Incentive theory and corporate gouvernance : the case of chinese enterprise

• Auteur / Autrice : Ninglan Li
• Direction : Alain Alcouffe
• Type : Thèse de doctorat
• Discipline(s) : Sciences économiques
• Date : Soutenance en 1998
• Etablissement(s) : Toulouse 1

Mots clés

Mots clés contrôlés

Entreprises -- Réorganisation

Entreprises -- Direction générale

Gestion

Entreprises publiques

Chine

Gouvernement d'entreprise

Résumé

Cette these traite les problemes les plus difficiles des entreprises d'etat chinoises comme le surinvestissement, la privatisation spontanee, le controle interne, etc. A travers la reforme du gouvernement d'entreprise qui inclut notamment la reforme de l'organisation interne, la faillite, les banques, la structure de propriete, les systemes d'incitations. Il faut distinguer deux points : d'une part, nous reconnaissons que les structures du gouvernement d'entreprise dans les eae chinoises suivront des modeles differents en fonction des circonstances institutionnelles existantes et des differentes experiences nees de la reforme; d'autre part, si nous prenons en compte la contrainte politique, nous estimons que la constitution de societes et la restructuration financiere possible a travers lerole qui pourrait etre confere aux banques pourraient etre des mesures importantes dans la reforme du gouvernement d'entreprise au cours du processus de transition. Analyser le gouvernement des entreprises chinoises est un champ entierement nouveau et difficile a cause de la situation chinoise particuliere. Le principale objectif de cette these reside dans l'analyse theorique et empirique du gouvernement d'entreprise dans les eae chinoises, des causes et des effets des problemes actuels en utilisant les theories economiques occidentales et les donnees chinoises les plus recentes. Elle formule des propositions de reformes pour les mecanismes de controle des eae, comme les faillites, les banques, la propriete et les systemes d'incitation etc. Pour lesquels il existait jusqu'a present peu d'etudes.

This thesis analyses corherently the issue of corporate governance in the chinese state-owned enterprises (soes). This these is organized in five chapters. Chapter i analyses theoretically and empirically the governance reform in the soe. It sexplains why corporate governance matters in the soes in the framework of transaction cost economics and incomplete contract approach the empirical results are as follow. The traditional state-owned enterprises have set up the internal institutions of corporate governance like those in the capitalist firms. As different enterprises will have different ownrship structures, corporate governance structures of the soes will be diversified. Chapter ii discusses the issue of over-leverage of the soes and the role of bankruptey in corporate governance. It proposes a bankruptey procedure which intends to restructure the finance of the bankrupt enterprises through a two-step debt-equity swap or a particular rearrangement of the relationship between debtorsthis is a modification to the ahm procedure for the merit of taking into account the political constraint. Chapter iii deals with the insider control problem of the soes through the role of banks. To counterbalance the insider control, the bank is prefered to act as an institutional outsider to monitor the insiders given imperfect capital and management markets. Although banks in china tend to be more important in the enterprise financing, they need to be reformed and provided incentives in order to curb the insider control. From this perspective, this chapter proposes a bank reform through spinning off the vast network of the existing central bank as multiple regional commercial banks. Chapter iv addresses the ownership issue in the chinese enterprise reforms by emphasizing that introducirs. According to stylized characteristics of soes, the arrangements of their ownership should be carried out in a discriminative way. Chapter v is an analytical discussion of the relation between performances and managerial pay in the soes. Although after the economic reform since 1978, managerial pay is linked to the performance of the enterprise, namely, the profits, empirical evidence tells us that their relativity is not obvious. Besides, managerial pay increases slower than workers's wages. This means that managers are lack of meaningful incentives to improve the performance. A better