L'activité en tant que bien : réflexions sur les fondements de la distinction des obligations de faire et de donner

Activity as property, reflections on the distinction of the obligations to do and to give

• Auteur / Autrice : Serge Vicente
• Direction : Dominique Lefèbvre
• Type : Thèse de doctorat
• Discipline(s) : Droit
• Date : Soutenance en 1999
• Etablissement(s) : Grenoble 2

Mots clés

Mots clés contrôlés

Droit des biens

Obligations (droit)

Garantie

Services

Mots clés libres

Droit prive

Droit commercial (assurances) responsabilite

Contrats

Résumé

De recentes evolutions jurisprudentielles ont critique la summa divisio des obligations de dare et de facere en posant le probleme de sa pertinence. Ses detracteurs soulignent son inutilite pratique en insistant sur les faiblesses d'un de ses deux elements : l'obligation de dare. Pourtant, cette conclusion ne convainc pas et achoppe sur une definition trop extensive de l'obligation de faire. La comprehension actuelle de cette obligation semble tres eloignee de celle qu'en avaient les jurisconsultes du xviie siecle qui l'envisageaient exclusivement comme l'acte de creation d'une richesse non encore existante. En revenant dans les limites de sa definition originelle, l'obligation de faire ne chevauche plus l'obligation de donner et contribue a leur autonomie respective. Cette limitation de la notion de facere a la seule activite economique met en evidence l'obligation de praestare qui consiste a fournir une activite non creatrice de valeur et dont l'illustration topique est l'obligation de delivrance. Cette obligation de praestare explique l'execution de l'obligation de donner et confere une coherence a la distinction des obligations, d'autant plus significative que l'evolution des relations economiques de ces dernieres annees en renforcent son interet. La mise en evidence d'une distinction fonctionnelle des biens, opposant respectivement les biens refuges, envisages par les contractants pour leur utilite financiere, et les biens d'usage, envisages par les contractants pour leur utilite economique, justifie le role de la summa divisio des obligations. L'utilite economique que doit fournir le fournisseur d'un bien d'usage apparait alors comme une garantie de service. Cette obligation de garantie, veritable obligation de faire utile, existe egalement en matiere de service et s'affirme comme la representation juridique de l'utilite economique. A l'instar de celle des biens d'usage, cette obligation doit beneficier au sous-contractant du creancier initial, a condition d'envisager sa transmission au regard du mecanisme de la cession de creance et du fondement de l'equite naturelle. Elle asseoit ainsi l'utilite des services sur le meme plan que celle des biens.

Recent developments in the field of jurisprudence have called in question the summa divisio of the obligations of dare and facere by posing the problem of its relevance. Critics underline its inutility in practice by insisting on the weaknesses of one of its elements : namely, the obligation of dare. This conclusion, however, is not convincing and comes up against too wide a definition of the obligation to do. The present understanding of this obligation seems very remote from that of the 17th century jurisconsults, who envisaged it exclusively as the act of creation of a not yet existing wealth. By reverting to the limits of its original definition, the obligation to do no longer overlaps the obligation to give, and contributes to their respective autonomy. This limitation of the notion of facere to economic activity brings to the fore the obligation of praestare, which consists in providing a non value creating activity, the pertinent illustration of which is the obligation of deliver. The obligation of praestare explains the exercise of the obligation to give and lends consistency to the distinction between the obligations, which is all the more significant in that the development of economic relations in recent years emphasises its interest. The prominence given to a functional distinction between goods, opposing respectively stock goods, viewed by the contracting parties for their financial utility ans usable goods, viewed by the contracting parties for their economic utility, justifies the role of the summa divisio of the obligations. The economic utility, which should provide the supplier with exchange goods, thus appears as a guarantee of service. This garantee obligation, an actual obligation to do, also exists where service is concerned, and has become established as the juridical representation of economic utility. Following the example of usable goods, this obligation should benefit the sub, contractor of the initial creditor, provided its conveyance is considered from the point of view of the mechanism of the transfer of debt and on the ground of natural equity. It thus bases the utility of the services on the same level as that of the goods.