Contribution a la theorie de la conscience, concue comme activite du cerveau

A contribution to the theory of consciousness, conceived as an activity of the brain

• Auteur / Autrice : GILBERTO LOURENCO GOMEZ
• Direction : Odile Bourguignon
• Type : Thèse de doctorat
• Discipline(s) : Psychologie
• Date : Soutenance en 1998
• Etablissement(s) : Paris 7

Mots clés

Mots clés contrôlés

Conscience

Mots clés libres

Conscience, champ de

Résumé

On explore la possibilite de concevoir theoriquement la conscience comme une activite du cerveau. Des objections a cette identification, basees sur la notion de qualia, sont refutees la conscience phenomenale est identifiee a la conscience d'acces. La conscience es concue comme une sorte de + perception ; d'etats informationnels du cerveau. L'etat de conscience represente une integration d'etats non-conscients prealables. Les travaux de libet sur le moment de l'experience consciente sont analyses. Son hypothese de l'attribution retroactive (backward referral) doit etre abandonnee. Comme l'activite cerebrale (bereitschaftspotential) precede l'intention consciente, on a discute les implications de ce fait sur la conception de la volonte et du libre arbitre. Les actes volontaires non deliberes sont executes sans une conscience prealable de l'intention de les accomplir la decision d'accomplir un acte delibere, au contraire, est influencee par la conscience de l'intention le libre arbitre est considere comme compatible avec la causalite des processus psychiques la theorie a pu etre appliquee aux differents contenus de la conscience. On a analyse la conscience des perceptions, des sensations corporelles, des intentions, des actions des souvenirs, des idees, des pensees, du langage, des etats affectifs, des croyances, des desirs, de soi-meme et la conscience d'etre conscient. On a explore aussi la relation entre la theorie de la conscience et la psychanalyse. Celle-ci s'est montree compatible avec la theorie avancee, qui a pu eclairer quelques aspects du devenir conscient dans le processus psychanalytique. L'approche est interdisciplinaire : la theorie doit prendre compte de contraintes imposees par la philosophie, la neurophysiologie, la psychologie, la neuropsychologie, etc. . La conscience est concue, non comme une propriete de certains etats mentaux, mais comme une activite specifique, d'ordre superieur, fondee sur des activites non-conscientes d'ordre inferieur.

This thesis explores the possibility of theoretically conceiving consciousness as an activity o1 the brain. Objections, based on the concept of qualia, to the identification of consciousness with a brain activity are refuted. Phenomenal consciousness is identified with access- consciousness. Consciousness is conceived as a sort of + perception ; of informational states of the brain. The state of consciousness represents an integration of prior nonconscious states. Libet's research on the timing of conscious experience is reviewed and analyzed. His hypothesis of backward referral is rejected. Since specific brain activity (the readiness potential) precedes the conscious intention, the implications of this fact -on the concepts of volition and free will were discussed. Non-deliberate voluntary acts are performed without a prior consciousness of the intention to perform them. Conversely, the decision to perform a deliberate act is influenced by consciousness of the intention. Free will is viewed as compatible with the causal determination of mental processes. The theory was successfully applied to the different contents of consciousness. Consciousness of perceptions, of bodily sensations, of actions, of memories, of ideas, of thoughts, of language, of affective states, of beliefs, of desires, of oneself and consciousness of being conscious were analyzed. The relation between the theory of consciousness and psychoanalysis was also explored. Psychoanalysis was seen as compatible with the proposed theory, which was able to enlighten some aspects of the process of becoming conscious in psychoanalytic treatment. The general approach is interdisciplinary: the theory must take into account constraints derived from philosophy, neurophysiology, psychology, neuropsychology, etc. Consciousness is conceived, not as a property of some mental states, but as a specific higher-order activity, based on lower-order nonconscious activities.