was dressed casually wearing pants and t-shirt, without any jewellery other than his wedding ring and his watch. These initial elements challenge two features normally attributed to *narcos*: on the one hand, he does not seem to be someone unavailable or clandestine[814]. On the other hand, neither his office, nor his appearance fits into the stereotype of the ostentatious figure deeply discussed in Chapter 2. If Alberto Alcántara's hypothesis was true and Pacheco participates in money laundering, this *narco* does not look like a *narco*.

Considering his profile[815], Alejandro Pacheco is the son of a businessman who owns a middle-sized company. "To become an entrepreneur, I had my father's school", he stated. Then, while analysing Pacheco's interview, we are actually exploring the case of a businessman's son married to a drug lord's daughter. As can be deducted from his friends' accounts, Pacheco got his undergraduate degree from an exclusive private university, where he met people who became businessmen, as himself, but he also met his wife.

Regarding the foundation of his enterprise, his trajectory is not far from the one recalled by first generation entrepreneurs. To start, according to his own words, he was supported by the so-called "three F's" formula, namely, fools, friends and family. As many other businessmen's experiences, his project was nurtured by acquaintances able to support it,

[812] See Appendix *SB*.
[813] Alfonso Magadán contacted me with Pacheco through *Whatsapp*, who immediately answered accepting my request on conducting an interview with him a couple of days later. (Fieldwork carnet, October 5th, 2015).
[814] Albeit we agreed on having a one-hour meeting, before starting, he told me that his schedule was full and he only had a half an hour for our conversation. Actually, the interview was the shortest of the 65 conducted, lasting around 28 minutes. Although the planning change could be interpreted as a sort of reluctance to talk to me, due to his profile, I do not have enough evidence to support such claim, mostly because the interview reduction was announced at the beginning and not as the reaction to the interview content. (Fieldwork carnet, October 7th, 2015).
[815] From here after, the sources are the interview conducted with Alejandro Pacheco. (October 7th, 2015). Zapopan Jal., or the Fieldwork carnet, October 7th, 2015.

despite its uncertain results. The difference derives from what the term "family" could represent in Pacheco's example. Are his in-laws involved somehow in his enterprise? It is not the purpose of this research to clarify this yet, it is enough to say that this possibility is an extended open-secret[816]. In any regard, what is important in this case is to elucidate how this possibility could affect his relationship with the business sector and the rapport he holds with the public institutional structure.

Considering that businessmen describe an ensemble of protection mechanisms based on recognizing alleged *narcos* and keeping distance from them, despite sharing basic social spaces, is Alejandro Pacheco mostly an isolated businessman regarding the *Tapatio* sector? Is *X*'s son-in-law a businessman that operates at the margins of the institutions, even challenging the state?

During the whole interview, Alejandro Pacheco distinguished some of the main challenges that he has faced as a businessman. As will be detailed, these constraints are not far from the ones expressed by his peers. Nevertheless, the way he perceived problems and the way he dealt with them, can shed light on the extent to which his marriage with *X*' daughter has curbed him to operate in the under-world.

Early in the interview, Pacheco shared how difficult it had been to enter a consolidated market, especially since he has an innovative approach that contrasts with the oligopolistic market of big firms. His account is similar to the one of Chávez and Magadán, two young businessmen who had been pioneers in a market or had proposed product variation versus a consolidated one[817]. Evoking this experience, Pacheco assumed he had to face Goliath, but to do so, he went to a trial claiming unfair competition conditions. He overcame the situation mostly due to some peers' solidarity and an efficient strategy that involved private consultancy and negotiation capacity to win the fight in the tribunals. According to his account, belonging to business associations enabled him to create a front with other medium-

[816] Around 2015, a local newspaper published a couple of notes where they claim that Pacheco's mother and sister could be associated with his in-laws in small enterprises. Although the journalistic pieces seemed easy to ignore within the sea of information, it has to be noticed that Pacheco's ties with the drug lord *X* and its possible implications has been explored on the public arena. In addition, while analyzing the OFAC list in 2017, a well-known journalist stated that *X*'s family (in-laws included) were repetitive names on such listing. I intentionally omit the exact references to guarantee the anonymity in the case.

[817] Interviews conducted with Raymundo Chávez, Agro-industrial Sector. (August 29th, 2015). Zapopan, Jal., and Alfonso Magadán, Industrial Sector. (September 23rd, 2015). Zapopan, Jal.

size enterprises to enforce their position during the legal process and compensate the power asymmetry vis-à-vis the market leaders.

The precedent anecdote reflects that, as many other businessmen, Alejandro Pacheco is a member of business associations and such filiation has been useful to have the solidarity of the sector, when it comes to working through a problem. It seems that, regarding the business sector, *X*'s son-in-law is quite well positioned. If the businessmen with whom he shares the chambers are aware of Pacheco's kinship ties, his fruitful membership to business associations might be considered evidence that his potential link with the *Narco* does not represent sector exclusion. On the contrary, if his peers ignored his proximity to "the elephant in the room", it might be stated that protection mechanism set up by businessmen to share information are not as effective as they intend or, at least, the filtration does not cover the whole sector.

In addition, a general review of public documents of the company Pacheco owns revealed that he upholds several export and import agreements, mostly with North American companies, showing that Pacheco is not only well integrated to the local sector, but he also plays in the international arena, despite US efforts to noisily point out those who might be linked with drug trafficking associations[818].

His experience as a "David" struggling against an oligopolistic market is also a generous lead to follow regarding Pacheco's rapport with the institutional framework.

When it comes to describing his relationship with the government, Alejandro Pacheco stated:

> *Well… we have had [financial] support… in fact, when the enterprise just started, we got access to the economic development promotion… a segment of the government [focused on] promoting economic development, gave us* ***financial support****, and it was very useful… and then, with the [government as a] ruler… well, eh…* ***we had a legal suit****… arguing unfair conditions… […]*[819] *before the Competence Commission… and, after four years of trial,* ***we got a positive resolution*** *[…] and it was a very positive resolution for the enterprise and for the sector in general, because […] big companies are not blocking our way…*
>
> Alejandro Pacheco, Industrial Sector Businessman
> Zapopan, Jal., October 7th, 2015
> *(Q5-23)*

[818] Fieldwork carnet, October 6th, 2015.
[819] He offers more details about the process and the resolution, however, they are intentionally omitted to avoid revealing the real sector and kind of enterprise he runs.

To deal with unfair conditions of competition, Pacheco appealed to the institutions, proving that he is not necessarily excluded from state protection. He has also enjoyed the benefits of the public budget which has been available to support young entrepreneurs. This experience is similar to the one recalled by Alberto Hernández, Alfonso Magadán or Manuel Gómez[820] who recognized that public grants were meaningful to *founding* and *funding* their companies. Besides, public resources invested on funding *Sodas Z* could be a picture of the intertwining between public money and the alleged ill-gotten money.

Pacheco's access to formal entities is not a one-time episode. In addition, it is a choice. Concurring with most of businessmen interviewed, Alejandro Pacheco sees labour unions as a pitfall for the sector's development. To deal with them, he appealed to the institutional channels:

> *I **prefer to fight in the tribunals** rather than crossing my arms…in front of someone **who wants to extort money from me**, like a labour union, right?*
>
> Alejandro Pacheco, Industrial Sector Businessman
> Zapopan, Jal., October 7th, 2015
> *(Q5-24)*

Observing his links with the business sector and his relationship with institutions, it is possible to claim that Alejandro Pacheco is not an excluded businessman. In other words, he repeatedly plays on the legal ground. Therefore, it might be considered that during our conversation, he had incentives to show his total adherence to the law and his belonging to the upper-world. Being the case, appealing to institutional framework might be more a narrative strategy than a practical procedure for him. However, two nuances in his words enable us to argue that he is not especially thoughtful with his words and how those might be interpreted bearing in mind his in-laws.

While arguing that he hired a law firm to face the trial already discussed, he stated as a key element to find a firm that was very well-connected, capable of doing what is needed to win the case. His words suggest that he is not delivering an extremely moralistic speech, but the account of someone who accepts that, as he said, in the Mexican context you have to "pull the levers to get what you want". The extent to which those levers remain in the legal framework or not, is not clear but, as discussed elsewhere in the text, it seems difficult to

[820] Interviews conducted with Alberto Hernández, Industrial sector. (September 22nd, 2015). Guadalajara, Jal.; Alfonso Magadán, Industrial sector. (September 23rd, 2015). Zapopan, Jal. and Manuel Gómez, Service Sector. (October 15th, 2015). Guadalajara, Jal.

sharply separate these two worlds. In addition, his position regarding corruption is good proof that he is not constrained to present himself as a pristine character:

> *Well,* ***corruption makes… increases the operation costs****… for instance, we have a chain of stores, a dozen of stores […] most of them are located in Mexico City and we realised that there is a lot of corruption… and to open, to have the licences to open… you have to give them a big bribe, right?* ***Around 250 thousand pesos***[821] ***for every store****, so… that makes the costs higher, right? In Guadalajara we haven't seen that level of corruption, there is much more in Mexico City.*
>
> *I: And, let's say, deal with it, what kind of decisions you have to…?*
>
> *AP: Well, only… the return of investment, takes much more time… it increases…* ***you have to include corruption and bribes that you have to cover to get the licence… then, simply, the risk increases…*** *the risk of having an enterprise goes higher.*
>
> Alejandro Pacheco, Industrial Sector Businessman
> Zapopan, Jal., October 7th, 2015
> *(Q5-25)*

As can be seen in precedent quote, for Alejandro Pacheco corruption is seen as any other rational decision that drives him to calculate costs and benefits. In his words, there is not a consideration regarding a good or bad behaviour, and it is only something to include in the company production costs. Thus, if declared corrupt practices or paying bribes could be inhibited due to social desirability bias, such predisposition is not observable in Pacheco's account. Additionally, the data he refers to catches our eye. Considering that, for instance, half of the times they accepted to give a bribe in exchange of an operation licence that represented about one and a half million pesos (around 90, 525 dollars). For a medium-size enterprise, it sounds like a hardly affordable pattern, however, capital availability does not to seem a challenge for this businessman. Tellingly, his words regarding the times when an adverse context forces new entrepreneurs to close the company may illustrate this point. Other businessmen explained that, in such situation, they had recourse to bank loans, expanding investors' portfolio or even, claiming bankruptcy, Alejandro Pacheco had a tool that no one else can take advantage of:

> *Me: Those times, when you were thinking about… bring the curtain down, just close the company… how did you managed not to do it?*
>
> *AP: [silence] well… look, honestly, I think there were two factors [to help], it was* ***with a lot of… perseverance****, or foolishness, who knows!... and second of all… that… fortunately,* ***the shareholders had enough capital to keep investing on the company, setting aside the original projections****, right? I think that… is one of the main failures*

[821] Around 15, 088 dollars, considering the exchange rate of 16,57 pesos per every dollar, registered on October 7th, 2015 (http://www.banxico.org.mx).

> *we have as entrepreneurs, we think that the period of finances in red numbers would be shorter, and we fail preventing it... that's why several projects just close.*
>
> Alejandro Pacheco, Industrial Sector Businessman
> Zapopan, Jal., October 7th, 2015
> *(Q5-26)*

The quote speaks for itself. If anything, it is only pertinent to outline two aspects: *i)* perseverance and persistence are present in his account, showing how he fits in the ensemble of businessmen that privileged the culture of effort as a main value, as already evoked; *ii)* able to endlessly pump money, his investors do not look like any other described by the interlocutors during fieldwork.

A last unavoidable feature to analyse in Pacheco's interview is his perception regarding insecurity and violence and, ultimately, how he makes reference to *narcos* as a threat for *Tapatios*. First and foremost, he considers the problem of insecurity to be over-rated, claiming that media exaggerates and triggers fear in the population. Then, he considers that only the wealthy businessmen are really vulnerable regarding property crimes and that the effects of violence have not been as determinant as the press shows:

> *For instance,* ***we didn't stop selling because of the*** **narco-bloqueos**[822]*... yes, we stopped one day, as many others, we closed [the enterprise]… but, the day after,* ***we were encouraging people to return to the streets****,* ***not to let fear take over****… and, in fact, with some friends,* ***we created the hashtag*** **'recuperemos Guadalajara'**[823] *and no… they [*narco-bloqueos*] did not fright[ened us], they did not affected us that much…*
>
> Alejandro Pacheco, Industrial Sector Businessman
> Zapopan, Jal., October 7th, 2015
> *(Q5-27)*

Not being aware of his ties with the drug lord *X*, this extract of the conversation could be compared to any other young businessman who believes in the citizen's capacity to represent a balance, when it comes to violent *Narco* action. To counteract the damages of the context of insecurity might be even be taken as a socially responsible attitude. Certainly, to reduce the *Narco* to the *narco-bloqueos* is a clear oversimplification. Nevertheless, it is significant that he brings the term to the conversation, as if it was not a taboo while speaking with a stranger.

[822] On *narco-bloqueos* see Chapter 1 (especially footnote 124).
[823] Let's recover Guadalajara.

In the face of politicians who he calls "ignorant, thieves and lazy", Alejandro Pacheco considers that citizen action could be especially effective. He even considers participating in politics, if independent candidates are solid[824], because he does not "trust any political party". *X*'s son-in-law, as elected representative by the independent (citizen oriented) path, might be the ultimate stage of the blurry boundaries between the political, economic and criminal arenas.

Recapitulating the evidence presented lengthwise the chapter, it is possible to state that the rapport between political, economic and criminal arenas is not as simple as two separate clear-cut worlds which frontiers are eventually challenged by one of the actors, belonging to one side or the other. It is neither pertinent to reduce it to an ensemble of short-term exchanges between actors, who stay well-defined and through certain hierarchy is observable. It seems much more complex and dynamic where borders are constantly redefined. Figure 5.6 attempts to illustrate such configuration.

First of all, the spheres representing the actors might not be conceived as closed and well-defined levels, since one person could be businessman, politician and *narco* at the same time. Then, as a certain hierarchy of one actor over the others is not a guarantee, more than a triangle, the image should be a circular in shape. In addition, the links between the actors, in contrast to a tit-for-tat dynamic, seem less structured. Some ties could be strong and long-lasting, while others could be spontaneous and non-repetitive games. Some of them occur in a grey zone[825] (Auyero, 2007), while others occur within formality and institutional scaffolding.

[824] In 2014, a constitutional amendment enables the participation of independent candidates (non-members of a political party) in the electoral process (Acuerdo por el que se reforman, adicionan y derogan diversas disposiciones de la Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos. Diario Oficial de la Federación, Ciudad de México, February 10th, 2014). This new figure has been especially used by former partisan militants who attempt being elected on the citizen image. On the Constitutional amendment background and context see the report IBD, 2015.

[825] This notion of 'grey area' receives interesting interpretations in the academic literature. According to Auyero and Mahler, the "grey area" (*zona gris*) is a space formed by the invisible, informal, even illegal links between established political elites and other important actors of the political game. The authors claim that it is not only formed by politicians but by the collective violence instigators (Auyero and Mahler, 2011). Sciarrone, on the other hand, defines the "grey area" as the space of possible links, agreements and business shared by businessmen and criminal groups (Sciarrone, 2008).

Figure 5.6 Business, Politicians and *Narcos*: the blurry boundaries



Source: Elaborated by the author based on fieldwork analysis.

Finally, the three arenas could be related directly or through other actors, brokers usually considered as "neutral". The case of an activist that has fought against certain industries to stop a river being polluted clearly illustrates this aspect. When I asked her if the *Narco* plays a role in this arena , she stated:

> *"Ah! [sighs] […]. After seeing* ***that the state was not responding, the businessmen didn't respond*** *and that we, the society, we were not enough to… respond… we were not strong enough to generate a clear answer… and… It… was 2010, we had already tried even with human rights organization, everything… and* ***we realised we were not going to achieve anything****… then, a group of people, we started crying during a meeting, literally, beaten! Because… we have lost the bet, even journalist had left… so, one of the mates… she goes* ***'well, I would like to propose… let's go to talk with the*** **narcos!** *What else has to happen before we doing something to stop our people from dying'… I tell you that and I've got a lump in my throat, because she, hopeless, said* ***'let's be brave and go talk to them, rumour has it that they help… indeed, they help the*** **jodidos**[826]**!** ***and recover towns and stuff'****. We had the dilemma, an ethical… debate, we said* ***'if neither the State, nor businessmen react... are we going to go to criminals', well, they are all criminals!*** *[laughs]"*
>
> Elvia Lara, Activist
> Guadalajara, Jal., October 15th, 2015
> *(Q5-28)*

[826] Mexican term to refer someone who live badly, without money, hopeless. (DEM, 2017).

Although Elvia Lara did not clarify if, in the end, they actually decided to request *narcos'* help or not, her account shows that a *Narco,* under the reputation of 'good narcos', could be contacted by the activists to force businessmen to stop river pollution. Thus, the business sector, in such case, rather that colluded, would be threaten by *narcos* due to ecologists' requests. In fact, according to Jesús Salas, an industrialist and former Minister, philanthropic causes, NGOs, associations that work with orphans or hospitals are spaces where the "intermingling and coexistence"[827] with *Narco* also occurs. That lead, however, might be developed in future research.

The complex configuration has many features. The elephant seems huge and the blind men, at certain moments, blend in with the pachyderm. Actually, even if it is not touched, building friendship with someone who has been living hand-in-hand with it is significant.

In the second wave of fieldwork in Guadalajara, I contacted Armida Romero and María Emma Santillán not only because, as explained in the Introduction, they helped me a lot reaching people during the first visit to the city, but mostly because we kept in touch since my first stage at Guadalajara[828]. When I arrived in the city, María Emma rapidly proposed to have dinner the three of us, to catch up and to figure out how they could help me in this second wave of collecting information. In that regard, I had only one request: I asked them if they had any ideas to be able to speak to the State General Attorney[829]. María Emma answered that she could probably help since her father knew him. Then she added: "he [the State General Attorney] was supposed to attend my wedding, but at the end, he cancelled. He had to work or something but, let me ask to my father if he can help you". At this early stage of the anecdote, it is already visible that María Emma's father, a prominent businessman, had some ties with important politicians and public officers and such relationships could be oiled sharing a social event, as María Emma's wedding, something not necessarily surprising in the Mexican context. What would be less expected is the rest of the story.

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[827] Interview conducted with Jesús Salas, Industrial and former Minister. October 8th, 2015. Zapopan, Jal.
[828] Following episode account is either based on the *Whatsapp* messages exchange with María Emma Santillán and Armida Romero, between January 11th and 22nd, 2017 or derived from the conversation hold with them, during dinner, on January 15th, 2017.
[829] Knowing that his interview could be neither easy to achieve, nor very helpful due to the "media training effect", evoked in the methodological considerations, my idea was to employ the interview as an entrance to contact medium-level officers, who would never speak to me, unless their boss said so.

Two days after, María Emma texted me saying that her father would gladly help me to obtain an appointment with the State General Attorney, and even go with me to the interview. I thought that having both interlocutors in the conversation, despite being a methodological challenge, could be useful to observe their interaction. María Emma was visibly happy to help. She said that his father would call me as soon as he got news from the Attorney. I asked her the father's complete name and some tips on how to address to him: "he is not very formal, call him *licenciado*[830], that's OK", she answered.

As part of my fieldwork protocol, I took a look at her father's profile on *Google* to have some clues about him. If he would drive me to the General Attorney, it might be pertinent to have more information. So far, I just knew that he never agreed on giving me an interview during my initial fieldwork, despite his daughter's persistence in asking him. María Emma argued that he was "shy and he didn't feel comfortable speaking". The simplest search process resulted into a couple of newspapers articles[831] that mentioned him as an alleged *operador financiero*[832]for *a* drug cartel.

According to the press notes, María Emma's father might be a childhood friend of a couple of figures related to the cartel. The first character was a descendant of a prominent family of local politicians, but with a problematic reputation himself. He was implicated in various rumours on his links with drug trafficking and he was assassinated. The second one had been arrested in the same operation in which a group of cartel members were captured. In the moment I read the press releases, he was awaiting trial on charges of operations conducted with funds of illicit origin and illegal carrying of firearms. The newspapers also explained that my possible contact with the State General Attorney might be under investigation not only due to the long-lasting friendship with both figures, but also since they were partners in different business. Thus, he could be a cartel's front man or *operador financiero.*

[830] Someone who has earned a bachelors' degree.
[831] I deliberately avoid including the complete reference of the notes to preserve the anonymity of María Emma Santillán and her family identities.
[832] According to Jorge Lara, former deputy attorney general, there is not a legal definition for "operador financiero". However, it is possible to build one considering money laundering in its different modalities. A financial operator is, then, someone who without committing any of the crimes from which ill-gotten money has originated, perform the necessary activities to conceal illegally obtained resources, by means of administration, custody investment or transference. They could be individuals or entities, either formal or front companies which due to their business activity, are part of the formal financial system.

After reading obsessively the press extracts and searching for more information on the web and newspapers online versions, I realised that the fieldwork was sharply revealing how porous were the boundaries between the so-called legal and illegal worlds. I felt nervous and, for the first time on the fieldwork, I was afraid. Then I recalled the words of one of my interviewees who, off the record, had told me "the problem in Guadalajara is that you never know to whom you are talking to"[833].

Some elements suddenly made sense: *i)* María Emma's father had never accepted the interview. I went to check the *Excel* sheet where I registered the contacts I made before having an appointment, then I noticed that, during my initial fieldwork, I exchanged more than ten messages with María Emma's brother (also businessman) who kindly accepted to give me an interview, but never had free time to schedule it; *ii)* While dinning, María Emma told us, kind of ashamed, that his father had over-reacted about her husband when they got engaged: "*¡lo mandó a investigar!"*[834]*,* she complained. María Emma did not give more details, but afterwards, an ensemble of unanswered questions arose in front of me. Did her father hire someone to investigate his son-in-law to be? Has he a regular staff able to do the task? Anyway, appealing the experts to collect information about someone seems not to be businessmen's exclusive protection mechanism, but also part of the tools of this (potential) businessman/*narco*.

The anecdote could be seen as an insignificant approach to the elephant in the room, however, that suggest at least three leads to follow for the analysis. First, I did not dig deep to reach this information about María Emma's father, so anyone who writes his name in *Google* could find the same sources. This speaks to the visibility of these versions and how they coexisted with the society pages, since her wedding appeared in the local press, as expected in any wealthy family.

Second, the possibility to access the General Attorney through someone who has been publicly declared to be probably related with a drug cartel is meaningful. That points out that the links between businessmen, government and *narcos* are fluid and persistent. In fact, it would be difficult to locate María Emma's father either as a businessman or as *narco* (as illustrated in Figure 5.6). In the end, the meeting with the Attorney never took place, so it is

[833] Fieldwork notes, August 28th, 2015.
[834] He asked someone to investigate him.

also possible to speculate that they are probably not that close or, they hardly know each other. Being the case, to offer a contact with him could likely be a sort of bluff. With what purpose?

Third, an obvious question to ask is if María Emma knows about the allegations surrounding her father. I am not able to know it for sure, nevertheless, it seems she does not. We talked about the presence of the *Narco* in the city many times and her accounts and reactions were similar to any other interlocutor. In fact, the quote that opens Part I is clear in that regard, she reproduces many of the elements of the dominant narrative, not being more watchful or cautious while speaking about it. Besides, in one of our last conversations, María Emma told me that her brother was really the only one involved in his father business. The girls were into different activities: she runs a philanthropic organization while her sister is in the artistic field. Women are kept out of business is usual and, when it comes to illegal transactions, it seems the rule. In *Mafiosi* dynamics, the ties are knit through males which is why consanguinity bonds could be categorized as agnatic kinship or kinsmen (Blok, 2002). Perhaps, a gender gap gives María Emma the possibility to stay blind, despite growing up and inhabiting with the giant elephant in the exact same room.

Part III. Co-Producing Social Order: The Case of a Protection Group "Created *by* and *for* Businessmen"

> *L'aspiration de l'agneau à se faire loup suscite la plupart des événements. Ceux qui n'ont pas de crocs, en rêvent; ils veulent dévorer à leur tour, et y réussissent par la bestialité du nombre.*
> *L'histoire, -- ce dynamisme des victimes.*
>
> E. M. Cioran[835]

Thus far, this research has intended to contribute to the understanding of protection mechanisms, focusing on businessmen that operate in dangerous contexts. Thus, it has explored what *Tapatio* proprietors consider a threat, as well as some of the mechanisms they adopt to neutralize them. In that vein, an entanglement of government and non-government protection suppliers has been identified, all of whom stated they were related through bonds relying on coalition, collusion and sometimes collision dynamics. Businessmen have been portrayed as "VIP victims" that employ such suppliers for protection, either due to their selective and personalized access to law enforcement agencies, or to their financial means to purchase this service.

As has been previously stated, the specialized literature in the field of protection services frames businessmen mostly as victims and, when it grants them a more active role, it is one limited to that of sponsors for militias and other violent entrepreneurs. Thus, landowners, shopkeepers and/or industrials have seemed to be the financial source for guards and even death-squads[836]. Nevertheless, studies focusing on business sector evolution in Mexico and the state of Jalisco in particular have demonstrated that local notables had played a main role on the country's democratic transition and, notably, in the adoption of the market-oriented economic model (Cerutti Pignat, 2007; Román et. al., 2004; Arellano Ríos, 2004).

Re-reading the implications of both frameworks, it might be said that the level of organization required for an established supply and demand relationship, and especially a stable sponsorship role, indicate that the issue is not one of isolated occurrence, but is rather a far-reaching and consistent problem. However, although they gained unprecedented influence in other realms, such as in the electoral arena and in the state's transition to a market economy,

[835] Cioran, E. M. (1980). *Syllogismes de l'amertume.* Paris: Gallimard, p.129.
[836] See footnote 21 in Introduction.

when it comes to policing, they seem reduced to victims with money, (un)willingly paying in exchange for protection. A gap, then, emerges in the narrative: How did the more active economic elites participate not only in demanding protection, but in defining how it is supplied?

Outside of Mexico there are documented cases describing how threatened proprietors are prone to get involved in the production of their own protection services.

By way of illustration, Calderón Figueroa (2013) argues that behind the emergence of Peruvian Urban Patrols[837] there were small-scale producers, retailers, micro-entrepreneurs and even informal street vendors. It means that the economic sector not only paid for the protection, but also established the groups that provided it, and were likely involved in defining the manner in which they did so as well. However, the analysis is focused on the patrols' activities in administering justice, leaving aside the *ronderos'*[838] sociological profile, trajectories and specific activities and making it difficult to clearly observe retailers and micro entrepreneurs as protection (co)producers.

In the case of the previously mentioned *Convivir* groups of Colombia, Grajales (2016) explains that a rich banana producer was a key agent in the emergence of these militarized private security providers. Yet, financial resources seem to be only one of several contributions by Colombian economic elites to the violence; the author demonstrates that such groups were also used as a mechanism to involve businessmen in the counter-insurgency cause. Here, the role of businessmen is not limited to that of a mere "victim paying for protection." Rather, it denotes a more diverse range, directly affecting violence patterns and their administration.

In fact, throughout the present discussion, some leads have already suggested that constraining businessmen to the figure of "victims" lead us to neglect their importance in defining their own protection conditions and, ultimately, their influence in shaping local social order. For instance, while analyzing how they and their families have shared several social spaces with the *narcos*, their leading role in defining the threat and managing to deal

[837] The Urban Patrols (*Rondas Urbanas*) emerged in Cajamarca, Peru in the mid-1990s. They were inspired by the patrolling model implemented earlier by the Peruvian *Rondas Campesinas* (Peasant Patrols). For more on the *Rondas Campesinas* see Gálvez Rivas and Serpa Arana, 2013; Piccoli, 2008; Gitlitz, 1998.
[838] Members of the *Rondas* or patrols.

with it despite having protection suppliers has been made clear. Furthermore, businessmen's long-standing participation in citizens' security councils and alleged support for high-level law enforcement nominations, both reviewed in precedent chapters, is indicative of a sector that likely has been doing much more than resisting threats.

This chapter aims to take the prior intuition further, shedding light on businessmen not exclusively as crime victims but also as producers of self-protection services. Then, I will argue that, concerned about their own security, businessmen co-produce their own protection and, thus, they contribute in shaping Guadalajara's policing patterns and social order.

Co-production of public services is a scenario in which such services (education, health or security, for instance) are not only produced and delivered by public agencies and/or private suppliers, but also by the citizens and communities benefited from such service (Brandsen and Honingh, 2015).

The notion was originally developed from an economics perspective through the foundational texts of Ostrom (1977), Ostrom and Ostrom (1977) and Parks et al. (1981). For Ostrom, the "inputs used to produce a good or service are contributed by individuals who are not 'in' the same organization" (1996: 1073). Parks then defines co-production as "a mixing of the productive efforts of regular producers and consumers" (Parks et al., 1981: 1002). These definitions, as can be observed, lack clarity in several aspects, especially considering the vagueness in the relationship implied by the word "contributing."

However, despite the ambiguities in the terms, one must keep in mind two helpful conditions posited by this notion of co-production: first, that the beneficiaries of a public service are interested in transforming the service they receive (Ostrom, 1996), and second, that this entails a change in the relationship they hold with the regular and alternative providers of the service.

From other approaches such as new public management or third sector (voluntary) studies, some authors have revisited the concept, emphasizing that public service beneficiaries could take part in one or many of the stages of the production process (commissioning, design, implementation, assessment, etc.) and that this would entail different types of co-production (Brandsen and Honingh, 2015; Koven, 1992; Brudney and England, 1983).

Additionally, the typologies proposed by Brandsen and Honningh (2015; 2018) avoid considering as "co-production" any action taken by citizens merely to acquire a public service (for instance, a citizen calling the police or students attending public schools). Thus, what they refer to as an active contribution necessarily applies to one or more of the public service production processes.[839]

Regarding public security, scholars studying co-production build on the understanding that public safety and order is not exclusively provided by the state alone, although this is considered its core task. They claim that the way public safety is produced had changed from a top-down model to a more "intimate relationship between police and citizens" (Loeffler, 2018: 213). This perspective assumes, then, a high degree of trust among the actors, opposite of what has been observed in in the preceding pages.

Certainly, this corpus of literature has several limitations. For one, it sets public, private and citizen's arenas as clearly delimited and distinct from one another. In that sense, actors (regular and alternative providers, as well as consumers) would be sharply separated, yet prone to collaborate in order to achieve the provision of the same (shape of) public good, based on the same interests and intentions. When it comes to policing and social order, in addition, all the actors would be respectful of the state's claim to the monopoly on legitimate use of physical force, settling the limits of everyone's margin of maneuver, as no one would attempt to replace or challenge law enforcement agencies. In fact, scholars warned of the possibility that co-production might entail an "adverse effect when these limits are not recognized" (Loeffler, 2018: 220), resulting in the state being replaced and qualifying this scenario as "the 'dark side' of co-production" (Williams et al., 2015 in Loeffler, 2018: 220). Lest it remain a "dark side," the entanglement between arenas and actors, sometimes competing while others collaborating, must be our starting point of analysis.

In view of the foregoing, I will borrow the notion of "co-production" in a way not entirely attached to this literature, but as a means of describing a scenario in which businessmen

[839] A subtle difference between co-government (or co-management) and co-production should be noted, since the former refers to interorganizational collaboration, while the latter refers to the links between private and public realms during the production process (Brandsen and Honingh, 2015).

actively take part in the way protection is delivered to them particularly, and to the rest of the *Tapatios* by consequence[840].

To accomplish that purpose, this section studies the case of a currently existing anti-kidnapping group, founded in 1997 *by* and *for Tapatio* businessmen: *Minerva 1997*[841].

Consequently, in this part, the analysis will change in relation to prior pages. Rather than observing the *Tapatio* business sector in its entirety, the focus will shift to a group created by a small ensemble of local notables. This does not mean that the discussion will yield exclusively micro-level conclusions, as the group is located within the larger sector landscape, giving its presence and performance an influential role in Guadalajara's security environment.

In that vein, to carry on the in-depth analysis of *Minerva 1997,* I will divide the collected information into four groups: (a) the narrative of the group founders and (explicit or presumed)[842] members; (b) the accounts of other businessmen that, while not part of the group, shared some references or knowledge about it, even implicitly; (c) words coming from complementary profiles (public servants, journalist, scholars); and (d) press notes or any other open source that alluded to the anti-kidnapping group[843]. On an exceptional basis, I will mobilize some interviews that do not make any reference to this group. This will be when the omission itself demonstrates a relevant point and contributes to a better understanding of *Minerva 1997.* Therefore, although the fieldwork has been highly exploited across previous chapters, in this part it will be the primary, and almost exclusive, source of information.

The argument will be developed across two highly complementary chapters, the first of which will be a response to a fundamental question: What are we talking about when we

[840] Other authors working on policing studies have used the term "co-production" in a more flexible way, emphasizing the many kind of authors involved in the process. For instance, regarding the French case, Ocqueteau (2004) used the term to denote a period in which "private security participated in the co-production of collective security" (p. 155).
[841] Pseudonym chosen to keep a key aspect of the group's original name (its affiliation to the city) while ensuring the anonymization of the sources. "*La Minerva"* is the most representative monument of the city. It is a fountain adorned with a statue of the Roman goddess Minerva, carried out in the early 1950s. The figure is apparently inspired in the mother of the then Governor (and also celebrated writer) Agustín Yañez (1953-1959). (Fieldwork carnet, November 25th, 2015).
[842] In some cases, there are strong signs that the respondent is (or has been) member of the group. However, he/she was not explicit about it. Certainly, that will be discussed in the following pages.
[843] In order to keep the anonymity of the respondents and the group itself, I will mention the press notes in a general way, not offering the exact reference unless the identity of the sources is not compromised.

speak of *Minerva 1997*? I claim that a set of conjunctural and structural factors contribute to the decision of an ensemble of businessmen to actively engage in the production of protection services. In addition, characterizing the earliest stages of the group will lay the foundations for a better understanding of the extent of *the group's influence* on the protection producing patterns.

Chapter 7, in its turn, will provide a deep analysis of *Minerva 1997*'s accounted actions and routines: How do they do what they do? In this regard, the group will be observed with focus on the relations settled with government and non-government protection suppliers, but also on its own features, namely, its ambiguous position regarding visibility-secrecy dimensions and its long-lasting presence in Guadalajara's landscape of violence. From that standing point, I will demonstrate that the ensemble of blurry boundaries between the private and public, the formal and informal, and the legal and illegal realms discussed in previous chapters have provided optimal scaffolding for the construction of this group and, in consequence, allow us to witness how businessmen transcend their condition of protection demanders and consumers, becoming directly involved in the production process and, ultimately, in shaping Guadalajara's social order.

Chapter 6. The *Minerva 1997:* The Genealogy of an Anti-Kidnapping Group

> *In Jalisco, a group named Group…* Minerva 1997*, was created, and that group was* ***created by businessmen, for businessmen****. They attend specifically to the issue of kidnappings.*
>
> Raymundo Chávez, Agro-Industrial
> Zapopan, Jal., August 29th, 2015
> *(Q6-1)*

> *There is a… well,* ***it is not a police body****, but****… it is an anti-kidnapping group****, here in Jalisco.* ***When you have a problem, you can talk to them.*** *Through this…businessmen's Association Coordinator … and there,* ***it [the problem] can be taken care of.***
>
> Benito Alvarado, Industrial Sector Businessman
> Zapopan, Jal., September 2nd, 2015
> *(Q6-2)*

It was my sixth day of work on the field. I had spent the first days trying to contact potential interviewees, scheduling appointments and "casing the place." That day, I had scheduled my second interview. I was expecting to collect some interesting findings, mostly I was looking forward to the opportunity to refine some of the questions included in my interview protocol. I did not imagine that I was about to start pulling on one of the most precious threads of this research: the existence of *Minerva 1997*.

Juan Zenón, an 80-year-old businessman, son of a European immigrant, asked me to meet him in his company's facilities. It was a big, old factory located in the middle of a popular neighborhood named *Colonia Magnolias*[844]. Jokingly, Zenón told me that people used to call the area "*The Colombia Magnolias,"* a play on words to underline that the neighborhood hosts "a lot of little and big drug dealers,"[845] as is commonly attributed to the South American country. Despite the reputation of the area and having been a kidnapping victim himself almost 20 years ago, he said he was not afraid of crime and violence. In fact, the security devices and entry filters in the building were hardly perceptible,[846] something he emphasized proudly as evidence that he decided "not to keep being a prisoner to criminals" after the kidnapping he suffered. Curious about this episode, but also trying to avoid causing him

[844] Pseudonym. The real name is also a flower. *Colonia* means neighbourhood.
[845] Interview conducted with J. Zenón, Industrial Sector Businessman. (August 27th, 2015). Guadalajara, Jal. Hereafter, the quotations attributed to Juan Zenón come from the same interview unless otherwise specified.
[846] For a discussion of the devices *Tapatio* businessmen deploy in their companies, see Chapter 4.

discomfort, I asked shyly if he would mind talking about it. "No, it doesn't bother me at all," he answered. He went into some detail, describing his experience as one of several other Mexican businessmen affected in those times during the late-1990s.

> *- [Seeing that it was] a number of businessmen that were affected by kidnappings and such, was there any collective reaction in which you worked together as businessmen to protect yourselves?*[847]
>
> *- Yes, definitely!*
>
> *- What happened?*
>
> *- **A group was created. It was called*** **Minerva 1997.** *If you want to discuss security,*[848] *I can get you an interview with Héctor L. Orta. He is the… he is part of the group* Minerva 1997. *It is **a group of businessmen created to watch out for and control**… negative opportunities that crime had against businessmen. **It helped a lot!***
>
> Juan Zenón, Industrial Sector
> Zapopan Jal., August 27th, 2015
> *(Q6-3)*

This was the first time I had heard about the group, and many questions arose from Zenón's account. What precisely does "a group of businessmen" mean? How did they "watch out for and control" criminal threats? How had the group "helped a lot," and who did it help? Is the group still operating today?

One week later I was interviewing the *Minerva 1997*'s co-founder Héctor L. Orta. In total, we met three times to talk at length about the group.[849] In addition, knowing about the group early in the fieldwork, I was able to inquire about it among the rest of the interviewees, through the following general question: "do you know, or have you heard about, any effort or endeavor made by *Tapatio* businessmen regarding business sector safety?"[850] A dozen

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[847] This is the only case in which I used the framing "protect yourselves" as part of the question. Starting with the third interview, the queries about *Minerva 1997* were formulated avoiding notions that could contaminate or condition the answer.

[848] The conditional "if you want to discuss security," as if that subject was not the heart of my research, comes from my strategy of starting with generic questions and letting issues of security emerge on their own or after I had established some empathy with the interlocutor, as explained in the Introduction.

[849] It is possible that his disposition to talk about the group relies on J. Zenón's intermediation to contact him. This intuition will be further developed in Chapter 7. I interviewed Héctor L. Orta On September 3rd and 18th, 2015 and in January 18th, 2017.

[850] The question formulated as generically as mentioned was normally enough to get an answer related to *Minerva 1997.* The reader must notice that I intentionally did not use words such as "to protect" or "to be protected." I even avoided saying "yourselves," to avoid conditioning the interviewees' narrative, especially when it comes to their description of the group. Exceptionally, I reformulated the question into a more specific one if the answer was confusing or vague, yet always seeking not to condition the answer.

interviewees talked about the group *Minerva 1997*, sometimes naming it explicitly, while others referred to it in a more indirect way.[851]

Although intriguing, the notion of an "anti-kidnapping group" is vague, especially when it comes to businessmen taking part in it. In previous chapters it has been stated that businessmen's participation in shaping the public security agenda and the protection market has been quite significant, but how does this group fit in such complex configuration?

This chapter aims to analyze the emergence and nature of *Minerva 1997,* trying to characterize it from its earliest stage: *what is Minerva 1997?* First, I discuss the context in which the group was created, showing it was the optimal scenario for the emergence of "not a police body, but an anti-kidnapping group," to recall Benito Alvarado's words, which serve as this chapter's epigraph. Then, I will sketch a first image of the group, based on two elements, namely, how different actors define the group and what is known about their member profile. Together, context and profile shall explain the complex entity that is *Minerva 1997.*

6.1 Conjunctural and structural factors behind *Minerva 1997*'s emergence

In 1997, businessman Juan Zenón was driving his car in a crowded avenue of Guadalajara City. Suddenly, a group of gunmen blocked his way and, at gun point, kidnapped him. Some minutes later, they called Zenón's relatives to obtain a ransom in exchange for the businessman's release. His more than 40 days in captivity were added to the hundreds of kidnapping-for-ransom cases registered at the state of Jalisco back in those years.

According to Zenón, his kidnapping was "the straw that broke the camel's back"[852] for the business sector. Considering the "poor awareness that government had shown about the magnitude of the problem,"[853] around thirty businessmen reacted by creating the anti-kidnapping group *Minerva 1997.*

[851] I intentionally omit the exact number of respondents who meet this criterion in order to avoid the mistaken interpretation of qualitative data as representative of an interviewee proportion or, even further, of business sector in general, as discussed in the Introduction.
[852] Interview conducted with Juan Zenón, Industrial Sector Businessman. (August 27th, 2015). Zapopan, Jal. Hereafter, the accounts attributed a Juan Zenón come from the same interview unless otherwise specified.
[853] Interview conducted with Héctor L. Orta, Industrial Sector Businessman and co-founder of the group. (September 3rd, 2015). Zapopan, Jal.

> *And it [Minerva 1997] has been around for many years. [It arose]* ***due to a kidnapping wave*** *that occurred many years ago, and very worried businessmen formed it [Minerva 1997].*
>
> Juan Galicia, Construction and
> Real Estate Sector Businessman
> Zapopan, September 25th, 2015
> *(Q6-4)*

Among those who made reference to the anti-kidnapping group, there is a common narrative that assumes it was created due to the unprecedented kidnapping crisis registered in the late-1990s, Zenón's case being the one that triggered *Minerva 1997's* emergence.

About the starting moment, Héctor L. Orta, one of the founders, recalled:

> *Some years ago, here in Jalisco, 16 years ago,* ***we had 115 kidnappings of businessmen*** *per year. That was totally wrong! What happened?* ***We organized a group****. We started with around 30 entrepreneurs [he hits the table while speaking], we got together, and* ***we went to visit the Governor*** *[he hits the table]. He didn't… he didn't… he ignored us… so we met together outside the Jalisco House, that is to say, where he lives, and we stayed there until he agreed to have a meeting with us. So, we told him, as easy as that[he hits the table], 'you either solve this problem, or we stop paying taxes starting tomorrow, and you will see what to do, but this cannot go on anymore'. So,* ***we put pressure on the government to do its part****, so that he would make changes and make arrangements with the federal government, to ask them [Federal Government]* ***to send people from Mexico City, and the Army****… to solve the serious problem we had. And we, as businessmen… so… [we said] 'let's join together, so we can see how… to* ***support the government*** *and* ***how we help ourselves to defend ourselves against all those things.****'*
>
> Héctor L. Orta, Industrial Sector Businessman
> and co-founder of Minerva 1997
> Zapopan, September 3rd, 2015
> *(Q6-5)*

The first element that the previous quote reveals is how, for the founders of *Minerva 1997,* kidnappings were unbearable, likely due to the amount of cases, to the point that they were able to demand the Army's intervention, which could be read as an extreme situation. Nevertheless, it has been discussed in Part II, that Army presence in public security tasks does not seem to be either innovative nor unfamiliar for businessmen. Therefore, the "unprecedented" condition of the kidnapping wave is worth a more detailed review.

A second element is a kind of "problem appropriation". It seems that kidnappings were not only an intolerable situation but, above all, a businessman's trouble. The use of the first-person plural in Orta's account - "we had kidnappings" - points to how he perceived the crisis as their own challenge, as businessmen rather than as *Tapatio* civilians. It is clearer when he

evoked the number of kidnappings as if the only victims were businessmen. According to official figures, in 1997 –year of the creation of the group- Jalisco local authorities registered 122 kidnappings for ransom[854]. However, as discussed in Chapter 1, the available information does not allow us to distinguish how many of the victims were businesspersons. If anything, it helps to notice that Orta's perspective is highly aligned with the narrative explored in the first chapter which conceives of the business sector as particularly vulnerable regarding crimes such as kidnapping. Thus, although the problem appropriation might be a necessary element to explain the businessmen's reaction, it seems not to be enough to understand the way they did it.

Actually, the extract of Orta's account shows that businessmen's first reaction was not truly a peculiar situation, as a group of businessmen knocking high-level authorities' door to seek solutions to their problems is not an unusual scene.

The anecdote shared by Victor Manuel Olvera,[855] a service sector businessman, helps illustrate this. According to him, the substandard conditions of public healthcare forced a group of businessmen to address the highest-level (federal and local) authorities. Their claim was clear: businessmen pay taxes for every employee's public healthcare rights. However, the poor conditions of the services implied two additional costs for proprietors: a) Having to work with employees with some diseases (who are also less productive) or to operate with reduced staff; and b) being forced to subsidize private health insurances for employees. To deal with the problem, while gathered at a business association's offices they organized a meeting with the authorities and confronted them with a large line of workers, located in the lobby as if they were endlessly waiting for a medical appointment in a public hospital. This kind of mobilization reaffirmed the businessmen's statement: either public healthcare services improve, or they would stop paying taxes.

In that sense, the starting action taken by the soon-to be members of *Minerva 1997* is hardly distinguishable from others inspired by issues other than insecurity. Actually, the mobilization of 'ill workers' could be read as more challenging to the authorities, since businessmen brought workers to the meeting to protest, performing a sort of public hospital's

[854] Executive Secretariat of the National Public Security System (SESNSP). Data are available from 1997 and onward. For more on the figures of kidnappings registered by the law enforcement agencies, as well as some of its limitations, see Chapter 1.
[855] Interview conducted with Victor Manuel Olvera, Service Sector. (October 15th, 2015). Zapopan, Jal.

waiting room, trying to confront authorities to "what ill workers had been experiencing for a long time," as Olvera explained.

Given the above, it is pertinent to answer why, after protesters had met the Governor and delivered quite a direct message, they decided to remain organized and figure out what else they should do "to defend themselves" under the circumstances. If, as demonstrated in Chapter 1, businessmen have historically been crime victims -including kidnapping-, why did *Minerva 1997* emerge precisely in the late1990s? Why did Zenón's case, instead of all the previous ones, become a trigger for such a reaction? It seems necessary to make a wider review of the context in which the group was created.

I propose, then, to analyze the context in which *Minerva 1997* emerged on the basis of two main types of factors: On the one hand, the wave of kidnappings (including Zenón's case) that occurred in the 1990s will be reviewed as conjunctural factors to elucidate some of their specificities. On the other hand, the change of the political and economic landscapes that took place in those times, and its impact on the business sector, will be observed as structural factors.

The kidnapping-for-ransom became an expanded practice all over the country during the 1990s, reaching its highest point between 1996 and 1998. The press estimated that 2,597 kidnappings occurred in Mexico in this period, of which 168 (6,5%) were registered in Jalisco[856]. Official data estimates, on the other hand, that among the 1,781 cases of kidnappings reported at the national level between 1997 and 1998, 211 cases (11,9%) correspond to Jalisco[857]. Indeed, compared to the rest of Latin America, the national figures in those years were only exceeded by those registered in Colombia (Preston and Dillon, 2004).

[856] El Sexenio del Secuestro. (August 17th, 1999). *Mural*.

[857] Executive Secretariat of the National Public Security System (SESNSP). Data are available from 1997 and onward. The data coming from the press are not necessarily comparable with those coming from law enforcement agencies, since they could be supported by different sources (even to define the analysis unit). Official data represents the cases that appeared as a preliminary investigation (*Averiguación Previa*), referring to the crimes reported to the prosecutor's office. For a discussion on official data limitations see Chapter 1. Other efforts to estimate the real dimension of the problem come from press coverage, organized civil society, international organizations and think tanks. Based on press reports, official documents and direct accounts from alleged victims or their families, they offer alternative estimates seeking to minimize the *cifra negra* (dark figure). Despite the importance of the effort, significant methodological weaknesses (and sometimes, politically biased agendas) make it difficult to have accurate figures (Consejo Ciudadano para la Seguridad Pública y la Justicia Penal, A.C., 2011).

Perhaps the best-known kidnapper in that period was the so-called '*El Mochaorejas*' (the Ear Chopper), who was active mostly in Mexico City and central states of Mexico. Daniel Arizmendi, '*El Mochaorejas*', is a former local police officer in the state of Morelos, who became a car-jacker and, eventually a kidnapper. At the beginning of his kidnapping trajectory he targeted wealthy businessmen. His nickname comes from his habit of maiming his victims' ears to send to their families as a pressure mechanism. His criminal activity reached an "industrial rhythm", achieving a large number of kidnappings in a continuous (almost simultaneous) way (Preston and Dillon, 2004). Such standard is due to the network he established, composed by members of his family, police officers, lawyers and local politicians[858]. Press coverage revealed he was operating under police officers' protection until his capture, in 1998[859]. That made him the Mexican kidnapper that had accumulated the largest fortunes from ransoms, according to Francisco Herrera, kidnapping-and-ransom consultant[860]. Currently, Arizmendi is serving a sentence of 60 years[861] in a Federal high security prison[862].

Regarding Jalisco, in that period, the kidnapping victims were not only important businessmen from different sectors, but also some celebrities' relatives: the son of one of the most famous Mexican singers,[863] or the father of an award-winning filmmaker, among others[864]. The only aim of kidnappers seemed to be obtaining large amounts of money and, for that purpose, businessmen usually seemed to be the optimal target.

> *[In Jalisco], perhaps the moment it [kidnapping for ransom]* ***started to become a crisis was when El Loncho and his people appeared.*** *They came from Sinaloa. When the*

[858] "Arizmendi: delito como herencia familiar". (September 7th, 2008). *Reforma*.
[859] A very detailed press coverage of this case is available through the many articles and notes published by *Reforma* newspaper form November 24th, 1997 to August 1998. Other important remarks of the case could be found in Preston and Dillon (2004).
[860] Around 40 million dollars in that time. (Interview conducted with Francisco Herrera, owner of a Private Security Company and kidnapping-and-ransom consultant. (February 1st, 2017). Mexico City).
[861] With a last sentence handed down in 2006, Arizmendi accumulated 398 years in prison to serve. However, according to the Federal Criminal Code, the maximum term of imprisonment in Mexico is 60 years. (Art. 25, Titre II, Chapter II of the Federal Criminal Code).
[862] After his capture, Arizmendi was transferred to the high security prison of La Palma, State of Mexico. In 2005, he was relocated at Puente Grande, Jalisco, after authorities recognized that while in prison a close –and dangerous- link between the former kidnapper and the drug lords Osiel Cárdenas (Cartel del Golfo) and Benjamín Arellano Félix (Cartel de Tijuana) emerged, ("Trasladan de La Palma a internos". (January 16th, 2005). *Reforma*).
[863] "Rompe Vicente el Silencio". (September 26th, 1998). *Reforma*; "Liberan al hijo mayor de Vicente Fernández". (September 12nd, 1998). *Reforma*.
[864] "Sigue libre uno de los secuestradores del padre de Guillermo del Toro". (October 8th, 2014). *Proceso*; "Manda del Toro mensaje de Paz". (November 16th, 2015). *Reforma*.

> *'war against* Narcos*' started, a lot of the… drug cartel leaders moved to Jalisco, so they [businessmen] thought it would be neutral territory*[865] *(…) but then, suddenly, when they [the criminals]* ***started targeting businessmen, not other*** **narcos** ***but businessmen****, that's when the businessmen started to organize themselves. There (…) were a lot of conferences of self-protection and stuff, they started talking about professionalizing police bodies, and* ***businessmen began to want to hold control of the fighting against these kinds of crimes.***
>
> Francisco Herrera, Private Security Company
> and kidnapping-and-ransom consultant
> Mexico City, February 1st, 2017
> *(Q6-6)*

Francisco Herrera refers to José Alonso Ávila Palafox, *El Loncho*, a kidnapper whose recognized hallmark was to cut off his victims' fingers[866]. Considered the most dangerous kidnapper since *El Mochaorejas. El Loncho* operated in Baja California, Chihuahua, Jalisco, Nayarit, Nuevo León, Sinaloa, Sonora and Zacatecas,[867] known to be responsible for plenty of high-profile kidnapping-for-ransom cases.

According to media, he ran a "very sophisticated organization" which reached around 500 members divided into cells, each with a very specific duty in order to perform high-profile kidnappings-for-ransom.[868]

El Loncho had been arrested in 1995 at the maximum-security prison of Puente Grande, accused of a businessman's kidnapping-for-ransom. Then, he admitted to having been responsible for another 25 cases since 1992. However, he was released some weeks later "due to lack of evidence of crime."[869] Beyond further illustrating the limitations of the justice systemin prosecuting a case, *El Loncho's* release demonstrates how passing through the penitentiary system did not necessarily undermine his criminal organization.

Conversely, despite the commonly accepted notion that kidnapping requires high levels of organization and sophisticated criminal cells,[870] it shall be noted that, in those times, a

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[865] Certainly, Herrera's narrative about the *narcos* clearly fits within the one widely discussed in Chapter 2. It shall be noted, however, that when he refers to the "war against *Narco*" it is in relation to the *CANADOR Operation* rather than with what was currently referenced with the same label (former President Felipe Calderón's [2006- 2012] strategy against drug lords).
[866] "Su marca: cortar los dedos". (January 9th, 1999). *Mural*.
[867] "Detectan a secuestrador que supera a Arizmendi". (January 19th 1999). *Mural*.
[868] 'Acaba la leyenda del "El Loncho"'. (December 23rd, 1999). *Mural*.
[869] "Estuvo preso… pero salió libre". (January 20th, 1999). *Mural*.
[870] Interview conducted with Francisco Herrera, private security company owner and kidnapping-and-ransom consultant. (February 1st, 2017). Mexico City.

number of less organized groups were also perpetrating these offenses in Jalisco.[871] That said, what these crimes had in common was the fact that, whether highly organized or more spontaneous, perpetrators were seeking victims for ransom. Consequently, when referring to kidnapping in the late 1990s, we are more mostly speaking of kidnapping-for-ransom, rather than other modalities observed nowadays, such as the so-called *levantón.*

As has been explained in prior chapters, a *levantón* is an abduction allegedly perpetrated by *narcos*, whether as rituals for settling scores, cartel's inner-control and punishment measures, or even as a means of collecting legally agreed-upon debts. Thereupon, kidnappings-for-ransom were not necessarily related with drug traffickers' presence in Guadalajara. It is pertinent to underline this aspect, especially considering the implicit mixing in Herrera's previous account. When the kidnapping-and-ransom consultant explains that Ávila Palafox was born in Sinaloa, a state largely stigmatized for being the cradle of notable drug lords, and he links *El Loncho's* arrival to Guadalajara with the period during which figures such as Caro Quintero and "Don Neto" moved to the city, he draws these actors closer to one another, although a possible bond among them remains unclear. Here, it remains important to consider that, while it is possible that the account offered by Herrera was solely informed by his knowledge of the period discussed, it is also possible that his present recollection is influenced by the dominant contemporary discourse around insecurity, which tends to relate most crime and violence to drug trafficking.[872]

The cruelty associated with kidnappings seems to come from those times, as *El Mochaorejas* stays in businessmen's memories as the moment when this crime became harsher than others.

> *Kidnapping is, I think, one* ***of the most… horrible crimes****, because… I mean, this is my perception… a murder, it is painful, a death… you suffer it, you assimilate it, and then, you move on. But****, a kidnapping, it is a lifelong harm, to the family and to the kidnapped****. You don't know if [the victim] is fine, if they are hurting him, if they have maimed him… Do you remember the* Mochaorejas*? His cruelty, you don't know if [the victim] is ok… if he or she was raped, if he is going to come back… then, you have a permanent heartbreak, uncertainty… horrible! [It is] worse than a death, in my opinion.*
>
> Raymundo Chávez, Agro-industrial Sector Businessman
> Zapopan, Jal., August 29th, 2015
> *(Q6-7)*

[871] "'Plagian' en Jalisco 8 bandas". (October, 23rd, 2000). *Mural*.
[872] On Sinaloa as drug lords cradle, the arrival of Caro Quintero and "Don Neto" in Guadalajara and, ultimately, the current narrative that over-emphasises the role of drug trafficking organizations on defining the contemporary landscape, see Chapter 2.

Businessmen and their families seemed clearly affected by these crimes. To attach the case to the greater research structure, it is possible to state that an actual or potential threat was identified. From this, what means do businessmen have to demand protection? They have regular and alternative suppliers.

Regarding the role of law enforcement in dealing with the wave of kidnappings-for-ransom, a member of *Minerva 1997* stated that, before they created the group, kidnapping cases were managed through the office of sexual offenses,[873] showing the lack of specialized institutional means to face this problem. This seemed to be the case all over the country. Although kidnapping was (and still is) a local jurisdiction crime *(delito del fuero común)*, the amount and geographical spread of the cases drove the then Attorney-General and the State's Attorneys to prioritize this issue during the First Attorney's National Conference celebrated in 1996. Then, they agreed on establishing specialized agencies to fight against kidnapping in several states. Such public offices, in addition, would be a sort of inter-state network to promote different Attorneys' Offices to work together.[874] The emergence of anti-kidnapping agencies must be contextualized within the progressive fragmentation and devolution of bureaucracies and the building of a polycentric system, occurring then in Mexico and Latin America, as widely explained in Chapter 3.

Along with the referenced institutional transformation, the wave of kidnappings in the 1990s also coincided with the emergence of security professionals, whose locus was the private realm, or more precisely, the entanglement of private protection provision services that market-oriented reforms yielded. Such is the case of the so-called patrimonial crisis insurances and kidnapping-for-ransom consultants *(negociadores*), both reviewed in Chapter 4. Rather than focusing on the emergence of these security professionals' profile or to point out how non-government protection providers took part of a "million-dollar industry,"[875] what shall be especially recalled from the discussion conducted before in the text is how these

[873] Interview conducted with Ernesto González, Industrial Sector. (October 16th, 2015). Zapopan, Jal. I was not able to confirm this version. Indeed, the former governor Alberto Cárdenas, running the state when *Minerva 1997* appeared, claimed not to remember how kidnappings were managed before his administration (Interview conducted with the former governor Alberto Cárdenas Jiménez. (April 22nd, 2018). Mexico City).
[874] "Habrá agrupaciones mixtas anti-secuestro". (October 27th, 1996). *Reforma*.
[875] Steinsgler, José. (September 26th, 1999). La Industria del Secuestro S.A: El precio de ser millonario. *La Jornada*.

staff were coaching businessmen to go all the way through a kidnapping-for-ransom experience. *Negociadores'* contribution not only shaped the negotiations with perpetrators, but also determined whether law enforcement agencies intervened at certain point and, if so, how they did.

So far, it is possible to characterize kidnapping-for-ransom as highly cruel, rent-seeking oriented, perpetrated by (more or less) organized criminal groups, managed by victims' relatives through an ensemble of non-government professionals or/and an (un)specialized government agency. Yet, the 1990s was not the first-time businessmen were victims of kidnapping. How does this wave compare with other kidnapping critical situations experienced before by local notables? Why did this crisis encourage businessmen to, as Herrera stated, "hold control of the fighting against these kinds of crimes" through *Minerva 1997*?

To address the prior questions, it is useful to return to the kidnapping that occurred during the 1970s which, as has been demonstrated in Chapter 1, also affected the business sector.

First of all, it is necessary to recall two elements from the discussion provided in the first chapter: 1) Guadalajara is considered the cradle of the urban *guerrilla*, incarnate by groups such as FRAP, UP and the LC23S[876]; 2) as elsewhere in Latin America, *guerrilla* groups used bank robbery and kidnappings to finance their operation, acquire weapons and negotiate the release of what they called "political prisoners."[877]

Then, reviewing the modality of kidnappings perpetrated by *guerrilla* groups more closely might grant some points of reference to better understand the wave of kidnappings in the 1990s and, eventually, the scenario in which *Minerva 1997* emerged.

Among the *Tapatio* businessmen who were victims of kidnapping in those times, Fernando Aranguren (1973) and Pedro Sarquis Marrawe (1974) were, perhaps, the most shocking cases, since they died during their captivity. Although both cases were significant, businessmen were not the only targets of *guerrilleros*: politicians, diplomats and other outstanding profiles completed the target population. For instance, in 1974 the FRAP

[876] On these groups see Chapter 1.
[877] *Vgr.* "Hoy fueron puestos a disposición del agente del Ministerio Público, 13 delincuentes de los 17 que participaron en el secuestro del Lic. José Guadalupe Zuno Hernández". (September 26th, 1974). *AGN, DGIPS. Caja 1187, Expediente A*; "Relación de personas que se encuentran prófugas y pertenecientes a diversas organizaciones subversivas". (n.d.). *AGN, DGIPS. Caja 1490-A, Miscelánea Expediente 1.*

kidnapped José Guadalupe Zuno, the renowned local politician who was also the father-in-law of then President of Mexico Luis Echeverría (1970-1976).[878]

Regarding their methods of operation, there are three common factors among most of the kidnappings committed by *guerrilla* groups.[879] First of all, the victim was a renowned figure, close to power elites. Then, *guerrilleros'* requests included: a) a significant amount of money as ransom; b) the release of a group of their comrades, imprisoned in different penitentiaries of the country; and c) the means to publish and diffuse some messages, mostly containing the *guerrilla* movement's claims (Zamora, 2014).

Although the money request was a fundamental component of kidnappings, the underlying objective of *guerrilleros* was to challenge the state authority and political elites, while the 1990s kidnappings did not seem to be related to any political claims. Accordingly, during the 1970s, victims were generally "bourgeois" able to collect a substantial amount of money to pay a ransom, but also "members of the exploiter oligarchy,"[880] and close to political elites that could represent an advantage for *guerrilleros* during the negotiation process.

By way of example, in Aranguren's kidnapping case, his family –and the family of the diplomat also kidnapped in those days[881]- expressed on TV that after the Federal Government did not agree to release "political prisoners" as the kidnappers demanded on the negotiation process, the families were still able to fulfill the "financial engagement" they did to preserve victims' life (to pay the ransom). In addition, they offered to "try to obtain, from the governor, safe-conduct passes [for kidnappers] to leave the country."[882] Thus, by kidnapping Aranguren and Williams, the *Guerrilla* group not only gained the opportunity to obtain pecuniary resources, but also a means of getting "safe-conduct passes," even when the government chose to adopt a radical position during the negotiation. Victims and their relatives were able to mobilize financial capital, but they could also serve themselves from

[878] On Zuno's family see footnote 134 in Chapter 1.
[879] It must be said that not all the kidnappings in those days were perpetrated by *guerrilla* groups, the kidnapping-for-ransom was also present but to a smaller-extent. See the case of "the millionaire, Mennonite merchant". Aaron Redekop in Chihuahua. *AGN, DGIPS, Caja 1049, Exp. 2, 1974.*
[880] For illustrative purposes, see Figure 1.2 in Chapter 1.
[881] The Bristish Honorary Consul in Guadalajara, Anthony D. Williams.
[882] "Palabras pronunciadas en el Canal 4 de la Televisión Tapatía a las 22:30 Hrs. de hoy por los hermanos de los secuuestrados". (October 12th, 1973). *AGN, DGIPS, Caja 1188, Expediente 3, October 1st to January 31st, 1974.*

their proximity to local government to have something else to offer in exchange for victims' release.

Nevertheless, their free access and close communication with the Governor did not guarantee businessmen would be able to obtain some of the other petitions addressed by the *guerrilla*, for instance, the imprisoned comrades' release.

Since *guerrilla's* kidnappings were, above all, political contestations, it becomes understandable that, back in those times, the main actor responsible of managing the crisis was the Federal Government, rather than victim's families, even if kidnappers used to contact both. In fact, the file concerning Fernando Aranguren's kidnapping illustrates that, even when the victim's family was deeply involved in the negotiation process, the federal government[883] led the case management.[884] As in most of the cases, the position of the PRI-ruled government was a strong refusal to negotiate with *guerrilleros* and, instead, to increase the counter-insurgency measures against the rebels and their families (Zamora, 2014), all in all, they were in the middle of the *Guerra Sucia.*

When it comes to the business sectors' reactions, some of them just showed their support of government actions through the statement "we are with the authority."[885] They also expressed their discontent –even indignation- with the situation through messages published in the press or by adopting mourning signals in their companies, once the unfortunate end of the victim became known.[886] However, these actions were not different from those implemented by

[883] The Secretariat of the Interior and, specifically, the DFS.
[884] AGN, DGIPS. Caja 1188, Expediente 3, October 1st to January 31st, 1974.
[885] Gazette Bank of Images 1970-2016.
[886] "Grupo de empresas que por medio de la prensa nacional presenta sus condolencias a los familiares del Lic. Fernando Aranguren". (October, 19th, 1973). *AGN, DGIPS, Caja 1188, Expediente 3, October 1st to January 31st, 1974*; "Duelo: comercio e industria cerrarán el lunes.- en todo el estado se van a suspender actividades". (October 20th, 1973). *AGN, DGIPS, Caja 1188, Expediente 3, October 1st to January 31st, 1974.*

other social groups[887], such as parents' associations,[888] or groups in other parts of the country, where criminal incidents also occurred.[889]

From the sector's observed reaction, it is fair to say that, despite the fact that some of their peers had become mortal victims of kidnappings perpetrated by *guerrilla* groups, businessmen did not organize themselves in the 1970s in an effort to protect themselves, as it happened more than twenty years later with the emergence of *Minerva 1997*. A former public officer from the intelligence civil agency, during an informal conversation,[890] emphasized that back then, the families of abducted businessmen did not have any other mechanism to deal with kidnappings aside from the very element that motivated the crime in the first place: their relationship with high-level state elites. Again, Aranguren's case could support this claim. According to an anecdote evoked by Zamora (2014), once Mario Moya Palencia, then Secretariat of the Interior, stated his unwillingness to budge on *guerrilleros'* requests, the father of the victim "turn[ed] to his younger son saying with sadness 'we just lost your brother'" (p.168). In other words, victims' leeway completely depended on government's decision to negotiate or not with kidnappers.

The other conjunctural aspect normally mentioned by *Tapatio* businessmen to explain *Minerva 1997*'s emergence, as earlier mentioned, was the case of Juan Zenón's kidnapping. Even the former Governor Alberto Cárdenas mentioned this case as a turning point in the kidnapping (and security) crisis, accepting that it forced his administration to rush implementation of measures they were already planning to address the problem.[891]

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[887] "Que los niños no acudan a clases, invitación de Pater Familias". (October 21st, 1973*). AGN, DGIPS, Caja 1188, Expediente 3, October 1st to January 31st, 1974*; "Jalisco está de luto". (October 28th, 1973). *AGN, DGIPS, Caja 1188, Expediente 3, October 1st to January 31st, 1974.*

[888] The reaction of parents' associations regarding Aranguren's kidnapping and death could be analysed in a deeper way, if more information about the association's profile was available. If the associations that called to adopt grief signals were mostly those that represent high-class private schools, it would be possible to read those actions as the "high-born" families protesting after losing one of its members. Being the case, the social reaction would come more from Aranguren's membership to high-class families than to business sector. If, in contrast, the parents' associations represented any kind of school's social profile, that would be seen in the reaction of *Tapatio* society, in general. As of this writing it remains a lead to follow for future research.

[889] "Existe temor e inconformidad en diversos sectores de la comunidad, por la creciente ola de delitos.- Sinaloa". (August 29th, 1973). *AGN, DGIPS, Caja 1711-C, Expediente 10, June 1st, 1969 to June 17th, 1974*; "Por medio de un manifiesto publicado en los diarios de todo el estado, miembros de la CANACO de Mazatlán piden al gobernador dicte medidas enérgicas para solucionar la ineptitud, desorganización y falta de capacidad de la Policía Judicial del Estado". (March 14th, 1973). *AGN, DGIPS, Caja 1711-C, Expediente 10, June 1st, 1969 to June 17th, 1974*.

[890] Informal conversation held with a former public officer on April 20th, 2018 in Mexico City.

[891] Interview conducted with former Governor Alberto Cárdenas. (April 22nd, 2018). Mexico City.

Certainly, Zenón is a high-profile businessman: his company is large, with many years of operation. He has also been an active member of the sector, leading and participating in many associations during his career. Although these are fair leads to help locate Zenón's position in the landscape, it is also useful to explore what his peers say about him in order to explain why his kidnapping could trigger the businessmen's protest and, eventually, the creation of the *Minerva 1997.*

Zenón was recognized by other businessmen as generous and endearing,[892] and several interlocutors mentioned him as an unusual example of trust and solidarity among businessmen. In fact, José Gerardo Zapata,[893] owner of a big company in the industrial sector, said that he frequently asks Zenón for advice regarding his business. He even remembered that a couple of times, during a difficult period for his company, he borrowed money from him, emphasizing both his wisdom and his generosity.

Beyond these anecdotes, I attested to his ranking over some businessmen when he took me to three of them to conduct interviews.[894] In one case, Zenón contacted the businessman via phone call, in my presence, and his request for the interview with me seemed more like an order from a superior than a favor between friends: "Look, I'm going to put you on the phone with Miss Martínez, so you can talk to her and reach an agreement on when you are able to receive her, eh!"[895] Regarding the other case, the interviewee told me that he just accepted to meet me because his "beloved friend" ask him to do it.[896]

Beyond the professional arena, Zenón and his wife appeared in several tabloid magazines as part of Guadalajara's socialite class. Although this is not a conclusive finding, as it does not come from a systematic review of these publications, what shall be emphasized is the indication that Zenón might be seen not only as a businessman, but as a member a select circle of local notables, as was discussed earlier in Chapter 5.

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[892] Interviews conducted with: José Gerardo Zapata, Industrial Sector Businessmen. (September 1st, 2015). Zapopan, Jal.; Héctor L. Orta, Industrial Sector Businessmen and co-founder of the group. (September 3rd, 2015). Zapopan, Jal.; Alberto Alcántara, Commerce Sector Businessman. (September 9th, 2015). Zapopan, Jal.
[893] Interviews conducted with José Gerardo Zapata, Industrial Sector Businessmen. (September 1st, 2015). Zapopan, Jal.
[894] The path of contact of the interviewees is available on the Methodological Appendix *SB*.
[895] Interview conducted with J. Zenón, Industrial Sector Businessmen. (August 27th, 2015). Guadalajara, Jal.; Fieldwork carnet notes, August 27th, 2015.
[896] José Gerardo Zapata, Industrial Sector Businessmen. (September 1st, 2015). Zapopan, Jal.

Although he is not a member of one of the renowned families of the cities, his European ancestry may have provided him with a certain status within high-society, in particular considering what Andrés González, entrepreneur of the culture-service sector, explained about Guadalajara:

> *Since its foundation, [in Guadalajara]* ***the indigenous and creole communities have been completely separated****… and that divided the city, symbolically, since its foundation, and I think that we dragged that tradition on, of negating the natives […] and evidently that is still present in the* Tapatio *society… I mean,* ***it is a very racist society!*** *Even now, while growing and receiving people from a lot of different places, there is still a lot of racism,* ***we are proud of being the*** **güeritos.**[897]
>
> Andrés González, Service Sector Businessman
> Guadalajara, Jal., October 30th, 2015
> *(Q6-8)*

While all components of Zenón's social and financial status mentioned above assign weight to his kidnapping as the catalyzing event for the emergence of *Minerva 1997*, its origin could be further nuanced by revisiting and examining 1970s kidnappings. The previously observed case of Fernando Aranguren could be helpful in that examination. As mentioned before, Aranguren was a major industrialist in a time when the sector was just a narrow group of businessmen. He also was a member of the socialite class. His weight within the business sector was at least commensurable with that of Zenón's. Even further, his kidnapping ended in a tragedy; he was murdered. Nonetheless, as previously described, the business sector reacted with statements and grievance signals, but not with organizing a group for self-protection.

A comparison between kidnappings perpetrated by urban *guerrillas* during the 1970s and the kidnappings-for-ransom that occurred in the 1990s, the main aspects of which are summarized in Table 6.1, gives evidence that the offense in itself was deeply transformed, going from highly politicized to ransom-oriented, laying the foundations of crisis management in which the regular protector is no longer the leading figure, nor the most concerned.

[897] *Güero* is the Mexicanism used to refer to blond or white people. *Güeritos* is its diminutive and plural, (DEM, 2017).

Table 6.1 Comparative patterns of kidnappings in 1970s and 1990s

Comparison features	1970s	1990s
Perpetrator	• Urban *guerrilla* groups	• Organized and semi-organized groups of offenders
Main Purpose	• Politically oriented (stating ideological claims)	• Economically oriented (seeking for ransom)
Businessman Victimization	• As part of the *bourgeoisie* and exploiting oligarchy • As close to political elites	• As people with financial means to pay a ransom
Main Crisis Manager	• Federal Government (*DFS*) • Victims' relatives in a marginal role	• Victims' families through non-government consultants (*negociadores)* and (un)specialized public agencies

Source: Elaborated by the author based on the ensemble of interviews conducted, between August 2015 and January, 2017, with an ensemble of businessmen settled in Guadalajara Metropolitan Area, Mexico and other complementary profiles; Archives information (AGN); National and local press review and Literature review.

So, the conjunctural factors behind the emergence of *Minerva 1997* must be understood from the features that made them different to previous experiences. In other words, a wave of kidnappings is not precisely the right factor to explain the rise of the anti-kidnapping group, but the occurrence of several kidnappings-for-ransom in which victims and their families had more influence on the crisis management process.

From the prior comparison it is possible to underline at least three main lessons: 1) considering the cruelty associated to kidnappings, the fact that it is more likely to affect businessmen than any other group, and even the existence of a "turning point case," the crime in itself does not seem to explain the emergence of *Minerva 1997*. Therefore, kidnapping appears as a necessary but insufficient condition to explain the group's inception; 2) During both waves of kidnappings, the crime was transformed, becoming a different threat for local notables; 3) the role of main crisis manager relocated to businessmen and their relatives, positioning them in a more active form of engagement using non-government actors to ensure protection.

The transformation of the threat (from politically oriented to rent seeking) seems to be at the centre of businessmen's relocation within the victim's archetype. However, it does not

entirely explain the means they had to embody the role of primary managers during a kidnapping crisis. In other words, while the kidnapping-for-ransom could explain businessmen's willingness to "take control," it does not necessarily explain their *ability* to do so. Structural factors might be considered to contextualize the businessmen's new role, namely, the transformation of the economic and political landscape that, ultimately, represented a major transformation of the business sector.

Both the economic and political transformations have been discussed in the precedent pages. Yet, to relate them with *Minerva 1997* would still be a misguided endeavour.

Regarding the major economic changes that began in the early 1980s, as explained earlier in the text, the market-oriented transformation and the consequent thinning of its bureaucracy brought forth a progressive devolution of tasks formerly concentrated by centralized governments, not only in Mexico but in Latin America.

The Mexican government, which used to own companies to produce henequen, tobacco, tile or bicycles (Soto Laveaga, 2009), for instance, was narrowed by the delegation of such processes to the hands of the private sector. From December 1982 to June 1994, the Mexican government disposed of 81% of public sector entities, keeping only 219 of 1,153. The rest were divested through privatization (44,5%) or via dissolution, liquidation, merger or transfer (Rogozinski, 1998). The entire production model was therefore transformed. For the private sector, it meant an increasing freedom to operate in new and diverse markets (González Gómez, 1998) that used to be dominated by public production.

Within this context, another transformative event for the sector was the signature and subsequent implementation of NAFTA in 1994. The trade, which upended Mexico's domestic industry, became a major challenge for businessmen who were pushed to be competitive in an open market with uneven conditions as compared to their foreign counterparts.

Carlos Solano, a company owner in the food-processing industry, described how the firm, established by his father in 1975, was forced to take part in the open market depending on older technologies, less efficient processes, uncertain economic conditions and a government that, suddenly, stopped acting as protector.[898] For some respondents, those reforms supposed

[898] Interview conducted with Carlos Solano, Industrial Sector. (October 8th, 2015). El Salto, Jal.

the bankruptcy of their companies and the necessity to start all over again.[899] This narrative emphasizes the deep upheaval that the sector underwent during this period, not only because businessmen were clearly challenged, but also because they then took more control of their domain.

Hence, the devolution process promoted by market-oriented reforms brought the construction of a polycentric system in which multiple small-scale government agencies and non-government actors took over activities that used to be addressed by an extended bureaucracy (see Part II). In Jalisco, this process opened an opportunity for business to intervene in public life through new means, either through institutional spaces or more informal practices. Thus, as detailed in previous chapters, a succession of advisory boards in which the sector always held at least one chair were created; in addition, some businessmen became privileged interlocutors of local government as well as government spokespersons regarding crime figures. That scenario meant a schema of personalized, direct communication between businessmen (as local notables) and law enforcers.

Regarding the political transformation, the democratic transition dating back from the mid-1980s brought a "societal complexification" with the emergence of new actors (middle-class or neighbourhood leaders) and the transformation of the role of old actors (churches and the business sector) (Isunza Vera, 2001; Modoux, 2006). In addition, in the 1990s the multi-party competition arrived in the political landscape accompanied by increasing citizen participation, focused mostly on election supervision and validity (Isunza Vera, 2001). Businessmen in Jalisco did also take part in the fight for preferred electoral results, as can be appreciated in the account of Víctor Manuel Olvera about the gubernatorial election celebrated in Jalisco in 1995.

> *As part of a businessmen association, we played an important role: we were the first organization in the whole country […]* ***the first body that supervised an election.*** *We were tired of the lack of democracy, of frauds and ballot theft, and we wanted democracy, so we were the first chamber that made a whole program to supervise the election in 1995 […] it was so important, the job we did, …that, in fact,* ***media were following us more, [our numbers,] rather than [those of] the Electoral Institute [****…] because we brought together many businessmen and their employees and we* ***spread over many ballot boxes, with video cameras, with cameras, um… we interviewed people at the exit…*** *[Me: Did you conduct an exit poll?] Yes! Yes, yes… and* ***we***

[899] Interviews conducted with Benito Alvarado, Industrial Sector. (September 2nd, 2015). Zapopan, Jal.; Elizabeth Calixto, Industrial Sector. (October 30th, 2015). Guadalajara, Jal.

> ***provided very useful data**, and the authorities felt supervised, because we [pointed out irregularities] and spoke of how the election was going on.*
>
> Víctor Manuel Olvera, Service Sector
> Zapopan, Jal., October 15th, 2015
> *(Q6-9)*

As can be seen in Olvera's quote, some businessmen mobilized themselves and their resources to observe an election that eventually became a turning point, given it was the first time a PAN candidate took the gubernatorial seat. To better gauge the significance of the activities described by Olvera, they must be analysed in consideration of the means that citizens had, back then, to supervise and witness the legitimacy of an election. For instance, although in Mexican elections exit polls are currently a regular exercise and many different actors are able to conduct them (political parties, media, think tanks and pollsters), in those times, they were less common (Moreno, 2018).[900]

Considering the shift from being mostly aligned to the hegemonic party to supervising gubernatorial election, it seems that the business sector had changed significantly. Yet, the political context of the 1980s-1990s shall not be read as one of a clear rupture of the business sector with the PRI or its elites. Rather, it must be visualized as a heterogenization of the sector, as some of the biggest industrialists remained (or returned to be) supporters of the PRI, while others, especially medium-sized business owners, attempted to participate in politics exploring innovative avenues, notably within the PAN, the oldest opposition political party (Mizrahi, 2003; Loaeza, 1999).

Effectively, the inclusion of businessmen in PAN ranks resulted in a whole new period of activity for the oldest opposition party, the so-called *Neopanismo*. As has been described in the Introduction, from 1983 to 1988, the PAN had been reshaped by the inclusion of different businessmen within its ranks. At the same time, that meant the politicization (or more accurately, the participation in partisan politics) of a cohort of businessmen who were normally excluded from the spaces of political power, an exclusion which resulted from the collaborative schemes settled between the PRI and certain business associations (Loaeza, 2010; Loaeza, 1999; Nuncio, 1986).

[900] Regarding businessmen, there is a version according to which the Business Coordinating Council (*Consejo Coordinador Empresarial*, CCE) would have conducted and kept unpublished a survey in the context of the deeply contested national elections of 1988 (Nares, March 6th, 2018; Nares, February 27th, 2018).

Even if Jalisco witnessed a late *Neopanismo,* due to the fact that the electoral victories of this political party started in the mid-1990s (Modoux, 2006), the *panista* government changed the way businessmen accessed political positions. For instance, as stated in the Introduction, during the 1980s, the position of Vice-Mayor of Guadalajara used to be filled by a businessman or a member of a business sector family. No other municipality had a "vice-mayor." However, in Guadalajara, it was a position accorded to the business sector as part of the corporatist style of PRI-rule.[901] The *panista* administration, on the other hand, brought with it diverse cabinets with members, appointed or elected, coming not from partisan or political trajectories, but from the business world and from different socio-professional profiles (Modoux, 2006).

That being said, it is important to recall that the relationship between the first *panista* governor, Alberto Cárdenas, and the heterogeneous business sector was not always based on collaboration, entailing a dynamic scenario in which both actors were constantly navigating tensions and negotiations. As has been broadly discussed in Chapter 3, former Governor Cárdenas granted businessmen a significant capacity to influence the public security agenda, while he remained focused on rewriting the federal pact and the economic development strategy. This by no means represented the government's retreat, but a relocation though its polycentric shape.

Both economic and political transformations significantly affected the institutional structure of law enforcement, and subsequently of policing as well. This was also the case with businessmen and their profile as protection demanders: they became more visible, they gained access to additional and more diverse paths of influence to affect public security policy, without losing their old spaces, and they gained a more extended repertory of collective (in)action to interact with state agencies.[902] Thus, businessmen extended their leeway within public security councils, but also took part in public actions, whether it was counselling, sponsoring half of the expensive *Programa Jalisco*, taking the lead on communicating official crime figure trends, or even launching their own "guidelines for action."[903]

[901] Interview with Javier Hurtado, Researcher. (January 19th, 2017). Zapopan, Jal.
[902] To use the terms of Offrelé (2009).
[903] For more details see Chapter 3, section 3.2.

Accordingly, within the increasing occurrence of kidnapping-for-ransom, which businessmen considered their own problem, this renewed sector had to react differently, and they did so. Yet, what exactly did this reaction yield? What kind of creature is *Minerva 1997?* A detailed review of its features will be provided in the following pages.

6.2 Characterizing *Minerva 1997*: too many versions, too little certainties

If *Minerva 1997* is a group "created *by* and *for* businessmen," it is probably best to enter its world through the *Tapatio* businessmen and their own accounts. Considering that, due to the design of a neutral questionnaire for interviews and data collection, businessmen's answers regarding whether they knew the group and what they knew about it were spontaneous and unprompted, this first exploration will: a) locate *Minerva 1997* within the business sector's natural discourse, and; b) identify the group's features, whether well-defined or which require a deeper analysis.

Figure 6.1 contains a first schematic view of how the businessmen that mentioned or alluded to the group, described it. As can be seen, the respondents' narrative goes from the very general "a group *of* businessmen", assuming they fill its ranks, to options such as "a group sponsored by businessmen." The former is quite vague. On the other hand, if the latter were the case, the group would be similar to those discussed earlier in Part II. Conversely, other leads point in a different direction: a scenario in which businessmen might be more than victims purchasing protection.

Analysing the narratives collected in fieldwork, it is possible to recover three dimensions useful in drawing a first image of the group, namely, its size, its member profile, and its target population (whom it serves). Nonetheless, these three guiding lines will demonstrate a lack of consensus among those trying to describe *Minerva 1997*.

Regarding the group's size, descriptors such as "small" or "little" appeared in the accounts. Although this characteristic might not be very informative, it gains importance if it is seen as a signal of selectiveness. Thus, a "top group" or "formed by *certain* businessmen" drives the attention, once again, to the idea that this was the *crème de la crème* within the sector, an aspect already observed in the other protection patterns earlier discussed.

Thereupon, at first, its member profile is bathed by the local nobles' air. Actually, "the important ones" is a recurrent property evoked among those who pay attention on the group's entry barriers. Apparently, it is a selective group based on the importance of the businessmen.

Figure 6.1 Businessmen's descriptions of *Minerva 1997*



Source: Elaborated by the author based on the ensemble of interviews conducted, between August 2015 and January, 2017, with an ensemble of businessmen settled in Guadalajara Metropolitan Area, Mexico who referred the *Minerva 1997.*

Nevertheless, "importance" is an ambiguous term, since *Tapatio* businessmen (and more precisely, *Minerva 1997* members) could consider many different attributes "important". On the one hand, the adjective could be defined depending on concrete characteristics: company size, its time on the market, utilities, or branches outside of Jalisco. All those terms were present as signals of importance during several interviews, while discussing the business sector in Guadalajara, in general, as opposed to the anti-kidnapping group. On the other hand, "importance" could be an attribute relative to businessmen rather than with their companies. Thus, his reputation, his family (bloodline), the kind of people he socialized with and other elements of their personal trajectories could matter.

As explored in prior chapters, all these attributes could define who the businessman is and, consequently, the kind of protection he receives. It is certainly possible that both kinds of elements behind this label (those of the firm and those of the person) are mixed and

intrinsically related. In that sense, the account of the young businessman Alfonso Magadán is illustrative, as he explained that the group's members are "the big capitals, the wealthiest of the state, the most important families."[904] Thus, wealth and belonging to an important family go together and constitute the necessary attribute to be part of *Minerva 1997*.

This "*by* and *for* businessmen" ensemble reveals how the edges of *Minerva 1997* will probably rely on certain kinds of group identity which provide a "source of constraint"[905] and which could be identified in two manners: (a) as mentioned, they considered themselves a particularly vulnerable group with regard to kidnappings, since it was a crime which used to target people with high purchasing power, and (b) the founders of the group are seen not only as businessmen, but also as members of renowned local families. Therefore, the sense of belonging expresses more a social aspect than an economic one. As discussed in Chapter 5, the "Guadalajara families" is a social category, which probably entails common values and beliefs. It announces that, eventually, *Minerva 1997* membership conditions are going to surpass the professional activity criteria (being part of the "business sector" since you have a firm), towards a social arena where kinship will play a key role: who you are, socially speaking.

Family ties as the source of constraint brings other cases to mind, for instance, the business cluster *Grupo Monterrey*. It is an ensemble of 19 families that were originally organized by distributing among them the productive activities of the Mexican northern city of Monterrey. Scholars consider that part of their success relies on their ability to establish a network of couples, strongly interconnected, to lead business. Presumably, their marriages were planned with standards comparable to royalty (Basañez, 2002). Over time, some of their members left the productive activities but not the Group, since their membership depends more on their bloodline than on their economic activity.

If kinship, rather than socio-professional profile, brings this group's members together, then, more than "a group created *by* and *for* businessmen," it could be "a group created *by* and *for* the local notables." Hence, the population included in the group would not be businessmen precisely, but people who belong to the wealthiest families of the city. This is particularly

[904] Interview conducted with Alfonso Magadan, Industrial Sector. (September 23rd, 2015). Zapopan, Jal.
[905] According to Converse the constraint is "a sort of glue to bind together many more specific attitudes and beliefs, and these postures are of prime centrality in the belief system as a whole" (2006 [1964]:7).

relevant considering that, as mentioned before, the *Tapatio* business sector is quite heterogeneous.

In addition, the circle of local notables, seen from outside, is readable as "people all of the same level," assuming certain homogeneity that deepens the gap between "the wealthiest" (and able to be protected) from the others, the "ordinary mortals,"[906] to recall the expression that Manuel Gómez employed to refer to those excluded from *Minerva 1997.*

Nevertheless, it must be noted that, for some businessmen, services provided by *Minerva 1997* are purchasable: "it is private, you pay for it and that's it!"[907] said Juan Galicia, owner of a real estate firm. That opens two significant patterns to explore: 1) If it is the case, whatever the services, they are commodified and, in consequence, they represent a profit source for the group. Thus, *Minerva 1997* acquires the air of an enterprise, another protection seller, except that its members seem to be its clients; 2) If *Minerva 1997* is similar to a private security company, how it is located regarding this complex industry? Is any person who can afford the service able to get it?

Apart from their function as signals of group identity, as already pointed out, the group deals with kidnappings as a threat that the sector "owns." Regarding that, at least two questions are unavoidable: 1) How do they deal with it? and; 2) To what extent could the occurrence of businessmen dealing with kidnappings be considered something peculiar, regarding other challenges the sector faces or, even further, considering other social groups also touched by crime and insecurity?

Regarding the services, the obvious lead is that *Minerva 1997* caters to kidnapping-for ransom situations, nevertheless, neither what it means, nor how they do it is clear from that starting point. The narratives of those who made reference to the group underlines that it could be more than an anti-kidnapping group, as its members could perform other tasks.

Figure 6.2 schematizes the narratives around the activities that businessmen attributed to *Minerva 1997*. Once again, the dominant pattern is the diversity of versions, some more specific, others quite vague. The exploration of the ensemble of answers shows that some

[906] Interview conducted with Manuel Gómez, Service Sector. (October 15th, 2015). Zapopan, Jal.
[907] Interview conducted with Juan Galicia, Construction and Real Estate Sector. (September 25th, 2015). Zapopan, Jal.

interlocutors focus on the activities the group might be performing, while others emphasize the domain in which they apparently work.

Reading the figure clockwise starting with "provides protection," it is possible, first of all, to locate the explicit term "protection" within the narrative of those who describe *Minerva 1997* activities. Then, one should note the importance of kidnapping as well as other domains in which the group would be acting, and finally, the other activities that, not explicitly considered to be protection, are attributed to the group.

Figure 6.2 Activities that businessmen attributed to *Minerva 1997*



Source: Elaborated by the author based on the ensemble of interviews conducted between August 2015 and January, 2017, with an ensemble of businessmen settled in Guadalajara Metropolitan Area, Mexico who referred the *Minerva 1997.*

Despite the fact that "protection" is a term often employed to refer to *Minerva 1997*, what really outlines how the group could be located in the protection market are the details added to the general notion of "a group that provides protection." Therefore, the uncertainty around its selectivity criteria also reaches those who they are supposed to protect. The self- or inner-

protection scenario, and the allusion to group members' families draw *Minerva 1997 closer* to the co-production model, while the mention of "vulnerable persons"[908] as potential beneficiaries of their services locates them among the alternative protection providers analysed in Chapter 4. It must be noted, however, that both scenarios are not only likely, but not mutually exclusive.

Although kidnapping-for-ransom is at the origin of *Minerva 1997*, it is apparently not the only domain in which the group might perform some of their activities. Perhaps, the wave of kidnappings that occurred in the late 1990s defined its main concern at the beginning but, over the time, the group dabbled in offering protection addressing other crimes. When kidnapping is translated in businessmen narrative as "this kind of issue," then it is coded with a more comprehensive label: "security issues," where other concerns might fit.

The possible incursion of *Minerva 1997* in domains different from kidnapping could have been result of different factors. For instance, once assuming the costs inherent to providing protection on kidnapping, for *Minerva 1997* it would be less costly to treat other crimes, since part of the "production costs" are already paid. This possibility could be more likely especially if, as some versions point out, the group receives a fee for the services delivered. Then, they could maximize their profits by diversifying their offer. In other words, the group of businessmen would be using economies of scale.

In addition, the anti-kidnapping group could be encrusted in the protection market and, consequently, in its inherent dynamics, such as the persistent fear paradox, discussed in Chapter 4. Then, demanders' increasing needs might have driven *Minerva 1997* to cater to other domains and, in doing so, to contribute to the emergence of new demands.

Furthermore, if *Minerva 1997* emerged within a kidnapping-for-ransom wave, once the offense figures came down, the prevalence of the group would depend on their capacity to manage other threats and to expand the profile of their potential customers.

> *Three years on [after the foundation of* Minerva 1997*]* ***the number of kidnappings went down, there were no more of these threats****, and there were no more kidnappings of three or four businessmen at a time… and back then, we held many meetings where we discussed what to do:* ***'Shall the group disappear or not?'*** *Fortunately, most of the founding associates considered that…* ***that we should continue on with this effort and***

[908] Interview conducted with Alfredo Palomino, Industrial Sector. (October 7th, 2015). Guadalajara, Jal.

> ***with helping… keep helping society and the families,*** *and anyone who might ask the group to help.* ***Whoever asked for help, no matter who he was, would be helped!***
>
> Máximo Ballesteros, Private Security Company Owner
> and founding associate of *Minerva 1997*
> January 19th, 2017, Zapopan, Jal.
> *(Q6-10)*

The prior quote sheds light not only on the reactive disposition of the group during a crisis, but on its willingness to remain in the landscape for what is more than 20 years now. It is then fair to affirm that *Minerva 1997* is a dynamic group which must be analyzed in consideration of its evolution through time. If it started as an organization strictly concerned with businessmen's kidnappings and, in that sense, reproduced the selectivity of the local notables, nowadays it could be more open regarding both their customers and their tasks. Regardless, and according to its co-founder Héctor L. Orta, "the group remains strong, as usual… as always, and it is recognized everywhere."[909] Then, the persistence of the group through the years, as well as the incursion of the group in other domains, open promising avenues to explore: all other possible threats the group has been managing since then and how this management has been carried out.

Given that domains other than kidnapping are possible areas of action for *Minerva 1997*, activities other than "protection" are also attributed to the group. Although these activities could be considered to be modalities to deliver different forms of protection, even to reinforce patterns such as self-policing measures, interviewees do not qualify them within protection provision. Thereupon, when "consultancy," "teaching" or "providing information [on security conditions]" are mentioned among *Minerva 1997*'s activities, respondents suggest that information and knowledge are one of the group's assets. That is consistent with both the numerous self-policing measures businessmen adopted and the old practice of attending meetings and workshops with law enforcers and specialists, as explained in Part II.

That said, investigating the activities that *Minerva 1997* might perform drives us directly to the rapport it could hold with the city's regular protection provider: law enforcement. Previous chapters have widely proven the complexity of the interactions within the multilateralization of policing. So where is *Minerva 1997* located in such a configuration?

[909] Interview conducted with Héctor L. Orta, Industrial Sector. (September 18th, 2015). Zapopan, Jal.

Víctor Olvera, a businessman in the service sector, argues that the group aims to strengthen ties with the government as a way to obtain an ensemble of benefits for its members:

> *It [Minerva 1997] was created precisely with the intention… of having, I mean… having more* ***bonds with government****… to get… licences* ***to bear arms****,* ***for their personal –and familial- security staff****… for theirs companies, also… They have* ***direct communication… information*** *that allows them… to be vigilant of criminal groups… eh…* ***back and forth*** *[the group and the government]!*
>
> Víctor Manuel Olvera, Service Sector Company
> Zapopan, Jal., October 15th, 2015
> *(Q6-11)*

Two elements in Olvera's account shall be noted: on the one hand, when Olvera states that the anti-kidnapping group and the government build a relationship based on a mutual cooperation, he also opens the possibility of a long-term relation that, as explored in prior examples, could entail certain reciprocity between economic and political elites. Collaboration, however, seems one of the many dynamics characterizing the rapport between the polycentric system and *Minerva 1997.* In fact, José Antonio Reséndiz, who wrote a book about *Tapatio* businessmen and belongs to a very well-known family, explained that "local Government works within the group [*Minerva 1997*],"[910] suggesting, rather than a collaboration, certain subordination or even symbiosis among those actors. By contrast, one of the interviewed former officers recalled and qualified the group as "an expression of the selfish and bourgeois business sector,"[911] implying a certain tension between the members of *Minerva 1997*and some of the officers involved in security duties.

Perhaps *Minerva 1997* and the polycentric law enforcement system could be developing a rapport based on subordination, rivalry, substitution, cooperation or complementarity, all at the same time. It is not necessarily an *aporia*. It would be possible that the tone of their exchanges depends on every circumstance. That creates a configuration built on permanent negotiations between actors and, consequently, changing game rules, players' location, and the (a)symmetries among them.

On the other hand, Olvera's account also sheds light on the benefits that *Minerva 1997* would obtain from establishing close bonds with local government. The reader will have noticed that the ensemble of gains Olvera enlisted had already appeared, across previous chapters, as

[910] Interview conducted with José Antontio Reséndiz, Writer. (September 17th, 2015). Zapopan, Jal.
[911] The name of the former officer as well as the interview details are intentionally omitted for anonymization purposes.

benefits local notables seek and receive due to their selective and personalized relationship with law enforcement. As these gains precede *Minerva 1997's* emergence, rather than causing them, the anti-kidnapping group could be acting as a sort of broker between law enforcers and a wider proportion of the business sector. Thus, from their condition as "very important businessmen," it is possible that *Minerva 1997* members negotiate the benefits within the polycentric system and, later, they distribute them among the group's associates and customers, if they are not one and the same, although doing so in accordance with their own rules and criteria.

The prior intuition could help explain the large capacities that some of the businessmen attributed to *Minerva 1997*. For instance, the Alcántara businessmen, who occasionally have appealed to the group, stated:

> *Concretely, Minerva 1997, for instance, protects you against kidnappings… [Antonio A.: And this is a group created* ***only by businessmen, only families from Guadalajara*** *that came together and said 'well, what do we do?' and* ***they have a set of protocols and… private security coverage and a lot of stuff****...] Intelligence! [Antonio A:* ***investigation, intelligence*** *and everything!]* ***The Attorney's Offices are involved*** *[Antonio A: they have had it (the group) for several years], if you want to know about authentic businessmen, you have 120 of the highest rank there!*
>
> Alberto and Antonio Alcántara, Commerce Sector
> Zapopan, Jal., September 9th, 2015
> *(Q6-12)*

From the Alcántaras' account it must be noted that the outstanding ensemble of resources they listed situates the group on the fine-line between the public and private realms, especially when it comes to "investigation and intelligence." As has been discussed in previous chapters, investigation tasks, either towards potential partners or customers, has been highly appreciated by the business sector. But beyond this, they are situated within the blurry boundaries dividing public-private realms and legal-illegal practices.

Certainly, the possibility that among its many resources *Minerva 1997* would have an armed group equipped to deliver protection catches the eye. In that vein, Gustavo Moreno, a middle-aged businessman in fiscal consultancy, said that this "top group of businessmen has an armed group that is providing protection,"[912] implying that violence could be part of the resources they are able to offer while delivering protection. If any, where are the boundaries between the legal and illegal bearing of weapons in this situation? , especially considering

[912] Interview conducted with Gustavo Moreno, Service Sector. (Sepember 19th, 2015). Zapopan, Jal.

the several cases in which, either in Mexico or abroad, landowners and other proprietors (un)willingly sponsor armed groups seeking protection, as reviewed in Part II.

For her part, Paula Gudiño, a Commerce Sector businesswoman, argued that, rather than having firearms themselves, *Minerva 1997* trains their armed bodyguards.[913] Clearly, by evoking the notion of "training," the businesswoman joins the group of interviewees who offer leads to follow, rather than certainties. Nonetheless, her account must be examined in recollection of the fact that, as demonstrated in Chapter 4, the close protection associated to bodyguards, in Guadalajara, has been dominantly granted by police officers in exchange for payment and based on unclear assignment criteria. Thus, if the selective members of *Minerva 1997* are also the selective group benefited by the *Tapatio* VIP protection schema, the anti-kidnapping group would be, indeed, training law enforcers.

Given the aforementioned, the rapport between *Minerva 1997* and violence entrepreneurs, retrieving Volkov's (2002)[914] term, shall be carefully observed, even considering the possibility that group members could themselves fit into the term Volkov coined.

After reviewing the wide variety of versions businessmen that don't belong to *Minerva 1997* have about this violence entrepreneurship, there are many more questions (and hypotheses) than answers regarding its member and/or beneficiary profiles, the kind of activities they perform, the means they are able to use, or the rapport they hold with the regular and alternative protection providers. So far, it seems too few certainties have emerged regarding *Minerva 1997* itself.

The diversity of versions is informative in itself, in fact, as it points to a variability of information, unequally distributed among the members of the business sector. Seeing that many of the interviewees do not know or have not heard about the group (at least, as per their own account), while others are able to describe it (despite the many versions), we can deduce that the location of the group within the visibility-secrecy dimension must not be taken for granted, especially considering the lines delivered by Olivia Ciriaco, member of *Minerva 1997*:

[913] Interview conducted with Paula Gudiño, Commerce Sector. (October 22nd, 2015). Guadalajara, Jal.
[914] On "violent entrepreneurs" and other contributions of Volkov (2002) see the theoretical discussion provided in the Introduction.

> *Yes, yes, in fact* ***there is a specialized group, endorsed by the businessmen****.* ***For obvious reasons, it is not possible to say its name,***[915] *but… it is a group supported by… by… by them, by all the businessmen. And any situation affecting you… anything!...* ***these people… have to solve the problem****.*
>
> Olivia Ciriaco, Construction and Real Estate Sector
> September 15th, 2015, Zapopan, Jal.
> *(Q6-13)*

The certitude that the businesswoman shows on how the group's name must be obviously kept secret, and considering that she is one of its members, indicates that inside the group there could be some rules about the visibility-secrecy of the group. In contrast, Víctor Manuel Olvera does not only feel free to evoke the group's name several times, but he claims that it is not a secret and, instead, it became very famous at certain point:

> *Yes, indeed, here in Guadalajara* ***one group, at certain point, became very famous, the*** **Minerva 1997***[…] I'm not member, but it was created by the important proprietors of Guadalajara […] That group,* **Minerva 1997,** ***that exists in Guadalajara, that… I mean, it is not a secret, there are I think many people who know it!***
>
> Víctor Manuel Olvera, Service Sector Company
> Zapopan, Jal., October 15th, 2015
> *(Q6-14)*

The contradiction between the discreet member of the group and the businessman who emphasized he does not belong to *Minerva 1997's* ranks reinforces the picture of a group unclearly settled between secrecy and visibility and, in consequence, this dimension shall be further explored.

Despite the simple syntax within the question "what is *Minerva 1997?"* the first exploration drives to a sort of *mise-en-abîme* (placed into the abyss); to the multiplication of queries within a question, as that of the rhetorical figure endlessly opening a door that leads us to more doors to open, "an infinite perspective on and reduplication of the initial motif" (Melville in Rubenstein, 2008:30).

Building on the loose ends that the first sketch of *Minerva 1997* provided, some of them will be analysed more carefully in the next pages. The following section will focus on the member

[915] Although she intentionally omits the group's name, some elements of her narrative suggest that she is alluding *Minerva 1997.* For instance, her description about the emergence of the group fits in the widely shared narrative discussed in the prior section. Nevertheless, the possibility of similar groups operating on the field should not be dismissed. This and other leads will be developed further in following pages. (Fieldwork carnet notes, September 15th, 2015).

profile as the last step in understanding what the group is. Then, it will be possible to move towards an examination of how *Minerva 1997* members do what they do in Chapter 7.

6.3 The group's selectivity: member and beneficiary profiles

According to Héctor L. Orta, co-founder of *Minerva 1997*, around 30 businessmen created the group. Almost twenty years later, the group is composed of about 150 associates, as they called the members.[916] Although these numbers illustrate a group that multiplied its membership to more than 4 times its size in those years, it remains as a tiny cell with respect to the *Tapatio* business sector. In addition, despite the variety of accounts describing *Minerva 1997* and its many components, it seems that if there is any consensus it is on the description of the group as selective. How, then, are the members of *Minerva 1997* selected?

In the previous section, some intuitions were raised around this question. However, for a wider discussion on the group's selection criteria and their implications, it is pertinent to focus on the narrative coming from the group members or of those who have had a direct experience with the group, assuming that their versions are, rather than perceptions, recalled experiences. That said, this does not mean that their words must be taken as certainties, but as the version that inner actors decided to share. Thus, the reader will notice that, from now on, a small group of interviewees will gain a significant weight in the discussion, while the rest will move towards a more supportive role.

At its origin, as previously explained, about thirty upset businessmen decided to protest before the governor of Jalisco regarding the kidnappings-for-ransom crisis. Some of them decided to stay organized and move beyond demanding the government's response. Businesswoman Olivia Ciriaco recalled that "it was one proprietor who had the initiative, and then, later, he started calling us… inviting us to be part of the group, and now we are a lot of businesspersons."[917] Thus, it seems that the first mechanism to fill the group ranks was a direct invitation from the founding members. This version was confirmed by other businessmen, such as Juan Zenón[918] and Paula Gudiño.[919] The former, as has been stated,

[916] Interviews conducted with Héctor L. Orta, Industrialist and co-founder of the group. (September 3rd, 2015); (September 18th, 2015); (January 18th, 2017). Zapopan, Jal.
[917] Interview conducted with Olivia Ciriaco, Construction and real estate sector. (September 15th, 2017). Zapopan, Jal.
[918] Interview conducted with Juan Zenón, Industrialist. (August 27th, 2015). Zapopan, Jal.
[919] Interview conducted with Paula Gudiño, Commerce Sector. (October 22nd, 2015). Guadalajara, Jal.

had been kidnapped in those times and his case was primordial to the group's foundation. The latter, on the other hand, offered an additional element in her narrative: while Ciriaco and Zenón described a process of initiating contact based on the proximity between *Minerva 1997's* founding members and the invited businessmen, Gudiño explained that she received the invitation from one of the many business associations she is a part of. That demonstrates that, besides the social capital derived from belonging to the same small circle, businessmen associations and chambers (wider although still selective) might be significant intermediaries in gaining access to the group. The prior is significant, especially considering that, as has been stated elsewhere in the text, Guadalajara has an important amount of associations, expanding the possible points of entry to this selective group.

Nowadays, in Héctor L. Orta's words, "a lot of people want to enter [the group]… we have a waiting list of people wanting to [take] part… a waiting line!"[920] Considering factors such as businessmen feeling particularly vulnerable regarding certain crimes and their propensity to get protection, both discussed in previous chapters, attempting to be part of *Minerva 1997* sounds like a consistent movement. Even the group's reputation as an organization "formed by the most important businessmen" could grant, besides protection, social status, raising the community's interest in joining. However, the group's co-founder himself states that, despite so many people wanting to be a part of *Minerva 1997*, "one thing is that they want to enter, yet, another different thing is that we allow them to enter."[921] Why so? He himself delivers a collection of reasons:

> *Because, all of us here, people have to be, first of all…* ***vetted****, to be sure they are* ***respectable people… and good people.*** *Because, it is very dangerous* ***if we allow a cheater to join us, someone who is doing twisted things, a*** **narco,** ***a corrupt****… because it could finish us!* ***So, it's a filter… and we have to know this person*** *[the businessman willing to join the group], and since we are the most important [businessmen],* ***we likely will know him*** *[…] And it could be that he is a great businessman, with lots of money, but it could be that he has grown his firm by harming a lot of people, or because he cheated, or by stealing… from the government… or such… I mean,* ***one thing is being important, yet a very different thing is to be a good businessman****.*
>
> Héctor L. Orta, Industrialist and
> *Minerva 1997* founding associate
> Zapopan, Jal., September 18th, 2015
> *(Q6-15)*

[920] Interview conducted with Héctor L. Orta, Industrialist. (September 18th, 2015). Zapopan, Jal.
[921] *Idem*

The prior account is clear on some of the criteria the group members employ during their vetting process. As in cases previously discussed, vetting peers through conducting investigations has been a historically useful mechanism in the business sector. In addition, self-identifying as part of "the most important businessmen," this founding associate assumes, on the one hand, that he knows the "who's who" of Guadalajara, and, on the other hand, that such knowledge is enough to exclude undesirable profiles from their anti-kidnapping group. It is also remarkable that, at the beginning, such figures could be easily clustered into the "outlaws" category: cheaters, *narcos* and corrupt entrepreneurs. Thus, a quite normative criteria seems to be the first on which the vetting measures rely.

This lead reroutes our view toward the protective behaviors that businessmen in Guadalajara adopt within an environment in which they have being historically sharing spaces with *narcos* and their families. As discussed in Chapter 5, what seems to particularly bother businessmen is to share their exclusive *cotos*[922] and private schools with the *narcos-nacos*, those who, besides participating in drug trafficking activities, are considered unable to translate their wealth to education and good taste. At a first glance, it seems that Héctor L. Orta associates the necessity of vetting the potential members with the lack of legality surrounding these profiles. That is reinforced by a sort of moral statement regarding the means of accumulating capital. However, the vetting also includes the new rich, people whose behavior is considered uncouth, in other words, *nacos*:

> ***The new rich, those, we don't want them*** *in the group. Out! 'No but, see, he's an entrepreneur that…', 'Wait, but, how old is he?'* ***'Well, he is 30 years old,' 'and how much money does he have?' 'I don't know, lots of millions,' 'and how did he get them?'*** *'We don't know' […] I don't know… I mean, they could be very smart but this is basic… I'm a businessman, don't tell me that a 30-year-old guy… see, for instance, the X siblings*[923] *or, I don't know…* ***I won't believe it! Why? Because it is not true, this is not how businesses are done!*** *… So, [we set] the* ***necessary locks: filters*** *at everyone's entrance!*
>
> Héctor L. Orta, Industrialist and
> *Minerva 1997* founding associate
> Zapopan, Jal., September 18th, 2015
> *(Q6-16)*

As shown in Héctor L. Orta's account, although being wealthy could be appreciated by the founding members of *Minerva 1997*, he is suspicious of businessmen with meteoric careers.

[922] Gated neighbourhoods, see Chapter 5, section 5.2.
[923] He evokes a couple of famous siblings that have been recently doing business in Guadalajara within critics and scandals.

Probably because he is a firm believer of the effort culture, claiming repeatedly that working hard is the only right path to make a fortune. Thus, he proudly situated himself within those who "started from below, the ones who build themselves and their firms through time."[924] Indeed, he sharply separates the *Tapatio* business sector into two main groups, namely, the ones who come from below and the ones he describes as "rich men, spoiled children who inherited the company and the fortune."[925]

From the above, it is fair to claim that the group's entry barriers, or "necessary locks" as Orta names them, are not only defined based on normative criteria (candidates' probity), but also on the way founding members conceived of what a "good businessman" is. Certainly, the traces of the market-oriented reforms that occurred in Mexico are visible again in this narrative, as Héctor L. Orta draws the "self-made man" as the valued businessman style. The epitome of the one who "work[s] hard and act[s] right" (Bender, 2009: 46), a hallmark of Neoliberalism, impregnates his account and, more importantly, an important part of the game rules of *Minerva 1997*. Considering that the self-made man is also encouraged by a market-oriented system to "privatize issues that might otherwise be understood as collective social problems" (Bender, 2009: 48), the domain of this role model within the anti-kidnapping group could have significant implications regarding, among other aspects, the definition of the groups' activities and operation models.

Furthermore, it shall be clarified that not only the entrance, but the permanence in the group relies on the same contours of selectiveness criteria, as vividly illustrated in an episode Héctor L. Orta recalls. The anecdote concerns the expulsion of a former member, probably a bank owner, whose *junior*'s misbehavior drove him out of *Minerva 1997:*

> *Sometimes, for instance,* ***some members entered [the group] but then their children had a huge problem!*** *Because they were not properly raised… -we have already had some cases- and we were supposed to… people that… because it was something regular* ***'please, I need someone to go with my children… because they are going to this bar… and we need someone to accompany them'.*** *–That's fine, we will protect them!',* ***but when we saw the children being arrogant and going like 'I'm very rich, I can do this and that…' and they mistreat security staff… they are out!*** *'Hey, but… listen…!' –****No, here we don't want anyone who feels superior, someone who mistreats our staff, we are not accepting those manners from anyone!*** *[…] If the young man thinks he is superior… just because his father is rich… so he dares to yell at or insult the bodyguard… 'You are out! And you know what? Don't call me to protect*

[924] Interview conducted with Héctor L. Orta, Industrialist and founding member of *Minerva 1997*. (September 3rd, 2015). Zapopan, Jal.
[925] Idem

> *your son… you are out of the group!' And we used to have very important businessmen… bank owners! I mean…* ***Did they get mad? Yes, they did, but we don't care! The image of our group is above all.***
>
> Héctor L. Orta, Industrialist and
> *Minerva 1997* founding associate
> Zapopan, Jal., September 18th, 2015
> *(Q6-17)*

The vetting process of *Minerva 1997*, then, excludes from the group alleged outlaws, the new rich (*nacos)* and arrogant juniors (or their parents, more accurately). In addition, such criteria are not only applied to define members' entrance, but also their permanence. That said, two other elements form the prior quote can be informative. Although they will be discussed more thoroughly in Chapter 7, they shall be mentioned below.

First, besides the vetting process, the quotation is telling with regards to some of the services *Minerva 1997* provides and who solicits them. Thus, bodyguards protecting businessmen's children paints the kind of protection that, in Guadalajara, is usually supplied either by commissioned police officers or private security firms, as explained in Chapter 4. In which of these categories could *Minerva 1997*'s "security staff" fall, then?

Secondly, we must make note of the importance that Héctor L. Orta's account grants to the group's image. What is "the image" they desire and strive to project? Additionally, if *Minerva 1997* has a confusing position in the visibility-secrecy dimension, as suggested earlier, who are supposed to be the viewers of the image that the founding associate aims to project? Considering that discretion about what could be observed from inside the group is appreciated, to what extent would an expulsion risk information leaks that could jeopardize, among other aspects, the group's image?

The preceding section has explored the highly variable opinion that the business sector has of the group, when they express knowledge about it. Yet, when it comes to the inner-circle, it seems that the group's image, or at least that of its leaders, is highly based on trust, particularly when it comes to financial accountability, as illustrated by Olivia Ciriaco's account:

> ***They have been very transparent on money issues****… the numbers [of the group] well, I think is one of the few associations I know that has good numbers and… in which* ***they tell you when there is any money left, they deliver good numbers!***
>
> Olivia Ciriaco, Construction and Real Estate Sector
> Zapopan, Jal., September 15th, 2015
> *(Q6-18)*

From this businesswoman's words it is possible to intuit that the members' role might not be egalitarian, as some of them are deeply involved in the decision-making process and the group's shaping, while others seem to stand aside, receiving financial reports and, presumably, paying periodic fees.

In that vein, Héctor L. Orta, who identifies himself as a founding associate and head of the group's Presiding Committee, explains that even if they are currently a hundred members, the decision-making process stays in a small group's hands:

> *In **the Presiding Committee** (Mesa Directiva), there are **three persons**… **the current president, the treasurer and the operative director**. The latter, I hired him a lot of years ago, and he is still with us, **he worked before close to a Governor, he also worked in the Federal Attorney's Office**…and he had other positions… afterwards he came with us… I called him this morning, by the way…, the decisions, **the main decisions we make… we make them among the three or four of us.***
>
> Héctor L. Orta, Industrialist and
> *Minerva 1997* founding associate
> Zapopan, Jal., January 18th, 2017
> *(Q6-19)*

The only position of the Committee that seems regularly renewable is the president (or head of the Committee), although it is not clear how long the charge lasts: "it is similar to the business associations in which the president changes every two years. With us it is the same, we change every two years, although sometimes is every three or five or six years… that changes,"[926] explained Orta, who has been reelected president an (unspecified) number of times since the group was created.

It should be also said that the presidential election is not open to all *Minerva 1997* members, instead, it remains restricted to "a dozen members who integrate the Council, who have been part of the group since the beginning and know everything about *Minerva 1997* perfectly."[927] This form of organization implies that the presidency rotates among the small circle that constitutes the Council, based on rules that seem flexible to the extent to which a two year term could, instead, last six years.[928]

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[926] Interview conducted with Héctor L. Orta, Industrialist and *Minerva 1997* founding associate. (January 18th, 2017). Zapopan, Jal.,

[927] Idem

[928] No other interviewee referred to the election of the Committee President. It is possible that the interviewees who belong to the group are excluded from the electoral process, as they do not belong to the Council. However, it is also possible that rather than an election involving deliberation and votes, the president's selection is more an agreed rotation among the Committee's members, although qualified as an "election" by Orta. The second

Additionally, it is fair to argue that there are different, at least three, membership degrees within the anti-kidnapping group: those in the Presiding Committee, those in the Council, and the rest of the members. Thus, even when the group grew in the last 20 years, it has been always run by the same small ensemble of selected businessmen who created it.

From the three interviews conducted with Héctor L. Orta, it is possible to partially shape the profile of the Committee President. Besides what has been mentioned before, Orta has been president of different businessmen associations, he belongs to a well-known family in the region and he insistently evoked his close communication with Federal and Local high-level public officers as part of his personal attributes. Assuming that the other former presidents of the group – if any –have similar profiles, *Minerva 1997's* head would have been in a leading position within a body of organized businessmen, social elites and those close enough to political elites. Those bonds could bring an ensemble of resources to the group, having direct effects on the kind of protection the group could deliver, considering the importance of personalized relations that businessmen had held with the polycentric law enforcement system, as discussed in Chapter 3.

Although Héctor L. Orta was surprisingly generous in sharing information, in his narrative there is no additional information about the treasurer's profile. Yet, from the vetting process he described regarding the group members, it is possible to deduce that the person responsible for managing the group's finances has to have the Council members' trust, not only the Committee President's approval.

As for the Operative Director, he is none other than Máximo Ballesteros, one of the Private Security Company owners I interviewed. Although Héctor L. Orta mentioned Ballesteros several times during the interviews, even providing his name, he did not put me in touch with him. Nonetheless, I reached Ballesteros through a completely different path,[929] entailing two elements worthy of bearing in mind: (a) the generosity that Orta showed in sharing information throughout three interviews was not enough to drive me towards his Operative director. In other words, he did not give me access to another node of the group's network; and (b) Máximo Ballesteros granted the interview not as *Minerva 1997* Operative Director,

scenario is possible considering that a social desirability bias could condition Orta's account, as democratic processes have better esteem than what could be read as an arbitrary selection process.

[929] The interviewees contact path is available in Appendix *SB*.

but as one of many other businessmen I met. Thus, knowing his role in the anti-kidnapping group, I was able to inquire about his two positions, as will be seen in the next chapter.

By now, Ballesteros' profile pictures one of many former officers who passed through the "revolving door," becoming a private security sector businessman whose customers are themselves mostly businessmen.[930] That is a regular pattern, as discussed in Chapter 4. Yet, what does this profile bring to *Minerva 1997*? If Orta means close connections with former presidents and governors, Ballesteros represents long-lasting bonds with mid- and operative-level law enforcers in both federal and local realms. As a former officer, he also provides the profile of a trained member, as well as someone who knows government agencies from the inside, at least in some extent.

The fourth member of the committee, barely mentioned by *Minerva*'s current leader, is "the commander in charge of managing all the operative staff, who has been the same for the last 16 years."[931] Although Orta did not provide any information about him, or a lead to follow in order to inquire around his profile, it is worth noting that *Minerva 1997* actually has an operative staff coordinated by a commander, suggesting that whether the former is an off-duty police officer or the group's operative staff, somehow, the group emulates police bodies' structures. Either way, the operative staff might be the task force that other businessmen refer to as *Minerva 1997*'s "armed group", as previously discussed.

The potential members' vetting process draws not only a selective group but one in which normative, moral and social standards define who is allowed to join the group and who is not. Even further, it determines who becomes part of the minuscule circle of decision makers. The Committee President, however, argues that they are not elitist, but cautious. Arguing that their precaution is not elitism, Héctor L. Orta explains how the group is able to serve anyone who may need it. Thus, he suggests that they are selective regarding their members, but not regarding their customers.

> *That is very important!* ***We are not elitist! Even if it seems we are. It's a group comprising the most important businessmen in Jalisco, but… anyone who has a problem… a kidnapping situation, could call us… we don't charge him a thing, not***

[930] In fact, one of the public officers I interviewed said that "Ballesteros was one of the first characters who passed from the public sector to the private security industry." The details of the interview are intentionally omitted to guarantee the anonymity of the public officer and Ballesteros himself.
[931] Interview conducted with Héctor L. Orta, Industrialist and *Minerva 1997* founding associate. (September 18th, 2015). Zapopan, Jal.

> ***one cent**. **Even if you are not one of our members, we will serve you. If, after that, you want to join us… that is different**… but I'm not going to tell you… 'if you don't pay me what we ask to be part of the group… **150 thousand pesos**[932] **to be part of the group, and if you don't pay… X amount monthly**, I won't serve you!', No, no! **Because, commonwealth is above personal benefits.** This is very important. It is more important to achieve commonwealth than private benefit… even than the economic profit! Of course, if we had a disproportionate case…if someone was calling every once in a while… 'hey, come here please!' then we will see what to do… there are not many cases… but it could happen. This is another… thing. **But if someone is suffering because he has just been kidnapped and he has no means to defend himself… and someone is suffering because he is afraid of going to the government… and he tells us 'this is what is happening'… or our members go like 'Hey! I have a friend who is going through this' Go ahead! We will gladly serve him, even if he is not one of our members.** Thus, this is a very important aspect. I mean, the institution **was built to help those in need**… we are not elitists, we serve anyone who… is going through a serious… delicate situation, right?*
>
> Héctor L. Orta, Industrialist and
> *Minerva 1997* founding associate
> Zapopan, Jal., September 18th, 2015
> *(Q6-20)*

This account points out significant aspects of the relationship between *Minerva 1997* and the beneficiaries of its services. First, I allow myself to use both labels, "customers" and "beneficiaries," as Héctor L. Orta's narrative suggests there is a payment in exchange for their protection services, although in some cases, they do not charge them.

In the same vein, two sources of finance resources for *Minerva 1997* become clearer: on the one hand, that group members pay an entrance fee and a monthly fee. On the other hand, it seems they charge the customers for their services. Although the details of the latter will be discussed in Chapter 7, about the former it must be noted that the amount evoked by Orta could be random, as the for the monthly fee he decided to use a generic "X" instead of a number. Yet, if the membership's fee is not random, it is fair to say that it would be quite affordable for medium and large sized firm proprietors.

Secondly, it becomes clear that not all the clients are group associates. That is confirmed by Juan Zenón and the Alcántaras, who, despite the fact they had appealed to *Minerva 1997* for help in a threatening situation,[933] they decided not to join the group, once the situation was handled.

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[932] 150 thousand pesos: 8,943 USD considering that the exchange rate the day of the interview was 16,77 Mexican pesos per dollar (SAT, 2016).

[933] Some of the details on the episode in which the Alcántaras were victims of crime which, eventually, drove them to appeal to *Minerva 1997* were in previous chapters and will be complemented in Chapter 7.

"They help us a lot, but as my dad said, we have neither the size nor the interest to… get involved in those issues,"[934] argued Antonio, the youngest of the Alcántaras. The size is, certainly, a relative parameter as the Alcántaras' firm is one of the largest in its field. However, they do not consider themselves as part of "the important" businessmen, the dominant shortcut used to describe the group. The interest in security issues is another determinant to joining the group:

> *They invited me to be part of [*Minerva 1997*], I said no! Because I did not want to continue the paranoia around insecurity, that's why I'm not part of the group, because* ***they would be talking about nothing but insecurity*** *[laughs] then, I don't want to participate, as a victim I don't want to participate in any of it, because* ***then you have to be deeply interested in that kind of issue.***
>
> Juan Zenón, Industrial Sector
> Zapopan Jal., August 27th, 2015
> *(Q6-21)*

The kind of involvement that being an associate implies is not clear either in the Alcantaras', nor in Zenón's accounts. It seems that is a matter of attention devoted to the issue, however, it might also be related to becoming protection producers, a scenario that not all businessmen seem willing to be part of.

Returning to the openness that *Minerva 1997* shows regarding its potential customers, what Héctor L. Orta described as criteria in deciding to supply their services is interesting, namely, they help those who do not have the means to deal with a kidnapping situation and/or do not trust the law enforcers - what he labels as "the government." Both conditions deserve a deeper analysis, which will be developed in the next Chapter, however, this provides two main pillars to support the future analysis: what "means" does *Minerva 1997* represent to the businessmen who appeal the group? And, if the lack of trust around the institutions seems reason enough to contact *Minerva 1997*, how does that affect the relationship between the anti-kidnapping group and the law enforcement system?

That said, even if Orta insists on explaining that the group is able to serve anyone who needs it, there are two nuances that must be explored. The first one is related to the regular path used to reach the group, while the second one has to do with the kind of situation that the potential customer struggles with.

[934] Interview conducted with Alberto, Alcántara Jr. and Antonio Alcántara, Commerce Sector. (September 9th, 2015). Zapopan, Jal.

Following Orta's account, whoever needs their intervention can have it. However, the way to gain access to the group implies a selection process in itself, since *Minerva 1997* is normally reachable only through the recommendation of friends and acquaintances that lead them to the group, and, in some cases, the contact points are group members themselves.

The Alcántaras' case, once again, is illustrative. When asked how they gained access to *Minerva 1997* in the moment they needed it, Antonio, the family patriarch, and his son Alberto, described the following path:

> *[Antonio]- A* ***friend of mine… he told us,*** *[almost whispering] and Juan Zenón, he also gave me the advice…*
>
> *[Alberto]-* ***By way of recommendation, we met a specialist****, someone who works here in Guadalajara…*
>
> *[Antonio, interrupting]-* ***Máximo, Máximo Ballesteros*** *[the* Minerva 1997 *Operative Director].*
>
> *[Alberto]- Yes, we met him and then* ***we hired him first individually, to get a consultation*** *about our familial habits, the facilities' conditions, the entire business, and once they made their first exploration, then he asked us* ***'do you want to go beyond?'*** *and then we talked about it with a couple of persons, what it was about.*
>
> Alberto and Antonio Alcántara, Commerce Sector
> Zapopan, Jal., September 9th, 2015
> *(Q6-22)*

The Alcántaras' account shows that friends and respectful businessmen who have (or have had) contact with the group are the contact point for others who may need *Minerva 1997's* services. Considering that *Tapatio* businessmen adopt different behaviors to safeguard their social circles from what they consider unwelcome profiles, it is fair to derive that, due to the contact process, *Minerva 1997's* potential customers are businessmen like them, or people belonging to the same social networks. In that sense, the group is selective also when it comes to its beneficiaries, even bearing in mind that the social filters established by the *Tapatios*, as largely explained in Chapter 5, do not necessarily guarantee the sanitization of their group.

The next chapter will analyze the entanglement between the private security firm run by Ballesteros and *Minerva 1997*. By now it must be emphasized that the group's operative director is also a contact point between the anti-kidnapping group and its beneficiaries. That could extend the range of possible beneficiaries since Ballesteros, as proprietor of a private security firm, could be hired by anyone able to pay for the service his company supplies, no matter the social credentials. Nevertheless, it is not certain if the offer "to go beyond" that the Alcántaras received from Ballesteros is the same for other clients or if it is provided only

for a particular profile. Indeed, that brings to the table the second nuance to consider in Orta's statement regarding the group's disposition to be there for whoever may need their support: despite *Minerva 1997* being described as an anti-kidnapping group, they do not necessarily deal with all the modalities that this offense has taken in the last years.

Although *Minerva 1997'*s activities as an anti-kidnapping group will be at the center of the next chapter, it is important to note that the group does not take part in protecting or supporting businessmen when, rather than a kidnapping-for-ransom, the situation is an abduction perpetrated by *narcos,* the so-called *levantón.*[935]

> *A kidnapping,* ***when organized crime commits the kidnapping, by default, we know they [organized criminals] have no idea of****... **I mean… of how to carry a kidnapping out**, it is not a gang expert on kidnappings,* ***it involves more risks****, because it is not anymore like… a gang of kidnappers goes 'my… my…the most important thing is that I have the victim, that is what worth the most'. Here [on kidnappings committed by organized crime] it is not like this, it is more like* ***'well, whatever, I can*** **levantar** ***another one whenever I want'****, so it changes the way of committing a kidnapping, as well as* ***the way to the crisis must be managed, so we prefer to stand aside.***
>
> Máximo Ballesteros, Private Security Company Owner
> and founding associate of *Minerva 1997*
> October 16th, 2015, Zapopan, Jal.
> *(Q6-23)*

Different conditions could explain why *Minerva 1997* decides not to deal with abductions allegedly performed by *narcos.* It is possible that, as the Operative Director states, *levantones* require different management skills that the group does not necessarily have. It implies that, whatever activities the group may perform to protect the beneficiaries, to challenge the *narco* falls beyond its limits, either because the latter are perceived as powerful or dangerous enough not to warrant confrontation, or because *Minerva 1997*'s members do not necessarily take these crimes as "a businessmen's problem." That is to say, the lack of the "problem appropriation" distinctly occurring around this type of kidnapping-for-ransom would lead them to "stand aside" in these cases.

The criteria used to select customers is also quite telling with regards to how the extensive narrative around the *narcos* shapes part of the rules of *Minerva 1997*. As has been demonstrated in Chapters 2 and 5, respectively, *narco* violence is not seen as a direct threat against the business sector. If any, it is the *narcos'* willingness to be a part of their exclusive social spaces what bothers *Tapatio* businessmen. Hence, as *levantados* are not necessarily

[935] On *levantón,* see footnote 19 in Introduction and the discussion in Chapter 2.

perceived as kidnapping victims, but as people that likely had old scores or business with the *narcos* (or as *narcos* themselves), they are not a "business sector problem." Even when some of their peers could be *levantdos* as a means to collect a legally agreed-upon debt, as shown in Chapter 4, *Minerva 1997* would not get involved.

Recalling the previously reviewed case of Rafael Magaña, the real estate businessman whose son was killed in the middle of a soccer field, allegedly by *narcos*, it is pertinent to observe that despite the fact that Magaña was a businessman participating in different business associations, he did not obtain his peers' support, probably because his son's death was deemed a "*narcos'* crime." Thus, it seems that, in that sense, *Minerva 1997* members use similar criteria to business associations when it comes to deciding whom to offer support. After all, they are businessmen, the "most important of the city."

If *Minerva 1997* is not elitist when opening the door to potential members and customers, they are clearly selective. To have a sharper idea about who form the anti-kidnapping group and to whom they probably supply protection, it is necessary to discuss what do they do and, most importantly, how they do it. The next chapter provides details on the kind of activities that *Minerva 1997* performs and how they constitute a form of coproducing protection.

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Chapter 7. Victims, brokers and philanthropists: businessmen coproducing protection

> *"I think I had two or three days working at the Secretariat,* ***I was completely lost, thinking 'what am I doing here?****'. Then, I realised that a* licenciado*, old friend of my father, was still working there.* ***He was a*** **priista,** ***he had been congressman a lot of times****, and I thought, 'that is great, my father knows him very well, they are good friends', so I sent for him. He was happy to see me and before leaving the office he said 'look, you come from the private sector, there, things are quite different so, if you allow me, here is a piece of advice:* ***as a public officer, one can do only what the law dictates; as businessman, one can do what the law does not forbid!'*** *like this, with these words, with this clarity".*
>
> Jesús Salas, Businessman, Industrial Sector
> and former local and federal public officer
> Zapopan Jal., October 8th, 2015
> *(Q7-1)*

Appointed local and federal public officer in the late-1990s and 2000s respectively, Jesús Salas, a businessman in his late-60s, recalls his experience within the public administration and how he asked his brother to run his company meanwhile. It evokes an image of a player wearing two *cachuchas* (caps), the one of the businessmen and one of the public officer. Although this "double-cap" trajectory was usual after the *neopanistas* reached several positions, it is still intriguing how they balanced both profiles.

"How do you manage to 'press pause' on your business career to become a public officer? How do you handle wearing the two caps?", I asked during the interview. Jesús Salas answered with an anecdote that opens this chapter. This piece of advice, which Jesus claims to have never forgotten, pictures intertwinement between the public and the private spheres: indeed, you never 'press pause', instead, you learn to play with the relevant cap depending on each situation.

In Part II, it was argued that public-private divide is rather fuzzy, creating a complex entanglement of protection suppliers. The piece of wisdom that the old *priista* shared, in its turn, sheds light on how the actors navigate through this "grey area" in which businessmen, political actors and law enforcers are (in)formally related, using the lack of clarity to (re)negotiate their places and obtain what they are seeking for.

In this chapter, I build on this notion of fuzziness and argue that it is precisely within such a context that *Minerva 1997* co-produces protection for a selective group of businessmen,

reaching tailored-made solutions for what they perceive as their security challenges. I also argue that while producing such solutions for themselves and their peers, they shape policing and, consequently, the (in)security landscape for the rest of the Jalisco inhabitants.

In the previous chapter, it has been argued based on the accounts of businessmen that *Minerva 1997* is a selective group created *by* and *for* businessmen, although the diversity of narratives posed more questions than answers. Through two sections, this chapter will shift the scope towards the group's main actions by first, building on the narratives of those businessmen located in *Minerva 1997's* front row. I will explore how *Minerva 1997* operates, showing how the blurry boundaries largely discussed in the previous chapters are the constant backdrop of the group. The second section focuses on one of the leads proposed in the preceding chapter, namely, the rapport the anti-kidnapping group has with visibility (and secrecy), as well as other lessons learned across 20 years. Overall, we will demonstrate that the *Tapatios* businessmen have aggressively participated in co-producing protection and, thereby, shaping the local security landscape.

The reader will notice that two recurring accounts throughout this chapter, of namely, Héctor L. Orta, industrial sector businessman and co-founder of *Minerva 1997,* and that of Máximo Ballesteros, who owns a Private Security Company and has served as the Operative Director of the group since it was founded. Although it could be a limited perspective to draw the group's picture from two versions, both Orta and Ballesteros have been deeply situated in the group since its origins, thus their words are pertinent in as much as their respective roles in group's history. Nonetheless, some bias could be attributed to their accounts. For instance, it could be argued that being part of the selective group of decision makers, as stated in the previous chapter, they could replicate their accounts and obscure other profiles' experiences. As stated earlier, I was able to reach them through separate contacts, so it is unlikely that their accounts would be mutually conditioned before the interviews were conducted, since it is improbable that they knew of my communication with the other party. Furthermore, when it was possible, I compared their accounts with the versions provided by other interlocutors. In any case, they are key figures as one has served as the president of the board several times and the other has been the only Operative Director the group has known.

7.1 *Minerva 1997*'s main actions

According to Héctor L. Orta[936], when the ensemble of businessmen left *Casa Jalisco* after demanding the Governor Alberto Cárdenas to prompt measures to reduce kidnappings, they decided to do take other actions to improve their security conditions. Thus, they created the group whose first purpose was offering security advices to their peers. Shortly, they realized that, beyond spreading self-policing mechanisms, they should be able to offer some surveillance devices and close protection bodyguards. By doing that, members of *Minerva 1997* were about to transform their position from "victims" to that of protection suppliers.

Nevertheless, to be able to offer such protection services, they recruited Máximo Ballesteros, former staff member in Governor office and a federal level security office to run *Grupo Doríforos*[937]*,* the Private Security Company through which *Minerva 1997* grant the abovementioned services. Certainly, *Minerva 1997* had entered the private security sector. The conditions of private security industry, discussed in Chapter 4, resonate here. Firstly, we have discussed the importance of the "revolving doors" that connect law enforcement system and private security companies, through off-duty police officers running private firms and, in some cases, returning to the public service after a while. In this case, a *sui generis* revolving door seems enabled by *Grupo Doríforos* creation: businessmen coming from other sectors and trajectories made incursions on private security sector, albeit not leaving their industries, factories or store chains aside.

In a sector dominated by a lack of regulation and control, *Grupo Doríforos* could be established quickly making *Minerva 1997* competitive in the protection market, especially as it was test worthy among its peers. Taking part of the security market also meant being allowed to legally bear arms and make profits offering protection as will be discussed later in the chapter.

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[936] Interviews conducted with Héctor L. Orta, Industrial Sector Businessmen and co-founder of the group, (September 3rd, 2015;). Zapopan, Jal. Hereafter, references coming from Orta's account will be referenced specifying only the date of the interview, as his profile and the location did not change during the three encounters with him.

[937] Pseudonym chosen to anonymize the original name of the firm keeping a key aspect of the brand: their condition of elite guards and the possibility to operate at the burrows of public and clandestine spheres. The Doriphors is an appellation used by classical sources to refer the personal guard of the Roman Emperor Constantine (around 312 a.C.) The author acknowledges A. Sánchez, Ancient History specialist for kindly suggest this pseudonym. [Informal phone communication conducted with A. Sánchez, Historian. (February 15th, 2018)].

Establishing *Grupo Doríforos* also allowed *Minerva 1997* to expand their scope regarding potential clients, and also different threats. Hence, kidnapping, the original engine of the group, was only one of the many risks that the ensemble of businessmen could deal with. This being the case, what started as a focalized concern associated with a wave of kidnappings transcended, laying the foundation to *Minerva 1997* with broader expansion and permanence in the policing landscape.

On the other hand, the profile of Máximo Ballesteros deserves certain attention. As explained before, Héctor L. Orta considered him an expert. He had been a public officer in both federal and local administrations, in addition to being trained by the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). He also attended some specialization courses in Israel[938].

Furthermore, Orta's words are quite telling about the profile that *Minerva 1997* considered as necessary to their organization. Ballesteros trajectory within public administration represents experience and knowledge on the subject, as recognized by Orta, with insight on how law enforcement agencies operate, as well as valuable social capital constituted by former colleagues and subordinates. Furthermore, Ballesteros training suggest a quite an operative profile - not necessarily of a business manager. With these attributes, *Minerva 1997* was not only in the way of supplying surveillance devices and bodyguards to watch out business facilities, but also possessed the potential to go further.

In Chapter 6 we have examined how Héctor L. Orta mentioned *Minerva* 1997's "operative staff" and the Commander that coordinated them. Although uncertain, this information could have two readings: 1) If by "operative staff" Orta is referring to the agents employed by *Grupo Doríforos* as private security agents, then Ballesteros would be a sort of CEO and *Minerva 1997* the firm's shareholders. If this was the case, what explains the division in both entities? 2) Besides the agents hired by *Grupo Doríforos*, *Minerva 1997* could have their own staff that could either be on the firm's payroll. Additionally, the Commander could either be serving Ballesteros as owner of a private security company or the businessmen conforming the *Minerva 1997*.

Thus far, and limiting the observation to the creation of *Grupo Doríforos,* the case could be seen simply as a group of businessmen diversifying their investments while creating their

[938] Interview conducted with Héctor L. Orta, […].(September 3rd, 2015), Zapopan, Jal.

own private security company instead of purchasing protection. However, a more exhaustive analysis of *Minerva 1997* shows that the picture is quite more complex.

The list of services that *Minerva 1997* provided, either through *Grupo Doríforos* could be classified in preventive and reactive actions. Firstly, the following excerpt sheds light on some of the preventive services *Minerva 1997* offers to their associates or customers.

> *Another edge we covered was* ***… we analysed and… 90% of the actions taken for the bad guys to kidnap someone take place because they realize that people are not prepared to anticipate the dangerous situations****. Ok, good! So…'let's analyse everything and we can train our members… of the group, to tell them so many things', like what? 'look, from now****, forget about hiring maids…anyone you just found… or anyone. They need to pass through a sieve****, to know where does she come from… [he hits on the table at every question phrased]* ***where does she live? How are…? Where…? Who are her parents? Who are her siblings?'*** *to inhibit anyone attempting to harm you'. 'Do you have office assistants? Ok, you have to be careful!' Everyone… 'You receive phone calls, right?* ***It is forbidden to answer the phone!*** *Only if he is a relative you know, your brother!'(…), and* ***that's how we are going to avoid the contact between the bad guys and the good guys****… otherwise, the bad guys scare good guys, they got anxious and the [dangerous] situation starts goes out of control… so… we have to… Another thing, 'how do you go to work?' –'Well, I normally go…' –'Ok, do you notice if there is someone around your place when you leave?' – 'No!' –'From now on,* ***you have to hire people****…' 'At night, do you have enough lighting to inhibit someone strange to settle…there?' –'No, I don't!',* ***lights and cameras inhibit bad guys*** *(…). And also, if you go to a restaurant and you notice some…* ***strange people****… leave the place! Because they could… kill you or kidnapping you… but, you have to be aware of all the possible risks. When you leave your company,* ***never take the same path****… take some different ways… there are… there are a set of things to do. Then, all these things come* ***from an analysis to minimize risks****. What happened? The risks were minimized!*
>
> Héctor L. Orta, Industrialist and
> *Minerva 1997* founding associate
> Zapopan, Jal, September 18th, 2015,
> *(Q7-2)*

The first relevant feature has to do with Héctor L. Orta's use of words. He impersonates his conversation with the customers suggesting that *Minerva 1997* (and himself) have a very active role, much more than just transferring potential clients to the private security firm. In addition to this, it shows how his questions towards the potential client led to the acquisition of more protection services. This clearly fits into the "persisting fear paradox" posited in Chapter 4, since one security need implies the acquisition of a security device, which nonetheless, does not neutralize fear or insecurity. On the contrary, the fear persists and so does the consumption of security devices.

Secondly, the list of self-policing measures referenced by *Minerva 1997* co-founder retrieves the image of the "self-made man", the one who manages to some extent, the challenges he faces. As explained in previous chapters, that is a signal of a business sector shaped by the market-oriented economic reforms and a clear feature of Orta's profile. It is interesting to observe how this mind-set is shared and reproduced through the services the anti-kidnapping group offers. That is to say, among other services, *Minerva 1997* is counselling their customers on how to constrain themselves to minimize the risks. Being in charge of minimizing your own risks is a way to affect the public's protection demand (or lack of it) towards law enforcers.

Third, the account shows the importance granted to vetting employees. That is coincidental with previous findings. As stated in Chapter 1, businessmen identified shoplifting as one of the offenses that especially affects them. On the other side, Chapter 4 had illustrated how hybrid police corps, such as the Auxiliary Police, was regularly hired to perform this kind of investigations among the employees, even infiltrating the firm's staff.

Thus far, what *Minerva 1997* offers seems aligned to other protection suppliers' set of services. If anything, going further in the conversation with the co-founder, an interesting angle, unexplored before in this research, becomes visible.

Beyond the explicitly oriented "good guys vs. bad guys" speech, the previous quote points out how members of *Minerva 1997* (a group of "important" businessmen) define the attributes to distinguish the archetype of "bad guys" and ultimately, the threat they potentially face. On the one hand, this criterion guides the vetting process for their social or professional life. On the other hand, that could imply the exclusion of potential workers based not only on normative standards (criminal records, for instance), but also on moral parameters. For instance, while explaining why businessmen should be careful during the recruitment process of their employees, Orta warns the *Minerva 1997* associates in the following manner:

> *Because,* ***if you let the door open, anyone can enter!*** *If you don't implement a vetting process among your employees… if you hire all those…****tattooed, with piercings****… so, don't complain latter that you are full of* ***drug addicts*** *in your company!*
>
> Héctor L. Orta, Industrialist and
> *Minerva 1997* founding associate
> Zapopan, Jal., September 3rd, 2015
> *(Q7-3)*

Tattoos, piercings and drugs, the co-founder of *Minerva 1997* sets them all in the same category, all criminalized or seen as inherently felonious acts. In this case, the legal-illegal parameters are mixed up with the perception of what is appropriate and what is not when it comes to an employee appearance. Thus, if the threat is the possibility of hiring employees that could potentially shoplift or perpetrate some harm against the businessman, it is fair to say that, based on his conservative position, Héctor L. Orta problematizes tattoos and addictions and formulates them as security threat for his sector.

Taking the argument further, and coming back to the discussion presented in the Introduction, economic elites could establish protection mechanisms to face what they perceive to be menacing, including "the poor 'dangerous classes'", in the words of Huggings (1997). Besides, if security threats concerning the sector are premised on the beliefs and values of the economic elites, the same principles should be reflected in the protection mechanisms they demand or produce. That intuition will be strengthened in subsequent pages.

Thus far, it seems that *Minerva 1997* is, as any other owner of a private security firm, producing different security commodities. Doing so, it seems that its field of action is limited to the private arena, interacting with the local government only to demand better policies regarding kidnappings. However, in a context of fuzzy boundaries it was hard to expect this group would be clear-cut.

Certainly, an observation of the reactive actions *Minerva 1997* carries out, their complex rapport with the local law enforcement system becomes significant. According to Héctor L. Orta, along with the self-policing measures and the surveillance devices, they also provide advice to businessmen when facing a kidnapping. The account concerning this kind of service is quite telling regarding *Minerva 1997*'s rapport with the law enforcement and its focus on policing provision.

> *In those times [late-1990s] we used to have a lot of cases of… phone calls [concerning kidnapping cases]… 'From now on, I want you to be aware how bad is for you [businessmen] to answer immediately… and pay the day after [a ransom]…or if you refuse to pay'.* ***'There are technologies and techniques to deal with bad guys, ok? So let us handle it!'****, because, if they are asking you 10 millions… is equally badly to tell them 'Of course! Just don't kill me… tomorrow you'll have your [money]…', if you say so, they are not going to stop on 10 millions but ask 20… because they know you have a lot of money and you are going to pay them! Then, there are a number of things you can do to drive them [kidnappers] out of their minds… in order to make them softer… and you are not going to say you wont pay either, because if they truly have him [kidnapped person] they will kill him!* ***So, what I mean is… you have to come***

> ***with us. If you can't go with the government because you don't trust them… you don't trust any public servant… you can talk to us… tell us all that you want and we will protect you! Regarding the government, we will tell them 'Look, we have all this information… but you can't duck the issue! because we will keep an eye on this. And if we see that someone is colluded or someone receives…so, you better tell them [police officers] to behave'****, so we performed such supervision.*
>
> Héctor L. Orta, Industrialist and
> *Minerva 1997* founding associate
> Zapopan, Jal., September 18th, 2015,
> *(Q7-4)*

The prior account confirms that *Minerva 1997* deals with kidnappings, as some of the businessmen have heard. The mechanics of its operations, which were unclear in Chapter 6 are clarified to some extent through Héctor L. Orta's narrative. He stated that, effectively, *Minerva 1997* participates in crisis management operations fulfilling the role of kidnapping-and-ransom consultant (*negociador*) and, by doing so, also act as intermediaries between victims and law enforcement agencies.

Like any other kidnapping-for-ransom consultant, *Minerva 1997* negotiates with the kidnappers aiming to achieve to return hostages for affordable ransoms. The description provided by Héctor L. Orta is detailed by Máximo Ballesteros Jr., Deputy Director of *Grupo Doríforos*[939]. *H*e explains that they chose someone in the family to address the negotiations, they collect information on the kidnapped social networks in order to exclude employees or acquaintances as likely offenders, they decided whether if it is pertinent or not to report the crime and trigger the local police intervention. It can be said that his account is very similar to the one of Francisco Herrera[940] who, as discussed in Chapter 4, owns a private security company and defines himself as kidnapping-for-ransom consultant. Indeed, according to both, Héctor L. Orta and Herrera, the latter advised *Minerva 1997* while they were creating the group.

Suffice it to say that Francisco Herrera, Ballesteros (and with him *Minerva 1997*) need to be situated in a strategic position between the victims, the kidnappers and the law enforcers in order to do their job. They have to possess information not only coming from open sources,

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[939] Interview conducted with Máximo Ballesteros Jr., Deputy Director of *Grupo Doríforos*. (October 16th, 2015). Zapopan, Jal. In the interview were present the Deputy Director of the Company and his father, Máximo Ballesteros, Director and founder of the firm. However, Ballesteros Jr. shared with me the details of how to they "advice clients" on kidnapping crisis management once his father had left the room to attend another meeting.

[940] Interview conducted with Francisco Herrera, Private security company and kidnapping-and-ransom consultant. (February 1st, 2017). Mexico City.

but information that allows them to increase the odds to release the victim. Thus the kidnapper's profile or his networking with law enforcers or politicians is cardinal[941] and can only be acquired through deep entrenchment in such configuration. To that extent, *Minerva 1997* cumulates precious information regarding the configuration of that which it is a part of.

Managing a kidnapping crisis *Minerva 1997,* as *negociador,* could encourage or inhibit the participation of the law enforcers. If they decide not to report the case, police officers will remain out of the picture. Besides the effect that it has on official crime figures, observing this element, Jesús Salas words resonate: following its legal mandate, law enforcers should release the victim and catch the kidnappers, while *negociadores* would privilege the first objective not being forced to contribute to achieve the second.

Thus, if the kidnapping is entirely managed by *Minerva 1997*, the information collected on the perpetrators could reach law enforcement agencies only at the behest of businessmen. From this angle, considering that kidnappers are seen as a threat especially address against businessmen, it is fair to say that *Minerva 1997* would have incentive to do both, release the victim and contribute in the dismantling of the criminal organization. That being the case, involving the regular protection provider might imply certain collaboration between the actors.

It must be noted that while providing protection, *Minerva 1997* does not replace the local government. Instead, they act as brokers between law enforcers and kidnapping victims. Based on the infamous reputation of the police corps, businessmen present themselves as an effective alternative to solving a kidnapping case. A brief reference to the conceptualization developed by academic literature on clientelism, the broker figure becomes clearer. As owners of essential information about both, the policy makers and the beneficiaries, brokers are the key piece that connects the actors, making the distribution of benefits possible to individuals who will effectively reciprocate in the ballot box (Stokes et. al., 2013). In this case, owning information regarding all the actors involved, *negociadores* are in the position to trigger (or not) the delivery of the public service (policing) and also to handle possible retributions the service recipient might give in return. Thus, *Minerva 1997* is able to manage

[941] Idem

both, the intervention of the law enforcers and the reward victims grant them, as will be shown later.

The role of supervisors of law enforcers' performance feeds the image of businessmen as exerting certain hierarchy over the public agencies. However, it must be acknowledged that monitoring and reporting agencies achievements was a task that the former Governor Alberto Cárdenas granted to business sector, in order to lend credibility to the information presented to the public. Yet, the unfinished idea within Héctor L. Orta's account, does not inform us what kind of measures (if any) the group takes in case of detecting public officers collusion.

Neither the "monitoring tasks" nor the "brokering" occurs in a simple scenario, as will be demonstrated observing the links between *Minerva 1997* and the local government.

In the late-1990s, in the context of a progressive fragmentation of public agencies[942], the newly elected Jalisco's Governor Alberto Cárdenas faced a wave of kidnappings and the subsequent businessmen's demand for solutions. One of the measures his government took was the creation of a small public agency specialized in managing kidnappings, the anti-kidnapping unit[943]. In Chapter 1, we have learnt that the creation of these types of agencies become usual all around the country and, indeed, it was an agreement reached by the state attorney's offices in their first annual conference. In that sense, the creation of the anti-kidnapping unit in Jalisco was mostly a sign of the times.

The former governor Alberto Cárdenas[944] recalled that, to conceive the agency, he took the advice of Francisco Barrio who was the Governor of Chihuahua at the time. Fellow party members and belonging to the new generation of *panistas* running state governments, Barrio shared his experienced in creating these kinds of institutions:

> ***[the case of Juan Zenón]*** *it was one of the triggers to create the Secretary[945] and the anti-kidnapping unit. It has kidnapped many businessmen thus far, but* ***this one make me accelerate****... faster! To create this area helped Pancho Barrio. When I was starting [the administration] the situation heated up! So one day, in a meeting we had here in Mexico City, I went 'hey, Pancho, someone you know? Someone you believe in? Let me borrow him for 15 days****, I already have a team of 10 or 12 boys there, I trust them***

[942] On this process and the configuration of the polycentric system see Chapter 3.
[943] I intentionally omit more details of the name of the agency for anonymity purposes.
[944] Interview conducted with the former governor Alberto Cárdenas. (April, 22nd, 2018). Mexico City.
[945] The former Governor refers the formation of the Public Security Secretary. For more details regarding the transformation of the institutional frame see Chapter 3.

> ***a lot, but I want to endow it method****, I want to give it more order, procedures'. And he did, he sent me someone who stayed for a while, and created a great team!*
>
> Alberto Cárdenas, Jalisco former governor
> April 22nd, 2018, Mexico City
> *(Q7-5)*

The anti-kidnapping unit was effectively a small agency, composed of a select group of highly trained actors. The local newspaper *Público*[946] reported at the times that it was conformed by 20 experts, although they described them as *negociadores* and not police officers, emphasizing that its position in the institutional landscape was unclear[947].

Although Cárdenas acknowledged that the kidnapping of Juan Zenón forced him to accelerate the creation of the specialized unit, he cited the episode as if his cabinet managed the project omitting thus far, any participation of the business sector. Later, he added: "when we created the anti-kidnapping unit, businessmen went 'how much do we grant'? We throw part of the money!"[948]. As in other projects addressed by the *panista* governor, a group of businessmen contributed with financial support[949].

Héctor L. Orta's memories regarding those times are, however, differently phrased.

> *Some days later [after the first meeting with the Governor du to Juan Zenón's kidnapping], we went… we said 'what are we going to do?* ***Let's create a group of people, here in Jalisco, who have enough knowledge to address the kidnapping problem****. It is going to be* ***part of the Government****, it will be the one conducting* ***concrete action to arrest the bad guys, because we can't do that****… it is beyond our scope', 'Oh yes, very good, let's do it!', and we started…*
>
> Héctor L. Orta, Industrialist and
> *Minerva 1997* founding associate
> Zapopan, Jal., September 18th, 2015
> *(Q7-6)*

From the businessmen's perspective, they planned the agency and, as part of the design process, they decided to attach it to the local law enforcement system in order to endow it with the prerogatives it needed to operate: conducting detentions is forbidden for private entities, however, it can be done through a police body worthy of keeping close. Once again, the double-cap scenario shows itself.

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946 The local newspaper *Público* was purchased by the national newspaper *Milenio.* There is not available information of the local newspaper.
947 I intentionally omit the newspaper release exact reference for anonymization purposes.
948 Idem
949 See Chapter 3.

Besides the financial contribution, Héctor L. Orta[950], explained that *Minerva 1997* had participated in the anti-kidnapping unit created through hiring of consultants from other parts of the country (among them Francisco Herrera, the *negociador* interviewee), financing and supervising the training to the unit staff members, who attended courses even abroad. Additionally, businessmen performed as a transmission belt between the multiple security agencies that, as discussed in Chapter 3, were divided, due to the tensions among members of Cárdenas security cabinet. Even, Héctor L. Orta who took advantage of his participation in national business associations and the visibility that it granted him, offered the local government a set of budgetary petitions to the Federal government[951]. This last anecdote shall be de-constructed in the context of regional political leaderships gaining significance in the national landscape and the discussion of a New Federal Pact[952]. Hence, the episode illustrated how local government could make use of businessmen's social and political capital in order to gain what the inter-partisan tensions could deny.

Thus *Minerva 1997* seemed to work hand by hand with the local government, putting their own resources at the disposal of the public security project. In its turn, *Minerva 1997* members gained a wide margin of manoeuvre to intervene in the creation of a public security agency. Financing the training of the specialized unit, they could decide the operative approach the police body implemented. Having direct contact with poorly connected centres (public agencies) of the law enforcement system, and being the link between them, the group could also decide what kind of information was shared among the agencies or when they had to be coordinated and when some tensions were more optimal for businessmen purposes.

Despite the contradiction between the former governor and the co-founder of *Minerva 1997*[953], it is possible that none of the actors exerted a dominant position during the creation and operationalization of the anti-kidnapping unit. Instead, permanent re-negotiations were required, especially as all the actors (law enforcers and businessmen) needed each other to achieve their aims.

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[950] Interviews conducted with Héctor L. Orta, […]. (September 3rd, 2015; September 18th, 2015; January 18th, 2017).
[951] Interview conducted with Héctor L. Orta, […]. (September 18th, 2015).
[952] See the Introduction.
[953] Actually, the contradiction between could be read as both characters trying to play the leading role, at least discursively. However, in Chapter 3, while describing the formation of a polycentric system, it was demonstrated that the administration of Cárdenas delegated to businessmen part of the public security agenda (at least the communication towards the public opinion and the report of the official crime figures).

At first glance, when the actors are reminiscing about a generalized set of actions they performed, it seems that *Minerva 1997* maintains a fine line between the public and the private realms. In this context, as Lund (2006) highlights the paradox of "twilight institutions", actors are strongly aware of the distinction between state and society, but their actions constantly undermine this distinction. For that reason, it is pertinent to review some of their actions in more detail, which would enable us to observe how *Minerva 1997* and local government co-produce policing.

First, it is appropriate to come back to the dynamics of kidnapping crisis management to explore in detail how the professed boundaries between government and businessmen are actually quite blurry.

In a kidnapping crisis, tracing the calls that captors make to demand he ransom is probably the best opportunity to recover the victim without depending on negotiation success, so the first hours of the kidnapping are crucial. To be able to wiretap a telephone, the state agencies need a judicial order whose procurement certainly entails a lengthy process. Since this practice has been weakly regulated in Mexico, prosecutors have few incentives to scrutinize the law to justify their demand before the judge. The creation of a group of judges specialized in precautionary measures[954] at the federal level[955] expedited this process, but it is exclusive for federal cases (mostly related with Organized Crime). However, the *Minerva 1997* has its own network for tapping private communications quickly and discreetly, prancing around the legal-illegal interface.

Describing the kind of activities they settled to manage a crisis, Héctor L. Orta said that, from the beginning, they "made all the arrangements with the telephone company to trace the calls and to get the necessary information [the coordinates]"[956]. Once they figure out where the call comes from, *Minerva 1997* members give such information to the anti-kidnapping unit staff, which undertakes the process of an eventual detention of a *flagrante delicto,* rescuing the victim.

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[954] Search warrant, tapping communications, and *arraigo* (40 days legal detention ordered by a judge under the suspicion that the subject committed a crime, prolonged form of pre-trial detention).
[955] Acuerdo 75/2008 del Pleno del Consejo de la Judicatura Federal por el que se crean los Juzgados Federales Penales Especializados en Cateos, Arraigos e Intervención de comunicaciones. Diario Oficial de la Federación, Mexico City, December 4th, 2008.
[956] Interviews conducted with Héctor L. Orta […]. (September 3rd, 2015; September 18th, 2015; January 18th, 2017, Zapopan, Jal.

If the anti-kidnapping unit, as government entity, obtains the coordinates of the call without a judicial order, their officers would be committing a felon. Moreover, it jeopardizes the investigation process and an eventual sanction for the alleged kidnappers, as the public officers will be violating the due process right. In contrast, doing the exact same thing, businessmen would be holding an agreement between peers and, ultimately, reaping the fruits of their investments on social capital, since the agreement depends on sharing resources between members of the same professional field.

On the other hand, *Minerva 1997* could not use their operative staff to release a kidnapping victim, but by sharing information they can trigger the law enforcement action, which has this prerogative. In this case, the collaboration between public and private agents seems a win-win situation, due to the complementarity of their competences through which, every actor finds in its counterpart the parcel of authority they are missing (Favarel-Garrigues, 2013).

In this case, *Minerva 1997* members and law enforcement agents are both acting in the fuzzy limits of legality. Actually, when Orta describes the intervention of the unit staff to release victims, suddenly appears a "we" that makes it hard to comprehend whether he is talking on behalf of a group of businessmen or as part of the public agency. Furthermore, in the second interview Héctor L. Orta, realized he was describing, for the second time, an almost law-breaking situation:

> *Those actions [wire tapping]* ***although they were not… somehow… approved by the law****… we do it* ***because of the emergency*** *and so… then… because, otherwise…they [law enforcement agencies] were not able to implement those actions [release victims]…then****… this is very delicate, I don't know if I must say it or how to say it****… but what is true is that we saw the problem, we look for solutions, we told them and they took actions and then* ***the problem started being solved!***
>
> Héctor L. Orta, Industrialist and
> *Minerva 1997* founding associate
> Zapopan, Jal., September 18th, 2015
> *(Q7-7)*

The emergency and effectiveness justify, according to *Minerva 1997* co-founder, the possible transgression of a law. In the end, if they were contravening privacy rights, it would be those of criminals, so it seems defensible from his perspective. Doing so, they are ranking "the good guys" rights over those of the alleged offenders. As has been discussed in some cases of co-production and vigilantism "in certain circumstances, private actors who are otherwise

law-abiding citizens may engage in illegal activities in order to protect their assets or to punish others they regard as transgressors" (Chang et al., 2018: 107).

Certainly, neither *Minerva 1997* nor Héctor L. Orta were prevented by the law to exchange information with another businessman (the one managing telecommunications). The latter, in contrast, has the mandate of protecting the personal information of his clients. Such regulation, being relatively recent[957], does not imply significant penalties. In addition, according to a former CISEN officer, wire-tapping is only one of the many mechanisms Mexican businessmen use to carry out industrial espionage[958].

It is clear that, while managing a kidnapping crisis, businessmen members of *Minerva 1997* co-produces protection, since they implement different actions in collaboration with the law enforcers. Wire-tapping case is one in which *Minerva 1997* demonstrates how they could be differentiated from other kidnapping-and-ransom consultants, as no one else is situated so critically at the core of the economic elite network and consequently, in a position to mobilize such capital.

Thus far, the co-production process might be summarized as a group of businessmen that, after undergoing an experience of kidnaping, founded a private security company and collaborate with the local government to establish a specialized public agency. Nevertheless, the frontiers among *Minerva 1997*, *Grupo Doríforos* and the *government anti-kidnapping unit* are not always clear, pointing out more and hybrid (or twilight) entity than a private one.

The picture becomes more complex while going forward in deconstructing activities and operations of *Minerva 1997* as the co-production task does not finish once the victim is back home. The founders and Executive Director of *Minerva 1997* agreed on the importance of reinforce institutions to achieve sustainable changes[959]. One of their strategies is to improve police officers conditions. As explained elsewhere in the text, this is not an innovative enterprise for businessmen in Guadalajara, since the early 1980s they have conducted some efforts in this respect, for instance, sponsoring a campaign to alphabetize police officers or

[957] Ley Federal de Protección de datos personales en posesión de los particulares. Diario Oficial de la Federación, Mexico City, July 6th, 2010.
[958] Informal conversation with a former CISEN officer. (April, 18th, 2018). Mexico City.
[959] Interviews conducted with Héctor L. Orta […]. (September 3rd, 2015; September 18th, 2015; January 18th, 2017, Zapopan, Jal.); Máximo Ballesteros. (January 19th, 2017). Zapopan, Jal.; Ernesto González, Industrial Sector. (October 16th, 2015). Zapopan, Jal.

by instituting the award in recognition and monetary prize to the "police officer of the month"[960].

Minerva 1997, in its turn, under the narrative to reinforce the police bodies, established a system of rewards to those who participate in a successful hostage release. To finance such endeavour, they used the unpaid ransoms. Indeed, when a businessman, or his relatives, seeks *Minerva 1997* intervention to manage a kidnapping crisis, they will probably recover the victim without paying the ransom (or, at least, less than what kidnappers demanded). In such cases, *Minerva 1997* asks the victims for part of this money to compensate the "good work of police officers"[961]. Doing so, according to Orta, police officers would have the incentives to produce good work while also minimizing the risk of being corrupted by kidnappers. So, they receive "a significant amount of money, not just anything, but a really important amount [of money]".[962]

Minerva 1997 Council[963] knows they cannot grant compensatory payments to police officers without defying the rules and regulations of police bodies, in particular, because that would be considered as bribes. To overcome that barrier, they operate the rewards system through the *Fundación Doríforos*, the philanthropic branch of *Minerva 1997*[964]. Thus, formally the anti-kidnapping unit officers do not receive special bonuses from a group of businessmen, instead the public agency receives donation from the third sector.

Certainly, the case may fuel the discussion on how businessmen could use philanthropy and civil society organizations to improve public image, to lighten their fiscal load or even to launder money (Porter and Kramer, 2006). However, for this research purpose, what has to be noted is how businessmen, through this non-profit initiative, gain selective protection.

In Chapter 4 we have explored other forms of close or selective protection that commissioned police officers provide to businessmen and how such service is situated in the midst of a reciprocity circle between political and economic elite. The rewards program launched by *Minerva 1997*, conversely, entails an agreement between businessmen and police corps

[960] Gazette Bank of Images 1970-2016.
[961] Interviews conducted with Héctor L. Orta, […]. (September 3rd, 2015; September 18th, 2015; January 18th, 2017, Zapopan, Jal.)
[962] Interview conducted with Héctor L. Orta, […]. (September 18th, 2015).
[963] As explained in Chapter 6, integrated by the President of the Presiding Committee and a dozen of selected members of *Minerva 1997*.
[964] The Foundation is attached to the private security company and it is run by Máximo Ballesteros.

operative profiles. If, as described by Orta, *Minerva 1997* grants awards to the police officers in ceremonies in which their "sons, their family are present, to make them proud of the father"[965], they could also gain the gratitude and loyalty of the agents. Decorated officers may reciprocate with selective protection. Hence, on-duty officers could be devoted to safeguarding *Minerva 1997* either to pay back the award or to gain another monetary stimulus.

Earlier in the section, while discussing how the group could be analogues to the figure of brokers, there was as a loose end in terms of understanding how the victims reciprocate the benefit. The rewards program is then the way to tie it up as, the money that decorated police officers receive comes from the victims through the brokerage of *Minerva 1997*.

The reciprocity circle is not limited to hostage releases and awards ceremonies. In contrast, it is practiced on a daily basis. For instance, Héctor L. Orta considers that the "good communication" they sustain with the anti-kidnapping unit agents, firstly comes from the respect they have for each other. In more practical terms, it also has to do with the fact that businessmen pay the agents' mobile phone bills, thus creating a direct channel of communication: "the Commanders *X* and *Y,* they are always available and ready when we call them"[966], said *Minerva 1997*'s founder.

The fluid communication and the accompanying prompt protection service might appear excessive, as mobile phones are becoming increasingly common and affordable. However, in a context where police corporations face precariousness to the point that, in some cases, they have to personally purchase their uniforms and equipment[967], *Minerva 1997* contribution could mean a lot for police officers.

Thus, the co-production process regarding kidnapping is a recurring long-term game, since the players (*Minerva 1997* members and law enforcement agents) interact repeatedly, whether preventing crimes or resolving them. In that sense, the exchanges between the actors are not necessarily tit-for-tat, but far more diffused depend upon credible commitment and trust from both parts as well (Ostrom, 1996). As an example, the co-founder of the group

[965] Interview conducted with Héctor L. Orta […]. (September 18th, 2015).
[966] Idem
[967] "Policías de Jalisco invierten su salario en comprar chalecos antibalas, calzado y municiones". (August 13th, 2019). *El Occidental*.

explained that every time an administration finishes, the newly appointed officers could change the staff and "good public servants" could be out of the institution. Claiming that the officer's talent should not be wasted, *Minerva 1997* assigns the former officer an income while he is out of public service[968]. Due to prevalent "revolving doors", it is possible that eventually, the officer would be back on the bureaucratic structure. Based on these odds, this sort of "unemployment insurance" guarantees, for *Minerva 1997*, a loyal and thankful partner within the public administration structure.

Besides the pattern of cooperation between *Minerva 1997* and the local government, certain tensions and confrontations are possible, especially if the parcels of authority previously discussed overlap. Being the case, operative profiles might confront a loyalty dilemma, between serving firstly one leadership or the other. Thus, police officers as violent entrepreneurs could solve such dilemma based maximizing their profits, ultimately, within informal agreements "people mostly do what they get paid to do" (Rick, 2017: 314).

Across the three interviews conducted with Héctor L. Orta and the two conducted with Máximo Ballesteros it is not clear if the police officer's rewards policy is devoted exclusively to the agents attached to the anti-kidnapping unit or if it also covers other police corps. Assuming the second scenario, it would mean that businessmen would have selective protection coming from different levels of the structure, which is quite convenient within a polycentric system.

Whether the rewards include more police forces or only the anti-kidnapping group, will emphasize another implication for the businessmen-agents rapport. According to Martha Huggins (1997), elite police corps tends to progressively gain operative autonomy, which could be used by them and by those who are able to pay for their services. Actually, the author observes how in Brazil, specialized polices forces, after acquiring additional outside remunerations from landowners, become rent-a-cops and, in extreme cases, death-squads. Although the picture observed by Huggins does not seem to be close to our sample, her conclusions pose potentially interesting ramifications for such a case.

The rewards policy also includes the sanctions if the agents fail to comply with their duties, or at least if *Minerva 1997* perceives it to be the situation. This being the case, Orta said, they

[968] *Idem*.

"talk to… and the corrupted officer goes to jail"[969]. Although he did not specify who they talk to. His comments also suggest the unlikelihood of a fair trial. It seems *Minerva 1997* has certain influence on integrating the unit staff and vetting its members. In fact, the co-founder said that if they consider "someone is not very…good [righteous]"[970], they talk to the boss asking him to fire this person. Defining who operates security policy they, somehow, set up the delivery of the public service.

The reader has noticed that, in the discourse on the rewards-sanctions mechanism, the *Fundación Doríforos* disappears as all attention is focused on *Minerva 1997.* In this direction, the way Máximo Ballesteros describes the foundation he runs is quite informative:

> *Me: In your experience, how did you get the idea of… how it emerges the idea of, in addition to having a firm, establish a foundation…?*
>
> *I: Well, here, the curious thing was… in fact* ***it is an association****… that emerged from the idea that a group of businessmen had, motivated by… the motivation we have in Mexico to do this things, right? It was fear,* ***fear regarding kidnappings!*** *That year there were many kidnappings and it was fear what convinced a lot of businessmen to say 'let's establish the association'. Thus,* ***there is a huge sense of social responsibility… within the foundation*** *and then,* ***the association achieved an improvement in the situation in three or four years, but we decided to preserve and expand it.***
>
> Máximo Ballesteros, Private Security Company Owner
> and Operative Director of *Minerva 1997*
> Zapopan, Jal., January, 19th, 2017
> *(Q7-8)*

From the first lines of the prior account it is noticeable how Ballesteros assimilates the *Foundation Doríforos* with *Minerva 1997* since his descriptions fairly fits into the one of the group under analysis. However, he emphasizes social responsibility, an attribute usually associated to philanthropy and, in doing so, recovers the label of "foundation". From there, it is possible to say that *Fundación Doríforos* is mostly the philanthropic façade of *Minerva 1997*.

Through the exploration of the actions it is fair to say that *Minerva 1997* is a complex configuration in which are entangled a group of businessmen, a specialized public agency, a private security company and a philanthropic foundation. Figure 7.1 attempts to represent

[969] Interview conducted with Héctor L. Orta, […]. (September 3rd, 2015).
[970] *Idem.*

this combination leaving behind the generic "a group created *by* and *for* businessmen" discussed in the previous chapter to observe such an intricate protection pattern.

As can be seen in the schema, there are situations in which all these actors co-produce security ensemble, while in other cases they could operate separately from the configuration. Thus, when the private security company *Grupo Doríforos* provides a service to one of their clients, they do not necessarily act on behalf of *Minerva 1997.* In the same sense, the anti-kidnapping unit do not intervene exclusively in the cases managed by the businessmen group, as other citizens may reach it (at least, the should be able to). The figure also allows us to recall that *Minerva 1997* emerged within one of the abundant *Tapatio* business associations and that, even considering its complexity, they remain a select group among a heterogeneous sector demanding protection.

Figure 7.1 *Minerva 1997* or a model of protection co-production



Source: Elaborated by the author based on the ensemble of interviews conducted between August 2015 and January 16th, 2017, with an ensemble of businessmen settled in Guadalajara Metropolitan Area, complementary profiles who referred the *Minerva 1997* and open sources revision. Circles sizes are illustrative and do not represent accurate prportions.

The variety of information regarding *Minerva 1997* activities merits a comprehensive account, which will reveal how the workings of this group turn the erstwhile victims into protection co-producers. As seen in Table 7.1 the set of activities carried out by *Minerva*

1997 could be classified according to two dimensions: 1) the level of businessmen's involvement on producing protection that the activity implies; and 2) the stage of the public service production in which the action could be situated.

Considering these dimensions, it is possible to claim that the borders of the involved actors are clearer when businessmen are less active, turning to a more "grey area" when they gain weight on either designing or delivering protection.

Through the set of activities it is also clearer how, while coproducing protection for its members, *Minerva 1997* affects the security landscape for the rest of Guadalajara inhabitants. Having such a lead in designing the public security policy, the institutional design and even the organizational dynamics of the law enforcement agencies, they transform the way the public service is delivered.

Table 7.1 Activities carried out by *Minerva 1997* to produce protection

Public service stage	Businessmen role: Less active	Businessmen role: More active
Design	• Advocacy • Consultancy	• Agents training • Cross-agency coordination enablers
Delivering	• Implementation Private Security Devices • Private Security offer for their peers • Supervising Law Enforcement Agencies' actions	• Cross-agency brokers • Brokers between Law Enforcement Agencies and users • Information producers • Rewards and sanction policy settlers

Source: Elaborated by the author based on the ensemble of interviews conducted between August 2015 and January 16th, 2017, with an ensemble of businessmen settled in Guadalajara Metropolitan Area, complementary profiles who referred the *Minerva 1997* and open sources revision.

Perceiving kidnapping as their main problem and driving public and private efforts to handle it, they are: 1) perceiving the threat; 2) formulating it as businessmen problem; 3) mobilizing their resources to be protected and; 4) producing protection themselves. However, they are

also: a) neglecting other possible security threats; b) obscuring other potential victims; c) hogging limited protection resources; d) shaping Jalisco's policing.

Countering threats to businessmen including their eventual elimination is beneficial to the whole society. Thus, *Tapatios* would gain when local notables coproduce their own protection in addition to spreading it to other less protected sectors. In this sense, the case of racketeering is extremely revealing. As explained in Chapter 4, in contrast with other cases, *Tapatio* businessmen do not seem to be quite affected by this crime with the only exception being the big food market sellers (*locatarios en mercados de abastos*). Besides the explanations offered in the chapter, Alfonso Magadán, young businessmen in the industrial sector claimed "when *cobro de piso* started, the *Minerva [1997]* became active and it finished… or went anywhere else".

Minerva 1997, thus, contributes to the broader delineation of who is protected from whom and with what measures.

7.2 The visibility-secrecy continuum and other lessons learned

An image of *Minerva 1997* within a "grey area" consisting of victims-businessmen-brokers-and-philanthropists, would not be complete without a discussion of this actor's position in the visibility-secrecy continuum. I use the notion of "continuum" to evoke different degrees between secrecy and visibility, advancing that this attribute does not necessarily behave as a "clandestine-public" dichotomy. Instead, I argue that some aspects of the group are more visible while others are more secret.

As we elaborated in the previous chapter, there is asymmetric information regarding *Minerva 1997*'s character and actions among businessmen. To build upon this point, we argue that businessmen's level of knowledge can be categorized into four levels: 1) those who do not know of the existence of the group; 2) those who have heard some rumours about the group; 3) those who know certain details about the group; 4) those who have had some contact with the group and possess first-hand information.

Taking advantage of the opportunity to raise this issue with all the interviewees except the first, I analysed the businessmen's general profiles to understand how the four previous groups are composed. In other words, I analysed who knows about *Minerva 1997* and how they get this information. In that regard, it must be stated that a necessary condition to have

some knowledge of the group is to participate in the business sector's associative life. Hence, the businessmen situated outside the network of chambers are clearly unable to acquire information about the existence of the group. Throughout this research, we have understood the importance of chambers and associations for businessmen. In this case, their significance is confirmed. However, it has to be acknowledged that membership in associative life is a necessary but not sufficient condition to get access to information about *Minerva 1997*. Conversely, the more active profiles within the business associations seem more likely to have heard about the group or even have some complementary information. Thus, young businessmen who have been leaders of chambers or associations[971] know more about *Minerva 1997* than members of association who describe themselves as averse to "chambers' *grilla*"[972].

Yet, due to the selective nature of *Minerva 1997*, proximity to the group is reserved for *la crème de la crème*, as illustrated in the case of the Alcantaras:

> *After [having used* Minerva 1997's *services],* ***I spoke about it with some people from my network****, and one told me 'I belong to that network for I don't know how many years', 'oh, okay, tell me more about it', and he spoke more about this group and all that****… the group was recommended to me, because… because… my father*** *[Alberto Alcántara]* ***is a… and the family… our family is a well-known family in… the local business industry****. The opportunity to participate or the invitation also emerged from there and…. then we decided that it was not a necessity.*
>
> Antonio Alcántara, Industrial Sector
> Zapopan, Jal., September 9th, 2015,
> (Q7-9)

Readers will remember from previous chapters that the Alcantaras were victim of a cargo truck robbery and, after unsuccessfully approaching the State Attorney's Office, Juan Zenón directed them towards Máximo Ballesteros. Thus, the networks of the Alcantaras' status as patriarchs within *la crème de la crème* and their well-known last name granted them entry into the world of *Minerva 1997.* The prior account further states that networks are also the means through which the group's reputation is (re)produced.

The visibility-secrecy dimension builds on a network of "those who know" in addition to "those who say" actors. Sharing information about the group is what makes the network

[971] Interview conducted with Alfonso Magadán, Industrial Sector. (September 23rd, 2015). Zapopan, Jal.
[972] *Grilla* is a Mexican term to refer to the atmosphere of gossip and slander that occurs within political spheres, labour unions, and business circles, due to the attempts of several of its participants to take personal advantages (DEM, 2019). Interview conducted with Sergio Hernández, Service Sector. (September 1st, 2015). Guadalajara, Jal.

meaningful and, from Antonio Alcantara's account, it is possible to deduce that word-of-mouth is the primary instrument of spreading information about the group. However, not all the businessmen are able to spread their knowledge.

> *Me: Do you have knowledge about initiatives or collective efforts that businessmen bring together to… prevent, the security issue…? -* ***[I: Yes!] Does that work? -[I: Yes, it works] -[Silence] could you…tell me more about it?***
>
> *I:* ***I would prefer not to [say more]****. [Me: Ok]* ***I don't want to be rude but…*** *[Me: No, no…it's ok]* ***well… but it works****. I know cases where my friends had their machines stolen and… they go with them, and within a week we have those machines back.*
>
> Daniel Campos, Industrial Sector
> Guadalajara, Jal., September 8th, 2015
> *(Q7-10)*

> ***I know a couple of [groups] that are completely secret, that I cannot even share with you but I also know another one they create… it is called*** **Minerva 1997** *that several businessmen created here, a long time ago, when there were kidnappings and with… and they have a complete system of information that provides data and… that they protect…but no…no…* ***[Silence]*** *I do not want to give too much information [****Me:*** *Of course!]* ***I find it a sensitive subject.***
>
> Susana Piña, Industrial Sector
> Zapopan, Jal., October, 9th, 2015
> *(Q7-11)*

Both accounts share the intuition that they should not delve into details. Silences cutting the fluency of the speech mirror unwillingness to move forward, making it crystal-clear that they will not share more information. Yet, both quotations are quite informative. Daniel Campos confirms that, actually, *Minerva 1997* efficiently handles threats beyond mere kidnappings or extortion. Susana Piña, in her turn, adds interesting elements to the picture. *Minerva 1997* could be just one among several other protection supplies created *by* and *for* businessmen. Indeed, Daniel Campos could be referring to *Minerva 1997* or some other group, as he gives few details. Furthermore, following Piña's account, among the different groups, *Minerva 1997* is not one of the "completely secret" groups. That opens many avenues. Are the other groups clandestine? Why? What does it imply? Also, she situates *Minerva 1997* in a "grey area" pertaining to the visible-secrecy continuum: it is possible to say something about the group but there are elements that remain secret.

The press release evoked earlier, which reports the existence of the anti-kidnapping unit (and assimilates it to what we know as *Minerva 1997*) outlines how the agency is untraceable, as it did not appear in any government organisational chart and nobody knows where they are

situated. Nonetheless, the reporter had some access to the unit and was able to conduct an interview with its coordinator, who asked to remain anonymous. When the reporter asked him if he ran a secret group, the coordinator answered: "Let's say we are discreet rather than secret"[973].

The former governor Alberto Cárdenas remembers the criticism arising from the lack of information about the anti-kidnapping unit, "Few people knew where the unit was located, for obvious reasons (…), not even the neighbours knew the unit was just there, handling kidnappings, otherwise, it would be to easier to make it for criminals".[974] Hence, it is fair to say that the group was intentionally "discreet" from the beginning only about some aspects. In that regard, Héctor L. Orta's memories indicate that discretion (or secrecy) was essentially a lesson learned.

> *What happened? With these… I do not refer to it as obstacles… I would say… important objectives that the group needed to accomplish, there have not been a lot of problems between us…or between… although we did make a change.* ***At the beginning, every year we had a reunion with all the associates****, around 150 people, in a big hotel conference room, we invited the Governor and the Secretary of Security and all that… all our invitees came…* ***but people were at risk … when someone is seen next to the bad guys****, and they did not know that this group existed…, then* ***we decided to stop having these reunions that made us visible to the public eye, that drove us into the spotlight because we felt a risk. Then… [we conducted] more discreet and confidential actions****, to make meetings with the Secretary of Security and the Secretary of Defense and with… but in a totally different occasion and only with the Presiding Committee, and…* ***we then report to all associates at one point… by telephone and using codes to respect anonymity****, then… this… this was amended (…) and then, we do it with the Committee, with 25 or 30… members… of the group…that are selected, that are important… and that…* ***and they diffuse information with other people, the important things****…* ***And also when there is the big… the big meeting of… we filter people… a very special filter to avoid unwanted people****…* ***we never know and… to be very careful with a lot of things.***
>
> Héctor L. Orta, Industrialist and
> *Minerva 1997* founding associate
> Zapopan, Jal., January 18th, 2017
> *(Q7-12)*

The quotation is meaningful in itself. If anything, it is convenient to relate Héctor L. Orta's account with the discussion provided in Chapter 5 concerning *Tapatios* permanent risk of "bowling with the bad guys". Although his narrative is confusing at this point, it seems that *Minerva 1997's* members learned that gatherings with the group's members and some public

[973] I intentionally omit the exact reference of the press release for anonymization purposes.
[974] Interview conducted with the former Governor Alberto Cárdenas. (April 22nd, 2018). Mexico City.

officers were not sanitized spaces, either because "bad guys" could be there or because some of their members are related to them. After all, he arrives at a premise already seen in this research: in Guadalajara, "we never know".

Minimizing risks in a context such as Guadalajara is understandably associated with keeping a low profile and operating discretely. However, the *Tapatio* businessmen's good manners also weigh in on how *Minerva 1997* is situated in this regard:

> ***We do not show ourselves to the public because is part of our norms, our agreements. We do not give conferences or interviews or appear in newspapers. Nothing! Zero!*** *(…) It's been 16 years since we started and all that success and all that has happened, we are in that… unknown for the public because… one of the measures, not measures but our group believes in* ***not being in the spotlight and avoiding [publicity]*** *… because it may exist other type of principles and going 'hey, man, we handled this guy's case and we rescued him alive, and we did all the intelligence work, we are the best! We are the most important group, the government is a group of dumb people, they do not know how to do it!', we are…we could!* ***But that goes against… our final objective and our beliefs.***
>
> Héctor L. Orta, Industrialist and
> *Minerva 1997* founding associate
> Zapopan, Jal., September, 18th, 2015
> *(Q7-13)*

In this case, discretion is not associated with security risks but with the manners that, as has been discussed previously in Chapter 5, differentiates businessmen from the *new rich, narcos* or arrogant juniors. In this view, people from affluent cultured backgrounds do not show off their achievements.

Additionally, reading both accounts together, it is fair to say that *Minerva 1997*'s discretion is strategically in-house and appropriate outwardly. It is, indeed, a strategic way to operate in a context in which businessmen can hardly trust some of their peers as they could be close to "bad guys", and it is appropriate behaviour before the rest of *Tapatios*. However, the available information does not allow us to conclude the extent to which secrecy is a necessary ingredient to co-produce protection in such a "grey area", a question that should be pursued in future research.

Concerning the visibility-secrecy dimension, it can be noticed that even being an outsider to the business network, I was able to interview the Presiding Committee President three times and the Operative Director two times. As explained earlier, Juan Zenón contacted me with Héctor L. Orta, who was very generous during the three encounters, providing me with extensive responses to my queries. Such behaviour confirms that *Minerva 1997* is not a secret

group which only *la crème de la crème* is able to know about. Nevertheless, other evidence also gives me full grounds to state that discretion is a lesson that *Minerva 1997* members keep learning. To support such a claim, in the following paragraphs, I will retrieve an anecdote from the encounters with Héctor L. Orta.

During the first encounter, after more than an hour of conversation, Héctor L. Orta was willing to continue sharing his memories and experiences but had to leave to attend a meeting. He offered me to continue the conversation a few days later, to go into more details. Before leaving his office, I asked if there were some files about *Minerva 1997* or some documentary information I could read. "Yes, yes, we have lots of things, I will give you something in the next encounter", he answered hurryingly[975].

In the second interview, he repeated a lot of the information provided in the first encounter, although he did offer interesting new details. When the interview was about to finish, he went again over the *Minerva 1997*'s achievements including a reduction in incidents of kidnapping, facilitating the communication between different government agencies despite their differences and, most crucially, the successful release of a number of kidnapping victims. Then he stated:

> *And so,* ***we can give you some information about all this stuff****… let me see… If I can… I have to ask… [he dials the phone]* ***I'll give you the information****, but is it getting clear?* ***Quite impressive!, right? There are not so many similar cases, right?*** *[He starts speaking with his assistant over the phone] Ey, do you have the information on* Minerva 1997 *that I asked you the other day? … [he is silent, listening to his interlocutor]* ***… yes, yes… give me what you have…****[he is silent, listening to his interlocutor] otherwise… I will ask… …[he is silent, listening to his interlocutor], OK, OK, bye! [he hangs up the telephone] So…* Minerva 1997*, this is how we started and how we…* ***I think you have a lot of information now****, is it clear for you?*
>
> Héctor L. Orta, Industrialist and
> *Minerva 1997* founding associate
> Zapopan, Jal., September 3rd, 2015
> *(Q7-14)*

Needless to say that, at the end, he did not give me any documents or files. The conversation with his assistant was persuasive enough to change his mind. It would be idle to speculate on his assistant's words. Conversely, what is significant is how he does not have a sort of information protocol on what he shares and with whom. But sometimes, he realises along the way that he has said a lot about the inner workings of *Minerva 1997*. Indeed, it was not until

[975] Fieldwork carnet, September 3rd, 2015.

the third interview, a year and a half after the first meeting, that he asked if I was thinking of publishing my research[976], mirroring how such a possibility was not in his mind during the prior encounters and, in that extent, did not condition his narrative.

Aside from the business sector, *Minerva 1997* is part of the landscape of other actors, the complementary profiles of this research. Regarding them, it must be said that the journalist interviewees know about the group. One of them even explained that during the *narcobloqueos*, *Minerva 1997* was his main source of information. According to him, businessmen have intelligence and people on the ground so they have quick up-to-date information coming from those situated in the front row.

By contrast, law enforcers and public officers seem reluctant to talk about the group and dynamics of their rapport with these businessmen, if any.

> *I: Well**, **I got the information from media outlets**. It emerged in the 1990s and it was visible to the public eye. It is a group of businessmen from Jalisco created to protect their personal security…**I haven't seen them… no…. I am not aware what it internally looks like**… but… it is the response of businessmen to a necessity… to their personal insecurity, right? … I imagine… **I feel or perceive that they manage guards, that they drive vehicles… they manage…. I guess they use intelligence tools to be aware of risky areas**. I understand they have… contact or they are close to agencies of the State Attorney's Office in Jalisco. But that is all I know.*
>
> *Me: And when you were Chief of Police, for example, did you ever have to handle anything similar to…?*
>
> *I: **No, absolutely not, because they deal primarily with the… in the area of justice procuration, then, it has nothing to do with us.***
>
> Anonym. Former police officer in a Municipality in Jalisco,
> Fieldwork carnet. Date unspecified for anonymization purposes.
> *(Q7-15)*

The narrative of this former municipal chief of police shows two interesting patterns. On the one hand, he refers to many of the different activities performed by *Minerva 1997* and discussed in the previous section. On the other hand, he states that he never interacted with the group although, considering his position and the prior discussion, it seems unlikely. That is consistent with other narratives collected during the fieldwork, in which public officers recognize the existence of the group but refrain from giving details of a possible interaction with *Minerva 1997*, probably as they are more aware of the implications of describing how a selected group of businessmen co-produce protection.

[976] Fieldwork carnet, January, 18th, 2017.

The last characteristic of *Minerva 1997* that shall be review is its persistence, which also reflects both an element of secrecy and some lessons learned for its members. If the kidnappings figures effectively decreased, the survival of the group more than 20 years later, outliving different political parties running the state and Guadalajara municipalities is puzzling.

Among the diverse narratives around *Minerva 1997*, one has to do with the group's persistence. Some interlocutors refer to the group in the past tense, restricting its activities to the late 1990s. Some of them even speculate on the reasons behind its dissolution. As this research has shown, the group still exists. The next pages will address this apparent contradiction, paying special attention to what it says about *Minerva 1997* itself and, ultimately, what it brings to the understanding of businessmen's protection patterns.

For Héctor L. Orta, the group's persistence for more than 20 years proves that it is doing something good. Two main reasons explain, according to the *Minerva 1997* co-founder, the long-lasting presence of the group within the landscape, namely, probity and efficiency.

> *There is one… there is one… piece of information or data that is… as I would say… very clear that* ***nobody will be able to deny****…* ***when you have a security institution and you have almost twenty years in the business*** *and you know all the people… in this…* ***in this organization… there has not been a single case of corruption, not even one single case of corruption!*** *This is very important! Very important! Because this does not mean that these people [the employees of this organization] are either saints or perfect, what it means is that we run a vetting process and that we supervise all the time… we supervise how people act [employees] and* ***we are constantly checking if… they modify their lifestyle, getting suddenly rich, right?***
>
> Héctor L. Orta, Industrialist and
> *Minerva 1997* founding associate
> Zapopan, Jal., September, 3rd, 2015
> *[Q7-16]*

> *Up until now, we haven't had any big criticism about the people that formed part of the group…* ***and we haven't had… among all the kidnapping cases [treated], not even one murdered****. Then,* ***we are doing something good!*** *There is something good going on! Why?* ***Because there is nobody, after all these years, who has done what we did [the police officers reward program]****… that is really nice! Right?*
>
> Héctor L. Orta, Industrialist and
> *Minerva 1997* founding associate
> Zapopan, Jal., January 18th, 2017
> *(Q7-17)*

The co-founder of *Minerva 1997* seems proud of achieving what no other police corps had done before: being free of corruption cases. That relates both accounts as their rewards

program and the vetting process implemented is, according to him, what made possible such a feat. Assuming Héctor L. Orta to be accurate, that is to say that, for *Minerva 1997,* contributing to reinforcing institutions had represented rather its permanence than its extinction from the set of "security institutions", as Orta refers to it. Anyhow, that could be mirroring how all the actors involved are prone to maintaining the "grey area" of entanglement they had formed.

However, Francisco Herrera[977], the kidnapping-and-ransom consultant who advised the group when it was created, had another version of the rewards program that businessmen put in place for the special unit agents. According to him, it started in the right way: a proportion of the money that victims did not pay to the kidnapper would serve for funding *Minerva 1997* and granting extra-payments to police officers who participated in their release. Herrera added that transforming a ransom into a reward for the specialized agents is a usual practice in the industry. However, he explained that in Jalisco, as in many other cities, the rewards are discretionarily assigned and, consequently, some agents could become dissatisfied. Besides, the reward money would have served to compensate some politicians' staff members or a businessman's driver, who was neither related to the kidnapping nor took any risk. Facing such practices, anti-kidnapping unit staff would leave its ranks or seek for other sources of compensation.

Either Herrera's version actually corresponds to the *Minerva 1997* case or, if it is informed by other experiences, it points out the discretionary power within the reciprocity circle, the one observed regarding the selective protection pattern discussed in Chapter 4.

Besides, as stated before, *Minerva 1997* has been there throughout both the *panistas* and *priistas* administrations (currently, even with members of the *Movimiento Ciudadano* party). The co-founder's explanation raises what seems to be the argument of "political neutrality".

> ***Oh, ok… we have to… c****onvince people that we are not politicians, that we are not interested in power****, that we want to serve society****, that we want to… benefit people, do right, and nobody can go against our ideals. I mean…*** *I am not here to steal your position* ***or something. Then… ok…*** *another political party comes****… people know… 'Minerva 1997, yes? how can we help you?',*** *because they know we are not looking for a political position, that we are not corrupt, that we are not thinking of making business****, that we do not want anything else than to do right to others, and this is the flag that this… that everyone!... should have everywhere. Then… if you have the***

[977] Interview conducted with Francisco Herrera, owner of a Private Security Company and kidnapping-and-ransom consultant. (February 1st, 2017). Mexico City.

> ***same ideals, to support society, in whatever it is, it becomes difficult… to destroy that.*** *Then, this represents our flag now, then political parties such as the PRI, PAN, - PRD has not come to see us yet - but PRI, PAN and… and… nothing happened, the group still stands.*
>
> Héctor L. Orta, Industrialist and
> *Minerva 1997* founding associate
> Zapopan, Jal., September, 18th, 2015
> *(Q7-18)*

Whether accurate or not, the political neutrality label grants the group the reputation they need to be brokers for their peers. Bearing in mind the low levels of trust that businessmen towards both political parties and police bodies, the philanthropist takes some distance from these figures to ensure people's support, although, as has been discussed, the borders between them are blurry. That said, being a "discreet/secret" group, the label "people" would probably refer to businessmen and their families, rather than public opinion.

The explanation of the group's "political neutrality" also reveals how, within the configuration settled by *Minerva 1997* and local government, electoral competence or political ambitions among businessmen could upset the balance with which they seem to function. At least, *Minerva 1997* members' lack of intentions to achieve political positions makes them inoffensive and grants them the collaboration of actual politicians. Indeed, neither Orta nor the Operative Director hold a political or public officer position after founding *Minerva 1997*. It is possible that their desire to improve the situation is fulfilled through *Minerva 1997*, although it is also possible that the political arena is not appealing compared with what they can manage as businessmen-brokers-philanthropists.

That said, being outside the cabinet or congress seats does not mean that *Minerva 1997* is not doing politics, as protection patterns could be criss-crossed by partisan dynamics. Bringing back some of the elements reviewed in Chapter 3 about the tensions between the different members of Alberto Cárdenas' security cabinet, it must be recalled that the political ambitions of the Government Secretary conditioned his confrontations with the Public Security Secretary. Hence, when *Minerva 1997* enables communication between them, it is engaging in the political arena, either strengthening or weakening a potential candidate to run the state.

In further research, however, an appealing lead to follow is how inner and intra partisan tensions and alliances could frame the protection alternative that *Minerva 1997* represents. In that regard, future years could be a very interesting period in which to observe, as the

arrival of the political party *Movimiento Ciudadano* could represent the (re)arrangement of the binomial state-businessmen. In Chapter 4, we proposed a partisan approach to read the criticisms that some members of *Movimiento Ciudadano,* currently public officers, addressed towards police officers commissioned to protect some businessmen. As such *Minerva 1997* could also become the target of critiques*,* and the way businessmen handle them would be interesting to observe.

Although Orta's narrative is quite optimistic, other indices from the fieldwork point out that, indeed, *Minerva 1997* went through difficult times, especially a tragic moment that could have brought about the group's extinction. One of the versions of this episode is the one shared by Francisco Herrera, the kidnapping-and-ransom consultant*:*

> ***They [the anti-kidnapping group] sent them [the agents] to… to investigate****, they sent them* ***to arrest people****, and they abducted and killed them.* ***They applied a sort of*** **Ley Fuga**[978] *when executing them, they don't even worry about what happened, they forgot… that from the new generations of (kidnappers) come (…) up until 5 or 6 years ago, well…* ***there was a very critical situation because the anti-kidnapping group… from… Jalisco… well, they killed a family! … because, they did not agree with the small reward that they received****, but this family was friends with a high-level officer, and then, yes, people got angry… so the group got dismantled.*
>
> Francisco Herrera, Kidnapping-and-ransom consultant
> Mexico City, February 1st, 2018
> *(Q7-19)*

Other versions, either coming from the interlocutors or from some press releases, share some features with Herrera's narrative. In some versions, the killing of the victim was an accident or the outcome of a badly-managed crisis. Nevertheless, to elucidate what actually happened falls far from the aims of this research. Conversely, what the possible scenarios tell us about businessmen co-producing protection is significant. Herrera's account drives us towards how specialized agents, managed by discretionary rules to provide selective protection, could become a threat themselves. In an extreme scenario, considering their resources and incentives, specialized agents could become both releasers and kidnappers. In that way, they would fuel the machine that gives them over-payments.

The other scenarios, in its turn, contribute to visualizing how, in the middle of a crisis, accountability or delineation of responsibilities on the situation is virtually impossible. Rereading Herrera's account, when he explains that the anti-kidnapping group sent agents to

[978] According to Piccato (2017), *Ley Fuga* is a form of extrajudicial punishment "in which prisoners were killed by soldiers or policemen alleging that they were trying to escape" (p. 121).

perform detentions, it is not clear what "the anti-kidnapping group" is for him. Is it the specialized unit? Is he thinking of businessmen's operational staff? In the first case, it could be within law enforcers' prerogatives; otherwise, it could be an illegal detention.

The rest of Herreras' account preserves such confusion. He talks about "businessmen" and "agents", mixing everything. Although at the beginning of the analysis I read such confusion as the discursive reflex of someone unclear about his thoughts, at this point it could be, mostly, the confusing description of a confusing picture.

The *Minerva 1997*, evidently, did not disappear after the crisis some interlocutors refer. However, it seems that a schism occurred within the group. After collecting information from different sources (mainly the complementary profiles and press releases), I noticed that the group slightly changed its name[979]. In addition, the scarce information available from open sources, dating mostly from the late 1990s, points to the prior name. It persisted in the narrative of some businessmen, although in some cases, mistaken and mixed with the name of an urban *guerrilla* group settled in Guadalajara in the early 1970s[980]. Conversely, *Minerva 1997* members are consistent in naming the group with the new label.

Despite being quite generous during the interviews, on this point Héctor L. Orta showed himself reluctant to provide details, avoiding the question. He neither denied nor clarified why *Minerva 1997* changed its name. Perhaps the prior name was associated with the tragic episode that some sources evoked. If this is the case, *Minerva 1997* would have faced a major crisis in which the borders between the legal and illegal realms would be erased. If its staff, rather than protecting businessmen, became their predators, the entire configuration would have been turned upside down.

In any case, *Minerva 1997* is nowadays a protection co-producer in Guadalajara. Furthermore, the model they implemented could be replicated in other Mexican cities.

> *And then later on we started… we started to spread this information, we started to know about this…* ***they called us from the State of Mexico, Veracruz, Oaxaca… and then, we started giving advice to all these people, to construct something similar in their states.***
>
> Héctor L. Orta, Industrialist and
> *Minerva 1997* founding associate

[979] The current name is quite similar to the original one, however, it implies a new label. I omit details on the change and the open sources accessed for anonymization purposes.
[980] Fieldwork carnet, date unspecified for anonymization purposes.

Zapopan, Jal., September 18th, 2015,
(Q7-20)

Although among the information collected there is no strong evidence that *Minerva 1997* operates beyond Jalisco, it seems they have been transferring their model. Certainly, several variations among the experiences could be traced, especially considering that different regions confront different threats in terms of crime and violence. Further, since the business sector in each region is also variable, diverse configurations could be observed.

Seeking protection, *Minerva 1997* could contribute to create a national market of consultants who, fuelling citizens' fears, become indispensable.

> ***There is… this other group from… from… Nayarit and Colima****, 10 years ago or something,* ***they claimed to be the best group in Mexico, it is a lie!*** *The guy was… there was a guy…* ***they [the group] brought a guy****, he rented a piece of equipment called "the donkey" … a piece of equipment… well, it was a suitcase… well, that wire-tapped phone calls, wire-tapping, from American spies****, but each device or tool… he brought to the State Attorney's Office was very expensive*** *and some said 'well, let's buy it for… it is hurting us badly and people are demanding it…' (…) also this guy… commander…. I forgot his name… but we knew him very well, and all the codes that he used, everything… everything…* ***he sold them [to businessmen and to local governments] whatever he wanted, he sold trucks, he sold… he uniformed them****… those uniforms that you can see in U.S catalogues, he did whatever he…* ***every single issue that he could solve… he made it bigger… and there they were… businessmen and local government, throwing more and more money! And there he was, from state to state… selling them everything.***
>
> Francisco Herrera, Kidnapping-and-ransom consultant
> Mexico City, February, 1st, 2018,
> *(Q7-21)*

Such a protection pattern could also affect the organizational model of law enforcement agencies in various states. Eventually, it could have effects on the public security context and the way the problem is addressed. In this vein, *Minerva 1997* can be a potentially path-breaking innovation with broader implications for security management in various states of Mexico.

Hence, our research was centred on the story of businessmen as actual or potential victims of crime or violence. After discussing *Minerva 1997* in-depth, it is possible to say that the story finishes with businessmen, *la crème de la crème*, co-producing protection and, doing so, shaping the entire security landscape.

Conclusions

This research has attempted to answer how businessmen are protected and how such patterns have affected the way in which pubic security is delivered at the local level. Ultimately, its findings could also be telling in terms of how the economic elite contribute to shaping (in)security, violence and social order in Mexico and beyond.

Regarding the state of the art, theoretical and empirical gaps have been identified. First, the growing literature devoted to understanding the entanglement of diverse government and non-government protection providers has succeeded in its reading of such entanglement as evidence of state reconfiguration rather than retreat. However, these studies focus mainly on the protection supplier in depth and hardly explore the position of the demander. Aiming to reduce this gap, the present research privileged the narrative of the protection receiver, although seen in relation to the provider. Furthermore, this work does not conceptualize the protection receiver as an entire (undefined) community, but as a socio-professional group, namely, businessmen. In this way, significant nuances can be established in the way the heterogeneous group of businessmen are protected.

The second theoretical gap is related to scholars' inclination to conceive the receiver of protection only as a victim. Even if businessmen might have certain agency in defining their position within the racketeering-protection scenario, they are still considered to be victims. In contrast, in this research, a wider scope has been sought to visualize protection receivers not only as crime victims, but also as protection customers and (co)producers.

In the mainstream literature, when "victims" are at the centre of the analysis, they are depicted as if they were a homogeneous group, including in the same label a variety of actors, studied through victimization surveys and other tools which are unable to reflect the complexities and nuances that the supplier-receiver binomial implies. We approach this empirical gap by focusing on businessmen with medium-sized and large enterprises settled in Guadalajara, the third most important economic hub in Mexico, using a qualitative approach relying on semi-structured interviews, several observation exercises as well as documentary and archival work.

Guadalajara, besides its importance in economic terms, is an intriguing case to study as it has witnessed several periods of insecurity and violence along with major political and economic transformations.

A thorough analysis of the case of the *Tapatio* businessmen has led to numerous which contribute to the understanding of both protection patterns and businessmen's contribution to the shaping of social control.

Part I explores the genealogy and evolution of security threats that *Tapatio* businessmen have confronted since the 1970s. Across two chapters, two main threats have been analysed; on the one hand crime and on the other, the infamous *Narco* and its violence.

First, it has been established that businessmen must recognize a threat as such, in order to seek protection mechanisms. This point opens the discussion concerning how they define the threat of crime. It is demonstrated that, while being victims of extortion or racketeering, businessmen in the 1970s were neither necessarily aware of the presence of crime, nor their role as victims. However, since the 1980s and 1990s, in the context of an economic crisis and unplanned urbanization, property crime and other offenses skyrocketed yielding greater fear of falling victims to crime. For businessmen, this entailed recognizing the context as a threat and, consequently, taking on certain problems as their own leading to the definition of their security needs. Therefore, insecurity is not only seen as *a* problem but as *their* problem. Nevertheless, it has to be said that victimization surveys and other empirical tools have been mobilized to develop the argument but, simultaneously, their respective limits and flaws have been discussed herein at length.

Chapter 2 is devoted to the main character of contemporary studies on violence: the *Narco* (and the *narcos*). The main purpose has been to explore the extent to which that phenomena could represent a threat for businessmen, especially considering that the first organization labelled as a cartel in Mexico was precisely the *Cartel de Guadalajara*. Despite the abundant information on the subject, the biggest challenge has been to retrieve the history of the *Narco* in Guadalajara from a critical perspective. Thus, a common narrative regarding the arrival of the *narcos* to Guadalajara was identified. From such a starting point, *Tapatio* businessmen, as well as other inhabitants, built and preserve the *narco* image as being that of an outsider. In addition, reviewing the trajectories of the well-known figures of Caro Quintero, Ernesto Fonseca "Don Neto" and Félix Gallardo, we can observe the formation of a clear-cut

archetype of what a *narco* used to be in the 1980s and 1990s: a poorly educated peasant, and an easy-going billionaire able to share their (illegitimate) money with the poorest communities. In other words, a generation of the "good *narcos*" is depicted and their validity even nowadays is shown. The chapter describes how, during that period, *Tapatios* and the *Narco* established a sort of "startling familiarity" in which everyone noted the presence of the latter and witnessed, from time to time, the irruption of violent episodes which temporally upset their day to day lives. This generation of *narcos* was then replaced by a more violent version, performing visible acts of forced disappearances, homicides, *levantones* or burning buses. Along these lines, the chapter offers evidence that despite such violent patterns, businesses did not necessarily perceive the *Narco* as a threat towards them since this violence was amongst them and therefore was the "*narco*'s business". Consequently, they have not established protection mechanisms directly associated to *narco* violence. However, as demonstrated later in Part II, they do protect themselves from other attributes of *narcos,* at least they attempt to do so.

From Part I, then, it is possible to conclude that, driven by fear, businessmen determine property crimes to be their problem but, conversely, they do not consider violence related to drug trafficking organizations in equal terms. Besides being an effort to provide a broader context, these first steps allow us to explore how businessmen perceive, frame, formulate and transform certain situations as their problem and, from such "problem-making process", they shape their security necessities. Thus, despite all the voices pointing out *narco* violence as Mexico's most severe problem, it does not seem to be the *Tapatios'* worst threat.

Part II addressed the demand for protection that businessmen direct towards both, regular and alternative suppliers. Chapter 3 focuses on law enforcement agencies as the regular protection provider and challenges certain mainstream ideas. First, it is shown that rather than a retreat of the state, market-oriented reforms and the democratization process brought the fragmentation of government agencies and the establishment of a polycentric system. Thus, law enforcement acquired the features of multiple agencies at multiple levels, each with some prerogatives for the provision of protection. Businessmen then, playing the role of local notables, establish a relationship with law enforcers based on a selective and personalized rapport. So, the fragmentation of the local law enforcement system, then, does not represent

the dismantling of the government. Conversely, it implies a progressive devolution in which both, the political and economic elite were in agreement.

Chapter 4 explores the entanglement of alternative protection providers, in other words, non-government entities able to participate in the protection market as suppliers. Although at first glance, it could be deduced that the chapter is about the privatization of public security, in fact, it shows a scenario of the multilateralization of policing in which private, hybrid and even illegal actors grant different forms of protection. First, it is demonstrated that law enforcement agencies have sold the service to the private sphere, especially, traders, factory proprietors and bankers. Reviewing the case of the Auxiliary Police in-depth, the porosity of public-private borders is demonstrated. Indeed, convincing evidence points to the fact that this body is neither private, nor public. Observing the Auxiliary Police's specific attributes such as recruitment, salary policy, equipment, objectives and evaluation process, it is demonstrated that in all these conditions, public and private entities are involved. The discussion is complemented by the case of the local Police Officers commissioned to become private security guards of a select group of local notables. Hence, considering this modality of close protection, the chapter illustrates how bodyguards are one of the protection mechanisms implemented by certain businessmen but, beyond that, it is one of the bargaining chips in the reciprocity circle settled between the political and economic elite in Guadalajara.

Once it is settled that public and private realms are neither clearly divided, nor clearly defined, the chapter explores the protection modalities that market-oriented economic reforms brought or reinforced. Thus, self-policing measures as well as the services acquired through private security companies are analysed showing how the "self-made" man, highly promoted by this economic model, is also behind the way businessmen managed a certain number of threats. In addition, the "revolving doors" connecting public and private realms are illustrated, showing that the porosity of these borders is expressed not only by former law enforcers founding their security companies but by agents going back and forth from one realm to another. Thus, even when focusing on private security firms, policing is not entirely private and, most importantly, public entities remain quite present.

Along with the fuzziness of the division between public and private, the chapter demonstrates how the border delimiting legal from illegal is not clear either. The notions which guide the discussion are those of the "trouble-maker" and the "trouble-solver" and how they are

muddled. Then, the chapter addresses the case of the so-called *Taliban Lawyers*, a group of lawyers who extort businessmen by using judicial procedures and their collusive relationships with labour court judges. The threat although not an explicit crime or violent act, consists in filing lawsuits against them for "unfairly firing" an employee. Thus, lawyers and judges, who are supposed to be "problem solvers" are, actually, "problem makers", forcing businessmen to pay to avoid such a threat which is in the end equivalent to protection. This observation is put into perspective with the case of labour unions leaders, defined by businessmen as actual racketeers.

Moreover, regarding the supposed "problem makers", appealing evidence is provided to argue that *narcos* are (un)willingly hired to collect debts. A legal transaction, such as reinforcing a commercial agreement is then performed by illegal actors through illegal means. Actually, *narcos* perform *levantones* and carry out threatening visits to debtors. Since overdue loan portfolios trouble businessmen, *narcos* act as the fixer.

Seeing that Chapters 3 and 4 build on crimes and challenges that businessmen actually formulate as "their problem", Chapter 5 explores the protection patterns adopted regarding the *narcos'* presence which, as stated previously, does not seem to represent a security threat for them.

As much as businessmen do not seem highly concerned by *narco* violence, they are troubled by sharing their social spaces with them. That said, I provide strong evidence to show that what disturbs businessmen about *narcos* is their lack of education and good manners *(narcos-nacos)*, rather than their illegal or violent profile. Thus, *narcos* fit into the unwelcome category filled by other profiles such as the *new riches* or the arrogant juniors. The border where businessmen decide to draw the line is one which divides social classes.

In addition, it is illustrated how protection strategies implemented by businessmen in order to avoid being mixed with *narcos* strongly depends on the assumption that this profile can be clearly identified. Precisely, the *narco* archetype explored in Chapter 2, resonates here. Seen as poorly educated peasants unable to transform a small fortune into good-taste, businessmen assume that they are able to recognize *narcos* and keep them at a distance from their social circles. Such assumption falls apart and with it, the idea that the business-world and the *narco*-world are separated realms. The argument is developed by an initial understanding of businessmen as a professional category. Thus, some cases of informal "due

diligence" processes or self-policing strategies illustrate how businessmen avoid that *narcos* become their customers, providers or associates, among other implications which can even affect the business model as some of them decide "not to do business with anyone".

Social capital takes place as a good resource for the vetting process of these professionals who do business with people they know, namely their social networks. However, the protection mechanism is jeopardized as soon as it is clear that *narcos* are part of businessmen's social spaces, such as schools and luxury neighbourhoods. The gap between *narcos* and businessmen becomes even smaller when the son of one of them marries the daughter of the other. Discussing one of these cases, it was to state that when a business*man* marries the daughter of a *narco*, his peers still refer to him as a "businessman", although always associating the profile with the story which becomes an open-secret. Conversely, there are leads suggesting that when ladies from good families spend time with the son of a *narco*, they are considered as opportunist and ordinary. In addition, a businessman whose father in law is a drug lord does not stay within the margins of the business world. Instead, he is active in business associations and appeals to the institutions to manage some of the challenges he confronts to run his firm.

From this angle, it is possible to conclude that the pattern of protection receivers is a grey area in which private-public and legal-illegal divides are blurry. Yet, the dynamic (re)negotiation of the actors' scopes and limits, rather than representing disorder, is the route that governing and social control has taken.

Until this point, businessmen are seen as victims needing protection. Yet, Part III changes the equation, understanding businessmen as co-producers of protection. Indeed, businessmen transcend their passive role of victims to become active participants in the production process of services they receive. It shall be emphasized that I did not go looking for this pattern, conversely, it found me during my fieldwork. Mostly due to a lucky break, I gained access to the history of *Minerva 1997*, a group created *by* and *for* businesses to protect them(selves) from kidnapping and other threats.

The *Minerva 1997* is, then, the common thread of Chapters 6 and 7. First, I delivered a general revision of the groups' origin as well as the version *Tapatio* businessmen hold regarding the group. From there, it is possible to learn that, as the interlocutors on the field recognized both, the wave of kidnappings that occurred at the end of 1997, and particularly

the case of a renowned peer, triggered the creation of the group. Less known in the field, but clarified in this research, are the structural factors that explain the emergence of *Minerva 1997*. Hence, I claim that the major transformations on the Mexican landscape occurred in the 1990s, namely the market-oriented economic reform and the democratic transition, contribute to explain the groups' emergence. These changes enabled the formation of more active businessmen who, taking advantage of the complex configuration of protection providers, shaped their own protection solution. Exploring the way businessmen refer to the group, I found a significant variety of versions as well as unequal access to the information. This fact partially demonstrates not only the complexity of the group, but also its selective character. This first exploration reveals that an elite within the elite ("the most important businessmen") had the resources to create an anti-kidnapping group whose protective measures only covered a core of local notables.

Chapter 7 inquires in regards to the group's activities and builds on the narrative of two main characters: one of its co-founders and its operative director. *Minerva 1997* vividly illustrates that businessmen, similar to any other group of citizens, appeal for protection when they identify they are under threat. However, different from any other citizen, businessmen are positioned in the complex configuration of protection providers and, from there, they create tailored-made solutions for the selective group they serve. Doing so, they cross the grey area collaborating with local law enforcement agencies, founding their own private security companies and mobilizing their philanthropic resources, all in order to protect themselves and their peers. Easily transiting from one sphere to another, they have been providing protection services to *la crème de la crème* based on one puzzling principle: "as a public officer, one can do only what the law allows; as businessmen, one can do what the law does not forbid". Precisely, in this twilight space, *Minerva 1997* has instrumented kidnapping releases; however, this took place through the local specialized agency which was established in coordination with *Minerva 1997*.

Being partially secret and partially well-known, *Minerva 1997* has played a significant role in shaping not only the mechanisms of self-protection, but also the mechanisms through which public security is delivered, ultimately leading to social control in general.

Beyond protection, this research pays particular attention to a subject that must be explored in greater depth: the ways capitalists manage their threats and, doing so, how they condition

the criminal atmosphere for the others. Nevertheless, a path worthy to follow in ulterior research would be to inquire to what extent these protection patterns affects the way businessmen accumulate and deploy their financial capital. In other words, how the dangerous context in which their firms operate is managed and reinforced through profitable gains.

Regarding empirical aspects of the research at hand, the endeavour of contrasting *Tapatio* businessmen with local notables from Queretaro has yet to be concluded. As stated in the introduction, this city was considered in the fieldwork yet the information collected requires further analysis. At first glance, a comparison of the main difference between these sectors could be a pertinent starting point. As widely demonstrated in this research, local embeddedness and a sense of community are a consistent backdrop present in the way businessmen perceive a threat and the way they manage it. Conversely, Queretaro is a growing city in which the business sector is mostly composed of people coming from other states or from abroad which could represent a distinct position and social dynamic when both framing the threat and managing it. To what extent could immigration experiences also mean the transfer of selective protection patterns from one city to another? Is it possible to detect regional protection patterns which depend on the local elite? In any regard, these are questions that merit the corresponding retrieval, update and more profound analysis of the data.

Despite the fact that this research attempted to collect information through innovative sources, there is a debt concerning the analysis of legal files to better develop several of the arguments presented. Certainly, the Mexican judicial process made it difficult to examine judiciary files systematically. Instead, only certain cases could be accessed (or were leaked by government agencies), which entails a significant selection bias. For instance, the case of Javier Duarte, former governor of Veracruz accused of operations performed with ill-gotten money and organized crime, has recently drawn public attention[981]. Therefore, Duarte's lawyer has published the transcriptions of the hearings, providing interesting insights on the collusive bonds (or overlap) of political, economic and criminal actors. However, the access to such information is more an exception than a rule and, coming from the defendant's lawyer, must be seen as part of the case strategy. In future research, I suggest that the

[981] "Detienen a Javier Duarte en Guatemala". (April, 15th, 2017). *Reforma*.

methodological limitation that a biased case selection implies, shall be transformed into an object of study. Precisely, inquiring which judicial cases are visible and which are not would be quite informative in terms of the visibility-secrecy dimension only marginally discussed in this research. The process of registering, archiving and disclosing the cases of white-collar crime might reveal the factors explaining why certain cases are managed with greater public attention while others are inadequately registered.

Additionally, as touched on elsewhere in this research, a constitutional amendment was approved that envisages the transformation from an inquisitorial system (based on written-files) towards an accusatorial system (which rests upon hearings). One of the principles of the new system is to transform the hearing from a closed-door episode full of irregularities, to a well conducted and open public proceeding. Thus, it seems that in the future, researchers will be able to access sources of this kind. Being the case, procedures related to diverse modalities of money laundering and fraud could be observed and analysed in-depth. Nowadays, statistical data about such offenses, beyond being scarce and fairly weak, obscures the details on the overlapping between the business sector, the political arena and the *Narco*. Observing the hearings could enable the collection of valuable information, specifically the tracing of policies in an effort to fight financial crime.

Besides the value of the judicial procedure as a source of information, conducting interviews with Judicial Officers (Judges, Magistrates, prosecutors and public defenders) could be an optimal approach to document white collar crime cases processed early, in the 1980s and 1990s, a period that we have largely proven to be crucial.

Finally, there is another challenge to be addressed that is driven by this research. Betting on a qualitative approach has revealed a fruitful source of information that has kept us on track amidst nuances, which has allowed us to distinguish the fuzziness of the pre-assumed divides, namely, private-public, legal-illegal and provider-receiver of protection. Nevertheless, in certain parts of the argument, some quantitative data was provided, featuring some trends and supporting some intuitions. Despite methodological flaws, many of them deeply discussed in the text, the explanatory power of this data must not be disregarded. Ulterior research shall explore mixed methods techniques in order to enrich findings.

For instance, this research shows that local notables play a role in shaping policing and social control. In addition, some explanations are associated to what we know about the profiles of

the interviewed businessmen. Hence, some attitudes and identity signals suggest that their values and beliefs affect the way they perceive and formulate a threat, as well as how they manage it. However, what we know about these beliefs, through the interviews or the literature on (Mexican or *Tapatio*) businessmen, might be isolated observations or not representative of contemporary profiles. The reader may have noticed that I have taken care in the interpretation of the data bearing in mind this limitation. In that sense, a quantitative survey especially designed to measure a set of ideological, political and personal positions of businessmen could be useful. This instrument would allow to determine the extent to which such attitudes are related to their tendency towards punitive public security measures. The purpose would be to design quantitative instruments inspired in qualitative findings and vice-versa, in order to gain depth from the qualitative and width from the quantitative approach. Ultimately, to take the steps towards the necessary dialogue that both perspectives should have.

~

Appendix

Appendix 1.1: Figures representing crime and victimization patterns in Jalisco

1) Individuals sentenced for a crime, 1926-2008 (Rate per 100,000 inhabitants)



Source: Elaborated by the author based on the data collected by Piccato et al. (2018) as part of the project "Estadísticas del crímen en México: Series Históricas 1926-2008". Rates come from the original. Figures represent the number of persons convicted of a crime. The list of crimes includes homicides, injuries, robbery, fraud and swindling, insult, breach of trust, malicious damage on private property, rape, abduction and statutory rape, abortion, child murder, adultery, indecent assault, against public health and other offenses. Crimes included in every year are a selection of offenses considered in the primary sources used by the authors - Annual Statistical Digest from the Directorate General Statistics attached to the federal Ministry of Economy; the Ministry of Industry and Commerce; the Office of Programme and Budget and; INEGI (since 1980). Totals result from the sum of disaggregated crimes plus the category 'offenses not specified', except for the cases in which the primary source did not report disaggregated data for every crime. The author acknowledges Pablo Piccato for his meticulous explanation to clarify this point (personal communication, August-September, 2018)

2) Individuals indicted for a crime, 1926-2008 *(Rate per 100,000 inhabitants)*



Source: Elaborated by the author based on the data collected by Piccato et al. (2018) as part of the project "Estadísticas del crímen en México: Series Históricas 1926-2008". Rates come from the original. Figures represents the number of persons indicted of a crime. The list of crimes includes homicides, injuries, robbery, fraud and swindling, insult, breach of trust, malicious damage on private property, rape, abduction and statutory rape, abortion, child murder, adultery, indecent assault, against public health and other offenses. Crimes included in every year are

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3) Rates of theft committed in a commercial establishment, 1997-2017 *(Reported offenses, rate per 100,000 inhabitants)*



Source: Prepared by the author with information from Executive Secretariat of the National Public Security System (*Secretariado Ejecutivo del Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública*, SE-SNSP). Data includes preliminary investigations (*averiguación previa*) or investigative files (*carpetas de investigación*). Rates were calculated based on INEGI Population Census and Counts, interpolated with annual average growth rate. For 2016 and 2017, since population data are not still available, the projection assumes the average growth rate (2010-2015) remains the same.

4) Rates of crime prevalence per 10,000 Economic Units per type of crime in 2015



Source: Crime Against Business National Survey (ENVE, 2016). The rate of criminal prevalence (*prevalencia delictiva*) is calculated considering the economic units that have been victim of at least one crime divided into the total of economic units considered on the survey, multiplied by 10,000.

5) Crime incidence by the sector of the victim, 2015 (Percentage)



Source: Crime Against Business National Survey (ENVE, 2016). Percentages are calculated over the total amount of crimes committed (National level=3'989,768; Jalisco=219,514; Nuevo León=160,561)

6) Percentage of offenses occurred in 2015 by the size of the economic unit of the victim



Source: Crime Against Business National Survey (ENVE, 2016). Percentages are calculated over the total amount of crimes committed, excluding those occurred in micro-sized business (National: 453,628; Jalisco: 28,706; Nuevo León: 28,123)

Appendix 1.2: Figures representing the perception of crime in Jalisco

1) Percentage distribution of economic units expressing feeling the risk of falling crime victims in 2016, Jalisco



Source: Crime Against Business National Survey, 2016, INEGI (ENVE, 2016). Percentages are calculated over the total amount of economic unites considered in the survey (Jalisco=332,758). The original question was: "Considering the level of crime, do you think that during the reminder of 2016, the establishment could be victim of... [items]?" (*Consideando el nivel de delincuencia, ¿cree que en lo que resta de 2016 el establecimiento puede ser víctima de... [opciones de delito]*?

2) Perception of crimes against business during the last 12 years, Jalisco 2016 (Percentage)



Source: Crime Against Business National Survey, 2016, INEGI (ENVE, 2016).Percentages are calculated over the total amount of economic unites considered in the survey in Jalisco (N=332,758 , of which Industry= 40904; Commerce= 163,290; Services= 128,564). The original question was: "As far as you noticed, in [geographic area] crimes against business increased, remained the same or decreased, in the last 12 month?" (*Por lo que usted notó en [área geográfica] los delitos contra los establecimientos en los últimos 12 meses aumentaron, siguieron igual o disminuyeron?)*

Appendix 3.1: Complete version of Figure 3.1



5

HISTORIA DE UNA VIOLACION

Julio 23, 1977

En la madrugada, un joven no sobrio molestaba a una dama en el hotel El Tapatío. El personal de seguridad del negocio le llamó la atención, y al notar que estaba armado lo entregó a la Policía Municipal de Tlaquepaque. En la comandancia de Policía el detenido se identificó como Guillermo Orozco Loreto, y exhibió credencial que lo acreditaba como agente de la Dirección Federal de Seguridad.

Las autoridades municipales afirman que no se le dejó en inmediata libertad por falta de **capacidad decisoria** de la guardia, pero que al presentarse el jefe de la Policía lo dejó libre sin sanción alguna, no obstante las faltas cometidas, en atención al cuerpo de seguridad de que forma parte. Para ese momento ya se había presentado el regidor del Ayuntamiento de Guadalajara, Ing. Ismael Orozco Loreto, delante de quien se dieron excusas por la breve detención sufrida por Guillermo mientras se esclarecía su identidad.

El mismo 23 de julio, por la noche, un grupo armado irrumpió en el hotel El Tapatío, asesinó a balazos al empleado señor J. Jesús Camacho y secuestró a otros tres empleados. Al solicitarse garantías a la Policía Municipal de Tlaquepaque, ésta envió una patrulla con un chofer y tres agentes, misma que fue interceptada a mano armada por personas que se identificaron como elementos de la Dirección Federal de Seguridad. No se hizo resistencia, pues la policía ignoraba lo acontecido y no tenía razón para oponerse. Policías, chofer y patrulla fueron secuestrados por los elementos que los interceptaron.

Julio 27

La patrulla desaparecida apareció en las calles de Tlaquepaque, sin daño alguno. Poco después fueron apareciendo todos los secuestrados, que hasta la fecha se niegan a hacer declaración alguna.

Sin la menor atención al Ayuntamiento, el secretario de la Defensa Nacional, Gral. Félix Galván López, llamó a su despacho en la ciudad de México al jefe de la Policía Municipal, capitán retirado del H. Ejército Nacional, y le reclamó **la falta de respeto a la credencial** del joven Guillermo Orozco Loreto. Se le dieron respetuosamente las explicaciones del caso, aun sin ser necesario por tratarse de un hecho del fuero común y de indudable competencia municipal.

Julio 31

Dos periódicos locales, El Occidental y El Diario, publican un desplegado ordenado por el Ayuntamiento de Tlaquepaque. Firman el alcalde Marcos Montero Ruiz y ocho regidores, pero no lo hace el secretario y síndico, Lic. Fernando A. Gallo Lozano.

En ese documento se afirma que ningún integrante o colaborador del Ayuntamiento anda armado, fuera del cuerpo de seguridad pública, y que no tienen guardias personales porque no los necesitan ni tienen querellas con nadie. Y que por ese motivo es mayor la indignación con la que denuncian **la violación a la autonomía municipal, a las garantías**

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6

El Estado debe ser Libre y Soberano, y en eso consiste la esencia misma del pacto federal. Las autoridades están obligadas a velar por el respeto de esa soberanía, para el bien de todos los ciudadanos.

individuales, a nuestra convivencia democrática y al sistema constitucional revolucionario, cometida por personas que se dicen **integrantes de la Dirección Federal de Seguridad, y que asesinan, vejan, secuestran a particulares y servidores públicos, a bienes públicos, y allanan negocios particulares.**

Luego de sintetizar los hechos del 23 y 27 de julio, los integrantes del Ayuntamiento de Tlaquepaque se preguntan:

- **¿Depende el municipio, sus habitantes, sus servidores, sus bienes públicos y particulares de una importante dependencia federal o de una secretaría de estado?**
- **¿Ya no rige la Constitución General de la República y se ha roto el Pacto Federal?**
- **¿Están suspendidas las garantías individuales por la emergencia económica que atravesamos?**

Y añade: **un hombre asesinado, una familia desamparada, unos hombres vejados, el Municipio y la Constitución violados, y todo por qué? Porque el jovenzuelo detenido se ostentó después familiar de nuestro amigo don Javier García Paniagua, y algunos de sus presuntos subordinados quisieron quedar *bien con el jefe.***

El documento del Ayuntamiento de Tlaquepaque concluye solicitando justicia y respeto a las autoridades federales, apoyo del Gobierno del Estado, y solidaridad a todos los ayuntamientos de Jalisco.

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Agosto 2

La prensa da cuenta de que el Gobernador Constitucional del Estado, Lic. Flavio Romero de Velasco, manifestó su intención de entrevistarse con Marcos Montero para conocer los detalles del caso, y que afirmó enfáticamente que la autonomía municipal debe respetarse.

Agosto 3

A ocho columnas, las secciones locales de los tres matutinos que circulan en el área metropolitana de Guadalajara destacan las declaraciones del Gobernador Flavio Romero de Velasco, luego de entrevistarse con Marcos Montero: **Respetamos y haremos respetar la autonomía de los ayuntamientos y también la soberanía del Estado. No permitiremos que ninguna corporación policíaca venga a tomarse atribuciones que no le están de ninguna manera concedidas.**

El Gobierno del Estado apoya la protesta del municipio de Tlaquepaque porque la juzga correcta. Estamos dispuestos a coordinarnos con toda corporación o cualquier dependencia, pero no a subordinarnos. Una cosa es coordinación y otra muy distinta es subordinación.

Concluyó prometiendo hacer todas las instancias requeridas para que no se repitieran tan lamentables acontecimientos.

Agosto 5

El Poder Judicial del Estado publica a su vez un desplegado, firmado por el presidente del Supremo Tribunal de Justicia y los doce magistrados. En él afirma que las declaraciones del gobernador Romero de Velasco en torno a los hechos de Tlaquepaque son un gesto que lo enaltece y lo honra. Y dice que esos sucesos **seguramente son atribuibles a elementos desleales que no consultan sus de-**

7



Tanto la Constitución General de la República Mexicana, como la Constitución Política del Estado de Jalisco y la Ley Orgánica Municipal, establecen claramente que el municipio libre es la base de la administración pública. Pero la libertad del Municipio de Tlaquepaque fue conculcada por elementos federales.

cisiones con sus jefes y que no actúan interpretando debidamente las directrices de su corporación.

Continúa expresando que **como autoridades judiciales apreciamos la valiosa ayuda que los policías dependientes de la Federación han prestado en la lucha entablada contra el crimen y la corrupción; y lamentamos que algunos malos elementos, abusando de la autoridad que les ha sido conferida para la protección de la ciudadanía, manchen la buena imagen del organismo al que pertenecen, conducta que esperamos sea severamente castigada por sus superiores.**

Finaliza el Poder Judicial del Estado afirmando su respeto por las atribuciones de los otros poderes y reiterando que ninguno de ellos debe de subordinarse a otro.

8

Agosto 8

La XLVIII Legislatura del Estado de Jalisco expresó en otra inserción **su más firme convicción del respeto que se debe a la autonomía municipal, para la preservación de los derechos ciudadanos dentro del ámbito de su potestad constitucional, así como su total apego a la inviolabilidad de la soberanía del Estado como supuesto básico del Pacto Federal.**

Agosto 15

Hasta el momento de cerrar esta edición, aún no se han producido las expresiones de solidaridad hacia el Ayuntamiento de Tlaquepaque por parte de los otros municipios de la entidad, que solicitaba en su desplegado del 31 de Julio el alcalde Marcos Montero Ruiz. Al menos, no se han hecho del conocimiento público.

El Gobernador Constitucional del Estado, Lic. Flavio Romero de Velasco, sí manifestó su apoyo a Tlaquepaque, y en varias ocasiones reiteró su convicción de que debe respetarse la autonomía municipal y la soberanía estatal.

Los otros poderes estatales se adhirieron a ese apoyo, y manifestaron su acuerdo con la postura asumida por el Ejecutivo.

La opinión pública ha elogiado ampliamente la ejemplar actitud adoptada por el presidente municipal de Tlaquepaque, Marcos Montero Ruiz.

El Municipio Debe ser Libre

En repetidas ocasiones, el Comercio Organizado de Guadalajara ha expresado su convencimiento de que el municipio es el fundamento de la vida pública, y la prolongación del hogar. Partiendo de esas premisas ha luchado por que la administración municipal proporcione a los ciudadanos seguridad, mantenga el orden indispensable para el desarrollo de la comunidad y preste los servicios que el público requiere.

En su artículo 115, la Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos establece que las entidades federativas tendrán **como base de su división territorial** y de su **organización política y administrativa** el ***Municipio Libre***. La Constitución Política del Estado de Jalisco señala en su artículo segundo que **el Gobierno del Estado es Republicano, Representativo y Popular, teniendo como base de su organización política y administrativa el *Municipio Libre***. Y la Ley Orgánica Municipal insiste sobre el particular en su artículo primero, donde precisa que el ***Municipio Libre* es la base de la organización política y administrativa y de la división territorial del Estado de Jalisco.**

Pero, mientras eso establecen nuestras leyes fundamentales, la acción de algunas personas que debieran hacer cumplir esas leyes se traduce en secuestros y asesinatos. Una familia ha quedado desamparada. Los ciudadanos temen por su seguridad. Y nadie ha sabido que los responsables de estos hechos reprobables hayan sido consignados por los delitos que cometieron.

El Comercio Organizado, por medio del manifiesto que aparece en la página 4 de esta edición, expresa su satisfacción por los esfuerzos de las autoridades estatales para restablecer un clima de paz y tranquilidad. Solicita al gobernador, Lic. Flavio Romero de Velasco, que gestione el apoyo del señor Presidente de la República para que actos de esa naturaleza no se vuelvan a repetir. Y afirma su seguridad de que **con la debida coordinación de las distintas corporaciones encargadas del orden público y con el respeto propio a la soberanía del Estado, se logrará cimentar este clima necesario, que anhelamos los jaliscienses y que es en beneficio de México.**

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

Sr. Lic. Flavio Romero de Velasco,
Gobernador Constitucional del Estado de Jalisco,
Palacio de Gobierno,
Ciudad.

La ciudadanía jalisciense ha sido víctima una vez más de actos terroristas que lesionan al pueblo y traicionan a México.

Nuestra Institución condena los hechos ocurridos y exige a las autoridades, como responsables de la tranquilidad social, la rigurosa aplicación de las leyes, ejerciéndola plenamente con la responsabilidad que el pueblo les ha confiado.

En los momentos en que México requiere del esfuerzo y la dedicación al trabajo de todos para reconstruir nuestro país, elementos desorientados, haciendo caso omiso de los llamados a la cordialidad y a la unión e interpretándolos como signos de debilidad, destruyen fuentes de trabajo que han sido creadas por el cotidiano esfuerzo y dedicación de verdaderos mexicanos.

Los jaliscienses que creemos en México y tenemos fe en el futuro de nuestra patria, a pesar de provocaciones y actos delictivos, seguimos trabajando con redoblados esfuerzos, basados en el régimen de libertad y justicia que forje una patria digna para las futuras generaciones.

Demandamos de usted, que, en ejercicio de su autoridad, tome las medidas necesarias para que el pueblo goce de la tranquilidad y el orden a que tiene pleno derecho.

Guadalajara, Jal., Septiembre 14 de 1977

CAMARA NACIONAL DE COMERCIO DE GUADALAJARA

Source: Gazette Bank of Images 1970-2016. (August 15th, 1977: 5-8); (September 15th, 1977).

Appendix 3.2: Public Security Council Task Evolution (1984-2016)

Council Tasks Typology	State's Advisory Council on Public Security	State's Advisory Council on Citizen Protection	State Level Citizen's Protection Council	Public Security, Prevention and Social Readaptation Citizen's Council	Public Security, Prevention and Social Reinsertion Citizen's Council	Security and Justice Procuration Citizen's Council
	1984	**1991**	**1993**	**1998**	**2012**	**2016**
Public Policy design	- Endorse state, regional and municipal plans and programs on public security, and associate them with the National Program on Public Security - Suggest to the Executive Branch (within the framework of the National Development Plan) the subscription, enforcement or amendment to coordination agreements on public security with Municipal authorities	- Endorse the elaboration of state, regional and municipal citizens' protection plans and programs - Propose to the Executive Power, within the National and State level Development Plan, the settlement of coordination agreements regarding investigation, order, public tranquility and citizens' protection, with Municipal Governments	- Propose actions in order to prevent crimes and infractions to the state level laws and regulations - Approve the elaboration of state, regional and municipal public security plans and programs - Propose to the Executive Power, within the National and State level Development Plan, the settlement of coordination agreements regarding investigation, order, public tranquility and citizens' protection, with Municipal Governments	- Approve the elaboration of state, regional and municipal public security plans and programs - Propose to the Executive Power, within the National and State level Development Plan, the settlement of coordination agreements regarding investigation, order, public tranquility and citizens' protection, with Municipal Governments - Approve the designation of Public Security Secretariat General Directors, proposed by the Governor - Request the Governor the cessation, dismissal, removal from office of the Public Security Secretariat officer who had committed administrative or judicial offenses - Settle the guidelines and directives regarding crime policy - Design the general and special mechanisms to prevent crime	- Propose, and in its case to implement, strategies to enhance and promote the report of crimes and other strategies to reduce the unsafety perception index - Propose action to prevent crimes and offenses the state laws and regulations	- Propose prevention programs against insecurity - Enhance, promote and encourage the report of crimes though strategies that the Council considers appropriate within its prerogatives

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Council Tasks Typology	State's Advisory Council on Public Security	State's Advisory Council on Citizen Protection	State Level Citizen's Protection Council	Public Security, Prevention and Social Readaptation Citizen's Council	Public Security, Prevention and Social Reinsertion Citizen's Council	Security and Justice Procuration Citizen's Council
	1984	**1991**	**1993**	**1998**	**2012**	**2016**
Legislative-related	- Carry out studies on Public Security Codes, Laws and Regulations promoting their updating and standardization, and to propose the simplification of administrative infractions fines	- Carry out and to promote studies, updating and standardization of Public Security Codes, Laws and Regulations among the different government levels and to pursue the simplification of administrative procedures in order to benefit the society				
Studies, Analysis and Public debates	- Analyze public security issues and suggest objectives and policies to address them - Organize and participate in events, debate forums on public security issues	- Carry out the studies related to the state level situation regarding citizens' protection area, and to propose the objectives and policies to provide an adequate solution of the problems - Organize and participate in events, debate forums regarding citizens' protection issues	- Carry out the studies related to the state level situation regarding citizens' protection area, to analyze the problems of the high crime rates areas and to propose the objectives and policies to its adequate solution - Organize and participate in events, debate forums regarding citizens' protection issues	- Organize and participate in events, debate forums regarding citizens' protection issues	- Carry out the studies related to the state level situation regarding citizens' protection area, to analyze the problems of the high crime rates areas and to propose the objectives and policies to its adequate solution	- Carry out the studies related to the state level situation regarding citizens' protection area, to analyze the problems of the high crime rates areas and to propose the objectives and policies to its adequate solution - Monitor the high-impact crimes occurrence, which must be considered while expressing it opinions about preventive measures and government actions

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Council Tasks Typology	State's Advisory Council on Public Security	State's Advisory Council on Citizen Protection	State Level Citizen's Protection Council	Public Security, Prevention and Social Readaptation Citizen's Council	Public Security, Prevention and Social Reinsertion Citizen's Council	Security and Justice Procuration Citizen's Council
	1984	**1991**	**1993**	**1998**	**2012**	**2016**
Public Communication and policy diffusion	- Prepare, distribute and publish informational material on public security to develop citizens' awareness, through the exposition of the objectives and programs of public security bodies within schools and Minors Readaptation Centers - Disseminate the rights and duties of citizens on public security, as well as the police bodies prerogatives	- Prepare, elaborate, distribute and publish informational material regarding citizens' protection systems aiming to develop awareness of its implications, through the exposition of the objectives and programs of public security bodies within schools, readaptation centers or any other strategic place - Spread the citizens' rights and duties, regarding citizens' protection, as well as the police bodies prerogatives	- Prepare, elaborate, distribute and publish informational material regarding citizens' protection systems aiming to develop awareness of its implications, through the exposition of the objectives and programs of public security bodies within schools, readaptation centers or any other strategic place - Spread the citizens' rights and duties as well as the police bodies prerogatives	- Prepare, elaborate, distribute and publish informational material regarding citizens' protection systems aiming to develop awareness of its implications, through the exposition of the objectives and programs of public security bodies within schools, readaptation centers or any other strategic place - Spread the citizens' rights and duties as well as the police bodies prerogatives		
Crime records and statistics	- Integrate the State Police Services Registry - Support the creation of the National System of Unique Criminal Identification - Collaborate in the integration of the National Police Census, to keep it up to date, through permanent coordination mechanisms with different government levels	- Carry out the integration of the State level Police's Services Register and to support the integration of the National Register - Support the creation of the National and State level Criminal Identification Systems - Collaborate in the integration, maintenance and updating of the National Police Census, through permanent coordination mechanisms settled with different government levels				

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Council Tasks Typology	State's Advisory Council on Public Security	State's Advisory Council on Citizen Protection	State Level Citizen's Protection Council	Public Security, Prevention and Social Readaptation Citizen's Council	Public Security, Prevention and Social Reinsertion Citizen's Council	Security and Justice Procuration Citizen's Council
	1984	1991	1993	1998	2012	2016
Citizens' attention and participation	- Define the procedure to create the Citizens' complaints System to address complaints related with public security forces - Permanently link the duties of public security forces with social participation, to ensure that the modalities of restructuration and operation of this public service will be oriented by society - Invite the representatives of service clubs as convenient	- Design, promote and coordinate the projects through which civil society might be involved in different ways in citizens' protection programs - Invite the representatives of service clubs and any other civil society expression organism, to participate in events and forums regarding citizens' protection	- Propose norms and procedures that enable to improve the citizens' attention and conditions to file a complaint against security forces abuses - Design, promote and coordinate the projects through which civil society might be involved in different ways in citizens' protection programs	- Design, promote and coordinate the projects through which civil society might be involved in different ways in citizens' protection programs - Settle the adequate measures to assist crime victims - Promote citizens' participation in Public Security duties, through the figure of the communitarian visitor	- Propose norms and procedures that enable to improve the citizens' attention and conditions to file a complaint against security forces agents' abuses - Receive, regardless the specific area of the public security agencies, the complaints regarding the allegedly wrong or deficient behavior of the officers, having to address them within the next 48 hrs. to the competent authority to its legal attention and prosecution - Carry out and to manage the Anonymous Complaint Program, addressing expeditiously the facts to the competent authority	- Propose norms and procedures that enable to improve attention and security of the people who point out abusive behaviors of the public security system members - Receive the complaints or accusations regarding the allegedly wrong or deficient behavior of the public security system officers, having to address them within the next 48 hrs. to the competent authority to its legal attention and prosecution - Carry out and to manage an anonymous complaint program, addressing expeditiously the facts to the competent authority - Enhance the integration of the Municipal Citizens' Consultative Councils regarding Pubic Security
Other	- Strive for the extinction and non-integration of para-police groups within any public agency, as well as within the private and the social sectors, which setting is not foreseen in the Constitution - Propose solutions to deter administrative agencies, with inspection and monitoring functions, to bear arms, to identify themselves as police bodies and to act as such.	- Denounce, being the case, the existence of para-police groups within any public agency, as well as within the private and the social sectors, which setting is not foreseen in the Constitution, in order to achieve its extinction and non-integration - To propose solutions to deter administrative agencies, with inspection and monitoring functions, to bear arms, to identify themselves as police bodies and to act as such	- Verify the adequate provision of public security service	- Visit the State Attorney and Public Security Secretariat agencies and offices in order to verify their adequate performance, to avoid possible abusive behavior. In the latter case, immediately reporting them to the head of such agencies	- Verify the adequate provision of public security service - Request the State Human Rights Commission to file a complain motivated by facts the Council might know, as well as legal opinions or reports related to Commissions duties - Press formal charges before the Public Prosecution Service motivated by allegedly criminal facts the Council might know	- Denounce before the State or National Human Rights Commission, facts that might imply the violation to fundamental rights and that the Council might know while exerting its duties - Press formal charges before the Public Prosecution Service motivated by allegedly criminal facts the Council might know while exerting its duties - Administer the assets the Council receives according to the Internal Regulation - Sign cooperation and collaboration agreements, within its prerogatives - Receive donations from public or private entities

Source: Prepared by the author based on Decree 11676. Periódico Oficial del Estado de Jalisco, Mexico, November 13th, 1984; Decree 14160. Periódico Oficial del Estado de Jalisco, Mexico, January 5th, 1991; Decree 15310. Periódico Oficial del Estado de Jalisco, Mexico, December 28th, 1993; Decree 17087. Periódico Oficial del Estado de Jalisco, Mexico, January 15th, 1998; Decree 24036/LIX/12. Periódico Oficial del Estado de Jalisco, Mexico, July 21st, 2012; Decree 25832/LXI/2016. Periódico Oficial del Estado de Jalisco, Mexico, May 5th, 2016.

Appendix 3.3: The XV Military Zone Commander visits the Guadalajara Chamber of Commerce



LUIS G. CASTAÑEDA
1941
FELIX DIAZ GARZA
1943
ROBERTO E. REBORA
1944.1950.1951
J. TRINIDAD MARTINEZ
1945.1946
AUGUSTO BRUN
1947
PEDRO MARTINEZ
1952
JOSE P. QUIÑO
1953

GABRI
LIC. ABELAR
1958
JESUS
ING. JORG
1960.
G. GUILL
196
ARDO

SEGURIDAD PARA LOS TAPATIOS

* *"El mexicano es capaz de superar todas las crisis"*
* *Gracias al diálogo empieza a lograrse la paz*
* *"Todos somos soldados"*
* *"Yo estuve en el Hospicio 4 años"*
* *Hay que crear parques infantiles*

"El mexicano es capaz de superar todas las crisis", dijo el Gral. Luis R. Casillas, comandante de la XV Zona Militar, cuando asistió como invitado especial a la última sesión del Consejo Directivo de nuestra Cámara. Lo dijo con plena convicción, cuando expresó que por medio del diálogo, la tranquilidad y la armonía empiezan a volver a Guadalajara.

El alto jefe militar tuvo palabras de agradecimiento para los representantes del comercio organizado, "ustedes —dijo— que son quienes dan de comer al país, arriesgando sus capitales".

Destacó que era necesario el apoyo de todos los sectores para que haya armonía en Guadalajara, para que acabe el malestar que los habitantes de la ciudad han resentido por la falta de seguridad. Dijo que una de sus principales preocupaciones ha sido vigilar el área urbana, en especial las zonas comerciales, para contribuir a que sean respetados los derechos de los tapatíos. Y recalcó que gracias a los contactos con los diversos sectores ha sido posible que en solamente dos meses empiecen a disminuir los hechos de violencia. A manera de ejemplo señaló que los estudiantes ya no andan armados. Quienes traen armas, subrayó, ya no son los estudiantes.

GACETA MERCANTIL

Guadalajara, Nov. 22 de 1976

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

Página 2 GACETA MERCANTIL Guadalajara, Noviembre 22 de 1976

Al hacer notar la importancia de todos los sectores en el esfuerzo por superar los problemas del momento, el Gral. Casillas enfatizó que unos en una línea y otros en otra, todos somos soldados y que todos debemos trabajar por el bien del país.

Luego pidió el apoyo del comercio organizado para una institución educativa de muchos méritos, que ha beneficiado a muchos niños jaliscienses: el Hospicio Cabañas. "Yo estuve en el Hospicio 4 años" afirmó orgullosamente, y añadió que fue precisamente ahí donde aprendió a convivir con toda clase de personas.

Otro de los motivos de preocupación del Gral. Casillas es la falta de parques recreativos, donde los niños y los jóvenes puedan divertirse mediante la práctica del deporte. La creación de estos parques sería de gran utilidad para evitar ocio y vagancia.

Después, el Gral. Casillas destacó la importancia de los actos cívicos, e invitó a los miembros del Consejo Directivo de nuestra Cámara a asistir a una ceremonia de reconocimiento a algunos miembros del Ejército Mexicano.

Las palabras del comandante de la XV Zona Militar, dichas con tranquilidad y firmeza, motivaron el aplauso de los integrantes del Consejo Directivo. Y el Gral. Casillas insistió en que mediante el diálogo y el apoyo de todos se puede lograr el objetivo de recobrar la tranquilidad en Guadalajara. La fuerza, advirtió, hay que enseñarla pero no hay que usarla.

El señor Angel Franco Camberos presidió la sesión del Consejo Directivo, a la que asistieron algunos colaboradores del Gral. Luis R. Casillas. Entre ellos el coronel Julio Ortega López, comandante de la Sección de Intendencia; el teniente coronel Raymundo Escudero González, administrador del Hospital Militar Regional; y los tenientes Alfonso Abreu Valdez y Luis Humberto Gutiérrez García.

Source: Gazette Bank of Images 1970-2016. November 22nd , 1976.

Appendix 3.4: The Guadalajara Chamber of Commerce establishes the monthly award to recognize the best police officers



OPINIÓN

Editorial

La mística y las muchas misiones que tiene esta institución las resumió sabiamente el Lic. Efraín González Luna en su célebre frase: "Todo lo que le sucede a Guadalajara le concierne a la Cámara de Comercio".

Nuestra ciudad y el área metropolitana, como toda entidad que se desarrolla y crece, tiene que pagar los efectos de ese crecimiento urbano y poblacional.

Son muchos los problemas y carencias que trae consigo la modernización y el avance actual de la sociedad, siendo uno de los más graves la inseguridad social.

Es por eso que la Cámara de Comercio de Guadalajara, fiel a su misión a que se refiere la frase antes mencionada, ha decidido instituir el *premio al mejor policía del mes*.

Ciertamente existen malos elementos policiacos que desprestigian a su corporación y denigran a nuestra ciudad, pero estamos seguros que son más los buenos guardianes del orden los que pasan como héroes desconocidos la mayoría de las veces, que los que no hacen bien su trabajo.

El premio al mejor policía del mes lo que pretende es precisamente: reconocer y premiar públicamente al mejor del área metropolitana.

Estamos totalmente concientes que la logística a seguir en la implementación de este premio será incompleta al principio y un tanto imperfecta, pero nuestra intención es sembrar la semilla para que dé frutos la idea, y la mecánica de convocatoria y bases sobre las que después se haga la premiación, se irán perfeccionando poco a poco.

El primer paso consistirá en que, jefes de manzana, directivos de colonias y vecinos en general del área metropolitana, que conozcan a policías que se distingan por sus méritos y cumplimiento de su deber, máxime cuando se trate de actos heroicos, lo propongan ante esta Cámara de Comercio, enviando una carta donde detallen por qué creen que tal o cual policía es acreedor a la designación del mejor del mes.

Los premios consistirán en un reconocimiento público en una sesión ordinaria de Consejo Directivo y un diploma, así como la entrega de un artículo útil para el hogar, preferentemente de línea blanca. El policía premiado será dado a conocer a la sociedad a través de los medios de comunicación.

Esta distinción al mejor policía del mes, iniciará a partir del mes de junio, con motivo de la celebración del ciento ocho aniversario de la fundación de esta Cámara.

El objetivo que se persigue es coadyuvar a fortalecer la confianza de la sociedad en las corporaciones policiacas, limpiando la imagen que muchas veces se tiene de esos servidores públicos por culpa de los que son malos y corruptos.

La correspondencia deberá ser enviada con atención al Lic. José Cárdenas Díaz, a nuestro domicilio en Av. Vallarta 4095, Fracc. Camino Real. Zapopan, 45000 Jal.

Cartón

4 • García Mercantil

Source: Gazette Bank of Images 1970-2016. June 1st , 1996.

Appendix 4.1 The Auxiliary Police contributes to maintain social order (mid-1950s)



OTROS

Además de los servicios de rutina esta Co-mandancia tiene por deber reportar el alumbrado público que está fuera de servicio, hacer investigaciones y localizaciones gratuitas, informar a las Autoridades Superiores de la existencia de centros de vicio, combatir el clandestinaje y hacer las consignaciones de los expendedores de pulque (toreos) y expendios ilegales de debidas embriagantes, retirar magnavoces que sin autorización del Departamento Central, hacen propagandas, alterando la tranquilidad de las Colonias; retirar y evitar los bailes públicos que sin permiso legal se llegan a efectuar, hacer vigilancia estricta sobre las personas que sistemáticamente pretenden tirar basura en la vía pública, hacer servicios extras en autos abandonados por diferentes causas y desempeñar los servicios extraordinarios que las autoridades superiores ordenan.

(Foto de Jesús Legorreta, D. F. S.)

Reportando el alumbrado público.

MIL OJOS VIGILAN SU TRANQUILIDAD Y SEGURIDAD. Al DEDICARSE AL DESCANSO LOS HABITANTES DE LAS COLONIAS ENCOMENDADAS A LA POLICIA AUXILIAR, MILES DE OJOS DE LOS COMPONENTES DE ESTE CUERPO ATISBAN LAS CALLES Y LAS RESIDENCIAS DE SUS MORADORES, ESTANDO PRESTOS A IMPEDIR QUE SE ALTERE EL ORDEN.

SERVICIOS

POLICIA AUXILIAR

Página 11

- Reporting broken street lighting
- Conducting free investigations and locations
- Informing the authority about the existence of centres of vice
- Struggling against clandestinity
- Bringing charges against the *pulque*[982] sellers and illegal sellers of alcohol
- Retiring loudspeakers which, without the government licence, is used to propagandistic purposes, altering the neighbourhood quiet
- Retiring and avoiding public dances
- Close surveillance to those who intend to throw garbage
- Other services on abandoned cars

Source: 5to. Batallón. (August, 1956). Otros servicios. *Boletín Informativo Policía Auxiliar del D.F.,* p. 11.

[982] Alcoholic beverage original from the Mexican altiplano (DRAE, 2018).

Appendix 4.2: Number of Auxiliary Police agents registered in Jalisco (2011-2016)

Year	National	Jalisco
2011	115,784	1,154
2012	115,940	1,334
2013	116,108	1,106
2014	118,066	1,224
2015	120,530	*n.a.*
2016	117,256	*n.a.*

Source: INEGI. (2011-2016). *Censo Nacional de Gobierno, Seguridad Pública y Sistema Penitenciario Estatales*. The table includes officers attached, the previous year, to commercial, banker and auxiliary police bodies, either as operative level, first and middle level and administrative staff. "n.a." stands for "Not Available".

Appendix 4.3: Fake surveillance camera offered by a door-to-door sales company





Source: *Betterware* brochure, October, 2017. Images had been turned in black-and-white.

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Methodological Appendix

The following appendix have been elaborated by the author as part of the research design and the analysis process.

Appendix QG: Original Query Guideline

PAUTA DE ENTREVISTA
Query guideline

I. Historia de la empresa y trayectoria del empresario
Business's background and businessman's careers

a. Origen: ¿cómo se convirtió en empresario? ¿sus principales atributos para ser empresario?
Origin: How did you become a businessman? Which are your main qualities as a businessman?
b. ¿Cómo comenzó el proyecto de empresa? ¿quiénes? ¿cuándo? ¿En qué contexto?
How did your business project start? Who was in? when did it happen? Which was the context?
c. Ser empresario: definición, implicaciones. ¿Cómo definiría ser empresario?
Being a businessman: definition, implications. How do you define being a businessman?

II. Su relación con el sector empresarial
Your relationship with the business sector

a. Participación en asociaciones: ¿cuáles? ¿cómo? ¿por qué? ¿para qué?
Participation in associations: which ones? How did it happen? For which reasons? For which purposes?
b. Desde su experiencia: ¿cómo describe al empresariado Tapatio en general? Y, ¿respecto a coordinación, solidaridad, mecanismos de acción colectiva? ¿qué tan integrado se siente a éste?
From your experience: In general terms, could you describe the Tapatio business sector? How would you describe it in terms of coordination, solidarity, collective action mechanisms? How integrated do you feel?
c. ¿Cómo describiría su relación con otros empresarios?
How would you describe your relationship with other businessman?
d. Opiniones acerca de los principales problemas del empresariado Tapatio, por ejemplo:
Opinions about the Tapatio business' sector main challenges, for example:
   - Régimen fiscal / *Tax system*
   - Competencia y apertura comercial/ *Competitiveness and trade openess*
   - La economía informal/ *Informal economy*
   - Contexto de corrupción, inseguridad y violencia / *Corruption context, insecurity and violence*

III. La empresa y el empresario en relación con el gobierno
The business and the business sector in relation to the government

a. Desde su experiencia, ¿cómo definiría su relación con el gobierno (regulador, fiscalizador, cliente y financiador)
From your experience, how would you define your relation with the government (law enforcer, tax collector, client and funder)

IV. La empresa y el empresario en relación con otros actores sociales
The business and the businessman in relation to other social actors

a. ¿Cómo describiría su relación con actores como sindicatos, líderes religiosos, medios de comunicación, activistas u ONGs?
How would you describe your relationship with actors such as unions, religious leaders, media, activists or NGOs ?

Appendix CM: Original Message used to contact potential interviewees (in Spanish)

Soy estudiante del Doctorado en Ciencia Política en Sciences Po, Paris. Mi investigación se enfoca a comprender al sector empresarial y al empresario tapatío como agentes sociales y no solo como agentes económicos. En su calidad de empresario, me gustaría poder situar su experiencia y trayectoria en una perspectiva más amplia, tomando en cuenta sus interacciones cotidianas con otros actores relevantes en Guadalajara.
Por ello, me permito solicitarle una cita para poder realizar una entrevista semi-estructurada que duraría alrededor de una hora y media. Desde luego, soy consciente de lo complicado de su agenda, por lo que puedo adaptarme al tiempo del que disponga para charlar.
No omito mencionar que, durante la entrevista, no formulo ninguna pregunta relativa a los asuntos financieros ni suyos ni de los de su empresa. Además, toda la información colectada será parte de un corpus que analizaré yo, personalmente, y con el más alto rigor científico.

Appendix SB: "Snowball effect", Path of interview contact

First part



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Appendix SB: "Snowball effect", **Path of interview contact**

Second part



Appendix LI: List of Interviews

Folio (F)	Pseudonym	Sector	Company's Size	Date	Location
1	Leonel Novak Leonel Novak Jr.	Financial Sector	Medium-sized	August 26th 2015	Guadalajara
2	Juan Zenón	Industrial	Large	August 27th 2015	Zapopan
3	Rosa María Cortés	Private Security Company	Medium-sized	August 28th 2015	Guadalajara
4	Alejandro González	Commerce	Medium-sized	August 28th 2015	Zapopan
5	Raymundo Chávez	Agro-Industrial	Large	August 29th 2015	Zapopan
6	Orestes Ruiz	Commerce	Large	August 31st 2015	Zapopan
7	Sergio Hernández	Services	Medium-sized	September 1st 2015	Guadalajara
8	José Gerardo Zapata	Industrial	Large	September 1st 2015	Zapopan
9	Benito Alvarado	Industrial	Medium-sized	September 2nd 2015	Zapopan
10	Marco Antonio Zepeda	Services	Medium-sized	September 2nd 2015	Zapopan
11	Héctor Luis Orta	Industrial	Large	September 3rd 2015 September 18th 2015 January 18th 2017	Zapopan
12	Heinar Müller	Services	Medium-sized	September 4th 2015	Guadalajara
13	Daniel Campos	Industrial	Medium-sized	September 8th 2015	Guadalajara
14	Alberto Alcántara Alberto Alcántara Jr. Antonio Alcántara	Commerce	Large	September 9th 2015	Zapopan
15	Lorenzo Mendoza	Services	Medium-sized	September 13th 2015	Zapopan
16	Víctor Manuel González	Commerce	Medium-sized	September 15th 2015	Guadalajara
17	Olivia Ciriaco	Construction and real estate	Medium-sized	September 15th 2015	Zapopan
18	Nicolás Bermudez	Commerce	Medium-sized	September 17th 2015	Guadalajara
20	Gustavo Moreno	Services	Medium-sized	September 19th 2015	Zapopan
22	Alberto Hernández	Industrial	Medium-sized	September 22nd 2015	Zapopan

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Folio (F)	Pseudonym	Sector	Company's Size	Date	Location
23	Alfonso Magadán	Industrial	Medium-sized	September 23th 2015	Zapopan
25	Gerardo Nava	Construction and real estate	Medium-sized	September 24th 2015	Zapopan
26	Juan Galicia	Construction and real estate	Medium-sized	September 25th 2015	Zapopan
27	Eduardo Hernández	Commerce	Large	September 26th 2015	Guadalajara
28	Arnulfo Arellano	Services	Medium-sized	September 29th 2015	Guadalajara
29	Camilo Hernández	Industrial	Large	October 1st 2015	Zapopan
30	Fernando Huerta	Industrial	Large	October 1st 2015	Zapopan
33	Alfredo Palomino	Industrial	Medium-sized	October 7th 2015	Guadalajara
34	Alejandro Pacheco	Industrial	Medium-sized	October 7th 2015	Zapopan
35	Jesús Salas	Agro-Industrial	Large	October 8th 2015	Zapopan
36	Carlos Solano	Industrial	Large	October 8th 2015	Zapopan
37	Susana Piña	Industrial	Medium-sized	October 9th 2015	Zapopan
38	Fidel Torres	Construction and real estate	Medium-sized	October 13th 2015	Zapopan
39	Josefa Domínguez	Industrial	Medium-sized	October 14th 2015	Guadalajara
40	Manuel Gómez	Services	Medium-sized	October 15th 2015	Zapopan
41	Victor Manuel Olvera	Services	Medium-sized	October 15th 2015	Zapopan
44	Ernesto González	Industrial	Large	October 16th 2015	Guadalajara
45	Máximo Ballesteros Máximo Ballesteros Jr.	Private Security Company	Medium-sized	October 16th 2015 January 19th 2017	Zapopan
47	José Julio Huerta	Industrial	Medium-sized	October 17th 2015	Zapopan
50	Paula Gudiño	Commerce	Medium-sized	October 22nd 2015	Guadalajara
51	Edmundo Saavedra	Industrial	Large	October 23rd 2015	Tlajomulco
52	Juan Barbosa Jerónimo Cervantes	Industrial Industrial	Medium-sized Medium-sized	October 28th 2015	Zapopan
53	Raúl Velázquez	Commerce	Medium-sized	October 29th 2015	Skype
54	Andrés González	Services	Medium-sized	October 30th 2015	Guadalajara

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Folio (F)	Pseudonym	Sector	Company's Size	Date	Location
55	Elizabeth Calixto	Industrial	Medium-sized	October 30th 2015	Guadalajara
56	Gilberto Fuentes	Industrial	Medium-sized	January 16th 2017	Tlajomulco
57	Enrique Rodríguez	Information Technologies	Medium-sized	January 17th 2017	Guadalajara
60	Rafael Magaña	Construction and real estate	Medium-sized	January 23th 2017	Guadalajara

Complementary profiles interviewees

Folio (F)	Name or pseudonym	Position	Date	Location
31	Juan José Doñán	Journalist	October 3rd 2015	Guadalajara
42	Baltazar Rodríguez (Pseudonym)	Journalist	October 15th 2015	Zapopan
46	Eugenia Barajas	Journalist	October 16th 2015	Zapopan
48	Oscar Garza	Journalist	October 20th 2015	Zapopan
61	Francisco Herrera (Pseudonym)	Kidnapping-and-ransom consultant	February 1st 2017	CDMX
21	Laura Haro Ramírez	Public Officer or Politician	September 22nd 2015	Zapopan
49	Arturo Díaz Lombardo	Public Officer or Politician	October 21st 2015	Guadalajara
59	Enrique Ibarra	Public Officer or Politician	January 20th 2017	Guadalajara
62	José Manuel Sánchez (Pseudonym)	Public Officer or Politician	February 22nd 2017	Mexico City
63	Macedonio Tamez	Public Officer or Politician	February 23th 2017	Mexico City
64	Augusto Valencia López	Public Officer or Politician	March 1st 2018	Skype
65	Alberto Cárdenas	Public Officer or Politician	April 1st 2018	Mexico City
24	Eduardo González	Scholar or writer	September 23th 2015	Zapopan
32	Gustavo Monterrubio	Scholar or writer	October 5th 2015	Guadalajara
58	Javier Hurtado	Scholar or writer	January 19th 2017	Zapopan
19	José Antonio Reséndiz	Scholar or writer	September 17th 2015	Guadalajara
43	Elvia Lara	Social Activist	October 15th 2015	Guadalajara

Complementary profiles: Informal Conversations

Name or pseudonym	Position
Armida Romero	Start-up Manager
María Emma Santillán	Philanthropic Organization
Doña Rosy	Owner of a small restaurant
Juan	Uber Driver

Many other informal conversations had highly informed the analysis presented throughout this manuscript. However, I list only those whose accounts were retrieved at some point for the discussion.

Appendix TP: Transcription Protocol

Protocolo para la transcripción de entrevistas semi-estructuradas

Naturaleza de los datos cualitativos:
Los datos cualitativos permiten explorar, describir, comparar y sobre todo, comprender el sentido de las cosas que la gente hace o dice.

En el caso particular de la actual investigación, me interesa conocer las prácticas o conductas de los(as) informantes, así como entender qué dicen ellos(as) mismos(as) sobre sus actividades o las de otras personas y cómo se relacionan con otros actores relevantes de la arena político-social.

Esos "dichos" de los informantes son realmente discursos o maneras en que la gente relata sus experiencias, expresa sus opiniones, manifiesta sus expectativas, justifica sus acciones y omisiones, revela su nivel de información o comunica sus percepciones sobre algún asunto.

La información de ese tipo se encuentra contenida en las grabaciones que están a tu disposición, resulta necesario transcribirlas para realizar el análisis correspondiente. Así se producirá un acervo de documentos como respaldo de los hallazgos obtenidos durante la investigación referida.

Importancia de la transcripción:
La transcripción consiste en trasladar el contenido de la grabación en un texto escrito. Sin embargo, ello no siempre es fácil porque el lenguaje hablado tiene matices especiales que no siempre se alcanzan a notar en el lenguaje escrito. De ahí la importancia de que al transcribir, se tenga la suficiente sensibilidad para notar inflexiones de la voz, pausas, cambios de volumen, entonaciones y otros elementos similares para reflejar en el texto, con la mayor fidelidad posible, aquello que el informante dijo y la manera en que lo dijo.

Previo a la transcripción:
Cada una de las entrevistas será transcrita en un archivo *Word* independiente que tendrá como nombre "Folio X", de acuerdo con el folio asignado en la base de datos compartida. Para ello se utilizará la fuente *Arial 12* con espacio sencillo.

Antes de comenzar la transcripción, se debe colocar al inicio del documento, con negritas, el folio de la entrevista, el nombre del archivo de audio y las iniciales de quien transcribe.

Ejemplo:

FOLIO 1

Nombre del archivo de audio: **Folio 1_150826_001**

Transcribió: **MTMT** [sólo anotar las iniciales de la persona que transcribió]

En algunos casos, la entrevista se realizó en dos momentos en el tiempo, generalmente porque el entrevistado no tenía tiempo pero le interesaba continuar la charla. En ese caso, las dos grabaciones deben estar contenidas en el mismo archivo *Word* pero se debe distinguir claramente en qué momento ocurre el cambio, lo cual se logra al repetir el encabezado con el segundo nombre del archivo de audio.

La transcripción:

A lo largo de la transcripción, deberá distinguir claramente las intervenciones de cada participante en la entrevista señalando **en negritas** las iniciales del entrevistador, y cuando corresponda, la inicial del cargo del informante. Por ejemplo,

I = Informante
TM = Teresa Martínez (Entrevistadora)

Ejemplo:

TM: Muchas gracias por su disposición. Me gustaría comenzar preguntándole ¿cómo surgió la empresa?

INFORMANTE: La empresa fue creada por mi padre en 1962. Comenzó como un negocito pequeño y de ahí se profesionalizó.

TM: ¿Cómo definiría entonces el ser empresario?

I: Mire, para mi ser empresario es… es tomar riesgos.

Nota que a la primera intervención del informante la antecede la palabra completa **INFORMANTE,** mientras que en las intervenciones siguientes sólo se anota **I**.

Cuando haya más de un informante habrá que distinguirlos a lo largo de la entrevista con un sufijo numérico, por ejemplo **I1, I2, I3,** etc. Así, cada vez que el Informante 1 intervenga en la charla habrá que distinguirlo como **I1** y si el Informante 3 toma la palabra lo especificaremos con **I3.**

La transcirpción debe ser literal, por lo que se deben escribir todas las expresiones escuchadas en la grabación, no importa si son coloquiales o incluso si son improperios. También se colocan signos de exclamación e interrogación cuando corresponda, para explicitar la entonación usada por quienes participan en la charla.

Es posible que en la grabación, el informante evoque frases e, incluso, diálogos en los que él (ella) intervino. En esos casos, se usarán comillas sencillas (‘ ‘), dos puntos (:) y guiones cortos (-) para distinguir tales elementos.

I: ¡Imagínate! Tratar de sacar adelante tu negocito pa' que estos cuates te armen broncas sindicales. Porque eso son los sindicatos, ¡extorsionadores! Vienen y te dicen: 'nos tiene que pagar por la representación o le hacemos una huelga' y pues uno dice: 'oiga, ¿qué le pasa?, si yo tengo ya un sindicato'.

Es importante el uso de comillas sencillas pues en caso de que este fragmento sea citado en la tesis, tendré que entrecomillarlo, de modo que el diálogo recreado por el informante se tendría que ajustar con comillas sencillas. ¡Digamos que me ahorro un paso!

Ejemplo de cita en el cuerpo de la tesis:

"*Porque eso son los sindicatos, ¡extorsionadores! Vienen y te dicen: 'nos tiene que pagar por la representación o le hacemos una huelga' y pues uno dice: 'oiga, ¿qué le pasa?, si yo tengo ya un sindicato'"*.

Amelia, empresaria del sector de la construcción

Procura indicar las pausas utilizando comas (,). Si la pausa es más prolongada pero se conserva el sentido de la idea, utiliza punto y seguido (.). Si además escuchas que hay un cambio de idea principal, utiliza punto y aparte.

Los puntos suspensivos (…) te serán de utilidad cuando requieras expresar alguna pausa relativamente prolongada, o cuando consideres que una frase no tiene un final claro, ya sea porque quien habla no termina la idea o bien, otro interlocutor lo interrumpe.

I: Bueno, este grupo hace… ayuda, digamos… **[baja la voz]** cuando hay casos de secuestro. ¡Eso es lo que sé! Es decir, sí es solidario el empresariado, más en temas así… de delincuencia. Generalmente se ayudan… pero… o también a veces es la emergencia… pero sí, es solidario.

Utiliza **corchetes en negritas [ ]** para indicar alguna situación percibida en la grabación y que no corresponda a directamente a la conversación. Por ejemplo:

[risas]
[suena el teléfono]
[silencio] (para un silencio más prolongado que las pausas que hace el interlocutor y que las marcamos con puntos suspensivos (…)
[contesta una llamada. Se corta la grabación]
[baja la voz]
[se escucha un claxon]
[tocan a la puerta]

I: Obviamente, tiene que haber alguien que gane más pero… se reparte mucho mejor dentro de una empresa que de… de un tallercito normal. Otro problema serio es la mano de obra. Los sueldos de los obreros son muy bajos, la responsabilidad y el compromiso de los obreros es muy baja. Yo no los voy a culpar, en absoluto… quién…quién puede con eso **[Suena el timbre. Responde desde su teléfono:** ¿Sí? Ah, ahorita van primo, ¡ándale, gracias!**]** Entonces, es… es… este… es bien… para nosotros la capacitación ha sido un coco… ¡ya contesté Martita, gracias! Y… el problema se hace, más bien, en que le pagas a alguien…

Si durante el diálogo, quien tiene la palabra es **interrumpido por su interlocutor**, ya sea para completar la idea o cambiar de tema la interrupción quedará registrada en el párrafo **entre corchetes**, pero esta vez el texto no estará en negritas.

TM: …hay un espacio en la informalidad y no solamente en lo informal sino… desde lo informal hasta lo ilegal, ¿no? Ahí hay una zona… gris… **[I:** ¡Enorme! Sí**]** tremenda y, de alguna manera, ustedes tienen que funcionar con esto

I: …Pero bueno, sin ese tipo de apalancamientos, cómo despegas. ¿Contra quién vas a competir? Contra los Chinos, contra los gringos, contra los hindús. ¡Es imposible! ¿contra el mercado negro? **[risa sarcástica] [TM:** ese… ese es un punto…**]** el mercado negro tienen todos un flujo de efectivo que ni te puedes imaginar.

En caso de que el interlocutor no sólo interrumpa sino recupere el uso de la palabra, más que corchetes se abre otro renglón de diálogo.

TM: Con el proyecto de… más bien, más que tener una empresa, tener un pequeño negocio que te dé para…

I: ¡Para vivir!, sí, o que te dé los mismo que te ganarías en una empresa pero, siendo dueño de tu tiempo. Y ahí es en donde creo que puede haber muchas chapuzas para el… beneficio solamente del dueño.

Si pese a varios esfuerzos, no logras entender una palabra o palabras contenidas en la grabación, escribe **entre corchetes y negrita** la palabra ***inaudible***. Por ejemplo,

I: Le voy a contar cuando empezamos, las cosas no eran tan… **[inaudible]**… pero la verdad es que mi padre logró adaptarse.

Si los interlocutores utilizan expresiones en otro idioma, marcas o locuciones latinas, se deben transcribir *usando cursivas.*

I: … claro, al final, *I don't care*. Yo tengo que hacer mi planeación y ni modo, si no quieren cambiar y prefieren el *status quo*, yo tengo que seguir.

Al final de la transcripción, se especifica que hasta ahí llegó la grabación gracias a la leyenda, **centrada y en negritas**:

---------- Fin de la grabación----------

Appendix Q: Quotations excerpts in its original language (Spanish)

Quotations evoked in Chapter 1

Q 1-1

El movimiento del 68… la FEG tuvo aquí la consigna estatal y federal, especialmente federal, de reprimir cualquier muestra de simpatía con el movimiento del 68, incluso con amedrentamientos de amenazas de muerte, ¡ah! porque además otras cosa, les permiten a los de la FEG eh… armarse. Ahí empiezan… aparecen las armas, dadas por el Ejército… clandestinamente, es decir con el permiso del Gobierno. Este… se habla de que algunos… gentes, estudiantes de economía, de filosofía y letras este… se los llevaron, que de pronto habían hecho mítines y demás hablando de… ¡ah! que vinieron del… del Consejo Nacional de Huelga de la UNAM y que fueron este… que los que vinieron fueron secuestrados por los de… dirigentes de la FEG, o bueno… pistoleros de FEG, que fueron llevados a la Barranca, que les simularon un fusilamiento y, en fin, que eh… ésa es la función que hicieron, y eso tuvo una recompensa.

Juan José Doñán, Periodista
Guadalajara, Jal.
3 de Octubre de 2015

Q 1-2

(…) en la oficina que estábamos antes sí tuvimos una situación que se presentó… un robo afuera de las oficinas, un par de robos afuera de las oficinas, eh… detuvimos al ladrón… eh… y agotamos todas las instancias para levantar la denuncia y que a la persona la detuvieran, ¿no? eh… que fue algo engorroso, una burocracia terrible. Fuimos, no nos atendieron… 'no, hoy no les podemos tomar la denuncia, regresen mañana', fue pérdida de tiempo… eh… y al final de cuentas el… el ladrón, por ejemplo, no tenía ningún documento con él… o sea, el dio… dijo llamarse Juan Pérez y yo sí tuve que identificarme a la hora de levantar la denuncia… con mi nombre, con mi credencial de elector, entonces él sí sa… o sea, él sí sabía… con… quién era quien lo denunció y yo no sabía realmente quién era él, ¿no?

Gustavo Moreno, Sector Servicios
Guadalajara, Jal.
19 de Septiembre de 2015

Q 1-3

[…] sucedió a los dos años, ¿no? Cuando tú… cuando tontamente tú decías 'a mi no me toca, a mi no me toca', cuando en la realidad, llegan y ¡pum! Te ponen un manotazo, ¿no? te dicen 'no, no estás tan lejos', ¿no? Pero… fue algo muy… sencillo, eh… ¡nos fue re bien! [risas] ¡de veras, de veras! ¡nos fue re bien! Pero… unas computadores y unas teles y unas botellas de vino… o sea, ¡nada! Nada, nada… realmente… en comparación de otras situaciones en la que.. te dejan en la calle, ¿no?

Nada… fueron… 80 mil pesos… 100 mil pesos… cosas que dices tú… sucedía… sucedió en la madrugada y estábamos… continuando operaciones a la 1 de la tarde, ¿no? entonces, ¡no me detuvo!

Sergio Hernández, Sector Servicios
Zapopan, Jal.
1 de Septiembre 2015

Q 1-4

A nosotros… afortunadamente, no ha pasado más de…robos. Robos de transporte, muchos. Cuando mandas, por decir algo, 400 tráiler al mes, y te roban uno, pues no… dices tú… o te roban uno cada dos meses, digo… de 800 [TM: ¿es marginal?] Pues no… no, tampoco, pero no hay que alarmarse, ¿no?

José Gerardo Zapata, Sector Industrial
Zapopan, Jal.
1 de Septiembre de 2015

Q 1-5

Pues nos ha pasado de todo, ¿no? o sea, nos ha pasado desde… desde personas que se nos han desaparecido…este, debiéndonos una buena cantidad de dinero, y pues ahí no te queda más que tratar de localizarlos, tratar de ir a buscarlos a su casa, mandar a una persona, mandar este… correos, hablar por teléfono, que se te esconden, finalmente tratar…tratar de contactarlos. En algunas de esas cosas también hemos tenido que reconocer alguna pérdida y pues ya.

Alberto Hernández, Sector Industrial,
Zapopan, Jal.
22 de Septiembre de 2015

Q 1-6

Esteem, pues, mira, esteeee, en todo este tiempo hemos sufrido robos, hemos sufrido asaltos, hemos sufrido estee eeeh eeeehm [silencio] intentos de extorsión. Esteee y bueno, eh eso eso eso desde, desde el principio, fraudes también, hemos sufrido mu… últimamente mucho más fraudes ¿eh? Esteeem ee ee, pus definitivamente nos han afectado ¿no?, o sea, estee yo te hablo de clientes queeee, que esteee, que nos dan un anticipo, les mandas la mercancía y no te vuelven.., ¡o proveedores!

Alfredo Palomino, Sector Industrial,
Zapopan, Jal.
7 de Octubre de 2015

Q 1-7

Normalmente nosotros, desde hace como unos… 15 años para acá, las sucursales no usan puertas de metal… que se bajan… cortinas… porque siempre están… la mayoría,

24 horas abiertas… solamente… cuando en el sexenio pasado había muchas balaceras en las calles, se tuvo que poner cortinas para salvaguardar la gente que trabaja ahí y los clientes que estaban ahí, pero nunca con la necesidad de que fuéramos, o por la necesidad de que fuéramos atacados… tuvimos enfrentamientos enfrente de sucursales, hubo muertos en la puerta de sucursales, pero eran… entre individuos y no… contra la empresa. Contra la empresa, como… es más común o normal… y hay… ladrones que van y roban en efectivo, pero no… pero eso no es… no es sexenal, no es parte del movimiento, es que es parte de un ecosistema que hay, pero en cuestión de inseguridad… basados en narcotráfico o movimientos mucho más… fuertes, no, nunca ha habido… nunca ha habido modificaciones que se hicieron.

Eduardo Hernández, Comercio,
Guadalajara, Jal.
26 de Septiembre de 2015

Q 1-8

Pero de repente se presentó un gran aliado… ese gran aliado se llama el miedo. Cuando empezaron a tener problemas los empresarios de secuestros extorsiones, asaltos a mano armada, el factor miedo fue lo que hizo que entonces sí el empresario dijera 'oye, pues déjame buscar profesionales que me ayuden en este tema' […] Sí, ese tema es muy dinámico […] hay épocas en que… se dio mucha inseguridad por los secuestros, entonces el miedo era hacia el secuestro. Hay épocas que ha sido mucha… se sintió inseguridad porque había enfrentamientos entre las bandas de delincuentes, o sea, había violencia en las calles, también fue otra etapa. Luego otra etapa de que… empezaron los robos…asaltos y robos en las calles, a mano armada, entonces fue otro ingrediente más y ahora, curiosamente estamos cayendo en una etapa muy curiosa. Ahora, la mayor parte de nuestros clientes, y el mayor problema que existe, yo creo que a nivel nacional, en todo México, son los problemas internos en la empresa: fraudes internos, robo de materia prima, robo de producto y una bola de problemas internos en la empresa […]

Máximo Ballesteros, Empresa de Seguridad Privada
Zapopan, Jal.
16 de Octubre de 2015

Q 1-9

¡Sí! Sí ha ido cambiando, ha ido cambiando. Aunque todavía la cultura de la gente, por falta de conocimiento en el tema de seguridad y prevención si tiende mucho… el cliente nuestro, a lo primero que nos pide es 'es que necesito que me mandes… diez guardias armados, porque me están robando mucho en la empresa y necesito diez guardias armados'. Nosotros le decimos 'oye, porque no primero empezamos por el área de diagnóstico de la empresa, te hacemos un análisis de riesgo, una auditoría de seguridad, pues para que sepas cuál es el problema' 'No, no, no, es que un amigo me dijo que yo contrate diez guardias'.

Máximo Ballesteros, Empresa de Seguridad Privada
Zapopan, Jal.
16 de Octubre de 2015

Q 1-10

Pues lo sabes… aquí en la fábrica no… no, no… lo sabes cuando vas a la… a la cámara o vas a la asociación, en un grupo de amigos platicando 'me sucedió esto, me sucedió el otro, o le sucedió a mi sobrina o…', ese ambiente… te llega, por supuesto. Te afecta… no dejas de pensar en tus hijas, no dejas de pensar en tus nietos, ¿no? no dejas de pensar en los nietos ahorita de 18, 19, 20, 21 años… En cualquier momento te pueden dar una desagradable noticia.

José Gerardo Zapata, Sector Industrial
Zapopan, Jal.
1 de Septiembre de 2015

Q 1-11

Yo hace muchos años, creo que ya voy a cumplir como 5 o 6 años, no veo tele, no veo noticias, más bien… sí veo tele, o sea…pero ya no veo… noticias. No leo… noticias, este, más que… no sé, a lo mejor cosas de la BBC, cosas de… como ya más… pero local… que tengan que ver con sangre, que… me desconecté, no quiero contaminarme, entonces, prefiero no saber.

Raymundo Chávez, Agroindustria
Zapopan, Jal.
29 de agosto de 2015

Q 1-12

Bueno, pues el empresario… pues es muy palpable, es muy tangible, cuando le va bien, pues la empresa se ve. O sea, yo te puedo decir que muchísima gente piensa que soy millonario. ¡No soy! Pero… aparenta… el negocio aparenta más de lo que es… porque es un escaparate y más en el que estoy yo que son tiendas… tú ves tiendas en centros comerciales y dices 'este cuate tiene…' y la gente no sabe que muchas veces, este… el negocio en los centros comerciales, son economías de escala. Hay intangibles y demás, ¿no? Entonces, pienso que el empresario está muy expuesto a eso, entonces, por eso hay que manejar un perfil más bajo.

Daniel Campos, Sector Industrial
Guadalajara, Jal.
8 de Septiembre de 2015

Q 1-13

Este… el empresario ya más intermedio, pues yo creo que sí se ve bastante afectado porque… pues ¿a quién vas a querer asaltar, o a quién vas a querer extorsionar o a quién vas a querer robar?, ¡pues al que tenga lana! No… no te vas a ir con un súper empresario, al menos que tú seas un súper ladrón, ¿entiendes? O sea, no vas a tratar de secuestrar a la cabeza más grande de una familia, al menos que tú seas un pinche comando del crimen organizado más cabrón que… correrías muchos riesgos, o sea, esos cuates… o sea, los grandes empresarios tienen… pues no son tontos, pues…

tienen sus equipos de seguridad, entonces, vas a ir con los… con los medianitos, ¿no? Los chiquitos no, porque están muy jodidos, ¡vas a ir con… los de en medio!

Manuel Gómez, Sector Servicios
Guadalajara, Jal.
15 de Octubre de 2015

Q 1-14

Yo creo que finalmente, el empresario, no por cuestiones ilegales, pero por cuestiones legales, todo el tiempo se siente amenazado, o sea, no sabes en qué momento te va a explotar otra bomba, ¿no? una demanda laboral, un sindicato fregándote… o extorsionándote, porque a eso se dedican, eh… no sé, cualquier situación.

Víctor Manuel González, Sector Comercio
Guadalajara, Jal.
15 de Septiembre de 2015

Quotations evoked in Chapter 2

Q2-1

*Caro Quintero además, ya se supo, eh… **que solía regalarles a su suegro** y a no sé cuántas [personas]… y a sus amigos, eh… coches que se volvieron una suerte de marca… casi personal que era el Grand Marquís o el Gran Narquís que le decían*

Juan José Doñán, Periodista
Zapopan, Jal.
3 de Octubre de2015

Q2-2

[Los campesinos] es pura gente noble, igual que como lo soy yo y mis compañeros, el Señor Ernesto y con toda su gente… somos pura gente que…los que ayudamos a México… y… pus.. se nos… o sea, que hacemos escuelas, que ponemos clínicas, que metemos luz a los ranchos, agua potable, lo que no hace el gobierno, lo hacemos nosotros… pero pues no… o sea, no lo hacemos con ningún fin de recibir algo por eso, me entiendes, ni porque nos tomen en cuenta todo el mundo, nada más que nos sentimos… bien, nosotros mismos, ¿me entiende? (…)

Entrevista realizada por un conjunto de periodistas a Rafael Caro Quintero, en el Reclusorio Norte de la Ciudad de México, 1 de Mayo de 1985.
Noticiero 24 Horas, Archivo fílmico de Televisa.

Q2-3

(…) con la detención de Caro surgieron otros nombres, ¡los Zuno! (…)y luego pues… pasan a las noticias a un primer plano pues… estos capos con nombre y…y apellido y sobre todo otra cosa, de lo arraigados que estaban aquí desde hacía mucho tiempo y

que habían hecho negocios con parte del empresariado jalisciense entre otras cosas por su discreción. (…) O sea que no fue sino hasta el caso Camarena el que vino a destapar algo que este… tenía ya mucho tiempo aquí y que vamos a decir no causaba problemas policiales y luego bueno, a partir de ese momento pues… los cárteles, se habla de un cártel de Guadalajara

Juan José Doñán, Periodista
Zapopan, Jal.
3 de Octubre de 2015.

Q2-4

Fíjate, por ejemplo, este Rafael Caro Quintero. Rafael Caro Quintero, a él lo quería muchísimo la gente. Aquí en Guadalajara y en general… claro, los ricos no lo querían porque era un cabrón que hizo más lana que ellos en… un año, ¿no? en cinco años. Lo agarraron a los 30 años, creo, o menos… o sea, no fue una persona que hiciera una trayectoria de riqueza. Hizo dinero… y más dinero del que cualquiera haya hecho. Así… y de los de abolengo, más que ellos… o sea, él fue el primero que le dijo al Gobierno 'yo pago la deuda externa'. Miles y miles de millones y en efectivo, ¿no? O sea, eso es… único… eso es algo que llama la atención. Pero me refiero más que nada… sí, el cuate ha de haber sido matón y ha de haber sido drogadicto, lo que haya sido… alcohólico, no sé, este… mujeriego, podemos verle mil defectos al canijo, pero… algo que sí te digo es… que su línea de trabajo, en donde cultivaban, por ejemplo, le pagaban muy bien a los que cultivaban, a los que tenían… llegaba él y les decía 'pues yo les voy a pagar en tanto y cultívenme esto' y la gente emocionada, activaba la economía de la pobre gente en un pueblo, ¿no? Y todo el pueblo trabajaba en eso… este, aquí, pues llegar con tanta lana y abrir.. agencias de carros, porque él abrió muchas agencias de carros, él… este… hoteles, o sea, hizo muchos negocios, negocios… este… pues legales, ¿no? en aquél tiempo no existía el lavado de dinero, entonces, él agarraba y traía la franquicia que quería o la marca que quería y lo hacía… sí, pues a través de prestanombres, tal vez o como sea… para qué, pues para él siempre estar detrás del poder, ¿no? La forma de él es la forma de muchos, muchos, muchos narcotraficantes, no están mal con la gente, son pocos los que están mal con la gente.

Lorenzo Mendoza, Sector Servicio
Zapopan, Jal.
13 de Septiembre de 2015

Q2-5

*Este… **[silencio]** desde el tiempo de… de Fox… que… como que dejaron los cabos sueltos… este… pues empezaron… antes era gente pensante la que estaba acá… o sea, por definir… un narco… el jefe… no digamos la cabeza, ¿no? de los de aquí… eran gente… pensante que te decía 'oye, no te metas con la sociedad… no vayas en contra de ellos' y tenían controlados a sus sicarios. Pero a la hora que empiezan a agarrar a los mandos medios… el que subía era el sicario y el sicario no pensaba en eso. Entonces empieza a haber robos de autos a mano armada… eh… empieza a haber secuestros… y estos cuates lo que querían era dinero rápido… y se estaban metiendo con la sociedad…*

Baltazar Rodríguez, Periodista
Zapopan, Jal.
15 de Octubre de 2015

Q2-6

Había mucho respeto, este… mi mamá [se ríe] hasta me acuerdo que me contaba que iba a clases de cocina y…le tocaba que ahí estaba la mamá de… de este señor y…este, y era su compañera. Había restaurantes por ejemplo que… 'oiga, usted no puede entrar aquí' y 'ya, ok', y se iban. Hoy le dices eso a alguien y te… ¡acaban con el lugar! O sea, había como un respeto más…en la sociedad. Creo que ha cambiado el crimen, creo que también se ha integrado en la sociedad, ha habido otras… se han mezclado muy bien… este, por ejemplo, ya… los hijos de los malos se han casado con las hijas de los buenos, o las hijas de los malos…

Raymundo Chávez, Sector Agro-industrial
Zapopan, Jal.
29 de Agosto de 2015

Q2-7

Mira, preocupación, preocupación, ¡no! preocupado el que lo esté haciendo… porque… mira, nosotros en los 80… en el… en el… en el gran… en el primer… cómo le llamaban… cómo se… se me fue la palabra… este… cuando… en el 84, 85 que fue… igual que el 94… ***[TM:*** *La crisis …**]** ¡la crisis económica! La crisis económica del 84-85… ¡no la sentimos en Jalisco!, la inversión de estos grupos* ***[risa discreta]*** *¡era impresionante! Pero no mataban a nadie… no pasaba nada… aquí estaban… hacían casas gigantes, hacían todo… invertían, ponían… ponían empresas, bodegas, todo… porque aparte, el dinero lo empezaron a usar para hacer cosas. Este… pero no mataban a nadie, entonces, pues todos estábamos… sabíamos. Este.. eran otro tipo de grupos. Luego… hoy… hoy sí… hoy han… son otros grupos, hacen lo mismo pero ahora ya… antes lo hacían como ellos mismos, ¿no? ellos mismos lo hacían, trabajaban y… hoy, como que se lo encargan a alguien. Si ese alguien se equivoca, ¡lo matan! Se ha visto. 'Oye, por qué, cómo o qué', '¡no! pues es que él le manejaba, parece que invirtió mal o…', 'ah, lo invertiste…' ¡aparte, se enojan!* ***[risa]***

Ernesto González, Sector Industrial
Zapopan, Jal.
16 de Octubre de 2015.

Q2-8

…el tema de seguridad para mí es lo principal, en cuestión de lo… de lo de mi hijo. Es… eh… nace… a raíz del asesinato de mi hijo, que sucedió en 2008… aquí en una cancha de futbol, después de ira jugar futbol con un equipo de ex alumnos del [menciona una universidad privada muy coocida], este… asesinan a mi hijo y… como todo, cuando es gente de la delincuencia organizada, te enrarecen el… ¡todo, todo!, el lugar, el tema… dejaron al otro día unas armas, intentaron… eh… eh… accionaron un explosivo que no detonó… entonces, eh… ahí empieza una situación de que las

autoridades están coludidas, para que no se resuelvan los asuntos, para que la gente diga 'ah, mira, es un ajuste de cuentas, y ya', con eso ya le dan carpetazo y tema olvidado.

Rafael Magaña, Sector inmobiliario
Zapopan, Jal.
23 de Enero de 2017

Q2-9

*Entonces, un Buchón es alguien que se viste así, con su cinto Louis Vuitton, sus zapatos…este… Louis Vuitton, su camisa Dolce & Gabbana, este… pero ¡demasiado marcado! O sea, se nota, traen su mariconera, traen…este, obviamente gente que los está cuidando, eh… y las mujeres que están rodeadas, o las mujeres que están…as mujeres alrededor de él, son demasiado exóticas, o sea, ni las del table (teibol), o sea, súper chichis, súper nalga, súper labios…este… operadísimas, ¡corrientes!, o sea, se ven… bueno, a mi percepción… […] es llaman buchonas… sí sabes por qué, ¿no? [**TM:** No] El Buchanan's, el wiskey, no le pueden… no le dicen Buchanan's [exagera la pronunciación en inglés], le dicen Buchanans [exagera la pronunciación de la 'Ch'][risas] entonces, '¿me da un Buchanans?' 'Buchanans'…piden…y se les empezó a decir Buchones, a ellos y a ellas.*

Raymundo Chávez, Sector Agro-Industrial
Zapopan, Jal.
29 de Agosto de 2015

Quotations evoked in Chapter 3

Q3-1

… y veíamos que el tema de seguridad ya venía rojo, caliente, fuerte. Y cuando entramos nosotros inclusive, se nos calentó más. Entonces, era importante de que el Secretario de Gobierno se metiera de lleno a estas reformas y crear un ente que se dedicara exclusivamente a la Seguridad… y contratamos aquí un despacho de México, creo que acertamos también, fue una asesoría… cara, pero el diseño institucional fue asertivo [¿acertado?] al 100%. Porque cuando, y yo creo que fue al segundo año, que fue justamente también… cuando empezamos a ver que estaban tocando a empresarios importantes […] Entonces, en estas reformas creamos un ente antisecuestros ejemplar y extraordinario.

Alberto Cárdenas Jiménez
Ex Gobernador de Jalisco, 1995-2001
Ciudad de México, 22 de abril de 2018

Q3-2

Entonces, ellos [el Secretario y el Procurador] chocaron… desde los primeros momentos chocaron y… a veces en los dispositivos que eran de fuero común las… las

fricciones que tenían era 'No te metas, cabrón'… y era… llamarles yo la atención… a mi Secretario de Gobierno… 'oye, cabrón, que no se meta es… procuración de justicia lo que está haciendo el procurador, o sea… no te pidió el apoyo', entonces, pues yo veía al Secretario que estaba muy pegado con su militar y el… el procurador, pues aguantando vara, (…), [hasta que]… le dimos una buena salida (…).

Alberto Cárdenas Jiménez
Ex Gobernador de Jalisco, 1995-2001
Ciudad de México, 22 de abril de 2018

Q3-3

Yo a nivel federal he visto que los números dos (…). Yo creo que cuando son pre-presidenciables, los números dos… no son buenos, no es bueno que los números dos… este, sobre todo si no han respondido… en lo más importante. Yo cuando tenía este dos, que yo lo veía como sucesor, ¡pues hombre! sí, ciertamente el que está a la cabeza… el uno, tiene que ir visualizando, casi desde el principio, cuántos caballos traes para… cuántos caballos pueden arrancar ¿no?.

Alberto Cárdenas Jiménez
Ex Gobernador de Jalisco, 1995-2001
Ciudad de México, 22 de abril de 2018

Q3-4

(…) entonces empiezas a atar un poco de cabos y al final… […], yo agarro el teléfono y le digo al Secretario, 'ahorita se va, se va'. Me hablan del Ejército también, 'no se atreva a moverlo, no lo mueva, no lo mueva', 'Se va… es mi estructura, yo mando aquí y se va'. 'Mire que esto' 'Se va'… tarde, noche, quería una audiencia en la casa de Jalisco… varios, este, el tipo era fuerte…, al día siguiente… cuando… eh… me doy cuenta de que…. no sé quien les había dicho que estaba yo ahí en la Cámara de Comercio, se van para allá 800 elementos de seguridad y entran a la Cámara, había un evento no sé de qué, llegan tomando… rompen puertas, vidrios y se mete la policía … ¡iban por mí! Y… se dan cuenta que no estoy ahí, que estaba yo en Palacio y… de ahí se van… todo un contingente con decenas de patrullas… con policías gritando que no destituyera al capitán…. Y llegan a Palacio, llegan a Palacio ahí y este, se cierran puertas, y dentro del mismo Palacio… alguien les abre… alguien les abre, nadie puede pararlos, se van a mi oficina y sí… ahí pensé que me iban a tronar. Y fue cuando le hablo al Presidente Zedillo, le digo 'Presidente, está pasando esto… por estos motivos y creo que el único que puede parar esto es el… ¡el suegro!'. Y de esta forma es como… pasaron varios minutos… que son eternos, ¿no? y de repente ya se van… los elementos ¿no? y así fue como… una decisión de que ya no más, ya no más, te la juegas con quien ya no tienes confianza, con todas las consecuencias que esto hubiera tenido ¿no?

Alberto Cárdenas Jiménez
Ex Gobernador de Jalisco, 1995-2001
Ciudad de México, 22 de abril de 2018

Q3-5

(…) ha habido gobiernos mucho más abiertos a tener una relación propositiva, constructiva, de trabajo en equipo, entre gobierno y empresarios, gobierno y sociedad, este…yo por ejemplo, Alberto Cárdenas (…) fue muy abierto a eso, y los propios empresarios hoy dicen 'sí, sí, con Alberto nos puso en la mesa…se crearon organismos mixtos, en donde estábamos subidos Gobierno del Estado y empresarios' (…) el Consejo Estatal de Promoción Económica, el Sistema Estatal de Información Jalisco, el Consejo Estatal de Ciencia y Tecnología, este… etcétera, el Instituto Jalisciense de Tecnologías de la Información y en todos esos organismos, estaba el sector empresarial, estaba… en la mesa, y muchos de estos organismos los presidía, los preside el sector empresarial.

Alberto Cárdenas Jiménez
Ex Gobernador de Jalisco, 1995-2001
Ciudad de México, 22 de abril de 2018

Q3-6

(…) recuerdo que pedimos la intervención [de los empresarios]… que estuvieran ahí las mesas de escucha y de ver cómo se iba a forjar todo esto, al sector privado. Y… y recuerdo que… nombraron ellos a una cabeza… de todo el sector privado. Y… y este… desde las facultades que le dimos al consejo, al consejo de seguridad, le dimos facultades de meterse a revisar todas las estadísticas y llegamos a un acuerdo: De aquí en adelante el gobierno no va a decir las cifras, ustedes lo van a…y va a ser la voz del sector privado, quien va a decir, bajaron o subieron los delitos', ¿no? Entonces, inclusive se les decía, 'va a tener gran peso, si tu sector privado, dices que en la Procuraduría o en la Secretaría hay un mal elemento, si el que está cuidando a los reos, si el manejo de las cárceles se está perverso, quitamos, si tú me dices que está mal ahí, con evidencias, cambiamos. O sea, puedes destituir tú, a funcionarios estén fallando en esta tarea'. Entonces esto generó una gran inercia, y yo como gobernador dejé de hablar de seguridad. Eran ellos cada mes en su rueda de prensa, empezaron a decir 'se creó, costó, se vale citar el armamento nuevo, los chalecos antibalas, la ropa, las patrullas se van a concursar...'

T.M.: ¿Por qué pasar la, digamos la voz, sería del tema al sector empresarial y no tomarla tal cuál, un poco… qué ganaban ahí?

E: Pues primero, era el que la gente no… no se fuera con las palabras oficiales, que nos tenían una confianza muy grande, sin embargo, para un tema tan complicado, ¡vigílame tú ciudadano!, cuida tú, tú vas a revisar, ya nos pusimos de acuerdo en qué queremos, en qué tipo de Secretaría queremos, ya nos pusimos de acuerdo cuánto vamos a invertirle de presupuesto, lo que nunca en la historia… de Seguridad Pública, le metimos… le quitamos a otras áreas y le metimos ahí"

Alberto Cárdenas Jiménez
Ex Gobernador de Jalisco, 1995-2001
Ciudad de México, 22 de abril de 2018

Q3-7

Lo que provocó esa mención fue que, en esos años, Colombia estaba pasando por una etapa muy dura de inseguridad… allá sí provocada por el Narcotráfico y por los cárteles de la droga, allá en Colombia y una de las alternativas que los ciudadanos en Colombia tomaron fue la creación de autodefensas, y… famosos grupos paramilitares y que en un principio se pensó que iban a ayudar mucho en el tema de seguridad y lo complicaron más… porque entonces ya había tres poderes.. eh… en la lucha, en la disputa, por el orden y la gobernabilidad, que eran… el Gobierno de Colombia, los Narcotraficantes y los Cárteles y… y los Grupos de Autodefensas o paramilitares, y por eso se mencionó ahí… como diciendo 'no queremos que esto vaya a pasar aquí'. Curiosamente, 20 años después, prácticamente, suc.. o más, 25 años después… aquí en México sí se da el tema de los autodefensas en ciertos estados del país, en donde se ve… que en esos estados… no le daban oportunidad a la participación ciudadana, entonces los ciudadanos dijeron 'ok, no me dejas participar, pues voy a formar mi grupo de autodefensas', como Michoacán, Guerrero… esos estados, y pues … han sido un problema hasta la fecha, ¿verdad? esos grupos de autodefensa.

Máximo Ballesteros, Empresa de Seguridad Privada
Zapopan, Jal.
January 19th, 2017

Q3-8

Es, hacemos un reporte, dependiendo cada cuánto de las cifras el Sistema Nacional de Seguridad, generalmente hay cada mes, pero lo hacemos cada dos meses, o cada tres meses, dependiendo la variación que haya en los delitos, y lo mencionamos abiertamente en el… en el Consejo, con los presidentes de las cámaras, se les presentan las cifras, en qué lugar está Jalisco, en ciertos delitos, lo que está preocupante. Y a la par tenemos… hemos tenido reuniones con Policía Federal, con las instancias de seguridad, con la Marina, para… que ellos también nos muestren, pues lo que traen ellos, lo que están trabajando, las iniciativas y los resultados. En este… en estas reuniones que se hacen con ellos, la intención también es que los mismos industriales, los presidentes de las cámaras, les hagan llegar 'oye, ¿sabes qué?, pues yo, mi sector está fuerte en tal zona, y nosotros vemos tal delito', que a veces pus no está en las cifras, porque pus no hay… no hay denuncia. Y entonces, eso también es retroalimentación para ellos. En estas reuniones puede estar, desde el delegado de Policía Federal, con los comisarios o comandantes de las distintas regiones, para que ellos mismos den respuesta ahí, o den seguimiento a algún tema en especial, para cada uno de los sectores.

Jerónimo Cervantes, Sector Industrial
Zapopan, Jal.
Octubre 28, 2015

Q3-9

Un tiempo decían que en el tiempo de Bebeto… el famoso Bebeto Cárdenas, eh… habían mandado a entrenar a las cabecillas de la Policía de Guadalajara, a Israel y a Francia, que habían seguido cursos de… de formación y que la policía de aquí era

mejor que en las otras partes de México, no sé si será cierto o si era nomás una cosa publicitaria del gobierno de Cárdenas. ¡Puede que sí! No sé.

Leonel Novak, Sector Financiero
Guadalajara Jal.
Agosto 26, 2015

Q3-10

Estoy hablando de hace veintitantos años… llegaron a… llegó conciencia del sector gobierno de que tenían que estar muy bien pagados, o mejor pagados… y llegaron a tener conciencia de que tenían que tener gente con estudios, que no tenían antes. Y tenías que tener… y era una conciencia que tenían que hacer una revisión del… polígrafo y una serie de cosas que antes no se hacía tampoco, ¿ok? Entonces, estoy hablando de esa comparación de hace veintitantos años… que empezamos a hacer esto… a lo que tenemos ahora… y duró mucho tiempo para llegar a esas conclusiones que son… de párvulos… o son… muy sencillas de entender

Héctor L. Orta, Sector Industrial
Zapopan, Jal.
Enero 18, 2017

Q3-11

Es que la extorsión, la extorsión… no te la cobra otra persona más que el Federal de Caminos. No existe la maña que dice 'ah, por pasar por aquí te cobro…' […] Y, y hay muchos factores de riesgo en México, muchos, entonces...cuando hablaba del tema del narco… yo creo que el tema del narco como tal no es… no es… un riesgo tan alto… el riesgo es…, o sea, yo creo que más… más depredador es… el que le da el poder al narco… de opera.

Lorenzo Mendoza, Sector Servicio
Zapopan, Jal.
Septiembre 13, 2015

Q3-12

Contra el tema de seguridad se pueden hacer muchas cosas… nomás que… las autoridades no están rebasadas, están coludidas. En el… en los diferentes ámbitos de gobierno. Entonces, ahí… te mandan ese mensaje que 'no… no se puede hacer nada, pa' qué te metes'.

Rafael Magaña, Sector de la construcción y activista
Guadalajara, Jal.
Enero 23, 2017

Q3-13

¡Por la desconfianza! Por la desconfianza, y la desatención del Gobierno, porque había dos aspectos, uno: que no había confianza en algunos funcionarios, porque se creía que estaban corrompidos y que estaban relacionados con lo que estaba pasando y por el otro lado, también, no había atención por parte del Gobierno, o sea, a la… a ese tipo de organizaciones, no… no les hacían caso, no… los tomaban en cuenta, entonces la sociedad dijo 'ah, entonces, yo me organizo, ¡yo me encargo!'

Máximo Ballesteros, Empresa de Seguridad Privada
Zapopan, Jal.
Enero 19, 2017

Q3-14

T.M.: En el caso de su secuestro ¿hubo una resolución de… hubo gente sentenciada, procesada?

E: No. No supe. Y el que era Procurador entonces me dijo 'ni averigües ya te liberaron, ya se pagó el rescate, no averigües' 'oye pero…' 'no te preocupes', [el Procurador] resultó que era amigo mío, todavía es mi amigo. Me dice 'no te preocupes', 'tú haz tu vida con normalidad' y pues eso hice".

Juan Zenón, Sector Industrial
Zapopan, Jal.
Agosto 27, 2015

Q3-15

[E3: platícale del subprocurador] Sí, fuimos…fuimos con el… volviendo…volviendo al gobierno aliado o no aliado, o apoyo o no apoyo, fuimos con el subprocurador, 'oye, pues nos pasó esto' y dijo 'ah, ¿quieren que los agarremos?, sí, cómo no… fulano es… este, podemos ir por ellos si quieren, nomás que…¿ustedes tienen seguro?' 'sí, sí tenemos seguro', 'ah, mejor cóbrenlo, es mejor, porque sabe qué, nosotros vamos y agarremos y metemos a cuatro monos a la cárcel, ¿verdad? pero pues no son cuatro, son más y luego ellos pueden ir a buscarlos después a su negocio. [I3: tú ya cobraste] 'tú ya cobraste el seguro'. El subprocurador nos lo planteó de esa forma, ¿verdad? [I3: El subprocurador] 'pero ¿qué? Entonces ustedes díganme ¿vamos? Ahorita vamos por ellos. ¡Una, dos, tres!' Así… 'No pues…' [risas] ya mejor nos fuimos.

Antonio Alcántara, Sector Comercio
Zapopan, Jal.
Septiembre 9, 2015

Q3-16

Mi padre es la cara social de la compañía, y él tiene contactos en todos los niveles, políticos, empresariales…de todo tipo… locales y…regionales y lo que sea…y no… [E3: A nivel amistad] es lo mismo, si…cuando hemos tenido algún evento, por ejemplo, robo de mercancías, luego, luego mi papá…'oye, ¿qué onda? ¿me acerco a fulano? ¿quieres que le diga? ¿quieres que…?', después terminamos por decir 'pues no, ya fuimos al seguro, pues ya… ya resolvimos, no hay necesidad de contactarlos' y siempre

con el miedo de que si los contactamos y pedimos un favor, vamos a quedar siempre… [E2: expuestos] expuestos y en deuda. ¡Debes un favor!

Antonio Alcántara, Sector Comercio
Zapopan, Jal.
Septiembre 9, 2015

Q3-17

Pues a veces hay una desconfianza ante la autoridad, decir 'oye, pues si la persona que yo le puedo denunciar también anda… a lo mejor es amigo o es compadre o anda con éste… ¿qué me gano? nomás me puse otra vez de frente y… no logré nada', eso nos ha pasado mucho, por ejemplo, los que tenemos propiedades rústicas de repente ocurre que…que se meten a sembrar mariguana al rancho. Entonces, uno se pone en un dilema serio 'oye, ¿lo denuncio?… este, ¿me la juego?', yo o mis gentes, puede ser el arriero, el encargado que anda ahí, este… '¿y si no le hacen nada?', o sea, si por aquí entra y por acá sale, ya nada más me puse en una posición muy… complicada

Jesús Salas, Sector Agroindustrial
Zapopan, Jal.
Octubre 8, 2015

Q3-18

Yo creo que… primero estar enterados de qué hacer, otro es… poder tener un contacto… decir 'oye, le hablo a mi presidente de mi cámara, el presidente de cámara puede hablar con el… el del Consejo de Cámaras y el Consejo de Cámaras puede hablar con el Fiscal, ¿no? tener un contacto directo… para tener una respuesta

José Julio Huerta, Sector Industrial
Zapopan, Jal., Octubre 17, 2015

Q3-19

Mira, hablando de seguridad, ahí va el Fiscal General del Estado [risas] ¡Míralo! ¡Cuánta seguridad trae! [silencio] [risa] ¡hablando de seguridad! Hoy fue el tema aquí, el invitado especial fue… el Fiscal General…no importa cuántos guardias trae… vino a hablar con nosotros

Alfonso Magadán, Sector Industrial
Zapopan, Jal.
Septiembre 23, 2015

Q3-20

Por ejemplo, con la Quinta Región Militar hay una buena relación, el anterior comandante tenía una relación muy… muy directa con el empresariado, el actual también [TM: mj]. Lo acaban de cambiar hace menos de un año, lleva un año más o menos. También ha habido una relación permanente. Cualquier problemática, todas

las autoridades federales, tanto Policía Federal, Marina, Ejército… están a la disposición.

Jerónimo Cervantes, Sector Industrial
Zapopan, Jal.
Octubre 28, 2015

Q3-21

Por ejemplo, tuvimos un caso donde se hizo una petición, de mayor vigilancia al Municipio de Guadalajara en una zona determinada … me contactaron directo con el comandante, con el de la zona, su teléfono celular para cualquier otro hecho, que se le hablara directo a él, pero en la siguiente reunión, sí tenía pensado, sí hubo una mejoría, sí hubo seguimiento puntual del tema. En la siguiente reunión tenía pensado pus, agradecer… el tema, el apoyo, y no fue necesario agradecerlo, porque me ¡pus ganaron la jugada! Ellos mismos, primero me preguntaron '¿qué pasó?¿siguió el tema?, eh ¿actuamos bien?, ¿hace falta?'

Jerónimo Cervantes, Sector Industrial
Zapopan, Jal.
Octubre 28, 2015

Q3-22

Es el tema… yo creo que el tema de la impunidad va… obviamente la seguridad va… va en comparsa con la impunidad. Por decirte algo, dice… temas específicos, dos veces, dos empresarios les dijeron [baja la voz] 'a ver güey,, no se hagan pendejos, llevábamos cuatro semanas… en temas de secuestro de camionetas… robo de camionetas, el secuestro de varias camionetas…un secuestro de un familiar de uno… güey, cuatro semanas en la Procuraduría y no nos resolvían nada… y luego nos mandan a la Policía Estatal y nada, y luego nos hablan y se encabronan porque le hablamos a la Marina y nos lo resuelven en dos días. O sea, güey, esa es la corrupción dentro de ustedes… es que no están haciendo nada, es que están…' y así, se lo dijeron… 'son una bola de corruptos, son…', güey, no es posible que no haya manera…

Alfonso Magadán, Sector Industrial
Zapopan, Jal.
Septiembre 23, 2015

Quotations evoked in Chapter 4

Q4-1

Lo curioso fue que en esos picos que hubo de… 85… y luego noventa y tantos, la manera, al menos que en Jalisco se… se… atendió el tema de seguridad privada, fue que una parte de la seguridad del gobierno, que se llamaba Policía Auxiliar, pasó a ser manejada por particulares y es donde nacen las famosas Policías Auxiliares, bancaria, industrial… que eran, eran órganos… o sea, organizaciones o instituciones de Gobierno, pero que se las daban a particulares para que las manejaran, y operaban

como seguridad privada, pero en realidad eran de Gobierno, ¿verdad? y eso fue.. en la época… en los 80s y principio de los 90s… (…) empezó a haber más delitos patrimoniales y empezó a reforzarse ese esquema. Pero… una vez que se dieron cuenta que con ese esquema ya no alcanzaban a resolver los problemas, empezaron a formarse cada vez más empresas privadas de seguridad, con personal privado, civil, ¿verdad? no… no elementos del Gobierno

Máximo Ballesteros, Empresa de Seguridad Privada
Zapopan Jal.
Enero 19, 2017

Q4-2

Y se están poniendo candados de seguridad de todo tipo, desde policías internos… de hecho nos están… la Marina está utilizando personas para que tus recursos humanos sean policía interna… no te… porque ya se te están metiendo ladrones. La gente que te secuestra… son… tus propios… está bien estudiado que el 90% de los secuestros son por una persona que está dentro de ti… y ese tema de seguridad es, yo creo, lo que más se preocupa.

Alfonso Magadán, Sector Industrial
Zapopan, Jal.
Septiembre 23, 2015

Q4-3

O sea, y lo puedes ver en la calle. Tú ve a una plaza, Andares, en la tarde, y vas a ver la cantidad de escoltas que hay afuera de los restaurantes. La mayoría del empresario ya carga… o un chofer, o un escolta, o… un carro escolta. O sea, ya el empresario sí está manejando seguridad propia. Pero ya… vamos a otro tema, ya estás hablando de secuestros… eehh, asaltos… cuando salen de sus instalaciones, ya es otro tipo de ramo en la seguridad.

Rosa María Cortés, Empresa de Seguridad Privada
Guadalajara, Jal.
Agosto 28, 2015

Q4-4

La mayoría de la gente que tiene escoltas no están contratados por una seguridad privada, están comisionados por el Estado. Porque tienen relaciones y entonces yo le digo… al fiscal 'oye, ¿sabes qué? Pues comisióname 4 escoltas' entonces, los mandan de la policía, no sé si los pagan o no, no sé si son favores… pero…este… son comisionados.

Rosa María Cortés, Empresa de Seguridad Privada
Guadalajara, Jal.
Agosto 28, 2015

Q4-5

Llegamos un poco… por casualidad al tema porque lo que estábamos revisando era el trabajo de la fiscalía (…) Haciendo una revisión sobre la carga de trabajo y el número de personas que están contratadas con dinero público para atender estas tareas, nos dimos cuenta que había una sobrecarga de trabajo, pero no necesariamente una falta de personal. (…) O sea…que había gente contratada pero que no se estaba atendiendo las denuncias. (…) Pues, lo que nos dábamos cuenta es que había una asignación discrecional de los elementos de seguridad para la protección tanto de funcionarios públicos como de algunos sectores privados, donde había o donde hay empresarios, hay unos líderes sindicales, líderes religiosos, que cuentan con custodia personalizada.

Augusto Valencia López, Diputado Local, MC (2015-2018)
Via Skype
Marzo 1, 2018

Q4-6

Yo te puedo decir, y más tarde te puedo precisar los datos, de…en el Municipio de Guadalajara, cuántos policías estaban comisionados como guardaespaldas, como garantes de la seguridad… aquí tienen un término muy despectivo, que no me gusta utilizar, de guaruras, que les llaman, no… no es… guardaespaldas, digamos, o vigilantes… comisionados. Eran cientos… de policías, con… empresarios… de diverso orden, con… algunos medios de comunicación o con alguna gente con alguna posición relevante… en el ámbito deportivo o en el ámbito que lo hacían una figura pública destacada.

Enrique Ibarra, Secretario de Gobierno del Municipio de Guadalajara,(MC)
Guadalajara, Jal.
Enero 20, 2017

Q4-7

Porque dentro del intercambio de favores que se dan entre políticos y empresarios, pues está el tema de seguridad. Por ejemplo, yo siempre he sido muy crítico… tanto cuando fui alcalde como cuando fui jefe de la policía de Guadalajara, durante tres años, de lo que… es el peculado de… utilizar a policías como escoltas personales. ¡Eso es una atrocidad! Eh… eh… cuando llegué yo a jefe de la policía lo primero que hice fue quitarle los escoltas a una serie de… de empresarios que los habían recibido como favor de la administración anterior. Y eso se sigue dando, se sigue dando… este… eh… cantidad de empresarios traen escoltas que son policías en activo de la Secretaría de Seguridad del Estado de Jalisco, llamada ahora Fiscalía General o de Gobiernos Municipales.

MacedonioTamez, Diputado Federal (MC)
Ciudad de México
Febrero 23, 2017

Q4-8

Eh… son situaciones de hecho, no siempre se documenta. Yo investigué y…vi rara…raramente vi Oficios de Comisión para cuidar empresarios. Es más, no me acuerdo haber visto ninguno. Son situaciones de hecho. Al policía se le da la orden '¡cuida este lugar! ¡cuida esta casa! ¡cuida a esta persona!' y se le da un oficio en donde se le autoriza a vestir de civil y a portar armas, pero no para qué.

MacedonioTamez, Diputado Federal (MC)
Ciudad de México
Febrero 23, 2017

Q4-9

La manera en la que se selecciona al titular de la fiscalía, en el estado de Jalisco, advierte que el gobernador hace una propuesta al poder legislativo para que sean los diputados quienes lo rectifiquen. Y se ha generado, esta lógica de validación del titular con relación a los grupos de interés que tiene. [TM: Ok.] Entonces quienes han llegado al cargo de fiscal, pues tienen ciertas relaciones o acuerdos que participan dentro de la arena de lo político. Y bueno en lo político pues hay actores vinculados a los sectores productivos y una de las hipótesis es que… pues hay empresarios que validan el nombramiento a través de estos instrumentos, siempre y cuando tengan pues… eh… en retorno, un beneficio de protección.

Augusto Valencia López, Diputado Local, MC (2015-2018)
Via Skype
Marzo 1, 2018

Q4-10

Sí, digo…eh… en… en Jalisco, como… en otras ciudades que son de este tamaño, con esta problemática, pues se ven muchísimos escoltas, y carros blindados, escoltas… que cada vez es más complicado, porque hoy llegan a secuestrar a alguien seis carros, armas de alto poder, armas que vienen… que hasta surtidas por gobiernos de otros países. Y… y… este… ¿qué haces con eso? O sea, ¿qué necesitas? Otras 10 camionetas, tú… con otros veinte escoltas. ¡No vamos a acabar! No nos va a ajustar el dinero.

Ernesto González, Sector Industrial
Guadalajara, Jal.,
Octubre 16, 2015

Q4-11

Pues yo te diría que se está convirtiendo en un asunto aspiracional porque genera estatus ¿no? O sea, quien se siente escoltado probablemente también pretenda exponerse como una persona de mayor relevancia (…) Ahí tienen a sus esclavos porque luego los escoltas terminan cargando las bolsas o sirven de niñeras.

Augusto Valencia López, Diputado Local, MC (2015-2018)
Via Skype,
Marzo 1, 2018

Q4-12

Ha cambiado mucho. O sea, ha cambiado demasiado. Tanto que… la demanda de mi empresa hace 10 años no es la de ahorita. Ya es un… un 'debes de', o sea, cualquier empresa debe contratar seguridad, ¡punto! Aunque no quiera, ya es un requisito. Ehhh, creo que también la situación que está pasando el estado tiene mucho que ver… que es lo que te digo, hace dos, tres años, con todo esto que ha habido de los narcobloqueos, de los atentados, de… el boom de los escoltas creció, creció. El boom de los circuitos cerrados y las cámaras también creció y eso no lo tuvimos que investigar en un estudio de mercado. Eso te lo da el cliente. ¿Qué pasó también? Después hubo como un tiempo donde el cliente quería sustituir todo el trabajo humano con la tecnología. Entonces empezó toda la contratación de cámaras, alarmas y en vez de cinco guardias tenían 20 cámaras y un guardia. Eso también fue una racha.

Rosa María Cortés, Empresa de Seguridad Privada
Guadalajara, Jal.
Agosto 28, 2015

Q4-13

Primero se inició una empresa de asesoría-consultoría en materia de prevención y seguridad… empresarial, familiar y luego, derivado de eso mismo, los mismos clientes me decían 'si me estás recomendando que tenga cámaras, que tenga alarmas, que tenga gps, que esto… pues, yo confío en ti y tú, tú…¡encárgate de eso!' 'No, yo no veo ese rubro' 'No, no, no… encárgate, encárgate' y entonces dije 'vamos a ampliarnos y a poner empresas relacionadas con eso'.

Máximo Ballesteros, Empresa de Seguridad Privada
Zapopan Jal.
Octubre 16, 2015

Q4-14

Ya la seguridad se ha vuelto un sistema integral, o sea, ya el cliente cuando vienen ya no nada más me pide el guardia… que vigila… si ya es la empresa con la que se siente a gusto entonces va a querer que tú le des los demás servicios, que viene siendo cámaras, alarmas, un análisis de riesgos… o sea… integral.

Rosa María Cortés, Empresa de Seguridad Privada
Guadalajara, Jal.
Agosto 28, 2015

Q4-15

Yo de chico siempre, siempre tenía más la imagen de mi tío, que de mi papá, porque mi tío… ese sí me permitía hacer más cosas que él ¿no? Mira, en principio este… el arma de mi padre no la tocaba por porque él no quería… cuestiones de seguridad que tu gustes y mandes y todo este.. pero mi tío no, mi tío desde los 5 años llegaba y me decía 'tómala, guárdala' y ahí vas la sacudía.

Francisco Herrera, Negociador de secuestros
Ciudad de México
Febrero 1, 2017

Q4-16

De manera informal, a mi lo que me han contado, por ejemplo, el sector de los blindadores, es que a ellos les preocupa mucho que los obliguen a usar uniformes, que los identifique como personal de seguridad privada, en ciertas zonas, donde existe mayor presencia de grupos delictivos, delincuencia organizada. ¿Por qué? Porque si ellos tienen un logotipo que dice 'Blindajes X', los… los identifican los grupos delictivos, y saben que tienen el conocimiento necesario para la realización de blindajes. Y su gente no quiere ser identificada porque… temen que sean levantados por estos grupos y que los obliguen a blindar vehículos de la delincuencia organizada. Entonces, eh… creo que va más encaminado al tipo de conocimiento que pueden tener que hacia la prestación del servicio.

José Manuel Sánchez, Servidor Público Federal adscrito a
la Dirección General de Seguridad Privada,
Comisión Nacional de Seguridad,
Ciudad de México
Febrero 22, 2017

Q4-17

El cobro de piso, afortunadamente, no es algo que se haya dado de forma ya descontrolada en… en Guadalajara. Digo, probablemente, pues a alguien le habrá tocado, pues sí. Pero no es algo que tú digas '¡híjole!', ya como en otra partes, ¿no? lo que sucedió es que hubo una temporada que hubo muchas llamadas de extorsión, pero no eran… o sea, eran llamadas para ver qué sacaban de dinero, probablemente de gente desde las cárceles, o… gente que no se iba a… que realmente no iba a llegar frente a tu negocio, sino que estaban viendo a ver quién caía, ¿no?

Manuel Gómez, Sector Servicios
Zapopan, Jal.
Octubre 15, 2015

Q4-18

Se puso muy feo por un tiempo. Mira, mi amigo… mi amigo este… [nombre del amigo], él… no recuerdo… 3, 6… 6 años atrás, yo creo, él… insistió muchísimo y lo denunció ante el gobierno y ante las cámaras y ante los medios escritos… de este cobro de piso y… [baja un poco la voz] le quemaron el negocio… ¡se lo quemaron! Ya luego todo se calmó…

Ernesto González, Sector Industrial
Guadalajara, Jal.
Octubre 16, 2015

Q4-19

Bueno, es que cuando se presentaba él [el Procurador del Estado] siempre comentábamos esto y él siempre nos aseguraba que… que no estaba dándose, entonces si alguien, alguno de los empresarios decía 'es que a mí me ha pasado en mi zapatería' o no sé dónde… 'a ver dime cuándo, no sé qué y ahorita… mañana mismo te mando a alguien y…', entonces él más bien siempre estaba… o sea, salía de nosotros el tema, pero él siempre estaba dispuesto a apoyar y a ayudar y a…

Josefa Domínguez, Sector Industrial
Guadalajara, Jal.
Octubre 14, 2015

Q4-20

Sí, sí, sí… por supuesto y teníamos un Fiscal extraordinario antes, y este… él estuvo muy al pendiente de eso y este… porque por supuesto que en el centro de la ciudad empezaron a querer pedir piso y así [truena los dedos] en un segundo lo frenaron y ¡se acabó! […] el Fiscal estuvo muy presente, el Fiscal anterior, estuvo muy presente, él iba mucho a las cámaras, se reunía mucho con todos nosotros, hizo una buena labor y siempre nos aseguraba… y nos decía 'Si les llegan a pedir piso, márquenme, ¡directamente!, porque no tiene que darse'. Nos ha protegido mucho.

Susana Piña, Sector Industrial
Zapopan, Jal.
Octubre 9, 2015

Q4-21

Pues se unifican, ahí sí hay mucha unión en cuanto a ese tipo de seguridad… este, sí actúan en grupos, pues, ¿no? entonces, si sucede algo dentro de ahí, no pues olvídate, o sea, también hay mucha gente muy influyente que a la hora… o media hora de que sucede algo, ya hay helicópteros ahí volando, ya hay patrullas […] tienen conectes de los dos lados, de los buenos y de los malos, digo, yo en lo personal he visto que tienen muchísimas influencias con el sector político y con el sector de… delincuentes, ¿no? Entonces, ¡pues si no lo arreglan de una manera, lo arreglan de la otra! ¿no? ¡Así de fácil!

Gilberto Fuentes, Sector Industrial
Tlajomulco, Jal.
Enero 16, 2017

Q4-22

Un constructor que yo contraté estaba… con dinero… yo creo que malo… a través de unos… entonces, yo le debía a él un dinero alguna vez y… y… y el constructor se fue y vino… y vino una mafia a cobrarme. Entonces, este… pues yo conseguí el dinero, les pagué y se fueron. Este… pero… pero fue un… un episodio no agradable, este… sí tuve… sí fui a [menciona la asociación empresarial] y expliqué mi caso: 'oye, está así… así y así', 'bueno, si te siguen hablando o algo… me…', pero, ahora sí que… me tocaron unos delincuentes muy… ¡muy buenos! [risa discreta] en cuanto les pagué… [TM: Ahí se acabó] ahí se acabó. Este… no… tuve una llamada un año después y mi teléfono dice 'no contestar', no contesté y no me han vuelto a llamar.

TM: O sea y ellos te dicen: 'nos quedamos con la deuda de… de este cuate, nosotros te vamos a cobrar la deuda'…?

E: Sí, 'oye, este… ahora me debes a mí', 'oye, espérate, yo no hice negocios contigo', '¡me vale gorro!', 'oye, le hablamos a este tipo…', le hablé: 'oye, ¿qué onda? Aquí hay unos cuates, yo no hice trato con ellos', 'no, pues yo no puedo hacer nada, tú diríjete con ellos'. Y aquí, dos matones… 'oye, pues dame las… escrituras de tu casa, oye que… tu coche, y el otro… el de tu mujer y no sé qué', y empezamos a negociar porque querían que les diera, haz de cuenta, un millón de pesos, y yo debía como… 300 o 400 mil […] Entonces, este… pues pagué, con cheque a nombre de… haz de cuenta…con lo que… yo contraté […] en [menciona la asociación empresarial] me dieron la seguridad de que… si había alguna cosa, hasta le hablaban a los militares para que me pusieran una patrulla aquí afuera una semana. O, que… los cazaran, o sea, que estuvieran viendo y les llegaran y les dijeran 'shtt, ¡con este no te metas!', como para decir 'bueno, síguele tu camino, con éste ¡no!', eso es lo que te da… contención, estando dentro de la Cámara y siendo gente que participa, ¿no?

Juan Galicia, Sector inmobiliario y construcción
Zapopan, Jal.
Septiembre 25, 2015

Quotations evoked in Chapter 5

Q5-1

¡No puedes evitarlo! O sea, no te lo puedo garantizar, pero tengo una firme…sospecha, de que algunos de nuestros clientes siembran mariguana o siembran… este… amapola, no sé, mariguana sí. Hubo una época, eh… que llegaban clientes así con… no sé, 50 mil, 100 mil dólares en efectivo, y ya… este… 'me voy a llevar esto y esto, y esto y esto y esto' y pagaban…este… aquí, y sí podías llevar dólares en efectivo al banco. Ahorita ya no se puede, ¡qué bueno!... este… y… pues tú les preguntabas 'oye, ¿qué siembras?', pregunto, ¿no? para dar una buena

recomendación, o… y ya… 'maíz', y ya, dices… 'ese producto no es para maíz, ese tampoco, este tampoco, este tampoco' […] Entonces, ahí… uno, te miente. Dos, como que no te quiere contestar y hablar mucho, y tres, te llega con pacas de dinero en billetes de 20… ¿qué haces? ¿le vendes o no le vendes? ¿Sabes o no sabes en qué lo va a usar? ¡No sé! ¡A lo mejor sí lo va a usar en maíz! [risas] pero mi… mis antenitas de… cómo del Chapulín Colorado… Mis antenitas de vinil dicen que… pues va para otra cosa lo que están comprando. Entonces, yo no puedo prohibirles… pero pues qué les hago, qué les digo, o sea, '¡No te atiendo!' y al rato…matan a mi gente. Aparte, yo… no me consta. Y pues, es lo mismo, o sea, si van a… un OXXO, si van a un restaurante, si van al Wall-Mart, van a…donde sea a comprar, tú no sabes si es buena o mala la persona, ellos están pagando, están comprando, o sea… si van a una tienda de ropa, allá y compran… a lo mejor si entran a un… Ferragamo o a un Hugo Boss, y de pronto se llevan 100 mil pesos, pues sí te quedas como… 'Y ¿usted qué hace?' '¡no preguntes!', pero sospechas, o sea, sí son… son obvios.

Raymundo Chávez, Sector Agroindustrial
Zapopan, Jal.
Agosto 29, 2015

Q5-2

¡Yo no tengo clientes mafiosos! Eh… yo, cuando empecé a trabajar, estuve en un taller que estuve en un taller que estoy seguro que les hacía… a los mafiosos. Y sí, se ve que fluye muchísimo más el dinero, pero el final nunca es feliz [risas] pues… no creo que sea gente confiable, honestamente. Y… no… no nos interesa, hay mucho más dinero en otro tipo de joyería que en darle gusto a un mafioso. Al menos no es el esquema que hemos querido seguir. Sí hemos tenido oportunidades. ¿Cómo hacemos para quitárnoslos de encima? Con mucho… ¡no les puedes cotizar caro porque obviamente su problema no es el dinero! [E: Exactamente] Entonces, tienes que… hacerle al loco, y dices 'no, yo no puedo hacer esto', yo estoy especializado justo en otras cosas que no les van a gustar, finas, de buen gusto, 'yo nada más sé hacer esto', 'no, es que eso es muy simple', 'bueno amigo, pues… ve a otro lugar donde sí hacen cosas… ¡nacas!', ¡no les dices así! Pero… y se van solos eh, a la hora que ven que no quieres… […] y todos los que vemos a los clientes pues tenemos ya mucho tacto para llevar ese tipo de… de gente. Y nos caen, y no podemos asegurar que son o no son… pero sí hay un estereotipo de personas, que están muy de modita ahorita, que a nosotros no nos interesan y a las otras joyerías, les encanta que les caigan esos clientes, porque justo caen en el esquema de… te pago en efectivo, etcétera, … a mí ni me sirve el efectivo […] 'oye, ¿te puedo pagar en dólares en efectivo?', '¡claro que no!', 'oye, ¿te puedo pagar en pesos en efectivo?', 'claro que sí, en compras de más de 32,000 pesos necesito copia de tu IFE y de un comprobante de domicilio', 'Oye, ¿por qué?', 'porque hay Ley Antilavado y… si no… no puedo hacerlo'. 'Ah no, es que si es así no te lo compro', 'Bye', entonces, yo no te dije que no, tú solito… entonces, por ese aspecto es complicado, pero… en el momento en el que te guste ganarte ese tipo de dinero…¡ya valió madres!

Alejandro González, Comercio
Guadalajara, Jal.
Agosto 28, 2015

Q5-3

Hay otros empresarios, yo te doy los nombres y ojalá no los vayas a entrevistar [risas] es… en que si tu los ves y traen un anillo de brillantes un poquito más chiquito que esto… de brillante aquí, y puras esclavas de oro, y un reloj de oro… dices… 'a ver, ¿eso que me está mostrando? ¿poder? ¿fuerza?' pero que no es… lo normal, entonces, no necesitan decirte nada. Si… si yo veo a un empresario, o que llega en una reunión en un Rolls Royce convertible, pues… yo digo 'está bien que venga en coche, no se va a venir a pie, pero aquí vino a presumirnos, que trae un Rolls Royce y que, quiere que lo veamos porque tiene mucho dinero, porque se siente muy importante', […] o, tu vas a un restaurant, vas con unos amigos y ves que… 'tráigame por favor el vino más caro', el vino más caro no quiere decir que sea el más bueno, eh… ¡hay muchos muy buenos y no son tan caros! Ah… pero… pero… ya…ya no necesito preguntar nada, es una muestra de que ese empresario tiene poder y tiene dinero, pero de que está… distorsionado [el sentido] de su poder y su dinero.

Héctor L. Orta, Sector Industrial

Zapopan, Jal.

Septiembre 3, 2015

Q5-4

De alguna manera… yo creo que… este tipo de capitales [mal habidos], no… no se… pues no son muy visibles, ¿no? no se… están ocultos, ¿no? entonces, el decir 'pues, quién recibe esos apoyos o quién los recibe… esos apoyos', pues yo creo que eso le toca a la autoridad […] ¿no? por ejemplo, yo ahora… eh… hace poco… aquí… te enteras muchas veces, por ejemplo, por las publicaciones que hace el gobierno americano, ¿no? 'que la DEA subrayó o señaló tantas empresas, ¿verdad? que se dedicaban al comercio, que se dedicaban a la industria, que se dedicaban a los servicios, que se dedicaban a la hotelería', ¿verdad? y dices 'bueno, pues mira', que a lo mejor no sabes, ¿no?, qué… qué pasa ahí. Pero sí… sí es un tema seguramente complejo, complicado y difícil de… de detectar, seguramente.

Carlos Solano, Sector Industrial
Zapopan, Jal.
Octubre 8, 2015

Q5-5

O sea, es difícil decir que un empresario conocido en Guadalajara esté llevando a cabo actividades ilícitas… muy difícil… todos los que han salido que… que lavado de dinero… ¡nadie los conoce! [E: No los conocen en realidad] Yo no los conozco.

José Gerardo Zapata, Sector Industrial
Zapopan, Jal.
Septiembre 1, 2015

Q5-6

Es como un tabú, fíjate. Nunca se ha abordado eso… y si sale a flote, la gente se queda calladita, no dice nada. Lo vemos en el periódico, sale la nota. Fulanita de la empresa y venía el dinero lavado y eso, pero uno callado [E: hace poquito, por ejemplo, salió un art, una cosa, una nota del FBI, que tomaba varias empresas…][Interrumpe] ¡Sí!, no se comentó ahí, ¡ni una palabra! No se comenta, fíjate qué curiosos. Como que nos da miedo, porque no sabes enseguida, será su pariente ¿no?

Josefa Domínguez, Sector Industrial
Zapopan, Jal.
Octubre 14, 2015

Q5-7

Ahora, la triste realidad, también es que… ¡pues ya no está tan fácil!, ¿no? porque… pues son hábiles y usan presta nombres, y lavan dinero y entonces, pues ya no es tan fácil detectar y… y… eso le pega también a todo mundo, luego hay gente… las listas que traen historias 'no, es que él es… lavado de dinero y le está inyectando dinero el narco, ¿no?' y… a lo mejor es alguien que sí está haciendo bien las cosas […] Y pues, tú no sabes, tú no sabes si el empresario que te está… de entrada, el empresario que le quiere invertir, o él trae dinero sucio, él directamente, o a él alguien más le está inyectando y él no sabía y luego tú llegas con él y tú piensas que él es bueno, pero pues… ¡es como medio complicado! ¿no?

Manuel Gómez, Sector Servicio
Guadalajara, Jal.
Octubre 15, 2015

Q5-8

Pero bueno, ahí cada quien tendrá su… su estilo, sí creo que es importante… las sociedades son importantes para crecer, en algún punto. Eh…este… sí es importante… pero si no te sientes, si tú no tienes la confianza, vuelvo a lo mismo… si no tienes la… la este, pues incluso la mentalidad, o las personas con las que te vas a asociar, o… alguna afinidad, ¡mejor ni le entres! […] es mucho más enriquecedor que ese socio te… aporte, no solamente dinero, sino que te aporte… aunque sea el que se sepa que es socio de tu empresa… este… [E: o sea, ¿reputación?] Sí, entonces… eh… y eso es indispensable, también ahorita como estamos, ¿no? tienes que cuidar con quién te asocias, porque no todo es nomás que te inyecten capital, sino también de dónde viene ese capital.

Nicolás Bermudez, Sector Comercial
Guadalajara, Jal.
Septiembre 17, 2015

Q5-9

La verdad es que sí hacemos… [risas] incluso con los restoranes, hacemos investigación… de…de… pues de los socios y demás. Y sí hacemos… un sesgo… ¡sí

está cañón! Digo, a final de cuentas con… con… porque esa es otra, se dan… se ven… digo, el dinero no se puede esconder tan fácil [risas], y este… y aquí en Guadalajara está pasando que… abren 20 restoranes y cierran 15… ¿no? entonces también te tienes que cuidar, que la gente…pues, ¡se pelan con tu consigna, ¿no?! o es gente que no sabes si es… entonces…este…sí hemos llegado a tener que hacer investigaciones… [E: ¿Qué tipo de fuentes de información…eh, utilizas, típicamente para…?] Mira, nosotros, lo que te decía, de hacer sinergias. Hicimos un grupo de… importadores, este… y nos juntamos una vez al mes y… ahora sí que ¡a pasar el chisme!, ¿no? 'que si fulanito es confiable, fulanito no' y si hay alguien en la lista negra pues… procuramos avisarnos entre todos […] por eso hicimos este grupo, para… también alertarnos, en cuestión de… pues cuidarnos, también. [E: ¿Pero esas son como… iniciativas entre empresarios?] Sí, digo, también nosotros ahorita estamos con asociaciones empresariales como…como grupo empresarial también nos ha sacado de broncas, ellos este… tienen también su…sus modelos para investigación, hay despachos también que se encargan de las investigaciones, este… nosotros las investigaciones las hacemos por medio de un despacho.

Nicolás Bermudez, Sector Comercial
Guadalajara, Jal.
Septiembre 17, 2015

Q5-10

…creo que se han ido metiendo en la sociedad, más de lo que deberíamos haberles permitido, ¡sí! que están en nuestros clubes, en nuestras escuelas y que van a los antros que van nuestros hijos, ¡sí! este… este dinero mal habido, ¡sí! y que desgraciadamente hoy los valores están tan… cambiados y tan… que el valor del dinero es lo más alto.

Susana Piña, Sector Industrial
Zapopan, Jal.
Octubre 9, 2015

Q5-11

O sea, a la hora que estás en… en una comida social o esto, sí es una realidad que… que llega alguien que sabes que… que no tiene negocios correctos… y…y…y… y que te lo topes en los mismos lugares, pues… o inclusive, pudiera estar en las mismas escuelas, o sus hijos pudieran llevarse con tus hijos, es… es un tema que incomoda fuerte y sí, digamos, este… [silencio] hay una mayoría que hace una especie del 'ley del hielo', ¿no? digámoslo de esa manera. (…)

Alfredo Palomino, Sector Industrial
Guadalajara, Jal.
Octubre 7, 2015

Q5-12

Otra forma donde se vinieron a incrustar estas personas es a través de los hijos, o sea, las universidades locales, […] pues era el lugar de destino de todos los hijos de ricos…de Sinaloa, de Sonora, de Baja California, este… bueno, pues mandaban al hijo

a la hija a estudiar, le ponían su departamento, al rato venía el hermano, la hermana… luego al rato se venía la mamá que a estarse una temporada con ellos, luego se venía el papá quesque de vacaciones… ahí iba escalando… y uno veía desde los compañeros, compañeras de los hijos, de los sobrinos 'y ahora éste quién es, ¿por qué trae ese carro?', en fin, entonces, pues sí…este… ya cuando acordamos, pues ya formaban parte…de… la vida del estado y de la ciudad, de ciertos barrios, de ciertos lugares (…)

Jesús Salas, Empresario Agroindustrial
Zapopan, Jal.
Octubre 8, 2015

Q5-13

Creo que ha sido algo de… siete u ocho generaciones para acá. O sea, el tema… narco… antes no era ni siquiera mencionado, ¿sabes? O sea, entre la gente, era como… te mantenías muy al margen. Las últimas generaciones, ¿qué pasó? ¡los hijos de ellos… estudiaban con los hijos de los empresarios!... en las mejores escuelas… entonces, creo que las generaciones nuevas fuimos las que empezamos a crecer… con eso… ¡tan natural!, o sea, que ya decías… 'ah sí, el hijo…del Y' 'ah, sí es mi amigo. No me meto con él pero sí es mi amigo, ay ahí está su casa'.

Rosa María Cortés, Empresa de Seguridad Privada
Zapopan, Jal.
Agosto 28, 2015

Q5-14

Sí, no, bueno, por ejemplo, tenemos clientes que son escuelas, y nos… nos piden que hagamos estudios, o asesorarlos en… 'oye, me llegó la hija de… Juan Pérez, que ya sabemos quién es Juan Pérez, ¿qué hago?', y dicen, 'o sea, si le [risas], o sea, ¿la acepto o no? Si le digo que no, tengo repercusiones, este… ¿qué podemos hacer?'. Y obvio, nuestra recomendación es, pus, no aceptarlas, ¿para qué? Para que no se metan en más problemas. Porque también, nos han tocado otros clientes que… sí aceptaron a as personas y, esas personas con la educación que vienen teniendo, pues ya amenazando a los maestros, este… ya en… a otros niveles que… y ya… ahora es miedo a… a… 'que voy a hacer si lo corro, ¿cómo le hago?' o sea, si reprueba, o sea, 'ya tengo amenazada a todos los profesores'. [E: o sea, ya se vuelve imparable] Claro, ya se vuelve algo imparable. Entonces lo mejor es desde antes, o sea, decirles '¡no!, es que…no pasó los exámenes', o… lo que sea.

Máximo Ballesteros Jr., Empresa de Seguridad Privada
Zapopan, Jal.
Octubre 16, 2015

Q5-15

Sí, sí triste… tristemente. Yo creo que es falta de valentía, a veces ves que agarran narcos o cabecillas dentro de fraccionamientos… este… donde las señoras dicen 'Ay no sabía', que vive aquí a lado ¿no? o 'no nos habíamos dado cuenta' o después dicen

'sí se me hacía sospechoso porque cambiaba de coche cada año y traían… tenían 10 coches… este… último modelo y con vidrios obscuros y llegaban a altas horas…' dices a ver… 'creo que nos falta valentía', pero también en parte es entendible, porque después esa gente también es muy vengativa y tienen u[na manera de trabajar… durísima.

Susana Piña, Sector Industrial
Zapopan, Jal.
Octubre 9, 2015

Q5-16

A mí me tocó… estar en un coto… donde enfrente de mí me enteré que estaba el matón de… de… de… de un Federal, y el Federal obviamente metido en temas de mafia y Narco y todo eso… y… ¡y yo acepté mi realidad! Yo, la realidad que tenía para estar en un coto era esa. Y… y… y si me cambiaba de coto, había como probabilidad de que me tocara como vecino alguien así. Entonces, no tenía sentido migrarme a otro coto. Más bien, ¿cómo vivir con esa realidad? Entonces, lo que decidimos hacer en casa fue… [silencio] eh… ¡la casa es para dormir! ¡punto! Y… y… no vamos a salir a convivir con los vecinos, cada quien su rollo y…

Fernando Huerta, Sector Industrial
Guadalajara, Jal.
Octubre 1, 2015

Q5-17

Cuando ese grupo de empresarios se reúne en una boda, en una boda donde vas con tu esposa, ¿ok? Y, en esa boda, hay invitaciones de las personas, a esa boda, entonces… cuando eso sucede… entonces, a mi me gusta ir con… amigos y empresarios que tienen un perfil similar al mío. Pero, si a mi me invitan y no me dicen con quién me voy a sentar y ese que… me estoy sentando es… alguien que está del otro grupo [de empresaros] y que… hay síntomas de todos tipos… las esposas… pues la esposas a veces reflejan un poco de lo que es esa persona, ese empresario… y son diferentes, y visten diferente (…), en ese tipo de reuniones…no… comulgas y entonces lo único que haces es cuidar… yo… te digo lo que yo hago (…), pregunto a mi secretaria '¿cuáles son las personas que están ahí?', entonces, yo tengo dos caminos: si las personas son… más o menos, aceptables, les digo que sí voy. Y si… resulta que me van a poner… o en ese grupo hay x gentes que… sé que… no me gustan, pues digo que no voy a ir y ¡se acabó el problema! Y si me los encuentro ya ahí, no los saludo, no me tomo fotos con ellos.

Héctor L. Orta, Sector Industrial
Zapopan, Jal.
Septiembre 3, 2015

Q5-18

yo lo que he visto es que en los grupos… en los grupos de las altas esferas empresariales, sí… sí cuidan mucho eso, eh, o sea, sí lo bloquean, sí lo cuidan mucho.

O sea, por ejemplo, un ejemplo… muy sencillo, el… el club más pipiris nice de Guadalajara, el Country Club, es un club que no permite la… la… la… ¿cómo se llama? el aceptar a nadie al menos que vengas de una familia que ya haya sido miembro y o… y/o que estés recomendado por un chingo de personas y que el comité, que son varios, te acepten. O sea, no puede llegar alguien con un chorro de lana y decir '¡yo tengo un chorro de varo! Y ¿cuánto cuesta mi membresía y tal?', ¿no? entonces, realmente ahí… yo lo que he notado, y lo que he escuchado en pláticas es que ellos tratan… ¿cómo se llama?, de… de bloquear eso.

Manuel Gómez,
Sector Servicios
Zapopan, Jal., Octubre 15, 2015

Q5-19

O sea, sí se ha ido refinando, porque ya las ves estudiando a las niñas en el Tec de Monterrey, o sea… [baja la voz], déjame… no quiero decirlo… [TM: No, no…dilo, dilo…lo paramos] no, no, está bien: ¡No dejan de ser nacos! ¡Perdón! Y…o sea, [recupera el volumen de voz] algo… y con…di… ¡híjole! es que suena bien gacho que lo diga [risas] pero… no dejan de tener ese tipo de… de… ¡arrastran su origen! O el origen de… de sus padres o… ¡Siempre les sale el origen!

Jesús Salas, Empresario Agroindustrial
Zapopan, Jal.
29 de Agosto, 2015

Q5-20

Por ejemplo, ya… los hijos de los malos se han casado con las hijas de los buenos, o las hijas de los malos… ¡la hija de Caro está casada con un amigo! Este… acaba de salir, su papá, creo que hace poco… del… [risas] este señor, don Rafael Caro Quintero, y su hija pues es muy guapa, este… y se casó con un chavo bien de aquí de Guadalajara. Eh, empresa, tiene una cerveza (sic), no sé si la has visto, Cerveza Minerva [TM: ¡Ah! Sí, claro] Ah, pues es de él. Pues él está casado con la hija de este señor. Y es un chavo… bien, o sea, a habido este tipo de…entonces ya los nietos, pues son nietos de este hombre… y pues, nietos de familias…este, de empresarios…eh… ¡formales, serios! Y así, con muchos otros que ni nombres sabemos, ni conocemos…

Jesús Salas, Empresario Agroindustrial
Zapopan, Jal.
Octubre 8, 2015

Q5-21

Sí oías… pero del hijo de Y, ¡nada más de ese wey!, y que 'ay, que…' era como…fancy, y a mi me daba weva tremenda, así de que 'ay, que…vamos a salir y vamos con el hijo de Y', o sea, era como algo de… de glamour o… no sé qué chingados les daba a las viejas, este… como no sé si un toque de peligro o un toque de… o porque les pagaba cosas, o porque… no sé. Este… a mi me daba… entre pereza y… y weva…y tristeza… y… repudio, o sea, porque… lo llegué a ver hasta con mi hermana, o sea, mi hermana de pronto, hace unos años, este… le dije 'oye, esos amigos tuyos que traes son raros, están medio sospechosos y…' y ya como… hasta que no le cayó el 20, pues se alejó, pero pues sí es gente peligrosa. Entonces, no sé si hay algo sexy ahí de… del mal…

que le atraiga a… [E: … a la gente] ¡a las mujeres! [E: A las mujeres en particular.] ¡Sí!

Jesús Salas, Empresario Agroindustrial
Zapopan, Jal.
Octubre 8, 2015

Q5-22

Al: Para…para mi generación, para nuestra generación, mucha gente en Guadalajara sabe, ¿no? 'fulano fue a la boda del hijo de X y se casó con fulana' y mucha gente lo… lo sabe o tiene ubicada ese tipo de cosas como muy… y las tiende a ver hasta normales. Eh… pero ya es… yo creo que de cada quién, qué quiere. Yo, para mi familia procuro evitar ese tipo de cosas, y tengo grupos más cerrados donde son gente con la que yo crecí de toda la vida, gente… pues igual que yo, con la misma educación, con los mismos estudios y fuera de ahí no…busco relacionarme, ni me interesa, ni los busco ni…hasta lo evito probablemente.

M.T.: Hay dos cosas ahí muy interesantes que…dices… la primera es…e… 'tienden a normalizarlo', ¿a qué le atribuirías el hecho de que, efectivamente, de pronto se tienda a normalizar?

An: Pues es que tienen su vida normal, yo te puedo decir… a lo mejor no están dentro de mi círculo pero en mi generación estaba la hija de X, este…y donde a lo mejor, pues era parte de una bolita y la veíamos ahí y sabíamos todos qué era, quién era, pero hasta ahí llegaba. Este… y ya no es… ya… la señalaban más que nada por el apellido. [Al: (murmura) Se casó con… el de la refresquera, ¿no?] Sí, sí…

Alberto, Alberto Jr. and Antonio Alcántara, Comercio
Zapopan, Jal.
Septiembre 9, 2015

Q5-23

Bueno… hemos tenido apoyos… de hecho, cuando empezaba la empresa tuvimos un apoyo que aparte era un fomento económico, una parte del gobierno de fomento económico que nos dio un apoyo económico, y nos sirvió mucho y que… con ese regulatorio… […] ante la Comisión Nacional de Competencia, en México y… bueno, después de 4 años de juicio, tuvimos una resolución favorable […], entonces… es una resolución muy positiva para la empresa y para la industria […] porque pues … ya no nos… bloquean el paso, ¿no?

Alejandro Pacheco, Sector Industrial
Zapopan, Jal.
Octubre 7, 2015

Q5-24

Yo prefiero… pelear en los tribunales que… doblar las manos a alguien que me quiere extorsionar, como un sindicato, ¿no?

Alejandro Pacheco, Sector Industrial
Zapopan, Jal.
Octubre 7, 2015

Q5-25

AP: Pues la corrupción hace más costoso operar… por ejemplo, nosotros tenemos una cadena de tiendas, la mayoría están en el DF, entonces…en el Distrito Federal nos hemos dado cuenta que hay mucha corrupción y que… para poder abrir y para tener la licencia pues tienes que… pues… que dar una gran mordida, ¿no? de alrededor de 250 mil pesos por lugar, entonces, pues es una parte que encarece el… el hacer negocios, ¿no? En Guadalajara no hemos visto ese nivel de corrupción, más bien lo hemos visto en el DF.

M.T.: Y para, digamos, lidiar con este tipo de cosas… ¿qué tipo de decisiones toman…?

AP: Nada más… de… el retorno de inversión, el tiempo de retorno de inversión con el proyecto… se incrementa por… y metes la parte de la corrupción y la mordida que tienes que dar para que te den la licencia… entonces, simplemente, pues aumenta el riesgo… aumenta el riesgo de emprender.

Alejandro Pacheco, Sector Industrial
Zapopan, Jal.
Octubre 7, 2015

Q5-26

M.T.: Las veces que pensabas que se bajaba la cortina, ¿qué parte… cómo se da este… un poco, giro de timón para decir 'no, sigamos con esto'?

AP: [silencio] pues mira, honestamente, yo creo que fueron dos factores, fue como mucha… este… perseverancia o necedad, y segundo… que… afortunadamente, los socios tenían capital para seguir inyectándole a la empresa más allá de las proyecciones iniciales que se tenían, ¿no? creo que… esa es una de las principales… pues fallas que tenemos como emprendedores, pensar que… la época en números rojos va a ser más corta o más pequeña y prever realmente, una etapa fuerte… una etapa grande de números rojos. Entonces, yo creo que por eso la mayoría se desanima.

Alejandro Pacheco, Sector Industrial
Zapopan, Jal.
Octubre 7, 2015

Q5-27

No hemos dejado de vender por 'narco-bloqueos'… sí dejamos de vender un día, pero cerraron varios, entonces…pero… al día siguiente, estábamos impulsando a la gente a que retomara las calles y no se dejara… amedrentar y… de hecho hicimos un hashtag que era 'recuperemos Guadalajara' y… no… no nos han amedre… no, nos ha afectado mucho…

Alejandro Pacheco, Sector Industrial
Zapopan, Jal.
Octubre 7, 2015

Q5-28

¡Ahhh! [suspira] […] después de ver que el Estado no respondía, que la industria no respondía y que a la sociedad no la alcanzábamos, para que respondiera. Nuestras fuerzas no eran tan grandes como para que hacer que hubiera una respuesta unánime y… y con la fuerza que se requería por la gravedad. Fue… en el 2010… cuando le dimos la vuelta con las instancias de derechos humanos, nacionales y todo, que vimos que no iba a haber nada, que unas de las personas empezamos en una reunión a llorar, literalmente derrotados, porque… nuestra gran apuesta estaba perdida, ¿no? como el grito de que… ¡nos van a hacer caso! Y ¡no es posible! Y la injusticia y que… y cuando todos nos batearon, y que los medios de comunicación empezaban a irse, dice una maestra 'pues yo les quiero plantear, ¡vamos a hablar con los narcos!', ¿qué tendría…? ¿qué ten…? ¿qué ha tenido que pasar y qué tendríamos que hacer para que nuestra gente no se siga muriendo? Fíjate, te platico y me da un nudo en la garganta, porque ella así, desesperada dijo 'armémonos de valor y vayamos y hablemos con ellos, que al cabo tienen fama de que ellos sí ayudan. ¡Ayudan a los jodidos! Y restablecen pueblos, y hacen…¡no sé cuántas cosas!', entonces, ahí pues entramos en un conflicto… este… ético, muy pesado, porque decíamos 'no, cabrón, si no le pedimos nada al Estado, no queremos relacionarnos con él, no queremos relacionarnos con los empresarios, ¿vamos a ir a relacionarnos con los criminales?', entonces decía '¡pues criminales son todos! [risas]

Elvia Lara, Activista
Guadalajara, Jal.
Octubre 15, 2015

Quotations evoked in Chapter 6

Q6-1

En Jalisco se creo un grupo que se llama el Grupo… Minerva 1997, que ese grupo es creado por empresarios, para empresarios, que atienden específicamente el tema de secuestros.

Raymundo Chávez, Agro-industrial
Zapopan, Jal.

29 de Agosto de 2015

Q6-2

Hay una… pues no es policía, pero sí un grupo anti-secuestro, aquí en Jalisco. Cuando tú tienes un problema, puedes hablar con ellos. A través de ese… Coordinador de Cámara y ahí se puede controlar.

Benito Alvarado, Sector Industrial
Zapopan, Jal.
2 de Septiembre de 2015

Q6-3

*TM: Y, por ejemplo, en esa época, si fueron varios empresarios, que sufrieron secuestros y tal… ¿hubo, por ejemplo, una reacción del empresariado en la que trabajaran juntos por protegerse ustedes? [**I:** Sí, sí… definitivamente] ¿qué pasó?*

JZ: Se hizo un grupo que se llamó Minerva 1997. Si quieres hablar de seguridad te puedo conseguir una entrevista con el Señor Héctor L. Orta, él es el… el forma parte del grupo Minerva 1997. Es un grupo de empresarios que se formó para vigilar y controlar más o menos las oportunidades negativas que tenía el crimen hacia los empresarios. ¡Ayudó mucho!

Juan Zenón, Sector Industrial
Zapopan Jal.
Agosto 27, 2015

Q6-4

Y [el Minerva 1997] tiene muchos años. [Se formó] con una ola de secuestros que hubo hace mucho y que formaron los empresarios preocupados.

Juan Galicia, Sector mobiliario y de construcción
Zapopan, Jal.
Septiembre 25, 2015

Q6-5

(…) hace años, aquí en Jalisco, hace 16 años, teníamos 115 secuestros de empresarios al año. Lo cual era una situación totalmente incorrecta, ¿qué pasó? Organizo un grupo, que empezamos siendo 30 empresarios, [golpea la mesa] y fuimos a ver al Gobernados y no nos… [golpea la mesa] no nos… no nos quería hacer caso [golpea la mesa] y nos pusimos afuera de la casa Jalisco, o sea de donde él vive, [golpea la mesa] y ahí nos quedamos hasta que nos aceptó…[golpea la mesa] la entrevista y hablamos con él y le dijimos, así de fácil [golpea la mesa] 'o resuelves este problema o a partir de mañana no pagamos impuestos, a ver cómo le haces, pero ya no puede seguir esto'. Entonces, presionamos al gobierno, para que él, en su parte, hiciera

cambios e hiciera gestiones con el gobierno federal, para que viniera gente de México y el Ejército, para resolver el problema que se tenía tan grave y nosotros como empresarios, entonces, vámonos a unir para que veamos cómo… apoyemos al gobierno y cómo nos apoyemos a nosotros para defendernos de todas esas cosas.

Héctor L. Orta, Sector Industrial y cofundador del grupo Minerva 1997
Zapopan, Jal.
Septiembre 3, 2015

Q6-6

[En Jalisco] cuando empezó quizá a hacer crisis [el secuestro], fue cuando se apareció el Loncho y su gente y por allá, que venían de Sinaloa, cuando se empieza la Guerra hacia el Narcotráfico, muchos de los… de los… de los líderes de los cárteles se van a radicar a Jalisco, entonces… piensan ellos que esto va a ser una tierra neutral (…) pero de repente, cuando le empiezan a pegar al empresariado, no a los narcos, sino a los empresarios, es cuando se empiezan a organizar los empresarios, este… hay… incluso se daban muchas conferencias y todo de autoprotección, se empieza a [hablar de la profesionalización de la policía, y los empresarios empiezan a querer tomar ellos el control del combate a este tipo de delitos"

Francisco Herrera, Empresa de Seguridad Privada
y negociador de secuestros
Ciudad de México
Febrero 1, 2017

Q6-7

El secuestro yo creo que es de los crímenes más… horribles que puede haber en la humanidad, porque…digo, esto ya es percepción. Un asesinato, pues es doloroso, una muerte… eh… la sufres, este, la asimilas y sigues con la vida. Un secuestro, te daña de por vida, a la familia y al secuestrado, tú no sabes si está bien, si lo están lastimando, si le cortaron ya algo, ¿te acuerdas del Mochaorejas? Su crueldad. No sabes si [la víctima] está bien… si lo violaron, si la violaron, si… y si te la van a regresar, entonces, tienes una angustia, incertidumbre… ¡horrible! Peor que una muerte.

Raymundo Chávez, Sector Agro-Industrial
Zapopan, Jal.
Agosto 29, 2015

Q6-8

Desde su fundación, [en Guadalajara] las comunidades indígenas y los criollos fueron separados por completo… se dividió la ciudad, simbólicamente desde la fundación… y yo creo que fuimos arrastrando esa lógica de negar siempre al nativo […] Y, evidentemente, eso está permeando en la sociedad tapatía, todavía hasta hoy, o sea… es una sociedad muy racista, … y ahora Guadalajara en los últimos años ha crecido tanto y ha venido tanta gente de tantos lados, todavía hay mucho racismo, nos enorgullece ser güeritos

Andrés González, Empresario del Sector Servicios
Guadalajara, Jal.
Octubre 30, 2015

Q6-9

*Como Cámara también tuvimos otros temas muy interesantes, nosotros fuimos el primer organismo en todo el país […] el primer organismo empresarial que supervisó una elección. Estábamos hartos de la no democracia, del robo de los votos, y queríamos democracia y fuimos la primer cámara que hizo todo un programa para supervisar la elección de mil novecientos noventa y… 95, […] y fue tan… importante el trabajo que hicimos, que de hecho los medios de comunicación iban más con nosotros, este… que con el Instituto Electoral del estado, esto, lo otro, a preguntarnos, porque nosotros traíamos empresarios y empleados de muchas empresas repartidos en…muchísimas de las casillas, con cámaras de video, con cámaras fotográficas, este… entrevistábamos gente a la salida [**TM:** a la salida… un exit poll] o sea, sí, sí, sí, … y dimos datos verdaderamente que sirvieron muchísimo en ese tema y la autoridad se sentía supervisada, porque nosotros decíamos cómo iba la elección (…).*

Víctor Manuel Olvera, Sector Servicios
Zapopan, Jal.
Octubre 15, 2015

Q6-10

A los tres años, que bajó ya la incidencia de secuestros, que ya no había esas amenazas y que no había ya tres o cuatro empresarios secuestrados a la vez, y todo… ahí hubo varias reuniones en donde se pensó ¿qué se hace? ¿se desaparece el grupo o qué se hace? Y, por fortuna, la mayoría de los socios fundadores opinamos que… que no, que había que seguir haciendo ese esfuerzo y ayudando… seguir ayudando a la sociedad y a las familias y a quien pidiera ayuda a la asociación. Quien pidiera ayuda, fura quien fuera, se le iba a ayudar.

Máximo Ballesteros, Propietario de una Empresa de Seguridad Privada
y socio fundador de Minerva 1997
Zapopan, Jal.
Enero 19, 2017

Q6-11

se creó [el Minerva 1997] precisamente con esa intención, de tener…este, más vínculo con gobierno en el tema de que les den permisos de portación de armas a sus equipos de seguridad personal, familiar… este, sus negocios, este, tener cierto tipo de comunicación, de información que les permita…este estar alertas de grupos criminales, eh…ida y vuelta.

Víctor Manuel Olvera, Sector Servicios
Zapopan, Jal.

Octubre 15, 2015

Q6-12

*Grupo Minerva 1997, concretamente, por ejemplo, que te protege ante secuestros… [Antonio A.: Y es un grupo formado por puros empresarios y puras familias de Guadalajara que se reunieron y dijeron 'bueno ¿pues qué hacemos?' y tienen toda una…una serie de protocolos y de… cobertura de seguridad privada y un montón de cosas…] inteligencia [Antonio A.: investigación, inteligencia y todo] involucradas las PGRs [Antonio A**.:** lo tienen durante, lo han tenido durante años] si quieres saber de empresarios auténticos, ahí hay 120 de primera línea.*

Alberto and Antonio Alcántara, Sector Comercio
Zapopan, Jal.
Septiembre 9, 2015

Q6-13

Sí…sí, de hecho hay un grupo especializado, que está avalado por los empresarios. Por obvias razones, pues no se puede decir el nombre, pero… es un grupo que está sostenido por…por…por ellos, por los… por todos los empresarios. Y cualquier situación que te pase… ¡cualquier cosa! Estas personas están… tienen que solucionar el problema

Olivia Ciriaco, Sector Inmobiliario y de la Construcción
Septiembre 15, 2015
Zapopan, Jal.

Q6-14

Sí, de hecho aquí en Guadalajara se hizo muy famoso, en algún momento, el Minerva 1997, que lo forman, yo no pertenezco, pero lo forman empresarios de los importantes de Guadalajara […] ese grupo Minerva 1997, que existe en Guadalajara, que… digo, no es ningún secreto, lo conoce yo creo que ya muchísima gente.

Víctor Manuel Olvera, Sector Sevicios
Zapopan, Jal.
Octubre 15, 2015

Q6-15

Porque todos los que estemos aquí, tienen que ser gente pri… este… investigada de que son gente correcta y buena. Pero es ¡muy peligroso! que se meta uno que es… tranza, que esté haciendo cosas chuecas, que sea narco, que sea corrupto, porque

entonces nos acaba. Entonces, es un filtro… y tenemos que conocerlo a esa persona, y como somos los más importantes, pues seguramente que los vamos a conocer y no nomás conocer en un aspecto, oye. Porque puede ser que sea un gran empresario, con mucho dinero, pero que sea… un hombre que ha subido en su negocio porque se ha fregado a mucha gente, o porque ha hecho tranzas, o porque ha robado… al gobierno, tal… ese, una cosa es que sea importante, y otra cosa es que sea buen empresario.

Héctor L. Orta, Sector Industrial y cofundador del grupo Minerva 1997
Zapopan, Jal.
Septiembre 18, 2015

Q6-16

A esos nuevos ricos, no los queremos en el grupo, ¡fuera!, 'No, pero… fíjate que es un empresario que…' 'a ver, pero… y ¿cuántos años tiene?' 'pues tiene… 30 años' 'y, ¿cuánto dinero tiene?' 'Pues no… son… tiene muchos millones' 'Y, ¿de dónde los sacó?' 'No sabemos'… tampoco, oye, no… está bien que sean listos… pero hay cosas de párvulos. Ya soy empresario, no me digas que una persona de… 30 años, como ahorita está habiendo, los hermanos X, no sé qué… y o sea, puede que …que lo hizo nomás porque es muy listo. No se la voy a creer, ¿por qué? Porque no es cierto, porque no se hacen así los negocios… no te lo creo. Entonces, candados necesarios, filtros de entrada de toda la gente.

Héctor L. Orta, Sector Industrial y cofundador del grupo Minerva 1997
Zapopan, Jal.
Septiembre 18, 2015

Q6-17

Y luego también, otra cosa, algunos socios entraron pero luego después tuvieron sus hijos un verdadero broncón y un verdadero problema, que no los educaron bien – porque ya tuvimos algunos casos- y cuando nosotros íbamos a hacer… gentes que… porque era muy normal 'por favor, quiero a una persona que acompañe a mis hijos porque van a ir a la… al antro, y queremos que vayan'. 'Está bien, lo vamos a proteger para que…', pero cuando veíamos que los hijos eran maleducados y que… 'yo tengo mucho dinero, a mi no…que esto, que el otro' y le gritaban a las gentes de seguridad y los trataban mal… ¡van pa' fuera! 'Oye pero…' 'No, aquí no queremos a nadie que se sienta papacito, que maltrate a nuestra gente, porque eso no lo vamos a aceptar de nadie' […] Y si el muchacho se siente que es… papas… que es papas fritas y que tiene dinero su papá y que es capaz de gritarle y mentarle la madre… por ahí no va. Entonces, ¿sabes qué? 'O… no me hables de que… te vaya a dar protección a tu hijo, o… vas… fuera del grupo'… y tuvimos gentes ¡muy importantes! Que te… tenían bancos, bancos… o sea, no creas que era así… y… ¡va pa' afuera! ¿Se enojaron? Se enojaron, y no nos importa, porque está… primero la imagen de nuestro grupo.

Héctor L. Orta, Sector Industrial y cofundador del grupo Minerva 1997
Zapopan, Jal.
Septiembre 18, 2015

Q6-18

Y han sido tan claras las cuentas que han salido de esta asociación que se ha formado… bueno, yo creo que de las pocas asociaciones que yo he visto, que te entregan las cuentas claras y que te dicen cuando sobra dinero…o sea, y eso… dan buenas cuentas.

Olivia Ciriaco, Sector Inmobiliario y de la Construcción
Zapopan, Jal.
Septiembre 15, 2015

Q6-19

En esta Mesa Directiva, hay tres personas… que es el actual presidente, el tesorero, el director… tenemos un director, que yo lo contraté hace muchos años, que sigue con nosotros, que estuvo con un Gobernador, luego se fue a la Procuraduría General de la República, era el secretario del… luego, se vino conmigo y… hoy hablé por cierto con él en la mañana y… las primeras decisiones y las primeras cosas que hacemos… lo hacemos entre cuatro personas.

Héctor L. Orta, Sector Industrial y cofundador del grupo Minerva 1997
Zapopan, Jal.
Enero 18, 2017

Q6-20

¡Ah!, otra cosa… que tenemos en seguridad, ¡muy importante! No somos elitistas, aunque podría parecer. Es un grupo de empresarios de lo más importante de Jalisco, pues es… ¡Cualquier persona! que tenga un problema de secuestro y eso… nos llama por teléfono… ¡no le cobramos un centavo de nada! Y aunque no seas socio te vamos a atender. Si después de eso, quieres entrar con nosotros, ¡es diferente!, pero no te voy a decir… si tú no me pagas lo que cobramos por entrar… 150 mil pesos por entrar y pagas tanto mensual, no te atiendo… no, no, no… porque… está por encima el bien común, no el bien particular. Entonces, claro, que si hubiera un… [toce] una acción, digamos, desmedida, de alguien que le esté llamando cada ratito 'oye, ven por favor…' pues ya lo veremos que… no hay muchos, pero puede darse el caso. Entonces, no… esa es otra cosa, pero… si hay alguien que está sufriendo porque lo acaban de secuestrar y no tiene para defenderse y tiene miedo para ir al gobierno, que nos diga… y así está sucediendo: los mismos socios de nosotros 'oye, tengo un amigo que le está pasando esto' ¡adelante! Lo atendemos con mucho gusto, aunque no sea socio. Entonces, eso… es un tema súper importante. O sea, la institución está hecha para apoyar al más necesitado…¿no?

Héctor L. Orta, Sector Industrial y cofundador del grupo Minerva 1997
Zapopan, Jal.
Septiembre 18, 2015

Q6-21

Me invitaron a participar, le dije '¡no, porque no quiero seguir con la paranoia de la inseguridad, por eso no participo en su grupo, porque su grupo nomás van a hablar

de eso [risas] entonces no quiero… como víctima no quiero participar en nada' porque necesitan ser totalmente…este… afines a…ese tipo de… de problemas.

Juan Zenón, Industrial Sector
Zapopan, Jal.
Agosto 27, 2015

Q6-22

Al: Pues un amigo mío nos dijo, y luego el mismo Zenón…[casi murmura]

An: Por recomendación nosotros dimos con… con un especialista en seguridad que está en Guadalajara … [Al: Máximo, Máximo Ballesteros], sí y a él fue al que nosotros contratamos de manera individual primero, para hacer toda la supervisión de la… de nuestros hábitos familiares, de la plática que nos dieron, de todo el negocio, ya que hicieron todo el primer…la primera peinada a toda la situación, él nos dijo '¿quieren ir más allá?, existe esto' y ya, platicamos con un par de personas de que en qué consistía y todo ese rollo…

Alberto and Antonio Alcántara, Sector Comercio
Zapopan, Jal.
Septiembre 9, 2015

Q6-23

No sé, un ejemplo, un secuestro, cuando el crimen organizado hace un secuestro, ya por default sabemos que los que hicieron el secuestro no tienen idea de… o sea, de cómo hacer el secuestro, no es una banda experta en secuestros, hay más riesgos, porque ya no es de que…'ah, es que…' como la banda de secuestradores que dicen 'mi, mi… lo más importante que tengo es al secuestrado', eso es lo que vale. Acá no, acá es… pus… 'no pasa nada, luego levanto otro', cambia la manera de operar y de manejar también la crisis.

Máximo Ballesteros, Propietario de una Empresa de Seguridad Privada
y socio fundador de Minerva 1997
Octubre 16, 2015
Zapopan, Jal

Quotations evoked in Chapter 7

Q7-1

Yo creo que tendría dos o tres días en la Secretaría de Desarrollo Rural, me encontraba completamente perdido '¿qué estoy haciendo aquí? y, me di cuenta que ahí estaba trabajando un licenciado… amigo de mi padre. Era priista, había sido muchas veces diputado y dije 'ay qué bueno, mi papá lo conoce muy bien, son grandes amigos', y lo mandé llamar. Uy, le dio mucho gusto verme y antes de irse me dice 'y

si me permite le voy a dar un consejo, mire, usted viene de la iniciativa privada, allá las cosas son muy diferentes, -dice- como funcionario usted puede hacer sólo lo que la ley le manda; como particular, usted puede hacer todo lo que la ley no le impida', así, con esas palabras, con esa claridad.

Jesús Salas, Sector Industrial y ex servidor público local y federal
Zapopan, Jal.
8 de Octubre de 2015

Q7-2

Otra esquina que también cubrimos es… analizamos en donde… el 90% de las… de…de… de las acciones que toman los malos, al secuestrar, es porque se dan cuenta que la gente no está preparada para poder prever los momentos peligrosos. ¡Ah muy bien! Entonces, 'vamos a hacer un análisis de todo y vamos a hacer una capacitación a todos nuestros asociados… del grupo, para decirles muchas cosas', como cuáles, 'miren, a partir de ahora, olvídense de contratar a sus muchachas, de su casa, a la que encuentren, a cualquiera, necesitan pasarla por un cedazo, para saber de dónde viene, [golpea la mesa con cada pregunta que formula], dónde vive… cómo son… dónde… quiénes son sus papás, quiénes son sus hermanos, para inhibir a cualquiera que haga algo que vaya en contra de ustedes' 'Oigan, ¿tienen secretarias? Ah, ok, hay que cuidarse', todas las personas… otra cosa 'tienen ustedes llamadas telefónicas ¿verdad? prohibido contestar las llamadas telefónicas. Solamente que sea un pariente que ya lo conocen, que es el hermano (…) porque así vamos a evitar que haya esa conexión del malo con el bueno que asustan a los buenos, los malos y entonces, se ponen nerviosos y empieza la… la situación… se sale de control… otra cosa… a ver, '¿cómo te vas a tu trabajo?' 'Pues que… yo me voy…' ok, '¿te das cuenta si hay gente afuera de tu casa cuando sales?' '¡No!' 'a partir de hoy tienes que tener gente…', oye, en las noches, '¿tienes luces afuera de tu casa que inhiban a alguien que se pueda…poner afuera?'(…) y, también. Si tú vas a un restaurant, y si tú estás viendo en un momento dado gente… rara… ¡pues salte del restaurante, punto! Porque esos… te pueden matar, te pueden secuestrar… pero hay que tener consciencia de lo que te puede pasar… y si sales de tu fábrica, también, nunca te vengas por el mismo camino, toma diferentes caminos, y hay…hay una serie de cosas. Entonces, todo eso fue un análisis para minimizar los riesgos. ¿Qué sucedió con eso? ¡Se minimizaron los riesgos!

Héctor L. Orta, Sector Industrial y co-fundador del grupo *Minerva 1997*
Zapopan, Jal.
18 de Septiembre de 2015

Q7-3

Porque si aquí, tienes la puerta abierta, se te mete cualquiera…sí aquí no haces una investigación de toda tu gente… ah pues… si aquí tú dejas entrar todos los tatuados, con aretes, con… pos… ¡no te quejes después de que tienes drogadictos en tu empresa!

Héctor L. Orta, Sector Industrial y co-fundador del grupo *Minerva 1997*
Zapopan, Jal.

3 de Septiembre de 2015

Q7-4

En ese tiempo se daban muchos casos de llamadas telefónicas. 'A partir de hoy, quiero que sean conscientes que tan malo es que ustedes respondan de inmediato, y paguen mañana la…esa… como que no lo paguen'. Hay tecnologías y hay técnicas para tratar a los malos, ¿ok? 'déjenos tratarlos a nosotros', porque tan malo es que tú les digas… me piden diez millones 'cómo no señor, no me mate… pero… mañana' y si tú les dices eso no van… no van a terminar así… te van a… te van a pedir no diez, te van a pedir 20, porque saben que tienes mucho dinero, que vas a pagar ese dinero. Entonces, tienes que hacer una serie de cosas para que el otro se desespere y que vaya aflojando y… tampoco le vas a decir que no vas a pagar, porque… si es cierto que lo tienen, lo van a matar. Entonces, quiere decir que es… acude con nosotros. Que no lo puedes hacer con el gobierno porque no le tienes confianza al gobierno… cero confianza con los funcionarios de gobierno. Con nosotros puedes hablar, a ver… dinos todo lo que quieras y nosotros te vamos a proteger. Al gobierno le decimos 'mira, tenemos toda esta información, pero no te puedes salir por la tangente… porque vamos a estar… este si… dando el seguimiento. Y si vemos que alguien se colude o alguien recibe… pues vamos a declarar… entonces, más vale que les digas que se porten bien', entonces hubo una supervisión.

Héctor L. Orta, Sector Industrial y co-fundador del grupo *Minerva 1997*
Zapopan, Jal.
18 de Septiembre de 2015.

Q7-5

Fue de los detonadores para acelerar el proceso… de hacer la Secretaría y de formar esta área antisecuestros. Eran varios empresarios importantes ya… pero esto, fue… mete cambio de velocidades, ¡rápido! Esta área, nos ayudó a crearla Pancho Barrio, cuando yo empezaba aquí, se nos… calentó más esto, y un día… en una junta aquí en México, le digo 'Oye Pancho, ¿algún conocido? ¿una gente de tus confianzas?, préstamelo quince días, yo ya tengo un equipito de 10, 12 muchachos de mucha confianza, están haciendo ahí… y quiero darle método, quiero darle más orden, ¿no?'. Y si me mandó a una gente… que luego ya le gustó también quedarse por acá, se quedó un rato… y bueno, hicieron un súper equipo.

Alberto Cárdenas, ex Gobernador de Jalisco
Ciudad de México
22 de Abril de 2018

Q7-6

Después, empezó a pasar un poquito de días y entonces… fuimos a… decir… '¿y cómo vamos a hacer…? ¿dónde…? Hay que hacer aquí en Jalisco, un grupo de gente de Jalisco, que… que tengan conocimientos para atacar el problema de anti-secuestros que sea de parte del Gobierno, que sea el que haga las acciones concretas para aprehender a los malos, porque eso no lo podemos hacer nosotros, está fuera de nuestro alcance', '¡Ah pues sí! ¿Cómo no? Vamos a hacerlo…'

Héctor L. Orta, Sector Industrial y co-fundador del grupo *Minerva 1997*

Zapopan, Jal.
18 de Septiembre de 2015

Q7-7

Esas acciones que… aunque no estaban, de alguna manera, aprobadas legalmente, pero se podían hacer por la urgencia y por eso… entonces, porque de lo contrario no se podían llevar a cabo las acciones… entonces, esto es muy delicado, no sé si se deba decir o cómo se deba decir… lo que sí es que… vimos el problema, buscamos la soluciones, les dijimos y tomaron las acciones y entonces, se empezó de alguna manera a resolver.

Héctor L. Orta, Sector Industrial y co-fundador del grupo *Minerva 1997*
Zapopan, Jal.
18 de Septiembre de 2015

Q7-8

TM: En su caso particular, ¿cómo fue la idea? ¿en qué momento surge, además de tener una empresa, ahora una fundación?

E: Bueno, aquí, lo curioso de esto es que es… en realidad es una Asociación … como, nació de la idea de varios empresarios, la motivación es una de las motivaciones que existen en México para hacer cosas, ¿sí? fue el miedo… había un gran temor a los secuestros y en ese año… hubo… muchos secuestros, y ese miedo, fue lo que logró que muchos empresarios se convencieran para decir 'vamos a formar esa asociación',. Entonces, … hay un gran sentido de responsabilidad en la fundación, posteriormente sí, porque esa asociación civil logró mejorar el tema a los tres, cuatro años y se pudo haber desaparecido y se decidió que no… que continuara y que se ampliara.

Máximo Ballesteros, Director Operativo de *Minerva 1997*
Zapopan, Jal.
19 de enero de 2017

Q7-9

Yo lo platiqué después [de haber usado los servicios de Minerva 1997] con algunas personas de mí círculo, sin decir nada uno me dijo 'yo pertenezco a ese círculo desde hace no sé cuántos años', 'ah, muy bien, platícame más de él' y me platicó del grupo y así… fue mucho por recomendación, por…porque mi papá es una… y la familia…nuestra familia es una familia conocida en el ambiente de…empresarial local. Y de ahí surge también la oportunidad de participar o la invitación y…después decidimos que no, que no había necesidad.

Antonio Alcántara, Sector Industrial
Zapopan, Jal.
9 de septiembre de 2015

Q7-10

TM: ¿tienes conocimiento de iniciativas o de esfuerzos colectivos que hayan hecho los empresarios para… prevenir, para el tema de seguridad…? [I: ¡Sí!] ¿Y esto funciona? [I: Sí, sí funciona] [Silencio] ¿puedes… contarme un poquito más de eso…?

E: Pues, preferiría que no. [TM: Ok] No por mala onda, pero… [TM: No, no…está muy bien] este… pero sí funcionan. Casos así de que … no sé, tengo amigos que les roban máquinas y… van [con ellos], en una semana contamos con las máquinas.

Daniel Campos, Sector Industrial
Guadalajara Jal.
8 de septiembre de 2015

Q7-11

Conozco un par [de grupos] que son completamente secretos, que no los puedo compartir y conozco otra que hicieron… que se llama "Minerva 1997" que hicieron varios empresarios aquí, hace muchos años, cuando hubo muchos secuestros y con… y ellos tienen todo un sistema de información que dan datos y que dan este… que cuidan… que… pero no… no… [silencio] que tampoco quiero dar demasiada información [TM: Claro.] Se me hace un poco delicado.

Susana Piña, Sector Industrial
Zapopan, Jal.
9 de octubre de 2015

Q7-12

¿Qué… qué ha pasado? Que con estas… con estas… yo no digo obtsáculos… yo diría… puntos tan importantes que se tienen que cumplir, no ha habido muchos problemas entre… entre el grupo… o entre, entre… aunque sí hicimos un cambio. En un principio, en un principio, cada año hacíamos una reunión todos los asociados, que son 150, y lo hacíamos en un salón grande, de un hotel, invitábamos al Gobernador y al Secretario de Seguridad y no sé qué… asistían todos a los que invitábamos… pero cuando ya empezamos a ver todos los riesgos que corrían las gentes que aparecían ahí con los malos y no sabían que existía el grupo…, entonces decidimos ya no hacer reuniones que nos dieran.. una… una… visibilidad, que estuviéramos a la luz de mucha gente, porque estábamos corriendo riesgos. Entonces ya… acciones más tranquilas y… confidenciales y hacer reuniones con el Secretario de Seguridad y el Secretario de la Defensa y con… pero ya en un plan diferente y nomás asisten los de la Mesa Directiva, y… nosotros después hacemos informes a todos los asociados, en un momento dado… a través del teléfono, con una serie de cosas y con claves para que no se supieran quiénes son, entonces ya… eso se… eso se corrigió (…) Y luego, después, lo hacemos entre la mesa directiva, y luego con … 25 o a 30… este… miembros… este… del grupo… que son escogidos, que son importantes… y que… y que deben estar informados para que ellos difundan a otras gentes, las cosas importantes…y también cuando hay la… la reunión grande de… hacemos un filtro muy deli…, muy especial para que no se vaya a colar ninguna persona… que no sea la que debe de ser y… tener mucho cuidado de muchas cosas.

Héctor L. Orta, Sector Industrial y co-fundador del grupo *Minerva 1997*
Zapopan, Jal.
18 de Septiembre de 2015

Q7-13

Nosotros no aparecemos, por norma, por reglamento, en nada público. No damos… nos damos conferencias, ni damos entrevistas, ni salimos en el periódico. ¡Nada! ¡Cero! (…) Teniendo 16 años y el éxito tan grande y todo lo que ha pasado, en ese aspecto estamos… desconocidos del público, por qué, porque una de los… de los…este… medidas, no medidas, una de las convicciones del grupo es… no ser protagonista ni querer [publicidad]… con esto que estamos haciendo, porque podría haber otra política 'n'hombre, nosotros descubrimos al fulano y lo sacamos vivo, e hicimos esta labor de inteligencia, ¡somos muy fregones! Somos los más importantes, el gobierno son una bola de güeyes, no lo saben hacer, nosotros…' ¡podríamos! Pero eso… va en contra… del objetivo final.

Héctor L. Orta, Sector Industrial y co-fundador del grupo *Minerva 1997*
Zapopan, Jal.
18 de Septiembre de 2015

Q7-14

Entonces, te podemos dar información de estas cosas… déjame ver ahorita si tengo algo, porque si no… yo también te voy a pedir esto [marca el teléfono] te voy a… te voy a dar esto. ¿Ya estás entendiendo…? [TM: Sí, no… y es impresionante] ¿Estás de acuerdo que… no hay muchos casos de estos? [Comienza a hablar con su secretaria por teléfono] Oye, ¿tienes ahí alguna información de Grupo 22, de lo que te pedí el otro día? … por eso, sí, sí… dame lo que tengas, y si no… se lo voy a pedir eh… ándale pues, bye ! [cuelga el teléfono] Bueno, a ver, yo creo que con lo que yo te he dicho tienes mucho tema, vas entendiendo?

Héctor L. Orta, Sector Industrial y co-fundador del grupo *Minerva 1997*
Zapopan, Jal.
3 de Septiembre de 2015

Q7-15

E: Bueno, me enteré por los medios de comunicación. Más o menos apareció en los 90s cuando y era visible. Es un grupo creado por empresarios de Jalisco para cuidar su seguridad personal, eh… que… no lo he frecuentado jamás… no… lo desconozco por dentro, pero… eh… es la respuesta del empresariado a su necesidad… o a su inseguridad personal, ¿no? eh… me imagino… siento o percibo que manejan escoltas, manejan vehículos… manejan… tal vez algo de inteligencia para saber a dónde hay amenazas. Sí me he enterado que tiene… una cercanía o contacto con la dependencia anti-secuestros de la Fiscalía General de Jalisco. Pero hasta ahí es lo que sé.

TM: Y en la época que fue Jefe de Policía, por ejemplo, ¿en algún momento tuvo que tratar algo semejante a…?

E: No, en absoluto, porque ellos tratan principalmente con la… con el área de procuración de justicia, entonces, nada que ver con nosotros.

Anónimo. Ex Jefe de Policía de un Municipio de Jalisco
Nota de campo.
Fecha sin especificar por razones de anonimización.

Q7-16

Hay una… hay un… una información o un dato que es…como… yo diría… tan claro que nadie lo podría echar abajo eso… cuando tú tienes una institución de seguridad y tienes casi veinte años y toda tu gente que tienes en ese negocio… en ese… en esa organización… no se ha presentado un solo caso de corrupción, ¡un solo caso de corrupción! Eso es… ¡muy importante! ¡muy importante!, porque no quiere decir que las gentes [los empleados de la organización] son santos ni son perfectas, eso quiere decir que durante todos los años y todos los meses y todo nosotros tenemos chequeos… y supervisamos cómo actúa cada gente [empleado] y estamos revisando… si no de pronto se vuelven ricos.

Héctor L. Orta, Sector Industrial y co-fundador del grupo *Minerva 1997*
Zapopan, Jal.
3 de Septiembre de 2015

Q7-17

Hasta ahorita no hemos tenido una crítica grave de ninguna de las gentes que han estado con nosotros, ni tampoco hemos tenido, de estos ciento cuarenta agentes ningún secuestrado que lo hayan matado. Entonces ¡algo bueno estamos haciendo! ¡Algo bueno está pasando!, ¿por qué?, porque que no haya ninguno, después de tantos años que hemos hecho lo que hemos hecho [el programa de reconocimiento a los policías]… ¡está cañón, eh?!

Héctor L. Orta, Sector Industrial y co-fundador del grupo *Minerva 1997*
Zapopan, Jal.
18 de enero de 2017

Q7-18

Ah, ok… tenemos que… convencer que nosotros no somos políticos, que a nosotros no nos interesa el poder, que nosotros queremos servir a la sociedad, que nosotros queremos que la… que a la gente le vaya bien, y con esa bandera, nadie puede ir en contra. O sea, yo… no vengo a quitarte tu puesto ni nada. Entonces, ok… viene otro partido, ya… la gente conoce… 'No, el Minerva 1997, ¡adelante!, ¿en qué les podemos servir?' por qué, porque saben que no queremos un puesto político, que no hemos sido corruptos, que no pensamos hacer negocios, que no queremos nada más que hacer el bien a los demás, y esa es una bandera que deberían de tener los… ¡todos!… en

cualquier país del mundo. Entonces, si tú tienes la bandera del apoyo a la sociedad, en lo que sea, es muy difícil que… te la tumben. Entonces, esa es la bandera que nosotros tenemos hasta ahorita, entonces, han pasado ya PRI, PAN –no hemos tenido PRD- pero PRI, PAN y… y… no pasó nada, el grupo sigue.

Héctor L. Orta, Sector Industrial y co-fundador del grupo *Minerva 1997*
Zapopan, Jal.
18 de septiembre de 2015

Q7-19

Los mandan a… los mandan a investigar, los mandan a detener, y en una brecha así los topan y los matan, y en la forma en que quedan ejecutados es como si les hubieran dado la Ley Fuga, por eso ya ni se preocupan de lo que pasó ¿no? Pero pues se les olvida… que pues ahí vienen las nuevas generaciones [de secuestradores] (…) hasta hace un par de años, como 5 o 6 años, este… hubo una situación muy crítica porque el grupo antisecuestros… de… Jalisco… este, ¡mató a una familia!... que había asesorado, porque no les pareció el poco monto que les dio, de gratificación… namás que esa familia era amiga un alto funcionario y entonces pues sí, la gente se molestó… y pus el grupo se desmanteló.

Francisco Herrera, Negociador de Secuestros
Ciudad de México
1 de Febrero de 2018

Q7-20

ya después, empezamos… se empezó a divulgar esto, se empezó a conocer, y nos hablaban del Estado de México, de Veracruz, de Oaxaca… de no sé qué… y entonces, empezamos a dar asesorías a todas esas personas, para armar algo igual en sus estados.

Héctor L. Orta, Sector Industrial y co-fundador del grupo *Minerva 1997*
Zapopan, Jal.
18 de septiembre de 2015

Q7-21

Hay… otro grupo ….de Coahuila y Nayarit, en su momento, hace como 10 años, se hizo pasar como el mejor grupo de todo México, ¡es una mentira!, el cuate era… el cuate… rentaba un equipo que le decían 'la burra', un equipo… este, que era una maleta… este, que interceptaba llamadas, de intercepción, de espionaje americano , pero cada asunto que… que se los proponían las procuradurías era tan caro que algunos sí dijeron 'bueno, pues vamos a comprarlo para… está pegando aquí mucho y la gente lo demanda y todo…' (…) también este cuate, que… este… que se puso comandante… ya ni me acuerdo cómo se llamaba este cuate, pero nosotros lo conocíamos bien, y todas las claves usaba todo, pero… les vendió [a los empresarios y los gobiernos locales] lo que quizo, les vendió camionetas, les vendió… los

uniformó… de esos[uniformes] que puede ver en los catálogos de Estados Unidos, pero él los… hacía lo que… cada…cada asunto que podían resolver, lo magnificaban y, ahí estaban, los empresarios y los gobiernos, metiéndole y metiéndole lana! Y ahí iba, de estado en estado… vendiéndoles de todo.

Francisco Herrera, Negociador de Secuestros
Ciudad de México
1 de Febrero de 2018.

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Hommes d'affaires et modes de protection en contexte dangereux :

mise en perspective du cas de Guadalajara au Mexique

Résumé en Française

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Hommes d'affaires et modes de protection en contexte dangereux :

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Cette recherche s'est efforcée de déterminer comment les hommes d'affaires sont protégés et comment de tels modèles ont influé sur la manière dont la sécurité publique est assurée au niveau local. En fin de compte, ses conclusions peuvent également éclairer les manières dont l'élite économique contribue à façonner l'(in)sécurité, la violence ainsi que l'ordre social au Mexique et au-delà.

En ce qui concerne l'état de l'art, des lacunes empiriques et théoriques ont été identifiées. Tout d'abord, la littérature grandissante consacrée à la compréhension de l'enchevêtrement de divers pourvoyeurs de protection, tant gouvernementaux que non gouvernementaux, a été bien inspirée dans sa lecture d'un tel enchevêtrement comme preuve d'une reconfiguration de l'Etat au lieu d'un retrait de celui-ci. Toutefois, ces études se concentrent principalement, et en profondeur, sur le pourvoyeur de protection et n'explore que peu la position de celui qui en bénéficie. Dans le but de réduire cet écart, la présente recherche a privilégié le récit du destinataire de la protection, bien que ce soit examiné en relation avec le pourvoyeur. En outre, ce travail ne conceptualise pas le destinataire de la protection en tant que communauté entière (et indéfinie), mais en tant que groupe socioprofessionnel : les hommes d'affaires. De cette manière, des nuances significatives peuvent être établies dans la manière dont le groupe des hommes d'affaires, fortement hétérogène, est protégé.

La seconde lacune théorique est liée à la propension des spécialistes à ne concevoir le destinataire de la protection que comme victime. Même s'il est reconnu aux hommes d'affaires une certaine capacité à définir leur position au sein du scénario extorsion-protection, ils en sont toujours considérés comme victimes. En revanche, cette recherche ouvre un champ plus large, afin de concevoir les bénéficiaires de la protection non seulement comme victimes de la criminalité, mais également comme clients de la protection et (co) producteurs de celle-ci.

Dans la littérature grand public, lorsque les « victimes » sont au centre de l'analyse, elles sont décrites comme si elles constituaient un groupe homogène, rassemblant sous la même étiquette divers acteurs, étudiés par le biais d'enquêtes sur la victimisation et d'autres outils

qui sont tout aussi incapables de refléter les complexités et les nuances que recèle le binôme pourvoyeur-destinataire. Nous abordons cette lacune empirique en nous concentrant sur les hommes d'affaires à la tête de moyennes et grandes entreprises installées à Guadalajara, la troisième plaque tournante économique la plus importante du Mexique, en utilisant une approche qualitative reposant sur des entretiens semi-structurés, plusieurs exercices d'observation ainsi qu'un travail documentaire et de consultation d'archives.

Guadalajara, avec son importance sur le plan économique, s'avère un cas à étudier passionnant, car elle a été témoin de différentes périodes de crise d'insécurité et de violence, ainsi que de transformations politiques et économiques majeures, dont les hommes d'affaires ont joué un rôle notable.

Notre analyse minutieuse du profil de l'homme d'affaires *tapatios* a débouché sur plusieurs résultats qui contribuent à la compréhension tant du modèle de protection que de la contribution des hommes d'affaires à la mise en forme du contrôle social.

La première partie explore la généalogie et l'évolution des menaces à la sécurité auxquelles sont confrontés les hommes d'affaires *tapatios* depuis les années 1970. Deux menaces principales ont été analysées dans deux chapitres successifs : d'une part la criminalité commune et d'autre part, le fameux *Narco* et sa violence.

Premièrement, il a été établi que les hommes d'affaires doivent d'abord reconnaître comme telle une menace, avant de mettre en place des mécanismes de protection. Cette exigence préalable débouche sur une analyse de la façon dont ils conçoivent la menace criminelle. Il est démontré que, bien qu'ils soient victimes d'extorsion ou de racket, les hommes d'affaires des années 1970 n'étaient pas nécessairement conscients de l'existence d'un crime, ni de leur statut de victimes. Cependant, depuis les années 1980 et 1990, dans un contexte de crise économique et d'urbanisation non planifiée, la criminalité contre les biens et d'autres infractions ont grimpé en flèche, ce qui augmenta la crainte de se trouver victimes de la criminalité. Cette tendance a incité les hommes d'affaires à reconnaître le contexte comme une menace et, partant, à considérer certains problèmes comme les leurs, ce qui les a conduit à définir leurs propres besoins en matière de sécurité. Par conséquent, l'insécurité n'était désormais plus seulement perçue comme *un* problème, mais comme *leur* problème. Il nous faut préciser que, bien que les enquêtes de victimisation et d'autres outils empiriques ont été

mobilisés pour développer cet argument, leurs limites et défauts respectifs ont également été longuement discutés dans cette recherche.

Le chapitre 2 est consacré au personnage principal des études contemporaines sur la violence au Mexique : le *Narco* (et les *narcos*). L'objectif principal était d'explorer dans quelle mesure ce phénomène pouvait représenter une menace pour les hommes d'affaires, d'autant plus que la première organisation à être qualifiée de cartel au Mexique était précisément le *Cartel de Guadalajara*. En dépit des informations abondantes sur le sujet, le plus grand défi a été de retracer l'histoire du *Narco* à Guadalajara d'un point de vue critique : pour ce faire, je me suis efforcée d'identifier le récit commun concernant l'arrivée des *narcos* dans cette ville. A partir de ce moment, les hommes d'affaires *tapatios*, au même titre que l'ensemble des habitants de la région, ont construit et alimenté l'image du *narco* comme étant un étranger. En outre, l'examen des trajectoires des personnages bien connus de Caro Quintero, Ernesto Fonseca « Don Neto » et Félix Gallardo, nous permet d'observer la formation d'un archétype clair de ce qu'un *narco* fut dans les années 1980 et 1990 : un paysan peu instruit, et un milliardaire dépensier capable de partager son (illégitime) fortune avec les communautés les plus pauvres. En d'autres termes, une génération des « bons *narcos* » est alors représentée, une image qui perdure jusqu'à nos jours. Le chapitre décrit comment, au cours de cette même période, la population *tapatia* et le *Narco ont* créé une sorte de « familiarité sursautée » dans laquelle chacun notait la présence du *Narco* et assistait de temps à autre à l'irruption d'épisodes violents qui bouleversaient temporairement leur quotidien. Cette génération de *narcos* a ensuite été remplacée par une version plus violente, qui menait au grand jour des actes de disparitions forcées, homicides, *levantones*[983] ou bus incendiés. Dans ce cadre, le chapitre démontre que, malgré ces tendances violentes, les acteurs économiques ne percevaient pas nécessairement le *Narco* comme une menace pour eux puisque cette violence avait lieu entre membres de ces groupes délictueux et était donc « le problème du *narco* ». Par conséquent, ils ne se sont pas dotés de mécanismes de protection en réponse directe à la violence du *Narco*. Cependant, comme démontré plus loin dans la deuxième partie, ils se protègent d'autres attributs de *narcos,* ou du moins tentent de le faire.

De la partie I, il est alors possible de conclure que, poussés par la crainte, les hommes d'affaires conçoivent les crimes contre les biens comme leur problème, tout en ne portant pas

[983] Abductions performées par les *narcos*, voir Mendoza (2008)

le même jugement sur la violence découlant de la présence d'organisations de narcotrafiquants. En plus de fournir une description plus large du contexte, ces premières étapes nous permettent d'explorer comment les hommes d'affaires perçoivent, conçoivent, formulent et transforment certaines situations comme étant leur problème et comment, de ce « processus de reconnaissance du problème », ils façonnent leurs besoins de sécurité. Ainsi, en dépit de toutes les voix désignant la *narco* violence comme le problème le plus grave du Mexique, celle-ci ne semble pas être perçue par les hommes d'affaire *Tapatios* comme la pire menace.

La partie II a abordé la demande de protection que les hommes d'affaires adressent aux pourvoyeurs de sécurité, tant réguliers qu'alternatifs. Le chapitre 3 se concentre sur les agences officielles de sécurité en tant que pourvoyeur régulier de protection et prend le contrepied de certaines idées communément admises. Premièrement, il est démontré que, au lieu d'un recul de l'État, les réformes axées sur le marché et le processus de démocratisation ont entraîné la fragmentation des agences gouvernementales et la mise en place d'un système polycentrique. Ainsi, les forces de l'ordre ont acquis les caractéristiques de plusieurs organismes à plusieurs niveaux, chacun doté de certaines prérogatives pour assurer la protection. C'est alors que les hommes d'affaires, jouant le rôle de notables locaux, ont établi une relation avec les forces de l'ordre sur la base d'un rapport ciblé et personnalisé. Ainsi, la fragmentation des forces de l'ordre locales ne représente pas le démantèlement du gouvernement mais, à l'inverse, une décentralisation progressive sur laquelle les deux élites politiques et économiques étaient en accord.

Le chapitre 4 explore l'enchevêtrement de pourvoyeurs alternatifs de protection, c'est-à-dire, d'entités non gouvernementales capables de participer dans ce rôle au marché de la protection. Bien qu'à première vue ce chapitre semble traiter de la privatisation de la sécurité publique, il présente en fait un scénario de multilatéralisation de la police dans laquelle des acteurs privés, hybrides et même illégaux offrent différentes formes de protection. Premièrement, il est démontré que les forces de l'ordre ont vendu leurs services à la sphère privée, notamment aux commerçants, aux propriétaires d'usine et aux banquiers. Un examen en profondeur du cas de la police auxiliaire permet de mettre en évidence la porosité des frontières public-privé. En effet, des preuves convaincantes indiquent que ces entités ne sont ni privées, ni publiques. L'observation des attributs spécifiques de la police auxiliaire tels

que le mode de recrutement, la pratique de la politique salariale, l'acquisition des équipements, la définition des objectifs et la mise en œuvre des processus d'évaluation, révèle que, dans tous ces domaines, des entités tant publiques que privées sont impliquées. Mon analyse porte aussi sur le cas d'officiers de police locaux mandatés pour devenir des gardes de sécurité privés d'un groupe restreint de notables locaux. Par conséquent, en partant de cette modalité de protection rapprochée, le chapitre montre également comment ces gardes du corps constituent non seulement un des mécanismes de protection au service de certains hommes d'affaires mais aussi, plus que cela, un des atouts de négociation dans le cercle de réciprocité établi entre l'élite politique et économique à Guadalajara.

Après avoir mis en évidence que les domaines public et privé ne sont ni clairement divisés, ni clairement définis, ce chapitre 4 examine comment les réformes économiques axées sur le marché ont introduit de nouvelles modalités de protection ou ont renforcé celles qui existaient déjà. Ainsi, sont analysés les initiatives visant à assurer leur propre sécurité ainsi que les services obtenus par l'intermédiaire de sociétés de sécurité privées, montrant comment le « self-made man », fortement valorisé par ce modèle économique, est également derrière la manière dont les hommes d'affaires font face à un certain nombre de menaces. En outre, les « portes tournantes » reliant les domaines public et privé sont mises en évidence : la porosité de ces frontières est exprimée non seulement par la fondation de sociétés de sécurité par d'anciens membres des forces de l'ordre, mais également par les allers-retours des agents d'un secteur à l'autre. Ainsi, même lorsqu'on se concentre sur les entreprises privées de sécurité, le maintien de l'ordre n'est pas une tâche entièrement privée et, plus important encore, les entités publiques restent encore fortement présentes.

Parallèlement au flou de la division entre public et privé, le chapitre montre à quel point la frontière entre le légal et l'illégal n'est pas claire non plus. Les notions qui guident la discussion sont celles de la « fauteur de trouble » et de « solutionneur de troubles » et la façon dont ils finissent par se confondre. Ensuite, le chapitre aborde le cas des « *Avocats Taliban* », un groupe de juristes qui extorquent des hommes d'affaires en utilisant des procédures judiciaires et leurs relations de collusion avec des juges du travail. Même s'il ne s'agit ni d'un crime explicite ni d'un acte de violence, la menace consiste à engager des poursuites contre eux pour avoir « injustement licencié » un employé. Ainsi, les avocats et les juges, qui sont supposés « résoudre les problèmes », sont en réalité des « créateurs de problèmes »,

obligeant les entreprises à payer pour écarter une telle menace, paiement qui équivaut en définitive à l'achat d'une protection. Cette observation est mise en perspective avec le cas des dirigeants syndicaux, désignés par les hommes d'affaires comme les vrais racketteurs.

De plus, en ce qui concerne les supposés « fauteurs de problèmes », de solides preuves sont fournies pour affirmer que des *narcos* sont recrutés, volontairement ou pas, pour recouvrer des dettes. Une transaction légale, telle que le respect d'un accord commercial, est ensuite effectuée par des acteurs illégaux par des moyens illégaux : concrètement, des *narcos* effectuent des *levantones* et réalisent des visites menaçantes aux débiteurs. Comme les dettes en souffrance posent des problèmes aux hommes d'affaires, les *narcos* jouent ici le rôle de réparateurs.

Alors que les chapitres 3 et 4 sont basés sur les crimes et les défis que les hommes d'affaires reconnaissent comme étant « leur problème », le chapitre 5 examine les modes de protection qu'ils adoptent face à la présence de *narcos* qui, comme indiqué précédemment, ne semblent pas de leur point de vue représenter une menace pour leur sécurité.

Bien que les hommes d'affaires ne semblent pas très préoccupés par la *narco* violence, ils sont troublés à l'idée de partager leurs espaces sociaux avec eux. Je fournis des éléments solides pour montrer que ce qui dérange les hommes d'affaires au sujet des *narcos,* c'est leur manque d'éducation et de bonnes manières *(narcos-nacos)* plutôt que leur profil illégal ou violent. Ainsi, les *narcos* entrent dans une catégorie méprisée, qui comporte aussi d'autres profils tels que les *nouveaux riches* ou les juniors arrogants. La ligne que les hommes d'affaires décident de tracer est donc, aussi, une frontière entre classes sociales.

De plus, il est montré comment les stratégies de protection mises en œuvre par les hommes d'affaires pour ne pas être mêlés avec les *narcos* dépendent fortement de l'hypothèse que ce profil peut être clairement identifié. Justement, l'archétype du *narco* exploré dans le chapitre 2 trouve ici son écho. Les considérant comme des paysans mal instruits et incapables faire usage de leur petite fortune avec bon goût, les hommes d'affaires supposent qu'ils sont donc capables de reconnaître les *narcos* et de les garder à distance de leurs cercles sociaux. En fait, une telle prémisse tombe en morceaux et avec elle, l'idée que le monde des affaires et le monde du *Narco* sont des domaines séparés. L'argument part d'une compréhension des hommes d'affaires en tant que catégorie professionnelle. Ainsi, certains cas de processus informels de vérification ou de stratégies de mise en œuvre par soi-même de mesures de

sécurité montrent comment les hommes d'affaires tâchent d'éviter que *narcos* deviennent leurs clients, fournisseurs ou associés, entre autres conséquences qui peuvent même avoir une incidence sur le modèle d'affaires dans la mesure où certains décident de « ne pas faire d'affaires avec qui que ce soit ».

Le capital social constitue une bonne ressource pour le processus de validation de ces professionnels qui traitent avec des personnes qu'ils connaissent, à savoir leurs réseaux sociaux. Cependant, le mécanisme de protection est compromis dès lors qu'il apparaît clairement que les *narcos* sont insérés dans les mêmes espaces sociaux que les hommes d'affaires, comme les écoles et les quartiers de luxe. L'écart entre *narcos* et hommes d'affaires se réduit encore davantage lorsque le fils de l'un d'eux épouse la fille de l'autre. Lors de discussions autour de ces cas, il est notable qu'un homme d'affaires ayant épousé la fille d'un *narco* continue à être désigné par ses pairs comme un « homme d'affaires », mais que son profil reste constamment associé à cette histoire de mariage, qui devient un secret de polichinelle. Inversement, certaines pistes suggèrent que lorsque des femmes de bonne famille passent du temps avec le fils d'un *narco*, elles sont considérées comme opportunistes et ordinaires. En outre, un homme d'affaires dont le beau-père est un ponte de la drogue n'est pas marginalisé du monde des affaires. Au contraire, il est plutôt actif dans les associations professionnelles et fait appel aux institutions pour faire face à certains des défis qu'il doit affronter pour gérer son entreprise.

Sous cet angle, il est possible de conclure que les modalités de fourniture de protection sont une zone grise dans laquelle les clivages public-privé et légal-illégal sont flous. Pourtant, la (re) négociation dynamique des champs et des limites des acteurs involucrés, plutôt que de représenter un désordre, est la voie empruntée par la gouvernance et le contrôle social.

Jusqu'à ce point de cette recherche, les hommes d'affaires ont été considérés comme des victimes ayant besoin de protection. Cependant, la partie III modifie cet aspect de l'équation, en comprenant les hommes d'affaires comme des coproducteurs de la protection. En effet, ceux-ci transcendent leur rôle passif de victimes pour devenir des participants actifs dans le processus de production des services qu'ils reçoivent. Il faut souligner que je ne me suis pas lancée délibérément à la recherche de ce modèle : au contraire, c'est lui qui m'a trouvée lors de mon travail de terrain. En bonne partie par hasard, j'ai eu connaissance de l'histoire de

Minerva 1997, un groupe créé *par* et *pour* les entreprises dans le but de se protéger elles-mêmes de menaces telles que les enlèvements.

Minerva 1997 est donc le point commun des chapitres 6 et 7. D'abord, je procède à un passage en revue des origines du groupe et j'analyse le regard que portent les hommes d'affaires *tapatios* sur celui-ci. À partir de là, il est possible de comprendre que, comme l'ont reconnu mes interlocuteurs sur le terrain, la vague d'enlèvements qui s'est produite à la fin de 1997, et notamment celui d'un homme d'affaires de renom, ont été les motifs déclencheurs de la création du groupe. Habituellement moins mis en avant, les facteurs structurels qui expliquent l'émergence de *Minerva 1997* sont également explorés dans cette recherche. Je défends ainsi l'idée que les transformations majeures du panorama mexicain qui se sont produites dans les années 1990, à savoir la réforme économique axée sur le marché et la transition démocratique, contribuent à expliquer l'émergence de ces groupes. Ces changements ont permis la formation d'hommes d'affaires plus actifs qui, tirant parti de la configuration complexe des pourvoyeurs de protection, ont créé leur propre solution de protection. En explorant la façon dont les hommes d'affaires se réfèrent au groupe *Minerva 1997*, j'ai trouvé une grande variété de versions ainsi qu'un accès inégal à l'information à son sujet. Ce fait démontre en partie non seulement la complexité du groupe, mais également son caractère sélectif. Cette première exploration révèle qu'une élite au sein de l'élite (« les hommes d'affaires les plus importants ») avait les ressources pour créer une structure anti-kidnapping dont les mesures de protection ne couvraient qu'un noyau dur de notables locaux.

Le chapitre 7 étudie les activités du groupe et se base sur le récit des deux principaux protagonistes : l'un de ses cofondateurs et son directeur opérationnel. *Minerva 1997* illustre parfaitement le fait que les hommes d'affaires, de la même façon que n'importe quel autre groupe de citoyens, demandent à être protégés dès qu'ils perçoivent une menace à leur égard. Cependant, à la différence de tout autre citoyen, les hommes d'affaires ont une place dans la complexe configuration des pourvoyeurs de protection et, de cette position, ils créent une solution sur-mesure pour le groupe resserré qu'ils servent. Ce faisant, ils traversent la zone grise en collaborant avec les forces de l'ordre locales, en fondant leurs propres entreprises privées de sécurité et en mobilisant leurs ressources philanthropiques, le tout dans le but de se protéger eux-mêmes, ainsi que leurs pairs. Se mouvant facilement d'une sphère à une autre, ils ont commencé à fournir des services de protection à *la crème de la crème* en partant

d'un principe déconcertant : « en tant qu'officier public, on ne peut faire que ce que la loi autorise ; en tant qu'homme d'affaires, on peut faire ce que la loi n'interdit pas ». C'est précisément dans cet interstice que *Minerva 1997* a mobilisé à son profit les opérations de libération de victimes de kidnapping ; cependant, cela s'est déroulé par l'intermédiaire de l'agence spécialisée locale qui a été établie en coordination avec *Minerva 1997*.

En partie secrète et en partie connue, *Minerva 1997* a joué un rôle important dans la définition des mécanismes d'autoprotection, mais aussi des mécanismes par lesquels la sécurité publique est assurée, conduisant finalement à une transformation plus vaste du dispositif de contrôle social.

Au-delà de la protection, cette recherche accorde une attention particulière à un sujet qui gagne à être approfondi : la façon dont les propriétaires du capital gèrent leurs menaces et, ce faisant, influent sur le climat criminel ressenti et vécu par les autres. De futures recherches mériteraient d'être menées sur l'impact de ces modèles de protection sur la façon dont les hommes d'affaires accumulent et déploient leur capital financier. En d'autres termes, il s'agirait d'établir comment le contexte de danger dans lequel opèrent leurs entreprises est géré, voire même renforcé par des perspectives de profits.

En ce qui concerne les aspects empiriques de la recherche en cours, mon intention initiale d'étudier de façon croisée les hommes d'affaires du *Tapatío* et les notables locaux de Querétaro a finalement été écartée. Comme indiqué dans l'introduction, cette ville a été incluse dans mon travail de terrain, mais les informations recueillies à cette occasion nécessiteraient une analyse plus approfondie. À première vue, une comparaison des principales différences entre ces secteurs pourrait constituer un point de départ pertinent. Ma recherche a largement démontré que l'enracinement local et le sens de la communauté constituent la base à partir de laquelle les hommes d'affaires perçoivent une menace et la gèrent. En contraste avec Guadalajara, Querétaro est une ville en pleine croissance, dans laquelle le secteur des entreprises est principalement constitué d'expatriés nationaux et internationaux, ce qui est susceptible de produire une prise de position différente lorsqu'il s'agit de définir et de gérer la menace. Dans quelle mesure les déplacements de personnes pourraient-elles aussi signifier le transfert de schémas sélectifs de protection d'une ville à une autre ? Est-il possible de détecter des schémas de protection régionaux qui dépendent directement de l'élite locale ? A tous égards, ce sont des questions qui justifieraient un retour

sur les données déjà recueillies, ainsi qu'une mise à jour et un examen plus approfondi de celles-ci.

Bien que cette recherche ait tenté de réunir des informations par le biais de sources innovantes, elle est restée en retrait concernant l'analyse de dossiers juridiques qui aurait pu permettre de développer davantage plusieurs des arguments présentés. Sans nul doute, le processus judiciaire mexicain a rendu difficile, pour ne pas dire pratiquement impossible, d'examiner les dossiers judiciaires de façon systématique. Seuls certains cas sont accessibles (ou ont été révélés par des fuites provenant d'agences gouvernementales), ce qui cause un important biais de sélection. Par exemple, le cas de Javier Duarte, ancien gouverneur de Veracruz, accusé d'opérations menées avec des moyens financiers douteux et l'implication du crime organisé, a récemment attiré l'attention du public.

En réaction, l'avocat de Duarte a publié les transcriptions des audiences, fournissant des informations intéressantes sur les liens de collusion (voire les enchevêtrements) entre acteurs politiques, économiques et criminels. Cependant, l'accès à de telles informations est moins la règle que l'exception et, concernant l'initiative prise par l'avocat de l'accusé, elle doit être considérée avant tout comme faisant partie de sa stratégie de défense. Pour de futures recherches, je suggère que la limitation méthodologique qu'implique le biais de sélection soit transformée en objet d'étude en tant que tel. Identifier quelles affaires judiciaires sont visibles, et lesquelles ne le sont pas, serait éclairant pour mieux comprendre la dualité visibilité-secret, que cette recherche n'aborde que de manière marginale. Ainsi, le concept de « scandale » et les dynamiques qui y sont associées seraient pris en compte, ce qui permettrait d'explorer le rôle qu'il joue dans la formulation du problème et la gestion de la menace, qu'il s'agisse d'hommes d'affaires ou d'autres pourvoyeurs de services de protection.

De plus, comme évoqué dans cette recherche, un amendement constitutionnel récemment approuvé envisage la transformation d'un système inquisitoire (basé sur une procédure écrite) vers un système accusatoire (qui repose sur des audiences orales). L'un des principes du nouveau système est de transformer l'audition, jusqu'alors un épisode à huis-clos entaché de multiples irrégularités, en une procédure publique ouverte et menée conformément au droit. Il existe donc des raisons d'espérer qu'à l'avenir les chercheurs auront un meilleur accès aux sources juridiques. Dans ce cas, les procédures légales liées au blanchiment de capitaux pourraient être observées et analysées en profondeur. De nos jours, les données

statistiques disponibles sur ces infractions, en plus d'être peu nombreuses et de d'utilité réduite, ne font pas ressortir le chevauchement entre le secteur des entreprises, l'arène politique et le *Narco*. Assister en personne aux audiences serait une source d'informations précieuses à cet égard et permettrait de mettre en perspective les cas qui se trouvent placés sous les projecteurs médiatiques.

Enfin, cette recherche soulève un autre défi à relever. Le pari d'une approche qualitative a mis à jour une grande richesse d'informations, qui nous a permis de conserver une ligne cohérente tout en ménageant un espace pour les nuances, et nous a aidé à réaliser que les divisions préconçues sont en réalité floues, comme entre public et privé, légal et illégal, ou pourvoyeur et destinataire de protection. Néanmoins, certaines parties de mon argumentaire reposent sur des données quantitatives, mettant en évidence certaines tendances et corroborant certaines intuitions. Malgré des défauts méthodologiques, dont beaucoup sont longuement abordés dans le texte, le pouvoir explicatif de ces données ne doit pas être négligé. La recherche ultérieure explorera des méthodes mixtes afin d'enrichir les résultats.

Par exemple, cette recherche montre que les notables locaux jouent un rôle dans la définition du maintien de l'ordre et du contrôle social. De plus, certaines explications sont basées sur ce que nous savons des profils des hommes d'affaires interrogés. Par conséquent, certaines attitudes et des marqueurs d'identité suggèrent que leurs valeurs et croyances influent sur la façon dont ils perçoivent et interprètent une menace, ainsi que la façon dont ils la gèrent. Cependant, ce que nous savons de ces croyances, à travers les entretiens ou la littérature sur les hommes d'affaires (mexicains ou *tapatios*), peut constituer une observation isolée et donc ne pas être représentatif de l'ensemble des profils contemporains.

Le lecteur aura remarqué que j'ai pris cette limitation en compte au moment d'interpréter mes données. En ce sens, une étude quantitative spécialement conçue pour mesurer un ensemble de positions idéologiques, politiques et personnelles d'hommes d'affaires serait d'une grande utilité. Cet instrument permettrait de déterminer dans quelle mesure de telles attitudes sont liées à leur tendance à, par exemple, adopter des mesures de sécurité publique selon une logique punitive, ou mettre en place un processus de contrôle des agents de police fondé sur certains critères comme l'aspect physique du candidat ou l'utilisation de tatouages.

L'objectif serait de concevoir des instruments quantitatifs inspirés de résultats qualitatifs et inversement, afin de profiter tant de la profondeur de l'approche qualitative que de

l’amplitude de l’approche quantitative. En fin de comptes, il s’agirait de créer les conditions pour qu’ait lieu le nécessaire dialogue entre ces deux perspectives.

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